Nuclear close calls

{{Short description|List of incidents which could have led to a nuclear exchange}} {{Use dmy dates|date=March 2022}} {{Nuclear weapons}}

A '''nuclear close call''' is an incident that might have led to at least one nuclear explosion, but did not. They can be split into intentional use and unintentional use close calls.

Intentional use close calls may occur during increased military tensions involving one or more nuclear states. They may be a threat made by the state, or an attack upon the state. They may also come from nuclear terrorism.

Unintentional use close calls may occur due to equipment failure. Common examples are strategic bombers accidentally dropping or crashing with nuclear bombs, or early warning systems mistaking phenomena such as weather events or non-nuclear rocket launches for an ICBM first strike and therefore recommending a second strike.

Though exact details on many nuclear close calls are hard to come by, the analysis of particular cases has highlighted the importance of a variety of factors in preventing accidents. At an international level, this includes the importance of context and outside mediation; at the national level, effectiveness in government communications, and involvement of key decision-makers; and, at the individual level, the decisive role of individuals in following intuition and prudent decision-making, often in violation of protocol.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lewis |first1=Patricia |last2=Williams |first2=Heather |last3=Pelopidas |first3=Benoit |last4=Aghlani |first4=Sasan |title=Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy |journal=Chatham House |date=28 April 2014 |url=https://www.chathamhouse.org/2014/04/too-close-comfort-cases-near-nuclear-use-and-options-policy |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230721163703/https://www.chathamhouse.org/2014/04/too-close-comfort-cases-near-nuclear-use-and-options-policy |archive-date=21 July 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref>

A possible example of an accident that did result in a nuclear explosion is the 2019 Nyonoksa radiation accident in Russia.

Any nuclear exchange carries the possibility of rapid climate change, threatening global food production: nuclear famine.<ref name="agu.org">{{cite journal |last1=Fromm |first1=M. |last2=Stocks |first2=B. |last3=Servranckx |first3=R. |last4=Lindsey |first4=D. |display-authors=3 |year=2006 |title=Smoke in the Stratosphere: What Wildfires have Taught Us About Nuclear Winter |url=http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm06/fm06-sessions/fm06_U14A.html |url-status=dead |journal=Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=American Geophysical Union |volume=87 |issue=52 Fall Meet. Suppl |pages=Abstract U14A–04 |bibcode=2006AGUFM.U14A..04F |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006085234/http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm06/fm06-sessions/fm06_U14A.html |archive-date=6 October 2014}}</ref>

Despite reduction of nuclear arms and lower tensions after the end of the Cold War, estimated nuclear warhead stockpiles total roughly 15,000 worldwide, with the United States and Russia holding 90% of the total.<ref>{{cite news |last=Davenport |first=Kelsey |date=1 January 2022 |title=Nuclear Weapons: Who has what at a glance |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230722220208/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |archive-date=22 July 2023 |publisher=Arms Control Association}}</ref>

== Intentional use close calls == Intentional close calls may occur during increased military tensions involving one or more nuclear states. They may be a threat made by the state, or an attack upon the state. They may also come from nuclear terrorism.

=== 1950–1953: Korean War === {{See also|Korean War#U.S. threat of atomic warfare|Operation Hudson Harbor}} During the Korean War, the U.S. considered nuclear attacks on North Korea and Manchuria, in response to involvement from the People's Volunteer Army from China. Mark 4 nuclear bombs, lacking their fissile pits, were deployed to Guam and Okinawa. Boeing B-29 Superfortresses were stationed in Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and flew practice bombing runs with dummy nuclear or conventional bombs against North Korean targets.

The U.S. also considered strikes on Soviet Air Force bases in the Russian Far East.<ref name="g484">{{cite web |date=2018-01-02 |title=How the Korean War Put Presidents in Charge of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/01/how-the-korean-war-put-presidents-in-charge-of-nuclear-weapons?lang=en |access-date=2025-04-27 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}}</ref> The Artem air base was the most immediate.

=== 1954: First Indochina War === {{Main|Operation Vulture}} During the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, at the request of the French, the U.S. considered tactical nuclear weapons use against the Viet Minh. U.S. strategic bombers stationed in the Philippines or Okinawa, as well as carrier aircraft in the Seventh Fleet, were considered for a strike using three tactical nuclear bombs, possibly Mark 7s.

=== 1956: Suez Crisis ===

During the Suez Crisis, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) received a number of simultaneous reports, including unidentified aircraft over Turkey, Soviet MiG-15 fighters over Syria, a downed British Canberra medium bomber, and unexpected maneuvers by the Soviet Black Sea Fleet through the Dardanelles that appeared to signal a Soviet offensive. Considering previous Soviet threats to use conventional missiles against France and the United Kingdom, U.S. forces believed these events could trigger a NATO nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. In fact, all reports of Soviet action turned out to be erroneous, misinterpreted, or exaggerated. The perceived threat was due to a coincidental combination of events, including a wedge of swans over Turkey, a fighter escort for Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli returning from Moscow, a British bomber brought down by mechanical issues, and scheduled exercises of the Soviet fleet.<ref name="nuclear files 20">{{cite web |last=Philips |first=Alan F. |title=20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War |url=http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/accidents/20-mishaps-maybe-caused-nuclear-war.htm |website=nuclearfiles.org |date=1998 |publisher=Nuclear Age Peace Foundation |archive-date=3 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200703203219/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/accidents/20-mishaps-maybe-caused-nuclear-war.htm}}</ref>

===1958: Second Taiwan Strait Crisis=== U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter characterized the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis as "the first serious nuclear crisis".<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=M.H. Halperin|url=https://archive.org/details/The1958TaiwanStraitsCrisisADocumentedHistory_201712|title=The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History|date=December 1966|others=Daniel Ellsberg|pages=i–xvii}}</ref> In this conflict, the People's Republic of China (PRC) shelled the islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and the Matsu Islands along the east coast of mainland China (in the Taiwan Strait) in an attempt to probe the extent of the United States military defense of Taiwan's sovereign territory. This was an ultimately failed preemptive strike prior to an attempted invasion of Taiwan, where the Republic of China's (ROC) military forces and political apparatuses, known as the Kuomintang (KMT), had been exiled since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. A naval battle also took place around Dongding Island when the ROC Navy repelled an attempted amphibious landing by the PRC Navy.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030002-3|title=TAIWAN STRAITS|date=27 August 1958|publisher=CIA|quote=Nationalists{...}claim to have driven off "invasion fleet" headed for Tungting Island.}}</ref><ref name="1958 crisis">{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/The1958TaiwanStraitsCrisisADocumentedHistory/page/n183|title=The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis_ A Documented History|date=1975}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA234362/page/n21|title=DTIC ADA234362: Use of Naval Force in Crises: A Theory of Stratified Crisis Interaction. Volume 2|date=December 1988}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/1958Awake/page/n603|title=1958 Awake|date=8 October 1958}}</ref>

=== 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis === {{main|Cuban Missile Crisis}}

==== Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba ==== Under Operation Anadyr, the Soviet Union deployed both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, totalling 158 warheads. Of these, 80 were for use by the 9K52 Luna-M nuclear rocket artillery/short-range ballistic missile system, and 12 were for use by the FKR-1 cruise missile. At least one unit of the latter was targeted at the U.S. Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the island of Cuba.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |title= The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60 the Most Dangerous Day | National Security Archive|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba-cuban-missile-crisis/2022-10-27/cuban-missile-crisis-60-most-dangerous-day}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Norris |first1=Robert S. |last2=Kristensen |first2=Hans M. |title= The Cuban Missile Crisis: A nuclear order of battle, October and November 1962|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |date=2012 |volume=68 |issue=6 |pages=85–91 |doi=10.1177/0096340212464364 |bibcode=2012BuAtS..68f..85N |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0096340212464364|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

