{{Short description|Illegal attempt to unseat an incumbent}} {{Redirect2|Counter-coup|Coup|the injury type|Coup contrecoup injury|6=Coup (disambiguation)|7=and|8=Coup d'état (disambiguation)}} {{Use dmy dates |date=February 2020}} <!--This next code prevents the image from being crossposted elsewhere via Template:Excerpt--><noinclude>[[File:Bouchot - Le general Bonaparte au Conseil des Cinq-Cents.jpg|thumb|General Napoleon Bonaparte during the Coup of 18 Brumaire in Saint-Cloud, detail of painting by François Bouchot, 1840]] {{revolution sidebar}}</noinclude>
A '''''coup d'état''''' ({{IPAc-en|ˌ|k|uː|d|eɪ|ˈ|t|ɑː |audio=Coup d'état.ogg}}; {{IPA|fr|ku deta|lang|LL-Q150 (fra)-LoquaxFR-coup d’État.wav}}; {{literally|stroke of state}}),<ref name="MW definition">{{Cite web |title=coup d'état |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d%27%C3%A9tat |website=Merriam-Webster |access-date=4 April 2022 |archive-date=29 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211129220715/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d%27%C3%A9tat |url-status=live }}</ref> or simply a '''coup''',<ref>{{Cite web |title=What Is a Coup d'Etat? Definition and Examples |url=https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-a-coup-d-etat-4694507 |access-date=2025-10-15 |website=ThoughtCo |language=en}}</ref> is typically an illegal and overt attempt by a military organization or other government elites to unseat an incumbent person or leadership.<ref name=":02">{{cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan M |last2=Thyne |first2=Clayton L |title=Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset |journal=Journal of Peace Research |date=March 2011 |volume=48 |issue=2 |pages=249–259 |doi=10.1177/0022343310397436 |quote=To summarize, our definition of a coup attempt includes illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive... Coups may be undertaken by any elite who is part of the state apparatus. These can include non-civilian members of the military and security services, or civilian members of government. }}</ref><ref name=":18">{{Cite journal |last1=Chin |first1=John J |last2=Carter |first2=David B |last3=Wright |first3=Joseph G |date=2021 |title=The Varieties of Coups D'état: Introducing the Colpus Dataset |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=65 |issue=4 |pages=1040–1051 |doi=10.1093/isq/sqab058 |quote=A coup d ́etat occurs whenever the incumbent ruling regime or regime leader is ousted from power (or a presumptive regime leader is prevented from taking power) as a result of concrete, observable, and unconstitutional actions by one or more civilian members of the incumbent ruling regime and/or one or more members of the military or security apparatus }}</ref> A self-coup is said to take place when a leader, having come to power through legal means, tries to stay in power through illegal means.<ref name=":18" />
By one estimate, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, half of which were successful.<ref name=":02" /> Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.<ref name=":02" /> Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups,<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":0" /> though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.<ref name="Brooks" />
Many factors may lead to the occurrence of a coup, as well as determine the success or failure of a coup. Once a coup is underway, coup success is driven by coup-makers' ability to get others to believe that the coup attempt will be successful.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Singh |first1=Naunihal |title=Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups |date=2014 |publisher=JHU Press |id={{Project MUSE|31450|type=book}} |isbn=978-1-4214-1337-2 }}{{pn|date=April 2026}}</ref> The number of successful coups has decreased over time.<ref name=":02" /> Failed coups in authoritarian systems are likely to strengthen the power of the authoritarian ruler.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Timoneda |first1=Joan C. |last2=Escribà-Folch |first2=Abel |last3=Chin |first3=John |title=The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships |journal=British Journal of Political Science |date=July 2023 |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=878–901 |doi=10.1017/S0007123422000655 |hdl=10230/57138 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Habtom |first=Naman Karl-Thomas |date=2023-07-21 |title=When Failed Coups Strengthen Leaders |url=https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/when-failed-coups-strengthen-leaders/ |website=War on the Rocks |language=en-US |access-date=21 July 2023 |archive-date=29 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230729115031/https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/when-failed-coups-strengthen-leaders/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups, a phenomenon referred to as the "coup trap".<ref name=":5" />{{sfn|Przeworski|Alvarez|Cheibub|Limongi|2000|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}<ref name="Londregan">{{Cite journal |last1=Londregan |first1=John B. |last2=Poole |first2=Keith T. |date=1990 |title=Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power |journal=World Politics |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=151–183 |doi=10.2307/2010462 |jstor=2010462 }}</ref><ref name="LehoucqPérez-Liñán" />
In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military and the fragmenting of military and security agencies.<ref name=":10" /> However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness as loyalty is prioritized over experience when filling key positions within the military.<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":13" /><ref name=":16" /><ref name=":17" /> Regimes that came to power with revolutions face coups at a much smaller rate.{{Sfn|Levitsky|Way|2022|p=38}}
== Etymology == The term comes from French {{lang|fr|coup d'État}}, literally meaning a 'stroke of state' or 'blow of state'.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web |title=Coup d'état |url=http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coup-d'%C3%A9tat |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151106083058/http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coup-d%27%C3%A9tat |archive-date=6 November 2015 |access-date=12 January 2019 |website=Oxford Dictionaries }}</ref><ref name="MW definition"/><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 15, 2016 |title=Turkey Coup |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/news-trend-watch/turkey-coup-20160715 |access-date=February 5, 2021 |website=Merriam Webster |archive-date=11 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210111113731/https://www.merriam-webster.com/news-trend-watch/turkey-coup-20160715 |url-status=live }}</ref> In French, the word {{lang|fr|État}} ({{IPA|fr|eta|lang}}) is capitalized when it denotes a sovereign political entity.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Banque de dépannage linguistique – état |url=http://66.46.185.79/bdl/gabarit_bdl.asp?t1=1&id=1285&D=%C9tat |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120701102722/http://66.46.185.79/bdl/gabarit_bdl.asp?t1=1&id=1285&D=%C9tat |archive-date=1 July 2012 |access-date=12 December 2012 |publisher=Office québécois de la langue française }}</ref> Although the concept of a coup d'état has featured in politics since antiquity, the phrase is of relatively recent coinage.<ref name="ancient_coup">Julius Caesar's civil war, 5 January 49 BC.</ref> It did not appear within an English text before the 19th century except when used in the translation of a French source, there being no simple phrase in English to convey the contextualized idea of a 'knockout blow to the existing administration within a state'.{{cite quote|date=April 2026}}
One early use within text translated from French was in 1785 in a printed translation of a letter from a French merchant, commenting on an arbitrary decree, or {{lang|fr|arrêt}}, issued by the French king restricting the import of British wool.<ref>''Norfolk Chronicle'', 13 August 1785: "It is thought here by some, that it is a Coup d'Etat played off as a prelude to a disagreeable after-piece. But I can confidently assure you, that the above-mentioned {{lang|fr|arrêt}} was promulgated in consequence of innumerable complaints and murmurs which have found their way to the ears of the Sovereign. Our merchants contend, that they experience the greatest difficulties in trading with the English".</ref> What may be its first published use within a text composed in English is an editor's note in the London ''Morning Chronicle'', 1804, reporting the arrest by Napoleon in France, of Moreau, Berthier, Masséna, and Bernadotte: "There was a report in circulation yesterday of a sort of coup d'état having taken place in France, in consequence of some formidable conspiracy against the existing government."{{full cn|date=February 2026}}
In the British press, the phrase came to be used to describe the various murders by Napoleon's alleged secret police, the {{lang|fr|Gens d'Armes d'Elite|italic=no}}, who executed the Duke of Enghien: "the actors in torture, the distributors of the poisoning draughts, and the secret executioners of those unfortunate individuals or families, whom Bonaparte's measures of safety require to remove. In what revolutionary tyrants call ''grand[s] coups d'état'', as butchering, or poisoning, or drowning, en masse, they are exclusively employed."<ref>{{Cite news |title=unk |newspaper=Kentish Gazette |location=Canterbury |date=16 October 1804 |page=2}}{{vs|date=April 2026}}</ref>
== Related terms == === Self-coup === {{Excerpt|Self coup}}
=== Soft coup === {{main|Soft coup|Nonviolent revolution}} A '''soft coup''', sometimes referred to as a '''silent coup''' or a '''bloodless coup''', is an illegal overthrow of a government that{{snd}} unlike a regular coup d'état{{snd}} is achieved without the use of force or violence.<ref name=Leiv>{{cite journal |last1=Marsteintredet |first1=Leiv |last2=Malamud |first2=Andrés |title=Coup with Adjectives: Conceptual Stretching or Innovation in Comparative Research? |journal=Political Studies |date=November 2020 |volume=68 |issue=4 |pages=1014–1035 |doi=10.1177/0032321719888857 |hdl=10451/40441 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
=== Palace coup === A '''palace coup''' or '''palace revolution''' is a coup in which one faction within the ruling group displaces another faction within a ruling group.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Peterson |first1=M.J. |title=Routledge Handbook of State Recognition |chapter=Recognition of governments |date=2019 |pages=205–219 |doi=10.4324/9781351131759-16 |isbn=978-1-351-13175-9 }}</ref> Along with popular protests, palace coups are a major threat to dictators.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Raphael Boleslavsky |author2=Mehdi Shadmehr |author3=Konstantin Sonin |date=June 2021 |volume=19 |issue=3 |pages=1782–1815|title=Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup |journal=Journal of the European Economic Association |doi=10.1093/jeea/jvaa040}}</ref> The Harem conspiracy of the 12th century BC was one of the earliest attempts. Palace coups were common in Imperial China.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Andrew |first1=Anita M. |last2=Rapp |first2=John A. |title=Autocracy and China's Rebel Founding Emperors: Comparing Chairman Mao and Ming Taizu |date=2000 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing PLC |isbn=978-0-8476-9580-5 |page=324 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Hucker |first1=Charles O. |title=China's Imperial Past |date=1975 |doi=10.1515/9781503621190 |page=304 |isbn=978-1-5036-2119-0 }}</ref> They have also occurred among the Habsburg dynasty in Austria, the Al-Thani dynasty in Qatar,<ref>{{cite book |last1=Milton |first1=Patrick |last2=Axworthy |first2=Michael |last3=Simms |first3=Brendan |title=Towards A Westphalia for the Middle East |date=2019 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-005795-4 |page=104 }}</ref> and in Haiti in the 19th to early 20th centuries.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lundahl |first1=Mats |title=Politics or Markets? |date=2002 |doi=10.4324/9780203160091 |page=321 |isbn=978-1-134-95099-7 }}</ref> The majority of Russian tsars between 1725 and 1801 either usurped power or were overthrown in palace coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Erren |first1=Lorenz |title=Feofan Prokopovich's Pravda voli monarshei as Fundamental Law of the Russian Empire |journal=Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History |date=2016 |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=333–360 |id={{Project MUSE|619459}} |doi=10.1353/kri.2016.0027 }}</ref>
