Liberal international order

{{Short description|International system established after World War II}} {{Notconfused|International law}} [[File:UN-Sicherheitsrat - UN Security Council - New York City - 2014 01 06.jpg|thumb|275x275px|The United Nations Security Council is an embodiment of the liberal international order.]] In international relations, the '''liberal international order''' ('''LIO'''), also known as the '''rules-based order''' ('''RBO'''), consists of a set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on political liberalism, economic liberalism and liberal internationalism since the late 1940s.<ref name=":3" /> More specifically, it entails international cooperation through multilateral institutions (like the United Nations, World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund) and is constituted by human equality (freedom, rule of law and human rights), open markets, security cooperation, promotion of liberal democracy, and monetary cooperation.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=Lake|first1=David A.|author1-link=David A. Lake|last2=Martin|first2=Lisa L.|author2-link=Lisa Martin (political scientist)|last3=Risse|first3=Thomas|author3-link=Thomas Risse|date=2021|title=Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=225–257|language=en|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000636|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ikenberry|first=G. John|authorlink=John Ikenberry|date=2018|title=The end of liberal international order?|url=https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/inta94_1_2_241_ikenberry.pdf|journal=International Affairs|volume=94|issue=1|pages=7–23|doi=10.1093/ia/iix241|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200702021057/https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/inta94_1_2_241_ikenberry.pdf|archive-date=2 July 2020|via=OpenScholar @ Princeton|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Norrlof|first1=Carla|author1-link=Carla Norrlöf|last2=Poast|first2=Paul|last3=Cohen|first3=Benjamin J|author3-link=Benjamin Cohen (political economist)|last4=Croteau|first4=Sabreena|last5=Khanna|first5=Aashna|last6=McDowell|first6=Daniel|last7=Wang|first7=Hongying|last8=Winecoff|first8=W Kindred|date=2020|title=Global Monetary Order and the Liberal Order Debate|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekaa001|journal=International Studies Perspectives|volume=21|issue=2|pages=109–153|doi=10.1093/isp/ekaa001|issn=1528-3577|url-access=subscription}}</ref> The order was established in the aftermath of World War II, led in large part by the United States.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite news|last=Wright|first=Thomas|author-link=Thomas J. Wright (American scholar)|date=12 September 2018|title=The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable|work=The Atlantic|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/|url-status=live|access-date=23 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200702020627/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/|archive-date=2 July 2020}}</ref>

The nature of the LIO, as well as its very existence, has been debated by scholars.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ikenberry|first=G. John|authorlink=John Ikenberry|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t1s5|title=After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars|date=2001|publisher=Princeton University Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctt7t1s5 |jstor=j.ctt7t1s5|isbn=978-0-691-05090-4}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Mearsheimer|first=John J.|authorlink=John Mearsheimer|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5cgb1w|title=Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities|date=2018|publisher=Yale University Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctv5cgb1w |isbn=978-0-300-23419-0|jstor=j.ctv5cgb1w|s2cid=240217170 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Barnett|first=Michael|date=2019|title=The End of a Liberal International Order That Never Existed • The Global|url=https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16/the-end-of-a-liberal-international-order-that-never-existed/|access-date=2021-02-23|website=The Global|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":3" /> The LIO has been credited with expanding free trade, increasing capital mobility, spreading democracy, promoting human rights, and collectively defending the Western world from the Soviet Union.<ref name=":3" /> The LIO facilitated unprecedented cooperation among the states of North America, Western Europe and Japan.<ref name=":3" /> Over time, the LIO facilitated the spread of economic liberalism to the rest of the world, as well as helped consolidate democracy in formerly fascist or communist countries.<ref name=":3" />

Origins of the LIO have commonly been identified as the 1940s, usually starting in 1945,<ref name=":3" /> with some scholars pointing to earlier agreements between the WWII-era Allies such as the Atlantic Charter in 1941.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=McKean |first1=David |title=Partners of first resort : America, Europe, and the future of the West |last2=Szewczyk |first2=Bart M. J. |date=2021 |others=Bart M. J. Szewczyk |isbn=978-0-8157-3852-7 |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=16 |oclc=1240743103}}</ref> John Mearsheimer has dissented with this view, arguing that the LIO only arose after the end of the Cold War.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal|last=Mearsheimer|first=John J.|authorlink=John Mearsheimer|date=2019|title=Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order|journal=International Security|volume=43|issue=4|pages=7–50|doi=10.1162/isec_a_00342|issn=0162-2889|doi-access=free}}</ref> Core founding members of the LIO include the states of North America, Western Europe and Japan; these states form a security community.<ref name=":3" /> The characteristics of the LIO have varied over time.<ref name=":3" /> Some scholars refer to a Cold War variation of the LIO largely limited to the West, and a post-Cold War variation having a more widespread scope and giving international institutions more powers.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal|last1=Börzel|first1=Tanja A.|author1-link=Tanja Börzel|last2=Zürn|first2=Michael|author2-link=Michael Zürn|date=2021|title=Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=282–305|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000570|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free|hdl=10419/249777|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

