{{Short description|none}} {{About|the politics and government of the People's Republic of China|other uses|Politics of China (disambiguation)}} {{Use dmy dates|date=October 2017}} {{Use British English|date=October 2017}} {{Infobox communist political system | name = Politics of the<br>People's Republic of China | native_name = {{nobold|中华人民共和国政治}} | image = File:中華人民共和國國徽.svg | image_size = 100px | background_color = {{party color|Chinese Communist Party}} | caption = National emblem of China | type = Communist state under the system of people's congress | constitution = Constitution of China | formation = 1 October 1949 | communist_party = Chinese Communist Party | general_secretary = Xi Jinping | supreme_organ = National Congress | highest_organ_party = Central Committee | political_organ = Politburo | executive_organ = Secretariat | military_organ = Central Military Commission | supervisory_organ = Central Commission for Discipline Inspection | highest_organ = National People's Congress | highest_organ_type = Unicameral | highest_organ_place = Great Hall of the People, Beijing | presiding_organ = Presidium | permanent_organ = Standing Committee | permanent_organ_chair = Zhao Leji | permanent_organ_secretary = Liu Qi | executive_name = State Council | title_hog = Premier | current_hog = Li Qiang | appointer_hog = President | current_term = 14th State Council | cabinet_hq = Zhongnanhai | cabinet_ministries = 26 | military = Central Military Commission | leader_military = Xi Jinping | vice_chairmen_military = Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin | supervisory = National Supervisory Commission | director_supervisory = Liu Jinguo | vice_director_supervisory = Xiao Pei, Yu Hongqiu, Fu Kui, Sun Xinyang, Liu Xuexin and Zhang Fuhai | judiciary = Supreme People's Court | chief_judge = Zhang Jun (President) | court_seat = Beijing | procuratorate_name = Supreme People's Procuratorate | procuratorate_seat = Beijing | chief_procuratorate = Ying Yong (Prosecutor-General) }}
{{Politics of the People's Republic of China}} In the People's Republic of China, politics functions within the parameters of a unitary communist state, in which the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enacts its policies through people's congresses. This one-party state operates on the principle of unified state power, in which the legislature, the National People's Congress (NPC), is constitutionally enshrined as the "highest state organ of power."
The Chinese political system is considered authoritarian.<ref name=":17" /><ref name=":18" /><ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> There are no freely elected national leaders, political opposition is suppressed, all organized religious activity is controlled by the CCP, dissent is not permitted, and civil rights are curtailed.<ref name=":25" /><ref name=":27" /> Limited direct elections have occurred only at the local level, not the national level, with all candidate nominations controlled by the CCP.<ref name=":05" /><ref name=":13" /> The nature of the elections is highly constrained by the CCP's monopoly on power, censorship, and party control over elections.<ref name=":34" /><ref name=":35" /> By law, all elections at all levels must adhere to the leadership of the CCP.<ref name=":63" /> All government bodies and state-owned enterprises have internal CCP committees that lead the decision-making in these institutions. China's two special administrative regions (SARs), Hong Kong and Macau, are governed under the "one country, two systems" principle.
The NPC meets annually for about two weeks in March to review and approve major new policy directions, and in between those sessions, delegates its powers to the working legislature, the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC). This organ adopts most national legislation, interprets the constitution and laws, and conducts constitutional reviews, and is headed by the chairman, one of China's top officials. The president is a ceremonial office and has no real power but represents China abroad, though since the 1990s, the presidency has always been held by the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Elected separately by the NPC, the vice president has no power other than what the president bestowed on them but assists the president. The head of the State Council, the NPC's executive organ, is the premier. The general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party is China's leading official since the CCP is tasked with formulating and setting national policy which the state, after being adopted by the NPC or relevant state organ, is responsible for implementing.<ref>{{cite news |author=Natalie Liu|date=7 October 2022|title=View China's Xi as Party Leader, Not President, Scholars Say|work=Voice of America|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/view-china-s-xi-as-party-leader-not-president-scholars-say/6780982.html|access-date=7 October 2022|quote=But Clarke and other scholars make the point that Xi's real power lies not in his post as president but in his position as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.|archive-date=22 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022054144/https://www.voanews.com/a/view-china-s-xi-as-party-leader-not-president-scholars-say/6780982.html/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=How the Chinese government works|work=South China Morning Post|publisher=|url=https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/govt-explainer/index.html|url-status=live|access-date=12 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180512112538/https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/govt-explainer/index.html|archive-date=12 May 2018|quote=Xi Jinping is the most powerful figure in China's political system, and his influence mainly comes from his position as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.}}</ref>
The State Council, also referred to as the Central People's Government, consists of, besides the Premier, a variable number of vice premiers, five state councilors (protocol equal of vice premiers but with narrower portfolios), the secretary-general, and 26 ministers and other cabinet-level department heads. It consists of ministries and agencies with specific portfolios. The State Council presents most initiatives to the NPCSC for consideration after previous endorsement by the CCP's Politburo Standing Committee.
China's judicial organs are political organs that perform prosecutorial and court functions. Because of the judiciary's political nature, China does not have judicial independence. China's courts are supervised by the Supreme People's Court (SPC), which answers to the NPC. The Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) is responsible for prosecutions and supervises procuracies at the provincial, prefecture, and county levels. At the same administrative ranking as the SPC and SPP, the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) was established in 2018 to investigate corruption within the CCP and state organs. All courts and their personnel are subject to the effective control of the CCP's Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission.<ref name=":43">{{Cite journal |last=Ahl|first=Björn|date=2019-05-06|title=Judicialization in authoritarian regimes: The expansion of powers of the Chinese Supreme People's Court|journal=International Journal of Constitutional Law|language=en|volume=17|issue=1|pages=252–277|doi=10.1093/icon/moz003|issn=1474-2640|doi-access=free}}</ref>
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==Overview== {{See also|Paramount leader|Party and state leaders|Order of precedence in China|Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Generations of Chinese leadership}}
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the government in Beijing officially asserts to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, which it defines as including mainland China and Taiwan. This has been disputed by the Republic of China (ROC) government since the ROC government retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The ROC has since undergone significant political reforms following the end of martial law in 1987.<ref>{{Citation |last=Templeman |first=Kharis |title=Taiwan's Transition to Democracy and Beyond (1986–2024) |date=2024-11-28 |work=Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan |pages=51–67 |edition=2 |place=London |publisher=Routledge |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781003389910-6 |isbn=978-1-003-38991-0}}</ref>
China's population, geographical vastness, and social diversity has historically frustrated attempts to rule from Beijing. Reform and opening up during the 1980s and the devolution of much central government decision making, combined with the strong interest of local CCP officials in enriching themselves, made it increasingly difficult for the central government to assert its authority.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=He |first1=Qinglian |title=Xian dai hua de xian jing : dang dai Zhongguo de jing ji she hui wen ti |last2=何清涟 |date=1998 |publisher=Jin ri Zhongguo chu ban she |isbn=7-5072-0908-3 |edition=Di 1 ban |location=Beijing |oclc=39847047 }}</ref> At the time, limited direct elections were held at the village and town levels.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hillman |first=Ben |date=July 2023 |title=The End of Village Democracy in China |journal=Journal of Democracy |language=en |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=62–76 |doi=10.1353/jod.2023.a900433 |issn=1086-3214}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Why Did China Experiment with and then Abandon Village Elections? |url=https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/why-did-china-experiment-and-then-abandon-village-elections |access-date=2026-04-14 |website=Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies |publisher=Stanford University |language=en|date=October 1, 2024}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Martinez-Bravo |first1=Monica |last2=Padró I Miquel |first2=Gerard |last3=Qian |first3=Nancy |last4=Yao |first4=Yang |date=2022-09-01 |title=The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China |journal=American Economic Review |language=en |volume=112 |issue=9 |pages=2921–2958 |doi=10.1257/aer.20181249 |issn=0002-8282 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
The Chinese political system is considered authoritarian.<ref name=":17">{{Cite book |last=Truex |first=Rory |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8LgtDQAAQBAJ |title=Making Autocracy Work |date=2016-10-28 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-17243-2 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308185625/https://books.google.com/books?id=8LgtDQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":18">{{Cite book |last=Mattingly |first=Daniel C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FjzADwAAQBAJ |title=The Art of Political Control in China |date=2019-12-05 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-99791-8 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308185629/https://books.google.com/books?id=FjzADwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":19">{{Cite book |last=Tang |first=Wenfang |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_uw_CwAAQBAJ |title=Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability |date=2016-01-04 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-049081-2 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143102/https://books.google.com/books?id=_uw_CwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":20">{{Cite book |last1=Nathan |first1=Andrew J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6TnSAQAAQBAJ |title=Will China Democratize? |last2=Diamond |first2=Larry |last3=Plattner |first3=Marc F. |date=2013-09-01 |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press |isbn=978-1-4214-1244-3 |language=en |author-link2=Larry Diamond |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143101/https://books.google.com/books?id=6TnSAQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":21">{{Cite book |last=Teets |first=Jessica C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J6-BAwAAQBAJ |title=Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model |date=2014-06-09 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-03875-2 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143211/https://books.google.com/books?id=J6-BAwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last=Heurlin |first=Christopher |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F4UwDQAAQBAJ |title=Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making |date=2016-10-27 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-10780-8 |language=en |access-date=17 July 2021 |archive-date=17 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231117143202/https://books.google.com/books?id=F4UwDQAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref> There are no freely elected national leaders, political opposition is suppressed, all organized religious activity is controlled by the CCP, dissent is not permitted, and civil rights are curtailed.<ref name=":25">{{Cite book |last=Economy |first=Elizabeth C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fc5KEAAAQBAJ |title=The World According to China |date=2021-10-25 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-5095-3751-8 |language=en |oclc=1251737887 |author-link=Elizabeth Economy |access-date=7 August 2022 |archive-date=7 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220807180321/https://books.google.com/books?id=fc5KEAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":27">{{Cite web |title=China: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report |url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2021 |access-date=2021-07-17 |website=Freedom House |language=en |archive-date=24 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230724071501/https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2021 |url-status=live }}</ref> Limited direct elections have occurred only at the local level, not the national level, with all candidate nominations controlled by the CCP.<ref name=":05">{{Cite journal |last1=Gandhi |first1=Jennifer |last2=Lust-Okar |first2=Ellen |date=2009-06-01 |title=Elections Under Authoritarianism |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |language=en |volume=12 |issue=1 |pages=403–422 |doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434 |issn=1094-2939 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":13">{{Cite book |last1=Geddes |first1=Barbara |title=How Dictatorships Work |last2=Wright |first2=Joseph |last3=Frantz |first3=Erica |date=2018 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-33618-2 |pages=141 |doi=10.1017/9781316336182 |s2cid=226899229}}</ref><ref name=":28">{{Cite journal |last1=Landry |first1=Pierre F. |last2=Davis |first2=Deborah |last3=Wang |first3=Shiru |date=2010-06-01 |title=Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=en |volume=43 |issue=6 |pages=763–790 |doi=10.1177/0010414009359392 |issn=0010-4140 |s2cid=43175132}}</ref><ref name=":29">{{Cite journal |last=Manion |first=Melanie |date=2017-03-01 |title="Good Types" in Authoritarian Elections: The Selectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=en |volume=50 |issue=3 |pages=362–394 |doi=10.1177/0010414014537027 |issn=0010-4140 |s2cid=155166131}}</ref><ref name=":30">{{Cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Ching Kwan |last2=Zhang |first2=Yonghong |date=2013-05-01 |title=The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of Bargained Authoritarianism in China |journal=American Journal of Sociology |volume=118 |issue=6 |pages=1475–1508 |doi=10.1086/670802 |bibcode=2013AmJSo.118.1475L |issn=0002-9602 |s2cid=144559373}}</ref><ref name=":31">{{Cite journal |last=Wallace |first=Jeremy L. |date=2016 |title=Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China |journal=British Journal of Political Science |language=en |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=11–29 |doi=10.1017/S0007123414000106 |issn=0007-1234 |s2cid=154275103 |doi-access=free}}</ref>{{Excessive citations inline|date=December 2025}} The nature of the elections is highly constrained by the CCP's monopoly on power, censorship, and party control over elections.<ref name=":34">{{Cite news |last=Hernández |first=Javier C. |date=2016-11-15 |title='We Have a Fake Election': China Disrupts Local Campaigns |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/asia/beijing-china-local-elections.html |access-date=2021-11-05 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=5 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105023202/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/asia/beijing-china-local-elections.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":35">{{Cite news |date=2021-01-14 |title=The West once dreamed of democracy taking root in rural China |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2021/01/14/the-west-once-dreamed-of-democracy-taking-root-in-rural-china |access-date=2021-11-05 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=5 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105023203/https://www.economist.com/china/2021/01/14/the-west-once-dreamed-of-democracy-taking-root-in-rural-china |url-status=live }}</ref> By law, all elections at all levels must adhere to the leadership of the CCP.<ref name=":63">{{Cite journal |last1=Hao |first1=Mingsong |last2=Ke |first2=Xiwang |date=5 July 2023 |title=Personal Networks and Grassroots Election Participation in China: Findings from the Chinese General Social Survey |journal=Journal of Chinese Political Science |language=en |volume=29 |issue=1 |pages=159–184 |doi=10.1007/s11366-023-09861-3 |issn=1080-6954 |doi-access=free}}</ref> The level of comprehensive control exercised by the CCP, combined with its revolutionary origins, has led it to be described as "one of the most durable regimes in modern history".{{Sfn|Levitsky|Way|2022|p=115}}