=== Putsch === The term '''putsch''' ([[Help:IPA/Standard German|[pʊtʃ]]], from Swiss German for 'knock') denotes the political-military actions of a minority reactionary coup.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Putsch|url=https://www.dwds.de/wb/Putsch|access-date=2023-01-04|website=DWDS – Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache|date=31 August 2022|language=de|archive-date=4 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230104050446/https://www.dwds.de/wb/Putsch|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Etymology">{{Cite book |author=Pfeifer, Wolfgang |title=Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen |trans-title=Etymological Dictionary of German |language=de |publisher=Akademie Verlag |location=Berlin |isbn=978-3-05-000626-0 |edition=second |date=1993|author-link=:de:Wolfgang Pfeifer (Etymologe) }}</ref> The term was initially coined for the {{lang|gsw|Züriputsch}} of 6 September 1839 in Switzerland. It was also used for attempted coups in Weimar Germany, such as the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Küstrin Putsch, and Adolf Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Definition of putsch: Did you know? |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/putsch |access-date=16 February 2021 |website=Merriam Webster |archive-date=10 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210210192054/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/putsch |url-status=live }}</ref>
The 1934 Night of the Long Knives was Hitler's purge to eliminate opponents, particularly the paramilitary faction led by Ernst Röhm, but Nazi propaganda justified it as preventing a supposed putsch planned or attempted by Röhm. The Nazi term {{lang|de|Röhm-Putsch}} is still used by Germans to describe the event, often with quotation marks as the "so-called Röhm Putsch".<ref name="Röhm-Putsch">{{Cite web |title=Röhm-Putsch |language=de |publisher=Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM), German Historical Museum |url=http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/nazi/innenpolitik/roehm/ |access-date=26 March 2016 |archive-date=11 August 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140811150155/http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/nazi/innenpolitik/roehm/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
The 1961 Algiers putsch and the 1991 August Putsch in the Soviet Union also use the term.
The 2023 Wagner Group rebellion has also been described as a putsch.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Cashman |first1=Richard |last2=Ogryzko |first2=Lesia |title=Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia's ongoing imperial decline |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/wagner-putsch-is-symptomatic-of-russias-ongoing-imperial-decline/ |website=Atlantic Council |date=6 July 2023 |access-date=29 January 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Russia's aborted Wagner putsch: How it evolved |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/russias-aborted-wagner-putsch-how-it-evolved/ |website=Euractiv |date=26 June 2023 |access-date=29 January 2024}}</ref>
=== {{lang|es|Pronunciamiento}} and {{lang|es|cuartelazo}} === {{Main|Pronunciamiento{{!}}''Pronunciamiento''}} '''{{lang|es|Pronunciamiento}}''' ({{gloss|pronouncement}}) is a term of Spanish origin for a type of coup d'état. Specifically the {{lang|es|pronunciamiento}} is the formal declaration deposing the previous government and justifying the installation of the new government by the {{lang|es|golpe de estado}}. Edward Luttwak distinguishes a coup, in which a military or political faction takes power for itself, from a {{lang|es|pronunciamiento}}, in which the military deposes the existing government and hands over power to a new, ostensibly civilian government.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}
A "barracks revolt" or {{lang|es|cuartelazo}} is another type of military revolt, from the Spanish term {{lang|es|cuartel}} ('quarter' or 'barracks'), in which the mutiny of specific military garrisons sparks a larger military revolt against the government.<ref>Little-Siebold, Todd. "''Cuartelazo''" in ''Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture'', vol. 2, p. 305. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1996.</ref>
=== Other === Other types of actual or attempted seizures of power are sometimes called "coups with adjectives". The appropriate term can be subjective and carries normative, analytical, and political implications.<ref name=Leiv /> {{div col|colwidth=30em}} * Civil society coup * Constitutional coup, consistent with the constitution, often by exploiting loopholes or ambiguities * Counter-coup, a coup to repeal the result of a previous coup * Democratic coup * Dissident coup, in which the culprits are nominally protestors without backing from any military or police units (e.g. sometimes used to describe the January 6 United States Capitol attack)<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/08/19/jan-6-coup-authoritarianism-expert-roundtable-00052281 |title=Ask the 'Coupologists': Just What Was Jan. 6 Anyway? |last1=Zeitz |first1=Joshua |last2=Althaus |first2=Scott |publisher=Politico |date=2022-08-19 |access-date=2023-12-28 |quote=We have a set of categories including military coup, dissident coup, rebel coup, palace coup, foreign-backed coup, auto coup and others. So an attempted dissident coup is a coup initiated by a small group of discontents to include ex-military leaders, religious leaders, former government leaders, members of legislatures, parliament and civilians, but does not include security forces or police as they're organized arms of the government. And certainly by using that label, I am not trying to categorize in any sense the politics of people who are involved. }}</ref><ref name="ClintCenterStmt">{{Cite web|url=https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/coup-detat-project-cdp/statement_jan.27.2021|title=It Was an Attempted Coup: The Cline Center's Coup D'état Project Categorizes the January 6, 2021 Assault on the US Capitol|publisher=Cline Center for Advanced Social Research|access-date=July 21, 2021|archive-date=February 4, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210204105008/https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/coup-detat-project-cdp/statement_jan.27.2021|url-status=live}}</ref> * Electoral coup * Judicial coup, a "legal" coup, utilizing the judiciary as the main instrument. * Market coup * Medical coup, having a leader declared incapacitated by doctors, such as in Tunisia in 1987 * Military coup * Parliamentary coup * Presidential coup * Royal coup, in which a monarch dismisses democratically elected leaders and seizes all power (e.g. the 6 January Dictatorship by Alexander I of Yugoslavia)<ref>{{Cite book |title=How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse |author1=Barbara Geddes |author2=Joseph George Wright |author3=Joseph Wright |author4=Erica Frantz |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-11582-8 |year=2018 |page=285 |quote=where a monarch who had not been directly running the country (in the sense that there was a prime minister and responsible government...) decides to assume all power. Yugoslavia in 1929 was an example of this.}}</ref> * Slow-motion (or slow-moving or slow-rolling) coup{{div col end}}
=== Revolution, rebellion === While a coup is usually a conspiracy of a small group, a revolution or rebellion is usually started spontaneously by larger groups of uncoordinated people.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=coup d'état |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat |encyclopedia=Britannica }}</ref> The distinction between a revolution and a coup is not always clear. Sometimes, a coup is labelled as a revolution by its plotters to feign democratic legitimacy.<ref>{{cite AV media |last1=Newton |first1=Kevin |title=Change Caused by Revolutions, Coups & Wars |url=https://study.com/academy/lesson/video/change-caused-by-of-revolutions-coups-wars.html |url-access=registration }}{{self-published inline|date=April 2026}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lane |first1=David |title=The Orange Revolution: 'People's Revolution' or Revolutionary Coup? |journal=The British Journal of Politics and International Relations |date=November 2008 |volume=10 |issue=4 |pages=525–549 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-856X.2008.00343.x }}</ref>
== Prevalence and history == {{further|List of coups and coup attempts|List of coups and coup attempts by country}} According to Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell's coup data set, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, of which 227 (49.7%) were successful and 230 (50.3%) were unsuccessful.<ref name=":02" /> They find that coups have "been most common in Africa and the Americas (36.5% and 31.9%, respectively). Asia and the Middle East have experienced 13.1% and 15.8% of total global coups, respectively. Europe has experienced by far the fewest coup attempts: 2.6%."<ref name=":02" /> Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.<ref name=":02" /> From 1950 to 2010, a majority of coups failed in the Middle East and Latin America. They had a somewhat higher chance of success in Africa and Asia.<ref name="Brooks" /> Numbers of successful coups have decreased over time.<ref name=":02" />
A number of political science datasets document coup attempts around the world and over time, generally starting in the post-World War II period. Major examples include the Global Instances of Coups dataset, the Coups & Political Instability dataset by the Center of Systemic Peace, the Coup d'état Project by the Cline Center, the Colpus coup dataset, and the Coups and Agency Mechanism dataset. A 2023 study argued that major coup datasets tend to over-rely on international news sources to gather their information, potentially biasing the types of events included.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ben Hammou |first1=Salah |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan |last3=Sellers |first3=Bailey |title=Sourcing and Bias in the Study of Coups: Lessons from the Middle East |journal=International Studies Review |date=23 June 2023 |volume=25 |issue=3 |article-number=viad031 |doi=10.1093/isr/viad031 }}</ref> Its findings show that while such a strategy is sufficient for gathering information on successful and failed coups, attempts to gather data on coup plots and rumors require a greater consultation of regional and local-specific sources.
