Preventive war

{{Short description|Military action to prevent an enemy from acquiring attack capabilities}} {{Multiple issues| {{globalize|date=September 2010}} {{original research|date=January 2011}} }} {{War}} A '''preventive war''' is an armed conflict "initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk."<ref>''Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms'' p.413 (2001, as amended 2002).</ref> The party which is being attacked has a latent threat capability or it has shown that it intends to attack in the future, based on its past actions and posturing. A preventive war aims to forestall a shift in the balance of power<ref name="S.M._Walt">Taming American Power, Stephen M. Walt, pp 224</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Levy |first=Jack S. |date=2011 |title=Preventive War: Concept and Propositions |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2011.546716 |journal=International Interactions |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=87–96 |doi=10.1080/03050629.2011.546716 |s2cid=154345645 |issn=0305-0629|url-access=subscription }}</ref> by strategically attacking before the balance of power has had a chance to shift in the favor of the targeted party. Preventive war is distinct from preemptive strike, which is the first strike when an attack is imminent.<ref name=" S.M._Walt" /> Preventive uses of force "seek to stop another state . . . from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter, whereas [p]reemptive uses of force come against a backdrop of tactical intelligence or warning indicating imminent military action by an adversary."<ref>William Safire, "Rope-a-Dope: A Lexicon of Intervention," ''N.Y. Times,'' Oct. 13, 2002, p.30, 31.</ref>

==Concept== Scholars debate how to define a preventive war. For some, a preventive war must have some preventive motives, but for others, the preventive motives must be the key factors in the decision to go to war.<ref>{{Citation |last=Vasquez |first=John A. |title=Was the First World War a preventive war?: Concepts, criteria, and evidence |date=2014 |work=The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making |pages=199–224 |editor-last=Levy |editor-first=Jack S. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/outbreak-of-the-first-world-war/was-the-first-world-war-a-preventive-war/190A5814FAE9C54F278FA99AE787CAE4 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/CBO9781107336995.012 |isbn=978-1-107-04245-2 |editor2-last=Vasquez |editor2-first=John A.|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Some link preventive wars to power transitions, as one state seeks to forestall adverse shift in the distribution of power between it and another state.<ref name=":0" />

==Criticism== The majority view is that a preventive war undertaken without the approval of the United Nations is illegal under the modern framework of international law.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-preventive-war/523833/|title=How America Shed the Taboo Against Preventive War|last=Beinart|first=Peter|date=2017-04-21|website=The Atlantic|language=en-US|access-date=2019-03-13}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last1=Warren|first1=Aiden|title=Self-Defense in International Law: Preemptive/Preventive Requisites|date=2014|work=Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations: The Post 9/11 US Challenge on International Law|pages=23–45|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=Aiden|series=New Security Challenges Series|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|language=en|doi=10.1057/9781137411440_3|isbn=9781137411440|last2=Bode|first2=Ingvild|editor2-last=Bode|editor2-first=Ingvild}}</ref><ref>{{citation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UQajT7Bqf-MC&q=un+charter&pg=PT97 |publisher = Oxford UP |editor1 = Henry Shue |editor2 = David Rodin |title=Preemption: military action and moral justification |chapter=The False Promise of Preventive War |author=Suzanne Uniacke |year=2007 |page=88|isbn = 9780199233137 }}</ref> The consensus is that preventive war "goes beyond what is acceptable in international law"<ref>{{cite book|title=International Law (6th edn)|last=Shaw|first=Malcolm|author-link=Malcolm Shaw (academic)|year=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge|isbn=978-0-521-72814-0|page=1140}}</ref> and lacks legal basis.<ref>{{cite book|title=Principles of Public International Law|last=Brownlie|first=Ian|author-link=Ian Brownlie|year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0-19-921176-0|page=734}}</ref> The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stopped short of rejecting the concept outright but suggested that there is no right to preventive war. If there are good grounds for initiating preventive war, the matter should be put to the UN Security Council, which can authorize such action,<ref>https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C9B1B6D819968E83C1256F5E00597208/$file/Report+of+the+High-level+Panel+on+Threats+Challenges+and+Change.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210123052413/https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C9B1B6D819968E83C1256F5E00597208/$file/Report+of+the+High-level+Panel+on+Threats+Challenges+and+Change.pdf |date=2021-01-23 }} p.54</ref> given that one of the Council's main functions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression") is to enforce the obligation of member states under Article 4, Paragraph 2 to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."<ref>{{cite web | url=https://un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text | title=United Nations Charter (Full text) }}</ref> The Charter's drafters assumed that the Council might need to employ preventive force to forestall aggression such as initiated by Nazi Germany in the 1930s.<ref>"One of the fundamental purposes of the Charter is to provide forces which will be immediately available to the Security Council to take action to prevent a breach of the peace."Senate Executive Report No. 8, "to Accompany Executive F," 79th Cong. (1945).</ref>

