{{short description|Separation of religious matters and state affairs in Turkey}} {{use dmy dates|date=July 2024}} [[File:Protect Your Republic Protest - 2 (2007-04-14).jpg|350px|thumb|The Republic Protests took place in 2007 in support of the Kemalist ethos, avowing state secularism, against the perceived Islamization of Turkey under the ruling Justice and Development Party.]] {{Religion in Turkey}} {{Atatürk sidebar}} In Turkey, secularism or laicism (see ''laïcité'') was first introduced with the 1928 amendment of the Constitution of 1924, which removed the provision declaring that the "Religion of the State is Islam", and with the later reforms of Turkey's first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which set the administrative and political requirements to create a modern, democratic, secular state, aligned with Kemalism.
Nine years after its introduction, ''laïcité'' was explicitly stated in the second article of the then Turkish constitution on 5 February 1937. The current Constitution of 1982 neither recognizes an official religion nor promotes any.<ref>{{cite web| title = Turkey | work = The World Factbook | publisher = Central Intelligence Agency (US) | date = 2008-07-24 | url = https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/turkey/ | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210110073821/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/turkey | url-status = dead | archive-date = January 10, 2021 | access-date = 2008-08-01}}</ref>
The principles of Turkish secularism, and the separation of state and religion, were historically established in order to modernize the nation. This centralized progressive approach was seen as necessary not only for the operation of the Turkish government but also to avoid a cultural life dominated by superstition, dogma, and ignorance.<ref>{{cite web| url =http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-11/secularism-in-turkey| title =Secularism in Turkey| last =Daver| first =BÜLENT| website =Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı| publisher =PROF. DR. BÜLENT DAVER| access-date =2019-03-21| quote =This principle, unlike in western countries, is not realized by evolutionary currents and philosophers' ideas, spread among most people throughout the century, but rather by direct and decisive action and revolutionary enthusiasm from a very small elite consisting of bureaucrats and young army officer.| archive-date =2019-03-22| archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20190322031719/http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-11/secularism-in-turkey| url-status =dead}}</ref>
Turkey's concept of {{Lang|tr|laiklik}} ("laicism") calls for the separation of state and religion, but also describes the state's stance as one of "active neutrality", which involves state control and legal regulation of religion.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Öztürk|first1=Ahmet Erdi|last2=Sözeri|first2=Semiha|title=Diyanet as a Turkish Foreign Policy Tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria|url=https://www.academia.edu/36059631|journal=Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association|date=2018 |volume=11 |issue=3 |language=en|pages=3, 5|doi=10.1017/S175504831700075X |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180919132327/https://www.academia.edu/36059631/Diyanet_as_a_Turkish_Foreign_Policy_Tool_Evidence_from_the_Netherlands_and_Bulgaria|archive-date=19 September 2018}}</ref> Turkey's actions related with religion are carefully analyzed and evaluated through the Presidency of Religious Affairs ({{Lang|tr|Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı}} or simply {{Lang|tr|Diyanet}}).<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Turkey's Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?|journal = Southeast European and Black Sea Studies|volume = 16|issue = 4|pages = 619–635|last=Ahmet Erdi Öztürk|doi=10.1080/14683857.2016.1233663|year = 2016|s2cid = 151448076|url = http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5402/1/Turkeys-Diyanet-under-AKP-rule-from-protector-to-imposer-of-state-ideology.pdf}}</ref> The duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are "to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places".<ref>[http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=13 Basic Principles, Aims And Objectives] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080108071157/http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=13 |date=2008-01-08 }}, Presidency of Religious Affairs</ref>
==History== {{Further|Kemalism|Atatürk's reforms|History of the Republic of Turkey}} The history of secularism in Turkey extends to the Tanzimat reforms of Ottoman Empire. The second peak in secularism occurred during the Second Constitutional Era. The current form was achieved by Atatürk's Reforms.