Some argue that during the general secretaryship of Xi Jinping, collective leadership in the country has waned.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shirk |first=Susan L. |author-link=Susan L. Shirk |date=2018 |title=The Return to Personalistic Rule |url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/ |journal=Journal of Democracy |language=en |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=22–36 |doi=10.1353/jod.2018.0022 |issn=1086-3214}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Baranovitch |first=Nimrod |date=2021-03-04 |title=A Strong Leader for A Time of Crisis: Xi Jinping's Strongman Politics as A Collective Response to Regime Weakness |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |language=en |volume=30 |issue=128 |pages=249–265 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2020.1790901 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref> Others, such as academician Joseph Torigian, argue that Deng Xiaoping never really implemented collective leadership.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-01-30|title=China's leadership power increasingly concentrated|url=https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/chinas-leadership-power-increasingly-concentrated|access-date=2026-05-14|website=Stanford University|language=en|last=Torigian|first=Joseph}}</ref>
=== Self-description === The Chinese constitution describes the country's system of government as a people's democratic dictatorship.<ref name=":014">{{Cite journal |last=Bose|first=Arun|date=February 1995|title=Mao Zedong and the People's Democratic Dictatorship|journal=China Report|language=en|volume=31|issue=1|pages=67–85|doi=10.1177/000944559503100104|issn=0009-4455}}</ref> The CCP has also used other terms to officially describe China's system of government including "socialist consultative democracy", and whole-process people's democracy.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Holbig|first=Heike|date=2022|title=Inside "Chinese Democracy": The Official Career of a Contested Concept under Xi Jinping|url=https://ideas.repec.org//a/ibn/jpl123/v15y2022i2p21.html|journal=Journal of Politics and Law|language=en|volume=15|issue=2|page=21|doi=10.5539/jpl.v15n2p21|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":015">{{Cite web |title=Whole-Process Democracy|url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/whole-process-democracy/|access-date=2023-01-10|website=China Media Project|date=23 November 2021|language=en-US}}</ref>
According to the CCP theoretical journal ''Qiushi'', "[c]onsultative democracy was created by the CPC and the Chinese people as a form of socialist democracy. ... Not only representing a commitment to socialism, it carries forward China's political and cultural traditions. Not only representing a commitment to the organizational principles and leadership mode of democratic centralism, it also affirms the role of the general public in a democracy. Not only representing a commitment to the leadership of the CPC, it also gives play to the role of all political parties and organizations as well as people of all ethnic groups and all sectors of society".<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |title=The Development of Socialist Consultative Democracy in China |url=http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201301/201302/t20130218_211654.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170309221709/http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201301/201302/t20130218_211654.htm |archive-date=9 March 2017 |access-date=2018-05-13 |website=Qiushi}}</ref>
The semi-official journal ''China Today'' stated the CCP's view: "Consultative democracy guarantees widespread and effective participation in politics through consultations carried out by political parties, peoples congresses, government departments, CPPCC committees, peoples organizations, communities, and social organizations".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fx361.com/page/2018/0408/3360430.shtml|title=Socialist Consultative Democracy_参考网|website=www.fx361.com|access-date=2018-05-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180514064651/http://www.fx361.com/page/2018/0408/3360430.shtml|archive-date=14 May 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> On the other hand, according to the 2023 V-Dem Democracy indices China was the second least electoral democratic country in Asia.<ref name="vdem_dataset">{{cite web |last=V-Dem Institute |date=2023 |title=The V-Dem Dataset |url=https://www.v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ |access-date=14 October 2023 |archive-date=8 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221208183458/https://www.v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
==Communist Party== {{Main|Chinese Communist Party}}
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominates the Chinese political landscape. Constitutionally, the party's supreme body is its National Congress, which meets every five years. Meetings were irregular before the Cultural Revolution but have been periodic since then. The National Congress elects the Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); the Central Committee in turn elects bodies such as:
*The General Secretary, which is the highest-ranking official within the Party and usually the Chinese paramount leader. *The Politburo, consisting of 22 full members (including the members of the Politburo Standing Committee); *The Politburo Standing Committee, the most powerful decision-making body in China, which as of June 2020 consists of seven members;<ref>{{cite web |title=Backgrounder: 中国共产党第十九届中央领导机构 |url=http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/dhgjjg/940713685.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200604064416/http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/dhgjjg/940713685.htm |archive-date=2020-06-04 |access-date=2020-07-12 |publisher=Government of China}}</ref> *The Secretariat, the principal administrative mechanism of the CCP, headed by the General Secretary; *The Central Military Commission
=== Role and function === The CCP constitution states that the party is the highest force for political leadership. The party's institutions overlap with government institutions and the party has authority over government decisions at both the local and central levels.<ref name=":0224">{{Cite book |last=Li|first=David Daokui|title=China's World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict|date=2024|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393292398|location=New York, NY|author-link=David Daokui Li}}</ref>{{Rp|page=36}} Senior government officials throughout the country are appointed by the CCP, and are mostly CCP members.<ref name=":16">{{Cite news |last=Ma|first=Josephine|date=17 May 2021|title=Party-state relations under China's Communist Party: separation of powers, control over government and reforms|work=South China Morning Post|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3133672/why-chinas-communist-party-inseparable-state|access-date=23 June 2023|archive-date=28 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230528070726/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3133672/why-chinas-communist-party-inseparable-state|url-status=live}}</ref> All government departments, state-owned enterprises and public institutes include CCP committees, from the village level to the national level. The CCP committees in government bodies supervise and lead the bodies, with the State Council legally required to implement CCP policies.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":232">{{Cite web |last=Zheng|first=William|date=2024-03-06|title=Xi's dominance in Chinese politics to grow with change to State Council: expert|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3254387/chinas-communist-party-get-deeper-control-over-state-council-led-premier-li-qiang-ties-are-redefined|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240307115123/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3254387/chinas-communist-party-get-deeper-control-over-state-council-led-premier-li-qiang-ties-are-redefined|archive-date=2024-03-07|access-date=2024-03-10|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|quote=It includes specific clauses saying the council will closely follow the Communist Party’s ideology, leadership and instructions, further defining its role as faithful policy implementer of the ruling party.}}</ref> As outlined by the CCP constitution: "Government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east and west – the party leads them all."<ref name=":16" />
According to scholar Rush Doshi, "[t]he Party sits above the state, runs parallel to the state, and is enmeshed in every level of the state."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Doshi |first=Rush |author-link=Rush Doshi |title=The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order |date=2021-09-30 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-752791-7 |edition=1 |pages=35 |language=en |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197527917.001.0001 |oclc=1256820870}}</ref> On the relationship between the government and the CCP, James Palmer, writing for ''Foreign Policy'', states that, "[t]he Chinese government is essentially the shadow of the Communist Party, moving as the party does, and consequently government roles matter far less than party ones."<ref>{{Cite news |last=James|first=Palmer|date=15 March 2023|title=China Gets a New Premier|work=Foreign Policy|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/15/china-li-qiang-new-premier/|access-date=15 March 2023|archive-date=15 March 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230315221155/https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/15/china-li-qiang-new-premier/|url-status=live}}</ref> According to ''The Economist'', "[e]specially when meeting foreigners, officials may present name cards bearing government titles but stay quiet about party positions which may or may not outrank their state jobs."<ref name=":010">{{Cite news |date=March 9, 2023|title=What party control means in China|newspaper=The Economist|url=https://www.economist.com/china/2023/03/09/what-party-control-means-in-china|url-access=subscription|access-date=2023-03-11|issn=0013-0613|archive-date=2023-03-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311010428/https://www.economist.com/china/2023/03/09/what-party-control-means-in-china|url-status=live}}</ref> CCP control is tightest in central government offices and urban economic, industrial, and cultural settings; it is considerably looser over the government and party establishments in rural areas, where a significant percentage of mainland Chinese people live. The CCP's most important responsibility comes in the selection and promotion of personnel. They also see that party and state policy guidance is followed and that non-party members do not create autonomous organizations that could challenge party rule. Significant are the leading small groups which coordinate activities of different agencies. State-owned enterprises, private companies and foreign-owned businesses are also required to have internal CCP committees.<ref name=":92">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |oclc=1348572572 |s2cid=253067190}}</ref>
In relative liberalization periods, the influence of people and groups outside the formal party structure has increased, particularly in the economic realm. Nevertheless, in all governmental institutions in the PRC, the party committees at all levels maintain a powerful and pivotal role in the administration.<ref name=":010" /> During the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, there were proposals to increase the separation of the state and the party, termed ''dangzheng fenli'' ({{Lang-zh|s=党政分離}}), advocated by more liberal officials such as Zhao Ziyang.<ref>{{Citation |last=Zhang|first=Qianfan|title=Does Authoritarian Legality Work for China?|date=2021|work=The Indian Yearbook of Comparative Law 2019|pages=169–208|editor-last=John|editor-first=Mathew|access-date=|place=Singapore|publisher=Springer Singapore|language=en|doi=10.1007/978-981-16-2175-8_9|isbn=978-981-16-2174-1|editor2-last=Devaiah|editor2-first=Vishwas H.|editor3-last=Baruah|editor3-first=Pritam|editor4-last=Tundawala|editor4-first=Moiz|author-link=Zhang Qianfan |series=The Indian Yearbook of Comparative Law }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Lovell|first=Julia|title=Maoism: A Global History|date=2019-09-03|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-0-525-65605-0|pages=445|language=en|quote=Although the party has long dominated — in theory and practice — the government of China (a dominance enshrined in the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the current constitution), in practice the intensity of its control has oscillated at different moments...in the history of the PRC.|author-link=Julia Lovell}}</ref><ref name=":16" /> The proposals included abolishing CCP committees from some government departments, increasing the influence of the State Council, and having professional managers leader SOEs instead of CCP committees. These proposals were abandoned after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.<ref name=":013">{{Cite journal |last=Zhang|first=Qianfan|date=2021-07-04|title=The Communist Party Leadership and Rule of Law: A Tale of Two Reforms|journal=Journal of Contemporary China|language=en|volume=30|issue=130|pages=578–595|doi=10.1080/10670564.2020.1852743|s2cid=229394840|issn=1067-0564|author-link=Zhang Qianfan}}</ref><ref name=":16" />
Integration of the state and its institutions with the CCP as well as the CCP's strengthening vis-à-vis the state has accelerated during Xi Jinping's tenure,<ref name=":16" /> particularly following a series of institutional reforms initiated in 2018<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Guo |first=Baogang |date=2019 |title=Revitalizing the Chinese Party-State: Institutional Reform in the Xi Era |url=https://www.chinacenter.net/2019/china-currents/18-1/revitalizing-the-chinese-party-state-institutional-reform-in-the-xi-era/ |journal=China Currents |publisher=China Research Center |volume=18 |issue=1}}</ref> and 2024 amendments to the Organic Law of the State Council.<ref name=":232" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Staunton |first=Denis |date=11 March 2024 |title=China strengthens Communist Party's control over central government |url=https://www.irishtimes.com/world/asia-pacific/2024/03/11/china-strengthens-communist-partys-control-over-central-government/ |access-date=2026-05-14 |newspaper=The Irish Times |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite news |date=March 11, 2024|title=China passes law granting Communist Party more control over cabinet|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-passes-law-granting-communist-party-more-control-over-cabinet-2024-03-11/|access-date=March 11, 2024|work=Reuters|author-first1=Mei Mei|author-last1=Chu|author-first2=Laurie|author-last2=Chen}}</ref> Under Xi, several state and party bodies have effectively merged under the "one institution with two names" system.<ref name=":16" />
