China–Iran relations

{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2026}} {{Infobox bilateral relations|China–Iran|Iran|China|mission1=Embassy of Iran, Beijing|mission2=Embassy of China, Tehran|map=Iran China Locator.png|filetype=png}} [[File:Ali Khamenei met with Xi Jinping in Tehran 2016 (7).jpg|thumb|250px|CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.]] '''China–Iran relations''' ({{lang-zh|s=中国–伊朗关系}}, {{Langx|fa|روابط ایران و چین}}) refer to the bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and Iran. The relationship between the two civilizations is one of the oldest continuous contacts in history, stretching back more than 2,500 years. Their earliest interactions began when the Achaemenid Empire and the Zhou dynasty had indirect contact in the 6th century BC.<ref>{{Cite news |title=CHINESE-IRANIAN RELATIONS xiv. The Influence of Eastern Iranian Art |url=https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/chinese-iranian-xiv/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250630173943/https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/chinese-iranian-xiv/ |archive-date=30 June 2025 |access-date=15 November 2025 |work=Encyclopaedia Iranica |language=en-US}}</ref> The first direct and official contact started between the Parthian Empire and Han dynasty around 200 BC, when the Chinese envoy Zhang Qian encountered the Parthian court.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Persia- Sino Relations |url=https://china.mfa.gov.ir/en/viewpage/10217/china.mfa.gov.ir |access-date=15 November 2025 |website=china.mfa.gov.ir |language=en}}</ref> In 115 BC, Emperor Wu of Han, seeking to expand trade—especially in his search for high-quality horse herds—sent envoys with gifts to the court of Mithridates II.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Garver |first=John W. |date=11 December 2006 |title=Twenty Centuries of Friendly Cooperation: The Sino-Iranian Relationship |url=https://www.theglobalist.com/twenty-centuries-of-friendly-cooperation-the-sino-iranian-relationship/ |access-date=15 November 2025 |website=The Globalist |language=en-US}}</ref>[[File:Zhang_Qian.jpg|thumb|250px|The 138–126 BC travels of Zhang Qian to the West, Mogao Caves, 618–712 AD mural.]]Persian merchants became the main carriers of goods and culture across Central Asia, bringing their religions, music, and ideas into China.<ref>{{Citation |chapter=Merchants of an Imperial Trade |date=2018 |title=The Muslim Merchants of Premodern China: The History of a Maritime Asian Trade Diaspora, 750–1400 |pages=12–50 |last=Chaffee |first=John W. |series=New Approaches to Asian History |location=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/9780511998492.002 |isbn=978-1-107-01268-4}}</ref> Ambassadors were exchanged, and Chinese travelers visited Iran regularly. Each side introduced new goods to the other, the most famous of which was Chinese silk. The trade route carrying this precious commodity from China to Europe passed through Iran, becoming known as the Silk Road, with Iran controlling much of the trade that moved silk, metals, glass, and textiles between East and West.<ref>{{Cite web |date=26 November 2023 |title=Silk Road In Iran: Tracing Trade Routes And History |url=https://orienttrips.com/mag/silk-road-in-iran/ |access-date=15 November 2025 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Silk Road {{!}} Facts, History, & Map {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Silk-Road-trade-route |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260228055015/https://www.britannica.com/topic/Silk-Road-trade-route |archive-date=2026-02-28 |access-date=2026-03-22 |work=Encyclopedia Britannica |language=en}}</ref>

During the Sassanid Empire, royal marriages took place.<ref>{{Cite web |last=King |first=Kevin |date=12 November 2024 |title=Chapter 3 Sino-Iranian Relations in the Sasanian Period in: Sino |url=https://www.stanleyparkhigh.co.uk/chapter-3-sino-iranian-relations-in-the-sasanian-period-in-sino/ |access-date=15 November 2025 |website=Stanley Park High School |language=en-GB}}</ref> Several Sassanid kings and nobles married Chinese princesses or women from influential Chinese families to strengthen ties. These unions symbolized the close relationship between the two sides. Persian communities lived in Chinese cities during the Tang dynasty, and after the fall of Sassanid Empire, some Sassanid princes even took refuge in China.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Prince of Persia: The Last Sassanians in Tang China 波斯王子卑路斯 |url=http://dragonsarmory.blogspot.com/2018/05/a-prince-of-persia-last-sassanids-in.html |access-date=15 November 2025 |website=A Prince of Persia}}</ref> Trade also expanded by sea, with Persian sailors linking the Persian Gulf to Chinese ports.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Tofighian |first=Hossein |date=20 February 2022 |title=The Research in the Iran-China Maritime Trade Case Study: The Najirom Historical Port |url=https://nbsh.basu.ac.ir/article_4550_en.html |journal=Archaeological Research of Iran |language=en |volume=11 |issue=31 |pages=191–218 |doi=10.22084/nb.2021.21925.2156 |issn=2345-5225}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Pasha Zanous |first1=Hamidreza |last2=Ahmadi |first2=Farajollah |date=23 August 2015 |title=Sīrāf: Maritime Trade between Iran and China During Late Sasanid Period and Early Islamic Centuries |url=https://jis.ut.ac.ir/article_57517_en.html |journal=Iranian Studies |language=en |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=49–63 |doi=10.22059/jis.2016.57517 |issn=2252-0643}}</ref> In the 13th century during the Mongol era, Iran (under Ilkhanate) and China (under Yuan) were part of a single empire.

In modern times, official diplomatic relations were established in 1937 between the Republic of China and Pahlavi Iran. During the Cold War before the mid-1960s, Iran was generally aligned against the People's Republic of China until both countries' relations with the Soviet Union and the United States shifted. After the Iranian Revolution, China and the U.S. were both distrusted, but subsequent sanctions by the west pushed Iran closer to the east.<ref name=":7" /> Cooperation gradually expanded, with China purchasing more than 80 percent of Iran's shipped oil by 2025 and becoming a leading investor in transportation and industrial projects.<ref>{{Cite web |date=9 November 2025 |title=Iran's crude oil exports to China hit new record high: report |url=https://en.mehrnews.com/news/238560/Iran-s-crude-oil-exports-to-China-hit-new-record-high-report |access-date=15 November 2025 |website=Mehr News Agency |language=en}}</ref> Relations deepened through long-term economic agreements and China's Belt and Road Initiative, making Iran one of China's most important strategic partners. In 2021, the two nations signed a 25-year cooperation agreement.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Iran, China sign 'strategic' deal in Tehran – DW – 03/27/2021 |url=https://www.dw.com/en/iran-china-sign-strategic-deal-in-tehran/a-57025741 |access-date=15 November 2025 |website=dw.com |language=en}}</ref>

==History==

=== Achaemenid-Zhou era === {{multiple image | align = right | direction = vertical | width = 290 | header = | image1 = Painted Panel of the Sarcophagus of Yü Hung (detail 3).jpg | alt1 = | caption1 = Detail of the stone panel painting on the sarcophagus, depicting two nimbate male figures dressing in Sasanian-style attire, drinking wine and playing pipa. Tomb of Yu Hong, 6th century CE. | image2 = Painted Panel of the Sarcophagus of Yü Hung (detail 1).jpg | alt2 = | caption2 = Left: a man holding a plate of fruits; right: a bearded man is performing the Huteng ("Barbarian leap") dance. Both figures have haloes. Tomb of Yu Hong, 6th century CE. }} There were indirect contact between the two sides in 550-330 BC. The Achaemenid Empire, stretching from the Mediterranean to Central Asia between the 6th and 4th centuries BC, pushed the Persian frontier close to regions that later connected directly with China. Although no formal diplomatic exchange is recorded between the two sides during this period, trade routes that would later form the Silk Road already existed in primitive form. Goods, ideas, and technologies moved step-by-step through Central Asian intermediaries, linking the two civilizations long before they physically met. Chinese texts reference Iran/Persia as ''Bosi''. In essence, the relationship was not one of direct diplomacy but of early trans-Eurasian connectivity, laying the foundation for the deeper relations that would flourish later.

===Han-Parthian era=== The Han dynasty diplomat and explorer Zhang Qian, who visited neighboring Bactria and Sogdiana in 126 BCE, made the first known Chinese report on Parthia. In his accounts, Parthia is named "Ānxí" ({{lang-zh|links=no|c=安息}}), a transliteration of "Arsacid", the name of the Parthian dynasty. Zhang Qian clearly identifies Parthia as an advanced urban civilization, whose development he equates to those of Dayuan (in Ferghana) and Daxia (in Bactria).

: "Anxi is situated several thousand ''li'' west of the region of the Great Yuezhi (in Transoxonia). The people are settled on the land, cultivating the fields and growing rice and wheat. They also make wine out of grapes. They have walled cities like the people of Dayuan (Ferghana), the region contains several hundred cities of various sizes. The coins of the country are made of silver and bear the face of the King. When the King dies, the currency is immediately changed and new coins issued with the face of his successor. The people keep records by writing on horizontal strips of leather. To the west lies Tiaozi (Mesopotamia) and to the north Yancai (Alans) and Lixuan (Hyrcania)." (Shiji, 123, Zhang Qian quote, trans. Burton Watson).<ref>安息在大月氏西可數千里。其俗土著，耕田，田稻麥，蒲陶酒。城邑如大宛。其屬小大數百城，地方數千里，最為大國。臨媯水，有市，民商賈用車及船，行旁國或數千里。以銀為錢，錢如其王面，王死輒更錢，效王面焉。畫革旁行以為書記。其西則條枝，北有奄蔡、黎軒。</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=史記 : 列傳: 大宛列傳 - 中國哲學書電子化計劃 |url=https://ctext.org/shiji/da-wan-lie-zhuan/zh |access-date=23 June 2025 |website=ctext.org |language=zh-TW}}</ref>

Following Zhang Qian's embassy and report, the Han conquered Dayuan in the Han-Dayuan war and established the Protectorate of the Western Regions, thereby opening the Silk Road and clashing with Persia sphere of influence (as some satraps were part of the conflict). Commercial relations between China, Central Asia, and Parthia flourished, as many Chinese missions were sent throughout the 1st century BCE:<ref>{{Cite web |title=Han Emperor Wu-ti |url=http://www.silkroadfoundation.org/artl/wuti.shtml |access-date=30 September 2024 |website=www.silkroadfoundation.org}}</ref> <blockquote>"The largest of these embassies to foreign states numbered several hundred persons, while even the smaller parties included over 100 members… In the course of one year, anywhere from five to six to over ten parties would be sent out." (Shiji, trans. Burton Watson).{{Citation needed|date=June 2019|reason=specify pages}}</blockquote>The Parthians were, apparently, very intent on maintaining good relations with China and also sent their own embassies, starting around 110 BC: "When the Han envoy first visited the Kingdom of Anxi (Parthia), the King of Anxi dispatched a party of 20,000 horsemen to meet them on the eastern border of the Kingdom. When the Han envoys set out again to return to China, the King of Anxi dispatched envoys of his own to accompany them. The Emperor was delighted at this." (Shiji, 123, trans. Burton Watson).

Parthians also played a role in the Silk Road transmission of Buddhism from Central Asia to China. An Shih Kao, a Parthian nobleman and Buddhist missionary, went to the Chinese capital Luoyang in 148 CE, where he established temples and became the first man to translate Buddhist scriptures into Chinese. The Persianized kingdom of Kushan became the crossroads for Sino-Indian Buddhist transmissions, with many Iranians translating Sanskrit sutras into Chinese.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.theglobalist.com/twenty-centuries-of-friendly-cooperation-the-sino-iranian-relationship/|title=Twenty Centuries of Friendly Cooperation: The Sino-Iranian Relationship|date=11 December 2006|website=The Globalist|first=John W.|last=Garver|language=en-US|access-date=25 June 2019}}</ref>

===Sassanid era=== [[File:Zhigongtu (Persia).jpg|thumb|upright|Persian ambassador at the Chinese court of Emperor Yuan of Liang in his capital Jingzhou in 526-539 CE, with explanatory text. ''Portraits of Periodical Offering of Liang'', 11th century Song copy.]] Like their predecessors the Parthians, the Sassanian Empire maintained active foreign relations with China. Ambassadors from Iran frequently traveled to China, with Chinese documents recording the reception of thirteen Sassanian embassies. Commercially, land and sea trade with China was important to both the Sassanian and Chinese Empires. Large numbers of Sassanian coins have been found in southern China, confirming the existence of bilateral maritime trade.<ref name=":1" />

On various occasions, Sassanian kings sent their most talented Persian musicians and dancers to the Chinese imperial court. Both empires benefited from trade along the Silk Road, and shared a common interest in preserving and protecting that trade. They cooperated in guarding the trade routes through central Asia, and both built outposts in border areas to keep caravans safe from nomadic tribes and bandits.

In 547, during the Liang dynasty in China, a Persian embassy paid tribute to the Liang. Amber was recorded as originating from Iran by the Liang Shu (Book of Liang).<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pfIQnqoQz0oC&pg=PA233|title=Materials for the physical anthropology of the eastern European Jews, Issues 1-6|last=Fishberg|first=Maurice|publisher=New Era Print. Co.|year=1907|edition=reprint|page=233|access-date=12 June 2011}}</ref>

There are records of several joint Sassanian and Chinese efforts against their common Hephtalite enemy. Following encroachments by the nomadic Turkic tribes on states in Central Asia, an apparent collaboration between Chinese and Sassanian forces repelled the Turkic advances. Documents from Mount Mogh also note the presence of a Chinese general in the service of the king of Sogdiana at the time of the Arab incursion.

The last members of the Sassanian Empire's royal family fled to Tang China. Following the conquest of Iran by Muslim Arabs, Peroz III, the son of Yazdegerd III, escaped, along with a few Persian nobles, and took refuge in the Chinese imperial court.<ref name="ReferenceA">A History of Chinese civilization, Jacques Gernet.</ref> Both Peroz and his son Narsieh (Chinese ''neh-shie'') were given high titles at the Tang court.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> In 661, Peroz III was appointed Governor of Persia. At least on two occasions, the last possibly in 670, Chinese troops were sent with Peroz to help him against the Arabs to restore him to the Sassanian throne, with mixed results. Narsieh later attained the position of commander of the Chinese imperial guards and his descendants lived in China as respected princes.<ref name="ReferenceA" />

===Tang and Islamic golden age=== [[File:Tang_sancai_vase_8th_9th_century.jpg|thumb|Tang ''sancai'' vase displaying Central Asian and Persian influence. 8-9th century. Guimet Museum.]] After the Islamic conquest, Iran continued to flourish during the Islamic Golden Age, and its relations with China continued. In 751, the Abbasid Caliphate, which ruled Iran, was in dispute with the Tang dynasty of China over the control of the Syr Darya region during the Battle of Talas. The commander of the Abbasid army was Zayid ibn Salih, a Persian, and the commanders of the Tang army were Gao Xianzhi, a Goguryo Korean, alongside Li Siye and Duan Xiushi, both Chinese. After the Abbasids won the battle, relations improved, and there were no more conflicts between China and the Persians.

Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and polo were exported to the Tang.<ref name=":1" />

===Mongol Yuan=== A large number of Central Asian and Persian soldiers, experts, and artisans were recruited by the Mongol empire Yuan dynasty of China. Some of them, known as ''semu'' ("assorted officials"), occupied important official posts in the Yuan state administration.<ref>{{harvnb|Dillon|1999|pp=19–21}}</ref> One of the most famous settlers from Bukhara was Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, who is identified as an ancestor of many Chinese Hui lineages and that of Yunnan's Panthay Hui population. His most famous descendant was Zheng He,{{Citation needed|date=November 2011}} who became the Ming dynasty's most famous explorer.

Han Chinese general Guo Baoyu campaigned with Genghis in Central Asia against the Khwarezmian Empire, and his grandson Guo Kan campaigned under Hulagu at the Nizari fortresess of Maymundiz and Alamut, as well as at Baghdad in 1258 in Iraq. They were direct descendants of Guo Ziyi.<ref>{{cite book |last=宋 |first=濂|title=元史|chapter=卷149#郭寶玉〈〔德海_侃〕〉[8]|url=https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E5%85%83%E5%8F%B2/%E5%8D%B7149#%E9%83%AD%E5%AF%B6%E7%8E%89%E3%80%88%E3%80%94%E5%BE%B7%E6%B5%B7_%E4%BE%83%E3%80%95%E3%80%89[8 |isbn=}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=宋first=濂|others=柯劭忞 |date=1920|title=元新元史|chapter=卷 146 (卷一百四十六 列傳第四十三) |url=https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%96%B0%E5%85%83%E5%8F%B2/%E5%8D%B7146}}</ref> [[File:Expansion of the Mongol Empire.svg|thumb|250px|Expansion of the Mongol Empire from 1206 to 1294]] In the 1220s, the Mongols sent Khitan and Han Chinese administrators to Bukhara and Samarqand to govern, and this was witnessed by Qiu Chuji on his way to meet Genghis Khan in Afghanistan.<ref>Buell, Paul D. "Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara". Journal of Asian History, vol. 13, no. 2, 1979, pp. 121–51. {{JSTOR|41930343}}. Accessed 28 July 2022.</ref> Chinese siege engineers were deployed in Iran and Iraq by the Ilkhanate.<ref>Raphael, Kate. "Mongol Siege Warfare on the Banks of the Euphrates and the Question of Gunpowder (1260-1312)". Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 19, no. 3, 2009, pp. 355–70. {{JSTOR|27756073}}. Accessed 28 July 2022.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Li |first=Chi Ch'ang |others=translated by E. Bretschneider |date=1888 |title=The Travels of Ch'ang Ch'un to the West, 1220-1223 recorded by his disciple Li Chi Ch'ang|url=https://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/changchun.html }}</ref> The Khitan Yelü Chucai was sent by the Mongols to Central Asia.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://contacthistory.com/?p=323|title="Impressions of Early 13th century Central Asia as seen in the poetry of Yelü Chucai": a guest lecture by Dr. Sally Church with Prof. Qiu Jiangning |last=Schivatcheva |first=Tina |date= 13 December 2017 |website=Joined-up History}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Ye-lü |first= Ch'u ts'ai |others=translated by E. Bretschneider |date=1888 |title=Account of a Journey to the West (Si Yu Lu), 1219-1224 |url=https://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/si_yu_lu.html}}</ref>

The war between Qaidu and Kublai wrecked the economy of Qocho and stopped trade between China and West Asia and Europe.<ref>{{cite book |last= Biran|first= Michal |date=2013 |title= Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State In Central Asia|series=Central Asia Research Forum|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AU3jAQAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA57 |location= |publisher=Routledge |page=57 |isbn=978-1-136-80037-5}}</ref> During the war between Kublai Khan and Kaidu, the Uyghurs of Qocho (Gaochang) fled Qaidu's assaults into Gansu, under Yuan control from Turfan, in 1283, placing Yongchang as their capital and between 1270 and 1275, making Gansu's city of Qamil their capital. Uyghur subjects fled along with the royal court.<ref>{{cite book |last=Allen |first= Thomas T. |editor1-last=Amitai|editor1-first= Reuven|editor2-last=Biran|editor2-first= Michal |date= 2014|edition=illustrated|title=Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change: The Mongols and Their Eurasian Predecessors |series=Perspectives on the Global Past|chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=7VgEEAAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA129|publisher=University of Hawaii Press |page=129 |isbn=978-0-8248-4789-0|chapter=Six : Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia }}</ref> The Mongols sent new people to repopulate the Jaxartes river (lower Syr Darya) and the city of Yangikent (Iamkint or Sakint) after deporting and killing the natives. The upper Yenisei region of Qianqianzhou received many Han Chinese artisans and the western Mongolia-based military base and granary city of Chinqai received many Han Chinese artisans put there by Mongols, as heard in 1221–1222 by Li Zhichang, who was going to Central Asia. Kublai Khan sent southern Han Chinese farmers from the Southern Song repeatedly to the Siberian Kyrgyz region of Yenisei in 1272, and before that year as well. He also sent them farming equipment and oxen. Tanguts, Khitans, and Han Chinese were sent to take care of gardens and fields in the depopulated and sacked city of Samarkand, where only 25% of the original 100,000 households survived the Mongol sacking, and Han Chinese artisans were "everywhere" in the ruined city, as witnessed on 3 December 1221. They managed to rehabilitate and reconstruct the city, since Samarqand was praised as a productive flourishing area before at least 1225, when the Khitan Yelu Chucai came there. Mongke sent Chang De to Hulagu in 1259. He went across Central Asia. He said, "numerous Chinese growing wheat, barley, millet, and [other] grains" lived around Lake Qizilbash and the Ulungur river in north Dzungaria and the cities of Almaliq and Tiermuer Chancha had many Han Chinese from Shaanxi in the Ili river valley. He said, "the Muslim populace [there] has become mixed with the Chinese and over time, their customs have gradually come to resemble those of the Middle Kingdom."<ref>{{cite book |last=Allen |first= Thomas T. |editor1-last=Amitai|editor1-first= Reuven|editor2-last=Biran|editor2-first= Michal |date= 2014|edition=illustrated|title=Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change: The Mongols and Their Eurasian Predecessors |series=Perspectives on the Global Past|chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=7VgEEAAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA130 |publisher=University of Hawaii Press |page=130 |isbn=978-0-8248-4789-0|chapter=Six : Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia }}</ref> During Mongke's rule in the 1250s in Iran in the 13th century, Iran received thousands of Han Chinese farmers. Han Chinese were the plurality in the Iranian Azerbaijan city of Khoy as of 1340, as testified by Mustawfi. Han Chinese in Khoy and Tabriz in Iranian Azerbaijan were originally sent to Marv by the Mongols before being sent to the Iranian Azerbaijani cities, as recorded by Rashid al-Din.<ref>{{cite book |last=Allen |first= Thomas T. |editor1-last=Amitai|editor1-first= Reuven|editor2-last=Biran|editor2-first= Michal |date= 2014|edition=illustrated|title=Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change: The Mongols and Their Eurasian Predecessors |series=Perspectives on the Global Past|chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=7VgEEAAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA131|location= |publisher=University of Hawaii Press |page=131 |isbn=978-0-8248-4789-0|chapter=Six : Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia }}</ref>

Rashid al-din said that the Chinese millet grain known as tuki was brought by Han Chinese first to Marv in Turkmenistan and then to Iranian Azerbaijan in Khoy and Tabriz. Later, Han Chinese were reported to be the most significant ethnicity generations later, in Khoi around 1340, when Mustawfi wrote about them.<ref>{{cite book |last=Allsen |first=Thomas T. |edition=illustrated, reprint, revised|date= 2004|title= Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia|series=Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0StLNcKQNUoC&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA121 |publisher= Cambridge University Press|page=121 |isbn=0-521-60270-X}}</ref> Rashid al-din wrote it in 1310. And local Muslims in Almalik lived with Han Chinese and Han Chinese were employed as guards and millet, barley, and wheat farmers around Beshbalik and worked in Samarkand as seen in 1259 by Liu Yu. Wheat and hemp were grown next to mud huts near the Kerulun river by Han Chinese farmers in 1247 near Karakorum, as seen by Zhang Dehui. Han Chinese made up 70% of herders in Mongolia, as seen by Xuting and Peng Daya. Siberia's Upper Yeniesei area, Samarkand, and western Mongolia all had Han Chinese craftsmen, as seen by Li Zhichang in 1221–1222. He visited Balkh, Samarkand, and Tashkent when he went to Central Asia and Mongolia from Shandong.<ref>{{cite book |last=Ebrey |first=Patricia Buckley |editor1-last=Ebrey |editor1-first=Patricia Buckley|editor2-last=Smith |editor2-first=Paul Jakov |date=2016 |edition=illustrated|title= State Power in China, 900-1325|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9SpADAAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA324 |location= |publisher=University of Washington Press |page=324 |isbn=978-0-295-99848-0|chapter=9 State-Forced Relocations in China, 900-1300 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last= LAMBTON |first=A.K.S |editor-last= Morgan|editor-first= Reuven Amitai-Preiss |date=2021 |title= The Mongol Empire and its Legacy|series=Islamic History and Civilization|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rJJOEAAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA148 |publisher=BRILL |page=148 |isbn=978-90-04-49273-8|chapter=THE ATHAR WA AHYA' OF RASHID AL-DIN FADL ALLAH HAMADANI AND HIS CONTRIBUTION AS AN AGRONOMIST, ARBORICULTURIST AND HORICULTURALIST }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Biran |first= Michal |date=2005 |title=The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History: Between China and the Islamic World |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=B934LaVBaz8C&dq=the+large+number+of+farmers+and+artisans+in+Samarqand+or+many+Almaliq+Besh+Baliq&pg=PA96 |edition=illustrated, reprint|publisher= Cambridge University Press|page=96 |isbn=0-521-84226-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Biran |first= Michal |date=2001|title=JSAI., Volume 25 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OicrkfOCPOYC&q=the+large+number+of+farmers+and+artisans+in+Samarqand+or+many+Almaliq+Besh+Baliq |publisher= Magnes Press, The Hebrew University|page=54}}</ref>

The Tabriz-based Rob'-e Rashidi and the Maraghe observatory in Ilkhanid Iran had scientists and scholars of Chinese origin. The "Book of Precious Presents or the Medicine of the Chinese People" (Tansuq-name ya tebb-e ahl-e Kheta) was translated by people working under Rashid-al-Din Fazl-Allah to Persian from Chinese and it was about Chinese medicine.<ref>{{cite book |last1= Vesel |first1=Ziva |last2= Berntjes |first2=Sonja |editor-last= Utas |editor-first=Bo |date= 2021|title= Persian Prose: A History of Persian Literature, Vol V|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7AwtEAAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA255 |location= |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |page=255 |isbn=978-0-7556-1781-4|chapter=Chapter 4 Science in Persia}}</ref>

Rashid al-Din wrote about Chinese culture and history.<ref>{{cite book |editor-last=Boyd |editor-first= Kelly |date= 1999|title=Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing, Volume 1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0121vD9STIMC&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA1466 |publisher= Taylor & Francis|page= 1466 |isbn=1-884964-33-8}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |date=1979 |title=National Union Catalog: A Cumulative Author List Representing Library of Congress Printed Cards and Titles Reported by Other American Libraries |series=Library of Congress catalogs|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=4h3hAAAAMAAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA539|publisher= Library of Congress}}</ref> Oljeitu's birth was witnessed by Rashid al-Din.<ref>{{cite book |last=Kamola |first=Stefan|editor-last=Babaie |editor-first=Sussan |date=2019 |title= Iran After the Mongols|series=The Idea of Iran|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LhGpDwAAQBAJ&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PA66 |location= |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |page= 66|isbn=978-1-78673-601-7|chapter=3 Beyond History: Rashid Al-Din and Iranian Kingship }}</ref> The Sunni convert Jew Rashid al-Din was executed after the Ilkhanate became Shia.<ref>{{cite book |editor1-last=Gettleman |editor1-first= Marvin E. |editor2-last=Schaar |editor2-first=Stuart |date=2012 |title=The Middle East and Islamic World Reader |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Hw1D9Ab8l-8C&dq=rashid+al+din+marv+chinese&pg=PT57 |location= |publisher=Open Road + Grove/Atlantic |edition=revised|isbn=978-0-8021-9452-7}}</ref>

Han Chinese were sent to the Upper Yenisei valley as weavers, into Samarkand and Outer Mongolia as craftsmen, as noticed by Ch'ang-ch'un in 1221-22 when he travelled to Kabul from Beijing and they moved to Russia and Iran. The Euphrates and Tigris basins were irrigated by Chinese hydraulic engineers and in 1258, at the siege of Baghdad, one of Hulagu Khan's generals was Han Chinese. Because of the Mongols, Chinese influenced architecture, music, ceramics, and Persian miniatures in the Golden Horde and Il-khan. Han Chinese, Mongols, Uighurs, Venetians, and Geonese all lived in Tabriz, where paper money was introduced and movable type printing and wood engraving as well as paper money, printed fabrics, and playing cards spread from China to Europe due to the Mongols. Wood engraving which was Chinese was mentioned in the 1313 book "Treasure of the Il-khan on the Sciences of Cathay", which was about Chinese medicine and translated by Rashid al-Din.<ref>{{cite book |last=Gernet |first=Jacques |editor=Cambridge University Press|translator=J. R. Foster, Charles Hartman|date= 1996 |title= A History of Chinese Civilization|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=jqb7L-pKCV8C&dq=It+is+said+that+in+the+fourteenth+century+there+were+Chinese+quarters+in+Tabriz+and+even+Moscow+and+Novgorod&pg=PA377|edition=illustrated, reprint, revised|publisher=Cambridge University Press|page=377 |isbn=0-521-49781-7}}</ref> The Mongols brought the Chinese idea of paper currency to Iran in 1294 where the name of the currency, chaw, was taken from the Chinese word Chao.<ref>{{cite book |date= 1917|title= Millard's Review of the Far East, Volume 3|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_Dg-AAAAMAAJ&dq=%22a+mann+of+bread+in+some+districts+was+sold+for+a+dinar%22&pg=RA1-PA256 |publisher= China Monthly Review|page=256}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |date=1918 |title=Millard's Review, Volumes 3-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IfoVAQAAMAAJ&dq=%22a+mann+of+bread+in+some+districts+was+sold+for+a+dinar%22&pg=PA256 |location= |publisher=Millard Publishing Company |page=256 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |date= 1917|title= Millard's Review of the Far East, Volume 3|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OD9CAQAAMAAJ&dq=%22a+mann+of+bread+in+some+districts+was+sold+for+a+dinar%22&pg=PA256 |location= |publisher= Millard Publishing Company|page=256}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Spalding |first= William Frederick |date= 1920|title=Eastern Exchange, Currency and Finance |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l6o0AQAAMAAJ&dq=%22a+mann+of+bread+in+some+districts+was+sold+for+a+dinar%22&pg=PA116|edition=3|publisher=Sir I. Pitman & Sons|page= 226 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://archive.org/details/easternexchangec00spal|title=Eastern exchange, currency and finance|first=William Frederick|last=Spalding|date=24 May 1917|publisher=London, New York : Pitman|access-date=24 May 2023|via=Internet Archive}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |date= 1965|title=The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Volume 2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-YbrAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22was+oblong+in+shape+and,+in+addition+to+some+chinese+signs%22&pg=PA14 |location= |publisher=Brill |page= 14}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://archive.org/details/volume-5/Volume%202/page/14/mode/2up|title=Encyclopedia of Islam : Umair Mirza : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming: Internet Archive|date=February 1986 |access-date=24 May 2023}}</ref><ref>[https://archive.org/stream/volume-5/Volume%202_djvu.txt "The CaOy made of the bark of the mulberry-tree, was oblong in shape and, in addition to some Chinese signs, bore the ^hdda. Underneath this was the name ..."]</ref><ref>[https://archive.org/stream/EncyclopaediaDictionaryIslamMuslimWorldEtcGibbKramerScholars.13/02.EncycIslam.NewEdPrepNumLeadOrient.EdEdComCon.LewPelScha.etc.UndPatIUA.v2.C-G.4th.Leid.EJBrill.1965.1991._djvu.txt "The Cao, made of the bark of the mulberry- tree, was oblong in shape and, in addition to some Chinese signs, bore the shahdda. Underneath this was the name ..."]</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://twitter.com/yakabikaj/status/1579124886303576065 |title=In 1294, the Mongols introduced the first paper currency in the Islamic world to Iran: چاو chāw (from Chinese 鈔 chāo). It turned out to be a disaster, throwing the capital Tabriz into chaos and threatening the downfall of the empire. |last=Jabbari |first=Alexander }}</ref>

