{{Short description|American physicist (born 1946)}} {{Infobox scientist | name = Theodore A. Postol | image = | caption = | birth_date = {{birth-date and age| 30 April 1946}} | birth_place = Brooklyn, New York, U.S. | death_date = | death_place = | residence = | field = Physicist and Science and technology studies | work_institution = MIT <br> Stanford <br> Argonne National Laboratory <br> Office of the Chief of Naval Operations | alma_mater = MIT | doctoral_advisor = | doctoral_students = | known_for = Criticism of U.S. missile defense effectiveness | prizes = | religion = | footnotes = }}

'''Theodore A. Postol''' (born 1946) is a professor emeritus of Science, Technology, and International Security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Prior to his work at MIT, he worked at Argonne National Laboratory, the Pentagon, and Stanford University. He was on the editorial board of the journal ''Science & Global Security'' until 2019. Postol is also a prominent critic of U.S. missile defense systems, frequently challenging the technical efficacy of military technologies through independent analysis.

Postol rose to national prominence in the early 1990s when he challenged U.S. Army claims regarding the success rate of the MIM-104 Patriot missile during the first Gulf War. While the government initially claimed a near-perfect interception rate, Postol’s analysis—later supported by a House Government Operations Committee investigation—concluded the actual success rate was likely below 10%.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/2003/03/27/patriot-missile-miscalculations-a-cause-for-us-concern/ |title=Patriot missile miscalculations a cause for U.S. concern |first1=Michael |last1=Killian |newspaper=Chicago Tribune|date=March 27, 2003}}</ref> For his work in disclosing misinformation regarding national missile defense, he has received numerous honours, including the Leo Szilard Prize (1990) and the Norbert Wiener Award (2001).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cpsr.org/about/wiener/wiener-award|title=Winners of the Norbert Wiener Award for Professional and Social Responsibility}}</ref>

In recent years, Postol’s work has been the subject of significant debate. He has vocally disputed Western intelligence and OPCW findings regarding chemical attacks in Syria (2013–2019) and challenged assessments of North Korean ballistic missile capabilities.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> These later analyses have been criticised by organizations such as Bellingcat and the Middlebury Institute for alleged methodological flaws and data errors, leading to his resignation from the editorial board of Science & Global Security in 2019.<ref name=":3" /><ref name="Errors" />

==Background== Postol received his undergraduate degree in physics and his PhD in nuclear engineering from MIT. Postol worked at Argonne National Laboratory, where he studied the microscopic dynamics and structure of liquids and disordered solids using neutron, X-ray and light scattering techniques, along with molecular dynamics simulations. He also worked at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, where he studied methods of basing the MX missile, and later worked as a scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations.<ref name=MIT>{{cite web|url=http://sts-program.mit.edu/people/emeriti-faculty/theodore-postol/|title=Theodore Postol}}</ref>

After leaving the Pentagon, Postol helped to build a program at Stanford University to train mid-career scientists to study weapons technology in relation to defense and arms control policy.<ref name=MIT /> In 1990, Postol received the Leo Szilard Prize from the American Physical Society for "incisive technical analysis of national security issues that [have] been vital for informing the public policy debate".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://wws.princeton.edu/news-and-events/events/item/theodore-postol-mit-ballistic-missile-expert-speak-march-25/|title=Theodore Postol, MIT ballistic missile expert, to speak March 25}}</ref> In 1995, he received the Hilliard Roderick Prize from the American Association for the Advancement of Science.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://archives.aaas.org/people.php?p_id=420|title=Theodore Postol, AAAS Awards and Honors}}</ref> In 2001, he received the Norbert Wiener Award from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility for his "courageous efforts to disclose misinformation and falsified test results of the proposed National Missile Defense system".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cpsr.org/about/wiener/wiener-award|title=Winners of the Norbert Wiener Award for Professional and Social Responsibility}}</ref> On September 28, 2016 the Federation of American Scientists awarded Postol their annual Richard L. Garwin Award,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/event/70th-anniversary-symposium-and-gala/|title=FAS 70th Anniversary Symposium and Awards Gala}}</ref> "that recognizes an individual who, through exceptional achievement in science and technology, has made an outstanding contribution toward the benefit of mankind."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/about-fas/awards/|title=FAS Awards}}</ref>