==== U.S. false alarm at interceptor airbase ==== [[File:Convair F-106A-1-CO 060928-F-1234S-039.jpg|thumb|right|upright=0.8|An F-106A during takeoff]] During the Cuban Missile Crisis, United States military planners expected that sabotage operations might precede any nuclear first strike by the Soviet Union. Around midnight on 25 October 1962, a guard at the Duluth Sector Direction Center in Minnesota saw a figure climbing the security fence. He shot at it and activated the sabotage alarm, which automatically set off similar alarms at other bases in the region. At Volk Field in Wisconsin, a faulty alarm system caused the klaxon to sound instead, which ordered Air Defense Command (ADC) nuclear-armed F-106A interceptors into the air. The pilots had been told there would be no practice alert drills and, according to political scientist Scott Sagan, "fully believed that a nuclear war was starting".<ref name="Sagan">{{cite book |author-link=Scott Sagan |last=Sagan |first=Scott D. |title=The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons |date=1993 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-21306-4 |pages=3, 99–100 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AObaDwAAQBAJ&q=%22volk+field%22}}</ref> Before the planes were able to take off, the base commander contacted Duluth and learned of the error. An officer in the command center drove his car onto the runway, flashing his lights and signaling to the aircraft to stop. The intruder was discovered to be a bear.{{r|Sagan}}<ref name="Rhodes">{{cite magazine |author-link=Richard Rhodes |last=Rhodes |first=Richard |title=The General and World War III |magazine=The New Yorker |date=19 June 1995 |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/06/19/the-general-and-world-war-iii |url-access=limited |pages=47–59 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043851/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/06/19/the-general-and-world-war-iii |archive-date=16 July 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref> Sagan writes that the incident raised the dangerous possibility of an ADC interceptor accidentally shooting down a Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber.{{r|Sagan}} Interceptor crews had not been given full information by SAC of plans to move bombers to dispersal bases (such as Volk Field) or the classified routes flown by bombers on continuous alert as part of Operation Chrome Dome. Declassified ADC documents later revealed that "the incident led to changes in the alert Klaxon system [...] to prevent a recurrence".{{r|Sagan}}

==== Soviet averted launch of nuclear torpedo ==== thumb|right|upright=0.8|''B-59'' near Cuba with a U.S. Navy helicopter circling above, {{Circa|October 28–29, 1962}} At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet patrol submarine {{ship|Soviet submarine|B-59||2}} almost launched a nuclear torpedo while under harassment by American naval forces on October 27. One of several vessels surrounded by American destroyers near Cuba, ''B-59'' dove to avoid detection and was unable to communicate with Moscow for a number of days.<ref>Michael Dobbs, ''One Minute to Midnight'', Vintage, Random House, 2009.</ref> {{USS|Beale|DD-471|6}} began dropping practice depth charges to signal ''B-59'' to surface; however, the captain of the Soviet submarine and its ''zampolit'' (political officer) took these to be real depth charges.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Robinson-Leon |first1=Jeremy |last2=Burr |first2=William |title=IV. Chronology of Submarine Contact During the Cuban Missile Crisis October 1, 1962 – November 14, 1962 |url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/subchron.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080709180311/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/subchron.htm |archive-date=9 July 2008 |access-date=24 July 2023 |website=National Security Archive |publisher=George Washington University}}</ref> With low batteries affecting the submarine's life-support systems and unable to make contact with Moscow, the commander of ''B-59'' feared that war had already begun and ordered the use of a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo against the American fleet. The ''zampolit'' agreed, but the chief of staff of the flotilla (second in command of the flotilla) Vasily Arkhipov refused permission to launch. He convinced the captain to calm down, surface, and make contact with Moscow for new orders.<ref name="thankyou">{{Cite news |author=Edward Wilson |date=27 October 2012 |title=Thank you Vasili Arkhipov, the man who stopped nuclear war |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-stopped-nuclear-war |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230621191207/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-stopped-nuclear-war |archive-date=21 June 2023 |access-date=24 July 2023 |newspaper=The Guardian}}</ref><ref name="isbn0-8050-7688-3">{{Cite book |author=Noam Chomsky |author-link=Noam Chomsky |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Xx3ptbzQ8L4C&pg=PA74 |title=Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance |publisher=Henry Holt |year=2004 |isbn=0-8050-7688-3 |location=New York |page=74}}</ref>

==== U.S. loss of ICBM launch authority ==== According to Scott Sagan, also on 27 October, at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, officers of Strategic Air Command jerry-rigged their launch system on a Minuteman ICBM, bypassing standard procedure and obtaining an independent launch authority.<ref name=":7" />

==== U.S. scramble of interceptors ==== Additionally on 27 October, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, resulting in the death of pilot Major Rudolf Anderson of the United States Air Force (USAF), and another U-2 flown by Captain {{visible anchor|Charles Maultsby}}, USAF, from Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, strayed {{convert|300|mi|km}} into Soviet airspace. Despite orders to avoid Soviet airspace by at least {{convert|100|mi|km}}, a navigational error caused by the aurora borealis took the U-2 over the Chukotka Peninsula, causing Soviet MiG interceptors to scramble and pursue the aircraft.<ref name="nuclear files 20" /><ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/06/missile_crisis_excerpt200806 |title=Lost in Enemy Airspace |magazine=Vanity Fair |author=Michael Dobbs |date=June 2008 |access-date= 29 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160801150618/http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/06/missile_crisis_excerpt200806 |archive-date=1 August 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="auto">{{Cite book|last=Dobbs|first=Michael|title=One minute to midnight : Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war|date=2008|publisher=Alfred A. Knopf|isbn=978-0-307-26936-2|edition=1st|location=New York|oclc=608213334}}</ref> American F-102A interceptors armed with GAR-11 Falcon nuclear air-to-air missiles (each with a 0.25 kiloton yield) were then scrambled to escort the U-2 into friendly airspace.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.x-plane.org/home/urf/aviation/text/missiles/aam.html |title=Air-to-air Missile Non-comparison Table |publisher=X-Plane |access-date=29 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110226180715/http://www.x-plane.org/home/urf/aviation/text/missiles/aam.html |archive-date=26 February 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref> Individual pilots were capable of arming and launching their missiles. The incident remained secret for many years.<ref name="auto" />

=== 1968–1969: Vietnam War === During the Vietnam War, the United States military developed at least two contingency plans relating to nuclear weapons in Vietnam. In early 1968, the Fracture Jaw plan called for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to South Vietnam during the Battle of Khe Sanh, and was approved by General William Westmoreland. It was vetoed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, partially out of fear of causing the People's Republic of China to enter the conflict.<ref name="p522">{{cite web |last=Sanger |first=David E. |date=2018-10-06 |title=U.S. General Considered Nuclear Response in Vietnam War, Cables Show |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/world/asia/vietnam-war-nuclear-weapons.html |access-date=2025-08-16 |website=The New York Times}}</ref> In late 1969, the Nixon White House developed the Duck Hook, which involved major escalation of the U.S. war effort via bombing and mining campaigns. The plan was abandoned by Nixon on 1 November due to opposition from the cabinet, lowered public war support, and uncertain effectiveness.