== Predictors == A 2003 review of the academic literature found that the following factors influenced coups:
{{div col}} * officers' personal grievances * military organizational grievances * military popularity * military attitudinal cohesiveness * economic decline * domestic political crisis * contagion from other regional coups * external threat * participation in war * collusion with a foreign military power * military's national security doctrine * officers' political culture * noninclusive institutions * colonial legacy * economic development * undiversified exports * officers' class composition * military size * strength of civil society * regime legitimacy and past coups {{colend|2}}
The literature review in a 2016 study includes mentions of ethnic factionalism, supportive foreign governments, leader inexperience, slow growth, commodity price shocks, and poverty.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bell |first1=Curtis |title=Coup d'État and Democracy |journal=Comparative Political Studies |date=August 2016 |volume=49 |issue=9 |pages=1167–1200 |doi=10.1177/0010414015621081 }}</ref>
Another 2016 paper<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gassebner |first1=Martin |last2=Gutmann |first2=Jerg |last3=Voigt |first3=Stefan |title=When to expect a coup d'état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |journal=Public Choice |date=December 2016 |volume=169 |issue=3–4 |pages=293–313 |doi=10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0 }}</ref> finds that government crises, political stability and absence of violence, purges, the level of political terror, general strikes, population growth, legal structure and security of property rights, and the share of democratic countries in the same region, predict the occurrence of a coup.
Harkness (2016)<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Harkness |first=Kristen A. |date=2016 |title=The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa |journal=The Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=60 |issue=4 |pages=587–616 |doi=10.1177/0022002714545332 |jstor=24755887 |hdl=10023/9391 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> finds find that concentration of force in a small number of units near the capital and ethnic or factional imbalance inside the army increase the likelihood of a coup.
Several papers suggest that economic crises are associated with regime upheavals.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Geddes |first1=Barbara |last2=Wright |first2=Joseph |last3=Frantz |first3=Erica |title=How Dictatorships Work |date=2018 |doi=10.1017/9781316336182 |isbn=978-1-316-33618-2 }}{{pn|date=April 2026}}</ref> Djuve et al. (2020) report robust evidence that low income, slow or negative growth, predict a higher likelihood of regime breakdown. Moreover, they find that intermediate democracy levels clearly predict coup-induced breakdowns and incumbent-guided transitions.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Djuve |first1=Vilde Lunnan |last2=Knutsen |first2=Carl Henrik |last3=Wig |first3=Tore |title=Patterns of Regime Breakdown Since the French Revolution |journal=Comparative Political Studies |date=May 2020 |volume=53 |issue=6 |pages=923–958 |doi=10.1177/0010414019879953 |hdl=2077/56816 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
Coups have been found to appear in environments that are heavily influenced by military powers. Multiple of the above factors are connected to military culture and power dynamics. These factors can be divided into multiple categories, with two of these categories being a threat to military interests and support for military interests. If interests go in either direction, the military will find itself either capitalizing off that power or attempting to gain it back.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Aslan |first1=Ömer |title=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics |chapter=Domestic and International Constituencies in Military Coups |date=2020 |doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1931 |isbn=978-0-19-022863-7 }}</ref>
Oftentimes, military spending is an indicator of the likelihood of a coup taking place. Nordvik found that about 75% of coups that took place in many different countries rooted from military spending and oil windfalls.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nordvik |first1=Frode Martin |title=Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? The Answer is Yes |journal=The Economic Journal |date=April 2019 |volume=129 |issue=619 |pages=1425–1456 |doi=10.1111/ecoj.12604 |hdl=11250/2657360 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name=":5" />
A 2024 IMF paper<ref name=":8">{{cite journal |last1=Cebotari |first1=Aliona |title=Political Fragility: Coups d'État and Their Drivers |journal=IMF Working Papers |date=2024 |issue=34 |page=1 |doi=10.5089/9798400266751.001 |doi-access=free }}</ref> find that the probability of a coup d'état is immediately elevated by acute exogenous shocks (stressors). The stressors include compromised economic growth, deterioration of the external financial position, and elevated levels of generalized and food price inflation. Also, a destabilized political and internal security environment serves as a potent proximal trigger for coup attempts.
The study<ref name=":8" /> pinpoints that a disproportionately young population structure, weak structural fundamentals characterized by widespread poverty, high income inequality, low literacy rates, and significant ethnic fractionalization are long-term endogenous factors that predispose a state to instability, as are also low governance quality, limited democratization, a high historical incidence and recent prevalence of coups (the "coup trap").
The paper<ref name=":8" /> establishes that structural fragility is not merely an additive risk factor, but an amplifier that dictates the system's responsiveness to shocks:
# Structural fragility intensifies the likelihood of a coup when stressors are present. # Conversely, the rate at which coup probability subsides when stressors recede is also accelerated in structurally weak states. # Weaknesses across multiple structural dimensions (e.g., combining high inequality with poor governance) exhibit a synergistic effect, exponentially increasing a country's susceptibility to political system fragilization. Furthermore, the co-occurrence of multiple stressors (overlapping crises, 2020–2023) similarly compounds the overall risk profile.