==Patriot missiles in Operation Desert Storm== {{main|MIM-104 Patriot#Success rate vs. accuracy|l1=Patriot missile success rate}}

The Patriot Missile was used in the first Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) to intercept descent-phase SCUD missiles fired by Iraq. The U.S. Army claimed a success rate of 80% in Saudi Arabia and 50% in Israel, claims that were later reduced to 70% and 40%. But President George H.W. Bush claimed a success rate of more than 97% during a speech at Raytheon's Patriot manufacturing plant in Andover, Massachusetts in February 1991, declaring, the "Patriot is 41 for 42: 42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted!"<ref>{{cite web|url=http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1991/91021504.html |title= Remarks to Raytheon Missile Systems Plant Employees in Andover, Massachusetts |date=February 15, 1991 |access-date=December 6, 2006 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20061108013327/http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1991/91021504.html <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date = November 8, 2006}}</ref> In April 1992, Postol told a House committee that "the Patriot's intercept rate during the Gulf War was very low. The evidence from these preliminary studies indicates that Patriot's intercept rate could be much lower than 10 percent, possibly even zero."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992_h/h920407p.htm |title=Optical Evidence Indicating Patriot High Miss Rates During the Gulf War |date=April 7, 1992 |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> Postol later criticized the Army's "independent" ''Analysis of Video Tapes to Assess Patriot Effectiveness'' as being "seriously compromised" by the "selective" and "arbitrary" use of data.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/pl920908.htm |title=Postol/Lewis Review of Army's Study on Patriot Effectiveness |author=Theodore Postol |date=1992-09-08 |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> A House Government Operations Committee investigation in 1992 concluded that, contrary to military claims on effectiveness, Patriot missiles destroyed only 9 percent of SCUD missiles during attempts at interception.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/2003/03/27/patriot-missile-miscalculations-a-cause-for-us-concern/ |title=Patriot missile miscalculations a cause for U.S. concern |first1=Michael |last1=Killian |newspaper=Chicago Tribune|date=March 27, 2003}}</ref> ''MIT Technology Review's'' senior writer, David Talbot, wrote that Postol "debunked claims by the U.S. Army that its Patriot missiles were successfully shooting down Iraqi Scud missiles during the first Gulf War".<ref name="mitr100714">{{cite web |last1=page |first1=David Talbotarchive |title=Israeli Rocket Defense System Is Failing at Crucial Task, Expert Analysts Say |url=https://www.technologyreview.com/2014/07/10/172100/israeli-rocket-defense-system-is-failing-at-crucial-task-expert-analysts-say/ |website=MIT Technology Review |access-date=25 August 2025 |language=en |date=10 July 2014}}</ref>

==National ballistic missile defense== In 1996, Dr. Nira Schwartz, a senior test-engineer at defense contractor TRW blew the whistle on TRW for exaggerating the capabilities of an antiballistic missile sensor.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-far-off-dream/ |title=A Far-Off Dream? |author=60 Minutes II |date=December 26, 2000 |access-date=December 6, 2006 |work=CBS News}}</ref> The sensor was subsequently used in a "successful" missile test in 1997. The then-Ballistic Missile Defense Organization launched an investigation in 1998 and asked a Pentagon advisory board called POET (Phase One Engineering Team), which included two staff members from MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, to review performance of TRW software, using data from the 1997 flight test. These engineers concluded in their report that Schwartz's allegations were untrue and despite failure of the sensor, the software "basically worked the way TRW said it worked."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tech.mit.edu/V126/N10/10lincolnlabs.html |title=Missile Dispute Enters 7th Year As Air Force Takes Over Inquiry |author=Keith Winstein |date=March 10, 2006 |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> In December 1998, TRW's contract was not extended by the government, which chose a competing system built by Raytheon.