During the Mongol-Yuan period, some historians claim Persian was the ''lingua franca'' of Central Asia, and many Persians and Central Asians migrated to China. There was a large Persian community in China, especially among Chinese Muslims, and claim that Persian was one of the official languages of the Yuan dynasty, alongside Chinese and Mongolian.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/chinese-iranian-viii|title=Chinese-Iranian Relations viii. Persian Lang. |website=www.iranicaonline.org|access-date=25 June 2019}}</ref> However, other historians challenge that claim and say Turkic languages, primarily Old Uyghur, were the auxiliary secondary language of the Yuan dynasty after the Mongol language and Chinese language and that Turkic languages were also the lingua franca of Mongol-ruled Central Asia, saying that Persian was not an official language of the Yuan.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Haw |first= Stephen G. |date=December 2014 |title= The Persian Language in Yuan-Dynasty China: A Reappraisal |journal= East Asian History|number=39 |pages=5–32 |issn=1839-9010 }}</ref>

The Chinese Yuan and Persian Ilkhanate enjoyed close relations,<ref name=":0" /> with nearly annual diplomatic exchanges between the two.<ref name=":1" />

In 1289, Kublai Khan established a Muslim university in Beijing. Persian works were translated en masse into Chinese, some of which are preserved today by the Peking University Library. Many tombstones and archaeological tablets found in China are also probably written in the Perso-Arabic script.<ref name=":0" />

China exported astronomical tools and discoveries, printing, paper money, sancai, and porcelain to Iran. Porcelain particularly grew popular among Persians.<ref name=":1" />

===Ming dynasty=== [[File:Mihran Sitad selects bride for the Persian king.jpg|thumb|Sassanid nobleman Mihransitad selects a bride for the Persian king from five daughters of the Chinese emperor, 14th century miniature.]] The famous Maragheh observatory in Maragheh, Iran, is also known to have had some Chinese astronomers working there alongside Iranian astronomers, and some Iranian astronomical instruments were also being used by astronomers in China.<ref>{{citation|last=van Dalen|first=Benno|title=History of Oriental Astronomy|pages=19–32|year=2002|editor-last=Ansari|editor-first=S. M. Razaullah|contribution=Islamic Astronomical Tables in China: The Sources for Huihui li|publisher=Springer Science+Business Media|isbn=978-1-4020-0657-9}}</ref> Safavid Iranian art was also partly influenced by Chinese art to an extent. Shah Abbas had hundreds of Chinese artisans in his capital Esfahan. Also, 300 Chinese potters produced glazed tile buildings, and hundreds of others produced metalwork, miniature paintings, calligraphy, glasswork, tile work, and pottery.<ref>McDougal Littel, WORLD HISTORY: PATTERNS OF INTERACTION, New York edition,{{ISBN|978-0-618-91330-5}}, {{ISBN|978-0-618-91330-5}}, Pages 514–515</ref><ref>{{citation|last=Newman|first=Andrew J.|title=Safavid Iran: rebirth of a Persian empire|page=69|year=2006|chapter=Monumental Challenge and Monumental Responses: the reign of Abbas I (1587&ndash;1629)|publisher=I. B. Tauris|isbn=978-1-86064-667-6}}</ref> From E. Sykes's "Iran and Its People": "Early in the seventeenth century, Shah Abbas imported Chinese workmen into his country to teach his subjects the art of making porcelain, and the Chinese influence is very strong in the designs on this ware. Chinese marks are also copied, so that to scratch an article is sometimes the only means of proving it to be of Persian manufacture, for the Chinese glaze, hard as iron, will take no mark."<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XRRzAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA359|title=Zanzibar the island metropolis of eastern Africa|last=Pearce|first=Francis Barrow|publisher=Dutton|year=1920|location=Great Britain|page=359|quote=Interest to quote the following extract from E. Sykes's Persia and Its People: "Early in the seventeenth century, Shah Abbas imported Chinese workmen into his country to teach his subjects the art of making porcelain, and the Chinese influence is very strong in the designs on this ware. Chinese marks are also copied, so that to scratch an article is sometimes the only means of proving it to be of Persian manufacture, for the Chinese glaze, hard as iron, will take no mark."|access-date=12 March 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XRRzAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA430|title=Zanzibar the island metropolis of eastern Africa|last=Pearce|first=Francis Barrow|publisher=Dutton|year=1920|location=Great Britain|page=430|quote=Shah Abbas, 202; his name mentioned on bronze guns at Zanzibar, 200; imports Chinese artisans to teach the art of pottery-making, 350|access-date=12 March 2012}}</ref>

Of the Chinese Lin family in Quanzhou, Lin Nu, the son of Lin Lu, visited Hormuz in Persia in 1376, married a Persian or an Arab girl, and brought her back to Quanzhou. Lin Nu was the ancestor of the Ming dynasty reformer Li Zhi.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=067On0JgItAC&pg=PA817|title=A-L, Volumes 1-2|author=Association for Asian studies|location=Ann Arbor, Michigan|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=1976|isbn=978-0-231-03801-0|page=817|access-date=29 June 2010}}</ref><ref name="Chen">{{cite web|url=http://www.iranica.com/articles/chinese-iranian-vii|title=Chinese-Iranian Relations vii. Persian Settlements in Southeastern China during the T'ang, Sung, and Yuan Dynasties|last=Chen|first=Da-Sheng|publisher=Encyclopedia Iranica|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101208182736/http://www.iranica.com/articles/chinese-iranian-vii|archive-date=8 December 2010|url-status=usurped|access-date=28 June 2010}}</ref>

Notable Chinese Muslims who undertook the task of translation of Persian into Chinese include Chang Zhimei (medicine) and Liu Zhi. Although Persian was still spoken among some Muslim communities, due to decreased contact with the Middle East, language use declined.<ref name=":0" />

Ming navy general Zheng He came from a Muslim family and sailed through much of the Old World, including India, Persia, Arabia, and Africa. In his wake, he left many relics, including the Chinese-Persian-Tamil Galle Trilingual Inscription, praising the Buddha, Allah, and Vishnu, respectively, in the three languages.<ref>Xinhua News Agency. "[http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/zhenhe/134661.htm A Peaceful Mariner and Diplomat]". 12 July 2005.</ref>

The Timurid empire wrote its letters to the Ming dynasty in Persian.

===Qing dynasty=== By the Qing, although hardly anyone in the court was fluent in Persian, in madrasas, Persian was still studied. In particular, the works of Sadi, Abd-Allāh Abū Bāker, Ḥosayn b. ʿĀlem Ḥosaynī, etc. were taught in said madrasas.<ref name=":0" />

=== Safavid, Afsharid, Zand and Qajar periods === thumb|Inside view of a Persian house, with China utensils in decorative niches on the wall. 16th century, Iran.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Allemagne |first1=Henry René d' |title=Du Khorassan au pays des Backhtiaris, trois mois de voyage en Perse |date=1911 |publisher=Paris, Hachette et cie |page=45 |url=https://archive.org/details/gri_33125014240549/page/n112/mode/1up}}</ref> [[File:Sheikh Safi al-Din Khānegāh and Shrine Ensemble 20190219 13.jpg|thumb|Chinese porcelain dating to the 17th century, in the ''Chinikana'' in the ''Sheikh Safi al-Din Khānegāh and Shrine Ensemble'' in Ardabil.<ref name="KR">{{cite book |last1=Rivzi |first1=Kishmar |title=SAINTS AND SACRED MATTER The Cult of Relics in Byzantium and Beyond |chapter= CHAPTER 14 THE INCARNATE SHRINE Shi'ism and the Cult of Kingship in Early Safavid Iran |date=2015 |publisher=Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-0-88402-406-4 |pages=209–303 |url=https://arthistory.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Rizvi%20-%20Saints%20and%20Sacred%20Matter%20BW.pdf}}</ref>]] During the Safavid period, political relations with China were limited, but cultural and commercial exchange was strong. Chinese porcelain, motifs, and artistic styles heavily influenced Safavid art, and trade continued through the Silk Road and maritime routes. In the Afsharid era, contacts were minimal and mostly indirect, as both states were focused on internal and regional conflicts.

During the Zand period, ties remained mostly restricted to limited trade, with no major diplomatic exchanges recorded. In the Qajar era, relations revived: embassies were exchanged, Iranian envoys visited China, and commercial interaction through Chinese ports increased, marking a renewed phase of diplomatic and economic engagement between the two sides.

===China and Imperial Iran===

Diplomatic links between China and Iran have been maintained into the 20th and 21st centuries with the formation of both the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in 1949 and 1979, respectively. In 1920, the Republic of China (ROC) signed a friendship treaty with the Qajar dynasty and established diplomatic relations at the ministerial level. In 1934, the Pahlavi dynasty established a consulate in Shanghai for the first time. The consulate was closed in 1937. In 1942, China established an embassy in Tehran.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Iran continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC government in Taipei and did not recognize the PRC government in Beijing. In 1951, Iran voted at the UN General Assembly to condemn PRC involvement in the Korean War. The CIA- and MI6-sponsored coup d'état of 1953 brought the Iranian Shah closer into the orbit of U.S.-led western countries and their global policy of containing communist elements, which also happened to be the Shah's political opponents domestically. Iran voted in favor of American proposals to prevent Beijing from representing China at the United Nations.<ref name=":13">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Chuchu |title=China's Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum? |date=2025 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-032-76275-3 |series=Changing Dynamics in Asia-Middle East Relations series |location=Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=108}} In 1958, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, visited the ROC. In the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Iran supported the proposal to condemn the PRC as an aggressor at the UN General Assembly. During this period, the People's Republic of China and Iran had only a small amount of trade.<ref name="history.mofcom">{{cite web |title=一带一路> 伊朗>四、与中国的外交关系 |url=http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?bandr=ylyzgdwjgx |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190210062039/http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?bandr=ylyzgdwjgx |archive-date=10 February 2019 |access-date=10 February 2019 |website=商务历史 |publisher=中华人民共和国商务部 }}</ref><ref name="M.Wang">{{cite journal |author1=王猛 |date=2008 |title=1945~2005:中国与伊朗外交关系考略 |journal=新疆社会科学 |issue=4 |pages=51–57}}</ref>

As the decade went on, however, relations between Beijing and the Soviet Union worsened while U.S-Soviet tensions eased, lowering the strategic importance of Iran to the United States. Both Iran and the PRC sought new allies. In 1965, Iran began to abstain from barring the PRC at the UN. In 1969, the Shah declared his support for Beijing's UN membership. Trade between China and Iran increased to $50 million during the 1960s, twenty times greater compared to the 1950s.<ref name="Dorraj" /> As Iran's relations with the Soviet Union improved as well, it no longer saw containing communism as a priority, leading to a cooling of its relations with Taipei. This would culminate in its switching of diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1971.<ref>{{cite web |title=Uncertainty and Instability: Taiwan-Iran Relations in the Early Cold War Period |url=https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/01/uncertainty-and-instability-taiwan-iran-relations-in-the-early-cold-war-period/ |date=13 January 2021 |website=Global Taiwan Institute}}</ref>

Meanwhile, during the 1970s, China and the United States adjusted their diplomatic strategies, hoping to join forces to confront the Soviet Union. According to the proposal made by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, when he met with Henry Kissinger, the US National Security Advisor, in 1973, a horizontal line should be formed with the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe to jointly oppose Soviet hegemony.<ref>{{cite web |title=毛泽东主席关于三个世界的理论和"一条线"战略 |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn//ziliao_611306/wjs_611318/2159_611322/t8972.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190212011946/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn//ziliao_611306/wjs_611318/2159_611322/t8972.shtml |archive-date=12 February 2019 |access-date=10 February 2019 |website=Ministry of Foreign Affairs}}</ref> As relations between China and the United States relations warmed up, Iran, then an ally of the United States, reacted quickly. On 13 April 1971, the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi sent his twin sister, Ashraf Pahlavi, to China for a secret visit to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations with Chinese leaders. On the evening of the 13 April, Zhou Enlai, then Premier of China, personally hosted Princess Ashraf at the Qianmen Roast Duck Restaurant. On 30 April, the Shah sent his sister, Princess Fatima, to China. On 16 August of the same year, China and Iran held negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations in Islamabad and issued a joint communiqué on the same day, in which Iran recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China.<ref>{{cite news |date=23 November 2018 |title=为周总理接待伊朗公主访华保驾护航 |url=https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2663664 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190212011938/https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2663664 |archive-date=12 February 2019 |access-date=10 February 2019 |work=澎湃新闻 《纵横》杂志 |url-status=live}}</ref> In October of the same year, Shah Pahlavi held a celebration for the 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire.<ref name="beijingreview">{{cite news |date=7 July 2011 |title=中国与伊朗关系回眸 |trans-title=A Look Back at China-Iran Relations |url=http://www.beijingreview.cn/2009news/guoji/guancha/2011-07/15/content_377075.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190212011428/http://www.beijingreview.cn/2009news/guoji/guancha/2011-07/15/content_377075.htm |archive-date=12 February 2019 |access-date=10 February 2019 |work=Beijing Review}}</ref> The Chinese government sent Zhang Tong, then ambassador to Pakistan, to attend (The original Chinese government special envoy was Guo Moruo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. However, Guo Moruo fell ill on the way after leaving Beijing on 11 October and was unable to go to Iran. The Chinese government then sent Zhang Tong to Iran to participate in the celebration).<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 October 1971 |title=应邀前往参加波斯帝国成立两千五百周年庆祝活动 我国特使到达伊朗 |newspaper=人民日报 |page=第1版}}</ref>