Aspects of the LIO are challenged within liberal states by populism, protectionism and nativism,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Flaherty|first1=Thomas M.|last2=Rogowski|first2=Ronald|date=2021|title=Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=75|issue=2|pages=495–523|doi=10.1017/S0020818321000163|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Broz|first1=J. Lawrence|last2=Frieden|first2=Jeffry|author2-link=Jeffry Frieden|last3=Weymouth|first3=Stephen|date=2021|title=Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=464–494|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000314|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":6" /><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal|last1=Goldstein|first1=Judith|author1-link=Judith Goldstein (political scientist)|last2=Gulotty|first2=Robert|date=2021|title=America and the Trade Regime: What Went Wrong?|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=524–557|doi=10.1017/S002081832000065X|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Musgrave |first=Paul |authorlink=Paul Musgrave |date=2019 |title=International Hegemony Meets Domestic Politics: Why Liberals can be Pessimists |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604983 |journal=Security Studies |volume=28 |issue=3 |pages=451–478 |doi=10.1080/09636412.2019.1604983 |issn=0963-6412|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mukherjee |first=Rohan |date=2024 |title=Hierarchy and Endogenous Contestation in the Liberal International Order |journal=Global Studies Quarterly |volume=4 |issue=2 |article-number=ksae028 |doi=10.1093/isagsq/ksae028 |issn=2634-3797|doi-access=free }}</ref> as well as growing hostility by conservatives to the LIO.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Williams |first=Michael C |date=2025 |title=The crisis of the conservative international order |journal=International Affairs |volume=101 |issue=3 |pages=947–965 |doi=10.1093/ia/iiaf011 |issn=0020-5850|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last=Lake |first=David A |title=Crisis of Legitimacy: Deep Contestation, Inequality, and the Liberal International Order |date=2026 |work=Deep Contestations of the Liberal International Order |pages=71–103 |editor-last=Wiener |editor-first=Antje |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |doi=10.1093/9780198981022.003.0004 |isbn=978-0-19-898099-5 |editor2-last=Lake |editor2-first=David A |editor3-last=Risse |editor3-first=Thomas}}</ref> Scholars have argued that embedded liberalism (or the logics inherent in the Double Movement) are key to maintaining public support for the planks of the LIO; some scholars have raised questions whether aspects of embedded liberalism have been undermined, thus leading to a backlash against the LIO.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ruggie|first=John Gerard|authorlink=John Ruggie|date=1982|title=International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order|journal=International Organization|volume=36|issue=2|pages=379–415|doi=10.1017/S0020818300018993|jstor=2706527|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mansfield|first1=Edward D.|last2=Rudra|first2=Nita|date=2021|title=Embedded Liberalism in the Digital Era|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=558–585|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000569|ssrn=3719975|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":12" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Martin |first=Lisa L. |authorlink=Lisa Martin (political scientist)|date=2023 |title=The Twin Challenges of Economic Inequality and Disinformation |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/915395 |journal=World Politics |doi=10.1353/wp.0.a915395 |issn=1086-3338|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Externally, the LIO is challenged by authoritarian states, illiberal states, and states that are discontented with their roles in world politics.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":14">{{Cite journal|last1=Farrell|first1=Henry|author1-link=Henry Farrell (political scientist)|last2=Newman|first2=Abraham L.|author2-link=Abraham L. Newman|date=2021|title=The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=333–358|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000302|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite journal|last1=Weiss|first1=Jessica Chen|author1-link=Jessica Chen Weiss|last2=Wallace|first2=Jeremy L.|date=2021|title=Domestic Politics, China's Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=75|issue=2|pages=635–664|doi=10.1017/S002081832000048X|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite journal|last1=Adler-Nissen|first1=Rebecca|author1-link=Rebecca Adler-Nissen|last2=Zarakol|first2=Ayşe|author2-link=Ayşe Zarakol|date=2021|title=Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=611–634|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000454|s2cid=234364938|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Cooley |first1=Alexander |author1-link=Alexander Cooley |last2=Nexon |first2=Daniel |author2-link=Daniel Nexon |date=2021 |title=The Illiberal Tide |work=Foreign Affairs |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-26/illiberal-tide |issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Meyerrose |first1=Anna M. |last2=Nooruddin |first2=Irfan |author2-link=Irfan Nooruddin |date=2023 |title=Trojan horses in liberal international organizations? How democratic backsliders undermine the UNHRC |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09511-6 |journal=The Review of International Organizations |volume=20 |pages=125–156 |doi=10.1007/s11558-023-09511-6 |issn=1559-744X|url-access=subscription }}</ref> China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and the United States have been characterized as prominent challengers to the LIO.<ref name="thespinoff">{{cite news|title=If the rules-based system is really crumbling, what could that mean for New Zealand?|url=https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/20-01-2026/if-the-rules-based-system-is-really-crumbling-what-could-that-mean-for-new-zealand|work=The Spinoff|date=20 January 2026}}</ref><ref name=":6" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":11" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kristinsson|first=Thorsteinn|date=2021|title=Networks of order in East Asia: Beyond hegemonic theories of the Liberal International Order|url=https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00361-w|journal=International Politics|volume=60 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.1057/s41311-021-00361-w|s2cid=240415250|issn=1740-3898|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name=":15">{{Cite news|last=Beckley|first=Michael|authorlink=Michael Beckley (political scientist)|date=2022-02-15|title=Enemies of My Enemy|journal=Foreign Affairs |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy|access-date=2022-02-19|issn=0015-7120|quote=The liberal order, like all international orders, is a form of organized hypocrisy that contains the seeds of its own demise. To forge a cohesive community, order builders have to exclude hostile nations, outlaw uncooperative behaviors, and squelch domestic opposition to international rule-making. These inherently repressive acts eventually trigger a backlash.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Goldstein |first=Judith |authorlink=Judith Goldstein (political scientist)|date=2022 |title=Wither the Trade Regime? |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac019 |journal=International Studies Review |volume=24 |issue=2 |article-number=viac019 |doi=10.1093/isr/viac019 |issn=1521-9488|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Some scholars have argued that the LIO contains self-undermining aspects that could trigger backlash or collapse.<ref name=":14" /><ref name=":15" />