===Ottoman Empire=== {{Further|Ottoman Caliphate|Religion in the Ottoman Empire}} The establishing structure (Ruling institution of the Ottoman Empire) of the Ottoman Empire (13th century) was an Islamic state in which the head of the Ottoman state was the Sultan. The social system was organized around millet. Millet structure allowed a great degree of religious, cultural and ethnic continuity to non-Muslim populations across the subdivisions of the Ottoman Empire and at the same time it permitted their incorporation into the Ottoman administrative, economic and political system.<ref name="sec">{{cite web |url=http://www.secularisminturkey.net/docs/Secular-Transcript.pdf |title=Secularism: The Turkish Experience |access-date=2013-09-28 |archive-date=2008-06-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080627111442/http://www.secularisminturkey.net/docs/Secular-Transcript.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> The Ottoman-appointed governor collected taxes and provided security, while the local religious or cultural matters were left to the regional communities to decide. On the other hand, the sultans were Muslims and the laws that bound them were based on the Sharia, the body of Islamic law, as well as various cultural customs. The Sultan, beginning in 1517, was also a caliph, the leader of all the Sunni Muslims in the world. By the turn of the 19th century the Ottoman ruling elite recognized the need to restructure the legislative, military and judiciary systems to cope with their new political rivals in Europe. When the millet system started to lose its efficiency due to the rise of nationalism within its borders, the Ottoman Empire explored new ways of governing its territory composed of diverse populations.{{citaiton needed|date=January 2026}}
Sultan Selim III founded the first secular military schools by establishing the new military unit, Nizam-ı Cedid, as early as 1792. However the last century (19th century) of the Ottoman Empire had many far reaching reforms. These reforms peaked with the Tanzimat which was the initial reform era of the Ottoman Empire. After the Tanzimat, rules, such as those relating to the equalized status of non-Muslim citizens, the establishment of a parliament, the abandonment of medieval punishments for apostasy,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/fm-publications/the-tanzimat-final-web.pdf | author=Hussain, Ishtiaq | title=The Tanzimat: Secular Reforms in the Ottoman Empire | work=Faith Matters | date=2011-10-07 |access-date=2013-09-28}}</ref> as well as the codification of the constitution of the empire and the rights of Ottoman subjects were established. The First World War brought about the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious Allies.
===Republic=== ====Atatürk's reforms==== {{Main|Atatürk's reforms}} thumb|One-party period was marked with sweeping reforms for women Reforms and policies designed to modernize Turkey adopted by Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder and the first president of Republic of Turkey, were known as "Kemalism", and had "six principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, revolutionism and statism".<ref name="Jakir Al Faruki 2017-22">{{cite journal |last1=Al Faruki |first1=Jakir |last2= Siddiky|first2=Md. Roknuzzaman |title=Secularism and the Muslim World: An Overview July 2017 Authors |journal=Journal of Social Science, Rajshahi College |date=July 2017 |volume=1 |issue=1 |page=22 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330320431 |access-date=23 November 2021}}</ref> Unlike some "softer" forms of secularism, Kemalist secularism "did not mean the separation of religion only from the state, rather it meant the separation of religion from whole public spheres—politics, jurisprudence, education, society and so on".<ref name="Wu, 2007">Wu, B. (2007). Secularism and secularization in the Arab world. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia). 1(1), 55-65</ref><ref name="Bagdonas, 2008">Bagdonas, O.D. (2008). A Poststructuralist to ideology and foreign policy: Kemalism in Turkish foreign policy discourse. A Doctoral Thesis, Central European University.</ref>
Kemalism excluded "religious symbols from public domain" and put religion "under the strict control of the state".<ref name="(Karakas, 2007">Karakas, C. (2007). Turkey: Islam and laicism between the interests of state, politics and society. PRIF Report No. 78, Peace Institute Frankfurt.</ref><ref name=" Burak, 2012)">Burak, Begum. (2012). Can secularism hinder democracy? The Turkish experiment. İnsan & Toplum, 2(4), 65-82</ref> The weekly holiday was changed from Friday to Sunday, the calendar changed from the Muslim lunar to Gregorian, and the alphabet changed from Arabic to Latin.<ref name="(Toprak, 2005">Toprak, B. (2005). Secularism and Islam: the building of modern Turkey. Macalester International: Vol. 15, Article 9, 27-43.</ref><ref name=" Burak, 2012)"/><ref name="Jakir Al Faruki 2017-22"/>
During the establishment of the Republic, there were two sections of the elite group at the helm of the discussions for the future. These were the Islamist reformists and Westerners.<ref name="sec"/> They shared a similar goal, the modernization of the new state. Many basic goals were common to both groups. The founder of the modern Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's achievement was to amplify this common ground and put the country on a fast track of reforms, now known as Atatürk's reforms.