In 2000, Schwartz gave Postol an unclassified version of the POET report from which sensitive text and graphs had been removed. Based on this redacted report, he notified the White House<ref>{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/spp/starwars/program/news00/postol_051100.html |title=Letter to John Podesta regarding BMDO testing claims |author=Theodore Postol |date=May 11, 2000 |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> and senior MIT officials of possible fraud and research misconduct at TRW and MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The Pentagon responded by classifying the letter and dispatching Defense Security Service members to his office.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tech.mit.edu/V120/N29/postol.29n.html |title=Ted Postol Involved in NMD Debate |author=Sanjay Basu |date=July 12, 2000 |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> Three agents of the Defense Security Service arrived unannounced to his campus office and attempted to show him other classified documents, but Postol refused to look at them, saying the visit was meant to silence him, which the Defense Security Service denied.<ref>{{cite news|last=Southwick |first=Ron |title=MIT Professor Says Pentagon Tried to Silence Him |newspaper=Chronicle of Higher Education |date=July 21, 2000|page=A23}}</ref>

===Investigation into TRW/MIT Lincoln Laboratory report=== Postol demanded the MIT administration under President Charles Vest and Provost Robert Brown investigate possible violations to MIT policies on research misconduct. The administration initially resisted,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tech.mit.edu/V122/N6/6postol.6n.html |title=Provost Denies Postol's Request for ABM Review |author=Keith J. Weinstein |date=February 22, 2002 |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> but later appointed another faculty member to conduct a preliminary investigation. In 2002, this professor's investigation found no evidence of a credible error, but he subsequently recommended a full investigation when Postol provided a statement of additional concerns. A subsequent 18-month investigation by the General Accounting Office in 2002 found widespread technical failures in the anti-missile system, contradicting the original report in 1997.<ref>{{cite news|last=Broad |first=William J. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/04/us/congressional-inquiry-cites-flaws-in-antimissile-sensor.html |title=Congressional Inquiry Cites Flaws in Antimissile Sensor |newspaper=The New York Times |date=March 4, 2002}}</ref> In May 2006, a panel composed of MIT faculty members concluded that the investigator recommended a full investigation "because of his inability to exhaust all the questions that arose during the inquiry," not because it appeared likely misconduct had occurred, and that a full investigation had not been warranted.<ref name="mit.edu">{{cite web |url=http://mit.edu/provost/reports.html |title=Letter and Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Research Misconduct Allegation |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref>

Under National Science Foundation regulations governing research misconduct, a preliminary inquiry should be completed within 90 days of an allegation, and a full investigation within 180 days subject to penalties as severe as suspension of federal funding.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.nsf.gov/oig/resmisreg.pdf |title=Research Misconduct Regulations |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> By December 2004, four years later, no formal investigation had been performed, and the Missile Defense Agency formally rejected MIT's request to investigate the classified data.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tech.mit.edu/V124/N58/58missile.58n.html |title=DoD Bars Inquiry on Fraud at Lincoln Lab |date=December 3, 2004|access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref> Postol stated that the MIT administration was compliant with the Pentagon's attempts to cover up a fiasco by dragging its feet on an investigation because defense contracts through Lincoln Laboratory constituted a major portion of MIT's operating budget.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://archive.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/articles/2005/10/23/going_postol/ |title=Going Postol |newspaper=Boston Globe Magazine |date=October 23, 2005 |first=Charles P. |last=Pierce}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://controllers.mit.edu/site/reports_publications/brown_book_annual_report_of_sponsored_research |title=Brown Book (Annual Report of Sponsored Research) |access-date=December 6, 2006}}</ref>

In early 2006, a compromise was reached whereby MIT would halt any attempt to conduct its own investigation and senior Air Force administrator Brendan B. Godfrey and former Lockheed Martin chief executive Norman R. Augustine would lead a final investigation.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/Investigation_Report_27JAN.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070410215147/http://www.defenselink.mil/home/pdf/Investigation_Report_27JAN.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=April 10, 2007 |title=Investigation of Alleged Research Misconduct by Lincoln Laboratory Members of the 1998-5 POET Study Team|date=2007-01-29 |access-date=2007-12-17}}</ref> Postol disputed the impartiality of this new investigation as Augustine was CEO while Lockheed was a contractor with NBMD.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tech.mit.edu/V126/N10/10lincolnlabs.html |title=Missile Dispute Enters 7th Year As Air Force Takes Over Inquiry |author=Keith Weinstein |date=2006-03-10 |access-date=2006-12-06}}</ref>

In May 2006, an MIT Ad-Hoc Committee on Research Misconduct Allegation concluded delays in the investigation were caused by a number of factors, including: "initial uncertainty about the applicability of MIT's research misconduct policy to a government [non-MIT] report"; government classification of relevant information, possibly in an attempt to make it unavailable to plaintiffs in the TRW whistle-blower trial; and Postol's failure to provide a clearly written summary of his allegations, which changed repeatedly during the investigation. The committee also found that Postol repeatedly violated MIT confidentiality rules "causing personal distress to the Lincoln Laboratory researchers, their families and colleagues".<ref name="mit.edu"/>