=== 1969: DPRK shootdown of U.S. EWAC aircraft === {{main|1969 EC-121 shootdown incident}} thumb|right|upright=0.8|The EC-121 shot down in 1969, seen here {{circa}} 1960A United States Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star early warning aircraft was shot down by a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, {{em|i.e.}}{{spaces}}North Korea) MiG-21, killing all 31 servicemen aboard. F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber jets at Kunsan Air Base were ordered to load B61 nuclear bombs and began preparations for a nuclear strike against the DPRK.<ref>{{cite news |last=Schuster |first=Bob |title=Nixon Considered Nuclear Option Against N. Korea |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128337461 |website=NPR |access-date=24 July 2023 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043850/https://www.npr.org/2010/07/06/128337461/nixon-considered-nuclear-option-against-n-korea |archive-date=16 July 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref> The attack was to include the airfield from which the North Koreans had attacked the U.S. aircraft.<ref>{{Cite news |last=McGreal |first=Chris |date=7 July 2023 |title=Papers reveal Nixon plan for North Korea nuclear strike |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/07/nixon-north-korea-nuclear-strike |access-date=24 July 2023 |issn=0261-3077 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230504162617/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/07/nixon-north-korea-nuclear-strike |archive-date=4 May 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref> After a few hours, the order to stand down was given and the jets never took off. Reportedly, President Richard Nixon was drunk when he gave the order for a nuclear attack against the DPRK.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Anthony |first1=Summers |title=Drunk in charge (part two) |url=https://www.theguardian.com/weekend/story/0,3605,362958,00.html |website=The Guardian |date=2 September 2000 |access-date=24 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043848/https://www.theguardian.com/weekend/story/0,3605,362958,00.html |archive-date=16 July 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref> The order to stand down was given on the advice of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.{{cn|date=December 2025}}

=== 1969: Sino-Soviet conflict === {{main|Sino-Soviet border conflict|Sino-Soviet split#Planned Soviet nuclear strike on China}}

In 1969, following the border conflict Battle of Zhenbao Island in March, the USSR considered a massive nuclear attack on China, targeting cities and nuclear facilities. It made military activity in the Russian Far East, and informed its allies and the United States of this potential attack. The Chinese government and archives were evacuated from Beijing while the People's Liberation Army scattered from its bases. The crisis abated when U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the Soviet Union that an attack on China would be met by a U.S. nuclear attack on 130 Soviet cities.<ref name="x444">{{cite web |last1=Osborn |first1=Andrew |last2=Foster |first2=Peter |date=2010-05-13 |title=USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100516014916/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |archive-date=2010-05-16 |access-date=2025-06-20 |website=The Telegraph}}</ref><ref name="m674">{{cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Mark |date=2010-05-12 |title=Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack |url=https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912221259/https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |archive-date=2015-09-12 |access-date=2025-06-20 |website=South China Morning Post}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |date=1969-08-18 |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969��1972: 63. Memorandum of Conversation |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d63 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241104110630/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d63 |archive-date=2024-11-04 |website=United States Department of State}}</ref> According to the U.S. Department of State, one of the two main "after-the-fact explanations" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test conducted by the U.S. military in October 1969 was to deter a possible Soviet nuclear strike against the People's Republic of China.<ref name=":9">{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972: 59. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241217085844/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |archive-date=2024-12-17 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite web |last=Aftergood |first=Steven |date=2011-10-25 |title=Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery |url=https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |archive-date=2024-09-12 |access-date= |website=Federation of American Scientists |language=en-US}}</ref>

=== 1973: Yom Kippur War === {{Israel and nuclear weapons}} {{main|Yom Kippur War}}

During the Yom Kippur War, Israeli officials panicked that the Arab invasion force would overrun Israel after the Syrian Army nearly achieved a breakout in the Golan Heights, and the U.S. government rebuffed Israel's request for an emergency airlift. According to a former CIA official, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan requested and received authorization from Israeli prime minister Golda Meir to arm 13 Jericho missiles and 8 F-4 Phantom II fighter jets with nuclear warheads. The missile launchers were located at Sdot Micha Airbase, while the fighter jets were placed on 24-hour notice at Tel Nof Airbase. The missiles were said to be aimed at the Arab military headquarters in Cairo and Damascus.<ref name="nuclear files 20" />

The United States discovered Israel's nuclear deployment after a Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft spotted the missiles, and it began an airlift the same day. After the UN Security Council imposed a ceasefire, conflict resumed when the Israel Defense Force (IDF) moved to encircle the Egyptian Third Army. According to former U.S. State Department officials, the leader of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, threatened to deploy the Soviet Airborne Forces against Israeli forces, and the U.S. Armed Forces were placed at DEFCON 3. Israel also redeployed its nuclear weapons. While DEFCON 3 was still in effect, mechanics repairing the alarm system at Kincheloe Air Force Base in Michigan accidentally activated it and nearly scrambled the B-52 bombers at the base before the duty officer declared a false alarm.<ref name="nuclear files 20" /> The crisis finally ended when Prime Minister Meir halted all military action.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Yom Kippur: Israel's 1973 nuclear alert|url=https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/64941032228992/|access-date=19 June 2020|website=UPI|language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622004130/https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/64941032228992/ |archive-date=22 June 2020 |url-status=live}}</ref> Declassified Israeli documents have not confirmed these allegations directly, but have confirmed that Israel was willing to use "drastic means" to win the war.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Did Israel ever consider using nuclear weapons?|url=https://www.haaretz.com/1.5122006|access-date=19 June 2020|newspaper=Haaretz|language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220124205259/https://www.haaretz.com/1.5122006 |archive-date=24 January 2022 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

=== 1983: Able Archer 83 NATO exercise ===

Able Archer 83 was a command post exercise carried out by NATO military forces and political leaders between 7 and 11 November 1983.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/able-archer-83-sourcebook|title=The Able Archer 83 Sourcebook|first=Nate|last=Jones|publisher=National Security Archive|access-date=24 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230617184100/https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/able-archer-83-sourcebook|archive-date=17 June 2023|url-status=live}}</ref> The exercise simulated a Soviet conventional attack on European NATO forces three days before the start of the exercise (D-3), transitioning to a large-scale chemical war (D-1), and on day one (D+1) of the exercise, NATO forces sought political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons to stem the Soviet advance which was approved by political leaders. NATO then began simulating preparations for a transition to nuclear war.<ref>"[https://web.archive.org/web/20130616055025/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/docs/6.b.%20Exercise%20Able%20Archer%2083%20SHAPE%20March%202013%20NATO.pdf Exercise Scenario]," Background Paper, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Unclassified, date unknown, via National Security Archive.</ref>

These simulations included 170 radio-silent flights to air lift 19,000 U.S. troops to Europe, regularly shifting military commands to avoid nuclear attack, the use of new nuclear weapon release procedures, the use of nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (C3) networks for passing nuclear orders, the moving of NATO forces in Europe through each of the alert phases from DEFCON 5 to DEFCON 1, and the participation of political leaders like Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl and Ronald Reagan.<ref name="nsa">{{cite news|last1=Jones|first1=Nate|last2=Harper|first2=Lauren|date=21 May 2013|title=The 1983 War Scare: "The Last Paroxysm" of the Cold War Part II|language=en|publisher=National Security Archive|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/|url-status=live|access-date=24 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230516020709/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/|archive-date=16 May 2023|series=Briefing Book # 427}}</ref>

The issue was worsened by leaders referring to B-52 sorties as "nuclear strikes",<ref name="nsa" /> by the increased use of encrypted diplomatic channels between the U.S. and UK,<ref>{{Cite book|first=Martin |last=Walker |title=The Cold War: A History |location=New York |publisher=Henry Holt and Company |year=1993 |page=276}}</ref> and by the nuclear attack false alarm in September.

In response, Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft were fueled and armed ready to launch on the runway, and ICBMs were brought up to alert. Soviet leaders believed the exercise was a ruse to cover NATO preparations for a nuclear first strike and frantically sent a telegram to its residencies seeking information on NATO preparations for an attack. The exercise closely aligned with Soviet timeline estimations that a NATO first strike would take 7 to 10 days to execute from the political decision being made.<ref name="Pry Scare 43–4">Pry, ''War Scare'', 43–4.</ref><ref>Gates, ''From the Shadows'', 271, 272.</ref>

Soviet forces stood down after 11 November when the exercise ended. NATO was unaware of the complete Soviet response until British intelligence asset Oleg Gordievsky passed on the information.<ref name="Oberdorfer Era 67">Oberdorfer, ''A New Era'', 67.</ref>