Their first act was to give the Turkish nation the right to exercise popular sovereignty via representative democracy. Prior to declaring the new Republic, the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the constitutional monarchy on 1 November 1922. The Turkish Grand National Assembly then moved to replace the extant Islamic law structure with the laws it had passed during the Turkish War of Independence, beginning in 1919. The modernization of the Law had already begun at the point that the project was undertaken in earnest. A milestone in this process was the passage of the Turkish Constitution of 1921. Upon the establishment of the Republic on 29 October 1923, the institution of the caliphate (a title held by the Ottoman Sultanate since 1517) remained, but the passage of a new constitution in 1924 effectively abolished this title. Even as the new constitution eliminated the caliphate it, at the same time, declared Islam as the official religion of the Turkish Republic. According to the law text passed by the Turkish Parliament, "Since the Caliphate was essentially present in the meaning and concept of the Government and the Republic, the office of the Caliphate was abolished."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Hilafetin_%C4%B0lgas%C4%B1na_ve_Hanedan%C4%B1_Osmaninin_T%C3%BCrkiye_Cumhuriyeti_Memaliki_Haricine_%C3%87%C4%B1kar%C4%B1lmas%C4%B1na_Dair_Kanun|title=Hilafetin İlgasına ve Hanedanı Osmaninin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Memaliki Haricine Çıkarılmasına Dair Kanun - Vikikaynak|website=tr.wikisource.org}}</ref>
Following quickly upon these developments, a number of social reforms were undertaken. Many of these reforms affected every aspect of Turkish life, moving to erase the legacy of dominance long held by religion and tradition. The unification of education, installation of a secular education system, and the closure of many religious orders took place on 3 March 1924. This extended to closure of religious convents and dervish lodges on 30 November 1925. These reforms also included the extension to women of voting rights in 1931 and the right be to elected to public office on 5 December 1934. The inclusion of reference to ''laïcité'' into the constitution was achieved by an amendment on 5 February 1937, a move regarded as the final act in the project of instituting complete separation between governmental and religious affairs in Turkey.
====Islamization under AKP==== [[File:Chatham House Prize 2010 (5163375167).jpg|thumb|Abdullah Gül's wife, Hayrünisa Gül became the first hijabi first lady in Turkish history]] According to at least one observer (Mustafa Akyol), under the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "hundreds of secularist officers and their civilian allies" were jailed starting in 2007, and by 2012 the "old secularist guard" were removed from positions of authority and replaced by members/supporters of the AKP and the Islamist Gülen movement.<ref name="NYT-23-7-16">{{cite news|last1=Akyol|first1=Mustafa|title=Who Was Behind the Coup Attempt in Turkey?|newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/opinion/who-was-behind-the-coup-attempt-in-turkey.html?_r=0|access-date=23 July 2016|agency=New York Times|date=July 22, 2016}}</ref> On 25 April 2016, the Turkish Parliament Speaker İsmail Kahraman told a conference of Islamic scholars and writers in Istanbul that "secularism would not have a place in a new constitution", as Turkey is "a Muslim country and so we should have a religious constitution". (One of the duties of Parliament Speaker is to pen a new draft constitution for Turkey.)<ref name="removed-Milliyet-27 April 2016">{{cite news |title=Secularism must be removed from constitution, Turkey's Parliament Speaker says |url=https://www.milliyet.com.tr/en/vadim-the-suicide-bomber-2271599 |access-date=31 January 2021 |agency=Milliyet |date=27 April 2016}}</ref>
Traditionally, the function of the ''Diyanet'' was to maintain control over and limit the religious sphere of Islam in Turkey. Some (David Lepeska, Svante Cornell) have complained that under Erdoğan that role has "largely been turned on its head",<ref name="Lepeska-2015">{{cite journal |last1=Lepeska |first1=David |title=Turkey Casts the Diyanet |journal=Foreign Affairs |date=17 May 2015 |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-05-17/turkey-casts-diyanet |access-date=27 July 2016}}</ref> with the ''Diyanet'', now greatly increased in size, promoting Islam in Turkey, specifically a certain type of conservative Islam—issuing ''fatawa'' forbidding such activities as "feeding dogs at home, celebrating the western New Year, lotteries, and tattoos";<ref name=rise>{{cite web|url=http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/463-the-rise-of-diyanet-the-politicization-of-turkey%E2%80%99s-directorate-of-religious-affairs.html |title=The Rise of Diyanet: the Politicization of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs |last1=Cornell |first1=Svante |publisher=turkeyanalyst.org |date=2015-10-09 |access-date=2016-07-27}}</ref> and projecting this "Turkish Islam"<ref name="Lepeska-2015"/> abroad.