[[File:Fpchina.jpg|thumb|Iranian Empress Farah Pahlavi state visit to China in 1972]] On 18 September 1972, Iranian Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Khuveda accompanied Queen Farah Pahlavi on a visit to China. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai personally went to the airport to greet them and accompanied them almost the entire time.<ref name="beijingreview" />

In April 1978, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided to send Hua Guofeng, Chairman of the CCP and Premier of China, to visit Romania and Yugoslavia in August. At that time, the official planes of Chinese state leaders were Boeing 707s, requiring a refueling stop en route to Europe. Tehran, the capital of Iran, was located roughly midway along the flight path and was a crucial transportation hub. Considering Iran's special position in Chinese diplomacy, the CCP Central Committee decided that Hua Guofeng's plane would stop in Tehran for refueling on the outbound journey and make an official visit to Iran on the return journey via Tehran. That year, Iran was in turmoil, with anti-Pahlavi demonstrations escalating. After careful consideration, Chinese diplomatic officials decided to proceed with Hua Guofeng's visit to Iran as planned. On 29 August 1978, after arriving in Tehran, Hua Guofeng, due to the massive scale of the demonstrations, had to cancel all his sightseeing itinerary and travel between the airport, hotel, and royal palace by helicopter. He also met with the Shah of Iran, Pahlavi. This visit seriously affected Sino-Iranian relations after the Iranian Revolution, to the point that the Iranian people believed that China supported the Pahlavi dynasty and that Hua Guofeng's trip was to cheer on the Shah as the Pahlavi dynasty was about to collapse.<ref name="takungpao">{{cite news |date=23 March 2015 |title=华国锋首次访问伊朗的前因后果 |url=http://news.takungpao.com/world/watch/2015-03/2952852.html?pc |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190212011633/http://news.takungpao.com/world/watch/2015-03/2952852.html?pc |archive-date=12 February 2019 |access-date=10 February 2019 |work=大公网 |url-status=live}}</ref>

=== China and the Islamic Republic of Iran === After the Iranian Revolution, relations between China and Iran cooled despite China's recognition of the new republic.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Girard |first=Bonnie |title=The History of China and Iran's Unlikely Partnership |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/the-history-of-china-and-irans-unlikely-partnership/ |access-date=15 November 2025 |website=thediplomat.com |language=en-US}}</ref> "Down with America, down with Israel, down with China" became a common slogan on the streets of Iran.<ref name="takungpao" /> Officially however the Islamic republic carried out a foreign policy of ''neither East nor West''.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last=Perletta |first=Giorgia |date=2025-01-02 |title=Iran's Foreign Policy from Non-Alignment to 'Look to the East': Between Ideology and Pragmatism |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19436149.2024.2384805 |journal=Middle East Critique |language=en |volume=34 |issue=1 |pages=21–41 |doi=10.1080/19436149.2024.2384805 |issn=1943-6149}}</ref> Subsequent deterioration of relationship between the Western countries and Iran contributed to increased ties with the PRC.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=108}} On 14 January 1980, in order to resolve the Iran hostage crisis, the United States proposed to impose economic sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council. The vote count was 10 in favor, 2 against, and 2 abstentions. The Chinese representative did not vote, and the proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite news |date=14 January 1980 |title=Soviets Veto Sanctions By U.N. Against Iran |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/01/14/soviets-veto-sanctions-by-un-against-iran/9d6b8b82-e415-4d14-b421-3b620ecdb88a/?utm_term=.959ed8ea1f15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190212011908/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/01/14/soviets-veto-sanctions-by-un-against-iran/9d6b8b82-e415-4d14-b421-3b620ecdb88a/ |archive-date=12 February 2019 |access-date=10 February 2019 |newspaper=The Washington Post |url-status=live}}</ref> Two weeks later, Iran sent a member of parliament, Ali Khamenei (who later became the Supreme Leader of Iran), to China to communicate diplomatic positions.<ref name="history.mofcom" /> In 1980, the Iran–Iraq War broke out. Most of the international community sympathized with Iraq and did not support Iran. China was one of the few neutral countries.<ref name="beijingreview" /> The two countries grew closer during the Iran-Iraq War because China was an important source of arms for Iran.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=108}} In 1983, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and other high-ranking officials visited China. Velayati met with Chinese President Li Xiannian. In 1984, Wu Xueqian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, visited Iran. Relations between the two countries warmed up and normalization was achieved. In 2016, Chinese leader Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Iran, and the two sides announced the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership.<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 June 2018 |title=习近平同伊朗总统鲁哈尼举行会谈 |trans-title=Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Iranian President Rouhani |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-06/10/c_1122964989.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20210328074051/http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-06/10/c_1122964989.htm |archive-date=28 March 2021 |access-date=28 March 2021 |website=Xinhua News Agency |language=zh}}</ref>

In 2016, China and Iran signed a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" agreement.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=27 March 2021 |title=Iran, China Sign 25-Year Cooperation Agreement |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_iran-china-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement/6203830.html |access-date=19 June 2025 |website=Voice of America |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=China and Iran: 25-year Strategic Partnership – MEPEI |url=https://mepei.com/china-and-iran-25-year-strategic-partnership/ |access-date=19 June 2025 |language=en-US}}</ref> This partnership focuses on expanding bilateral cooperation across a large number of sectors, including energy, trade, infrastructure, and military ties.<ref name=":6" /> This is thought to be part of a broader effort meant to strengthen the political and economic relationship between the two countries. Both are facing growing pressure from the United States and Western powers.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Current and Potential Future Threats to America |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/cooperation-between-china-iran-north-korea-and-russia-current-and-potential-future-threats-to-america?lang=en |access-date=19 June 2025 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | date=8 October 2024 |language=en}}</ref> The partnership has facilitated China's increasing role in developing Iran's energy infrastructure and investments in various industrial projects in Iran.<ref name=":13" /> In July 2019, Iran approved visa-free travel for all Chinese citizens, including those in Hong Kong and Macau, with China being one of twelve countries to have direct visa-free access to Iran.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/30/WS5d18ce3ba3103dbf1432b0f1.html|title=Iran approves visa-free travel for Chinese tourists|work=China Daily|date=30 June 2019|access-date=20 January 2021}}</ref> In June 2020, Iran was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong national security law at the United Nations Human Rights Council.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Lawler |first1=Dave |title= The 53 countries supporting China's crackdown on Hong Kong|url= https://www.axios.com/countries-supporting-china-hong-kong-law-0ec9bc6c-3aeb-4af0-8031-aa0f01a46a7c.html|website=Axios |access-date=20 January 2021 |language=en |date=2 July 2020}}</ref> The relationship between both countries includes also soft-power<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Yellinek|first=Roie|date=7 February 2022|title=Soft Power and SPPD in China Iran Relationship|journal=Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies|volume=24 |issue=5 |pages=733–754|doi=10.1080/19448953.2022.2037959|s2cid=252222674 |issn=1944-8953}}</ref> and digital diplomacy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wang|first1=Dan|last2=Yellinek|first2=Roie|date=9 February 2022|title=Iranian Digital Diplomacy Towards China: 2019 as a Turning Point|journal=Asian Affairs|volume=53 |pages=68–86|doi=10.1080/03068374.2022.2029054|s2cid=246711461|issn=0306-8374|doi-access=free}}</ref>

In March 2021, the two countries signed a 25-year cooperation agreement.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-china/iran-china-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement-idUSKBN2BJ0AD?il=0|title=Iran and China sign 25-year cooperation agreement|work=Reuters|date=27 March 2021|access-date=28 March 2021}}</ref> This agreement is estimated to be worth up to $400 billion.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Implications of the 2021 Iran-China Deal for the Oil Market |url=https://www.kapsarc.org/research/publications/implications-of-the-2021-iran-china-deal-for-the-oil-market/ |access-date=19 June 2025 |website=KAPSARC |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="Balkiz">{{Cite web |last=Balkiz |first=Karya Naz |title=China, Iran begin implementation of 25-year strategic pact |url=https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/china-iran-begin-implementation-of-25-year-strategic-pact-53678 |access-date=19 June 2025 |website=China, Iran begin implementation of 25-year strategic pact |language=en}}</ref> This agreement has been interpreted by the West as a response to the ongoing sanctions on Iran. The agreement has been described as a mutually beneficial initiative for both countries, providing Iran with economic relief, while supporting China's regional ambitions and access to energy resources.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Growing but Limited: Iranian Economic Relations with China |url=https://www.inss.org.il/publication/china-iran-economy/ |access-date=19 June 2025 |website=INSS |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="Balkiz" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=Will the Sino-Iranian Agreement Serve the Ambitious Geopolitical Interests of China? |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2021/07/will-the-sino-iranian-agreement-serve-the-ambitious-geopolitical-interests-of-china?lang=en |access-date=19 June 2025 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |language=en}}</ref> In February 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited China in the first such visit by an Iranian leader to China in more than twenty years.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=117}} On 10 March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced that they would normalize their relations, in a deal brokered by China.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gans |first=Jared |date=11 March 2023 |title=Five things to know about the Iran-Saudi deal brokered by China |url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/3895412-five-things-to-know-about-the-iran-saudi-deal-brokered-by-china/ |access-date=14 March 2023 |website=The Hill |language=en-US}}</ref> In June 2025, China's ambassador to the UN, Fu Cong, condemned Israeli strikes on Iran.<ref>{{Cite news |date=13 June 2025 |title=China's UN envoy condemns Israeli strikes on Iran - state media |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-un-envoy-condemns-israeli-strikes-iran-state-media-2025-06-14/ |access-date=14 June 2025 |work=Reuters}}</ref> On 17 May 2026, Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was appointed as the special representative for China, proposed by president Masoud Pezeshkian and supported by supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fan |first=Chen |date=2026-05-18 |title=Why Iran’s choice of Beijing envoy signals an ‘unprecedented’ commitment |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3353978/why-irans-choice-beijing-envoy-signals-unprecedented-commitment |access-date=2026-05-18 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref>

==Economy== {{Further|China–Iran trade relations}} China is both Iran's largest trading partner and its primary destination for energy exports.<ref>{{Cite web |title=China-Iran Fact Sheet |url=https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-iran-fact-sheet-short-primer-relationship |access-date=2026-05-21 |website=www.uscc.gov |language=en}}</ref> After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015, China and Iran agreed to expand trade relations to $600 billion in ten years from January 2016, on the occasion when Chinese leader Xi Jinping paid Hassan Rouhani a state visit.<ref name="xiir">{{cite news |last=Motevalli |first=Golnar |date=23 January 2016 |title=China, Iran Agree to Expand Trade to $600 Billion in a Decade |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-23/china-iran-agree-to-expand-trade-to-600-billion-in-a-decade |access-date=14 January 2026 |work=Bloomberg News}}</ref> This constitutes an increase of over 1,000%.<ref name="qzir">{{cite news |title=Iran plans to boost trade with China by about 1,000% over the next 10 years |url=https://qz.com/601831/iran-plans-to-boost-trade-with-china-by-about-1000-over-the-next-10-years/ |work=Quartz|first=Steve|last=Mollman |date=25 January 2016}}</ref> The agreement was concordant with the One Belt, One Road framework. A total of 17 agreements were signed, including one which relates to the Iranian nuclear program. The Chinese will also help connect Tehran with Mashhad via their high-speed rail technology.<ref name="bas">{{cite news |title=Alstom and Siemens Show How Not to Deal With China |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-06/alstom-and-siemens-show-how-not-to-deal-with-china-and-vestager |work=Bloomberg|first=David|last=Fickling |date=6 February 2019}}</ref>

===Oil and gas=== {{See also|Petroleum industry in Iran}} One of the main pillars of the relationship is oil and gas. China switched to petroleum primarily to move its energy supply from coal. There was a rapid increase in oil importation from 1974 into the 1990s.<ref name="Dorraj">Dorraj, Manochehr and Currier, Carrie L (2008). "Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing World" ''Middle East Policy''</ref> By 2025, China purchased over 80 percent of Iran's shipped oil.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gardner|first=Timothy|date=24 April 2026|title=US imposes sanctions on Chinese 'teapot' refinery for buying Iranian oil|url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-imposes-sanctions-chinese-teapot-refinery-buying-iranian-oil-2026-04-24/|access-date=25 April 2026|work=Reuters}}</ref> Approximately 80 percent of China's total imports from Iran are oil and the rest are mineral and chemical products. Because of this reliance on Iranian oil and gas, China is now investing in the modernization of Iran's oil and gas sector to secure access to the resource.<ref name="Simpson">{{Cite journal |last=Jr |first=George L. Simpson |date=1 March 2010 |title=Russian and Chinese Support for Tehran |url=https://www.meforum.org/2690/russian-chinese-support-for-iran |journal=Middle East Quarterly |language=en}}</ref> The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was granted an $85 million contract to drill 19 wells in the natural gas fields in Southern Iran and signed another similar $13 million contract.<ref name="Dorraj"/> Then, again in 2004, an agreement was reached where China would import 270 million tons of natural gas over 30 years from South Par fields, which are the richest natural gas fields in the world, for $70 billion. Another Chinese company, Sinopec Group, gets half-share in Yardarvaran oil fields, worth about $100 billion for the purpose of exploration.<ref name="Walt">Vivienne Walt (2005). "Iran Looks East" ''Fortune''</ref> Later in 2007, CNPC signed a $3.6 billion deal to develop offshore gas fields in Iran and then signed another $2 billion contract to develop the northern Iranian oil field near Ahvaz.<ref name="Simpson"/> Not only is China helping to develop the oil and gas sector, but China supports Iran's ambitions to bring Caspian Sea oil and gas to Southern Iranian ports through pipelines so the resources can be exported to Europe and Asia.<ref name="Dorraj"/> Iran relies upon its oil sales to China to ensure its fiscal well-being.<ref name="Simpson"/> China also sells gasoline to Iran despite international pressures that have halted Iran's ability to get gasoline from other suppliers.<ref name="Downs">Erica Downs & Suzanne Moloney (2011). "Getting China to Sanction Iran" ''Foreign Affairs''</ref>