=== 1991: Gulf War === {{Israel and nuclear weapons}} {{Main|Gulf War}}

==== Coalition nuclear weapons ==== The Coalition of the Gulf War included the nuclear-armed countries of the United States and the United Kingdom. They both deployed nuclear weapons to the region during the conflict, ostensibly to allow retaliation in the event of an Iraqi chemical weapons attack. The United States deployed 1,000 tactical weapons to the region, with 300 land-based weapons in Turkey, and 700 aboard warships in the Persian Gulf region. The United Kingdom also deployed five nuclear-capable vessels probably carrying between eight and sixteen nuclear weapons. Western chemical weapons were also mobilized to the region.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last1=Rai |first1=Milan |last2=McHugh |first2=Declan |date=May 1992 |title=NUCLEAR TARGETING OF THE THIRD WORLD |url=https://www.nuclearinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Defence_Briefing_Nuclear_Targeting_of_the_third_world_CND_May_1992_Volume_1_of_1.pdf |journal=CND Defence Briefing}}</ref>

Threats of nuclear use by coalition officials came from public statements, private communication with Iraqi officials, and leaked communications.<ref name=":3" /> Among them, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher all emphasized that the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against coalition forces would lead to a nuclear attack on Iraq.<ref name=":2" />

On January 7, 1991, ''The Washington Post'' reported that the U.S. military had ruled out the use of nuclear or chemical weapons in the conflict. Cheney had requested Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to produce nuclear strike options against Iraq. Powell later wrote that "To do serious damage to just one armored division dispersed in the desert would require a considerable number of small tactical nuclear weapons…. If I had had any doubts before about the practicality of nukes in the field of battle, this report clinched them".<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal |last=Kristensen |first=Hans M |date=February 2005 |title=U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe; A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning |url=https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/euro.pdf |journal=Natural Resources Defense Council |pages=29–32}}</ref>

On January 9, 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker delivered to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz a letter carrying a formal threat, presumably nuclear retaliation, to the following actions:

# If Saddam Hussein used chemical or biological weapons # If Saddam Hussein destroyed the Kuwaiti oil fields # If Saddam Hussein supported terrorists

Baker warned that the U.S. had "the means to exact vengeance" in the event of an Iraqi resort to WMD.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Iddon |first=Paul |date=24 January 2017 |title=Saddam Hussein Seriously Feared a U.S. Nuclear Strike During the Gulf War |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/saddam-hussein-seriously-feared-us-nuclear-strike-during-the-19164 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170126184422/http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/saddam-hussein-seriously-feared-us-nuclear-strike-during-the-19164 |archive-date=26 January 2017 |access-date=13 September 2021 |website=The National Interest |language=en}}</ref> After the war, the Defense Intelligence Agency credited these threats with deterring Iraq from launching chemical attacks on coalition forces.<ref name=":2" />

Researcher Hans M. Kristensen has argued that it is unclear if U.S. nuclear threats were fully understood by Iraqi officials, that they were more concerned by the threat of regime change, and that their destruction of the Kuwaiti oil fields indicates deterrence was not successful.<ref name=":4" />

==== Israeli nuclear weapons ==== During the Persian Gulf War, Ba'athist Iraq launched Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel and possessed a large cache of WMD in the form of chemical weapons. This, along with Saddam Hussein's previous threat to "burn half of Israel" with chemical weapons, led to fears that Saddam Hussein would order the use of the chemical weapons against the U.S.-led coalition or against Israel {{crossreference|(see: {{section link|Iraq–Israel relations|Until the 2003 Iraq War}})}}.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Ap|date=28 July 1990|title=Israeli Sees Chemical Option Against Iraqis|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/28/world/israeli-sees-chemical-option-against-iraqis.html|access-date=13 September 2021|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043850/https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/28/world/israeli-sees-chemical-option-against-iraqis.html |archive-date=16 July 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web|last=Pike|first=John|date=19 February 1998|title=Nuclear Threats During the Gulf War|url=https://irp.fas.org/eprint/ds-threats.htm|access-date=13 September 2021|website=Federation of American Scientists|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043848/https://irp.fas.org/eprint/ds-threats.htm |archive-date=16 July 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref> Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir and Israeli Air Force Commander-in-Chief Avihu Ben-Nun both warned that an Iraqi chemical attack would trigger "massive retaliation", implying that Israel would retaliate with nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein had a contingency plan to launch WMD-armed warheads against Tel Aviv in the event that he became cut off from the Iraqi Armed Forces leadership or if the Iraqi government was about to collapse, which almost certainly would have triggered a retaliatory nuclear response from Israel. Saddam Hussein ultimately never deemed this option necessary because he never felt as if his government was about to collapse.<ref>{{Cite news |title='Saddam gave orders to fire chemical weapons at Tel Aviv if he was toppled in First Gulf War' |url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/saddam-gave-orders-to-fire-chemical-weapons-at-tel-aviv-if-he-was-toppled-in-first-gulf-war/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043849/https://www.timesofisrael.com/saddam-gave-orders-to-fire-chemical-weapons-at-tel-aviv-if-he-was-toppled-in-first-gulf-war/ |archive-date=16 July 2023 |access-date=13 September 2021 |website=Times of Israel |language=en-US}}</ref>

=== 2017–2018: North Korea crisis === {{Main|2017–2018 North Korea crisis}}

thumb|right|upright=0.8|Kim Jong-un (left) and Donald Trump in June 2018

Between 2017 and 2018, the United States and North Korea, most particularly U.S. president Donald Trump and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un, exchanged threats that have been described as on the brink of nuclear war. In August 2017, Trump warned that North Korea would be met with "fire and fury, the likes of which the world has never seen".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-08-08 |title=Trump: North Korea Will Be Met With 'Fire And Fury Like The World Has Never Seen' If It Keeps Up Threats - CBS New York |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/trump-north-korea-fire-and-fury-threat/ |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=www.cbsnews.com |language=en-US}}</ref> During his speech in 2017 at the United Nations General Assembly, he warned that if the United States were forced to defend itself, they would have no choice but to "totally destroy North Korea".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-09-21 |title=Trump threatens to 'totally destroy' North Korea |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-un-north-korean-leader-suicide-mission-n802596 |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=NBC News |language=en}}</ref> North Korea, in response, has referred to Trump as a "dotard", stated that he will "pay dearly", and accused the U.S. of "declaring war".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Manchester |first=Julia |date=2017-09-21 |title=Kim Jong Un calls Trump a 'mentally deranged US dotard' |url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/351829-kim-jong-un-calls-trump-deranged-says-he-will-pay-dearly-for-his-threats/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221206012912/https://thehill.com/policy/international/351829-kim-jong-un-calls-trump-deranged-says-he-will-pay-dearly-for-his-threats/ |archive-date=2022-12-06 |access-date=2025-03-21 |work=The Hill |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-09-22 |title=The Latest: Kim says Trump will 'pay dearly' for threat |url=https://apnews.com/article/77d6b6f5e9b94a6a95a46b0b1820cbf3 |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Nelson |first=Louis |date=2017-09-25 |title=North Korea's foreign minister: Trump's words are 'clearly a declaration of war' |url=https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/25/north-korea-foreign-minister-trump-declaration-of-war-243098 |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=POLITICO |language=en}}</ref> In January 2018, Trump also tweeted that his country has a "bigger nuclear button" than North Korea.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-01-03 |title=Trump taunts Kim: My nuclear button 'is bigger & more powerful' |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-north-korean-leader-kim-my-nuclear-button-bigger-more-n834196 |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=NBC News |language=en}}</ref>

In January 2018, it was reported that Trump withdrew Victor Cha as a pick to be U.S. Ambassador to South Korea over his opposition to launch a limited strike at North Korea. The withdrawal sparked major concerns for North Korean experts that the U.S. was seriously considering war with North Korea.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Beauchamp |first=Zack |date=2018-01-31 |title=The most worrying piece of North Korea news you probably haven't heard |url=https://www.vox.com/world/2018/1/31/16954880/trump-north-korea-south-korea-ambassador-victor-cha |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref>

