{{Short description|Epistemology, proof, reliable means of knowledge in Indian philosophies}} {{About|proof and epistemology in Indian philosophies|the Journal of Physics|Pramana (journal)}} {{italic title}} {{Hindu philosophy}} '''''Pramana''''' ({{Langx|sa|प्रमाणम्}}; IAST: Pramāṇam) literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge".<ref name="sepramana">[http://spokensanskrit.org/index.php?tran_input=pramANa&direct=se&script=hk&link=yes&mode=3 pramANa] Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany</ref><ref name="jalo">James Lochtefeld, "Pramana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, pages 520-521</ref> One of the core concepts in Indian epistemology, pramanas are one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge.<ref name=jalo/> The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.<ref name="kp">Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0779-0}}, pages 25-26</ref><ref name=dpsb>DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony J. Marsella), Springer, {{ISBN|978-1-4419-8109-7}}, page 172</ref>
While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six{{efn|A few Indian scholars such as Vedvyasa discuss ten, Krtakoti discusses eight, but six is most widely accepted. Some systems admit as few as three pramanas. See Andrew J. Nicholson (2013), ''Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|978-0231149877}}, pages 149-150; see also [https://www.britannica.com/topic/pramana the Encyclopedia Britannica entry] on this topic.}} pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and attaining to the truth. Three of these are almost universally accepted: perception ({{IAST|pratyakṣa}}), inference ({{IAST|anumāna}}), and "word" (''śabda''), meaning the testimony of past or present reliable experts. The other three pramanas are more contentious: comparison and analogy ({{IAST|upamāna}}); postulation or derivation from circumstances ({{IAST|arthāpatti}}); and non-perception, or proof from absence ({{IAST|anupalabdhi}}).<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=gflood>Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|978-0521438780}}, page 225</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Pramana |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/pramana |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=16 June 2020}}</ref> Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence, and possibility of error.
The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six ''pramanas'' are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge.<ref>P Bilimoria (1993), Pramāṇa epistemology: Some recent developments, in Asian philosophy - Volume 7 (Editor: G Floistad), Springer, {{ISBN|978-94-010-5107-1}}, pages 137-154</ref> For example, the Charvaka school of the Śramaṇa tradition holds that only one (perception) is a reliable source of knowledge,<ref name=kamal/> Buddhism holds that two (perception, inference) are valid means,<ref name=ds/><ref name=jag/> Jainism holds three (perception, inference and testimony) as valid,<ref name=jag>John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|978-0791430675}}, page 238</ref> and the Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism hold that all six ''pramanas'' are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge.<ref name=eliottjag> *Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, {{ISBN|978-0815336112}}, pages 245-248; *John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|978-0791430675}}, page 238</ref> The various schools of Indian philosophy have debated whether one of the six forms of ''pramana'' can be derived from another and the relative uniqueness of each. For example, Buddhism considers Buddha and other "valid persons", "valid scriptures" and "valid minds" as indisputable, but that such testimony is a form of perception and inference ''pramanas''.<ref name=danper/>
==Etymology== {{IAST|Pramāṇa}} literally means "proof," based on the word ''pramā.'' The Sanskrit root {{IAST|pra}} ({{langx|sa|प्र}}), is a preposition meaning "outward" or "forth", and {{IAST|mā}} ({{langx|sa|मा}}) means "measurement." {{IAST|Pramā}} means "correct notion, true knowledge, basis, foundation, understand." {{IAST|Pramāṇa}} being a nominalization of the word,<ref>[https://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/scans/MWScan/2014/web/webtc2/index.php प्रमा] Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany</ref><ref>John A. Grimes (1996), A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|978-0791430675}}, page 237-238</ref> means that which is a "means of acquiring {{IAST|pramā}} or certain, correct, true knowledge".<ref name=sepramana/>
{{IAST|Pramāṇa}} forms one part of a trio of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are {{IAST|pramātŗ}}, ({{langx|sa|प्रमातृ}}, the subject, the knower) and {{IAST|prameya}} ({{langx|sa|प्रमेयम्}}, the object, the knowable). They each influence the knowledge, by their own characteristic and the process of knowing.<ref>[http://spokensanskrit.de/index.php?tinput=pramAtR&direction=SE&script=HK&link=yes&beginning= pramAtR] Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany</ref><ref>[http://spokensanskrit.de/index.php?tinput=prameya&direction=SE&script=HK&link=yes&beginning=0 prameya] Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany</ref>