China considers Iran a permanent partner for its exports and a source of its growing energy demand. In March 2004, Zhuhai Zhenrong Corporation, a Chinese state-run company, signed a 25-year contract to import 110 million metric tons of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Iran. This was followed by another contract between Sinopec and Iran LNG, signed in October of the same year. The deal, worth $100 billion, adds an extra 250 million tons of LNG to China's energy supply, to be extracted from Iran's Yadavaran field over a 25-year period. In January 2009, Iran and China signed a $1.76bn contract for the initial development of the North Azadegan oil field in western Iran. In March, the two countries struck a three-year $3.39 billion deal to produce liquefied natural gas in Iran's mammoth South Pars natural gas field. Because of its limited refining capacity, Iran imports one-third of its refined products, such as petrol, from China.<ref>{{citation |work=Iran Daily |url=http://www.iran-daily.com/1388/3378/html/economy.htm |title=Economy |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090422021123/http://www.iran-daily.com/1388/3378/html/economy.htm |archive-date=22 April 2009}}</ref><ref>{{citation|work=Al Jazeera|url= http://english.aljazeera.net/business/2009/09/2009923113235664683.html|title=Business|date=23 September 2009}}</ref>

[[File:Fpchina1972.jpg|thumb|Empress Farah Pahlavi and Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda during a state visit to China in 1972]] In 2011, the group Green Experts of Iran reported that Beijing and Tehran had signed a deal that would give China exclusive rights to several Iranian oil and natural gas fields through 2024, including rights to build necessary infrastructure there. In return, China promised to treat any foreign attack against these regions as attacks against its own sovereign territory, and will defend them as such. China would need no prior permission from Iran's government to maintain and increase its military presence in the country, and would control the movement of Iranians in and out of these territories.<ref>{{cite news|title=In a Treasonous Act, Iranian Regime Sells Out Parts of the Country to China!|url=http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-719390|publisher=CNN}}Translated from [http://www.greencorrespondents.com/2011/12/blog-post_792.html اختصاصی/ الحاق برخی مناطق کشور به حوزه منافع ملی چین / خیانت رسمی حکومت به استقلال ایران] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120107210340/http://www.greencorrespondents.com/2011/12/blog-post_792.html |date=7 January 2012 }} Retrieved 23 January 2012</ref> This agreement was the basis for PLA General Zhang Zhaozhong stating, "China will not hesitate to protect Iran even with a Third World War."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Prakash Katoch |date=20 June 2017 |title=Chabahar Port: Why future of India-Iran project hinges on outcome of Narendra Modi-Donald Trump meet |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/chabahar-port-why-future-of-india-iran-project-hinges-on-outcome-of-narendra-modi-donald-trump-meet-3722647.html |access-date=10 May 2024 |website=Firstpost |language=en-us |quote=In return, China promised to treat any foreign attack against these regions as attacks against its own sovereign territory, and defend them as such. China needs no prior permission from Iranian government to maintain and increase its military presence in Iran, and will control the movement of Iranians in and out of these territories. According to Green Experts of Iran, this agreement was the basis for PLA's General Zhang Zhaozhong stating, "China will not hesitate to protect Iran even with a Third World War."}}</ref>

China has been Iran's crude oil sink since the JCPOA was signed.<ref name=qzir/><ref name="rech">{{cite news |title=China's Iran oil imports hit two-month high in June: customs |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade-crude-idUSKCN0PV1KW20150721 |publisher=Reuters |date=21 July 2015}}</ref> In 2017, 64% of an export total of $16.9 billion with China was crude oil.<ref name="oecic">{{cite news |title=What does Iran export to China? (2017) |url=https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/irn/chn/show/2017/ |publisher=Observatory of Economic Complexity}}</ref> As of 2026, it was estimated that China bought more than 90% of all Iranian oil production.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Why Iran's fate means more to oil markets than Venezuela's |url=https://www.dw.com/en/iran-venezuela-oil-china-united-states-protests/a-75507250 |access-date=17 January 2026 |website=Deutsche Welle |language=en}}</ref>

===Trade=== During the Cold War, there were unofficial trade relations between Iran and China that have steadily increased over time. Trade reached $1.627 billion in the 1980s and $15 billion in 2007. In 2001, the volume of trade between Iran and China stood at roughly $3.3 billion,<ref>{{citation|publisher=Iran Vajahan|url=http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news_en.pl?l=en&y=2002&m=4&d=20&a=10|title=News|access-date=15 November 2010|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120904120209/http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news_en.pl?l=en&y=2002&m=4&d=20&a=10|archive-date=4 September 2012|url-status=usurped}}</ref> and in 2005, the volume of China-Iranian trade hit $9.2 billion.<ref>{{citation|work=Payvand|title=News|url=http://www.payvand.com/news/06/jul/1078.html|date=July 2006|access-date=15 November 2010|archive-date=11 October 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141011142805/http://www.payvand.com/news/06/jul/1078.html}}</ref> Iran's Deputy Minister of Commerce Mehdi Ghazanfari speculated that trade exchanges between Iran and China would exceed $25 billion in 2008.<ref>{{citation|work= Iran Daily|url=http://www.iran-daily.com/1387/3263/html/economy.htm#s342852|title= Economy}}</ref>

In 2005, exports from China represented 8.3% of the total import market in Iran, giving China the second largest share of the market after Germany. China's exports to Iran have experienced particularly rapid growth in the past five years, with China replacing Japan as the world's second largest exporter to Iran. Iran's imports from China rose by 360% between 2000 and 2005.<ref>{{citation|work=Payvand|title=News|url=http://www.payvand.com/news/06/may/1046.html|date=May 2006|access-date=15 November 2010|archive-date=9 July 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110709163548/http://www.payvand.com/news/06/may/1046.html}}</ref> China is now responsible for about 9.5% of all Iranian imports. In 1988, the Iranian market opened up to Chinese industry when the PRC began economic restructuring.<ref name="Dorraj" />

Once profitable trade relations were established, the PRC invested in Tehran's subway systems, dams, fishery, and cement factories while Iran helped supply China with the highly desired minerals of coal, zinc, lead, and copper.<ref name="Dorraj" /><ref name="Walt" /> Trade between the two states also included power generation, mining, and transportation equipment, along with arms and consumer goods such as electronics, auto parts, and toys.<ref name="Downs" /> Iran is full of Chinese products and cars.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/middleeast/iran-china-business-ties.html|title=For China's Global Ambitions, 'Iran Is at the Center of Everything'|last=Erdbrink|first=Thomas|date=25 July 2017|work=The New York Times|access-date=25 June 2019|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

Iran–China trade value reached $45 billion in 2011 and was expected to increase to $50 billion by 2012.<ref>{{citation|work=Payvand|url=http://www.payvand.com/news/12/apr/1001.html|title=Iran and China to expand trade relations|date=4 January 2012|access-date=23 April 2012|archive-date=5 May 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120505054428/http://www.payvand.com/news/12/apr/1001.html}}</ref>

Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's former representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said that the two countries "mutually complement each other. They have industry and we have energy resources".<ref name=wright/>

In January 2023, the Overseeing Chief of the Chabahar Free Zone Organization Amir Moghaddam reported that the primary holder dispatch leaving from China docked at Iran's key harbor of Chabahar, marking the foundation of the direct coordinate shipping line between China and Iran's southeastern seaport. He said that Chinese ships already emptied in Bandar Abbas, the capital city of the southern area of Hormuzgan, with their cargo, at that point, being exchanged to Chabahar in Sistan-Baluchistan Territory by means of little ships. With the foundation of the coordinated shipping line between China and Chabahar, cargoes are conveyed ten days prior, whereas fetched of stacking and emptying is decreased by 400 dollars per holder, the official clarified.<ref>{{cite web |title=First Direct Shipping Line Launched Between China and Iran's Chabahar |url=https://kayhan.ir/en/news/110817/first-direct-shipping-line-launched-between-china-and-iran%E2%80%99s-chabahar |website=kayhan}}</ref>

In 2023 the volume of Iran's export to China was $4.59B. Iran mainly exported to China ore, slag and ash (29.5%), plastic and articles of steel or iron (27.5%) and organic chemical (15.9%).<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |title=China (CHN) and Iran (IRN) Trade |url=https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/irn?depthSelector=HS2Depth&geomapMeasureSelector=geomapBalanceOption1 |access-date=18 February 2025 |website=The Observatory of Economic Complexity |language=en}}</ref> The volume of Chinees export to Iran in 2023 was $10B. China mainly exported to Iran machinery, mechanical appliances and parts (22.4%), electrical machinery and electronics (15.5%), cars, tractors, and trucks (24.9%).<ref name=":5" /> As of 2025, Iran's largest trading partner is China.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=108}}

The departure of Iranian ships carrying suspected rocket fuel precursors from a Chinese port has drawn attention, with expert noting the significance of Beijing allowing the vessels to sail amidst the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2026-03-07 |title=Laden Iranian ships depart Chinese port tied to key military chemicals |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/07/laden-iranian-ships-depart-chinese-port-tied-key-military-chemicals/ |access-date=2026-03-10 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

===Infrastructure=== Line 5 of the Tehran metro began operating in 1999 and was Iran's first metro system. The line was constructed by the Chinese company NORINCO.<ref>{{cite web|title=Massive Metroline Deal Inked with Iran |url=http://english.china.org.cn/english/BAT/95583.htm |website=China Internet Information Center |date=17 May 2004}}</ref>

===New Silk Road=== {{Main|Belt and Road Initiative}}

[[File:Belt and Road Initiative participant map.svg|thumb|Countries which signed cooperation documents related to the Belt and Road Initiative]] As of 2019, Iran had signed onto Chinese leader Xi Jinping's signature One Belt One Road plan,<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear|volume=28|author1=Mohsen Shariatinia|author2=Hamidreza Azizi|issue=128|journal=Journal of Contemporary China|pages=984–994|date=2019|doi=10.1080/10670564.2019.1594108|s2cid=159165411}}</ref> and Iran is considered to be a key part of China's geopolitical ambitions in central Asia and the Middle East, sometimes described in terms of a new Great Game.<ref>Alex Vatanka, [https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/05/chinas-great-game-in-iran/ China's Great Game in Iran], ''Foreign Policy'' (5 September 2019).</ref>

While cargoes are usually shipped between China and Iran by ship, it is also possible to travel between the two countries by train, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (see Eurasian Land Bridge). In 2016, the first direct container train between Yiwu (Zhejiang Province) and Tehran made its way across Asia in 14 days. This is supposed to be the beginning of regular container train service along this route.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://en.cncnews.cn/news/v_show/54902_Yiwu-Tehran_cargo_train.shtml|title=CNCNEWS - Yiwu-Tehran cargo train|access-date=24 May 2023|archive-date=6 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160206105046/http://en.cncnews.cn/news/v_show/54902_Yiwu-Tehran_cargo_train.shtml}}</ref>

Iranians and Chinese are currently renovating rails to connect Ürümqi to Tehran as well as connect Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (also see Five-nations railway, Afghanistan–China relations). In another 2016 test run, it took 12 days to deliver freight from Shanghai to Tehran, whereas it would have taken 30 days by sea.<ref name=":3" />

In May 2018, China planned to build a new freight train line with Iran.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/05/11/chinas-new-train-line-to-iran-sends-message-to-trump-well-keep-trading-anyway/|title=China's new train line to Iran sends message to Trump: We'll keep trading anyway|newspaper=The Washington Post|first=Rick|last=Noack|date=11 May 2018|access-date=20 January 2021}}</ref> In 2020, a leaked document showed that a 25-year strategic partnership would be implemented between the two countries, in which China would invest in Iranian infrastructure, transport, and seaports. In exchange, Iran would provide a heavily discounted regular supply of its oil.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/09/irans-pact-with-china-is-bad-news-for-the-west/ |title=Iran's Pact With China Is Bad News for the West |website=Foreign Policy |date=9 August 2020|first1=Alam|last1=Saleh|first2=Zakiyeh|last2=Yazdanshenas}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iran-china-partnership-means-region-200804152249160.html |title=What the new Iran-China partnership means for the region |website=Al Jazeera|first=Abdul|last=Basit|date=6 August 2020 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54db7b69e4b00a5e4b11038c/t/5f0a3b017adc097c9945645c/1594506439567/China_Iran_Document.pdf |title=ویرایش نهایی برنامه همکاری‌های جامع (25) ساله ایران و چین |website=Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Iran) |language=fa |date=2020 }}</ref> Above all, the reasons for the timing of this agreement is the rivalry between the US, the main opponent of Iran, and China, the main supporter of Iran, played a major role in taking the step of signing the agreement.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Yellinek|first=Roie|date=14 September 2020|title=Opinion – The Sino-Iran 25 Years Agreement: Why, and Why Now?|url=https://www.e-ir.info/2020/09/14/opinion-the-sino-iran-25-years-agreement-why-and-why-now/|access-date=15 September 2020|website=E-International Relations|language=en-US}}</ref>

==Politics== Open mutual support is seen in Iran's support of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and Chinese condemnation of the United States' attack on an Iranian passenger plane, among other things.<ref name="Dorraj" />

[[File:Visitation of Jiang Zemin to Iran- Mohammad Khatami- April 20, 2002.png|thumb|20 April 2002, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin and Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, an official Visitation.]]