===SM-3 interceptor=== In September 2009, President Barack Obama announced that his administration was scrapping the Bush administration's proposed anti-ballistic missile shield in Europe and replacing it with reconfigured SM-3 missiles.<ref>{{cite news|title=White House Scraps Bush's Approach to Missile Shield|first=Peter |last=Baker |date=September 17, 2009 |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.htm}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe |work=whitehouse.gov |title=Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in Europe |via=National Archives |date=September 17, 2009 }}</ref> A "Ballistic Missile Defense Review" was completed in March 2010 concluding that existing ballistic missile defense technologies provided a reliable and robust defense against limited ICBM attacks.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20FACT%20SHEET%20March%202010%20_Final_.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100527201317/http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20FACT%20SHEET%20March%202010%20_Final_.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=May 27, 2010 |title=2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Fact Sheet |date=March 3, 2010 |access-date=2010-05-18 |publisher=U.S. Department of Defense}}</ref><ref name="ACA">{{cite web|url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol |title=A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan |date=May 2010 |first1=George N. |last1=Lewis |first2=Theodore A. |last2=Postol |publisher=Arms Control Today}}</ref> In May 2010, Postol and George N. Lewis published an analysis concluding that the majority of SM-3 interceptor tests classified as "successful" actually failed to destroy incoming warheads.<ref name="ACA"/><ref name="NYTimes 05-18-2010">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18missile.html |title=Review Cites Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program |first1=William J. |last1=Broad |first2=David E. |last2=Sanger |newspaper=The New York Times |date=May 17, 2010}}</ref> The Missile Defense Agency challenged an article in ''The New York Times'' which described Postol and Lewis' results, stating that the SM-3 program was one of the most successful programs within the Department of Defense and that The New York Times chose not to publish information supplied by the MDA in response to the allegations made by Postol and Lewis.<ref name="DOD 05-18--2010">{{cite web|url=http://www.mda.mil/news/10news0005.html |title=Missile Defense Agency Responds to New York Times Article |date=May 18, 2010 |access-date=2010-05-20 |publisher=U.S. Department of Defense}}</ref> MDA Chief Spokesman Richard Lehner accused Postol and Lewis of basing "their assessment on publicly released photos gleaned from a sensor mounted aboard the SM-3 and postulat[ing] what they perceived to be the interceptor’s impact point although they had no access to classified telemetry data showing the complete destruction of the target missiles, or subsequent sensor views of the intercept that were not publicly released so as not to reveal to potential adversaries exactly where the target missile was struck."<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Hodge |first=Nathan |title=Missile Defenders Blast Critics After Interceptor Attack |url=https://www.wired.com/2010/05/missile-defense-agency-blasts-critics-after-interceptor-attack/ |access-date=2024-04-09 |magazine=Wired |language=en-US |issn=1059-1028}}</ref>

According to ''The Daily Telegraph'' in 2023, Postol has spent much of his career "trying to make sure that the U.S. doesn't build ballistic missile defences".<ref name=":4">{{cite news |url=https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-missile-battle-transformed-image-113144303.html |title=Ukraine's missile battle has transformed the image of America's Patriot interceptor |first=David |last=Axe |newspaper=The Daily Telegraph |date=June 23, 2023 |via=Yahoo! News |access-date=June 23, 2023}}</ref> Also in 2023, Postol was accused by other arms control experts of allowing his "long-standing opposition to existing US missile defense programs" to affect his analysis of North Korean missiles.<ref name="Errors" />