==Examples==

=== World War II === The Axis powers in World War II routinely invaded neutral countries on grounds of prevention and began the invasion of Poland in 1939 by claiming the Poles had attacked a border outpost first. In 1940, Germany invaded Denmark and Norway and argued that Britain might have used them as launching points for an attack or prevented supply of strategic materials to Germany. In the summer of 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, inaugurating the bloody and brutal land war by claiming that a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy threatened the Reich. In late 1941, the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran was carried out to secure a supply corridor of petrol to the Soviet Union. Iranian Shah Rezā Shāh appealed to US President Franklin Roosevelt for help but was rebuffed on the grounds that "movements of conquest by Germany will continue and will extend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas, unless they are stopped by military force."<ref>''Sunrise at Abadan'', Stewart Richard pp 94–108</ref>

==== Pearl Harbor ==== {{Main|Attack on Pearl Harbor|Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor}} The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Empire of Japan on December 7, 1941 has been characterized as a preventive war.<ref name="bakerinstitute.org">J. Barnes, R. Stoll, "Preemptive and Preventive War: A Preliminary Taxonomy", p.15, The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, [http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/Preemptive%20and%20Preventive%20War-1.pdf URL] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101123064942/http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/Preemptive%20and%20Preventive%20War-1.pdf |date=2010-11-23 }}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Copeland |first=Dale C. |date=2011 |title=A Tragic Choice: Japanese Preventive Motivations and the Origins of the Pacific War |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2011.546722 |journal=International Interactions |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=116–126 |doi=10.1080/03050629.2011.546722 |issn=0305-0629|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Many in the US and Japan believed war to be inevitable. Coupled to the crippling US economic embargo that was rapidly degrading the Japanese military capability, that led the Japanese leadership to believe it was better to have the war as soon as possible.<ref name="bakerinstitute.org"/> However, others have argued that rather than being motivated by grand strategic fears of decline, the Japanese started the war due to domestic and psychological pathologies.<ref name=":1" />

The sneak attack was partly motivated by a desire to destroy the US Pacific Fleet to allow Japan to advance with reduced opposition from the US when it secured Japanese oil supplies by fighting against the British Empire and the Dutch Empire for control over the rich East Indian (Dutch East Indies, Malay Peninsula) oil-fields.<ref>Keith Crane, ''Imported oil and US national security'', p. 26, Rand Environment, Energy, and Economic Development (Program), International Security and Defense Policy Center</ref> In 1940, American policies and tension toward Japanese military actions and Japanese expansionism in the Far East increased. For example, in May 1940, the base of the US Pacific Fleet that was stationed on the West Coast was forwarded to an "advanced" position at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii.