<ref name="al-monitor-29-4-16">{{cite news|last1=Tremblay|first1=Pinar|title=Is Erdogan signaling end of secularism in Turkey?|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/turkey-is-erdogan-signaling-end-of-secularism.html|access-date=25 July 2016|agency=Al Monitor|date=April 29, 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160808130552/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/turkey-is-erdogan-signaling-end-of-secularism.html|archive-date=8 August 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Sözeri|first1=Semiha|last2=Öztürk|first2=Ahmet Erdi|date=September 2018|title=Diyanet as a Turkish Foreign Policy Tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria|journal=Politics and Religion|language=en|volume=11|issue=3|pages=624–648|doi=10.1017/S175504831700075X|s2cid=148657630|issn=1755-0483|url=http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5404/1/Diyanet_Ozturk-Sozeri.pdf}}</ref>
In education, the AKP government pursued the explicit policy agenda of Islamization to "raise a devout generation" against secular resistance,<ref>{{cite web|author=Sukru Kucuksahin|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-high-schools-student-stand-up-against-islamism.html|title=Turkish students up in arms over Islamization of education|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=20 June 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=Zülfikar Doğan|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-education-erdogan-devout-generation-plan.html|title=Erdogan pens education plan for Turkey's 'devout generation'|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=29 June 2016}}</ref> in the process causing many non-religious citizens of Turkey to lose their jobs and schooling.<ref>{{cite web|author=Sibel Hurtas|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-post-putsch-crackdown-transform-education.html|title=Turkey's 'devout generation' project means lost jobs, schools for many|publisher=Al-Monitor|date=13 October 2016}}</ref> The turn to a more conservative and Islamic policy by the AKP, according to scholars such as M. Yavuz arises from the aftermath of the AKP's victory in the 2007 Turkish national elections. Due to the AKP's strong religious leanings and the centrality of political secularism in the state of Turkey, the AKP was charged with anti-secularism and had its funding cut by the Turkish constitutional court. Subsequently, this had led the AKP and through its collaboration with the Gülen movement to prosecute individuals who they had associated with their prosecution by the constitutional court in what Yavuz describes as "kangaroo courts". From there, it is arguably seen that the AKP with the Gülen movement, had begun to reshape state institutions and promoted Islamic-centric parties and individuals with the Gülen movement up till the 2016 Turkish coup attempt.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yavuz |first=M. Hakan |date=2019-01-02 |title=Understanding Turkish secularism in the 21th century: a contextual roadmap |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2019.1576367 |journal=Southeast European and Black Sea Studies |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=71–73 |doi=10.1080/14683857.2019.1576367 |issn=1468-3857|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
Following the July 2016 coup attempt—which President Erdoğan called "a gift from God"<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-17/coup-was-a-gift-from-god-says-erdogan-who-plans-a-new-turkey|title=Coup Was 'Gift From God' for Erdogan Planning a New Turkey|date=2016-07-17|newspaper=Bloomberg.com|access-date=2017-01-09}}</ref>—thousands were purged by the AKP government. The victims were primarily followers of the Gülen movement — which is alleged to have launched the coup<ref>{{Cite journal|title=From 'Diaspora by Design' to Transnational Political Exile: The Gülen Movement in Transition|journal = Politics, Religion & Ideology|volume = 19|pages = 33–52|last=Simon P. Watmough and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk|doi=10.1080/21567689.2018.1453254|year = 2018|doi-access = free}}</ref>—but also secularists who had not already been sacked in earlier purges.