== Syrian civil war chemical attacks == In 2013, Postol and Richard Lloyd, an expert in warhead design at the military contractor Tesla Laboratories, wrote about the Ghouta chemical attack that has taken place during the Syrian civil war.<ref name="NYTimes 09-04-2013">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/world/middleeast/rockets-in-syrian-attack-carried-large-payload-of-gas-experts-say.html |title=Rockets in Syrian Attack Carried Large Payload of Gas, Experts Say |first1=William J. |last1=Broad |newspaper=The New York Times |date=September 4, 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/syria/iraq_syria.pdf?ref=middleeast|title=An Analysis of the Nerve Agent Attack by Theodore A. Postol}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/world/middleeast/new-study-refines-view-of-sarin-attack-in-syria.html|title=New Study Refines View of Sarin Attack in Syria |first1=C.J. |last1=Chivers |newspaper=The New York Times |date=December 28, 2013}}</ref><ref name="thedailybeast1">[http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/17/the-kardashian-look-a-like-trolling-for-assad.html The Kardashian Look-Alike Trolling for Assad] 10.17.14 The Daily Beast, Noah Shachtman Michael Kennedy</ref> Analysing YouTube footage of the attacks and its aftermath, Postol and Lloyd believed they found a number of items to be inconsistent with the US government's claims about the incident.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/syria/Lloyd_warhead.pdf?ref=middleeast|title=Initial Investigation of Chemical Weapons by Richard M. Lloyd}}</ref><ref name="NYTimes 09-04-2013" /><ref name="Lloyd-Postol">{{cite web|url=https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006045/possible-implications-of-bad-intelligence.pdf|title=Possible Implications of Faulty US Technical Intelligence in the Damascus Nerve Agent Attack of August 21, 2013|date=14 January 2014|publisher=MIT Science, Technology, and Global Security Working Group |first1=Richard |last1=Lloyd |first2=Theodore A. |last2=Postol}} [https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1006045-possible-implications-of-bad-intelligence.html HTML version]</ref> Postol subsequently worked with Maram Susli to analyze the Ghouta attack.<ref name="thedailybeast1"/><ref>[https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/echoes-of-the-past-syria-chemical-weapons-and-civilian-targeting/ Echoes of the Past], ''War on the Rocks''1 May 2017: ''"Postol asserted that it was impossible for the Syrian government to have been responsible, and he enlisted the help of pro-Assad conspiracy theorist and Infowars contributor Maram Susli to help prove it."''</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wired.com/2017/05/conspiracy-theory-experts/|newspaper=Wired|access-date=2017-09-27|date=2017-05-31|first=Emma Fray|last=Ellis|title=To Make Your Conspiracy Theory Legit, Just Find an 'Expert'}}</ref><ref>[http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/live/2017/04/13/russie-syrie-posez-vos-questions-sur-la-strategie-de-donald-trump-a-l-international_5110894_3222.html#qtWxerh9cF1pCdtw.99 Le Monde]: ''"Maram Susli, qui a collaboré aux travaux de Richard Lloyd et de Theodore Postol, ne fait pas mystère de ses sympathies pour le régime."''</ref><ref name="Monbiot">George Monbiot [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/15/lesson-from-syria-chemical-weapons-conspiracy-theories-alt-right A lesson from Syria: it’s crucial not to fuel far-right conspiracy theories], The Guardian, 15 November 2017</ref>