=== Intra-party factions === Chinese politics have long been defined by the competition between intra-party factions' ability to place key members and allies in positions of power within the CCP and Chinese government.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Huang |first=Jing |title=Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics |date=2000-07-03 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-62284-4 |edition=1 |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511571688}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Citation |last=Zhiyue |first=Bo |title=Factional politics in the Party-state apparatus |date=2017-08-18 |work=Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party |pages=122–134 |editor-last=Lam |editor-first=Willy Wo-Lap |edition=1 |publisher=Routledge |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315543918-8 |isbn=978-1-315-54391-8 |editor-link=Willy Wo-Lap Lam}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite news |last=Lai |first=Alexis |date=2012-10-24 |title='One party, two coalitions' -- China's factional politics |url=https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/asia/china-political-factions-primer/index.html |access-date=2023-01-03 |website=CNN |language=en |archive-date=3 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230103080556/https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/asia/china-political-factions-primer/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
Under general secretaries Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the two main factions were the ''Tuanpai'' and the Shanghai clique.<ref name=":9" /> The ''Tuanpai'' were cadres and officials that originated from the Communist Youth League of China, while the Shanghai Clique were officials that rose to prominence under Jiang Zemin when he was first mayor, and then CCP committee secretary, of Shanghai.<ref name=":6" />
Xi Jinping, who became general secretary in 2012, has significantly centralized power, removing the influence of the old factions and promoting his allies, sometimes called the "Xi Jinping faction". Due to this, the old factions, including the ''Tuanpai'', are considered extinct,<ref>{{Cite web |title=China's 20th Party Congress Leadership Reshuffle: Stasis or Sweep? |url=https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-20th-party-congress-leadership-reshuffle-stasis-or-sweep |access-date=2022-10-14 |website=Asia Society |date=13 October 2022 |language=en |archive-date=3 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230103104254/https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-20th-party-congress-leadership-reshuffle-stasis-or-sweep |url-status=live }}</ref> especially since the 20th CCP National Congress, in which Xi's allies dominated the new Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Cheng |first=Evelyn |title=China shuffles leadership committee and retains many Xi allies |language=en |website=CNBC |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/22/china-shuffles-leadership-committee-and-retains-many-xi-allies.html |access-date=2022-10-22 |archive-date=16 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221116074002/https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/22/china-shuffles-leadership-committee-and-retains-many-xi-allies.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
== Constitution == {{Main|Constitution of China}}
The first constitution of the PRC was created on 20 September 1954, before which the Common Program, an interim constitution-like document created by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was in force. The second constitution in 1975 shortened the constitution to just about 30 articles, containing CCP slogans and revolutionary language throughout.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}} The role of courts was slashed, and the Presidency was gone. The third constitution in 1978 expanded the number of articles, but was still under the influence of the very-recent Cultural Revolution.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}
The current constitution, declared on 4 December 1982, is the PRC's fourth but has subsequently been amended five times.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Diamant|first=Neil J.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wukiEAAAQBAJ|title=Useful Bullshit: Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society|date=2022|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-1-5017-6129-4|language=en|access-date=February 2, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240727003907/https://books.google.com/books?id=wukiEAAAQBAJ|archive-date=July 27, 2024|url-status=live}}</ref> The last amendment involved, among other things, abolishing term limits for the state president and vice president.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Wei |first1=Changhao |last2=Hu |first2=Taige |date=2018-03-11 |title=Annotated Translation: 2018 Amendment to the PRC Constitution (Version 2.0) |url=https://npcobserver.com/2018/03/11/china-constitution-amendment/ |access-date=2026-05-15 |website=NPC Observer |language=en-US}}</ref>
The legal power of the CCP is guaranteed by the PRC Constitution and its position as the supreme political authority in the People's Republic of China is put in practice through its comprehensive control of the state, military, and media.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Folsom |first=Ralph Haughwout |url=http://archive.org/details/lawpoliticsinpeo0000fols |title=Law and Politics in the People's Republic of China in a nutshell |date=1992 |publisher=St. Paul, Minn. : West Pub. Co. |isbn=978-0-314-00999-9 |pages=76–77}}</ref>
== Leadership ==
=== Paramount leader === {{Main article|Paramount leader}}
Power is concentrated in the "paramount leader," an informal title currently occupied by Xi Jinping, who heads the three most important political and state offices: He is the general secretary of the CCP Central Committee, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of the PRC.<ref name=":23">{{Cite news|title=A simple guide to the Chinese government|url=https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/cpc-primer/|publisher=|quote=Xi Jinping is the most powerful figure in the Chinese political system. He is the President of China, but his real influence comes from his position as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.|access-date=2018-05-13|archive-date=2018-05-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180513080847/https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/cpc-primer/|url-status=live|work=South China Morning Post}}</ref> Near the end of Hu Jintao's term in office, experts observed growing limitations to the paramount leader's ''de facto'' control over the government,<ref>{{cite news|last=Higgins|first=Andrew|date=16 January 2011|title=Hu's visit spotlights China's two faces|newspaper=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/15/AR2011011504013.html|access-date=17 January 2011|archive-date=30 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130930002240/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/15/AR2011011504013.html|url-status=live}}</ref> but at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping's term limits were removed and his powers were expanded.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley|first1=Chris|last2=Bradsher|first2=Keith|date=25 February 2018|title=China Moves to Let Xi Stay in Power by Abolishing Term Limit|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/world/asia/china-xi-jinping.html|url-status=live|access-date=16 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201115061354/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/world/asia/china-xi-jinping.html|archive-date=15 November 2020|issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
As a one-party state, the CCP general secretary holds ultimate power and authority over state and government with no term limit.{{NoteTag|Xi Jinping has been recognized as China's top leader since assuming the position of CCP general secretary in November 2012.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-15/who-s-who-in-China-s-new-communist-party-leadership-lineup.html |title=Who's Who in China's New Communist Party Leadership Lineup – Bloomberg |website=Bloomberg News |access-date=24 June 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141024034823/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-15/who-s-who-in-china-s-new-communist-party-leadership-lineup.html |archive-date=24 October 2014 |url-status=dead |quote=Xi Jinping, 59, was named general secretary of the 82- million member Communist Party and is set to take over the presidency, a mostly ceremonial post, from Hu Jintao in March.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160729201558/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288|archive-date = 29 July 2016|title = China new leaders: Xi Jinping heads line-up for politburo|work = BBC News|url-status=live|date = 15 November 2012}}</ref>}} The CCP retains effective control over governmental appointments.<ref>[https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/303364/aib775n_1_.pdf "Does China's Land-Tenure System Discourage Structural Adjustment?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304195013/http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/303364/aib775n_1_.pdf|date=4 March 2016}}, Lohmar & Somwaru, USDA Economic Research Service, 1 May 2006. ''Accessed 3 May 2006.''</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Liu |first=Jingping |date=2023-12-22 |title=Manipulation without Resistance: Consensus Elections in Rural China |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/manipulation-without-resistance-consensus-elections-in-rural-china/7B7D8D7CC83F642B9B5C7A98B4C20F29 |journal=The China Quarterly |language=en |volume=259 |pages=696–710 |doi=10.1017/S0305741023001765 |issn=0305-7410 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250612203236/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/manipulation-without-resistance-consensus-elections-in-rural-china/7B7D8D7CC83F642B9B5C7A98B4C20F29 |archive-date=2025-06-12|hdl=10397/109373 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> The offices of CCP general secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission have often been held by one individual since 1989, granting the individual predominant power over the country. Since 1982, the CCP general secretary has also been the political chief position of China (above the president and premier).<ref>{{cite news |title=国庆35周年阅兵 |url=http://www.81.cn/2015dyb/2015-08/19/content_6638244_4.htm |work=中国军网 (Official website of the People's Liberation Army)) |page=4 |date=2015-08-19 |accessdate=2015-08-19 |language=zh-cn |quote=9时40分，党和国家领导人胡耀邦 (CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang)、邓小平 (CMC Chairman Deng Xiaoping)、赵紫阳 (Premier Zhao Ziyang)、李先念 (President Li Xiannian)、陈云 (Discipline Inspection Chief Chen Yun)、彭真、邓颖超、徐向前、聂荣臻、乌兰夫等，偕同全国各界人民代表和各国来宾，在雷鸣般的掌声中登上天安门城楼。}}</ref>
=== Party and state leaders === {{Main|Party and state leaders}} The CCP Politburo Standing Committee consists of the government's top leadership.<ref name=":022">{{Cite book |last=Li|first=David Daokui|title=China's World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict|date=2024|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393292398|location=New York, NY|author-link=David Daokui Li}}</ref>{{Rp|page=55}} Historically it has had five to nine members. As of 2024, it has seven members.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=55}} Its officially mandated purpose is to conduct policy discussions and make decisions on major issues when the Politburo, a larger decision-making body, is not in session. According to the CCP's constitution, the general secretary of the Central Committee must also be a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.<ref>{{Cite web |title=16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2002|url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49109.htm#4|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071018054320/http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49109.htm#4|archive-date=2007-10-18|access-date=2017-09-06|website=China Internet Information Center}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable (WP:NOTRS).|date=June 2023}}
The membership of the PSC is strictly ranked in protocol sequence. Historically, the general secretary (or party chairman) has been ranked first; the rankings of other leaders have varied over time. Since the 1990s, the general secretary (also the president), premier, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's top anti-graft body, and the first-ranked secretary of the CCP secretariat have consistently also been members of the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref name="CF111312">{{cite news |date=13 November 2012|title=China's Next Leaders: A Guide to What's at Stake|newspaper=China File|publisher=Asia Society|url=http://www.chinafile.com/china%E2%80%99s-next-leaders-guide-what%E2%80%99s-stake|url-status=dead|access-date=18 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130210034750/http://www.chinafile.com/china%E2%80%99s-next-leaders-guide-what%E2%80%99s-stake|archive-date=10 February 2013}}</ref>
Ranked below the party's Politburo Standing Committee are deputy state leaders including the party's chief staff, vice premiers, and the party secretaries of China's most important municipalities and provinces.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=55}}Ministers and provincial governors are next in rank, followed by deputy ministers and deputy provincial governors.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=55}} Ministry director generals and sub provincial municipality mayors rank below this, followed by ministry deputy director generals and third-tier city mayors.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|pages=55–56}} There are five ranks below these which reach to the base of the government and party hierarchies.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=56}}
== State institutions ==
=== National People's Congress === {{Main|National People's Congress}}
The National People's Congress (NPC) is the supreme state organ of power of China.<ref name=":9223">{{Cite book |last=Šebok|first=Filip|title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower?|publisher=Routledge|year=2023|isbn=978-1-03-239508-1|editor-last=Kironska|editor-first=Kristina|chapter=China's Political System|editor-last2=Turscanyi|editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=78}} With 2,977 members in 2023, it is the largest parliamentary body in the world.<ref name=":32">{{cite web |title=中华人民共和国第十四届全国人民代表大会代表名单|url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/kgfb/202302/c9e83a897334470c8c591655602970fd.shtml|access-date=27 May 2023|website=National People's Congress|archive-date=26 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230226112946/http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/kgfb/202302/c9e83a897334470c8c591655602970fd.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> Under China's current Constitution, the NPC is structured as a unicameral legislature, with the power to legislate, to oversee the operations of the government, and to elect the major officials of state. Its delegates are indirectly elected for a five-year term through a multi-tiered system. According to the constitution, the NPC is the highest state institution within China's political system.<ref name=":9223" />{{Rp|page=78}}thumb|Political Consultative Conference The NPC holds annual sessions every spring, usually lasting from 10 to 14 days, in the Great Hall of the People on the west side of Tiananmen Square, Beijing. These annual meetings are usually timed to occur with the meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a consultative body whose members represent various people's organizations, are the main deliberative bodies of China, and are often referred to as the Two Sessions. The meetings provide an opportunity for the officers of state to review past policies and present future plans to the nation.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Davidson|first=Helen|date=2023-03-01|title=Explainer: what is China's 'two sessions' gathering, and why does it matter?|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/02/china-two-sessions-explainer-what-is-it|access-date=2023-07-15|issn=0261-3077|archive-date=2023-03-31|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331223957/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/02/china-two-sessions-explainer-what-is-it|url-status=live}}</ref>