===Military=== China is believed to have helped Iran militarily in the following areas: conducting training of high-level officials on advanced systems, providing technical support, supplying specialty steel for missile construction, providing control technology for missile development, and building a missile factory and test range. It is rumored that China is responsible for aiding in the development of advanced conventional weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, combat aircraft, radar systems, and fast-attack missile vessels.<ref name="Simpson"/>

It was not until the 1990s that the relationship between China and Iran came under close scrutiny by the United States. From this scrutiny, it became known that China was using North Korea to traffic arms during the Iran-Iraq war to avoid antagonizing the West, but later cut out the middle man. In the years of 1984–1986, about $1–2 billion worth of arms sales occurred.<ref name="Hickley">Dennis Van Vranken Hickley (1990). "New Directions in China's Arms for Export Policy: Of China's Military Ties with Iran" ''Asian Affairs''</ref> And then in 1986, Iran obtained Chinese-made anti-ship surface-to-surface missiles that posed a threat to Persian Gulf shipping.<ref name="Simpson" /> In possessing these missiles, Iran is able to control the Strait of Hormuz and all of the naval trade to and from the Gulf countries.<ref name="Hickley" />

In later inquiries, it was discovered that China sold Iran precursor and dual-use chemicals and the technology and equipment needed to use them.<ref name="Simpson" /> In 1996, the Washington Post reported that China was supplying chemical weapons plants in Iran that were destined for the Army. Arms exports began to steadily decline in the 1990s yet China engaged in $400 million worth of arms transfer agreements with Iran. Sales increased to $600 million from 1997 to 2000. On average, it is estimated that China has made $171 million per year in arms exports to Iran since 1982.<ref name="Delpech">Therese Delpech (2006). ''Iran and the Bomb: The Abdication of International Responsibility''. Columbia University Press {{ISBN|978-0-231-70006-1}}</ref> China discontinued entering new arms export agreements with Iran in 2005.<ref>{{Cite web |last=FOUNDATION |first=OBSERVER RESEARCH |title=China's Arms Transfer to Iran |url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-s-arms-transfer-to-iran |access-date=25 June 2025 |website=orfonline.org |language=en}}</ref>

China and Iran held their first joint naval drill in 2017.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-china-military-drill/iran-and-china-conduct-naval-drill-in-gulf-idUSKBN1990EF|title=Iran and China conduct naval drill in Gulf |work=Reuters |date=18 June 2017 |access-date=9 January 2020}}</ref> These exercises focused on anti-piracy and search-and-rescue operations.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=108}}

After coming to office in 2021, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi pursued a "look east" policy to deepen ties with China and Russia. Tehran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in September 2021. In January 2022, Iran, China, and Russia held their third joint naval drills in the northern Indian Ocean.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news|title=Iran, China and Russia hold naval drills in north Indian Ocean|newspaper=Reuters|date=21 January 2022|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/iran-china-russia-hold-naval-drills-north-indian-ocean-2022-01-21/}}</ref> The three countries started joint naval drills in 2019 in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman area.<ref name=":2" /> The purpose of this drill is to strengthen security and its foundations in the region, and to expand multilateral cooperation between the three countries to jointly support world peace, maritime security, and create a maritime community with a common future.<ref name=":2" />

Iran began importing air defense systems from China, as reported by Middle East Eye. The report indicates that Iran started receiving initial air defense systems from China to enhance its air defenses following the conclusion of the June 2025 conflict (the Twelve-Day War) with Israel and the United States.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-receives-chinese-surface-air-missile-batteries-after-israel-ceasefire-say-sources |title=Iran receives Chinese surface-to-air missile batteries after Israel ceasefire deal|work=Middleeasteye.net |date= |access-date=21 July 2025}}</ref>

There were reports of enhanced security, intelligence, military and technology cooperation between Iran and China following the Twelve-Day War.<ref>{{Cite web |title=China's Long Game in Iran's Short War |url=https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/chinas-long-game-in-irans-short-war/ |access-date=2026-04-12 |website=Australian Institute of International Affairs |language=en-US}}</ref> China has "repeatedly expressed its stance on the threat or use of force in international relations and interference in the internal affairs of other countries" diplomatically; however, there are reports from Western think tanks that the relationship has gone beyond this.<ref name=a>{{Cite news |url=https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/01/28/how-china-aims-to-block-mossad-operations-in-iran/ |title=How China Aims to Block Mossad Operations in Iran |work=Modern Diplomacy |date=28 January 2026 |access-date=1 February 2026}}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=March 2026|certain=y}} Some reports in Western media and policy think tanks narrowed in on Beiijing's support for Iran's rehabilitation of its ballistic missile program.<ref>{{Cite web |last=esennett |date=2025-08-29 |title=Is the cautious China-Iran military cooperation at a turning point? |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/is-the-cautious-china-iran-military-cooperation-at-a-turning-point/ |access-date=2026-04-12 |website=Atlantic Council |language=en-US}}</ref>

In a report by the European journal ''Modern Diplomacy'', China has increased intelligence cooperation with Iran since the June 2025 conflict to combat the influence of the Israeli intelligence agency, known as the Mossad, and to identify the gaps in security. The cooperation involves assisting in the areas of surveillance, intelligence, and security.<ref name=a/>{{Unreliable source?|date=March 2026|certain=y}}

There are also reports that China has assisted Iran in its remote surveillance technology by providing it with surveillance satellites and access to the latest technologies from Chinese companies. In another development, Iranian officials have stated that Iran plans to use the Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system as an alternative to Western satellite navigation systems in a bid to cut its technological dependence. During the 2026 war, a CNBC report cited industry analysts who believed that Iran was indeed utilizing BeiDou to improve the accuracy of its missile strikes against adversaries, though both China and Iran declined to comment.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chin |first=Matthew |date=2026-03-26 |title=Electronic warfare in the Persian Gulf: How GPS interference is disrupting the Middle East |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/26/how-gps-interference-is-disrupting-the-middle-east.html |access-date=2026-04-12 |website=CNBC |language=en}}</ref><ref name=a/>{{Unreliable source?|date=March 2026|certain=y}}

Some sources, such as the Washington, DC-based think tank Brookings Institution, have suggested that China has been providing Iran with equipment and materials for air defense systems, anti-ship missiles, ballistic missile components, and dual-use materials, as well as technical and training assistance. On this point, the intelligence firm Dryad Global has said that Iran has been using the income from its sales of oil to China to acquire the Chinese HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/07/08/report-china-transferred-air-defense-systems-to-iran-after-ceasefire/ |title=Report: China transferred air defense systems to Iran after ceasefire |work=Israel Hayom |date=7 August 2025 |access-date=1 February 2026}}</ref>

In addition to this cooperation, China and Iran have conducted joint naval drills with Russia in the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean. According to analysts, these drills have special geopolitical significance in the light of mounting tensions between Iran and the United States.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://apnews.com/article/mideast-tensions-iran-china-russia-naval-drills-b150bd7fa1336e52fbbf6fd4afd593de |title=China, Iran and Russia hold joint naval drills in Mideast as tensions rise between Tehran and US |work=AP News |date=12 March 2025 |access-date=1 February 2026}}</ref>

Following the implementation of a ceasefire in the 2026 Iran War on 8 April, U.S. intelligence officials stated that China intended to transfer MANPAD air defense systems to Iran, shipping them through third parties to mask their Chinese origin. U.S. President Donald Trump, when referred to the CNN report, warned that China would face "big problems" if it carried through with transferring the anti-aircraft system.<ref name=":8">{{Cite web |last=Cohen |first=Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky, Zachary |date=2026-04-11 |title=Exclusive: US intelligence indicates China is preparing weapons shipment to Iran amid fragile ceasefire, sources say {{!}} CNN Politics |url=https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/11/politics/us-intelligence-iran-china-weapons |access-date=2026-04-12 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Khushi |first1=Akanksha |last2=Landay |first2=Jonathan |date=11 April 2026 |title=US intelligence indicates China preparing weapons shipment to Iran, CNN reports |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-intelligence-indicates-china-preparing-weapons-shipment-iran-cnn-reports-2026-04-11/ |access-date=12 April 2026 |website=Reuters}}</ref>

===Nuclear technology=== Nuclear cooperation began in the 1980s when China helped build a research reactor and supplied four other research reactors. Continued aid came in the form of helping Iran construct a uranium hexafluoride enrichment plant near Isfahan and the resumption of construction on a nuclear power plant at Bushehr that was left uncompleted by the French and Germans. In 1991, nuclear exports to Iran were discovered by the International Atomic Energy Association, which contained three types of uranium. A 1990 covert nuclear agreement was also discovered.<ref name="Delpech"/> This discovery was followed by an unprecedented nuclear cooperation agreement in 1992. The agreement was signed despite U.S. protests to have China limit its nuclear cooperation with Iran.<ref>Alidad Mafinezam and Aria Mehrabi (2008). ''Iran and Its Place Among Nations''. Praeger Publishers {{ISBN|978-0-275-99926-1}}</ref>

Direct nuclear cooperation has ended, but there is speculation over whether there remains indirect nuclear cooperation.<ref name="Delpech" /> In 2005, seven Chinese firms were suspected of selling nuclear weapons technology and all 7 had sanctions placed upon them. Those firms were banned from trading with the United States for two years.<ref>Sharif Shuja (2005). "China, Iran, and Central Asia: The Dawning of a New Partnership" ''Contemporary Review''</ref> There also continues to be Chinese nuclear experts, scientists, and technicians present in Iran.<ref name="Delpech" />

In 2015, China was part of the Iran nuclear deal framework. China opposes Iran's possible production and possession of nuclear weapons but does not see the urgency to stop it.<ref name="Simpson" />

After the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), China sought to preserve the JCPOA.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=111}} China emphasized that all parties should return to the JCPOA.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=111}} It worked with the remaining signatories (Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in an effort to develop avenues such as Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges which might result in Iran's continued compliance and facilitate legitimate trade with Iran amid the US-imposed sanctions on Iran.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=111}}

On 16 November 2021, United States President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping talked about their positions in the resumption of negotiations with Iran on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Biden, Xi discuss how to 'align' stances on Iran nuclear issue|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/16/biden-xi-discuss-how-to-align-stances-on-iran-nuclear-issue|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116230438/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/16/biden-xi-discuss-how-to-align-stances-on-iran-nuclear-issue |archive-date=16 November 2021 }}</ref>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC characterizes the US actions in withdrawing from the JCPOA and imposing sanctions on Iran as "unilateral bullying" and states that the US should "immediately correct its wrongdoings and lift these illegal sanctions."<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=112}}

China's government has raised concern about Iran's increase in stockpiling and uranium enrichment following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=114}}

===UN sanctions=== Iran relies on China's veto power on the Security Council to protect it from US-led sanctions.<ref name="Walt" />

China is known for its preference of diplomacy over sanctions. This tradition includes China's (along with Russia's) opposition to UN sanctions against Iran.<ref name="Simpson" /> In 1980, China refused to support the UN arms embargo against Iran and further abstained from voting on US sanctions against Iran.<ref name="Dorraj" />

Only in 2010, under US pressure, did China join Russia<ref name="Simpson" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/05/why-russia-and-china-joined-on-iran-sanctions/56905/|title=Why Russia and China Joined on Iran Sanctions|last=Fisher|first=Max|date=18 May 2010|website=The Atlantic|language=en-US|access-date=25 June 2019}}</ref> to support the UN sanctions on Iran.<ref name=":4">{{Cite news|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2011-02-20/getting-china-sanction-iran|title=Getting China to Sanction Iran|last1=Downs|first1=Erica|date=21 February 2011|access-date=25 June 2019|last2=Maloney|first2=Suzanne|journal=Foreign Affairs: America and the World|language=en-US|issn=0015-7120}}</ref>

In 2018, the US ordered Canada to arrest and detain Meng Wanzhou, CFO of Huawei, for 'illegally dealing with' and allegedly violating sanctions against Iran.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/05/tech/huawei-cfo-arrested-canada/index.html|title=Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou arrested in Canada|date=6 December 2018|first=Julia|last=Horowitz|work=CNN|access-date=25 June 2019}}</ref>

===Ideology=== [[File:Hua Guofeng with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during a state visit in Iran.jpg|thumb|Chinese leader Hua Guofeng with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during a state visit in Iran, 1978<ref>{{cite news|title=华主席抵德黑兰进行正式友好访问 巴列维国王举行盛大宴会热烈欢迎|publisher=People's Daily|date=30 August 1978|page=1}}</ref>]]

thumb|The image of the peace treaty between Iran and China signed on 1 June 1920, in Rome, Italy On 1 June 1920, a friendship agreement was signed between the Beiyang government and Qajar Persia. Ratifications were exchanged on 6 February 1922, with effect on the same day.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1922/42.html |title=Text in''League of Nations Treaty Series'', vol. 9, pp. 18–21 |publisher=Worldlii.org |date=1 June 1920 |access-date=25 April 2013}}</ref> Official diplomatic relations were established in 1937, with Li Tieh-tseng serving as ambassador representing the Republic of China. Prior to 1971, an unofficial relationship existed out of necessity. From this emerged the current relationship. The first Iranian embassy was formed in December 1973 and Abbas Aram was appointed to the post, becoming the first Iranian diplomat to serve in China, though the first embassy opened in 1942.<ref name=jwg>{{cite book|first=John W.|last=Garver|title=China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CPMoRVo3fSwC&pg=PA308|date=1 July 2006|publisher=University of Washington Press|isbn=978-0-295-80121-6|page=308|access-date=29 November 2013}}</ref> The Shah visited Taiwan to meet the President of China Chiang Kai-shek in 1958. In 1971, Imperial Iran supported Red China's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and it voted in favour to admit Beijing and replace Taipei. China was invited to the 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire. Iran recognized the People's Republic of China in 1971 with Chinese Communist Party chairman and Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng was one of the last foreign leaders to visit the Shah of Iran, before he was overthrown in 1979.<ref name=wright>{{cite news| url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55414-2004Nov16.html | newspaper=The Washington Post | title=Iran's New Alliance With China Could Cost U.S. Leverage | first=Robin | last=Wright | date=17 November 2004 | access-date=4 May 2010}}</ref> In the 1980s, the shared ideological themes of anti-imperialism and third world solidarity helped solidify the relationship, but they became allies as a way to counterbalance the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. When the USSR signed the Soviet-Indian friendship treaty, the relationship became a way to counter increasing Russian influence in the Persian Gulf. But there remained some distance between Mao's regime and that of the Shah because of ideology. The Shah was friendly towards the United States and Mao was a communist. The Shah also feared that the relationship could rally his communist opposition. Once the Shah was overthrown during the Islamic Revolution, China quickly recognized the new government on 14 February 1979.<ref name=jwg/> China was put into a difficult situation during the Iran–Iraq War in 1980 since China was allied with both nations. China was able to remain outside of the conflict and push for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.<ref name="Dorraj"/>

China has been at times careful in its deals with Iran to avoid antagonizing its own relationship with the U.S. and Israel.<ref name=":4" /> China's approach toward the Israel-Iran conflict is to put economics ahead of political, ideological, or humanitarian interests and sympathies, and it seems China has found a balance on how to work well with the 2 enemies.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Yellinek|first=Roie|title=How can China maintain good relations with both Israel and Iran?|url=https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-can-china-maintain-good-relations-both-israel-and-iran|access-date=12 October 2020|website=Middle East Institute|language=en}}</ref>

The cooperation emerges partly from Chinese and Iranian recognition as fellow heirs to great civilizations and because Iran has emerged as the regional leader in the Middle East. While there is also a shared distrust of the United States' government and its interests, many young Chinese and Iranians at the same time admire certain aspects of American society and culture. There is also Iranian admiration for China's rapid economic growth, and for the most part, their economic contributions to Iran are appreciated and respected.<ref name=":4" />

Some analysts argue that Iran can use its links with China to build more links across Asia while remaining insulated from potential U.S. attack.<ref name="Walt"/>

Beijing has generally supported the Iran-backed government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, joining Russia in vetoing several U.N. resolutions condemning Assad's actions in the Syrian civil war, and strongly opposing Western interference in the conflict, arguing that outside intervention would further worsen and complicate the situation. It has also allegedly been increasing military links with Syria in recent years, albeit in a more limited sense than Moscow, partly because of the presence of Uighur militant rebels on the side of the Syrian rebels.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/is-china-increasing-its-military-presence-in-syria/|title=Is China Increasing Its Military Presence in Syria?|work=The Diplomat|first1=Logan|last1=Pauley|first2=Jesse|last2=Marks|date=20 August 2018|access-date=20 January 2021}}</ref>

In April 2015, China stated that Iran had been officially accepted as a founding member of its newly founded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with the latter owning 15,808 shares.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-aiib-iran-idUSKBN0MZ08720150408|title=China says Iran joins AIIB as founder member|date=8 April 2015|work=Reuters}}</ref> There has also been recent discussion for Iran to eventually join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, of which it is currently an observer state, as a full member.