=== Coup trap and coup contagion === The accumulation of previous coups is a strong predictor of future coups,<ref name=":5">{{cite journal |last1=Belkin |first1=Aaron |last2=Schofer |first2=Evan |title=Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=2003 |volume=47 |issue=5 |pages=594–620 |doi=10.1177/0022002703258197 }}</ref>{{sfn|Przeworski|Alvarez|Cheibub|Limongi|2000|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}} a phenomenon called the coup trap.<ref name=Londregan /><ref name=LehoucqPérez-Liñán>{{cite journal |last1=Lehoucq |first1=Fabrice |last2=Pérez-Liñán |first2=Aníbal |title=Breaking Out of the Coup Trap |journal=Comparative Political Studies |date=2014 |volume=47 |issue=8 |pages=1105–1129 |doi=10.1177/0010414013488561 }}</ref> A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open political competition helps bring countries out of the coup trap and reduces cycles of political instability.<ref name=LehoucqPérez-Liñán />
Researchers have long debated over whether coups are contagious - that is, whether one coup increases the likelihood of others in the region. A 2018 study found no evidence of regional contagion: one coup does not make subsequent coups more likely.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Michael K. |last2=Joseph |first2=Michael |last3=Ohl |first3=Dorothy |title=Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=2018 |volume=62 |issue=2 |pages=410–441 |doi=10.1177/0022002716649232 }}</ref> A 2025 study challenges earlier findings by showing that coup dynamics can be contagious, but primarily through post-coup trajectories that reshape the abilities and incentives of would-be plotters.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ben Hammou |first1=Salah |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan |title=Following the Free Officers: Explaining the Politics of Coup Contagion and Containment |journal=International Studies Review |date=11 November 2025 |volume=27 |issue=4 |article-number=viaf033 |doi=10.1093/isr/viaf033 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
=== Regime type and polarization === Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to coups than very authoritarian states or democratic states.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hiroi |first1=Taeko |last2=Omori |first2=Sawa |title=Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état : An Event History Analysis |journal=Politics & Policy |date=February 2013 |volume=41 |issue=1 |pages=39–64 |doi=10.1111/polp.12001 }}</ref> A 2021 study found that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kim |first1=Nam Kyu |last2=Sudduth |first2=Jun Koga |title=Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships |journal=Comparative Political Studies |date=August 2021 |volume=54 |issue=9 |pages=1597–1628 |doi=10.1177/0010414021997161 |doi-access=free |url=https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/75457/7/Kim_Sudduth_CPS_2021_Political_institutions_and_coups_in.pdf }}</ref> A 2015 study finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Aksoy |first1=Deniz |last2=Carter |first2=David B. |last3=Wright |first3=Joseph |title=Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators |journal=World Politics |date=July 2015 |volume=67 |issue=3 |pages=423–468 |doi=10.1017/S0043887115000118 }}</ref> A 2016 study finds that there is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Harkness |first1=Kristen A. |title=The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=June 2016 |volume=60 |issue=4 |pages=587–616 |doi=10.1177/0022002714545332 |hdl=10023/9391 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease coordination obstacles among coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Johnson |first1=Jaclyn |last2=Thyne |first2=Clayton L. |title=Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty: How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1951–2005 |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=March 2018 |volume=62 |issue=3 |pages=597–625 |doi=10.1177/0022002716654742 }}</ref> A third 2016 study finds that coups become more likely in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wig |first1=Tore |last2=Rød |first2=Espen Geelmuyden |title=Cues to Coup Plotters: Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=August 2016 |volume=60 |issue=5 |pages=787–812 |doi=10.1177/0022002714553106 |url=http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-361570 }}</ref> A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Houle |first1=Christian |title=Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars |journal=Journal of Peace Research |date=September 2016 |volume=53 |issue=5 |pages=680–695 |doi=10.1177/0022343316652187 }}</ref>One study found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination problems for coup-plotters.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gassebner |first1=Martin |last2=Gutmann |first2=Jerg |last3=Voigt |first3=Stefan |title=When to expect a coup d'état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |journal=Public Choice |date=December 2016 |volume=169 |issue=3–4 |pages=293–313 |doi=10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0 |hdl=10419/156099 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kurrild-Klitgaard |first1=Peter |title=The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession |journal=Public Choice |date=April 2000 |volume=103 |issue=1–2 |pages=63–84 |doi=10.1023/A:1005078532251 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Kurrild-Klitgaard |first1=Peter |title=The Encyclopedia of Public Choice |chapter=Autocratic Succession |date=2003 |pages=358–362 |doi=10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_39 |isbn=978-0-7923-8607-0 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Escribà-Folch |first1=Abel |last2=Böhmelt |first2=Tobias |last3=Pilster |first3=Ulrich |title=Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |date=September 2020 |volume=37 |issue=5 |pages=559–579 |doi=10.1177/0738894219836285 |hdl=10230/46774 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence coup frequency.<ref name=LehoucqPérez-Liñán />
A 2019 study found that when a country's politics is polarized and electoral competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kinney |first1=Drew Holland |title=Politicians at Arms: Civilian Recruitment of Soldiers for Middle East Coups |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=October 2019 |volume=45 |issue=4 |pages=681–701 |doi=10.1177/0095327X18777983 }}</ref>
A 2024 study found that civilian elites are more likely to be associated with instigating military coups while civilians embedded in social networks are more likely to be associated with consolidating military coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ben Hammou |first1=Salah |title=The Varieties of Civilian Praetorianism: Evidence From Sudan's Coup Politics |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=October 2024 |volume=50 |issue=4 |pages=1096–1117 |doi=10.1177/0095327X231155667 }}</ref>
=== Territorial disputes, internal conflicts, and armed conflicts === A 2017 study found that autocratic leaders whose states were involved in international rivalries over disputed territory were more likely to be overthrown in a coup. The authors of the study provide the following logic for why this is:{{cquote|Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial rivalries need to strengthen the military in order to compete with a foreign adversary. The imperative of developing a strong army puts dictators in a paradoxical situation: to compete with a rival state, they must empower the very agency—the military—that is most likely to threaten their own survival in office.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Florea |first1=Adrian |title=Spatial Rivalry and Coups Against Dictators |journal=Security Studies |date=2 January 2018 |volume=27 |issue=1 |pages=1–26 |doi=10.1080/09636412.2017.1360072 }}</ref>}}However, two 2016 studies found that leaders who were involved in militarized confrontations and conflicts were less likely to face a coup.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Piplani |first1=Varun |last2=Talmadge |first2=Caitlin |title=When War Helps Civil–military Relations: Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=December 2016 |volume=60 |issue=8 |pages=1368–1394 |doi=10.1177/0022002714567950 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Arbatli |first1=Cemal Eren |last2=Arbatli |first2=Ekim |title=External threats and political survival: Can dispute involvement deter coup attempts? |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |date=April 2016 |volume=33 |issue=2 |pages=115–152 |doi=10.1177/0738894214545956 |url=https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1899920 }}</ref>
A 2019 study found that states that had recently signed civil war peace agreements were much more likely to experience coups, in particular when those agreements contained provisions that jeopardized the interests of the military.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=White |first1=Peter B. |title=The Perils of Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups |journal=The Journal of Politics |date=January 2020 |volume=82 |issue=1 |pages=104–118 |doi=10.1086/705683 }}</ref>
=== Popular opposition and regional rebellions === Research suggests that protests spur coups, as they help elites within the state apparatus to coordinate coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Casper |first1=Brett Allen |last2=Tyson |first2=Scott A. |title=Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d'état |journal=The Journal of Politics |date=April 2014 |volume=76 |issue=2 |pages=548–564 |doi=10.1017/S0022381613001485 }}</ref>
A 2019 study found that regional rebellions made coups by the military more likely.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Eibl |first1=Ferdinand |last2=Hertog |first2=Steffen |last3=Slater |first3=Dan |title=War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide |journal=British Journal of Political Science |date=July 2021 |volume=51 |issue=3 |pages=1002–1023 |doi=10.1017/S0007123419000528 |doi-access=free |url=https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/files/117868386/War_Makes_the_Regime_EIBL_Acc8Aug2019_GREEN_AAM.pdf }}</ref>
=== Economy, development, and resource factors === A 2018 study found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries".<ref name=":9">{{cite journal |last1=Nordvik |first1=Frode Martin |title=Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? The Answer is Yes |journal=The Economic Journal |date=April 2019 |volume=129 |issue=619 |pages=1425–1456 |doi=10.1111/ecoj.12604 |hdl=11250/2657360 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.<ref name=":9" />
A 2020 study found that elections had a two-sided impact on coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy. During periods of economic expansion, elections reduced the likelihood of coup attempts, whereas elections during economic crises increased the likelihood of coup attempts.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Krishnarajan |first1=Suthan |last2=Rørbæk |first2=Lasse Lykke |title=The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=August 2020 |volume=64 |issue=7–8 |pages=1279–1306 |doi=10.1177/0022002719900001 |url=https://pure.au.dk/portal/en/publications/83532f56-fb9b-4936-a454-03d21d89ea16 }}</ref>
A 2021 study found that oil wealthy nations see a pronounced risk of coup attempts but these coups are unlikely to succeed.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan |last2=Schiel |first2=Rebecca |last3=Ben Hammou |first3=Salah |title=Oil Wealth, Risk Acceptance, and the Seizure of Power |journal=Journal of Global Security Studies |date=11 August 2021 |volume=6 |issue=4 |article-number=ogaa053 |doi=10.1093/jogss/ogaa053 }}</ref>