The meetings cover reviewing and approving major new policy directions, laws, the budget, and major personnel changes. The NPC elects and appoints important state positions such as the president, the vice president, the chairman and other members of the Central Military Commission, the premier and rest of the State Council, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and procurator general of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.<ref name=":11">{{Citation |last=Gasper |first=Donald |title=The Chinese National People's Congress |date=1982 |work=Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective |pages=160–190 |editor-last=Nelson |editor-first=Daniel |place=London |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-06086-3_7 |isbn=978-1-349-06088-7 |editor2-last=White |editor2-first=Stephen}}</ref> The NPC also elects a Standing Committee (NPCSC), its permanent body which meets regularly between NPC sessions. Most national legislation in China is adopted by the NPCSC. Most initiatives are presented to the NPCSC for consideration by the State Council after previous endorsement by the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.<ref name=":11" />
Aside from the CCP, eight minor political parties, officially termed "democratic parties," also participate in the NPC, but are non-oppositional and have no real power.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Friedberg|first=Aaron L.|title=Getting China Wrong|date=2022|isbn=978-1-509-54512-4|location=Cambridge|pages=50|oclc=1310457810|author-link=Aaron Friedberg|publisher=Polity Press}}</ref><ref name=":043">{{Cite journal |last1=Liao|first1=Xingmiu|last2=Tsai|first2=Wen-Hsuan|date=2019|title=Clientelistic State Corporatism: The United Front Model of "Pairing-Up" in the Xi Jinping Era|journal=China Review|volume=19|issue=1|pages=31–56|issn=1680-2012|jstor=26603249}}</ref> They must accept the primacy of the CCP to exist and their members are preapproved by the CCP's United Front Work Department.<ref name=":24">{{Cite news |last=Baptista|first=Eduardo|date=2021-06-11|title=Are there other political parties in China?|language=en|website=South China Morning Post|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3136835/communist-party-not-chinas-only-political-party-there-are-eight|access-date=2022-12-26|archive-date=2022-06-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220608004910/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3136835/communist-party-not-chinas-only-political-party-there-are-eight|url-status=live}}</ref> Their original function was to create the impression that the PRC was being ruled by a diverse national front, not a one-party dictatorship. The major role of these parties is to attract and subsequently muzzle niches in society that have political tendencies, such as academia.<ref name=":011">{{Cite web |last=Brady |first=Anne-Marie |author-link=Anne-Marie Brady |date=2017 |title=Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf |url-status=live |publisher=Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars |s2cid=197812164 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200612023338/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf |archive-date=12 June 2020 |access-date=31 August 2020}}</ref> [[File:The_1st_Session_of_the_12th_National_People's_Congress_open_20130305.jpg|right|thumb|270x270px|The 12th National People's Congress held in 2013]] The NPC generally has a reputation of approving the work of the State Council and not engaging in overmuch drafting of laws itself. However, it and its Standing Committee have occasionally asserted themselves. For example, the State Council and the CCP were unable to secure passage of a fuel tax in 2009 to finance the construction of expressways.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jia|first=Hepeng|date=2009-01-08|title=China bites the bullet on fuel tax|url=https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/china-bites-the-bullet-on-fuel-tax/3000928.article|access-date=2023-03-15|website=Chemistry World|language=en|archive-date=2020-04-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200413113053/https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/china-bites-the-bullet-on-fuel-tax/3000928.article|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=National People's Congress|url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/government/html/7.stm|access-date=2023-03-15|website=BBC News|archive-date=2020-04-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200413113056/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/government/html/7.stm|url-status=live}}</ref> Likewise, the Ministry of Finance has sought to institute property taxes since the early 2010s, but opposition from the NPC (as well as local governments) have prevented any property tax proposals from reaching the NPC's legislative agenda.<ref name=":0223">{{Cite book |last=Li|first=David Daokui|title=China's World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict|date=2024|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393292398|location=New York, NY|author-link=David Daokui Li}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=60–61}} The NPC Standing Committee is more assertive than the NPC itself and has vetoed proposed laws.<ref name=":9223" />{{Rp|page=79}}
=== Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference === {{Excerpt|Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference|paragraphs=1}}
=== President === {{Main|President of China}} {{Further|Vice President of China}} The president of China is the state representative, serving as the ceremonial figurehead under the National People's Congress.<ref name=":23" /><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Ben |last2=Wong |first2=Sue-Lin |date=2018-02-25 |title=China Sets Stage for Xi to Stay in Office Indefinitely |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics/china-sets-stage-for-xi-to-stay-in-office-indefinitely-idUSKCN1G906W |url-status=live |access-date=26 February 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180226082043/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics/china-sets-stage-for-xi-to-stay-in-office-indefinitely-idUSKCN1G906W |archive-date=26 February 2018 |quote=However, the role of party chief is more senior than that of president. At some point, Xi could be given a party position that also enables him to stay on as long as he likes.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |author=Maizland |first1=Lindsay |last2=Albert |first2=Eleanor |date=October 6, 2022 |title=The Chinese Communist Party |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party |accessdate=October 6, 2022 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |quote=But most of his power stems from his role as general secretary because of how China's political system works: Party institutions and state institutions are technically separate, but the ultimate power comes from the CCP.}}</ref> Under the Chinese constitution, the President of China is a largely ceremonial office with limited powers.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wong|first=Chun Han|title=Party of One: The Rise of Xi Jinping and China's Superpower Future|date=2023|publisher=Simon & Schuster|isbn=9781982185732|page=24}}</ref> However, since 1993, as a matter of convention, the presidency has been held simultaneously by the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the top leader in the one-party system.<ref>{{cite news |date=6 October 2017|title=Does Chinese leader Xi Jinping plan to hang on to power for more than 10 years?|work=South China Morning Post|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2111123/does-chinese-leader-xi-jinping-plan-hang-power-more-10|url-status=live|access-date=12 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171007064411/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2111123/does-chinese-leader-xi-jinping-plan-hang-power-more-10|archive-date=7 October 2017|quote=If Xi relinquished the presidency in 2023 but remained party chief and chairman of the Central Military commission (CMC), his successor as president would be nothing more than a symbolic figure... “Once the president is neither the party’s general secretary nor the CMC chairman, he or she will be hollowed out, just like a body without a soul.”}}</ref> The office is officially regarded as an institution of the state rather than an administrative post; theoretically, the president serves at the pleasure of the National People's Congress, the legislature, and is not legally vested to take executive action on its own prerogative.{{NoteTag|It is listed as such in the current Constitution; it is thus equivalent to organs such as the State Council, rather than to offices such as that of the premier.}} The current president is Xi Jinping, who took office in March 2013.
The office was first established in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China in 1954 and successively held by Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. Liu fell into political disgrace during the Cultural Revolution, after which the office became vacant. The office was abolished under the Constitution of 1975, then reinstated in the Constitution of 1982, but with reduced powers. The official English-language translation of the title was "Chairman"; after 1982, this translation was changed to "President", although the Chinese title remains unchanged.{{NoteTag|In Chinese, the President of the PRC is termed ''Zhǔxí'' (主席) while the Presidents of other countries are termed ''Zǒngtǒng'' (总统). Furthermore ''zhǔxí'' continues to have the meaning of "chairman" in a generic context.}} In March 2018, presidential term limits were abolished.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley|first1=Chris|last2=Myers|first2=Steven Lee|date=2018-03-11|title=China's Legislature Blesses Xi's Indefinite Rule. It Was 2,958 to 2.|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/world/asia/china-xi-constitution-term-limits.html|access-date=2023-05-27|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=2019-10-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191026031518/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/world/asia/china-xi-constitution-term-limits.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shi |first1=Jiangtao |last2=Huang |first2=Kristin |date=26 February 2018 |title=End to term limits at top 'may be start of global backlash for China' |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |url-status=live |access-date=28 February 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227155138/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |archive-date=27 February 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=4 March 2018 |title=Xi Jinping's power play: from president to China's new dictator? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180304005848/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |archive-date=4 March 2018 |access-date=4 March 2018 |website=The Guardian}}</ref>
=== State Council === {{Main|State Council of China}}
The State Council is the supreme administrative organ of China's unified state apparatus and the executive organ of the National People's Congress. Members of the State Council include the premier, a variable number of vice premiers (now four), state councilors (protocol equal of vice premiers but with narrower portfolios), and ministers and heads of State Council commissions.<ref name=":9223" />{{Rp|page=79}} ==Local-level politics== Each local Bureau or office is under the coequal authority of the local leader and the leader of the corresponding office, bureau or ministry at the next higher level. People's Congress members at the county level are elected by voters. These county-level People's Congresses have the responsibility of oversight of local government and elect members to the Provincial (or Municipal in the case of independent municipalities) People's Congress. The Provincial People's Congress, in turn, elects members to the National People's Congress that meets each year in March in Beijing.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wei |first=Changhao |date=2022-03-29 |title=Explainer: How Seats in China's National People's Congress Are Allocated |url=https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/29/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |access-date=2022-08-05 |website=NPC Observer |language=en-US |archive-date=25 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221025040017/https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/29/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The ruling CCP committee at each level plays a large role in the selection of appropriate candidates for election to the local congress and to the higher levels.{{citation needed|date=June 2023}}
The Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions (SARS) have significant local autonomy including separate governments, legal systems, and basic constitutional laws, but must follow the central government in foreign policy and national security, and their chief executives are effectively picked by the CCP Politburo.{{cn|date=May 2026}}
Below the provincial level, there are prefectures and counties. Counties are divided into townships and villages. While most are run by appointed officials, some lower-level jurisdictions have direct elections.{{cn|date=May 2026}}
While operating under strict control and supervision by the central government, China's local governments manage relatively high share of fiscal revenues and expenditures.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kadochnikov|first=Denis V.|date=29 December 2019|title=Fiscal decentralization and regional budgets' changing roles: a comparative case study of Russia and China|journal=Area Development and Policy|volume=5|issue=4|language=en|pages=428–446|doi=10.1080/23792949.2019.1705171|s2cid=213458903|issn=2379-2949}}</ref> Their level of authority and autonomy in economic decision-making is high, and they have played a major role in national economic development.<ref name=":62" />{{Rp|page=1}} They do not have the right to make tax laws but may have the ability to adjust certain tax rates within boundaries established by the central government.<ref name=":02222">{{Cite book |last=Lin|first=Shuanglin|title=China's Public Finance: Reforms, Challenges, and Options|date=2022-09-22|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-009-09902-8|edition=1|doi=10.1017/9781009099028}}</ref>{{Rp|page=354}}
Through the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the municipal government regulatory mechanisms expanded, as did their capacity to regulate peri-urban areas.<ref name=":0322">{{Cite book |last=Rodenbiker |first=Jesse |title=Ecological States: Politics of Science and Nature in Urbanizing China |date=2023 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-6900-9 |series=Environments of East Asia|location=Ithaca, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=81}} The 1994 fiscal reforms resulted in the need of local governments to generate non-tax revenue, which they did in the form of revenues through land development and use fees.<ref name=":0322" />{{Rp|page=82}} This resulted in their increase in both administrative size and geographic size.<ref name=":0322" />{{Rp|page=82}} From 2002 to at least 2023, the cost of providing public goods has devolved to local governments from the central government and therefore local governments need to generate fees to provide public services.<ref name=":0322" />{{Rp|page=82}} Local governments are the key provider of public goods in China.<ref name=":122">{{Cite book |last=Zhan|first=Jing Vivian|title=China's Contained Resource Curse: How Minerals Shape State-Capital-Labor Relations|date=2022|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-009-04898-9|location=Cambridge, United Kingdom}}</ref>{{Rp|page=149}}
Since 2014, the National New-Type Urbanization Plan has resulted in the consolidation of planning processes that were formerly distributed across different bureaucracies, such as urban and rural land use, tourism planning, and environmental planning.<ref name=":0322" />{{Rp|page=87}}