In Buddhist literature, {{IAST|pramāṇa}} is referred to as {{IAST|pramāṇavāda}}.<ref>Tom J. F. Tillemans (2011), Buddhist Epistemology (pramāṇavāda), The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy (Editors: William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield), {{doi|10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195328998.003.0022}}</ref> {{IAST|Pramāṇa}} is also related to the Indian concept of ''yukti'' ({{langx|sa|युक्तिः}}) which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose.<ref>[http://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/scans/MWScan/tamil/index.html yukti] Monier-Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany</ref><ref name=rnar>R Narasimha (2012), Asia, Europe, and the Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries, Palgrave Macmillan, {{ISBN|978-1137031723}}, pages 95-97</ref> ''yukti'' and {{IAST|pramāṇa}} are discussed together in some Indian texts, with ''yukti'' described as active process of gaining knowledge in contrast to passive process of gaining knowledge through observation/perception.<ref>R Narasimha (2012), Asia, Europe, and the Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries, Palgrave Macmillan, {{ISBN|978-1137031723}}, pages 95-105</ref><ref>CA Scherrer-Schaub (1981), ''Le term yukti: primiere etude'', Etudes Asiatiques, 35: 185-199</ref> The texts on ''pramana'', particularly by Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism, often include in their scope what might be termed "theories of errors"; that is, philosophies regarding the reason for human error, how one may know if one is wrong, and—if so—how one can discover whether one's epistemic method or conclusion was flawed, as well what one ought then do in order to correct it.<ref>EI Warrier (2012), Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200 (Editor: Karl Potter), Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120830615}}, pages 512-530, 684</ref><ref>Gerald Larson and Ram Bhattacharya, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Editor:Karl Potter), Volume 4, Princeton University Press, {{ISBN|978-0691073019}}, pages 361-362</ref><ref>L Schmithausen (1965), Maṇḍana Miśra's Vibhrama-viveka, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Phil.-hist. Klasse. Sitzungsberichte, Vol. 247; For excerpts in English: Allen Thrasher (1993), The Advaita Vedānta of Brahma-siddhi, {{ISBN|978-8120809826}}, pages 20-38</ref>
==Hinduism== {{Hinduism}}
===Six ''pramanas''=== Hinduism identifies six ''pramanas'' as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: ''Pratyakṣa'' (evidence/perception), ''Anumāna'' (inference), ''Upamāna'' (comparison and analogy), ''Arthāpatti'' (postulation, derivation from circumstances), ''Anupalabdhi'' (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and ''Śabda'' (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=gflood/><ref name=eliottjag/>
In verse 1.2.1 of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (c. 9th–6th centuries BCE), "four means of attaining correct knowledge" are listed: ''smṛti'' ("scripture, tradition"), ''pratyakṣa'' ("perception"), ''aitihya'' ("expert testimony, historical tradition"), and ''anumāna'' ("inference").<ref>A. B. Keith (1925), [https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&dq=pratyaksa&pg=PA482 ''The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads''], Part II, p.482</ref><ref>S. C. Vidyabhusana (1971). [https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa&pg=PA23 ''A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools''], p.23</ref>
In some texts such as by Vedvyasa, ten ''pramanas'' are discussed, Krtakoti discusses eight epistemically reliable means to correct knowledge.<ref>Andrew J. Nicholson (2013), ''Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|978-0231149877}}, pages 149-150</ref> Six most widely recognized ''pramanas'' are:<ref name=eliottjag/><ref>Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharya (1994), Epistemology, in The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 6, Princeton University Press, {{ISBN|978-0691073842}}, pages 53-68</ref><ref>Howard Coward et al, Epistemology, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 5, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0426-0}}, pages 51-62</ref>
====''Pratyaksham''==== ''Pratyaksham'' ({{langx|sa|प्रत्यक्षम्|translit=Pratyakṣa}}''m'') means perception. It is of two types: external and internal. External perception is arises from the interaction between the five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception refers to the awareness arising from the inner sense, the mind.<ref name=kamal>MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16</ref><ref>B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|978-0198239765}}</ref> According to Matt Stefan, the distinction is between direct perception (''anubhava/anubhavaḥ'') and remembered perception (''smriti/smṛti'').<ref>Matt Stefan, [https://www.britannica.com/topic/pratyaksha pratyaksha], Encyclopedia Britannica.</ref>
The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:<ref name=kpmat>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0309-4}}, pages 160-168</ref> # {{IAST|Indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ}} ({{langx|sa|इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः}}): direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with object being studied. # ''Avyapadeśya'': non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception, with no intermediate agency involved. # ''Avyabhicāra'': consistency; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, or suspect. # ''Vyavasāyātmika'': definite; lacks bias, and inferential judgment; correct perception excludes doubt, either from failure to observe all the details, or from mixing inference with observation.
Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as a ''pramāṇa'', describing it as internal perception, a view contested by other Indian scholars. These internal perceptions include ''pratibhā'' (intuition), ''sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyakṣa'' (induction from specifics to a universal), and ''jñānalakṣaṇapratyakṣa'' (perceiving prior states of a 'topic of study' by observing its present state).<ref>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0309-4}}, pages 168-169</ref> Some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from ''pratyakṣa pramana'', distinguishing ''nirṇaya'' (definite judgment, conclusion) from ''anadhyavasāya'' (indefinite judgment).<ref>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0309-4}}, pages 170-172</ref>
====''Anumanam''==== Anumanam ({{langx|sa|अनुमानम्|translit=Anumānam}}) means ‘inference’ in Sanskrit, though it often is used to mean ‘guess’ in modern Indian languages. In the context of classical philosophy, it is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason.<ref>W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|0-7914-0362-9}}, page 26-27</ref> Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of ''Anumana''.<ref name=kamal/> In all except one Hindu philosophies,<ref>Carvaka school is the exception</ref> this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: ''pratijna'' (hypothesis), ''hetu'' (a reason), and ''drshtanta'' (examples).<ref name=jl4647>James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, page 46-47</ref> The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: ''sadhya'' (that idea which needs to be proven or disproven) and ''paksha'' (the object on which the ''sadhya'' is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if ''sapaksha'' (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if ''vipaksha'' (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand ''Vyapti''—the requirement that the ''hetu'' (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both ''sapaksha'' and ''vipaksha''.<ref name=jl4647/><ref>Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0779-0}}</ref> A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a ''nigamana'' (conclusion).<ref>Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, page 61</ref>
==== ''Upamanam'' ==== Upamanam ({{langx|sa|उपमानम्|translit=Upamānam}}) means comparison and analogy.<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=gflood/> Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge.<ref>VN Jha (1986), "The upamana-pramana in Purvamimamsa", SILLE, pages 77-91</ref> ''Upamana'', states Lochtefeld,<ref name=jl721/> may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like a cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.<ref name=jl721>James Lochtefeld, "Upamana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, page 721</ref> The subject of comparison is formally called ''upameyam'', the object of comparison is called ''upamanam'', while the attribute(s) are identified as ''samanya''.<ref name=mw457>Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, pages 457-458</ref> Thus, explains Monier Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is ''upameyam'', the moon is ''upamanam'', and charmingness is ''samanya''. The 7th-century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not.<ref name=mw457/> In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of ''Upamāna'' and their value in epistemology are debated.