On the contrary, a 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th century found that coup frequency does not vary with development levels, economic inequality, or the rate of economic growth.<ref name=LehoucqPérez-Liñán />
=== Coup-proofing === In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.<ref name=":10">{{cite journal |last1=Quinlivan |first1=James T. |title=Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East |journal=International Security |publisher=RAND |date=Fall 1999 |volume=24 |issue=2 |pages=131–165 |doi=10.1162/016228899560202 |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP844.html }}</ref> It may also involve frequent salary hikes and promotions for members of the military,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sabaté |first1=Oriol |last2=Espuelas |first2=Sergio |last3=Herranz-Loncán |first3=Alfonso |title=Military Wages and Coup d'État in Spain (1850–1915): the Use of Public Spending as a Coup-Proofing Strategy |journal=Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History |date=September 2022 |volume=40 |issue=2 |pages=205–241 |doi=10.1017/S0212610920000270 |hdl=2445/188798 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> and the deliberate use of diverse bureaucrats.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Woldense |first1=Josef |title=What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within |journal=Comparative Political Studies |date=June 2022 |volume=55 |issue=7 |pages=1236–1265 |doi=10.1177/00104140211047402 }}</ref> Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan |title=Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=December 2012 |volume=56 |issue=6 |pages=1017–1040 |doi=10.1177/0022002712445732 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Braithwaite |first1=Jessica Maves |last2=Sudduth |first2=Jun Koga |title=Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict |journal=Research & Politics |date=January 2016 |volume=3 |issue=1 |article-number=2053168016630730 |doi=10.1177/2053168016630730 |doi-access=free }}</ref> However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,{{syn|date=April 2026}}<ref>{{cite book |last1=Reiter |first1=Dan |title=Research Handbook on Civil–Military Relations |chapter=Coup-proofing and military effectiveness |date=2024 |pages=155–170 |doi=10.4337/9781800889842.00020 |isbn=978-1-80088-984-2 }}</ref><ref name=":11">{{cite book |last1=Talmadge |first1=Caitlin |title=The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes |date=2015 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-0175-7 }}{{pn|date=April 2026}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{cite journal |last1=Talmadge |first1=Caitlin |title=Different Threats, Different Militaries:Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies |journal=Security Studies |date=2 January 2016 |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=111–141 |doi=10.1080/09636412.2016.1134192 }}</ref><ref name=":13">{{cite journal |last1=Narang |first1=Vipin |last2=Talmadge |first2=Caitlin |title=Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War: Tests Using New Data |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=August 2018 |volume=62 |issue=7 |pages=1379–1405 |doi=10.1177/0022002716684627 }}</ref><ref name=":14">{{cite journal |last1=Brown |first1=Cameron S. |last2=Fariss |first2=Christopher J. |last3=McMahon |first3=R. Blake |title=Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution |journal=International Interactions |date=January 2016 |volume=42 |issue=1 |pages=1–30 |doi=10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598 }}</ref><ref name=":15">{{cite journal |last1=Bausch |first1=Andrew W. |title=Coup-Proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment |journal=International Interactions |date=2 January 2018 |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=1–32 |doi=10.1080/03050629.2017.1289938 }}</ref><ref name=":16">{{cite journal |last1=Biddle |first1=Stephen |last2=Zirkle |first2=Robert |title=Technology, civil-military relations, and warfare in the developing world |journal=Journal of Strategic Studies |date=June 1996 |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=171–212 |doi=10.1080/01402399608437634 }}</ref> and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Leon |first1=Gabriel |title=Soldiers or politicians? Institutions, conflict, and the military's role in politics |journal=Oxford Economic Papers |date=April 2014 |volume=66 |issue=2 |pages=533–556 |doi=10.1093/oep/gpt024 |url=https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/8a7ecef2-c672-491a-8601-9f564f33b824 }}</ref> One reason why authoritarian governments tend to have incompetent militaries is that authoritarian regimes fear that their military will stage a coup or allow a domestic uprising to proceed uninterrupted – as a consequence, authoritarian rulers have incentives to place incompetent loyalists in key positions in the military.<ref name=":17">{{cite journal |last1=Paine |first1=Jack |title=Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military's Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators |journal=American Political Science Review |date=November 2022 |volume=116 |issue=4 |pages=1425–1442 |doi=10.1017/S0003055422000089 }}</ref>
A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.<ref name=":6">{{cite journal |last1=Frantz |first1=Erica |last2=Stein |first2=Elizabeth A. |title=Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships |journal=Comparative Political Studies |date=June 2017 |volume=50 |issue=7 |pages=935–962 |doi=10.1177/0010414016655538 }}</ref> Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.<ref name=":6" />
According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.<ref>{{cite news |id={{ProQuest|1807732128}} |last1=Bell |first1=Curtis |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan |title=Analysis {{!}} Will Turkey's coup attempt prompt others nearby? |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/30/will-turkeys-coup-attempt-prompt-others-nearby/ |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=30 July 2016 |archive-date=21 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021225446/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/30/will-turkeys-coup-attempt-prompt-others-nearby/ |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Böhmelt |first1=Tobias |last2=Ruggeri |first2=Andrea |last3=Pilster |first3=Ulrich |title=Counterbalancing, Spatial Dependence, and Peer Group Effects |journal=Political Science Research and Methods |date=April 2017 |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=221–239 |doi=10.1017/psrm.2015.55 |hdl=20.500.11850/130560 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> Coup-proofing is more likely in former French colonies.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mehrl |first1=Marius |last2=Choulis |first2=Ioannis |title=The colonial roots of structural coup-proofing |journal=International Interactions |date=4 July 2021 |volume=47 |issue=4 |pages=750–776 |doi=10.1080/03050629.2021.1898958 }}</ref>
A 2018 study in the ''Journal of Peace Research'' found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Easton |first1=Malcolm R |last2=Siverson |first2=Randolph M |title=Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d'état |journal=Journal of Peace Research |date=September 2018 |volume=55 |issue=5 |pages=596–608 |doi=10.1177/0022343318763713 }}</ref> A 2019 study in ''Conflict Management and Peace Science'' found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Escribà-Folch |first1=Abel |last2=Böhmelt |first2=Tobias |last3=Pilster |first3=Ulrich |title=Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |date=September 2020 |volume=37 |issue=5 |pages=559–579 |doi=10.1177/0738894219836285 |hdl=10230/46774 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
In their 2022 book ''Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism'', political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way found that political-military fusion, where the ruling party is highly interlinked with the military and created the administrative structures of the military from its inception, is extremely effective at preventing military coups. For example, the People's Liberation Army was created by the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War, and never instigated a military coup even after large-scale policy failures (i.e. the Great Leap Forward) or the extreme political instability of the Cultural Revolution.{{Sfn|Levitsky|Way|2022|p=86}}
Some scholars have posited that the recruitment of foreign legionnaires into national armies can reduce the probability of military coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Escribà-Folch |first1=Abel |last2=Faulkner |first2=Christopher |last3=Mehrl |first3=Marius |title=Foreign Legionnaires and Military Mutinies |journal=Journal of Global Security Studies |date=30 December 2024 |volume=10 |issue=2 |article-number=ogaf001 |doi=10.1093/jogss/ogaf001 |doi-access=free |hdl=10230/71375 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
== The mechanics of coups == {{See also|How Tyrants Fall|Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook}} According to Dirsus, coups become possible when enough insiders decide the leader is a liability rather than an asset.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dirsus |first=Marcel |title=How tyrants fall: and how nations survive |date=2024 |publisher=John Murray |isbn=978-1-3998-0948-1 |location=London}}{{pn|date=April 2026}}</ref>
Luttwak{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}} points out that a coup requires
# A reasonably developed, centralized state''':''' A bureaucratic machine with ministries, command hierarchies, and national communications that can be captured and then used as‑is. # Concentrated political power: Power in the hands of a small elite or single party, so that controlling a limited set of institutions essentially is controlling the state. # Limited external interference: Enough autonomy that outside powers cannot simply reverse the coup the next day. # Some underlying social and economic discontent: Unrest makes the existing regime vulnerable and lowers loyalty in key institutions.
Luttwak also describes the necessary requirements for a successful coup:{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}
# Narrow conspiratorial core''':''' A small group within the military / security / bureaucratic nexus that secretly coordinates. The public and most of the state remain uninvolved.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}} # Control of key nodes, not everything: The aim is to control a few critical nodes (command centres, security headquarters, communications systems, symbolic buildings in the capital), because those nodes give leverage over the rest of the state machinery.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}} # Neutralization of loyalist centres of power''':''' Rather than fighting the entire army, plotters should focus on isolating or paralyzing the parts that might resist: cutting communications, blocking movement, detaining top command if possible. # Manufactured perception of fait accompli: By controlling communication channels (broadcast media, now also digital channels) and visible symbols of authority, the coup group tries to create the perception that it already is the new authority. Most officials and citizens then adapt to what looks like the new reality.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}} Connor and Hebditch (2017){{sfn|Connor|Hebditch|2017|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}} analyze the political, military, and social factors that cause the military to intervene in civilian government. They begin by categorizing coups into breakthrough coups''',''' which are designed to overthrow traditional or colonial systems and initiate a new political order (e.g., Egypt 1952, Cuba 1959), guardian coups ''',''' which are aimed at restoring "order" or defending constitutional principles from a failing or corrupt civilian government (e.g., Turkey) , and veto coups''',''' which are launched to block policies or prevent a particular group (e.g., civilian leftists) from gaining power (e.g., Argentina).{{sfn|Connor|Hebditch|2017|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}
Usually coups are swift, surgical military operation rather than a drawn-out revolution. It needs to strike when the government is weak, divided, or distracted (e.g., during an economic crisis or political chaos). The recruitment must be extremely covert and to prevent infiltration or preemptive arrests by the existing regime.{{sfn|Connor|Hebditch|2017|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}