Beginning in 2015, the central government allowed local governments to issue bonds to finance public capital spending for projects like infrastructure and hospitals.<ref name=":02222" />{{Rp|page=354}} The quantity of such bonds is set by the central government.<ref name=":02222" />{{Rp|page=354}} Local governments cannot issue bonds to pay for current spending, such as salaries.<ref name=":02222" />{{Rp|page=354}}
== Armed forces == {{Main|People's Liberation Army|People's Armed Police|Militia (China)}}
{{See also|List of wars involving the People's Republic of China}}The CCP created and leads the People's Liberation Army. After the PRC was established in 1949, the PLA also became a state military. The state's military system upholds the principle of the CCP's absolute leadership over the armed forces, often referred to under Mao's maxim that "the Party commands the gun." The CCP and the state jointly established the Central Military Commission (CMC) that carries out the task of supreme military leadership over the armed forces.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019">{{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 |date=2019 |volume=2 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-18559-0 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv941tzj |jstor=j.ctv941tzj |author-link=Taylor Fravel |s2cid=159282413}}</ref> The CMC chairman is concurrently held by the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in line with the CCP's absolute control over the military.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Li|first=Nan|date=26 February 2018|title=Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi's Hold on Central Military Commission|url=https://jamestown.org/program/party-congress-reshuffle-strengthens-xis-hold-central-military-commission/|access-date=27 May 2020|publisher=Jamestown Foundation|quote=|archive-date=26 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191026020506/https://jamestown.org/program/party-congress-reshuffle-strengthens-xis-hold-central-military-commission/|url-status=live|work=China Brief}}</ref>
== Legal system == {{Main|Law of the People's Republic of China|Judicial system of China}}
The People's Republic of China has a socialist legal system based upon civil law, formally called "socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics."<ref>{{Citation |last=Tiffert|first=Glenn|title=Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics: A New Genealogy|date=2018-07-05|work=Socialist Law in Socialist East Asia|pages=72–96|editor-last=Fu|editor-first=Hualing|edition=1|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108347822.004|isbn=978-1-108-34782-2|editor2-last=Gillespie|editor2-first=John|editor3-last=Nicholson|editor3-first=Pip|editor4-last=Partlett|editor4-first=William Edmund}}</ref><ref name=":9222">{{Cite book |last=Šimalčík|first=Matej|title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower?|publisher=Routledge|year=2023|isbn=978-1-03-239508-1|editor-last=Kironska|editor-first=Kristina|chapter=Rule by Law|pages=114–127|doi=10.4324/9781003350064-12|editor-last2=Turscanyi|editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref> The country does not have judicial independence or judicial review as its judiciary does not have authority beyond what is granted to it by the National People's Congress.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Chen|first1=Benjamin Minhao|last2=Li|first2=Zhiyu|date=2023|title=Courts Without Separation of Powers: The Case of Judicial Suggestions in China|journal=Harvard International Law Journal|language=en|doi=10.2139/ssrn.4418249|issn=1556-5068|ssrn=4418249|doi-access=free|url=https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/wp-content/uploads/sites/84/HLI101_crop-4.pdf|issue=1|volume=64}}</ref> The CCP's Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission maintains effective control over the courts and their personnel.<ref name=":43" />
=== Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate === {{Main article|Supreme People's Court|Supreme People's Procuratorate}}
The Supreme People's Court is the judicial organ of the People's Republic of China and is subject to the control of the CCP's Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission.<ref name=":43" /> Hong Kong and Macau, as special administrative regions, have separate judicial systems based on British common law traditions and Portuguese civil-law traditions, respectively. The judges of the Supreme People's Court are appointed by the National People's Congress.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}[[File:余华英拐卖儿童案二审.jpg|thumb|A trial by the Guizhou High People's Court]]
=== Nationality law === {{See also|Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China|}}
Nationality is granted at birth to children with at least one Chinese-national parent, with some exceptions. In general, naturalization or the obtainment of the People's Republic of China nationality is difficult. The Nationality Law prescribes only three conditions for the obtainment of PRC nationality (marriage to a PRC national is one, permanent residence is another). PRC nationals who acquire a foreign nationality automatically lose Chinese nationality.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China {{!}} Immigration Department |url=https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/residents/immigration/chinese/law.html |access-date=2023-01-13 |website=www.immd.gov.hk |archive-date=13 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230113112934/https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/residents/immigration/chinese/law.html |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=June 2023}} State functionaries and military personnel on active service are not permitted to renounce their Chinese nationality. If a citizen wishes to resume PRC nationality, foreign nationality is no longer recognized.<ref>{{cite web |title=Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/ywzn/lsyw/vpna/faq/t710012.htm |website=www.mfa.gov.cn |access-date=11 December 2021 |archive-date=11 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211211192813/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/ywzn/lsyw/vpna/faq/t710012.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=June 2023}}
=== Ethnic minorities === {{Excerpt|Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress|only=paragraph}}
==== Policies toward Uyghurs ==== {{Main|Persecution of Uyghurs in China}}
{{Further|Xinjiang internment camps}} In 2020, widespread public reporting detailed the Chinese government's pattern of human rights violations in its continuing maltreatment of Uyghurs.<ref name="indy">{{Cite web |date=5 July 2019 |title='Cultural genocide': China separating thousands of Muslim children from parents for 'thought education' |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200422051855/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslim-children-uighur-family-separation-thought-education-a8989296.html |archive-date=22 April 2020 |access-date=27 April 2020 |work=The Independent}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite news |date=17 December 2019 |title='Cultural genocide' for repressed minority of Uighurs |work=The Times |url=https://www.thetimes.com/article/cultural-genocide-for-repressed-minority-of-uighurs-bp0w6dw89 |url-status=live |access-date=27 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200425012712/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cultural-genocide-for-repressed-minority-of-uighurs-bp0w6dw89 |archive-date=25 April 2020}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite web |date=28 November 2019 |title=China's Oppression of the Uighurs 'The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide' |url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200121105242/https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html |archive-date=21 January 2020 |access-date=27 April 2020 |work=Der Spiegel}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=12 September 2019 |title=Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture |url=https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200414154451/https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 |archive-date=14 April 2020 |access-date=27 April 2020 |work=Financial Times}}</ref> These abuses include forced labor, arbitrary detainment, forced political indoctrination, destruction of cultural heritage, and forced abortions and sterilization.<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c|title = China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization|website = Associated Press|date = 20 April 2021|access-date = 9 October 2020|archive-date = 16 December 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201216200613/https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c|url-status = live}}</ref><ref name="bbc">{{Cite news |date=2020-06-29 |title=China 'using birth control' to suppress Uighurs |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53220713 |url-status=live |access-date=2020-07-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200629222610/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53220713 |archive-date=2020-06-29}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-10-06 |title=China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191208075342/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html |archive-date=2019-12-08 |access-date=2019-12-09 |website=The Independent |language=en}}</ref> Critics of the policy have described it as the Sinicization of Xinjiang and called it an ethnocide or cultural genocide, with many activists, NGOs, human rights experts, government officials, and the U.S. government calling it a genocide.<ref name="fore_Mene">{{Cite web|date=27 October 2020|title=Menendez, Cornyn Introduce Bipartisan Resolution to Designate Uyghur Human Rights Abuses by China as Genocide|url=https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-cornyn-introduce-bipartisan-resolution-to-designate-uyghur-human-rights-abuses-by-china-as-genocide|access-date=18 December 2020|work=foreign.senate.gov|publisher=United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|archive-date=26 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201226160250/https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-cornyn-introduce-bipartisan-resolution-to-designate-uyghur-human-rights-abuses-by-china-as-genocide|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="icij_Brit">{{Cite web|last=Alecci|first=Scilla|date=14 October 2020|title=British lawmakers call for sanctions over Uighur human rights abuses|url=https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/british-lawmakers-call-for-sanctions-over-uighur-human-rights-abuses/|access-date=18 December 2020|publisher=International Consortium of Investigative Journalists|archive-date=5 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201205093005/https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/british-lawmakers-call-for-sanctions-over-uighur-human-rights-abuses/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="ourc_Comm">{{Cite web|date=21 October 2020|title=Committee News Release – October 21, 2020 – SDIR (43–2)|url=https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/SDIR/news-release/10903199|access-date=18 December 2020|publisher=House of Commons of Canada|archive-date=24 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201024021902/https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/SDIR/news-release/10903199|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="wsj._U.S._says">{{Cite news |last1=Gordon |first1=Michael R. |last2=Xiao |first2=Eva |date=2021-01-19 |title=U.S. Says China Is Committing Genocide Against Uighur Muslims |language=en-US |work=The Wall Street Journal |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-declares-chinas-treatment-of-uighur-muslims-to-be-genocide-11611081555 |url-access=subscription |access-date=2023-06-24 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=19 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119184426/https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-declares-chinas-treatment-of-uighur-muslims-to-be-genocide-11611081555 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Quartz-genocide">{{cite news|last=Steger|first=Isabella|date=20 August 2020|title=On Xinjiang, even those wary of Holocaust comparisons are reaching for the word "genocide"|work=Quartz|url=https://qz.com/1892791/a-consensus-is-growing-that-chinas-uyhgurs-face-genocide/|url-status=live|access-date=20 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023143016/https://qz.com/1892791/a-consensus-is-growing-that-chinas-uyhgurs-face-genocide/|archive-date=23 October 2020}}</ref> The Chinese government denies it is committing human rights violations in Xinjiang.<ref name="cnn-fax">{{cite news |author=Ivan Watson, Rebecca Wright and Ben Westcott |date=21 September 2020 |title=Xinjiang government confirms huge birth rate drop but denies forced sterilization of women |publisher=CNN |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/21/asia/xinjiang-china-response-sterilization-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=26 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200927111925/https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/21/asia/xinjiang-china-response-sterilization-intl-hnk/index.html |archive-date=27 September 2020}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|doi=10.3390/laws9010001|doi-access=free|title=The Uyghur Minority in China: A Case Study of Cultural Genocide, Minority Rights and the Insufficiency of the International Legal Framework in Preventing State-Imposed Extinction |year=2020 |last1=Finnegan |first1=Ciara |journal=Laws |volume=9 |page=1}}</ref>
=== Legalist influence === Some scholars have drawn comparisons between the current governance of the CCP and certain aspects of the ancient Chinese philosophy of Legalism.<ref>{{Citation |last=Lin |first=Delia |title=The CCP's exploitation of Confucianism and Legalism |date=2017-08-18 |work=Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party |pages=47–58 |editor-last=Lam |editor-first=Willy Wo-Lap |editor-link=Willy Wo-Lap Lam |edition=1 |publisher=Routledge |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315543918-3 |isbn=978-1-315-54391-8}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last=Patapan |first=Haig |title=Legalism and Xi Jinping Thought |date=2022-11-18 |work=Chinese Legality |pages=52–70 |edition=1 |place=London |publisher=Routledge |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781003294887-5 |hdl=10072/422569 |isbn=978-1-003-29488-7|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schneider |first=David K. |date=2016 |title=China's New Legalism |url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-legalist-revival-15845 |journal=The National Interest |issue=143 |pages=19–25 |issn=0884-9382 |jstor=26557304}}</ref> As articulated by ''The Book of Lord Shang'', Legalism emphasizes centralized authority, strict laws, harsh punishments, and a merit-based bureaucratic system.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shang |first=Yang |author-link=Shang Yang |title=The Book of Lord Shang: Apologetics of State Power in Early China |date=2017-12-31 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-54233-3 |translator-last=Pines |translator-first=Yuri |doi=10.7312/shan17988 |jstor=10.7312/shan17988}}</ref>
==Foreign relations== {{Main|Foreign relations of China|Foreign policy of China}}
[[File:Bushhujintao.jpg|thumb|right|upright=0.9|Chinese leader Hu Jintao and US president George W. Bush, with first ladies Liu Yongqing and Laura Bush, wave from the White House. The relationship between the world's sole superpower United States and the emerging superpower status of the PRC is closely watched by international observers.]][[File:Karakorum-carretera-d08.jpg|right|thumb|upright=0.9|The Karakoram Highway connecting China and Pakistan is an example of China's international development involvements.]] The PRC maintains diplomatic relations with most countries in the world. In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China, commonly known as "Taiwan" since the 1970s, as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.<ref>Eddy Chang (22 Aug 2004). [http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/08/22/2003199768 Perseverance will pay off at the UN] {{Webarchive| url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070806100002/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/08/22/2003199768 |date=6 August 2007 }}, The Taipei Times, 22 August 2004</ref> China had been represented by the Republic of China at the time of the UN's founding in 1945. (See also China and the United Nations.)