== Definition == {{Main|International order}} Minimalist definitions of the LIO characterize it as "open and rules-based international order" while maximalist definitions include liberal social purpose, economic and political rights, and democratic decision-making procedures.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Goddard |first=Stacie |author-link=Stacie E. Goddard |date=2024 |title=Contestation in a World of Liberal Orders |journal=Global Studies Quarterly|volume=4 |issue=2 |article-number=ksae026 |doi=10.1093/isagsq/ksae026 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

David Lake, Lisa Martin and Thomas Risse define "order" as "patterned or structured relationships among units". Interactions in the LIO are structured by rules, norms and decision-making procedures. They note that the LIO is not synonymous with a "rule-based international order", as non-liberal rule-based orders may exist (such as the Westphalian order).<ref name=":3" /><ref name="benScott">{{Cite web |last=Scott |first=Ben |date=2021-06-30 |title=Rules-based order: What's in a name? |url=https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rules-based-order-what-s-name |access-date=2023-04-21 |website=www.lowyinstitute.org |publisher=Lowy Institute}}</ref> Others refer to the LIO as the rules-based international order (RBIO),<ref>{{Cite web |last=Latham |first=Andrew |date=2022-11-15 |title=The rules-based international order is ending. What will replace it? |url=https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3736389-the-rules-based-international-order-is-ending-what-will-replace-it/ |access-date=2023-04-21 |website=www.thehill.com |publisher=The Hill}}</ref> or the rules-based order (RBO).<ref name="benScott"/>

Lake, Martin and Risse define "liberal" as a belief in the universal equality of individuals, as well as individual and collective freedoms. Political liberalism entails the rule of law, and the sovereign equality of states, as well as protections for human rights, political rights and civil liberties. Economic liberalism entails free market-oriented policies. Liberal internationalism entails principled multilateralism and global governance.<ref name=":3" />

Michael Barnett defines an international order as "patterns of relating and acting" derived from and maintained by rules, institutions, law and norms.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal|last=Barnett|first=Michael|authorlink=Michael N. Barnett|date=2021|title=International Progress, International Order, and the Liberal International Order|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poaa019|journal=The Chinese Journal of International Politics|volume=14|issue=1|pages=1–22|doi=10.1093/cjip/poaa019|issn=1750-8916|pmc=7989545}}</ref> International orders have both a material and social component.<ref name=":7" /> Legitimacy (the generalized perception that actions are desirable, proper or appropriate) is essential to political orders.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":5" /> George Lawson has defined an international order as "regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other to be independent."<ref>{{Cite book|last=Lawson|first=George|url=https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/68644/ |title=The rise of modern international order|year=2016|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-185085-1|language=en-US|doi=10.1093/hepl/9780198739852.003.0002 |doi-broken-date=12 July 2025 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230522194917/https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/68644/ |archive-date=2023-05-22}}</ref> John Mearsheimer defines an international order as "an organized group of international institutions that help govern the interactions among the member states."<ref name=":6" />

In ''After Victory'' (2001), John Ikenberry defines a political order as "the governing arrangements among a group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles and institutions." Political orders are established when the basic organizing arrangements are set up, and they break down when the basic organizing arrangements are overturned, contested or in disarray. He defines a constitutional international order as a political order "organized around agreed-upon legal and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power." There are four main core elements of constitutional orders:

# Shared agreement about the rules of the game within the order # Rules and institutions that bind and limit the exercise of power # Institutional autonomy from special interests # The entrenchment of these rules and institutions with a broader, immutable political system.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book|last=Ikenberry|first=G. John|authorlink=John Ikenberry|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=86a3mz3W7DwC&q=after+victory+ikenberry|title=After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars|date=2001|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-05091-1|pages=23, 29–31|language=en}}</ref> In 2018, Ikenberry defined the liberal international order as:<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ikenberry|first=G. John|authorlink=John Ikenberry|date=2018|title=Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/why-the-liberal-world-order-will-survive/633E32F4A7B65CFE78D967F113D325A6|journal=Ethics & International Affairs|language=en|volume=32|issue=1|pages=17–29|doi=10.1017/S0892679418000072|s2cid=149397874|issn=0892-6794|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230601000122/https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/why_the_liberal_world_order_will_survive.pdf |archive-date=2023-06-01|url-access=subscription}}</ref><blockquote>multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty... There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. </blockquote>Charles Glaser has disputed the analytical value of the concept of the LIO, arguing that the concept is so broad and vague that "almost any international situation qualifies as an international order, so long as its members accept the sovereignty norm."<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal|last=Glaser|first=Charles L.|authorlink=Charles L. Glaser|date=2019|title=A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided|journal=International Security|volume=43|issue=4|pages=51–87|doi=10.1162/isec_a_00343|issn=0162-2889|doi-access=free}}</ref> Some critics of the LIO, such as John Mearsheimer, have argued that liberal democracy promotion and hyper-globalization are elements of the LIO.<ref name=":6" />