The move was opposed by some US Navy officials, including their commander, Admiral James Otto Richardson, who was relieved by Roosevelt.{{citation needed|date=July 2010}} Even so, the Far East Fleet was not significantly reinforced. Another ineffective plan to reinforce the Pacific was a rather late relocation of fighter planes to bases located on the Pacific islands like Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines. For a long time, Japanese leaders, especially leaders of the Imperial Japanese Navy, had known that the large US military strength and production capacity posed a long-term threat to Japan's imperialist desires, especially if hostilities broke out in the Pacific.{{citation needed|date=April 2008}} War games on both sides had long reflected those expectations.

===Iraq War=== {{Main|Criticism of the Iraq War|Rationale for the Iraq War}}

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was framed primarily as a preemptive war by the George W. Bush administration,<ref>David E. Sanger, "Bush's Doctrine for War," ''N.Y. Times,'' March 18, 2003 at A1</ref> although President George W. Bush also argued it was supported by Security Council Resolutions: "Under Resolutions 678 and 687—both still in effect—the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction."<ref>"Bush's Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave,'" ''N.Y. Times,'' March 18, 2003 at A 10.</ref> At the time, the US public and its allies were led to believe that Ba'athist Iraq might have restarted its nuclear weapons program or been "cheating" on its obligations to dispose of its large stockpile of chemical weapons dating from the Iran–Iraq War. Supporters of the war have argued it to be justified, as Iraq both harbored Islamic terrorist groups sharing a common hatred of the United States and was suspected to be developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iraq's history of noncompliance of international security matters and its history of both developing and using such weapons were factors in the public perception of Iraq's having weapons of mass destruction.

In support of an attack on Iraq, US President George W. Bush stated in an address to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002 that the Iraqi "regime is a grave and gathering danger."<ref>[https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002]</ref> However, despite extensive searches during the several years of occupation, the suspected weapons of mass destruction or weapons program infrastructure alleged by the Bush administration were not found to be functional or even known to most Iraqi leaders.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7634313|title=CIA's final report: No WMD found in Iraq|website=NBC News |date=25 April 2005 |access-date=2009-05-24}}</ref> Coalition forces instead found dispersed and sometimes-buried and partially dismantled stockpiles of abandoned and functionally expired chemical weapons. Some of the caches had been dangerously stored and were leaking, and many were then disposed of hastily and in secret, leading to secondary exposure from improper handling. Allegations of mismanagement and information suppression followed.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Ford |first1=Dana |title=Report: United States kept secret its chemical weapons finds in Iraq |url=https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/15/us/iraq-chemical-weapons/index.html |access-date=18 September 2019 |agency=Turner Broadcasting System, Inc |publisher=CNN |date=October 15, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Chivers |first1=CJ |title=The Secret Casualties of Iraq's Abandoned Chemical Weapons |url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleeast/us-casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=279797D532B892B5066743757602314B&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL |access-date=18 September 2019 |work=New York Times |date=14 October 2014}}</ref>

=== Twelve-Day War === {{Main|Reactions to the Twelve-Day War#Legality}} The Twelve-Day War in June 2025 was a preventive war launched by Israel to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. While Israeli officials called the War a “preemptive strike,” the legal and strategic reality fit preventive rather than preemptive definitions. Preemptive strikes respond to imminent threats when the signs of attack are present, while preventive strikes respond to a generalized threats of war in more distant future and are based on calculations that fighting now is better than fighting later.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jan |first=Farah N. |date=2025-06-16 |title=Iran-Israel 'threshold war' has rewritten nuclear escalation rules |url=https://theconversation.com/iran-israel-threshold-war-has-rewritten-nuclear-escalation-rules-258965 |work=The Conversation}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Goddard |first=Stacie |date=2025-06-13 |title=Israel’s June 2025 attack on Iran: Preemptive or preventive? |url=https://goodauthority.org/news/israel-june-2025-attack-on-iran-preemptive-or-preventive/ |work=Good Authority}}</ref> Israel is removing the source of a threat by surprise and on their own timetable.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Nichols |first=Tom |date=2025-06-12 |title=Israel’s bold, risky attack |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/06/israel-iran-war/683160/ |work=The Atlantic}}</ref>