Under the One-China policy, the PRC has made it a precondition to establishing diplomatic relations that the other country acknowledges its claim to all of China, including Taiwan, and severs any official ties with the Republic of China (ROC) government. The government actively opposes foreign government meetings with the 14th Dalai Lama in a political capacity, as the spokesperson for a separatist movement in Tibet.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2014-02-22 |title=Ignoring China's protest, Obama hosts Dalai Lama |url=https://apnews.com/28e972fcf7734e21af0ab1f5ffabb3c8 |access-date=2025-03-03 |website=AP News |language=en-US}}</ref>
The PRC has been playing a leading role in calling for free trade areas and security pacts amongst its Asia-Pacific neighbors. In 2004, the PRC proposed an entirely new East Asia Summit (EAS) framework as a forum for regional security issues that pointedly excluded the United States.<ref>Dillon, Dana and John Tkacik Jr, [http://www.policyreview.org/134/dillon.html "China's Quest for Asia"] {{Webarchive| url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060210135228/http://www.policyreview.org/134/dillon.html |date=10 February 2006 }}, ''Policy Review'', December 2005 and January 2006, Issue No. 134. Accessed 22 April 2006.</ref> The EAS, which includes ASEAN Plus Three, India, Australia and New Zealand, held its inaugural summit in 2005. China is also a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), alongside Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.<ref>{{Citation |last=Scott-Smith |first=Giles |title=The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation |date=2020 |work=The Changing Global Order: Challenges and Prospects |series=United Nations University Series on Regionalism |volume=17 |pages=177–191 |editor-last=Hosli |editor-first=Madeleine O. |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21603-0_10 |access-date=2024-06-28 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer International Publishing |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-030-21603-0_10 |isbn=978-3-030-21603-0 |editor2-last=Selleslaghs |editor2-first=Joren|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
=== Foreign aid === {{Main|Chinese foreign aid|Belt and Road Initiative}}
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China under the CCP in 1949, China joined the international community in providing foreign aid. In the past few decades, the international community has seen an increase in Chinese foreign aid. Specifically, a recent example is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure project that was launched in 2013 by Chinese leader Xi Jinping.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |title=China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative |access-date=2021-05-14 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |date=21 February 2019 |language=en |archive-date=26 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220526233755/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative |url-status=live }}</ref> The stated goal of the program is to expand maritime routes and land infrastructure networks connecting China with Asia, Africa, and Europe, boosting trade and economic growth.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Belt and Road Initiative|url=https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative|access-date=2021-05-14|website=World Bank|language=en|archive-date=18 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220518134904/https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative|url-status=live}}</ref> It involves a massive development of trade routes that will create a large expansion of land transportation infrastructure and new ports in the Pacific and Indian oceans to facilitate regional and intercontinental trade flow and increase oil and gas supply.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Ascensão |first1=Fernando |last2=Fahrig |first2=Lenore |last3=Clevenger |first3=Anthony P. |last4=Corlett |first4=Richard T. |last5=Jaeger |first5=Jochen A. G. |last6=Laurance |first6=William F. |last7=Pereira |first7=Henrique M. |date=May 2018 |title=Environmental challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0059-3 |journal=Nature Sustainability |language=en |volume=1 |issue=5 |pages=206–209 |doi=10.1038/s41893-018-0059-3 |bibcode=2018NatSu...1..206A |issn=2398-9629 |s2cid=133850310 |access-date=14 May 2021 |archive-date=18 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210618162814/https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0059-3 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>
=== International territorial disputes === {{Main|Territorial disputes of China}}
The PRC is in a number of international territorial disputes, several of which involved the Sino-Russian border. Although the great majority of them are now resolved,<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Kironska |first1=Kristina |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003350064 |title=Contemporary China: A New Superpower? |last2=Turcsanyi |first2=Richard Q. |date=2023-07-10 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-003-35006-4 |edition=1 |location=London |pages=225 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781003350064}}</ref> China's territorial disputes have led to several localized wars in the last 50 years, including the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 and the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979. In 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation,<ref>[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/21/content_548330.htm Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060826175727/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/21/content_548330.htm |date=26 August 2006 }} (21 March 2006). Retrieved 16 April 2006.</ref>{{Better source needed|date=April 2020}} which ended the conflict. Other territorial disputes include islands in the East and South China Seas, and undefined or disputed borders with India, Bhutan and North Korea.{{citation needed|date=June 2023}}
=== International organizations === {{Main|China and the United Nations}}
On 26 October 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 to transfer the seat from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC).<ref name=":02">{{Citation |last=Kent |first=Ann |title=China's participation in international organisations |date=2013 |work=Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy |pages=132–166 |editor-last=Zhang |editor-first=Yongjin |publisher=ANU Press |isbn=978-1-925021-41-7 |jstor=j.ctt5vj73b.11 |editor2-last=Austin |editor2-first=Greg |jstor-access=free}}</ref> Today, not only is China a part of many UN organizations, it is also one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. A memo done by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified Chinese nationals serving in leadership position within international organizations signifies China's increasing involvement in the international arena.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web |title=PRC Representation in International Organizations |url=https://www.uscc.gov/prc-international-orgs |access-date=2021-05-15 |website=United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission |language=en |archive-date=14 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210514143153/https://www.uscc.gov/prc-international-orgs |url-status=live }}</ref> For instance, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and so on are all organizations that Chinese nationals are currently in position of (The memo is updated on a semi-annual basis).<ref name=":03" />
== Policy development == The CCP's Central Policy Research Office drafts high-level policy proposals.<ref name=":72">{{Cite book |last=Hillman|first=Ben|title=The Communist Party of China: Understanding the Durability of the World's Most Powerful Political Organization|date=2025|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-009-66843-9|editor-last=Hillman|editor-first=Ben|edition=|location=New York|chapter=The Communist Party of China: Understanding Its Durability|editor-last2=Ji|editor-first2=Fengyuan|doi=10.1017/9781009668385}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=11}} Leading small groups help coordinate guiding principles for policy development.<ref name=":72" />{{Reference page|page=11}} Implementing agencies plan to put policies into action.<ref name=":72" />{{Reference page|page=11}}
CCP policy documents are often framed as "proposals", "opinions", or "guiding opinions" and such documents tend to be relatively short and establish underlying principles.<ref name=":062">{{Cite book |last=Hockx|first=Michel|author-link=Michel Hockx|title=Literature and Censorship in Modern China|date=2026|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9781032775838|location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=67}} The general trend is that state policy documents issued thereafter tend to express more concrete details.<ref name=":062" />{{Reference page|page=67}}
New policies are often tested locally before being applied more widely, resulting in a policy process that involves experimentation and feedback.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Heilmann|first=Sebastian|url=|title=Red Swan: How Unorthodox Policy-Making Facilitated China's Rise|date=2018|publisher=The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press|isbn=978-962-996-827-4|author-link=Sebastian Heilmann}}</ref>{{Rp|page=14}} This method of first implementing policy through local pilot testing was also used during the Mao era.<ref name=":132">{{Cite book |last=Simpson|first=Tim|title=Betting on Macau: Casino Capitalism and China's Consumer Revolution|date=2023|publisher=University of Minnesota Press|isbn=978-1-5179-0031-1|series=Globalization and Community series|location=Minneapolis}}</ref>{{Rp|page=108}} Generally, high level central government leadership refrains from drafting specific policies, instead using the informal networks and site visits to affirm or suggest changes to the direction of local policy experiments or pilot programs.<ref name=":44">{{Cite book |last=Brussee|first=Vincent|title=Social Credit: The Warring States of China's Emerging Data Empire|publisher=Palgrave MacMillan|year=2023|isbn=9789819921881|location=Singapore|doi=10.1007/978-981-99-2189-8}}</ref>{{Rp|page=71}} The typical approach is that central government leadership begins drafting formal policies, law, or regulations after policy has been developed at local levels.<ref name=":44" />{{Rp|page=71}}
After the period of reform and opening up, China has been characterized by a high degree of political centralization but significant economic decentralization.<ref name="landry">{{Cite book |last=Landry|first=Pierre F.|title=Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era|date=2008-08-04|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-88235-4|edition=1|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511510243}}</ref><ref name=":032">{{Cite book |last=Jin|first=Keyu|title=The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism|date=2023|publisher=Viking|isbn=978-1-9848-7828-1|location=New York|author-link=Keyu Jin}}</ref>{{Rp|page=7}} The central government sets the strategic direction while local officials carry it out,<ref name=":032" />{{Rp|page=7}} including developing the details of policy.<ref name=":Liu">{{Cite book |last=Liu|first=Lizhi|title=From Click to Boom: The Political Economy of E-Commerce in China|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2024|isbn=9780691254104}}</ref>{{Rp|page=30}} Since the tenure of Xi Jinping, the practice by which the CCP sets policy priorities at a high level is known as "top-level design".<ref name=":72" />{{Reference page|page=11}}
=== Budget === China's fiscal budget has four parts: general fiscal budget, budget for government funds, budget for operating income of state-owned capital, and social insurance budget.<ref name=":02222" />{{Rp|page=353}}
The largest part is the general fiscal budget, which is a unitary budget that is allocated between central fiscal and local fiscal budgets.<ref name=":02222" />{{Rp|page=353}} The central government sets targets for its fiscal revenue and expenditures, as well as local government fiscal revenue and expenditures.<ref name=":02222" />{{Rp|page=354}}
=== State capacity === China has a high degree of state capacity.<ref name=":053">{{Cite book |last=Meng|first=Wenting|title=Developmental Piece: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding|date=2024|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=9783838219073|series=Ibidem|pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=49–51}} Academic Thomas Heberer attributes China's state capacity to: (1) the legitimacy of its political system as viewed by its citizens, (2) the ability to exercise social control and regulation, (3) coercive resources, (4) the capacity to consult and collaborate with emerging social groups and organizations to balance conflicting interests, and (5) the ability to learn from failures and mistakes.<ref name=":053" />{{Rp|pages=50–51}}
=== Commentary === Academics Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry write that policy-making in China is influenced by the Chinese Communist Revolution, resulting in a policy approach that combined centralized leadership with intense mass mobilization, and that this mode of governance is defined by continuous experimentation and improvisation.<ref name=":33">{{Cite book |last=Li|first=Jie|title=Cinematic Guerillas: Propaganda, Projectionists, and Audiences in Socialist China|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2023|isbn=9780231206273}}</ref>{{Rp|page=45}} Heilmann writes that the state's "unusual adaptive capacity" in economic matters is attributable to an "institutional structure that ... enables it to try out alternative approaches to overcome long-standing impediments to economic development, tackle newly emerging challenges, and grasp opportunities when they open up."<ref name=":123222">{{Cite book |last1=Leutert|first1=Wendy|title=The Communist Party of China: Understanding the Durability of the World's Most Powerful Political Organization|date=2025|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-009-66843-9|editor-last=Hillman|editor-first=Ben|edition=|location=New York|chapter=China's Adaptive State Capitalism and Its International Sources|doi=10.1017/9781009668385|editor-last2=Ji|editor-first2=Fengyuan|last2=Eaton|first2=Sarah}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=197}} According to academics Jérôme Doyon and Chloé Froissart, the adaptive capacity resulting from a heritage of guerrilla warfare has made the CCP adept in dealing with uncertainty and has translated into a capacity to experiment first and then systemize the results.<ref name=":222">{{Cite book |last1=Doyon|first1=Jérôme|title=The Chinese Communist Party: a 100-Year Trajectory|last2=Froissart|first2=Chloé|date=2024|publisher=ANU Press|isbn=9781760466244|editor-last=Doyon|editor-first=Jérôme|location=Canberra|chapter=Introduction|doi=10.22459/CCP.2024|editor-last2=Froissart|editor-first2=Chloé|doi-access=free}}</ref>{{Rp|page=2}}