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://turkeypurge.com/leftists-kemalists-suspended-from-posts-for-being-gulenists-says-chp-report|title=Leftists, Kemalists suspended from posts for being Gülenists, says CHP report {{!}} Turkey Purge|website=turkeypurge.com|access-date=2017-01-09|archive-date=10 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170110020407/http://turkeypurge.com/leftists-kemalists-suspended-from-posts-for-being-gulenists-says-chp-report|url-status=dead}}</ref> One explanation for the replacement of secularist policies<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Yavuz|first1=M. Hakan|last2=Öztürk|first2=Ahmet Erdi|date=2019-02-18|title=Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdoğan|journal=Southeast European and Black Sea Studies|volume=19|pages=1–9|doi=10.1080/14683857.2019.1580828|issn=1468-3857|doi-access=free}}</ref> in Turkey is that business interests who felt threatened by socialism saw Islamic values as "best suited to neutralize any challenges from the left to capitalist supremacy."<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/turkeys-journey-from-secularism-to-islamization-a-capitalist-story_41004|title=Turkey's journey from secularism to Islamization: A capitalist story|date=May 23, 2016|newspaper=Your Middle East|access-date=2017-01-09|archive-date=10 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170110020356/http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/turkeys-journey-from-secularism-to-islamization-a-capitalist-story_41004|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Some (such as Turan Kayaoğlu) see interest and support of secularism in Turkey as strengthening, not decreasing.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/secularism-in-turkey-stronger-than-ever/|title=Secularism in Turkey: Stronger than Ever?|last=Kayaoğlu|first=Turan|date=10 April 2012|work=Brookings Institution|access-date=25 April 2017|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/turkey-is-getting-more-secular.html|title=Turkey is becoming more secular, not less|date=2015-03-02|work=Al-Monitor|access-date=2017-04-25|language=en-us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6554851.stm|title=Secular rally targets Turkish PM|date=14 April 2007|website=BBC News|access-date=25 April 2017}}</ref> After Erdoğan stated his desire to "raise a religious youth," politicians of all parties condemned his statements as abandoning Turkish values. A petition reading "[O]f Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Alawite, Shafi’i, religious and nonreligious, atheist and agnostic backgrounds, all joined with a firm belief in secularism, [we] find your recent remarks about raising a religious and conservative youth most alarming and dangerous" was signed by over 2,000 people. The pro-government newspaper ''Bugün'' ran a story stating "no one has the right to convert this society into a religious one, or the opposite." Surveys of the Turkish people also show a great support for maintaining a secular country. The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation found that only 9% of Turks supported a religious state in 2006.<ref name=":0" /> A 2015 poll by Metropoll found that over 80% of Turkish people supported the continuation of Turkey as a secular state, with even the majority of AKP voters supporting a secular state too.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.metropoll.com.tr/upload/content/files/1779-turkiyenin-nabzi-ocak-2015--site.pdf|title=Türkiye'nin Nabzı: Din, Şiddet ve Özgürlük [Pulse of Turkey: Religion, Violence and Freedom]|last=Sencar|first=Özer|date=January 2015|website=Metropoll|page=34}}</ref>
==Constitutional principles== {{See also|Constitution of Turkey}} The Constitution asserts that Turkey is supposed to be a secular and democratic republic, deriving its sovereignty from the people. The sovereignty rests with the Turkish Nation, who delegates its exercise to an elected unicameral parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Moreover, Article 4 declares the immovability of the founding principles of the Republic defined in the first three Articles: #"secularism, social equality, equality before the law" #"the Republican form of government" #"the indivisibility of the Republic and of the Turkish Nation", The Constitution bans any proposals for the modification of these articles (see Entrenched clause). Each of these concepts which were distributed in the three articles of the constitution can not be achieved without the other two concepts.{{Citation needed|date=November 2008}} The constitution requires a central administration which would lose its meaning (effectiveness, coverage, etc.) if the system is not based on ''laïcité'', social equality, and equality before law. Vice versa, if the Republic differentiate itself based on social, religious differences, administration can not be equal to the population when the administration is central.{{Citation needed|date=November 2008}} The system which tried to be established in the constitution sets out to found a unitary nation-state based on the principles of secular democracy.{{citation needed|date=December 2023}}