=== Iran War === {{Main|Rationale for the 2026 Iran war|Legality of the 2026 Iran war}} On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched surprise attacks against Iran, triggering the 2026 Iran war. The strikes targeted several military and government sites and assassinated several senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The United States and Israel framed the strikes as a preemptive war of self-defense.<ref name=":22">{{Cite news |last1=Jimison|first1=Robert|first2=Megan|last2=Mineiro|date=2026-03-02|title=Rubio Warns 'Hardest Hits' on Iran Lie Ahead and Offers Conflicting Rationales|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/02/world/middleeast/rubio-iran-war-strikes.html|access-date=2026-03-26|work=The New York Times|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=28 February 2026|title=US and Israel launch "pre-emptive" attack against Iran|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-it-launched-pre-emptive-attack-against-iran-2026-02-28/|access-date=26 March 2026|work=Reuters}}</ref> The Trump administration presented various rationales for the war, including warding off an imminent Iranian threat, pre-empting Iranian retaliation against U.S. bases and assets after an expected Israeli attack on Iran,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Stein|first=Chris|date=3 March 2026|title=US strikes on Iran triggered by Israel's plan to launch attack, Rubio says|url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/02/rubio-us-attack-israel-iran|access-date=10 March 2026|work=The Guardian|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=3 March 2026|title=US House speaker: Israel's determination to strike Iran left Trump with a 'very difficult' decision|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/us-house-speaker-israels-determination-to-strike-iran-left-trump-with-a-very-difficult-decision/|access-date=10 March 2026|work=The Times of Israel|language=en-US|issn=0040-7909|agency=Associated Press}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Mazzetti|first1=Mark|last2=Barnes|first2=Julian E.|last3=Pager|first3=Tyler|last4=Wong|first4=Edward|last5=Schmitt|first5=Eric|last6=Bergman|first6=Ronen|date=2 March 2026|title=How Trump Decided to Go to War|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/02/us/politics/trump-war-iran-israel.html|access-date=10 March 2026|work=The New York Times|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|quote=The president said he understood the risks of an attack, but he conveyed to Mr. Carlson that he had no choice but to join a strike that Israel would launch.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=For Israel's Netanyahu, Trump grants wishes, but his support carries risks |last1=Hendrix|first1=Steve|last2=Hudson|first2=John|date=8 March 2026|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/08/trump-netanyahu-israel-iran-war/|access-date=10 March 2026|newspaper=The Washington Post|language=en-US|issn=0190-8286|quote=Netanyahu made clear his desire to attack Iran's ballistic missile program in the coming weeks. The prime minister said Israel would be willing to strike Iran with or without U.S. involvement, though he wanted Trump to green-light the operation, the people said.<br />Netanyahu's determination to initiate hostilities led Trump to believe an Israeli attack was inevitable and that the best course of action was to involve U.S. military power to ensure its success, said two people familiar with this thinking.}}</ref> to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon,<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 February 2026|title=Read Trump's full statement on Iran attacks|url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/read-trumps-full-statement-on-iran-attack|work=PBS News|agency=Associated Press}}</ref> and to achieve regime change by bringing the Iranian opposition to power.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-indicates-goal-of-iran-strikes-is-to-topple-regime-tells-iranian-people-when-we-are-finished-take-over-your-government/ |date=28 February 2026 |last=Magid|first=Jacob|title=Trump indicates goal of Iran strikes is to topple regime; tells Iranian people: 'When we're finished, take over your government'|access-date=28 February 2026|work=The Times of Israel|language=en-US|issn=0040-7909|archive-date=28 February 2026|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260228190440/https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-indicates-goal-of-iran-strikes-is-to-topple-regime-tells-iranian-people-when-we-are-finished-take-over-your-government/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Volz|first1=Dustin|last2=Ward|first2=Alexander|last3=Seligman|first3=Lara|date=2 March 2026|title=Trump's Case for War With Iran Faces Growing Scrutiny|url=https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trumps-case-for-war-with-iran-faces-growing-scrutiny-96648cb9|access-date=4 March 2026|work=The Wall Street Journal|language=en-US|archive-date=6 March 2026|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260306060557/https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trumps-case-for-war-with-iran-faces-growing-scrutiny-96648cb9|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |last=Glasser|first=Susan|author-link=Susan Glasser|date=2 March 2026|title=Can Donald Trump Win a War with Iran If He Can't Explain Why He Started It?|url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-trumps-washington/can-donald-trump-win-a-war-with-iran-if-he-cant-explain-why-he-started-it|url-access=subscription|access-date=5 March 2026|magazine=The New Yorker|publication-date=2 March 2026}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Haake|first1=Garrett|author1-link=Garrett Haake|last2=Leavitt|first2=Karoline|author2-link=Karoline Leavitt|date=4 March 2026|title=White House says Trump's 'feeling based on fact' that Iran posed an imminent threat led to strikes. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said President Donald Trump's decision to launch Operation Epic Fury was based on the 'cumulative effect' of threats and his feeling 'based on fact' that Iran posed an imminent and direct threat|url=https://apnews.com/video/white-house-says-trumps-feeling-based-on-fact-that-iran-posed-an-imminent-threat-led-to-strikes-afdafd3d3fec4d1ba28babb5b2638ab5|access-date=4 March 2026|work=Associated Press|type=Internet video|quote=[Total running time, 1:41 min.]}}</ref> U.S. President Donald Trump said that the strikes aimed to "prevent this very wicked, radical dictatorship from threatening America and our core national security interests."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Liptak |first=Kevin |date=2026-02-28 |title=Trump says military campaign is "massive and ongoing" |url=https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-attack-02-28-26-hnk-intl?post-id=cmm60gtvr000g3b6r9djjxt4k |access-date=2026-05-04 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref>