Academic Chen Li writes that institutional adaptation in China's state sector extends to the late 1950s, and that since the 1990s, "continuous learning, experimentation, and adaptation of CPC central bureaucracy ... has not only brought about the rise of China's 'national champions' in finance, but also sustained critical support for the entire 'national team'."<ref name=":123222" />{{Reference page|page=198}}
== Civil service == {{Main|Civil service of China}}
China's civil service is divided into tiers.<ref name=":26">{{Cite book |last=Ang|first=Yuen Yuen|url=|title=How China Escaped the Poverty Trap|date=2016|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-1-5017-0020-0|doi=|jstor=10.7591/j.ctt1zgwm1j|author-link=Yuen Yuen Ang}}</ref>{{Rp|page=147}} The highest tiers (including department chiefs, deputy department chiefs, and section chiefs) have significant involvement in policy-making.<ref name=":26" />{{Rp|page=147}} According to the 2020 Law on Governmental Sanctions for Public Employees, any public employee, including civil servants, that publish "articles, speeches, declarations, and statements opposing the State’s guiding ideologies established in the Constitution, the leadership of the Communist Party, the socialist system, or the reform and opening up" are to be automatically dismissed from office.<ref name=":016">{{Cite web |last1=Zhang|first1=Haoran|last2=Wei|first2=Changhao|date=2020-06-25|title=Legislation Summary: New Statute Governing Public Employees' Conduct|url=https://npcobserver.com/2020/06/25/legislation-summary-new-statute-governing-public-employees-conduct/|access-date=2026-05-23|website=NPC Observer|language=en-US}}</ref>
== Ideological groupings == Various ideological groupings exist in China, often with hybrid and varying beliefs on political, economic, and cultural matters.<ref name=":52">{{Cite book |last=Song |first=Chenyang |title=Nationalist and Popular Culture Practices on Social Media: A Digital Ethnography of Chinese Online Fandom Nationalists |date=2025 |publisher=Transcript |isbn=978-3-8376-7926-7 |edition= |location=Bielefeld}}</ref>{{Reference page|pages=41-45}} The "Old Left" support pre-1978 Maoist socialism.<ref name=":52" />{{Reference page|page=44}} The New Left represents a broad range of political currents which are critical of economic liberalization, neoliberalism, market economics; it ranges from Maoists to those who advocate something more like the European welfare model.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wang |first1=Hui |title=One China, Many Paths |date=2003 |publisher=Verso |isbn=1-85984-537-1 |editor1-last=Chaohua |editor1-first=Wang |location=London |pages=55–86 |chapter=The New Criticism}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Goldman |first=Merle |date=2015 |title=Review of China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions |journal=The China Journal |issue=73 |pages=266–269 |doi=10.1086/679242 |issn=1324-9347 |jstor=10.1086/679242}}</ref><ref name=":52" />{{Reference page|page=44}} Initially, the term was propagated by liberal opponents who contended that there was no fundamental difference between diehard Maoists and the New Left.<ref name="ci">{{Cite book |last=Tu |first=Hang |title=Sentimental Republic: Chinese Intellectuals and the Maoist Past |publisher=Harvard University Asia Center |year=2025 |isbn=9780674297579}}</ref>{{Rp|page=10}}
Liberalism in China covers a significant range of ideologies.<ref name="ci" />{{Rp|page=9}} Among others, varieties of liberal thought in the PRC include the liberal Marxists of the 1980s (who opposed ultra-leftism and supported a reformist socialism) and the neoliberals of the 1990s (who sought market reform and contended that this would necessarily increase political rights).<ref name="ci" />{{Rp|page=9}} Academic Hang Tu summarizes, "[A] common thread that runs through these heterogenous intellectual dynamics is the call for the condemnation of Mao's revolutionary legacy in particular and the abandonment of radical approaches to Chinese history and politics in general."<ref name="ci" />{{Rp|page=9}}
The term conservativism has been used to characterize multiple intellectual trends, including Confucian revivalists, cultural nationalists, and proponents of realpolitick.<ref name="ci" />{{Rp|page=10}} A common theme among the diverse trends of conservatism in China is the continuity of the Chinese civilizational tradition and opposition to Western secular modernity.<ref name="ci" />{{Rp|page=10}}
Summarizing research in the Chinese political context, academic Chenyang Song writes that the left-wing/right-wing dichotomy is not an essential criterion for differentiating Chinese ideological stances, nor is it a pro-CCP or anti-CCP attitude.<ref name=":52" />{{Reference page|page=45}}
== Civil society == Academic debates on whether China has a civil society are ongoing.<ref name=":8">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chunfeng |title=Red Tourism in China: Commodification of Propaganda |publisher=Routledge |year=2023 |isbn=9781032139609}}</ref>{{Rp|page=62}}
Within China, academic debate regarding theories of the public sphere began in the 1980s.<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=62}} There is no consensus and academic debates involve disagreements in the applicability of concepts like "civil society," "private sphere," and "state" in the Chinese context.<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=62}} Among the issues is that the terminology developed by Jürgen Habermas was developed in discourse on German bourgeois society.<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=|pages=63–64}} The major groups in Habermasian theory include merchants, bankers, manufacturers, and entrepreneurs, which is not consistent with Chinese views of the "general public."<ref name=":8" />{{Rp|page=64}}
The majority of research on Chinese civil society from the early 1990s to the early 2010s has been to examine "the organizational independence of civic associations from the state".<ref name=":06">{{Cite journal |last=Salmenkari |first=Taru |date=2013 |title=Theoretical Poverty in the Research on Chinese Civil Society |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23359834 |journal=Modern Asian Studies |volume=47 |issue=2 |pages=682–711 |doi=10.1017/S0026749X12000273 |issn=0026-749X |jstor=23359834 |s2cid=145320886 |access-date=15 May 2021 |archive-date=15 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210515011118/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23359834 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> Researchers have argued that the western driven definition of "civil society" is too narrowly fixed, which does not allow for a full understanding of Chinese civil society. Taru Salmenkari, an associate professor specializing in contemporary China and issues of democracy and civil society in East Asia at Tallinn University, has argued in her "Theoretical Poverty in the Research on Chinese Civil Society" that to understand Chinese civil society, one must "...go beyond the question of the degree of autonomy from the state. It must address the nature of horizontal contacts through which civil society is constituted".<ref name=":06" />
=== Advocacy === A 2013 study by Harvard University found that while the censorship exists, the purpose of the censorship is not to silence all comments made about the state or any particular issues, but rather to prevent and reduce the probability of collective action.<ref name=":14">{{Cite journal |last1=King |first1=Gary |last2=Pan |first2=Jennifer |last3=Roberts |first3=Margaret E. |date=2013 |title=How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=107 |issue=2 |pages=326–343 |doi=10.1017/S0003055413000014 |issn=0003-0554 |jstor=43654017 |s2cid=53577293|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11878767 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> As the study illustrates, allowing social media to flourish also has allowed negative and positive comments about the state and its leaders to exist.<ref name=":14" /> According to another study, the development of technology and the internet has also allowed certain civil society advocacy, such as the Weiquan movement, to flourish.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Biao |first1=Teng |last2=Mosher |first2=Stacy |date=2012 |title=Rights Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan): The Rights Defence Movement Online and Offline |journal=China Perspectives |volume=3 |issue=91 |pages=29–41 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.5943 |issn=2070-3449 |jstor=24055481 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
=== Protests === {{See also|Mass incidents in China}}{{Excerpt|Protest and dissent in China}}
=== Citizen surveys === Surveys have shown a high level of the Chinese public's satisfaction with their government.<ref name=":09">{{Cite book |last=Jin |first=Keyu |title=The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism |date=2023 |publisher=Viking |isbn=978-1-9848-7828-1 |location=New York |author-link=Keyu Jin}}</ref>{{Rp|page=137}}<ref name=":62">{{Cite book |last=Lan |first=Xiaohuan |title=How China Works: An Introduction to China's State-led Economic Development |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2024 |isbn=978-981-97-0079-0 |translator-last=Topp |translator-first=Gary |doi=10.1007/978-981-97-0080-6}}</ref>{{Rp|page=116}} These views are generally attributed to the material comforts and security available to large segments of the Chinese populace as well as the government's attentiveness and responsiveness.<ref name=":09" />{{Rp|page=136}} Academic Klára Dubravčíková writes that a majority of the Chinese middle class are satisfied with the CCP and are among those who tend to credit it for the increase of living standards in China since reform and opening up.<ref name=":922">{{Cite book |last=Dubravčíková |first=Klára |title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower? |publisher=Routledge |year=2023 |isbn=978-1-03-239508-1 |editor-last=Kironska |editor-first=Kristina |pages=58–70 |chapter=Living Standards and Social Issues |doi=10.4324/9781003350064-7 |editor-last2=Turscanyi |editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=61}}
A 2009 study by academic Tony Sachs found that 95.9% of Chinese citizens were relatively satisfied or extremely satisfied with the central government, with the figure dropping to 61.5% for their local governments.<ref name=":052">{{Cite book |last=Meng |first=Wenting |title=Developmental Peace: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding |date=2024 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=9783838219073 |series=Ibidem |pages=57}}</ref> A study published in ''The China Quarterly'' on attitudes from 2003 to 2016 found that people in coastal regions were particularly satisfied with government performance.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|pages=|page=301}}
Survey data compiled by academic Bruce Dickson and published in 2016 concludes that approximately 70% of China's population supports the Chinese Dream.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8}}</ref>{{Rp|page=148}}
Using survey experiments from 2018, a 2023 study found that 37 percent supported "removing the term limit for the national leader" in indirect surveys, compared to 59.6% in direct surveys, though it did add that "as the 95% confidence interval crosses 50%, we cannot conclude that only a minority supported the term limit removal". It also found that 76.7% trust the central government while 67% trust the local government. It concludes that "The lack of evidence for majority support for the term limit removal indicates the Chinese public is not unquestioning or naïve; they are capable of expressing reservations about government, at least indirectly. This finding further suggests the relatively high level of trust in the national government is largely genuine".<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Nicholson|first1=Stephen P.|last2=Huang|first2=Haifeng|date=2023|title=Making the List: Reevaluating Political Trust and Social Desirability in China|url=|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=117|issue=3|pages=1158–1165|doi=10.1017/S0003055422000946|issn=0003-0554}}</ref>
According to the World Values Survey covering 2017 to 2020, 95% of Chinese respondents have significant confidence in their government.<ref name=":09" />{{Rp|page=13}} Confidence decreased to 91% in the survey's 2022 edition.<ref name=":09" />{{Rp|page=13}}
A 2020 survey by Harvard University found that citizen satisfaction with the government had increased since 2003, also rating China's government as more effective and capable than ever before in the survey's history.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url= |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages= |doi=10.1515/9781503634152 |oclc=1331741429 |author-link=Suisheng Zhao}}</ref>{{Rp|page=163}} The survey also showed that trust in government had increased since 2003, particularly following the anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last1=Wu |first1=Alfred M. |url=https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/vx021h696 |title=China as Number One? The Emerging Values of a Rising Power |last2=Araral |first2=Eduardo |last3=Huang |first3=Andbiao |date=2024 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-472-07635-2 |editor-last=Zhong |editor-first=Yang |series=China Understandings Today series |location=Ann Arbor, Michigan |chapter=Mapping the Changes of Trust in Transitional China |format=EPUB |editor-last2=Inglehart |editor-first2=Ronald |archive-date=14 October 2024 |access-date=5 March 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241014210020/https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/vx021h696 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Rp|page=300}} Satisfaction with interactions with local officials had also increased from 47.9% in 2011 to 75.1% by 2016.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|pages=300-301}} Publishing in 2024, academics Alfred Wu et al. conclude that survey data show that Chinese people in all segments of society tend to trust the government.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|page=301}}