===Headscarf controversy=== {{Main|Headscarf controversy in Turkey}} {{Further|Conservatism in Turkey|Freedom of religion in Turkey|Human rights in Turkey|Irreligion in Turkey}} {{See also|White Turks|Black Turks}} {| class="wikitable" style="border:1px black; float:right; margin-center:1em" |- ! style="background:#f99;" colspan="4"|Do you cover when going outside?<ref name=TESEV07p64>{{cite book|last=Fromm|first=Ali Çarkoğlu, Binnaz Toprak; translated from Turkish by Çiğdem Aksoy|title=Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey|year=2007|publisher=TESEV publications|location=Karaköy, İstanbul|isbn=978-975-8112-90-6|page=64|url=http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/5854/1/2007_08_Religon%2C_Society_and_Politics_in_a_Changing_Turkey.pdf|access-date=2021-07-27|archive-date=2021-02-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210221203347/http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/5854/1/2007_08_Religon%2C_Society_and_Politics_in_a_Changing_Turkey.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> |-Answers | || 1999 || 2012 |- | No, I do not || 47.3% || 66.5% |- | Yes, I wear a headscarf || 33.4% || 18.8% |- | Yes, I wear a türban || 15.7% || 11.4% |- | Yes, I wear a çarşaf || 3.4% || 0.1% |- | NI/NA || 0.3% || 2.2% |} The Turkish government had outlawed the wearing of headscarves by women who work in the public sector in 1982.<ref>''[https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=85105&MevzuatTur=3&MevzuatTertip=5 KAMU KURUM VE KURULUŞLARINDA ÇALIŞAN PERSONELİN KILIK VE KIYAFETİNE DAİR YÖNETMELİK]'' ("THE REGULATION ON THE DRESS AND ATTIRE OF PERSONNEL WORKING IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS") dated 16 July 1982.</ref> The ban had applied to teachers, lawyers, parliamentarians and others working on state premises. The ban on headscarves in the civil service and educational and political institutions was expanded to cover non-state institutions. Authorities began to enforce the headscarf ban among mothers accompanying their children to school events or public swimming pools, while female lawyers and journalists who refused to comply with the ban were expelled from public buildings such as courtrooms and universities {{Citation needed|date=February 2009}}. In 1999, the ban on headscarves in the public sphere hit the headlines when Merve Kavakçı, a newly elected MP for the Virtue Party was prevented from taking her oath in the National Assembly because she wore a headscarf. The constitutional rule that prohibits discrimination on religious grounds is taken very seriously. Turkey prohibited by law the wearing of religious headcover and theo-political symbolic garments for both genders in government buildings, schools, and universities;<ref name="The Islamic veil across Europe"/> a law that was upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights as legitimate on 10 November 2005, in ''Leyla Şahin v. Turkey''.<ref name="Leyla Şahin v. Turkey"/> In 2022, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has suggested the constitutional change to guarantee the right to wear a headscarf in the civil service, schools, and universities should be decided through a referendum.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-10-23 |title=Turkey's Erdogan proposes a referendum on right to wear headscarf |url=https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/23/turkeys-erdogan-proposes-a-referendum-on-right-to-wear-headscarf |access-date=2023-05-10 |website=euronews |language=en}}</ref>
==Impact on society== {{See also|Politics of Turkey}} The Turkish Constitution recognizes freedom of religion for ''individuals'' whereas identified ''religious communities'' are placed under the protection of state. The constitution explicitly states that it is illegal for a religious community to get involved in politics, or to form a Party openly representing a religious group.{{citation needed|date=December 2016}}