Jeff Colgan has characterized the liberal international order as the theme that unites multiple subsystems in the international system.<ref name=":16">{{Cite book |last=Colgan |first=Jeff D. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g3U-EAAAQBAJ |title=Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754640-6 |language=en}}</ref> These subsystems can experience drastic change without fundamentally changing the liberal international order.<ref name=":16" />

== Debates == The debate about liberal international order has grown especially prominent in International Relations.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ikenberry|first1=G. John|author1-link=John Ikenberry|last2=Parmar|first2=Inderjeet|author2-link=Inderjeet Parmar|last3=Stokes|first3=Doug|author3-link=Doug Stokes|date=2018|title=Introduction: Ordering the world? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice|journal=International Affairs|language=en|volume=94|issue=1|pages=1–5|doi=10.1093/ia/iix277|issn=0020-5850}}</ref> Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry list five components of this international order: security co-binding, in which great powers demonstrate restraint; the open nature of US hegemony and the dominance of reciprocal transnational relations; the presence of self-limiting powers like Germany and Japan; the availability of mutual gains due to "the political foundations of economic openness"; and the role of Western "civil identity."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Deudney|first1=Daniel|author1-link=Daniel Deudney|last2=Ikenberry|first2=G. John|author2-link=John Ikenberry|date=April 1999|title=The nature and sources of liberal international order|journal=Review of International Studies|language=en|volume=25|issue=2|pages=179–196|doi=10.1017/S0260210599001795|s2cid=146270842 |issn=0260-2105}}</ref> According to Charles Glaser, there are five key mechanisms in the LIO: "democracy, hierarchy built on legitimate authority, institutional binding, economic interdependence, and political convergence."<ref name=":8" />

The more supportive views of scholars such as Ikenberry have drawn criticism from scholars who have examined the imperial and colonial legacies of liberal international institutions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jahn|first=Beate|date=2018|title=Liberal internationalism: historical trajectory and current prospects|url=http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/70461/1/prospects%20of%20liberal%20internationalism%20final.pdf|journal=International Affairs|language=en|volume=94|issue=1|pages=43–61|doi=10.1093/ia/iix231|issn=0020-5850}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|title=No enchanted palace : the end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations|last=Mazower|first=Mark|authorlink=Mark Mazower|date=2009|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-13521-2|location=Princeton|oclc=319601760}}</ref> The contributions of non-Western actors to the formation of the liberal international order have also recently gained attention from scholars advancing global International Relations theory.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k9tPDwAAQBAJ&q=info:BiZBWjI4Tt8J:scholar.google.com&pg=PP1|title=Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics|last=Acharya|first=Amitav|author-link=Amitav Acharya|date=2018-03-22|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-316-76726-9|language=en}}</ref> In the case of Latin America, for example, "From as far back as the 1860s, Latin American jurists have made prominent contributions to international jurisprudence, the ‘mortar’ that binds international order. [...] However, in other ways, historically the LIO has been—and remains—superficial in its reach in Latin America."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Long|first=Tom|date=2018|title=Latin America and the liberal international order: an agenda for research|journal=International Affairs|language=en|volume=94|issue=6|pages=1371–1390|doi=10.1093/ia/iiy188|issn=0020-5850|url=http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/108259/1/WRAP-Latin-America-international-order-Long-2018.pdf}}</ref> According to Abrahamsen, Andersen, and Sending, the contemporary liberal international order includes the legacy of "southern actors" in Africa and Asia advocating the process of decolonization.<ref name=":13">{{Cite journal|last1=Abrahamsen|first1=Rita|last2=Andersen|first2=Louise Riis|last3=Sending|first3=Ole Jacob|date=2019-03-01|title=Introduction: Making liberal internationalism great again?|journal=International Journal|volume=74|issue=1|pages=5–14|doi=10.1177/0020702019827050|hdl=11250/2837725 |s2cid=151226407|issn=0020-7020|doi-access=free|hdl-access=free}}</ref>

International organizations play a central role in the liberal order. The World Trade Organization, for example, creates and implements free trade agreements, while the World Bank provides aid to developing countries. The order is also premised on the notion that liberal trade and free markets will contribute to global prosperity and peace. Critics argue that free trade has sometimes led to social problems such as inequality and environmental degradation.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Artuc|first1=Erhan|last2=Porto|first2=Guido|last3=Rijkers|first3=Bob|date=2020-01-06|title=Inequality and trade: Simulation evidence for 54 developing nations|url=https://voxeu.org/article/inequality-and-trade-simulation-evidence-54-developing-nations|access-date=2021-08-11|website=VoxEU.org}}</ref>

Post-Cold War, some consider international agreements on issues such as climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, and upholding initiatives in maritime law (UNCLOS) to constitute elements of the LIO.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Analysis {{!}} The G-20 is discussing the 'international liberal order.' That's a bad place to start a debate.|newspaper=Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/28/g-is-discussing-international-liberal-order-thats-bad-place-start-debate/|access-date=2021-08-11|issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Thompson |first=Alexander |date=2024 |title=Contestation and Resilience in the Liberal International Order: The Case of Climate Change |journal=Global Studies Quarterly |volume=4 |issue=2 |article-number=ksae011 |doi=10.1093/isagsq/ksae011 |issn=2634-3797|doi-access=free }}</ref> The European Union is often considered a major example of the liberal international order put into effect in terms of international agreements between the constituent countries.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web|last=Lehne|first=Stefan|title=Securing the EU's Place in the World|url=https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/11/17/securing-eu-s-place-in-world-pub-83246|access-date=2021-08-11|website=Carnegie Europe}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|first1=Anthony|last1=Dworkin|first2=Mark|last2=Leonard|author2-link=Mark Leonard (director)|date=2018-05-24|title=Can Europe save the world order? – European Council on Foreign Relations|url=https://ecfr.eu/publication/can_europe_save_the_world_order/|access-date=2021-08-11|website=ECFR}}</ref>