A coup should target communication hubs (like radio, television, and communication centers), political centers like presidential palaces and parliament buildings, and military bases to secure the means of violence.{{sfn|Connor|Hebditch|2017|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}
Propaganda and managing public perception in the execution and consolidation phases are critical. The conspirators should quickly broadcast a clear, motivating message to the public and the uncommitted military, often framing the coup as a necessary step to eliminate corruption, restore national dignity, or save the country from ruin, and to seize state media to control all information flow and create the immediate impression that the coup has already succeeded (fait accompli).{{sfn|Connor|Hebditch|2017|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}
Coups usually fail as a result from poor communication, hesitance, or the inability to neutralize the national leader or seize the media quickly enough.{{sfn|Connor|Hebditch|2017|p={{pn|date=April 2026}}}}
Muñoz<ref name=":22">{{cite news |last1=Muñoz |first1=Katja |title=How to Plan and Execute a Coup |url=https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/how-plan-and-execute-coup |work=Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik |date=31 January 2023 }}</ref> stresses the role of digitally-coordinated "playbook in orchestrating a coup. This new strategy involves multiple phases across various platforms: A small core group uses encrypted messenger services (like Telegram) for the initial, secret planning and organization of the various phases. They then use major social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter/X, YouTube, etc.) to amplify the narrative and galvanize their users. Less-moderated "alt-tech" platforms (Gettr, Parler, Truth Social) are used to push fringe content and further radicalize followers before finally mobilizing them for the physical, offline action.<ref name=":22" />
Using modern technology the plotters take advantage of algorithms designed for virality and engagement to ensure their narratives reach millions of users. They navigate the platforms' inconsistencies to avoid detection and removal for as long as possible, and they catapult content from smaller platforms onto the major ones without being flagged. They can avoid being flagged since they possess a considerable knowledge of content moderation policies.<ref name=":22" />
== Outcomes == Successful coups are one method of regime change that thwarts the peaceful transition of power.<ref name="PeacefulRare">{{Cite magazine |title=Orderly transfers of power occur less often than you might think |url=https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/16/orderly-transfers-of-power-occur-less-often-than-you-might-think |magazine=The Economist |access-date=29 June 2022 |archive-date=12 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220112021331/https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/16/orderly-transfers-of-power-occur-less-often-than-you-might-think |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="ElectionHabit">{{cite journal |last1=Przeworski |first1=Adam |title=Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections |journal=Comparative Political Studies |date=January 2015 |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=101–129 |doi=10.1177/0010414014543614 }}</ref> A 2016 study categorizes four possible outcomes to coups in dictatorships:<ref name=":2" /> * Failed coup * No regime change, as when a leader is illegally shuffled out of power without changing the ruling group or the type of government * Replacement of incumbent with another dictatorship * Ousting of the dictatorship followed by democratization (also called "democratic coups")<ref>{{cite book |last1=Varol |first1=Ozan O. |title=The Democratic Coup D'état |date=2017 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-062602-0 }}{{pn|date=April 2026}}</ref>
The study found that about half of all coups in dictatorships—both during and after the Cold War—install new autocratic regimes.<ref name=":2" /> New dictatorships launched by coups engage in higher levels of repression in the year after the coup than existed in the year before the coup.<ref name=":2" /> One-third of coups in dictatorships during the Cold War and 10% of later ones reshuffled the regime leadership.<ref name=":2" /> Democracies were installed in the wake of 12% of Cold War coups in dictatorships and 40% of post-Cold War ones.<ref name=":2" />
Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups,<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last1=Marinov |first1=Nikolay |last2=Goemans |first2=Hein |date=2014 |title=Coups and Democracy |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=799–825 |doi=10.1017/S0007123413000264 |ssrn=2270631 |ssrn-access=free }}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last1=Derpanopoulos |first1=George |last2=Frantz |first2=Erica |last3=Geddes |first3=Barbara |author-link3=Barbara Geddes (academic) |last4=Wright |first4=Joseph |date=2016 |title=Are coups good for democracy? |journal=Research & Politics |volume=3 |issue=1 |article-number=2053168016630837 |doi=10.1177/2053168016630837 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name=":0">{{cite journal |last=Miller |first=Michael K. |date=2016 |title=Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy? |journal=Research & Politics |volume=3 |issue=4 |article-number=2053168016681908 |doi=10.1177/2053168016681908 |doi-access=free }}</ref> though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.<ref name="Brooks">{{cite journal |last1=Brooks |first1=Risa A. |title=Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |date=11 May 2019 |volume=22 |issue=1 |pages=379–398 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Coups that occur during civil wars shorten the war's duration.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Thyne |first1=Clayton |title=The impact of coups d'état on civil war duration |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |date=May 2017 |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=287–307 |doi=10.1177/0738894215570431 }}</ref>
== Impact ==
=== Democracy === {| class="wikitable" |+ Coups and the end of the Cold War<ref name=":2"/><ref name=wsp_summary/> |- ! Time period !! Initial regime type || % of regimes facing coups in period* |- | rowspan=2 align=center|1950–1990{{br}}(Cold War) || Autocracies || {{center|49}} |- | Democracies || {{center|35}} |- | rowspan=2 align=center|1990–2015{{br}} || Autocracies || {{center|12}} |- | Democracies || {{center|12}} |}
{{table alignment}} {| class="wikitable col1left col4left" style="text-align:center;" |+ Coups and the end of the Cold War<ref name=":2"/><ref name=wsp_summary/>{{context inline|reason=the base rate, the proportion of regimes that were democracies, increased with the end of the Cold War|date=December 2024}} |- ! Time period !! Attempts !! Per year !! Coup seizes power !! Number !! Per year !! Change only in leadership !! New autocratic regime !! Democratization within 2 years |- | rowspan=2 align=center|1950–1990{{br}}(Cold War) || rowspan=2 | '''223''' || rowspan=2 | 5.575 || Success || '''125''' || 3.125 || 32%{{br}}'''40''' || 56%{{br}}'''70''' || 12%{{br}}<!--14% seems a typo?-->'''15''' |- | Failure || '''98''' || 2.45 <!--223 total attemps-125 successful---> || {{center|'''75'''}} <!--115-40-->|| '''15'''<!--85-70--> || '''8'''<!--23-15--> {{br}} |- | rowspan=2 align=center|1990–2015 || rowspan=2 | '''49''' || rowspan=2 | 1.96 || Success || '''20''' || 0.8 || 10%{{br}}'''2''' || 50%{{br}}'''10''' || 40%{{br}}'''8''' |- | Failure || '''29''' || 1.16<!--49-20--> || {{center|'''19'''}}<!--21-2--> || '''3'''<!--13-10--> || '''7'''<!--15-8--> |}
Since the end of the Cold War, coups have become rarer, and more likely to be followed by democratization. Coups still often simply replace one autocracy with another one (with the new autocratic regime usually more repressive, in an attempt to prevent another coup) or have no effect on regime type.{{syn|date=April 2026}}<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1">{{cite journal |last1=Thyne |first1=Clayton L. |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan M. |title=Coup d'état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950-2008 |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis |date=April 2014 |doi=10.1111/fpa.12046 }}</ref><ref name="assess_demcoup">{{cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan M. |title=An assessment of the 'democratic' coup theory: Democratic trajectories in Africa, 1952–2012 |journal=African Security Review |date=3 July 2014 |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=213–224 |doi=10.1080/10246029.2014.926949 |url=https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2010/8626 }}</ref><ref name="miller_reanalysis"/><ref name="response_to_miller">{{cite journal |last1=Derpanopoulos |first1=George |last2=Frantz |first2=Erica |last3=Geddes |first3=Barbara |last4=Wright |first4=Joseph |title=Are coups good for democracy? A response to Miller (2016) |journal=Research & Politics |date=April 2017 |volume=4 |issue=2 |article-number=2053168017707355 |doi=10.1177/2053168017707355 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name=wsp_summary/>
Research published in 2021 indicates that successful coups orchestrated by the ruling elite function primarily to recalibrate the authoritarian coalition, thereby sustaining the existing autocratic governance structure and rarely facilitating a shift toward democracy. In sharp contrast, successful coups initiated by non-elite actors (from below) often lead to the collapse of the authoritarian regime, generating a tangible opening for democratic transition.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Albrecht |first1=Holger |last2=Koehler |first2=Kevin |last3=Schutz |first3=Austin |title=Coup Agency and Prospects for Democracy |journal=International Studies Quarterly |date=17 December 2021 |volume=65 |issue=4 |pages=1052–1063 |doi=10.1093/isq/sqab079 |hdl=11382/552276 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
{{as of|lc=no|2017}}, there was debate about whether coups in autocracies should now be considered to promote democratization, on average, or if countries' chances of democratization are still unchanged or worsened by coups (since democratization can take place without a coup). One reason for the increase in the chance of democratization is that a higher proportion of coups (half of post-Cold-War coups) now take place in democracies (a higher percentage of countries are also now democracies). Democratic countries often rebound from coups quickly, restoring democracy, but coups in a democracy are a sign of poor political health, and increase the risk of future coups and loss of democracy. The dataset is small, so statistical significance varies depending on the model used, {{as of|lc=yes|2017}}; debate will end if data on more coups makes the pattern clear.{{syn|date=April 2026}}<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1"/><ref name="assess_demcoup"/><ref name="miller_reanalysis"/><ref name="response_to_miller"/><ref name=wsp_summary/>