In recent history, two parties have been ordered to close (Welfare Party in 1998, and Virtue Party in 2001) by the Constitutional Court for Islamist activities and attempts to "redefine the secular nature of the republic". The first party to be closed for suspected anti-secularist activities was the Progressive Republican Party on 3 June 1925.{{citation needed|date=December 2016}}
Issues relating to Turkey's secularism were discussed in the lead up to the 2007 presidential election, in which the ruling party chose a candidate with Islamist connections, Abdullah Gül, for the first time in the history of the secular republic. While some in Turkey have expressed concern that the nomination could represent a move away from Turkey's secularist traditions, including particularly Turkey's priority on equality between the sexes, others have suggested that the conservative party has effectively promoted modernization while reaching out to more traditional and religious elements in Turkish society.<ref>Tavernise, Sabrina. "[https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/world/europe/25turkey.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp In Turkey, a Sign of a Rising Islamic Middle Class]," ''New York Times'', April 25, 2007.</ref><ref name=Must>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6587061.stm "Turkey 'must have secular leader'"], ''BBC News'', April 24, 2007.</ref> On 22 July 2007, it was reported that the more religiously conservative ruling party won a larger than expected electoral victory in the snap general election.<ref>Tavernise, Sabrina. "[https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/europe/23turkey.html?ex=1342929600&en=6e633da0fb2c0b2f&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink Ruling Party in Turkey Wins Broad Victory]," ''New York Times'', July 23, 2007.</ref>
Turkey's preservation and maintenance of its secular identity has been a profound issue and source of tension. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has broken with secular tradition, by speaking out in favor of limited Islamism and against the active restrictions,{{Citation needed|date=July 2008}} instituted by Atatürk on wearing the Islamic-style head scarves in government offices and schools. The Republic Protests ({{langx|tr|Cumhuriyet Mitingleri|links=no}}) were a series of peaceful mass rallies that took place in the spring of 2007 in support of the Kemalist ideals of state secularism.<ref name="BBC">{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6554851.stm|title=Secular rally targets Turkish PM|work=BBC News|access-date=2008-08-05|date=2007-04-14}}</ref>
Although the constitution prohibits discrimination on religious grounds, religious discrimination was official policy: In Turkey, wearing headscarves in government buildings and schools was prohibited. <!--universities now allow it--><ref name="The Islamic veil across Europe">{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5414098.stm |title=The Islamic veil across Europe|work=BBC News|access-date=2006-12-13|date=2006-11-17}}</ref> The law was upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights as legitimate on 10 November 2005, in ''Leyla Şahin v. Turkey''. They held that government "encouragement of secularism" was a legitiamate state policy.<ref name="Leyla Şahin v. Turkey">{{cite web|url=http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2005/Nov/GrandChamberJudgmentLeylaSahinvTurkey101105.htm|title=Leyla Şahin v. Turkey|publisher=European Court of Human Rights|access-date=2008-08-21|date=2005-11-10|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080804023338/http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2005/Nov/GrandChamberJudgmentLeylaSahinvTurkey101105.htm|archive-date=2008-08-04}}</ref>
The strict application of secularism in Turkey has been credited for enabling women to have access to greater opportunities, compared to countries with a greater influence of religion in public affairs, in matters of education, employment, wealth as well as political, social and cultural freedoms.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Religion and Politics in Turkey|first=Ali|last=Çarkoğlu|publisher=Routledge|location=UK|year=2004|isbn=978-0-415-34831-7|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t5G_zw9exMQC&q=Religion+in+Turkey&pg=PP1 }}</ref>