Others argue that weak states played a central role in shaping the liberal international order.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Tourinho|first=Marcos|date=2021|title=The Co-Constitution of Order|journal=International Organization|volume=75|issue=2|pages=258–281|language=en|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000466|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|first=Martha|last=Finnemore|authorlink=Martha Finnemore|date=2009|title=Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be|journal=World Politics|volume=61|issue=1|pages=58–85|doi=10.1353/wp.0.0027|issn=1086-3338|doi-access=free}}</ref> Marcos Tourinho argues that weak states used the three strategies of "resistance", "community" and "norms" to push back on U.S. dominance during the construction of the liberal international order, thus ensuring that the order did not just reflect U.S. interests.<ref name=":4" /> Martha Finnemore argues that unipolarity does not just entail a material superiority by the unipole, but also a social structure whereby the unipole maintains its status through legitimation, and institutionalization. In trying to obtain legitimacy from the other actors in the international system, the unipole necessarily gives those actors a degree of power. The unipole also obtains legitimacy and wards off challenges to its power through the creation of institutions, but these institutions also entail a diffusion of power away from the unipole.<ref name=":5" /> David Lake has argued along similar lines that legitimacy and authority are key components of international order.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lake|first=David A.|authorlink=David A. Lake|date=2018|title=International Legitimacy Lost? Rule and Resistance When America Is First|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/abs/international-legitimacy-lost-rule-and-resistance-when-america-is-first/1EB3776D8B18081E528F4A84E229E241|journal=Perspectives on Politics|language=en|volume=16|issue=1|pages=6–21|doi=10.1017/S1537592717003085|s2cid=148632667|issn=1537-5927|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last=Lake|first=David A.|authorlink=David A. Lake|title=Authority, Coercion, and Power in International Relations|date=2013|url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199970087.001.0001/acprof-9780199970087-chapter-4|work=Back to Basics|pages=55–77|editor1-last=Finnemore|editor1-first=Martha|editor1-link=Martha Finnemore|editor2-last=Goldstein|editor2-first=Judith|editor2-link=Judith Goldstein (political scientist)|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199970087.003.0004|isbn=978-0-19-997008-7|url-access=subscription}}.</ref> Abrahamsen suggested that middle powers also benefit from liberal internationalism. By investing in the maintenance of multilateral institutions, moderate powers can collectively advocate for their self-interest, counterbalancing great power politics. Supporting liberal internationalism is thus a form of realpolitik for middle powers.<ref name=":13" />

Realist critics of the LIO include John Mearsheimer, Patrick Porter and Charles Glaser. Mearsheimer has argued that the LIO is bound to fail due to the pushback it faces internally within liberal states and externally by non-liberal states.<ref name=":6" /> Porter has argued that the LIO was actually a coercive order and that it was not liberal.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Porter|first=Patrick|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gGjjDwAAQBAJ|title=The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump|date=2020|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-1-5095-4213-0}}</ref> Glaser has argued that the balance of power theory, bargaining theory and neo-institutional theories better explain NATO than mechanisms associated with the LIO.<ref name=":8" />

Aaron McKeil of the London School of Economics finds realist criticism of liberal order insufficient. He argues that the alternative foreign policies offered by realists as "restraint" and "offshore balancing" would be more generative of proxy wars and would fail to offer the level of institutions required for managing great power competition and international challenges.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McKeil|first=Aaron|date=2021|title=The Limits of Realism after Liberal Hegemony|journal=Journal of Global Security Studies|volume=7|article-number=ogab020 |language=en|doi=10.1093/jogss/ogab020|issn=2057-3170|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Inderjeet Parmar has argued that the LIO is "imperialism by another name" and that it promotes a Eurocentric, Americentric class-based, white elitist and racist hegemony over the rest of the world.<ref name="ch1">{{cite web |last1=Parmar |first1=Inderjeet |authorlink=Inderjeet Parmar |title=The US-Led Liberal Order: Imperialism By Another Name? |url=https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_9_240_Parmar.pdf |access-date=22 August 2024 |publisher=Chatham House}}</ref> According to Amitav Acharya, the LIO is often perceived outside of the West as a narrow ideological, economic, and strategic system that promotes the interests and culture of Western nations at the expense of their own local cultural languages, identities, and religions.<ref name="eir1">{{cite web |last1=Acharya |first1=Amitav |date=14 January 2020 |title=Hegemony and Diversity in the 'Liberal International Order': Theory and Reality |url=https://www.e-ir.info/2020/01/14/hegemony-and-diversity-in-the-liberal-international-order-theory-and-reality/ |access-date=22 August 2024 |website=E-International Relations}}</ref> Gellwitzki and Moulton complement these critiques by arguing that the LIO endures through institutionalized political myths, such as liberal values, sovereignty, and Western leadership.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Gellwitzki |first1=C. Nicolai L. |last2=Moulton |first2=Jeremy F. G. |date=December 2025 |title=The New Age of Myth: Political Narratives and the Reconstitution of World Order |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/new-age-of-myth-political-narratives-and-the-reconstitution-of-world-order/165309F74E32FF153A36D3A0CC6058A8 |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=79 |issue=S1 |pages=S44–S56 |doi=10.1017/S0020818325101021 |issn=0020-8183|url-access=subscription }}</ref> These confer legitimacy and guide state behavior, but while influential in the West, they have lost significance elsewhere.