== Case for preventive nuclear war == {{See also|First strike (nuclear strategy)}} Since 1945, World War III between the United States and the Soviet Union was perceived by many as inevitable and imminent. Many high officials in the US military sector and some renowned luminaries in non-military fields advocated preventive war. According to their rationale, total war is inevitable, and it was senseless to permit the Russians to develop a nuclear parity with the United States. Hence the sooner the preventive war come the better, because the first strike is almost surely decisive and less devastating.<ref>Brodie, Bernard (1959). ''Strategy in the Missile Age'', (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 229.</ref><ref>Kaku, Michio & Axelrod, Daniel (1987). ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press), p 314.</ref> Dean Acheson<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset��: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 12-13.</ref> and James Burnham<ref>Burnham, James (1947). ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company), p 248, https://ia800504.us.archive.org/25/items/struggleforworld00burn/struggleforworld00burn.pdf</ref> adhered to the version that the war is not inevitable but is already going on, although the American people still do not realize it.

The US military sector widely and wholeheartedly shared the idea of preventive war.<ref>Baldwin, Hanson W. (October 1, 1950). “Hans Baldwin on preventive war,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', 6/10, October 1: p 318, https://books.google.com/books?id=_Q0AAAAAMBAJ </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 10-11.</ref> Most prominent proponents included Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson, JCS Chairman Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Navy Secretary Francis P. Matthews, Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington, Air Force Chiefs Curtis LeMay and Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Generals George Kenney and Orvil A. Anderson, General Leslie Groves (the wartime commander of the Manhattan Project) and CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith.<ref>Baldwin, Hanson W. (October 1, 1950). “Hans Baldwin on preventive war,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', 6/10, October 1: p 318, https://books.google.com/books?id=_Q0AAAAAMBAJ </ref><ref>LeMay, Curtis & Kantor, MacKinlay (1965). ''Mission with LeMay: My Story'', (New York: Doubleday & Company), p 481-482, 485.</ref><ref>Twining, Nathan (1966). ''Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at US Military Policy and Strategy'', (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p 19.</ref><ref>Ball, Desmond (1982/83). “US strategic forces: How would they be used?” ''International Security'', vol 7 (3): p 42.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 5, 19-20, 41.</ref><ref>Dingman, Roger (1988/89). “Atomic diplomacy during the Korean War,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 69.</ref><ref>Gentile, Gian P. (Spring 2000). “Planning for preventive war, 1945 – 1950,” ''Joint Forces Quarterly'', vol 24: p 70. </ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 131-132, 136, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Meilinger, Phillip S. (2012). ''Bomber: The Formation and Early History of Strategic Air Command'', (Alabama: Air University Press), p 290.</ref> NSC-100 and several studies by SAC and JCS during the Korean War advocated preventive war too.<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34.</ref>