====''Arthapatti''==== Arthapatti ({{langx|sa|अर्था��त्तिः|translit=Arthāpattiḥ}}) means postulation, derivation from circumstances.<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=gflood/> In contemporary logic, this ''pramana'' is similar to circumstantial implication.<ref>[http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/36920/arthapatti Arthapatti] Encyclopædia Britannica (2012)</ref> As an example, if a person was left in a boat on a river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this ''pramana'' as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted.<ref>James Lochtefeld, "Arthapatti" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, page 55</ref> However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for ''arthapatti'' in ancient Hindu texts is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat during the day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge.<ref>Stephen Phillips (1996), Classical Indian Metaphysics, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120814899}}, pages 41-63</ref> The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other ''pramanas'' or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.<ref>DM Datta (1932), The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical study of the Advaita theory of knowledge, University of Calcutta, Reprinted in 1992 as {{ISBN|978-8120835269}}, pages 221-253</ref>
====''Anupalabdhi''==== Anupalabdhi ({{langx|sa|अनुपलब्धिः|translit=Anupalabdhiḥ}}) means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof.<ref name=eliottjag/> ''Anupalabdhi pramana'' suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia| author= James Lochtefeld| title= Abhava| encyclopedia= The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M| year= 2002| publisher= Rosen Publishing |isbn= 0-8239-2287-1| page= 1}}</ref> In the two schools of Hinduism that consider ''Anupalabdhi'' as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either ''sadrupa'' (positive) or ''asadrupa'' (negative) relation—both correct and valuable. Like other ''pramana'', Indian scholars refined ''Anupalabdi'' to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a ''pramana''. The schools that endorsed ''Anupalabdi'' affirmed that it is valid and useful when the other five ''pramanas'' fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.<ref name=ds/>
''Abhava'' (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider ''Anupalabdi'' to be the same as ''Abhava'',<ref name=dpsb/> while others consider ''Anupalabdi'' and ''Abhava'' as different.<ref name=ds>{{cite journal| author= D Sharma |year= 1966| title= Epistemological negative dialectics of Indian logic — Abhāva versus Anupalabdhi| journal= Indo-Iranian Journal| volume= 9| number= 4| pages= 291–300|doi= 10.1163/000000066790086530}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia| author= Karl Potter |year= 1977| title= Meaning and Truth| encyclopedia= Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. 2| publisher= Princeton University Press; reprint by Motilal Banarsidass |isbn= 81-208-0309-4| edition= 1995 | pages= 155–174, 227–255}}</ref> ''Abhava-pramana'' has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of ''Padārtha'' (पदार्थ, referent of a term). A ''Padartha'' is defined as that which is simultaneously ''Astitva'' (existent), ''Jneyatva'' (knowable) and ''Abhidheyatva'' (nameable).<ref name=chba/> Specific examples of ''padartha'', states Bartley, include ''dravya'' (substance), ''guna'' (quality), ''karma'' (activity/motion), ''samanya/jati'' (universal/class property), ''samavaya'' (inherence) and ''vishesha'' (individuality). ''Abhava'' is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to "referents of positive expression" in ''Padartha''.<ref name=chba/> An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, ''asatkaryavada'' theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. ''Abhava'' was further refined in four types, by the schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: ''dhvamsa'' (termination of what existed), ''atyanta-abhava'' (impossibility, absolute non-existence, contradiction), ''anyonya-abhava'' (mutual negation, reciprocal absence) and ''pragavasa'' (prior, antecedent non-existence).<ref name=chba>{{cite encyclopedia| author= Chris Bartley |year= 2013| title= Padartha| encyclopedia= Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy |editor= Oliver Leaman| publisher= Routledge |isbn= 978-0415862530| pages= 415–416}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia| title= abhava| editor= Mohan Lal | encyclopedia= The Encyclopaedia of Indian Literature, Vol. 5| year= 1992 | publisher= Sahitya Akademy |isbn= 81-260-1221-8| page= 3958}}</ref>