John Dugard of the Leiden Law School has argued that the concept of the rules-based international order (RBO) operates in tension with international law and has often been used to advance Western interests. Dugard argues that RBO rests on tacit agreements between only a handful of Western states which other states have not endorsed and that its amorphous nature makes it easier for Western countries, particularly the United States, to justify special treatment for their actions when they violate international law.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dugard|first=John|authorlink=John Dugard|date=2023|title=The choice before us: International law or a 'rules-based international order'?|journal=Leiden Journal of International Law|volume=36|issue=2|pages=223–232|doi=10.1017/S0922156523000043|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to Jeremy Garlick of the Prague University of Business and Economics, in the eyes of developing countries, the United States practices double standards when it argues for a rules-based international order while simultaneously failing to sign on to international agreements such as the UN Convention of the Law of the Seas.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8}}</ref>{{Rp|page=153}}

== Relations with individual countries ==

China under Xi Jingping, Russia under Vladimir Putin and (since late 2025) the United States under Donald Trump have been characterized as the most threatening states to the LIO.<ref name="thespinoff"/><ref>{{Cite web|last=Ziegler|first=Charles E.|date=2021-03-06|title=A Russian-Chinese Partnership Against America?|url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russian-chinese-partnership-against-america-179280|access-date=2021-03-28|website=The National Interest}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last1=Stronski |first1=Paul |last2=Ng |first2=Nicole |date=2018-02-28 |title=Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/02/cooperation-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-the-russian-far-east-and-the-arctic?lang=en |access-date=2021-07-26 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}}</ref>

=== United States === During the second presidency of Donald Trump, the United States has pursued a campaign to annex Greenland, which is part of Denmark and whose citizens are also citizens of the European Union. This has triggered a confrontation between the United States on one side, and Denmark, the European Union and several NATO members on the other.

On 3 January 2026, US forces detained the Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and his wife during a large-scale strike on the country’s capital, with Trump saying the US will "run" Venezuela and is "not afraid of boots on the ground". A week later, the US withdrew from 66 international organisations and Trump told the New York Times "I don’t need international law".

These actions have been described by academics and commentators as deliberate steps towards ending a rules-based world order in favour of one where great powers have spheres of influence.<ref name="thespinoff"/><ref>{{cite news|title=What a post-US world order might look like|url=https://asiatimes.com/2026/01/what-a-post-us-world-order-might-look-like/|work=Asia Times|date=19 January 2026}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Wes Streeting warns of "disintegration" of rules-based world order after Venezuela attack|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/06/wes-streeting-venezuela-disintegration-rules-based-world-order|work=The Guardian|date=6 January 2026}}</ref>

In a widely acclaimed and discussed speech at the World Economic Forum in January 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney (whose country has also faced similar threats of annexation by Trump) described a "rupture" in the rules-based international order, which was always "partially false" as the "strongest would exempt themselves when convenient". He stated that the world is now in an era of great power rivalry and that "great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, and supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited".<ref>https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses</ref><ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/24/world/canada/carney-trump-us-greenland.html.</ref>

=== China === Some see China as a potential challenger to the liberal order. According to Darren Lim and John Ikenberry, China seeks an international order that protects its illiberal domestic political and economic model.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lim |first1=Darren J. |last2=Ikenberry |first2=G. John |author2-link=John Ikenberry |date=2023 |title=China and the Logic of Illiberal Hegemony |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2178963 |journal=Security Studies |volume=32 |pages=1–31 |doi=10.1080/09636412.2023.2178963 |hdl=1885/313670 |s2cid=257266865 |issn=0963-6412|hdl-access=free }}</ref> Scholars cite initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and One Belt One Road Initiative as institutions that appear to compete with existing liberal international institutions.<ref name="svann">{{cite news |last1=van Nieuwenhuizen |first1=Simone |title=China's "rule of law in international relations" |url=https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-rule-law-international-relations |agency=The Interpreter |publisher=THE LOWY INSTITUTE |date=1 August 2018 |access-date=9 October 2019 |archive-date=28 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230128111026/https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-rule-law-international-relations |url-status=dead }}</ref> Van Niewenhuizen is categorical that Xi Jinping, then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to supplant the LIO. According to political scientist Thomas Ambrosio, one aim of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to ensure that liberal democracy could not gain ground in these countries, promoting Sinocentric authoritarian norms in Central Asia.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ambrosio|first1=Thomas|authorlink=Thomas Ambrosio|date=October 2008|title=Catching the 'Shanghai Spirit': How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia|journal=Europe-Asia Studies|volume=60|issue=8|pages=1321–1344|doi=10.1080/09668130802292143|s2cid=153557248}}</ref>