In 2016, Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced his support for Iran's full membership in SCO during a state visit to Iran.<ref name="Xinhua">{{cite news | url = http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/23/c_135038723.htm | title = China supports Iran's application for full membership of SCO | date = 23 January 2016 | location = Tehran, Iran | agency = Xinhua News Agency | access-date = 11 June 2016 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160630232219/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/23/c_135038723.htm | archive-date = 30 June 2016 }}</ref>

In July 2019, UN ambassadors from 50 countries, including Iran, have signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region.<ref>{{cite news |title=Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/ |work=The Diplomat|first=Catherine|last=Putz |date=15 July 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |title=The Pro-Xinjiang Contingent |url=https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2019/07/pro-xinjiang-contingent/|first=Bruce|last=Sterling |magazine=Wired |date=28 July 2019}}</ref>

In January 2020, China condemned the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi alleging that the targeted killing of an Iranian general in Iraqi territory by the United States was in violation of international law.<ref>{{cite web |last=Fulton |first=Jonathan |date=6 January 2020 |title=China's response to the Soleimani killing |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/chinas-response-to-the-soleimani-killing/ |access-date=20 January 2021 |website=Atlantic Council}}</ref>

In June 2020, Iran was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong national security law at the United Nations.

Former lawmaker Ali Motahari tweeted in August 2020 how it was a failure for the Islamic republic that the US protested against "China's treatment and torture of Muslims from Xinjiang to eradicate the Islamic culture from that region" while Iran remained silent due to of its economic needs; he added that "Chinese Muslims are no different from Yemeni or Palestinian Muslims".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Esfandiari |first=Golnaz |date=7 August 2020 |title=Ex-Lawmaker Raises Rare Criticism Of Iran's Silence About China's Abuse Of Uyghurs, Other Muslims |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/ex-lawmaker-raises-rare-criticism-of-iran-s-silence-about-china-s-abuse-of-uyghurs-other-muslims/30771986.html |access-date=11 May 2024 |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |language=en}}</ref> Conservative lawmakers and news editors defended China by saying the country just had problems with Wahabi Takfiri ideology, not Islam in general.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Reza Haqiqatnezhad |date=4 August 2020 |title=Iran Hardliners Claim China Is Serving Islam By Suppressing Uyghur Muslims |url=https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-hardliners-claim-china-is-serving-islam-by-suppressing-uyghur-muslims-/30766289.html |work=Radio Farda}}</ref> In a 2021 meeting with a group of university students, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wondered why Iran was silent on China's "Uyghur genocide".<ref>{{cite web |date=16 March 2021 |title=احمدی‌نژاد: ایران چرا در مقابل نسل‌کشی اویغورها سکوت کرده است |url=https://www.aa.com.tr/fa/ایران/احمدی-نژاد-ایران-چرا-در-مقابل-نسل-کشی-اویغورها-سکوت-کرده-است/2177950 |access-date=16 March 2021 |website=Anadolu Agency}}</ref>

In 2021, the Iranian embassy in China published a series "An Iranian Diplomat's Xinjiang Diary" which related observations of religious respect in Xinjiang and contended that allegations of forced labor in Xinjiang were false.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=113}}

In late 2022, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian was reacting to a joint statement issued by China and states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which called for peaceful resolution of the islands dispute with the United Arab Emirates.<ref>{{cite web |title=FM Reasserts Iran's Sovereignty over Persian Gulf Trio Islands |url=https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/12/11/2819626/fm-reasserts-iran-s-sovereignty-over-persian-gulf-trio-islands |website=Tasnim News Agency}}</ref> Iran conveyed its "strong discontent" with the GCC-China statement, and China later expressed respect for Iran's territorial integrity.<ref>{{cite web |title=China voices support for Iran's territorial integrity |url=https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/479704/China-voices-support-for-Iran-s-territorial-integrity |access-date=13 December 2022 |website=Tehran Times|date=13 December 2022 }}</ref>

Following the April 2024 Iranian strikes against Israel, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a call with Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian where Wang reiterated Iran's assertion that its attack was a "limited" action taken in self-defense, adding he believed Iran could "handle the situation well and spare the region further turmoil".<ref>{{Cite web |date=16 April 2024 |title=Iran tells supportive China it's willing to exercise restraint against Israel |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/iran-tells-supportive-china-its-willing-to-exercise-restraint-against-israel/ |website=The Times of Israel |publisher=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> In contrast, ROC Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu condemned Iran's attack.<ref>{{Cite web |date=16 April 2024 |title=Taiwan hopes to continue building Israel friendship |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/04/16/2003816490 |access-date=20 June 2024 |website=Taipei Times |quote=In reference to Iran launching an unprecedented large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel on Saturday evening, Tsai also expressed her sincere concern and condolences, and condemned the use of violence to destroy world peace.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Joseph Yeh |date=15 April 2024 |title=FM condemns Iran attack on Israel, says Taiwanese in both nations safe |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202404150006 |access-date=19 June 2024 |website=Focus Taiwan |publisher=Central News Agency |language=en-US |quote="The Republic of China Taiwan government has joined peace-loving democratic partners worldwide to condemn the attack, and urges all parties involved to employ communication to resolve disputes and avoid escalating tensions," the MOFA statement added.}}</ref>

On 23 January 2026, China voted against a UN Human Rights Council resolution condemning the violent suppression of anti-government protests in Iran.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Motamedi |first1=Maziar |title=Iran rejects UN rights resolution condemning protest killings |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/24/iran-rejects-un-rights-resolution-condemning-protest-killings |work=Al Jazeera |date=24 January 2026}}</ref>

=== 2026 Iran war === {{Further|China in the 2026 Iran war}} China has cautioned against efforts to change the government in Iran, emphasizing the lack of popular support such actions. Beijing also called for the immediate cessation of military operation in the Middle East, stressing the need to respect Iran's sovereignty.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |title='No popular support': China warns against government change in Iran |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/no-popular-support-china-warns-against-government-change-in-iran |access-date=2026-03-09 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref>

In February 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched a major strike on Iran, but China remained largely silent. Despite Iran's retaliation and threat to key oil routes, Beijing avoided direct confrontation with the United States. China's muted response was widely interpreted as underscoring its prioritization of Taiwan over its strategic partnership with Iran. This shift highlighted China's focus on core interests over distant allies.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Xiaotong |first=Yang |date=2026-03-19 |title=China's silence on Iran reveals its true priorities |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/3/19/chinas-silence-on-iran-reveals-its-true-priorities |work=Al Jazeera}}</ref>

Following a two-week ceasefire being declared on 8 April 2026, a ''CNN'' report stated that according to U.S. intelligence, China is preparing to ship shoulder-fired anti-air missile systems (MANPADs) to Iran. The American intelligence sources maintained that China intended to transfer the weapons systems through third countries to mask their origin.<ref name=":8" />

==Society== There are several historic social connections between the two states. Although the two societies psychologically identify with one another because they both share the national pride and historical identity that comes along with being the descendants of two great empires and modern successor-states to ancient civilizations, there was limited interaction after the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949. Social interactions improved after the 1960s.<ref name="Dorraj" />

According to ''The Diplomat'' in January 2021, anti-Chinese sentiment in Iran was increasing in due to China's economic activity and social differences between the two countries.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Khaasteh |first1=Reza |date=26 January 2021 |title=Bitcoin Mining and Blackouts Add to Anti-Chinese Sentiments in Iran |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/bitcoin-mining-and-blackouts-add-to-anti-chinese-sentiments-in-iran/ |website=The Diplomat}}</ref> A September 2021 poll done by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland had 42% of Iranian respondents holding an unfavorable view of China compared to 58% holding a favorable view.<ref>{{Cite web |author1=Nancy Gallagher |author2=Ebrahim Mohseni |author3=Clay Ramsay |date=September 2021 |title=Iranian Public Opinion, At the Start of the Raisi Administration (page 35) |url=https://cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2021-10/Final-Iranian%20Public%20Opinion%20Sept%202021.pdf |website=Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland}}</ref> Gallup polling for 2023 had 51% of Iranians approving of China's leadership which was higher than approval of their own (43%), Russia's (31%), and USA's leadership (10%); the results had been consistent with Gallup data from 2021 and 2022 on Iranian approval of Chinese and American leadership.<ref>{{Cite web |last=BENEDICT VIGERS AND JULIE RAY |date=29 February 2024 |title=Iran Votes: Lukewarm on Leadership, Cool on Economy |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/611210/iran-votes-lukewarm-leadership-cool-economy.aspx |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240511022945/https://news.gallup.com/poll/611210/iran-votes-lukewarm-leadership-cool-economy.aspx |archive-date=11 May 2024 |website=Gallup.com |language=en}}</ref>

About 2,000 Chinese live in Tehran as of 2005, and 70 Chinese companies have relocated to Iran.<ref name="Walt" />

===Intermarriage=== {{See also|Chinese people in Iran|Iranians in China}} Iran and China have a long history of intermarriages, since at least the Tang. Immigrant communities of Persian Muslims in China intermarried with local women, forming part of the modern Hui people. At the same time, Persian women also intermarried with Chinese men: see Lin Nu, Liu Chang (Southern Han), Wang Zongyan (married Li Shunxian), and the Zhengde Emperor. Mixed descendants include Li Zhi (philosopher) and Hu Dahai.

Aurel Stein discovered 5 letters written in Sogdian, known as the "Ancient Letters", in an abandoned watchtower near Dunhuang in 1907. One of them was written by a Sogdian woman named Miwnay who had a daughter named Shayn, and she wrote to her mother Chatis in Sogdia. Miwnay and her daughter were abandoned in China by Nanai-dhat, her husband who was also Sogdian like her. Nanai-dhat refused to help Miwnay and their daughter after forcing them to come with him to Dunhuang and then abandoning them, telling them they should serve the Han Chinese. Miwnay asked one of her husband's relatives, Artivan, and then asked another Sogdian man, Farnkhund, to help them, but they also abandoned them. Miwnay and her daughter Shayn were then forced to become servants of Han Chinese after living on charity from a priest. Miwnay cursed her Sogdian husband for leaving her, saying she would rather have been married to a pig or dog.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/sogdlet.html |title=The Sogdian Ancient Letters 1, 2, 3, and 5 |translator=Nicholas Sims-Williams|website=University of Washington}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?id=5032|title= Aurel Stein Discovers the Sogdian "Ancient Letters" 313 CE to 314 CE|last=Norman |first=Jeremy |website=History of Information }}</ref><ref>Sogdian Ancient Letter No. 3. Reproduced from Susan Whitfield (ed.), The Silk Road: Trade, Travel, War and Faith (2004) p. 248.</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://sogdians.si.edu/ancient-letters/ |title=Ancient Letters |website=The Sogdians – Influencers on the Silk Roads |publisher= Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian Institution.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= https://kimon.hosting.nyu.edu/sogdians/items/show/869|title= Sogdian Ancient Letter III: Letter to Nanaidhat|last= Keramidas|first= Kimon|website= NYU|publisher= Telling the Sogdian Story: A Freer/Sackler Digital Exhibition Project|access-date= 19 April 2023|archive-date= 19 October 2023|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20231019174747/https://kimon.hosting.nyu.edu/sogdians/items/show/869}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= http://ringmar.net/irhistorynew/index.php/welcome/introduction-4/from-temujin-to-genghis-khan/5-2-a-nomadic-state/5-3-how-to-conquer-the-world/5-4-dividing-it-all-up/sogdian-letters/|title= Sogdian letters |website= ringmar.net|date= 5 March 2021 |publisher=History of International Relations }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last= de la Vaissière|first= Étienne |date=2005 |title= Sogdian Traders: A History|url=https://brill.com/downloadpdf/book/9789047406990/BP000005.xml |series=Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 8 Uralic & Central Asian Studies|volume=10|publisher=Brill |chapter=Chapter Two About the Ancient Letters|pages=43–70 |isbn=978-90-47-40699-0|doi=10.1163/9789047406990_005}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://brill.com/display/book/9789047406990/BP000005.xml|title=Sogdian Traders|first=Étienne de la|last=Vaissière|chapter=About the Ancient Letters |date=1 January 2005|publisher=Brill|pages=43–70|doi=10.1163/9789047406990_005 |isbn=978-90-474-0699-0 |access-date=24 May 2023|via=brill.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Livšic |first=Vladimir A. |editor1-last=Orlov |editor1-first=Andrei |editor2-last=Lourie|editor2-first=Basil |date=2009 |title =Symbola Caelestis: Le symbolisme liturgique et paraliturgique dans le monde chrétien |url= https://brill.com/downloadpdf/journals/scri/5/1/article-p344_21.xml|location= Piscataway|publisher=Gorgias Press |chapter=Sogdian "Ancient Letters" (II, IV, V)|pages=344–352 |isbn=978-1-4632-2254-3}}</ref>{{Excessive citations inline|date=June 2025}} Another letter in the collection was written by the Sogdian Nanai-vandak, addressed to Sogdians back home in Samarkand informing them about a mass rebellion by Xiongnu Hun rebels against their Han Chinese rulers of the Western Jin dynasty, informing his people that every single one of the diaspora Sogdians and Indians in the Chinese Western Jin capital Luoyang died of starvation due to the uprising by the rebellious Xiongnu, who were formerly subjects of the Han Chinese. The Han Chinese emperor abandoned Luoyang when it came under siege by the Xiongnu rebels and his palace was burned down. Nanai-vandak also said the city of Ye was no more as the Xiongnu rebellion resulted in disaster for the Sogdian diaspora in China.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title= Ancient Letters|encyclopedia= Encyclopædia Iranica|date=15 December 1985 |last=Sims-Williams |first=N. |pages=7–9|volume=II|url=https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ancient-letters }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= https://kimon.hosting.nyu.edu/sogdians/items/show/851|title= Sogdian Ancient Letter II|last= Keramidas|first= Kimon|website= NYU|publisher= Telling the Sogdian Story: A Freer/Sackler Digital Exhibition Project|access-date= 19 April 2023|archive-date= 25 September 2023|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230925174224/https://kimon.hosting.nyu.edu/sogdians/items/show/851}}</ref>