In 2017, Postol criticized the unclassified intelligence assessment released by the Trump administration blaming the air forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for the April Khan Shaykhun chemical attack.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://phaven-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/files/document_part/asset/1862086/BCI9ExNk1DbCJB809IPlDfi8xqE/ADDENDUM_TO_--_AQuickTurnaroundAssessmentoftheWhiteHouselntelligenceReport-Issued_on-April-11_2017_About-the_Nerve_Agent-Attack-in-Khan_Shaykhun__Syria__April13_2017__.pdf|title=Addendum to A Quick Turnaround Assessment of the White House Intelligence Report Issued on April 11, 2017 About the Nerve Agent Attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria|date=11 April 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=MIT expert claims latest chemical weapons attack in Syria was staged|url=http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mit-expert-claims-latest-chemical-weapons-attack-syria-was-staged-1617267|date=17 April 2017|newspaper=International Business Times}}</ref> Postol analysed the photographic evidence and concluded that the chemical attack was not an air raid, but was conducted from the ground using most probably an emptied 122mm artillery rocket tube, which is normally used as munition of a multiple rocket launcher, filling it with a chemical agent and detonating it by an explosive charge laid on top of it.<ref name=theNation>{{cite news|title=Democrats Shouldn't Be Trying to Banish Tulsi Gabbard|url=https://www.thenation.com/article/democrats-shouldnt-be-trying-to-banish-tulsi-gabbard/|date=12 April 2017|publisher=theNation}}</ref><ref name=Telepolis_Pany_13042017>{{cite news|title=Giftgas-Angriff in Chan Scheichun: Die Fakten des Weißen Hauses sind keine|url=https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Giftgas-Angriff-in-Chan-Scheichun-Die-Fakten-des-Weissen-Hauses-sind-keine-3685499.html|date=13 April 2017|publisher=Telepolis}}</ref> On 18 April, Postol published his findings that the crater present in the photographs could not have been the source of the necessary sarin smoke plume, as persons were seen in the video material live at the site, without appropriate protection gear. A sarin smoke plume would have killed them even hours after a sarin gas grenade explosion.<ref>T Postol ''[http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2017/04/67102.html The Nerve Agent Attack that Did Not Occur: Analysis of the Times and Locations of Critical Events in the Alleged Nerve Agent Attack at 7 AM on April 4, 2017 in Khan Sheikhoun, Syria]''</ref><ref name="Chomsky">Muhammad Idrees Ahmad [https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/5/5/chomsky-and-the-syria-revisionists-regime-whitewashing Chomsky and the Syria revisionists: Regime whitewashing], ''Al-Araby'', 5 May 2017</ref><ref name="Monbiot"/> On 21 April, he corrected this view in one aspect: "In my earlier report released on April 18, 2017 I misinterpreted the wind-direction convention which resulted in my estimates of plume directions being exactly 180° off in direction", which was however irrelevant for his main statement, that no sarin could have been emitted at the crater-site.<ref>T. Postol [http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2017/04/67182.html Important Correction TO The Nerve Agent Attack that Did Not Occur], 23 April 2017</ref> Later in April, Postol wrote that the "French Intelligence Report of April 26, 2017 contradicted the White House Intelligence Report of 11 April 2017".<ref>T Postol ''[http://www.washingtonsblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/The-French-Intelligence-Report-of-April-26-2017-Contradicts-Allegations-in-White-House-Intelligence-Report-of-April-11-2017_Optimized_.pdf The French Intelligence Report of April 26, 2017 Contradicts the Allegations in the White House Intelligence Report of April 11, 2017]'', 27 April 2017</ref><ref name="Chomsky"/> The following day he revised his view, saying he had confused the date and location for a different chemical attack four years earlier.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2017/04/correction-to-the-french-intelligence-report-of-april-26-2017-contradicts-the-allegations-in-the-whi.html|title = "Correction to: The French Intelligence Report of April 26, 2017 Contradicts the Allegations in the White House Intelligence Report of April 11, 2017 by Professor Theodore A. Postol" by Publius Tacitus}}</ref><ref name="Chomsky"/><ref name="Monbiot"/> Postol stated that none of the forensic evidence in ''The New York Times'' video<ref>{{cite AV media | url=https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000005063944/syria-chemical-attack-russia.html | title = "How Syria and Russia Spun a Chemical Strike" | publisher = The New York Times | date = 2017-04-26}}</ref><ref>{{cite AV media | url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qaCT6kzWFHk |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211214/qaCT6kzWFHk |archive-date=2021-12-14 |url-status=live| title = "How Syria and Russia Spun a Chemical Strike" | publisher = The New York Times | date = 2017-04-27}}{{cbignore}}</ref> and a follow-on ''Times'' news article<ref>{{cite news | title=The Times Uses Forensic Mapping to Verify a Syrian Chemical Attack | first= Malachy |last=Browne | newspaper=The New York Times | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/insider/the-times-uses-forensic-mapping-to-verify-a-syrian-chemical-attack.html | date=2017-05-01}}</ref> on the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack supported the conclusions reported by ''The New York Times''.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://phaven-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/files/document_part/asset/1884812/zZWDHJsmajTqEz4Cva4FOg5R9bw/The_New_York_Times_Video_Analysis_of_the_Events_in_Khan_Sheikhoun_on_April_4__2017_NONE_of_the_Cited_Forensic_Evidence_Supports_the_Claims__May29_2017__Standard_.pdf | title = The ''New York Times'' Video Analysis of the Events in Khan Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017: NONE of the Cited Forensic Evidence Supports the Claims | date= 2017-05-29}}</ref>