Rühlig asks in his March 2018 paper why China under Xi would seek to change a system by which it earns enormous profit.<ref name="trei">{{cite news |last1=Rühlig |first1=Tim |date=March 2018 |title=China's international relations in the new era of Xi Jinping – implications for Europe |publisher=European Institute for Asian Studies |url=http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/EU_Asia_at_a_Glance_Ruhlig_2018.pdf}}</ref><ref name="tris">{{cite news |last1=Rühlig |first1=Tim |date=2 March 2018 |title=A "New" Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping? |publisher=Institute for Security & Development Policy |url=http://isdp.eu/publication/new-chinese-foreign-policy-xi-jinping-implications-european-policy-making/}}</ref>

Nisha Mary Mathew contends that China's relationship with Iran is driven not only by economics, but by a desire to see an international order not dominated by the U.S. and its allies.<ref name="scoil">{{cite news |date=15 June 2019 |title=Oil tanker attacks: did Iran's ties with China just go up in smoke? |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3014610/oil-tanker-attacks-did-irans-ties-china-just-go-smoke |first1=Meaghan |last1=Tobin |first2=John |last2=Power |work=South China Morning Post |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

China contends that the U.S. violates the international order, sometimes citing the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq as an example.<ref name=":132">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Chuchu |title=China's Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum? |date=2025 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-032-76275-3 |series=Changing Dynamics in Asia-Middle East Relations series |location=Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=62}} On the 20th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that the US' bypassing of the UN Security Council violated the norms of the UN Charter, and "facts have demonstrated that any discourse on a 'rules based international order' that excludes the United Nations and international law is merely a façade for the principle of 'might makes right' and the law of the jungle."<ref name=":132" />{{Rp|pages=62-63}}

Publishing in 2024, academics Xinru Ma and David C. Kang observe that U.S. scholars who contend that China does not accept the RBO rarely consider it an issue that the U.S. also often ignores these same rules.<ref name=":Ma&Kang">{{Cite book |last1=Ma |first1=Xinru |title=Beyond Power Transitions: The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations |last2=Kang |first2=David C. |date=2024 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-55597-5 |series=Columbia Studies in International Order and Politics |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=190}}

=== Russia === Many scholars agree that the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin seeks to undermine the liberal international order.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last1=Götz|first1=Elias|last2=Merlen|first2=Camille-Renaud|date=2019-03-15|title=Russia and the question of world order|journal=European Politics and Society|volume=20|issue=2|pages=133–153|doi=10.1080/23745118.2018.1545181|issn=2374-5118|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web|last=Diamond|first=Larry|authorlink=Larry Diamond|date=2016-12-09|title=Russia and the Threat to Liberal Democracy|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/russia-liberal-democracy/510011/|access-date=2021-03-06|website=The Atlantic}}</ref> Various viewpoints have been developed on the subject. The first is that Russia is a "revanchist power" seeking to completely overturn international diplomacy, the second is that Russia is a "defensive power" that seeks to push incremental change in the existing order, and the third is that Russia is an "aggressive isolationist", with Putin playing a "spoiler role" in international affairs to boost legitimacy domestically.<ref name=":1" />

Political sociologist Larry Diamond argues that Putin's assault on liberal democracy is exemplified by the 2008 military intervention for the enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia against independent Georgia, Russian support for Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine, and the Russian military intervention in Ukraine by troops without insignia in 2014.<ref name=":2"/> Putin has been accused of giving financial support to far-right or national populist parties across Europe.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Foy|first1=Henry|last2=Barker|first2=Alex|last3=Barber|first3=Lionel|author3-link=Lionel Barber|date=2019-06-27|title=Vladimir Putin says liberalism has 'become obsolete'|url=https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36 |archive-date=2022-12-10 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=2021-03-06|newspaper=Financial Times}}</ref><ref name=":2"/> For example, the National Front (now National Rally) obtained a 9 million euro loan from a Russian bank in 2014.<ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite news|publisher=Reuters Staff|date=2020-06-08|title=Le Pen's far-right party reaches settlement on Russian bank debt: court|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-france-politics-idUSKBN23F1AH|access-date=2021-03-06}}</ref> Larry Diamond argues this influenced the policy of the National Front such as Marine Le Pen's support for the annexation of Crimea.<ref name=":2"/>