The post-Cold-War increase in the chances of post-coup democratization may partly be due to the incentives created by international pressure and financing.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /> US law, for instance, automatically cuts off all aid to a country if there is a military coup.<ref>{{cite news |id={{ProQuest|1392393006}} |last1=Baker |first1=Peter |title=A Coup? Or Something Else? $1.5 Billion in U.S. Aid Is on the Line |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/world/middleeast/egypts-arrests-of-islamists-pose-test-to-us-over-military-aid.html |work=The New York Times |date=4 July 2013 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> According to a 2020 study, "external reactions to coups play important roles in whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival.<ref name=ext_actors>{{cite journal |last1=Thyne |first1=Clayton |last2=Hitch |first2=Kendall |title=Democratic versus Authoritarian Coups: The Influence of External Actors on States' Postcoup Political Trajectories |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=November 2020 |volume=64 |issue=10 |pages=1857–1884 |doi=10.1177/0022002720935956 |doi-access= }}</ref>
But coup conspirators also increasingly say that they chose a coup to save their country from the autocratic incumbents. Successful conspirators may hold free and fair elections simply because they think it is a good idea.<ref name=":2" /> A desire for economic growth and legitimacy have also been cited as motivations for democratization.<ref name=":1" />
Legal scholar Ilya Somin believes that a coup to forcibly overthrow a democratic government might sometimes be justified. Commenting on the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, Somin opined, {{Blockquote|There should be a strong presumption against forcibly removing a democratic regime. But that presumption might be overcome if the government in question poses a grave threat to human rights, or is likely to destroy democracy itself by shutting down future political competition.<ref>{{cite news |id={{ProQuest|1805189390}} |last1=Somin |first1=Ilya |title=Opinion {{!}} Is the overthrow of a democratically elected government ever justified? |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/18/is-the-overthrow-of-a-democratically-elected-government-ever-justified/ |work=The Washington Post |date=18 July 2016 |archive-date=9 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230209063447/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/18/is-the-overthrow-of-a-democratically-elected-government-ever-justified/ |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>}}
===Repression and counter-coups=== It has been argued that failed coups might motivate a regime to reform and reduce repression.<ref name=":1" /> Such reforms are not obvious in the data, {{as of|lc=yes|2017}}. Coups that fail, or merely shuffle the leadership without changing the system, generally do not change the amount of repression (measured in government-sanctioned and pro-government killings).<ref name=":2" /><ref name="miller_reanalysis"/>
Research from 2016 suggests that increased repression and violence typically follow both successful and unsuccessful coup attempts.<ref name=wsp_summary>{{cite news |last1=Wright |first1=Joseph |last2=Geddes |first2=Barbara |last3=Frantz |first3=Erica |last4=Derpanopoulos |first4=George |title=Are coups good for democracy? |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/22/are-coups-good-for-democracy/ |work=The Washington Post |date=22 February 2016 |archive-date=22 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160822064522/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/22/are-coups-good-for-democracy/ |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> <!--Scholarly claim requires backing by a scholarly source, not an unverified Twitter account: However, some tentative analysis by political scientist Jay Ulfelder finds no clear pattern of deterioration in human rights practices in the wake of failed coups in post-Cold War era.--> According to a 2019 study, coup attempts lead to a reduction in physical integrity rights.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Curtice |first1=Travis B. |last2=Arnon |first2=Daniel |title=Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |date=November 2020 |volume=37 |issue=6 |pages=655–673 |doi=10.1177/0738894219843240 }}</ref>
Coups that lead to democratization unsurprisingly reduce repression, and coups that bring in a new autocratic regime increase it. Post-Cold-War, post-coup autocracies seem to have become more repressive and post-coup democracies less repressive; the gap between them is therefore larger than it was during the Cold War.<ref name=":2" /><ref name="miller_reanalysis">{{cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Michael K. |title=Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy? |journal=Research & Politics |date=October 2016 |volume=3 |issue=4 |article-number=2053168016681908 |doi=10.1177/2053168016681908 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
Averaging across democratic and non-democratic outcomes, most coups seem to tend to increase state repression, even coups against autocrats who were already quite repressive. The time interval in which violence is measured matters. The months after a bloodless coup can be bloody. The small sample size and high variability means that this conclusion again does not reach statistical significance, and a firm conclusion cannot be drawn.<ref name=no_easy>{{cite journal |last1=Lachapelle |first1=Jean |title=No Easy Way Out: The Effect of Military Coups on State Repression |journal=The Journal of Politics |date=2020 |volume=82 |issue=4 |pages=1354–1372 |doi=10.1086/707309 |jstor=48809744 }}</ref><ref name=":2" /><ref name="miller_reanalysis"/>
According to Naunihal Singh, author of ''Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups'' (2014), it is "fairly rare" for the incumbent government to violently purge the army after a failed coup. If it starts the mass killing of elements of the army, including officers who were not involved in the coup, this may trigger a "counter-coup" by soldiers who are afraid they will be next. To prevent such a desperate counter-coup that may be more successful than the initial attempt, governments usually resort to firing prominent officers and replacing them with loyalists instead.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12205352/turkey-coup-failed-why |title=Why Turkey's coup failed, according to an expert |author=Zack Beauchamp |work=Vox |date=16 July 2016 |access-date=16 July 2016 |archive-date=17 July 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160717152808/http://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12205352/turkey-coup-failed-why |url-status=live }}</ref>
Notable counter-coups include the Ottoman countercoup of 1909, the 1960 Laotian counter-coup, the Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66, the 1966 Nigerian counter-coup, the 1967 Greek counter-coup, 1971 Sudanese counter-coup, and the coup d'état of December Twelfth in South Korea.{{fact|date=April 2026}}
A 2017 study finds that the use of state broadcasting by the putschist regime after Mali's 2012 coup did not elevate explicit approval for the regime.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bleck |first1=Jaimie |last2=Michelitch |first2=Kristin |title=Capturing the Airwaves, Capturing the Nation? A Field Experiment on State-Run Media Effects in the Wake of a Coup |journal=The Journal of Politics |date=2017 |volume=79 |issue=3 |pages=873–889 |doi=10.1086/690616 |jstor=26551046 }}</ref>
=== International response === The international community tends to react adversely to coups by reducing aid and imposing sanctions. A 2015 study finds that "coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Shannon |first1=Megan |last2=Thyne |first2=Clayton |last3=Hayden |first3=Sarah |last4=Dugan |first4=Amanda |title=The International Community's Reaction to Coups |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis |date=October 2015 |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=363–376 |doi=10.1111/fpa.12043 }}</ref> Another 2015 study shows that coups are the strongest predictor for the imposition of democratic sanctions.<ref name="Soest 17–31">{{cite journal |last1=von Soest |first1=Christian |last2=Wahman |first2=Michael |title=Not all dictators are equal |journal=Journal of Peace Research |date=January 2015 |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=17–31 |doi=10.1177/0022343314551081 |url=http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/42736 }}</ref> A third 2015 study finds that Western states react most strongly against coups of possible democratic and human rights abuses.<ref name="Soest 17–31" /> A 2016 study shows that the international donor community in the post-Cold War period penalizes coups by reducing foreign aid.<ref name=":4">{{cite journal |last1=Masaki |first1=Takaaki |title=Coups d'État and Foreign Aid |journal=World Development |date=March 2016 |volume=79 |pages=51–68 |doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.004 }}</ref> The US has been inconsistent in applying aid sanctions against coups both during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, a likely consequence of its geopolitical interests.<ref name=":4" />
Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have adopted anti-coup frameworks. Through the threat of sanctions, the organizations actively try to curb coups. A 2016 study finds that the AU has played a meaningful role in reducing African coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan |last2=Lasley |first2=Trace |last3=Schiel |first3=Rebecca |title=Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950–2014 |journal=Studies in Comparative International Development |date=December 2016 |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=482–502 |doi=10.1007/s12116-015-9210-6 |url=https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/3304 }}</ref>
A 2017 study found that negative international responses, especially from powerful actors, have a significant effect in shortening the duration of regimes created in coups.<ref name=":7">{{cite journal |last1=Thyne |first1=Clayton |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan |last3=Parrott |first3=Sarah |last4=VanMeter |first4=Emily |title=Even Generals Need Friends: How Domestic and International Reactions to Coups Influence Regime Survival |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=August 2018 |volume=62 |issue=7 |pages=1406–1432 |doi=10.1177/0022002716685611 |url=https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/8683 }}</ref>
According to a 2020 study, coups increase the cost of borrowing and increase the likelihood of sovereign default.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Balima |first1=Hippolyte Weneyam |title=Coups d'état and the cost of debt |journal=Journal of Comparative Economics |date=September 2020 |volume=48 |issue=3 |pages=509–528 |doi=10.1016/j.jce.2020.04.001 }}</ref>
== Current leaders who assumed power via coups == Leaders are arranged in chronological order by the dates they assumed power, and categorized by the continents their countries are in.