In 2019, the Princeton based journal ''Science & Global Security'', on whose editorial board Postol sat,<ref>al-bab.com Brian Whitaker, [https://al-bab.com/blog/2019/10/mit-professor-postol-resigns-science-journal-spat-over-article-syria postol resigns] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191017175549/https://al-bab.com/blog/2019/10/mit-professor-postol-resigns-science-journal-spat-over-article-syria |date=17 October 2019 }}</ref> intended to publish a report titled "Computational Forensic Analysis for the Chemical Weapons Attack at Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April 2017" about the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack written by Postol, Goong Chen, Cong Gu, Alexey Sergeev, Sanyang Liu, Pengfei Yao and Marlan O. Scully. The report questioned the findings of the OPCW investigation which concluded that the Assad regime had used sarin.<ref name="sgs">{{Cite web|url=http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/editorial/2019/09/from_the_editors.html|title=From the Editors - From the Editors|website=scienceandglobalsecurity.org|access-date=2019-11-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190925120713/http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/editorial/2019/09/from_the_editors.html|archive-date=25 September 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> The website ''Bellingcat'' disagreed with the report's interpretation and stated there were many caveats in the reports analysis.<ref name=":2">{{cite web | url = https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/08/04/tulsi-gabbards-reports-on-chemical-attacks-in-syria-a-self-contradictory-error-filled-mess/ | title = Tulsi Gabbard's Reports on Chemical Attacks in Syria – A Self-Contradictory Error Filled Mess | date= 2019-08-04}}</ref> According to ''Bellingcat'', the report's use of simulation was methodologically flawed, as the paper only provided a simulation of a 122mm type rocket, and did not attempt to study other possible options.<ref name=":3">{{cite web | url = https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/09/13/simulations-craters-and-lies-postols-latest-attempt-to-undermine-the-last-vestiges-of-his-reputation/ | title = Simulations, Craters and Lies: Postol's Latest Attempt to Undermine the Last Vestiges of his Reputation | date= 2019-09-13}}</ref> In response to the ''Bellingcat'' article, the editors of ''Science & Global Security'' said "Regrettably, the ''Bellingcat'' group blog post contains a number of incorrect statements about the contents and conclusions of the paper to be published. Some of the statements appear to refer to an earlier manuscript and do not take account of all the changes made during the peer review and editorial process managed by this journal".<ref name="sgs" /> The journal later decided not to publish the paper after it "identified a number of issues with the peer-review and revision process".<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/editorial/2019/09/from_the_editors_1.html|title=From the Editors - From the Editors|website=scienceandglobalsecurity.org|access-date=2019-11-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191214174948/http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/editorial/2019/09/from_the_editors_1.html|archive-date=14 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.science.org/content/article/scientists-clash-over-paper-questions-syrian-government-s-role-sarin-attack|title=Scientists clash over paper that questions Syrian government's role in sarin attack|last1=Kupferschmidt|first1=Kai|date=2019-09-24|website=Science {{!}} AAAS|language=en|access-date=2019-11-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191120005837/https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/09/scientists-clash-over-paper-questions-syrian-government-s-role-sarin-attack|archive-date=20 November 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> In response Postol, who said he was not involved with the deliberations for the paper, resigned from the journal's editorial board, calling the decision "totally wrong and untenable".<ref>{{Cite web |last=KUPFERSCHMIDT |first=KAI |date=14 October 2019 |title=Prestigious journal pulls paper about chemical attack in Syria after backlash |url=https://www.science.org/content/article/prestigious-journal-pulls-paper-about-chemical-attack-syria-after-backlash |access-date=9 April 2024 |website=Science.org}}</ref>

==Iron Dome== In July 2014, Postol was quoted in the ''MIT Technology Review'' criticising the effectiveness of the Israeli Iron Dome antimissile system.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.technologyreview.com/s/528916/israeli-rocket-defense-system-is-failing-at-crucial-task-expert-analysts-say/|title=Israel's "Iron Dome" Anti-Rocket Technology|first=David|last=Talbot}}</ref> The article received so many negative comments<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.technologyreview.com/s/528916/israeli-rocket-defense-system-is-failing-at-crucial-task-expert-analysts-say/#comments|title=Israel's "Iron Dome" Anti-Rocket Technology|first=David|last=Talbot}}</ref> that the website invited Postol to present his evidence. His response, in August, was purportedly based on photographic evidence of the system in operation.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Postol|first1=Theodore|title=An Explanation of the Evidence of Weaknesses in the Iron Dome Defense System|url=http://www.technologyreview.com/view/528991/an-explanation-of-the-evidence-of-weaknesses-in-the-iron-dome-defense-system/|website=MIT Technology Review|access-date=18 October 2015}}</ref>