Also paradoxical with the Turkish secularism is the fact that identity document cards of Turkish citizens include the specification of the card holder's religion.<ref>[http://www.nvi.gov.tr/Hizmetler,Nufus_Cuzdani.html State ID cards] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160825204711/http://www.nvi.gov.tr/Hizmetler,Nufus_Cuzdani.html |date=25 August 2016 }}, ''General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Matters'', Ministry of the Interior {{in lang|tr}}</ref> This declaration was perceived by some as representing a form of the state's surveillance over its citizens' religious choices.{{citation needed|date=December 2016}}
The mainstream Hanafite school of Sunni Islam is entirely organized by the state, through the ''Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'' (Religious Affairs Directorate), which supervises all mosques, educates the imams who work in them, and approves all content for religious services and prayers. It appoints imams, who are classified as civil servants.<ref>Fox, Jonathan. ''World Survey of Religion and the State'', Cambridge University Press, 2008, {{ISBN|978-0-521-70758-9}}, page 247</ref> This micromanagement of Sunni religious practices, at times, seems much more sectarian than secular, as it violates the principle of state neutrality in religious practice.{{citation needed|date=December 2016}} Groups that have expressed dissatisfaction with this situation include a variety of non-governmental Sunni / Hanafi groups (such as the Nurcu movement), whose interpretation of Islam tends to be more activist; and the non-Sunni (Alevi), whose members tend to resent supporting the Sunni establishment with their tax money (whereas the Turkish state does not subsidize Alevi religious activities).{{citation needed|date=December 2016}}
==See also== {{Portal|Turkey}} * Conservatism in Turkey * Freedom of religion in Turkey * Headscarf controversy in Turkey * Islam in Turkey * Religion in Turkey * White Turks * Black Turks
==References== {{Reflist}}
==Further reading== *Orhan, Özgüç. "[https://archive.org/download/the-paradox-of-turkish-secularism/The_Paradox_of_Turkish_Secularism.pdf The Paradox of Turkish Secularism]." Turkish Journal of Politics 4.1 (2013). *Ahmet T. Kuru. ''Secularism and State Policies toward Religion The United States, France, and Turkey'' Cambridge University Press, 2009. *Hirschberger, Bernd / Püttmann, Friedrich. "[https://www.transcript-open.de/doi/10.14361/9783839468272-008 The Political Instrumentalization of the Topics of Secularism, Religious Freedom and Islamophobia in Turkey]". In: Hirschberger, Bernd / Voges, Katja (eds.) (2024): [https://www.transcript-publishing.com/978-3-8376-6827-8/religious-freedom-and-populism/?number=978-3-8376-6827-8 Religious Freedom and Populism: The Appropriation of a Human Right and How to Counter It]. Bielefeld: transcript. Retrieved 30 June 2024, pp. 91–104. *Topal, Semiha. "[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-011-9114-z Everybody wants secularism—but which one? Contesting definitions of secularism in contemporary Turkey]." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 25.1 (2012): 1–14. *Peker, E. 2020. "Beyond Positivism: Building Turkish Laiklik in the Transition from the Empire to the Republic (1908–38)." ''Social Science History'' *Davison, Andrew. "[https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/4/article/43708/summary Turkey, a "secular" state?: The challenge of description]." The South Atlantic Quarterly 102.2 (2003): 333–350. *Sevinc, K., Hood, R. W. Jr., Coleman, T. J. III, (2017). [http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199988457.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199988457-e-10 Secularism in Turkey]. In Zuckerman, P., & Shook, J. R., (Eds.), ''The Oxford Handbook of Secularism''. Oxford University Press. *Dorroll, Philip. "[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11562-017-0377-7 Shari ‘a and the Secular in Modern Turkey]." Contemporary Islam 11.2 (2017): 123-135. *M. Hakan Yavuz, "[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2019.1576367 Understanding Turkish Secularism in the 21th Century: A Contextual Roadmap]", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 19, No.1; https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1576367 <!-- Please use the following templates when adding references: *{{cite book |first =| last = |coauthors = |authorlink = |title = |edition = |publisher = |location = |year = |id = |url = }}
*{{cite journal |title = '''REQUIRED''' }} --> *{{cite web|url=https://www.huffpost.com/entry/turkey-secularism_b_9818250|title=Stop Defending Turkey's 'Secularism' — It's Been a Lie All Along|work=Fréderike Geerdink|date=2 May 2016 |publisher=Huffington Post}}
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Category:Secularism in Turkey Category:Religion in Turkey Turkey Category:Religious policy