==== ''Shabda'' ==== {{See also|Śāstra pramāṇam in Hinduism|Sources of dharma}}
Shabda ({{langx|sa|शब्दः|translit=Śabdaḥ}}) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts,<ref name=dpsb/><ref name="eliottjag"/> specifically the ''shruti'', Vedas.<ref>Anantanand Rambachan (), ''Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a Source of Valid Knowledge in Sankara'', University of Hawaii Press, p.29</ref> Hiriyanna explains ''Sabda-pramana'' as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly.<ref name=mhir>M. Hiriyanna (2000), The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120813304}}, page 43</ref> He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through ''Sabda'' (words).<ref name=mhir/> The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the ''Sabda'' of reliable sources.<ref name=eliottjag/><ref name=mhir/> The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Charvaka, state that this is never possible, and therefore ''Sabda'' is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.<ref>P. Billimoria (1988), Śabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge, Studies of Classical India Volume 10, Springer, {{ISBN|978-94-010-7810-8}}, pages 1-30</ref>
===Acceptance per school=== Different schools of Hindu philosophy accept one or more of these ''pramanas'' as valid epistemology.<ref name=gflood/>
====Charvaka school==== Charvaka school accepted only one valid source of knowledge—perception.<ref name=jag/> It held all remaining methods as outright invalid or prone to error and therefore invalid.<ref name=kamal/><ref>Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2010), What the Cārvākas Originally Meant?, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 529-542</ref>
====Vaisheshika school==== Epistemologically, the Vaiśeṣika school considered the following as the only proper means of knowledge:<ref name=jag/>
#Perception (''Pratyakṣa'') #Inference (''Anumāna'')
====Sankhya, Yoga, Vishishtadvaita Vedanta, and Dvaita Vedanta schools==== According to the Sankhya, Yoga, and two sub-schools of Vedanta, the proper means of knowledge must rely on these three pramanas:<ref name=jag/><ref name="Pramana">[http://www.hindupedia.com/en/Pramana Pramana] at Hindupedia, the Hindu Encyclopedia</ref>
#Pratyakṣa — perception #Anumāna — inference #Śabda/Agama — testimony/word of reliable experts
These are enumerated in sutra I.7 of the Yoga Sutras. The mode of Pramana itself in sutra I.6 is distinguished among 5 classes of vritti/mental modification, the others including indiscrimination, verbal delusion, sleep, and memory.
====Nyaya school==== {{Main|Nyaya}}
''Nyaya'' literally means the science and study of ''pramanas''.<ref name="kp" /> The Nyāya school accepts four<ref name="jag" /> means of obtaining knowledge (''pramāṇa''), viz., Perception (''Pratyakṣa''), Inference (''Anumāna''), Comparison (''Upamāna''), and Word (''Śabda'').<ref name="Pramana" />
====Prabhakara Mimamsa school==== In the Mimamsa school of Hinduism, linked to Prabhakara, the following pramanas are considered as proper:<ref name=jag/> # ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception) # ''Anumāṇa'' (inference) # ''Śabda'' (word, testimony) # ''Upamāṇa'' (comparison, analogy) # ''Arthapatti'' (postulation, presumption)
====Advaita Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa schools==== In Advaita Vedānta, and Mimamsa school linked to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the following pramanas are accepted:<ref name=jag/>{{sfn|Puligandla|1997|p=228}} # Śabda (word, testimony) # Pratyakṣa (perception) # Anumāṇa (inference) # Upamāṇa (comparison, analogy) # Arthāpatti (postulation, presumption) # Anupalabdhi, Abhava (non-perception, cognitive proof using non-existence) Nearly all Vedantins, except Neo-Vedantins for example, accept ''śabda'' ''pramāṇa'' as a more important ''pramāṇa'' than ''anumāna''.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Nicholson |first=Andrew J. |date=2007-08-01 |title=Reconciling dualism and non-dualism: three arguments in Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-007-9016-6 |journal=Journal of Indian Philosophy |language=en |volume=35 |issue=4 |pages=376 |doi=10.1007/s10781-007-9016-6 |issn=1573-0395|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
==Buddhism== {{main|Buddhist logic}}
{{Buddhism}} According to the ''Padmākara Translation Group'', in a 2005 translation of Śāntarakṣita's ''The Adornment of the Middle Way'': <blockquote> Strictly speaking, pramana (''tshad ma'') means "valid cognition." In [Buddhist] practice, it refers to the tradition, principally associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, of logic (''rtags rigs'') and epistemology (''blo rigs'').<ref>Śāntarakṣita (author); Mipham (commentator); Padmākara Translation Group (trans.): ''The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham.'' (2005) Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Shambhala Publications, Inc. {{ISBN|1-59030-241-9}} (alk. paper): p.390</ref> </blockquote>