A 2020 study by University of Southern California researchers affiliated with the Hoover Institution found that more anonymous surveys show 50 to 70 percent think the government works for the people, lower than what direct surveys show support at above 90 percent.<ref name=":15">{{Cite news |date=January 16, 2024 |title=China's leaders are less popular than they might think |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2024/01/16/chinas-leaders-are-less-popular-than-they-might-think |url-access=subscription |access-date=2024-01-16 |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613 |quote=The results suggest that when the survey was conducted in June and November 2020 between 50% and 70% of Chinese people supported the party. (This is an upper bound, say the researchers, because concerns about online surveillance may still have spooked some respondents into giving positive responses.) |archive-date=16 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116225645/https://www.economist.com/china/2024/01/16/chinas-leaders-are-less-popular-than-they-might-think |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |last=Wachtel |first=Ileana |date=January 29, 2024 |title=When Chinese citizens are surveyed anonymously, support for party and government plummets |url=https://phys.org/news/2024-01-chinese-citizens-surveyed-anonymously-party.html |access-date=2024-01-31 |website=Phys.org |language=en |archive-date=31 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240131043010/https://phys.org/news/2024-01-chinese-citizens-surveyed-anonymously-party.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The same survey found that Han Chinese are more positive towards the government than are ethnic minorities, who tend to conceal their views of the government.<ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Carter |first1=Erin Baggott |last2=Carter |first2=Brett L. |last3=Schick |first3=Stephen |date=2024-01-10 |title=Do Chinese Citizens Conceal Opposition to the CCP in Surveys? Evidence from Two Experiments |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=259 |language=en |pages=804–813 |doi=10.1017/S0305741023001819 |issn=0305-7410 |doi-access=free}}</ref> It also found that college education, CCP membership and urban residency were correlated with higher support for the government. The survey found that support for Xi Jinping was between 65% and 70%.<ref name=":15" />
According to a survey by Pew Research Center in 2020, Chinese citizens are among the most optimistic in the world.<ref name=":012">{{Cite book |last1=He |first1=Lingnan |url=https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/vx021h696 |title=China as Number One? The Emerging Values of a Rising Power |last2=Yang |first2=Dali L. |date=2024 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-472-07635-2 |editor-last=Zhong |editor-first=Yang |series=China Understandings Today series |location=Ann Arbor, Michigan |chapter=Political Participation in China: Social Surveys as Windows to Chinese Political Attitude and Behavior |format=EPUB |editor-last2=Inglehart |editor-first2=Ronald }}</ref>{{Rp|page=130}}
Survey results from researchers at Stanford University from 2014 to 2020 show no clear alignment along the left-right spectrum or pro-government or anti-government positions. Wealthier and more educated Chinese tend to prefer market liberalization, political democratization, and are less nationalistic, while poorer and less educated citizens show the opposite trend. The survey's authors believe may be a reflection of how the former group has benefited more from China's market reforms.<ref>{{Cite web |date=January 15, 2022 |title=Is there a Political "Left" or "Right" in China? Charting China's |url=https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/there-political-left-or-right-china-charting-chinas-ideological-spectrum |access-date=2024-12-18 |website=sccei.fsi.stanford.edu |language=en |archive-date=12 December 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241212013918/https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/there-political-left-or-right-china-charting-chinas-ideological-spectrum |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Pan |first1=Jennifer |last2=Xu |first2=Yiqing |date=December 21, 2025 |title=Gauging preference stability under authoritarianism |journal=Research & Politics |language=en |volume=12 |issue=4 |article-number=20531680251400418 |doi=10.1177/20531680251400418 |issn=2053-1680 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
Summarizing survey data developed from 2003 to 2020, academic Lan Xiaohuan writes that overall satisfaction is approximately 83% for the central government, 78% for provincial governments, and 70% for county and township governments.<ref name=":62" />{{Rp|page=116}} Lan also concludes that the anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping was successful in raising public confidence in the ethics of government officials.<ref name=":62" />{{Rp|page=116}}
According to a 2021 analysis by Princeton University academic Rory Truex of survey results, Chinese people who are discontented with the CCP typically have socially marginalized personalities and are more introverted, fearful and anxious while displaying lower levels of dependence, sentimentality, self-esteem, cheerfulness and enthusiasm about life, while CCP members and supporters exhibit more traits associated with personal and professional success such as confidence, organization and work ethic, interpersonal skill, and creativity and dynamism. Results from the study showed that those discontented with the CCP typically showed high neuroticism and low conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience, while CCP members on average had very high levels of extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The survey results suggest that this contributes to the CCP's continuing dominance by relegating people discontented with CCP to the margins of society.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Truex |first=Rory |date=2022 |title=Political Discontent in China Is Associated with Isolating Personality Traits |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/719273 |journal=The Journal of Politics |volume=84 |issue=4 |pages=2172–2187 |doi=10.1086/719273 |issn=0022-3816 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>
Publishing in 2025, academic Bingqin Li writes that survey data shows that improved social services may strengthen public trust in the government.<ref name=":12322222">{{Cite book |last=Li|first=Bingqin|title=The Communist Party of China: Understanding the Durability of the World's Most Powerful Political Organization|date=2025|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-009-66843-9|editor-last=Hillman|editor-first=Ben|edition=|location=New York|chapter=Social Stability Through Responsive Social Policy|doi=10.1017/9781009668385|editor-last2=Ji|editor-first2=Fengyuan}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=259}} Li cites survey data showing that political trust and policy expectation of both the central and local governments were higher in New Rural Pension Scheme pilot areas than in non-pilot areas, and data showing that improving infrastructure led to improvements of political trust.<ref name=":12322222" />{{Reference page|pages=259-260}} Li summarizes, "Further research also found that political trust in local governments has been strongly influenced by the perception that these governments perform well, are responsive to citizens' needs, and are free from corruption."<ref name=":12322222" />{{Reference page|page=256}}
=== Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) === {{See also|List of non-governmental organizations in China}} Although NGO development in China is relatively slow compared to other countries, a Harvard University academic study reveals that China had NGOs as early as during the Dynasties. Specifically in the forms of American missionaries, which assisted in rural reconstruction programs and ideological reforms locally.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Thomson |first=James Claude |title=While China faced West : American reformers in Nationalist China, 1928–1937. James C. Thomson, Jr. |date=1969 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=0-674-95135-2 |oclc=462172943}}</ref> After the establishment of The People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Mao banned any NGOs that were related to counter revolutionary goals. During the reform era under Deng beginning the 1970s, NGOs although not completely banned, three laws were implemented to keep relatively tight control over them––the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Foundations, and the Interim Provisions for the Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China.<ref name=":04">{{Cite web |last=Ye |first=Zhang |date=1 Aug 2003 |title=China's Emerging Civil Society |url=https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-emerging-civil-society/ |access-date=2021-05-15 |website=Brookings Institution |language=en-US |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308221843/https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-emerging-civil-society/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The latter two were implemented after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, and the general tone of all the regulations emphasized government control. For instance, the regulations require a two-tiered management system, in which before being legally registered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, a government agency must sponsor the organization; thus, two governmental agencies must be monitoring the day-to-day operations of the NGO.<ref name=":04" /> However, in the 1990s, NGOs began to regain momentum despite restrictions in place.<ref name=":04" /> Today, the number of registered organizations in China has grown to over 700,000, "... including many professional and friendship associations, foundations working in the fields of education, science, and culture, and a large number of nonprofits engaged in poverty alleviation, social work with people with disabilities, children, and the elderly. The number of nonprofits and environmental education and climate action groups has also significantly grown".<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kuhn|first=Berthold|date=11 June 2019|title=Civil society in China: A snapshot of discourses, legislation, and social realities|url=https://doc-research.org/2019/06/civil-society-in-china-a-snapshot-of-discourses-legislation-and-social-realities/|access-date=2021-05-15|website=Dialogue of Civilization (DOC) Research Institute|language=en-US|archive-date=3 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210603214810/https://doc-research.org/2019/06/civil-society-in-china-a-snapshot-of-discourses-legislation-and-social-realities/|url-status=live}}</ref>
In 2017, a policy called "Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities in Mainland China Law" (FNGO Law) was enacted, which creates registration barriers that, for instance, require a Chinese partner organization to sign on. The reaction from the West has widely been that the space for NGOs to conduct work in may be shrinking.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Lang |first1=Bertram |last2=Holbig |first2=Heike |date=2018 |title=Civil Society Work in China:: Trade-Offs and Opportunities for European NGOs |chapter=Trade-Offs and Opportunities for European NGOs |url=https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/civil-society-work-in-china-trade-offs-and-opportunities-for-european-ng-os |publisher=German Institute of Global and Area Studies |jstor=resrep24803 |jstor-access=free |access-date=16 January 2024 |archive-date=16 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116230230/https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/civil-society-work-in-china-trade-offs-and-opportunities-for-european-ng-os/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
Many NGOs in the PRC have been described as government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGOs) that are organized under the CCP's united front system.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fedasiuk |first=Ryan |date=2022-04-13 |title=How China's united front system works overseas |url=https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-chinas-united-front-system-works-overseas/ |access-date=2022-04-15 |website=The Strategist |publisher=Australian Strategic Policy Institute |language=en-AU |archive-date=13 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220413020633/https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-chinas-united-front-system-works-overseas/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":07">{{Cite news |last1=Sotoudeh |first1=Nazpari |last2=Stefano |first2=Erica |date=September 29, 2021 |title=Free speech risky as China keeps close tabs on its overseas students |work=Eurasianet |url=https://eurasianet.org/free-speech-risky-as-china-keeps-close-tabs-on-its-overseas-students |access-date=October 2, 2021 |archive-date=29 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929190510/https://eurasianet.org/free-speech-risky-as-china-keeps-close-tabs-on-its-overseas-students |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=French |first=Paul |date=February 4, 2012 |title=China Briefing Part 3: Civil society - The land of the Gongo |url=https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/stakeholder-engagement/china-briefing-part-3-civil-society-land-gongo |access-date=2022-09-11 |website=Reuters |language=en-GB |archive-date=1 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221001153217/https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/stakeholder-engagement/china-briefing-part-3-civil-society-land-gongo |url-status=live }}</ref>
The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) is a people's organization and chamber of commerce established in 1953.<ref name=":Zhang">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Angela Huyue |title=High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2024 |isbn=9780197682258 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001}}</ref>{{Rp|page=167}} The ACFIC was established to advance the CCP's interests and promote the party's policies among private entrepreneurs.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=167}} It seeks to influence policy through submitting proposals to the CPPCC, a process which requires relevant government ministries to investigate the proposals and prepare a formal response.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=167}}
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)'s stated goal is to advocate for workers' interests within the CCP and the government.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=|url=https://dn721502.ca.archive.org/0/items/chinas-revolution-and-the-quest-for-a-socialist-future/China's%20Revolution%20and%20the%20Quest%20for%20a%20Socialist%20Future%20--%20Ken%20Hammond.pdf}}</ref>{{Rp|page=130}} It also seeks to address occupational health and safety issues and carries on industrial policy oversight.<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=84}} It is the country's sole legal workers union.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=161}} The CCP controls the appointment of ACFTU officials at the regional and national levels.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=161}} ==See also== *Politics of Hong Kong *Politics of Macau
== Notes == {{NoteFoot}}
== References == {{Reflist}} {{reflist|group=lower-alpha}} === Books === * {{Cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |author-link=Steven Levitsky |last2=Way |first2=Lucan |title=Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism |date=2022 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0691169521 |doi=10.1515/9780691223575 |jstor=j.ctv2drhcnf}}
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Category:Politics of China Category:Articles with excerpts