In Congress, preventive warriors counted Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze,<ref>Later, Nitze distanced himself from a “small group” of believers in preventive war. Nitze, Paul H. (1976). “Assuring strategic stability in an era of Détente,” ''Foreign Affairs'', vol 54 (2): p 212.</ref> expert on the Soviet Union Charles E. Bohlen of the State Department, Senators John L. McClellan, Paul H. Douglas, Eugene D. Millikin, Brien McMahon (Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee), William Knowland and Congressman Henry M. Jackson. The diplomatic circle included distinguished diplomats like George Kennan, William C. Bullitt (US Ambassador to Moscow), and John Paton Davies (from the same embassy).<ref>''FRUS'' (1949), vol I: p 284. </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 8-9, 20, 47.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 4-5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 127, 131-132, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Albertson, Trevor D., (2015). “Ready for the worst: Preemption, prevention and American nuclear policy,” ''Air Power History'', vol 62 (1): p 32.</ref>

John von Neumann of the Manhattan Project and later a consultant for the RAND Corporation expressed: "With the Russians it is not a question of whether but of when… If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today?"<ref>Blair, Clay (February 25, 1957). “Passing of a great mind: John von Neumann, a brilliant, jovial Mathematician, was a prodigious servant of science and his country,” ''Life'': p 96, https://books.google.com/books?id=rEEEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA89</ref><ref>Chen, Janet & Lu, Su-I & Vekhter, Dan (1999). "Von Neumann and the development of game theory," (Stanford University), https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/game-theory/neumann.html</ref> Other renowned scientists and thinkers, such as Leo Szilard, William L. Laurence,<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 7-8.</ref> James Burnham,<ref>Burnham, James (1947). ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company), p 248, https://ia800504.us.archive.org/25/items/struggleforworld00burn/struggleforworld00burn.pdf</ref> and Bertrand Russell.<ref>Perkins, Ray (Winter 1994/95). "Bertrand Russell and preventive war," ''Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives'', vol 14: p 135-153.</ref> joined the preventive effort. The preventive war in the late 1940s was argued by “some very dedicated Americans.”<ref>Twining, Nathan (1966). ''Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at US Military Policy and Strategy'', (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p 49.</ref><ref>Meilinger, Phillip S. (2012). ''Bomber: The Formation and Early History of Strategic Air Command'', (Alabama: Air University Press), p 314.</ref> “Realists” repeatedly proposed the preventive war.<ref>Oppenheimer, Ernest (December 1, 1947). “The challenge of our time,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', vol 3 (12): p 370, https://books.google.com/books?id=pA0AAAAAMBAJ</ref> "The argument—prevent before it is too late—was quite common in the early atomic age and by no way limited to “the lunatic fringe.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 7-8.</ref> A famous atomic scientist expressed a concern: In 1946, public discussion of international problems, in the United States at least, "has moved dangerously towards a consideration of so-called preventive war. One sees this tendency perhaps most markedly in the trend of news in Americans newspapers."<ref>Urey, Harold C. (November 1, 1946a). “Atomic energy and world peace,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', vol 2 (9-10): p 2, https://books.google.com/books?id=WgwAAAAAMBAJ</ref>