The crisis has been described as the "Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Broad |first2=William J. |date=2017-04-17 |title=A 'Cuban Missile Crisis in Slow Motion' in North Korea |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/us/politics/north-korea-missile-crisis-slow-motion.html |access-date=2025-03-21 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In Van Jackson's book ''On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War'', he stated that the United States was close as ever to World War III between 2017 and early 2018.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ward |first=Alex |date=2018-12-12 |title=How Trump made the North Korea crisis worse |url=https://www.vox.com/2018/12/12/18130628/north-korea-trump-nuclear-war-jackson |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref> Trump also reportedly considered evacuating Americans from South Korea despite warnings that such a move could lead to war.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Liptak |first=Jeremy Diamond, Kevin |date=2018-05-15 |title=Sources: Trump sought to evacuate military families from South Korea before Olympics {{!}} CNN Politics |url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/15/politics/trump-south-korea-olympics/index.html |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last3= |date=2019-12-10 |title=Trump Demanded U.S. Evacuation From South Korea Despite Threat of War: Book |url=https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-demanded-evacuation-u-s-families-south-korea-threat-sparking-war-new-book-1476449 |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=Newsweek |language=en}}</ref> Reports also emerged in 2023 that Trump was considering the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea in 2017.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-01-12 |title=Trump discussed using a nuclear weapon on North Korea in 2017 and blaming it on someone else, book says |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-discussed-using-nuclear-weapon-north-korea-2017-blaming-someone-rcna65120 |access-date=2025-03-21 |website=NBC News |language=en}}</ref>

=== 2019 India-Pakistan conflict === {{Main|2019 India–Pakistan border skirmishes}}

In 2023, Mike Pompeo, who served as United States Secretary of State in 2019, claimed that U.S. diplomacy prevented heightened tensions between India and Pakistan from sparking a nuclear war. According to Pompeo, he was informed by Sushma Swaraj in February 2019 that the Indian government believed Pakistan was preparing a nuclear attack, and that India was preparing an escalatory response. Pompeo claimed that he and then National Security Advisor John Bolton spoke with then Pakistani Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa in "the tiny secure communications facility in our hotel", who was under the equivalent impression about Indian nuclear preparations. The situation was de-escalated as U.S. intermediaries informed both countries that no nuclear attack preparations were occurring. Neither the Indian Ministry of External Affairs nor Pakistani Foreign Office commented on Pompeo's claims.<ref>{{Cite news |date=24 January 2023 |title=India, Pakistan came close to a nuclear war, claims former U.S. Secretary of State in new book |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pakistan-came-close-to-a-nuclear-war-claims-former-us-secretary-of-state-in-new-book/article66429650.ece |access-date=25 January 2023 |work=The Hindu |issn=0971-751X}}</ref><ref name="g275">{{cite web |last=Biswas |first=Soutik |date=2023-01-25 |title=India and Pakistan came close to nuclear war: Pompeo |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-64396138 |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=BBC News}}</ref>

=== 2022–present: Russian invasion of Ukraine === {{Main|Nuclear risk during the Russian invasion of Ukraine}}

Russia has threatened the use of nuclear weapons throughout its invasion of Ukraine, characterized as nuclear blackmail.<ref name="ambassador_bbc">{{Cite news |date=29 May 2022 |title=Russia won't use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, says ambassador to UK |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61618902 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220529211503/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61618902 |archive-date=29 May 2022 |access-date=2 June 2022 |work=BBC News}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author1=Ishaan Tharoor |date=2022-09-21 |title=Russia pushes the panic button and raises risk of nuclear war |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/21/russia-referendums-ukraine-occupied-nuclear/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220922000836/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/21/russia-referendums-ukraine-occupied-nuclear/ |archive-date=2022-09-22 |access-date=2022-09-21 |newspaper=The Washington Post |place=Washington, D.C. |issn=0190-8286 |oclc=1330888409}}</ref>

In late 2022, tensions over Russian nuclear use reached a high point. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov implied nuclear weapons could be used to defend annexed Ukrainian territories.<ref>{{cite news |date=24 September 2022 |title=Lavrov, at the UN, pledges 'full protection' for any territory annexed by Russia |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-un-lavrov-idUSKBN2QP0FY |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221001213955/https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lavrov-un-pledges-full-protection-any-territory-annexed-by-russia-2022-09-24/ |archive-date=1 October 2022 |work=Reuters}}</ref> Russian officials, including Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu,<ref>{{cite news |date=24 October 2022 |title=Russia claims Ukraine 'dirty bomb' in final stages |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221024-russia-claims-ukraine-dirty-bomb-in-final-stages |work=France 24}}</ref> publicly and privately accused Ukraine of preparing to use a radioactive dirty bomb on Ukrainian territory.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Ioanes |first1=Ellen |date=30 October 2022 |title=What to expect after Russia's latest escalatory nuclear rhetoric |url=https://www.vox.com/2022/10/30/23426491/russia-ukraine-dirty-bomb-nuclear |access-date=2 November 2022 |work=Vox |language=en}}</ref> A tweet by the Russian Ministry of Defence, purportedly showing evidence of a Ukrainian dirty bomb in production, was debunked as a collection of old and unrelated photos.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Norton |first1=Tom |date=27 October 2022 |title=Fact Check: Russia's claim that photo shows 'dirty bomb' in Ukraine |url=https://www.newsweek.com/fact-check-russias-claim-that-photo-shows-dirty-bomb-ukraine-1755089 |access-date=2 November 2022 |work=Newsweek |language=en}}</ref> On 24 October, John Kirby stated that there was no evidence Russia was preparing a dirty bomb strike.<ref>{{cite news |date=24 October 2022 |title=US says Russia's 'dirty bomb' claims are pretext for escalation in Ukraine |url=https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-russias-dirty-bomb-claims-pretext-escalation-ukraine/story?id=92010587 |access-date=2 November 2022 |work=ABC News |language=en}}</ref> At Ukraine's request, the United Nations sent an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigation to Ukraine, which found no evidence of a dirty bomb being developed or any other undeclared nuclear activity.<ref>{{cite news |date=27 October 2022 |title=Inspectors to Look for Evidence of Dirty Bomb Production in Ukraine this Week, IAEA Says |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-nuclear-iaea-russia-putin-inspection-dirty-bomb/32104450.html |access-date=2 November 2022 |work=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-11-03 |title='No sign' of Ukrainian 'dirty bomb', says UN nuclear watchdog |url=https://www.euronews.com/2022/11/03/ukraine-war-russian-top-brass-met-to-discuss-using-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-us- |access-date=2022-11-03 |website=euronews |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-11-03 |title=IAEA Inspectors Complete In-Field Verification Activities at Three Ukraine locations, No Indications of Undeclared Nuclear Activities and Materials |url=https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-inspectors-complete-in-field-verification-activities-at-three-ukraine-locations-no-indications-of-undeclared-nuclear-activities-and-materials |access-date=2022-11-03 |website=www.iaea.org |language=en}}</ref> U.S. officials feared that those allegations by Russia may be a confirmation of it preparing for a nuclear strike on Ukraine, using dirty bomb allegations or a false flag attack as a pretext.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web |last=Sciutto |first=Jim |date=2024-03-09 |title=Exclusive: US prepared 'rigorously' for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine in late 2022, officials say |url=https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/index.html |access-date=2024-06-12 |website=CNN Politics |publisher=CNN |language=en}}</ref> The U.S., as reported by CNN, has "prepared 'rigorously' for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine". It also engaged U.S. diplomats, as well as asked other countries, namely China and India, to engage diplomatically to persuade Russia to avoid nuclear escalation.<ref name=":02" />

On 25 March 2023, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced plans to install Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Kostenko |first1=Heather |last2=Chen |first2=Hira |last3=Humayun |first3=Mariya |last4=Knight |first4=Andrew |last5=Carey |first5=Radina |last6=Gigova |first6=Maria |date=2023-03-26 |title=Russia plans to station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Putin says |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/25/world/russia-putin-nuclear-weapons-belarus-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=2023-03-31 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref>

On 19 November 2024, Putin signed a decree allowing Russia to use nuclear weapons in response to conventional attacks by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power, lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike in response to a possible conventional attack.<ref>[https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-issues-warning-us-with-new-nuclear-doctrine-2024-11-19/ (Reuters)]</ref>