===Asia=== <div style=overflow:auto> {| class="wikitable" ! Position ! Post-coup leader ! Deposed leader ! Country ! Event ! Date |- | President || Emomali Rahmon || Rahmon Nabiyev{{refn|group="n"|Nabiyev was forced to resign by government militia on 7 September 1992, with Emomali Rahmon assumed interim power in November.<ref>{{cite AV media |title=Twenty Years Later: The Tajik Civil War And Its Aftermath |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-civil-war-anniversary/28563541.html |publisher=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |date=26 June 2017 }}</ref> Emomali Rahmon was, at the time, known as Emomali Rahmonov (see Name changes).}}|| {{nowrap|{{Flag|Tajikistan|1991}}}} || Tajikistani Civil War || {{dts|19 November 1992}} |- | President of the Supreme Political Council || Mahdi al-Mashat || Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi{{refn|group="n"|Hadi was forced to resign by Houthi rebels on 22 January 2015, but later renounced his resignation. The coup culminated into a civil war.}}|| {{flag|Yemen}} || Houthi takeover in Yemen|| {{dts|6 February 2015}} |- | Prime Minister || Min Aung Hlaing || Aung San Suu Kyi || {{flag|Burma}} || 2021 Burmese coup d'état || {{dts|2 February 2021}} |- |} </div>
===Africa=== {{See also|Coup Belt}} <div style=overflow:auto> {| class="wikitable" ! Position ! Post-coup leader ! Deposed leader ! Country ! Event ! Date |- | President || {{Nobr|Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo }} || Francisco Macías Nguema || {{Nobr|{{flagicon image|Flag of Equatorial Guinea 1973-1979.svg}} Equatorial Guinea }} || 1979 Equatoguinean coup d'état || {{dts|3 August 1979}} |- | President || Yoweri Museveni || Tito Okello || {{flag|Uganda}} || Ugandan Bush War || {{dts|29 January 1986}} |- | President || Denis Sassou Nguesso || Pascal Lissouba || {{flag|Congo}} || Republic of the Congo Civil War || {{dts|25 October 1997}} |- | President || Abdel Fattah el-Sisi || Mohamed Morsi || {{flag|Egypt}} || 2013 Egyptian coup d'état || {{dts|3 July 2013}} |- | President || Emmerson Mnangagwa || Robert Mugabe{{refn|group="n"|Mugabe resigned on 21 November 2017.}}|| {{flag|Zimbabwe}} || 2017 Zimbabwean coup d'état || {{dts|24 November 2017}} |- | {{Nobr|Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council }} || Abdel Fattah al-Burhan || Omar al-Bashir || {{flag|Sudan}} || 2019 Sudanese coup d'état || {{dts|21 August 2019}} |- | Chairman of the National Committee {{Nobr|for the Salvation of the People of Mali}} || Assimi Goïta || Bah Ndaw || {{flag|Mali}} || 2021 Malian coup d'état || {{dts|25 May 2021}} |- |President |Kais Saied |Hichem Mechichi{{refn|group="n"|Prime Minister, Head of Government (under Tunisian Constitution, Shared Executive Power), Kais Saied Also Abolished the Parliament, which represents the Legislative Power in a representative Democracy)}} |{{flag|Tunisia}} |2021 Tunisian self-coup{{refn|group="n"|"Constitutional" Coup, By Activation of Article 80 (full Power Seizure in case of "Imminent Danger"), which is not well-defined, as there is a conflict of interest if the president is the sole arbiter of defining "Danger", and there is no judicial reconciliation (Ex. Constitutional/Supreme Court), Kais Saied removed Head of Government and Parliament}} |{{dts|25 July 2021}} |- |Chairman of the National Committee {{Nobr|of Reconciliation and Development}} |Mamady Doumbouya |Alpha Condé |{{flag|Guinea}} |2021 Guinean coup d'état |{{dts|5 September 2021}} |- |President of the Patriotic Movement {{Nobr|for Safeguard and Restoration}} |Ibrahim Traoré |{{Nobr|Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba }} |{{flag|Burkina Faso}} |{{Nobr|September 2022 Burkinabé coup d'état }} |{{Nobr|{{dts|30 September 2022}}}} |- |President of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland |Abdourahamane Tchiani |Mohamed Bazoum |{{flag|Niger}} |2023 Nigerien coup d'état |{{dts|26 July 2023}} |- |Head of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions |Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema |Ali Bongo Ondimba |{{flag|Gabon}} |2023 Gabonese coup d'état |{{dts|30 August 2023}} |- |President of the Council of the Presidency for the Re-Foundation |Michael Randrianirina |Andry Rajoelina |{{flag|Madagascar}} |2025 Malagasy coup d'état |{{dts|14 October 2025}} |- |High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order |Horta Inta-A Na Man |Umaro Sissoco Embaló |{{flag|Guinea-Bissau}} |2025 Guinea-Bissau coup d'état |{{dts|26 November 2025}} |} </div> {{Reflist|group=n}}
== See also == {{div col|colwidth=20em}} * Assassination * Civilian-based defense * Civil-military relations * Civilian control of the military * Constitutional crisis * ''Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook'' * Coup de main * Military coup * Democratic backsliding * Kleptocracy * Leadership spill * List of protective service agencies * Military dictatorship * Hybrid regime * Mutiny * Political corruption * Political warfare * Sabotage * ''Seven Days in May'' * Soft coup * State collapse * Succession crisis * List of coups and coup attempts by country * List of coups and coup attempts * List of coups and coup attempts since 2010 {{div col end}}
== References == {{Reflist}}
==Sources== * {{cite book |last1=Connor |first1=Ken |last2=Hebditch |first2=David |title=How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution |date=2017 |publisher=Skyhorse |isbn=978-1-5107-2969-8 }} * {{cite book |last1=Luttwak |first1=Edward |title=Coup D'etat: A Practical Handbook |date=1979 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-17546-4 |jstor=j.ctvjghwdq }} * {{cite book |last1=Przeworski |first1=Adam |last2=Alvarez |first2=Michael E. |last3=Cheibub |first3=Jose Antonio |last4=Limongi |first4=Fernando |title=Democracy and Development |date=2000 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511804946 |isbn=978-0-521-79032-1 }} * {{Cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |last2=Way |first2=Lucan |title=Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism |date=2022 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0691169521 }}
== Further reading == {{refbegin|30em}} * {{cite journal |last1=Beeson |first1=Mark |title=Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines: Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious? |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=April 2008 |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=474–490 |doi=10.1177/0095327X07303607 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Ben Hammou |first1=Salah |title=The Varieties of Civilian Praetorianism: Evidence From Sudan's Coup Politics |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=October 2024 |volume=50 |issue=4 |pages=1096–1117 |doi=10.1177/0095327X231155667 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Ben Hammou |first1=Salah |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan |title=Following the Free Officers: Explaining the Politics of Coup Contagion and Containment |journal=International Studies Review |date=11 November 2025 |volume=27 |issue=4 |article-number=viaf033 |doi=10.1093/isr/viaf033 |doi-access=free }} * {{Cite book |first1=Ken |last1=Connor |first2=David |last2=Hebditch |title=How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution |publisher=Pen and Sword Books Ltd |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-84832-503-6}} * {{cite book |last1=De Bruin |first1=Erica |title=How to Prevent Coups d'État |date=2020 |doi=10.1515/9781501751936 |isbn=978-1-5017-5193-6 }} * {{Cite book |first=S.E. |last=Finer |title=The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics |publisher=Pall Mall Press |location=London |year=1962 |page=98}} * {{Cite book |first=D. J. |last=Goodspeed |title=Six Coups d'État |publisher=Viking Press |location=New-York |year=1962 }} * {{cite journal |last1=McGowan |first1=Patrick J. |title=Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part I, Theoretical Perspectives |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=October 2005 |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=5–23 |doi=10.1177/0095327X05277885 }} * {{cite journal |last1=McGowan |first1=Patrick J. |title=Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Findings |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=January 2006 |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=234–253 |doi=10.1177/0095327X05277886 }} * {{Cite book |last=Malaparte |first=Curzio |author-link=Curzio Malaparte |title-link=Coup d'État: The Technique of Revolution |title=Technique du Coup d'État |language=fr |location=Paris |publisher=Éditions Grasset |year=1931}} * {{cite journal |last1=N'Diaye |first1=Boubacar |title=How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=July 2002 |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=619–640 |doi=10.1177/0095327X0202800406 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan M |last2=Ben Hammou |first2=Salah |last3=Smith |first3=Amy Erica |last4=Borba |first4=Lucas |last5=Kinney |first5=Drew Holland |last6=Chacha |first6=Mwita |last7=De Bruin |first7=Erica |title=Forum: A Coup At the Capitol? Conceptualizing Coups and Other Antidemocratic Actions |journal=International Studies Review |date=11 February 2022 |volume=24 |issue=1 |article-number=viab062 |doi=10.1093/isr/viab062 |url=https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/en/publications/4cbe9416-7e3c-47da-b78a-f116095b1e17 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Schiel |first1=Rebecca |last2=Powell |first2=Jonathan |last3=Faulkner |first3=Christopher |title=Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018 |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |date=July 2021 |volume=38 |issue=4 |pages=481–499 |doi=10.1177/0738894220934882 }} {{refend}}
== External links == * {{Commons category-inline|Coups d'état}} * {{Wikiquote-inline}} * {{Wiktionary inline}} * [https://www.johnjchin.com/colpus John J. Chin, David B. Carter & Joseph G. Wright. Dataset on all military and non-military coup attempts in the world since 1946.] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20210107034216/https://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-detat-dataset.html Powell, Jonathan & Clayton Thyne. Global Instances of Coups from 1950–Present] via Archive.org.
{{Coup d'état}} {{Authority control}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Coup Detat}} Category:Coups d'état Category:Changes in political power Category:Civil–military relations