Sogdians were called "Hu" (胡) by the Chinese during the Tang dynasty.<ref>{{cite book |last=Light |first=Nathan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mCRkAAAAMAAJ&q=%22the+hu-chi,+mainly+Iranian+girls,+found+in+China+during+the+Tang+period%22 |title=Slippery Paths: The Performance and Canonization of Turkic Literature and Uyghur Muqam Song in Islam and Modernity |date=1998 |publisher=Indiana University |location= |page=303 |quote=... see Mikinosuke ISHIDA, " Etudes sino - iraniennes, I : A propos du Hou - siuan - wou, " AIRDTB, 6 ( 1932 ) 61-76, and " The Hu - chi, Mainly Iranian Girls, found in China during the Tang Period, " MRDTB, 20 ( 1961 ) 35-40 .}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Israeli |first1=Raphael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lLHgAAAAMAAJ&q=%22the+hu-chi,+mainly+Iranian+girls,+found+in+China+during+the+Tang+period%22 |title=Islam in China: A Critical Bibliography |last2=Gorman |first2=Lyn |date=1994 |publisher=Greenwood Press |isbn=0-313-27857-1 |edition=illustrated, annotated |page=153 |issn=0742-6836 |quote=... 1033 Chinese Mohammedans, " 9012 " How Can We Best Reach the Mohammedan Women ?, " 6025 " How Islam Entered China, " 1057 " The Hu - Chi, Mainly Iranian Girls Found in China during the Tang Period, " 2010 " The Hui and the ... |number=29 of Bibliographies and indexes in religious studies}}</ref> Central Asian "Hu" women were stereotyped as barmaids or dancers by Han in China. Han Chinese men engaged in mostly extra-marital sexual relationships with them as the "Hu" women in China mostly occupied positions where sexual services were sold to patrons like singers, maids, slaves, and prostitutes.<ref>{{cite book |last=Abramson |first=Marc S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-GLGnRspmcAC&dq=%22vast+numbers+of+non-Han+women+served+in+subordinate+positions%22&pg=PA20 |title=Ethnic Identity in Tang China |date=2011 |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press |isbn=978-0-8122-0101-7 |series=Encounters with Asia |page=20 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Hansen |first=Valerie |url=https://history.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/hansen-silk-road-trade.pdf |title=Les sogdiens en Chine |date=2005 |publisher=Yale University |isbn=978-2-85539-653-8 |editor-last1=Trombert |editor-first1=Eric |pages=299–300 |language=en |chapter=The Impact of the Silk Road Trade on a Local Community: The Turfan Oasis, 500-800 |quote=One cannot help wondering whether the inns at Turfan provided sex workers with an opportunity to service the Silk Road merchants since the official histories report that there were markets in women at both Kucha and Khotan. [...] The few documented pairings of Chinese male owners with young Sogdian girls raise the question how often Sogdian and Chinese families intermarried. |editor-last2=de la Vaissière |editor-first2=Étienne}}</ref> Southern Baiyue girls were exoticized in poems.<ref>{{cite book |last= 李 |first= 白|date= |title=全唐詩|url=https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E5%85%A8%E5%94%90%E8%A9%A9/%E5%8D%B7184#%E8%B6%8A%E5%A5%B3%E8%A9%9E%E4%BA%94%E9%A6%96|location= |publisher= |page= |chapter=卷184#越女詞五首 卷一百八十四}}</ref> Han men did not want to legally marry them unless they had no choice, such as if they were on the frontier or in exile, since the Han men would be socially disadvantaged and have to marry non-Han.<ref>{{cite book |last=Abramson |first=Marc S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-GLGnRspmcAC&dq=%22documented+cases+of+marriage+between+Han+men+and+non-Han+women+occurred+when+the+Han+men+were+in+socially+liminal+situations%22&pg=PA158 |title=Ethnic Identity in Tang China |date=2011 |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press |isbn=978-0-8122-0101-7 |series=Encounters with Asia |page=158 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=劉 |first=昫 |url=https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E8%88%8A%E5%94%90%E6%9B%B8/%E5%8D%B7193 |title=舊唐書 |publisher=Wikisource |chapter=卷193 卷一百九十三}}</ref> The task of taking care of herd animals like sheep and cattle was given to "Hu" slaves in China.<ref>{{cite book |last= Abramson |first=Marc S. |series=Encounters with Asia|date= 2011 |title= Ethnic Identity in Tang China|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-GLGnRspmcAC&dq=%22presented+the+captured+women+and+livestock%22&pg=PA136 |location= |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press|pages=135, 136|isbn=978-0-8122-0101-7}}</ref>

==Culture== Chinese culture has influenced Iran's literature, television, and cultural events. An example of this influence is the opening of Chinese restaurants in Tehran.<ref name="Walt" /> China wants to create a positive image of itself, in order to uphold existing and future relations.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Yellinek |first1=Roie |last2=Mann |first2=Yossi |last3=Lebel |first3=Udi |date=1 March 2020 |title=Chinese 'Soft Power Pipelines Diffusion' (SPPD) to the Middle Eastern Arab Countries 2000-2018: A Discursive-Institutional Study |journal=British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies |volume=48 |issue=5 |pages=941–959 |doi=10.1080/13530194.2020.1732870 |issn=1353-0194 |s2cid=213061595}}</ref> Iran's similar attempts of cultural influence inside of China have been received with open arms.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Yellinek|first1=Roie|last2=Yossi Mann|first2=Udi Lebel|date=April 2019|title=China's Soft Power in China-Iran Relations|url=https://www.ariel.ac.il/wp/jimes/העוצמה-הרכה-של-ס…ביחסי-סין-ואיראן/|journal=The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies |language=he|volume=4|issue=7|pages=*39–*65|doi=10.26351/JIMES/4/7|s2cid=230172727|issn=2522-6959|url-access=subscription}}</ref> In addition, China opened the Confucius Institute at the University of Tehran and at the University of Mazandaran.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Yellinek|first1=Roie|last2=Mann|first2=Yossi|last3=Lebel|first3=Udi|date=1 November 2020|title=Chinese Soft-Power in the Arab world – China's Confucius Institutes as a central tool of influence|journal=Comparative Strategy|volume=39|issue=6|pages=517–534|doi=10.1080/01495933.2020.1826843|s2cid=226263146|issn=0149-5933}}</ref>

===Literature=== Li Shunxian is a Persian-Chinese woman who wrote celebrated Chinese poetry during the Tang dynasty.

Ha Dechen and Wang Jingzhai helped translate Persian literature into Chinese. Sadi's works are particularly well-known and have been broadcast on Chinese media.<ref name=":0" />

===Linguistics=== Mainly through Silk Road trade, Chinese borrowed Middle Persian words for exotic commodities. Oddly, these loanwords are typically themselves loans from a pre-Iranian substrate, e.g. Elamite or BMAC:<ref>{{citation|last=Miao|first=Ruiqin|title=Loanword Adaptation in Mandarin Chinese: Perceptual, Phonological and Sociolinguistic Factors|date=December 2005|url=http://roa.rutgers.edu/files/814-0306/814-MIAO-0-0.PDF|journal=Doctoral Dissertation|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100718190553/http://roa.rutgers.edu/files/814-0306/814-MIAO-0-0.PDF|publisher=Stony Brook University|archive-date=18 July 2010}}</ref><ref>{{citation|last=Feng|first=Zhiwei|title=The Semantic Loanwords and Phonemic Loanwords in Chinese Language|date=March 2004|url=http://www.lingviko.net/feng/loanword-zwfeng.pdf|journal=11th International Symposium of NIJLA|pages=200–229|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121112231301/http://www.lingviko.net/feng/loanword-zwfeng.pdf|location=Tokyo|archive-date=12 November 2012}}</ref><ref>{{citation|last=Zha|first=Zheng-sheng|title=Language Contact|url=http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/chinese/aspect/contact.HTM|journal=Chinese 352: Aspects of Chinese Language|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090717021705/http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/chinese/aspect/contact.HTM|archive-date=17 July 2009}}</ref>

{| class="wikitable sortable" |+Chinese loanwords from Persian !Term !Chinese !Pinyin !Wade–Giles !Persian equivalent !Etymologies |- |lion |{{linktext|獅}}/狮 |shī |shi |شیر šīr | |- |alfalfa |{{linktext|苜蓿}} |mù-xū |mu-hsü |buksuk |MChin ''mḭuk-sḭuk'' |- |grape |{{linktext|葡萄}}/蒲桃 |pú táo |p'u t'ao |باده bāde 'wine, must' < MPers ''bādag'' |MChin ''buo-dâu'' < LHan Chin ''bɑ-dɑu'' < Bactrian *bādāwa |- |pomegranate |(安) {{linktext|石榴}} |(ān) shí líu |(an) shi liu |آرتساخ arsak |MChin.''ân-źḭäk-lḭəu'' (< -lḭog) < *anārak; cf. Sogdian ''n'r'kh'' (nāraka) |- |amber |{{linktext|琥珀}} |hǔpò |hup'o |کهربا kahrobā < MPers ''kah-rubāy'' |MChin ''xuo^B-pʰɐk'', or rather from southwestern Asiatic *χarupah |- |wolfberry |{{linktext|枸杞}} |gǒuqǐ |kouch'i |گوجه gojeh 'plum, greengage' | |- |suona |{{linktext|嗩吶}} |suǒnà |sona |سورنا sornāy | |- |sweet almond |{{linktext|巴旦木}} |badanmù |patanmu |بادام baadaam | |- |cup |{{linktext|盞}}/盏 |zhǎn |chan |جام jam |Though likely related, it is unknown which one was derived from the other. |} ''Huihuihua'' is a dialect of Chinese with more Persian and Arabic words.<ref name=":0" />

The Galle Trilingual Inscription is associated with the voyages of Zheng He.{{citation needed|date=January 2025}}

== Issues ==

=== Diplomatic issues === [[File:Map of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs.svg|thumb|Greater and Lesser Tunbs, Abu Musa, and the Strait of Hormuz]] In June 2024, China reaffirmed its position on the disputed Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which are administered by Iran by claimed by the UAE, stating its support for efforts by the United Arab Emirates to achieve a peaceful resolution, despite objections from Iran. Tehran responded by summoning the Chinese ambassador in a rare diplomatic protest, criticizing Beijing's repeated backing of UAE's claims and urging China to revise its stance.<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 June 2024 |title=China maintains stance on disputed Gulf islands despite Iran's anger |url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/china-maintains-stance-on-disputed-gulf-islands-despite-irans-anger |access-date=31 December 2025 |work=The Straits Times |language=en |issn=0585-3923}}</ref>

In December 2025, China again drew criticism from Iran after Beijing, in a joint statement with the UAE, expressed support for efforts to reach a peaceful resolution of the dispute over the Persian Gulf islands. Iranian media and political figures sharply condemned Beijing for what they described as a double standard, arguing that China's stance undermined Iran's territorial integrity while contradicting its own firm positions on sovereignty issues such as Taiwan. Conservative lawmaker Ahmad Naderi said Beijing could not uphold the One China policy while questioning Iran's territorial integrity, and warned that Iran had so far shown restraint over China's treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang but could reconsider if its sovereignty was challenged. Hardline editor Hossein Shariatmadari likewise argued that China's stance implied its own claims over Taiwan and other territories could be disputed.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sharifi |first=Kian |date=17 December 2025 |title=China Draws Iranian Ire Over UAE Islands Claim |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-china-uae-persian-gulf-islands/33625742.html |access-date=31 December 2025 |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Sinaiee |first=Maryam |date=19 December 2025 |title=Beijing's position on Iranian islands angers Tehran's pro-China front |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/202512177147 |access-date=31 December 2025 |website=www.iranintl.com |language=en}}</ref>

==See also== {{Portal|Politics}} * Afghanistan–China relations (parts of Afghanistan historically were part of Persian empires and Greater Iran) * Foreign relations of Imperial China * Foreign relations of Iran * Chinese people in Iran * Iranians in China * Narsieh * Peroz III * Sino-Roman relations

==References== {{Reflist}}

==Further reading== * For a comprehensive comparative analysis of China and Iranian political economy of development, see: Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (2022) Why Did China's Rise Succeed and Iran's Fail? the Political Economy of Development in China and Iran, Asian Affairs, 53:1, 28–50, DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2022.2029038 OPENACCES: [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/03068374.2022.2029038?scroll=top&needAccess=true Citations: Why Did China's Rise Succeed and Iran's Fail? the Political Economy of Development in China and Iran] *{{Cite book|last1=Cardenal|first1=Juan Pablo|author-link1=Juan Pablo Cardenal|last2=Araújo|first2=Heriberto|author-link2=Heriberto Araújo |title=La silenciosa conquista china |location=Barcelona|publisher=Crítica|year=2011|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jQ2fvBVpQpYC |pages=70–79; 140–144|language=es|isbn=978-84-9892-257-8}} * {{citation|last=Dillon|first=Michael|title=China's Muslim Hui community: migration, settlement and sects|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hUEswLE4SWUC|year=1999|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-7007-1026-3}} * {{citation|last=Lipman|first=Jonathan Neaman|title=Familiar strangers: a history of Muslims in Northwest China|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4_FGPtLEoYQC|year=1997|publisher=University of Washington Press|isbn=978-962-209-468-0}} * [http://www.iranian.com/main/2010/aug/china-and-iran- China and Iran] Article by Nabil Rastani * Garver, John W. ''China And Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-imperial World.'' University of Washington Press, 2006. {{ISBN|978-0-295-98631-9}} * "Persian language in Xinjiang" (زبان فارسی در سین کیانگ). Zamir Sa'dollah Zadeh (دکتر ضمیر سعدالله زاد ه). ''Nameh-i Iran'' (نامه ایران) V.1. Editor: Hamid Yazdan Parast (حمید یزدان پرست). {{ISBN|978-964-423-572-6}} Perry–Castañeda Library collection under DS 266 N336 2005. * John Keefer Douglas, Matthew B. Nelson, and Kevin Schwartz; "Fueling the Dragon's Flame: How China's Energy Demands Affect its Relationships in the Middle East." United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 2006. [https://web.archive.org/web/20121212004708/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2006/China_ME_FINAL.pdf] *Yellinek, Roie, ET AL, "[https://www.ariel.ac.il/wp/jimes/%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A6%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%97%D7%A1%D7%99-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9F/ China's Soft Power in China-Iran Relations]", The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies, DOI: 10.26351/JIMES/4/7.[https://www.ariel.ac.il/wp/jimes/%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A6%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%97%D7%A1%D7%99-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9F/] *Yellinek, Roie, [https://jamestown.org/program/a-reappraisal-of-china-iran-ties-after-us-jcpoa-withdrawal/ A Reappraisal of China-Iran Ties After US JCPOA Withdrawal], Publication: China Brief Volume: 18 Issue: 14.

{{Foreign relations of China}} {{Foreign relations of Iran}} {{BRICS}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:China-Iran relations}} Category:China–Iran relations Iran Category:Bilateral relations of Iran