On 21 November 2024, Russia used a conventionally armed multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) system, on the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile to attack the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, marking their first usage in combat. The MIRV system was developed by multiple nations for nuclear strategic missiles.<ref name="r017">{{cite web |last1=Edwards |first1=Christian |last2=Nicholls |first2=Catherine |last3=Radford |first3=Antoinette |last4=Sangal |first4=Aditi |date=2024-11-21 |title=Russian ballistic missile carried multiple warheads, US and Western officials say |url=https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ukraine-russia-war-11-21-24#cm3rqdcdg00053b6ql9grs2v0 |access-date=2024-11-21 |website=CNN}}</ref>

On 7 December 2024, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement offering security guarantees to Belarus including nuclear security and the possible use of Russian nuclear weapons to repel aggressions.<ref>[https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-security-agreement-nuclear-doctrine-c07ef5d341f93be6934ac14a77b58f8b (AP)]</ref> Two days later, Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko confirmed the presence of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus, including Russia's Oreshnik missile system.<ref>[https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-lukashenko-putin-nuclear-oreshnik-ukraine-0cb678c1d0144fb6b372693a4ec6af4d (AP)]</ref>

On 4 May 2025, in an interview to mark his 25 years of power in Russia, Putin remarked that "he hoped that there would be no need to use nuclear weapons" to bring the Russian invasion of Ukraine "to its logical conclusion".<ref>{{cite news |date=2025-05-04 |title=Russia's Putin says he hopes there will be no need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2025/05/04/europe/putin-speech-nuclear-weapons-ukraine-intl-latam |access-date=2025-05-11 |website=edition.cnn.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Petrenko |first=Roman |date=2025-05-04 |title=Putin "hopes" Russia will not need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine |url=https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/05/4/7510526/ |access-date=2025-05-11 |website=pravda.com.ua}}</ref>

== Unintentional close calls == Unintentional use close calls may occur due to equipment failure. Common examples are strategic bombers accidentally dropping or crashing with nuclear bombs, or early warning systems mistaking phenomena such as weather events or non-nuclear rocket launches for an ICBM first strike and therefore recommending a second strike.

=== 1957: U.S. accidental bomb drop in New Mexico === {{main|Mark 17 nuclear bomb#1957 incident}}

A B-36 accidentally dropped a bomb just south of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Due to safety measures, the plutonium core was not mounted to the bomb at the time but rather stored elsewhere in the plane, preventing a nuclear detonation. The conventional explosives created a {{cvt|7.6|m}}-wide crater on impact.

=== 1958: U.S. accidental bomb drop in Savannah, Georgia ===

A bomb was mistakenly dropped by a U.S. Air Force Boeing B-47E-LM Stratojet near Savannah, Georgia, when a man in the bomb bay area grabbed the emergency release pin by accident. Similar to the 1957 incident, safety precautions meant that the plutonium was not mounted to the bomb but rather stored elsewhere on the plane at the time.

=== 1960: U.S. false alarm from moonrise === Radar equipment in Thule, Greenland, mistakenly interpreted a moonrise over Norway as a large-scale Soviet missile launch. Upon receiving a report of the supposed attack, NORAD went on high alert. However, doubts about the authenticity of the attack arose due to the presence of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in New York City as head of the USSR's United Nations delegation.<ref name="UCS close calls">{{cite web |title=Close Calls with Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/04/Close%20Calls%20with%20Nuclear%20Weapons.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230724002452/https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/04/Close%20Calls%20with%20Nuclear%20Weapons.pdf |archive-date=24 July 2023 |access-date=5 April 2016 |website=Union of Concerned Scientists}}</ref><ref name="K Blows Top">{{cite book |last=Carlson |first=Peter |title=K Blows Top: A Cold War Comic Interlude Starring Nikita Khrushchev, America's Most Unlikely Tourist |date=2009 |publisher=PublicAffairs |isbn=978-1-58648-497-2}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Stevens |first1=Matt |last2=Mele |first2=Christopher |date=2018 |title=Causes of False Missile Alerts: The Sun, the Moon and a 46-Cent Chip |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/false-alarm-missile-alerts.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230711225541/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/false-alarm-missile-alerts.html |archive-date=11 July 2023 |access-date=24 July 2023 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

=== 1961: U.S. strategic bomber crash in North Carolina === {{See also|1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash}}thumb|right|upright=0.8|One of Mark 39 nuclear bombs after the 1961 incident near Goldsboro, North CarolinaA B-52 Stratofortress carrying two 3–4-megaton Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air near Goldsboro, North Carolina, dropping its nuclear payload in the process.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Schneider |first=Barry |date=May 1975 |title=Big Bangs from Little Bombs |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dQsAAAAAMBAJ |journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |volume=31 |issue=5 |page=28 |bibcode=1975BuAtS..31e..24S |doi=10.1080/00963402.1975.11458238 |url-access=subscription |access-date=13 July 2009}}</ref> The pilot in command, Walter Scott Tulloch, ordered the crew to eject at {{convert|9000|ft|m}}. Five crewmen successfully ejected or bailed out of the aircraft and landed safely, another ejected but did not survive the landing, and two died in the crash.<ref>{{cite web |last=Sedgwick |first=Jessica |title=Bombs Over Goldsboro |url=http://www.lib.unc.edu/ncc/ref/nchistory/jan2008/index.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111228001711/http://www.lib.unc.edu/ncc/ref/nchistory/jan2008/index.html |archive-date=28 December 2011 |access-date=24 January 2012 |work=This Month in North Carolina History (January 2008)}}</ref>

Information declassified in 2013 showed that "only a single switch prevented the ... bomb from detonating and spreading fire and destruction over a wide area."<ref>The declassified document says 24 megaton. However, Hansen wrote that "the United States has never deployed such a high-yield weapon".{{cite Q|Q109333421}}</ref> An expert evaluation written on 22 October 1969 by Parker F. Jones, the supervisor of the nuclear weapons safety department at Sandia National Laboratories, reported that "one simple, dynamo-technology, low voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe", and that it "seems credible" that a short circuit in the Arm line during a mid-air breakup of the aircraft "could" have resulted in a nuclear explosion.<ref name="guardian-goldsboro-revisted">{{Cite web |date=20 September 2013 |title=Goldsboro revisited: account of hydrogen bomb near-disaster over North Carolina – declassified document |url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/20/goldsboro-revisited-declassified-document |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230522173411/https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/20/goldsboro-revisited-declassified-document |archive-date=22 May 2023 |access-date=24 July 2023 |website=The Guardian |language=en}}</ref>

=== 1961: U.S. strategic bomber crash in California === {{Main|1961 Yuba City B-52 crash}}

A B-52 Stratofortress carrying two nuclear weapons experienced a catastrophic decompression, eventually forcing the crew to eject. The crewless plane crashed 15 miles west of Yuba City, California. The bombs did not detonate due to safety features.

=== 1961: U.S. false alarm from communications failure ===

Staff at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters (SAC HQ) simultaneously lost contact with NORAD and multiple Ballistic Missile Early Warning System sites. Since these communication lines were designed to be redundant and independent from one another, the communications failure was interpreted as either a very unlikely coincidence or a coordinated attack. SAC HQ prepared the entire ready force for takeoff before already overhead aircraft confirmed that there did not appear to be an attack. It was later found that the failure of a single relay station in Colorado was the sole cause of the communications problem.<ref name="UCS close calls" />

===1962: U.S. mistaken order during Cuban Missile Crisis=== {{further|United States nuclear weapons in Japan#Nuclear weapons accidents}}