==North Korea missile tests== In August 2017, Postol shared with ''Newsweek'' a paper he co-authored with Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker of Schmucker Technologies which stated that missiles tested earlier in 2017 by North Korea were incapable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the mainland United States despite being widely described as intercontinental ballistic missiles.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.newsweek.com/trump-north-korea-missiles-nuclear-scientists-649702 | title = Newsweek Exclusive: North Korean Missile Claims are a 'Hoax' | website = Newsweek | date= 2017-08-11}}</ref>

Postol's findings<ref>{{Cite web |last=Postol |first=Theodore |date=2023-08-17 |title=The Transfer of a Russian ICBM to North Korea? |url=https://beyondparallel.csis.org/the-transfer-of-a-russian-icbm-to-north-korea/ |access-date=2024-04-09 |website=Beyond Parallel |language=en-US}}</ref> regarding the similarities between the North Korean Hwasong-18 and Russian RT-2PM2 Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles were roundly criticized in 2023 by a publication entitled ''Errors in Postol’s Analysis of the Hwasong-18'' from a team of arms control analysts and professors from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterrey, including Daniel Allen, Madeline Berzak, Michael Duitsman, Decker Eveleth, John Ford, Sam Lair, Jeffrey Lewis, and Tricia White.<ref name=Errors>{{cite web|url=https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1218663/errors-in-postols-analysis-of-the-hwasong-18/|website=Arms Control Wonk|first=Jeffrey|last=Lewis|title=Errors in Postol's Analysis of the Hwasong-18|date=20 August 2023|access-date=9 April 2024}}</ref> Postol was accused of "many errors. Most of these errors are careless.... [and] when corrected, demonstrate that Postol’s conclusions are likely wrong."<ref name="Errors" /> The team further claimed that Postol's analysis "is marred by significant factual inaccuracies. Many of these inaccuracies would have been caught by an analyst carefully looking at the totality of the evidence, rather than simply assuming the missiles are the same," and claimed that "in general, Postol works backwards to create a model that fits his assumptions."<ref name="Errors" />

==Books== * {{cite book |first1=Bruce G. |last1=Blair |first2=Jonathan |last2=Dean |first3=Steve |last3=Fetter |first4=James |last4=Goodby |first5=George N. |last5=Lewis |first6=Theodore |last6=Postol |first7=Frank N. |last7=Von Hippel |first8=Harold A. |last8=Feiveson |title=The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |date=June 1999 |isbn=978-0-8157-0953-4 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/nuclearturningpo0000unse }}

== References == {{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}

== External links == {{Wikiquote}} *[http://sts-program.mit.edu/people/emeriti-faculty/theodore-postol/ MIT Faculty Webpage for Theodore Postol] *[http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/roguestate/interviews/postol.htm Rogue State], ABC Australia, 2001 *[http://www.technologyreview.com/Biotech/12805/ Postol vs. the Pentagon], Technology Review, April 2002 *[https://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30812FC3B5B0C718CDDA80894DB404482 M.I.T. Studies Accusations of Lies and Cover-Up of Serious Flaws in Antimissile System], The New York Times, 2003 *[https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/MIT-physicist-knocks-anti-missile-system-2666045.php MIT physicist knocks anti-missile system], San Francisco Chronicle, 2003 *[https://archive.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/articles/2005/10/23/going_postol/ Going Postol], Boston Globe Magazine, 2005 *[http://russianforces.org/files/BriefOnEastEuropeMissileDefenseProposal_August24,2007_FinalReduced.pdf Theodore Postol's presentation for his August 2007 report at the Congress] *[http://www.democracynow.org/2007/7/3/u_s_russia_at_odds_over July 2007 Postol's appearance in a show on White House Plans for Missile System in Eastern Europe], Democracy Now, 2007

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{{DEFAULTSORT:Postol, Theodore}} Category:1946 births Category:Living people Category:Massachusetts Institute of Technology faculty Category:21st-century American physicists Category:MIT School of Science alumni