Bernard Brodie noted that at least prior to 1950, preventive war was a “live issue … among a very small but earnest minority of American citizens.”<ref>Brodie, Bernard (1959). ''Strategy in the Missile Age'', (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 227-228.</ref> The dating of Brodie is too short, as the preventive war doctrine has had increasing support since the Korean War started.<ref>''FRUS'' (1950), vol III: p 197-204. </ref> The late summer 1950 saw “a flurry of articles” in the public press dealing with preventive war. One of them in Time magazine (September 18, 1950) called for a buildup, followed by a “showdown” with the Russians by 1953.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 21.</ref> “1950 may have marked the high tide of ‘preventive war’ agitation…”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 24. </ref> According to Gallup poll of July 1950, right after the outbreak of the War, 14% of the polled opined for the immediate declaration of war on the USSR, the percentage which only slightly declined by the end of the War.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 149-150, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> “So preventive war thinking was surprisingly widespread in the early nuclear age, the period from mid-1945 through late 1954.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” Security Studies, vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref>

The preventive warriors remained minority in America’s postwar political arena, and Washington’s elder statesmen soundly rejected their arguments.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 11.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, 127-128, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> However, during several of the East-West confrontations that marked the first decade of the Cold War, well-placed officials in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations urged their Presidents to launch preventive strikes on the Soviet Union.<ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, 127-128, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> Entry in Harry S. Truman’s secret personal journal on January 27, 1952 tells: {{Blockquote| It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum with a ten-days expiration limit informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast … and that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria … by means now at our control and if there is any further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our peaceful purposes. This means all-out war. It means Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Beijing… and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated. This is the final chance for the Soviet Government to decide whether it desires to survive or not.<ref>Kaku, Michio & Axelrod, Daniel (1987). ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press), p 73. </ref>}} In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in a summary memorandum to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles: In present circumstances, "we would be forced to consider whether or not out duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment we could designate.”<ref>Eisenhower, Dwight, (September 8, 1953). " Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State," ''Office of the Historian'', https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d89</ref> In May 1954, the JCS’s Advance Study Group proposed to Eisenhower to consider “deliberately precipitating war with the USSR in the near future,” before Soviet thermonuclear capability became a real menace.<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34. </ref> The same year, Eisenhower asked in a meeting of National Security Council: “Should the United States now get ready to fight the Soviet Union?” and pointed out that “he had brought up this question more than once at prior Council meetings and he had never done so facetiously.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 39.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 137-138, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> By the fall 1954, Eisenhower made his mind up and approved a ''Basic National Security Policy'' paper which stated unequivocally that “the United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war, or acts intended to provoke war.”<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 127-128, 137, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 6.</ref>

Winston Churchill was more resolved on the preventive war. He argued repeatedly in the late 1940s that matters needed to be brought to a head with the Soviets before it was too late, while the United States still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly.<ref>Kissinger, Henry A. (1961). ''The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy'', (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), p 178-179.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 9-10. </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> Charles de Gaulle in 1954 regretted that now it was too late.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref> Curtis LeMay<ref>LeMay, Curtis & Kantor, MacKinlay (1965). ''Mission with LeMay: My Story'', (New York: Doubleday & Company), p 485.</ref> and Henry Kissinger<ref>Kissinger, Henry A. (1979). ''The White House Years'', (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company), p 62.</ref> later expressed the same regret over missed opportunity.

==References== {{Reflist}}

==External links== * [https://web.archive.org/web/20070311025054/http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/~wwwdrint/20042rouillard1.htm The Caroline Case : Anticipatory Self-Defence in Contemporary International Law (Miskolc Journal of International Law v.1 (2004) No. 2 pp. 104-120)] * [https://ssrn.com/abstract=397601 The American Strategy of Preemptive War and International Law]

Category:Counterterrorism in the United States Category:Aggression in international law Category:Law of war Category:Wars by type Category:Prevention Category:Warfare by type