According to a technician who served there, a mistaken order was issued by Kadena Air Base in Okinawa to nuclear missile sites in Okinawa to launch all their nuclear missiles. None were launched. A team responsible for four missiles at Bolo Airfield in Yomitan reported that the order's codes were in order, but the local officer in charge did not trust the order, partly because only one of their four missiles was targeted on Russia, and he saw no logic why missiles would be launched against China too, and because readiness was at DEFCON 2, not DEFCON 1.<ref name="apj">{{Cite web |last=Masakatsu |first=Ota |date=30 March 2015 |title=U.S. Veterans Reveal 1962 Nuclear Close Call Dodged in Okinawa |url=https://apjjf.org/-Steve-Rabson/4825/article.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326124137/https://apjjf.org/-Steve-Rabson/4825/article.html |archive-date=26 March 2023 |access-date=24 July 2023 |website=The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus}}</ref> Others serving there at the time have made statements saying they doubt this incident ever happened.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Tritten |first1=Travis |date=23 December 2015 |title=Cold War Missileers refute Okinawa near-launch |url=https://www.stripes.com/news/special-reports/features/cold-war-missileers-refute-okinawa-near-launch-1.385439 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211121063427/https://www.stripes.com/special-reports/featured/cold-war-missileers-refute-okinawa-near-launch-1.385439 |archive-date=21 November 2021 |access-date=8 January 2016 |website=Stripes.com |publisher=Stars and Stripes}}</ref>

=== 1964: U.S. strategic bomber crash in Maryland === {{Main|1964 Savage Mountain B-52 crash}}

A B-52 carrying nuclear bombs was severely damaged while flying in turbulence over Western Pennsylvania. The plane crashed in Garrett County, Maryland, at Savage River State Forest. Having completed an Operation Chrome Dome mission, the plane was traveling from Massachusetts to Georgia carrying two nuclear bombs. Reports on the condition of the bombs varied, with Department of Defense (DoD) saying they were "relatively intact" while Sandia National Laboratories engineers saying they "broke apart" and that it was too risky to hastily move them. Within two days, the bombs were retrieved and taken to a local airport for transportation to Air Force facilities. The pilot ordered the crew to eject from the plane when it lost control. Three crew members died in the crash or due to exposure in the snowy winter conditions.

=== 1965: U.S. false alarm from blackout computer errors ===

The Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert after a massive power outage in the northeastern United States. Several nuclear bomb detectors—used to distinguish between regular power outages and power outages caused by a nuclear blast—near major U.S. cities malfunctioned due to circuit errors, creating the illusion of a nuclear attack.<ref name="nuclear files 20" />

=== 1965: U.S. attack aircraft falling off carrier === {{Main|1965 Philippine Sea A-4 incident}}

During a training exercise in the Philippine Sea, a nuclear-armed Douglas A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft fell off the side of the aircraft carrier USS ''Ticonderoga''. The jet, pilot and weapon were not recovered.

=== 1966: U.S. strategic bomber crash in Spain === {{Main|1966 Palomares B-52 crash}}

A B-52G bomber and KC-135 tanker crashed over the Mediterranean Sea. The bomber was carrying nuclear weapons at the time. While the bombs did not detonate, they did contaminate the area with radioactive material.

=== 1966: French false alarm from weather (likely) === In the early days of the French Strategic Air Forces, electrical transmissions were disrupted due to a thunderstorm, causing a wartime takeoff order to be displayed. The French Air Force launched a Mirage IV with an AN-11 atomic bomb. The crew was called back by radio, but did not respond, as required by procedure. When they reached their refueling zone, they were unable to find the supply plane, forcing them to abort their mission, turn back, and land.<ref>{{cite web |date=8 June 2015 |title=Le jour où un Mirage IV décolla avec une vraie bombe nucléaire... (Actualisé-3) |url=https://www.lopinion.fr/secret-defense/le-jour-ou-un-mirage-iv-decolla-avec-une-vraie-bombe-nucleaire-actualise-3}}</ref>

=== 1967: U.S. false alarm from weather ===

A powerful solar flare accompanied by a coronal mass ejection interfered with multiple NORAD radars over the Northern Hemisphere. These radars included three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) that had been recently upgraded, and only resumed operation eight days prior to the flare.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Knipp |first1=D. J. |last2=Ramsay |first2=A. C. |last3=Beard |first3=E. D. |last4=Boright |first4=A. L. |last5=Cade |first5=W. B. |last6=Hewins |first6=I. M. |last7=McFadden |first7=R. H. |last8=Denig |first8=W. F. |last9=Kilcommons |first9=L. M. |last10=Shea |first10=M. A. |last11=Smart |first11=D. F. |date=September 2016 |title=The May 1967 great storm and radio disruption event: Extreme space weather and extraordinary responses |journal=Space Weather |language=en |volume=14 |issue=9 |pages=614–633 |bibcode=2016SpWea..14..614K |doi=10.1002/2016SW001423 |issn=1542-7390 |doi-access=free}}</ref> This interference was initially interpreted as intentional jamming of the radars by the Soviets, and thus an act of war. A nuclear bomber counterstrike was nearly launched by the United States.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wall |first1=Michael D. |date=9 August 2016 |title=How a 1967 Solar Storm Nearly Led to Nuclear War |url=https://www.space.com/33687-solar-storm-cold-war-false-alarm.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043849/https://www.space.com/33687-solar-storm-cold-war-false-alarm.html |archive-date=16 July 2023 |access-date=12 August 2016 |website=Space.com}}</ref> The Strategic Air Command had prepared to launch fighters before NORAD alerted them of the solar flare.

===1968: U.S. strategic bomber crash in Greenland === {{Main|1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash}}

A fire broke out on a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber just off Greenland, and the plane crashed into the sea without causing a detonation.

=== 1979: U.S. false alarm from computer training scenario ===

Computer errors at the NORAD headquarters in Peterson Air Force Base, the Strategic Air Command command post in Offutt Air Force Base, the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon, and the Alternate National Military Command Center in the Raven Rock Mountain Complex led to alarm and full preparation for a nonexistent large-scale Soviet attack.<ref name="nuclear files 20" /><ref name="UCS close calls" /> NORAD notified National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that the Soviet Union had launched 250 ballistic missiles with a trajectory for the United States, stating that a decision to retaliate would need to be made by the president within three to seven minutes. NORAD computers then placed the number of incoming missiles at 2,200.<ref name="The 3 A.M. Phone Call">{{cite news |last=Burr |first=William |date=1 March 2012 |title=The 3 A.M. Phone Call: False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks during 1979-80 Led to Alert Actions for U.S. Strategic Forces |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb371/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230702222558/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb371/ |archive-date=2 July 2023 |access-date=24 July 2023 |publisher=National Security Archive |language=en |series=Briefing Book # 371}}</ref> Strategic Air Command was notified, and nuclear bombers prepared for takeoff. Within six to seven minutes of the initial response, PAVE PAWS satellite and radar systems were able to confirm that the attack was a false alarm.<ref name="nuclear files 20" /><ref name=":0" /><ref>{{cite web |title=Norad false alarm causes uproar |url=http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/norad-false-alarm-causes-uproar |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170527182739/http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/norad-false-alarm-causes-uproar |archive-date=27 May 2017 |access-date=24 July 2023 |website=CBC Digital Archives |publisher=CBC}}</ref>

Congress quickly learned of the incident because Senator Charles H. Percy was present at the NORAD headquarters during the panic. A General Accounting Office investigation found that a training scenario was inadvertently loaded into an operational computer in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex.<ref name="nuclear files 20" /> Commenting on the incident, U.S. State Department adviser Marshall Shulman stated that "false alerts of this kind are not a rare occurrence. There is a complacency about handling them that disturbs me."<ref name="The 3 A.M. Phone Call" /> Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev composed a letter to U.S. President Jimmy Carter that the false alarm was "fraught with a tremendous danger" and "I think you will agree with me that there should be no errors in such matters."<ref name=":1">{{cite news |last1=Burr |first1=William |date=6 April 2020 |title=False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks Put U.S. Forces on Alert in 1979-1980 |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-03-16/false-warnings-soviet-missile-attacks-during-1979-80-led-alert-actions-us-strategic-forces |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230723233247/https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2020-03-16/false-warnings-soviet-missile-attacks-during-1979-80-led-alert-actions-us-strategic-forces |archive-date=23 July 2023 |access-date=24 July 2023 |publisher=National Security Archive |language=en |series=Briefing Book # 699}}</ref> In the months following the incident, there were three more false alarms at NORAD, two of them caused by faulty computer chips.<ref name="UCS close calls" /> One of them forced the National Emergency Airborne Command Post to taxi into position at Andrews Air Force Base.<ref name=":1" />