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and a widespread response against the invasion has led to renewed discussion of the liberal international order.<ref name=":17">{{Cite web |date=21 March 2022 |first=Lucan |last=Way |title=The Rebirth of the Liberal World Order? |url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/the-rebirth-of-the-liberal-world-order/ |access-date=2022-05-28 |website=Journal of Democracy |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":18">{{Cite web |last=Schake |first=Kori |authorlink=Kori Schake|date=2022-02-28 |title=Putin Accidentally Revitalized the West's Liberal Order |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/vladimir-putin-ukraine-invasion-liberal-order/622950/ |access-date=2022-05-28 |website=The Atlantic}}</ref><ref name=":19">{{Cite web |last=Lawler |first=Dave |date=2022-05-26 |title=Ukraine dominates Davos agenda |url=https://www.axios.com/2022/05/26/ukraine-dominates-davos |access-date=2022-05-28 |website=Axios}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{Cite news |date=2022-04-21 |first=Edward |last=Luce |authorlink=Edward Luce |title=Biden should scrap talk of the 'liberal international order' |work=Financial Times |url=https://www.ft.com/content/41d10062-ebe7-4fe4-ba63-c530e61b8f20 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/https://www.ft.com/content/41d10062-ebe7-4fe4-ba63-c530e61b8f20 |archive-date=2022-12-10 |url-access=subscription |access-date=2022-05-28}}</ref> Political scientist Lucan Way writes that the invasion has inadvertently strengthened the liberal international order in opposition, with the full-scale Russian invasion being a more conspicuously imperialistic challenge to sovereignty than smaller-scale frozen conflicts and political interferences. Way says that blocs such as the European Union will have more unified action while being currently pillars in the liberal international order.<ref name=":17" /> Samir Saran, head of the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, says that a renewed emphasis in the liberal international order offers new opportunities for the international community, but hopes that the LIO should maintain interest in global issues after the security crisis in Europe.<ref name=":19" /> Edward Luce says the invasion is a serious threat to the international order because, "should Putin succeed, it would legitimise the law of the jungle, where large countries can annex smaller ones with impunity." At the same time, Luce suggests different terminology should be used besides "liberal international order" due to what he says is the selective nature of diplomacy.<ref name=":20" /> Kori Schake argues that the Russian invasion has provoked a Western response which strengthens the transatlantic alliance, a main component of the LIO, yet has also involved a global response, with the largest partner being Japan. Schake suggests that Ukraine's own defense is a new strengthening element to the LIO, by showing a stark contrast between liberalism and authoritarianism.<ref name=":18" />

John Mearsheimer argues that the US-led liberal international order emerged in 1991 after the break-up of the Soviet Union, when the United States became the only superpower in the world. The absence of any other power capable of challenging the US hegemony resulted in numerous illiberal activities (e.g. bombing on Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003–2011 and in 2014, Libya in 2011 and in 2015–2019) initiated by the United States under false pretences of protecting democracy and human rights.<ref>{{cite book |first=John J. |last=Mearsheimer |authorlink=John Mearsheimer |year=2018 |title=The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-23419-0}}</ref> However, these wars have "failed to spread democracy or produce international stability", and instead they "antagonized the forces of nationalism and realist counter-hegemonic power politics".<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/7/1/ogab020/6318578 | doi=10.1093/jogss/ogab020 | title=The Limits of Realism after Liberal Hegemony | date=2022 | last1=McKeil | first1=Aaron | journal=Journal of Global Security Studies | volume=7 | article-number=ogab020 | doi-access=free }}</ref> The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was notable as perhaps the first time that NATO and its allies failed to achieve their goals, potentially symbolizing the end of the unipolar moment of liberal hegemony and the beginning of a new international order, which may or may not be multipolar.<ref>{{cite magazine | url=https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2023/05/liberal-internationalism-has-failed-but-we-can-live-in-a-multipolar-world | title=Liberal internationalism has failed, but we can live in a multipolar world |first=Michael |last=Lind |magazine=New Statesman | date=6 May 2023 }}</ref>

== Further reading == *[https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec_a_00342 Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order] by John J. Mearsheimer *[https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/50/2/7/133734/The-Rules-Based-International-Order-A-Historical The Rules-Based International Order: A Historical Analysis] by Marc Trachtenberg *[https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy Misreading the “Liberal Order”] by Paul Staniland *Robert Keohane. 1984. ''[https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sq9s After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy]''. Princeton University Press. * John Ikenberry. 2001. ''[https://muse.jhu.edu/book/62935 After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars]''. Princeton University Press. * Patrick J. Hearden. 2002 ''Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order During World War II'', Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press. *Latin America and the liberal international order by Tom Long *[https://academic.oup.com/ia/issue/94/1 Ordering the world? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice], edited by G. John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, Doug Stokes *Kyle M. Lascurettes and Michael Poznansky. 2021. "International Order in Theory and Practice." in the ''Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies''. *Robert Jervis, Dian N. Labrosse, Stacie E. Goddard and Joshua Rovner (2023). [https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/jerv20598 ''Chaos Reconsidered: The Liberal Order and the Future of International Politics''.] Columbia University Press.

== References == {{Reflist}}

==External links== *[https://www.eurasiareview.com/01022018-will-current-world-order-survive-without-us-power-analysis/ Will Current World Order Survive Without US Power?] by Rajesh Rajagopalan *[https://newrepublic.com/minutes/150378/solve-problem-like-liberal-international-order How do you solve a problem like the liberal international order?] by Jeet Heer *[https://newrepublic.com/article/153323/amnesia-us-foreign-policy-establishment The Amnesia of the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment] by John Glaser *[https://web.archive.org/web/20190507091214/https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/mourning-a-phantom-the-cherished-rules-based-order-never-existed Mourning a phantom: the cherished “rules-based order” never existed] by Helen Thompson * [https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/united-states-cold-war.html The ‘Liberal World Order’ Was Built With Blood] by Vincent Bevins * [https://unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/ Welcome back to 1945: The liberal world order was always a myth] by Aris Roussinos * [https://www.crikey.com.au/2025/06/24/donald-trump-iran-bombing-international-rules-based-order/ Trump’s bombing proves ‘the global order’ was just power politics all along. Now? Welcome to the jungle] by Bernard Keane * [https://harici.com.tr/en/the-myth-of-the-us-led-rules-based-international-liberal-order-and-the-gaza-genocide/ The myth of the US-led rules-based international liberal order and the Gaza genocide] by Umur Tugay Yücel

Category:International relations International order Category:Multilateral relations Category:International security Category:International relations terminology Category:International relations theory Category:Democracy promotion Category:Western culture