=== 1980: U.S. false alarm from Soviet missile exercise ===

A Soviet submarine near the Kuril Islands launched four missiles as part of a training exercise. American early warning sensors determined one of the four to be aimed towards the United States. In response, the United States convened officials for a threat assessment conference, at which point it was determined to not be a threat and the situation was resolved.<ref name="UCS close calls" />

=== 1980: Explosion at U.S. missile silo === {{Main|1980 Damascus Titan missile explosion}}

An explosion in Arkansas ripped the doors off a silo and launched part of a nuclear missile out of the structure. The warhead landed 30m away, but safety features prevented either a detonation or release of radioactive material. The incident caused one death and 21 injuries, and sparked a congressional inquiry.<ref>{{cite web |title=Encyclopedia of Arkansas |url=https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/titan-ii-missile-explosion-2543/ |website=Encyclopedia of Arkansas}}</ref>

=== 1983: Soviet false alarm from weather (likely) ===

Several weeks after the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 over Soviet airspace, a satellite early warning system near Moscow reported the launch of one American Minuteman ICBM. Soon after, it reported that five missiles had been launched. Convinced that a real American offensive would involve many more missiles, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov of the Air Defense Forces refused to acknowledge the threat as legitimate and continued to convince his superiors that it was a false alarm until this could be confirmed by ground radar.<ref name=":0" /><ref name="wash">{{cite news |last=Hoffman |first=David |date=10 February 1999 |title=I Had A Funny Feeling in My Gut |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter021099b.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120327191136/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter021099b.htm |archive-date=27 March 2012 |access-date=24 July 2023 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref><ref name="Baltimore Sun">{{cite web |last=Shane |first=Scott |date=31 August 2003 |title=Cold War's Riskiest Moment |url=https://hnn.us/articles/1709.html#bombs9-5-03 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060819033034/http://hnn.us/articles/1709.html |archive-date=19 August 2006 |access-date=24 July 2023 |website=History News Network |publisher=Baltimore Sun}} article reprinted as "The Nuclear War That Almost Happened in 1983"</ref><ref name="PetrovBBC">{{cite news |date=18 September 2017 |title=Stanislav Petrov, who averted possible nuclear war, dies at 77 |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41314948 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043848/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41314948 |archive-date=16 July 2023 |access-date=17 January 2018 |work=BBC}}</ref><ref name="PetrovAP">{{cite news |date=21 September 2017 |title=Stanislav Petrov, 'the man who saved the world' from nuclear war, dies at 77 |url=https://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-stanislavsky-petrov-20170921-story.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043850/https://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-stanislavsky-petrov-20170921-story.html |archive-date=16 July 2023 |access-date=17 January 2018 |newspaper=Los Angeles Times |agency=Associated Press}}</ref><ref name="PetrovNPR">{{cite news |last=Myre |first=Greg |date=18 September 2017 |title=Stanislav Petrov, 'The Man Who Saved The World,' Dies At 77 |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/18/551792129/stanislav-petrov-the-man-who-saved-the-world-dies-at-77 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230712090722/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/18/551792129/stanislav-petrov-the-man-who-saved-the-world-dies-at-77 |archive-date=12 July 2023 |access-date=18 January 2018 |work=NPR}}</ref><ref name="PetrovSmithsonian">{{cite web |last=Daley |first=Jason |url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/man-who-saved-world-nuclear-annihilation-dies-77-180964934/ |title=Man Who Saved the World From Nuclear Annihilation Dies at 77: In 1983, Soviet lieutenant colonel Stanislav Petrov kept his cool and reported a U.S. missile strike as a false alarm, preventing a massive counterstrike |date=18 September 2017 |work=Smithsonian.com |access-date=17 January 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043849/https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/man-who-saved-world-nuclear-annihilation-dies-77-180964934/ |archive-date=16 July 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref>{{Excessive citations inline|date=August 2024}}

=== 1991: Tornado at U.S. strategic bomber airbase === {{Main|1991 Andover tornado}}

On April 26, 1991, a large tornado touched down southwest of the city of Wichita, Kansas, heading towards the city of Andover. As the tornado approached Andover, it struck the McConnell Air Force Base, where it narrowly missed ten lined up Rockwell B-1 Lancers, two of them armed with nuclear warheads.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Smith |first=Cecelia Hanley and Elisabeth |title=Tornado hit Andover, Kansas days after the anniversary of the 1991 deadly twister |url=https://www.cjonline.com/story/weather/2022/04/29/tornado-ks-andover-wichita-kansas-1991-multi-vortex-mcconnell-airforce-base/9595058002/ |access-date=2024-11-20 |website=The Topeka Capital-Journal |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=McMillan |first=Laura |date=April 26, 2024 |title=Remembering the deadly 1991 Andover tornado |url=https://www.ksn.com/weather/weather-stories/monday-marks-30-years-since-deadly-andover-tornado/#:~:text=It%20destroyed%20102%20base%20housing,had%20nuclear%20warheads%20on%20them. |access-date=November 20, 2024 |website=KSN}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=US Department of Commerce |first=NOAA |title=Timeline for supercell that produced the Wichita/Andover Tornado |url=https://www.weather.gov/ict/andovertimeline |access-date=2024-11-20 |website=National Weather Service |language=EN-US}}</ref>

=== 1995: Russian false alarm from Norwegian research rocket ===

Russian President Boris Yeltsin became the first world leader to activate the Russian nuclear briefcase after Russian radar systems detected the launch of what was later determined to be a Norwegian Black Brant XII research rocket being used to study the northern lights.<ref>{{cite news |last=Hoffman |first=David |date=15 March 1998 |title=Cold-War Doctrines Refuse to Die |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter031598a.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180811054005/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter031598a.htm |archive-date=11 August 2018 |publisher=Washington Post Foreign Service}}</ref> Russian ballistic missile submarines were put on alert in preparation for a possible retaliatory strike.<ref>{{cite web |date=23 January 2012 |title=January 25, 1995—The Norwegian Rocket Incident |url=http://www.eucom.mil/article/23042/this-week-in-eucom-history-january-23-29-1995 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120921003744/http://www.eucom.mil/article/23042/this-week-in-eucom-history-january-23-29-1995 |archive-date=21 September 2012 |publisher=United States European Command}}</ref> When it became clear the rocket did not pose a threat to Russia and was not part of a larger attack, the alarm was cancelled. Russia was, in fact, one of a number of countries earlier informed of the launch; however, the information had not reached the Russian radar operators.<ref name="UCS close calls" />

===2007: Improper transport of U.S. nuclear weapons=== {{main|2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident}}

On 29 August 2007, six nuclear-armed AGM-129 ACM cruise missiles were mistakenly loaded onto a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52H heavy bomber at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota and transported to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The nuclear warheads in the missiles were supposed to have been removed before the missiles were taken from their storage bunker. The missiles with the nuclear warheads were not reported missing and remained mounted to the aircraft at both Minot and Barksdale for 36 hours. During this period, the warheads were not protected by the various mandatory security precautions for nuclear weapons, and the government was not aware of their location. The incident was the first of its kind in 40 years in the United States and was later described by the media as "one of the worst breaches in U.S. nuclear weapons security in decades".<ref>Ricks, "Tough Punishment Expected for Warhead Errors", Warrick, "Missteps in the Bunker"</ref>

== References ==

== Further reading ==

* {{cite news |last=Gorvett |first=Zaria |title=The nuclear mistakes that nearly caused World War Three |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200807-the-nuclear-mistakes-that-could-have-ended-civilisation |work=BBC Future |date=9 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716043848/https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200807-the-nuclear-mistakes-that-could-have-ended-civilisation |archive-date=16 July 2023 |url-status=live}}

Close calls Close calls Close calls * Close calls Category:War scare