Buddhism accepts only two ''pramana'' (''tshad ma'') as valid means to knowledge: Pratyaksha (''mngon sum tshad ma'', perception) and Anumāṇa (''rjes dpag tshad ma'', inference).<ref name=danper/> Rinbochay adds that Buddhism also considers scriptures as the third valid ''pramana'', such as from Buddha and other "valid minds" and "valid persons". This third source of valid knowledge is a form of perception and inference in Buddhist thought. Valid scriptures, valid minds and valid persons are considered in Buddhism as ''Avisamvadin'' (''mi slu ba'', incontrovertible, indisputable).<ref name=danper>Daniel Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism, {{ISBN|978-0937938768}}, pages 19-20</ref><ref>Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper (1981), Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, {{ISBN|978-0937938027}}, page 115-119</ref> Means of cognition and knowledge, other than perception and inference, are considered invalid in Buddhism.<ref name=ds/><ref name=jag/>
In Buddhism, the two most important scholars of pramāṇa are Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.<ref>Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) p.1</ref>
===Sautrantrika=== Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are usually categorized as expounding the view of the Sautrāntika tenets, though one can make a distinction between the "Sautrāntikas Following Scripture" ({{Bo|t=ལུང་གི་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ|w=lung gi rjes 'brang gi mdo sde pa}}) and the "Sautrāntikas Following Reason" ({{Bo|t=རིགས་པ་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ|w=rigs pa rjes 'brang gi mdo sde pa}}) and both these masters are described as establishing the latter.<ref name="Shantarakshita32">Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 32–39</ref> Dignāga's main text on this topic is the ''Pramāṇa-samuccaya''. Dignāga's ''Pramāṇa-samuccaya'' played a crucial role in shaping the discipline of epistemology (''pramāṇaśāstra''), blending it with logical discourse. Dharmakīrti, influenced by Dignāga, further developed these ideas in his Pramanavarttika.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Arnold |first=Daniel Anderson |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/ocm57316839 |title=Buddhists, brahmins, and belief: epistemology in South Asian philosophy of religion |date=2005 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-13280-0 |location=New York |pages=3-4 |oclc=ocm57316839}}</ref>
These two rejected the complex Abhidharma-based description of how in the Vaibhāṣika school and the Sautrāntika Following Scripture approach connected an external world with mental objects, and instead posited that the mental domain never connects directly with the external world but instead only perceives an aspect based upon the sense organs and the sense consciousnesses. Further, the sense consciousnesses assume the form of the aspect (Sanskrit: Sākāravāda) of the external object and what is perceived is actually the sense consciousness which has taken on the form of the external object. By starting with aspects, a logical argument about the external world as discussed by the Hindu schools was possible. Otherwise their views would be so different as to be impossible to begin a debate. Then a logical discussion could follow.<ref name="Shantarakshita32" />
This approach attempts to solve how the material world connects with the mental world, but not completely explaining it. When pushed on this point, Dharmakīrti then drops a presupposition of the Sautrāntrika position and shifts to a kind of Yogācāra position that extramental objects never really occur but arise from the habitual tendencies of mind. So he begins a debate with Hindu schools positing external objects then later to migrate the discussion to how that is logically untenable.<ref name="Shantarakshita32" />
Note there are two differing interpretations of Dharmakīrti's approach later in Tibet, due to differing translations and interpretations. One is held by the Gelug school leaning to a moderate realism with some accommodation of universals and the other held by the other schools who held that Dharmakīrti was distinctly antirealist.<ref name="Shantarakshita37">Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) p.37</ref>
====Apoha==== A key feature of Dignāga's logic is in how he treats generalities versus specific objects of knowledge. The Nyāya Hindu school made assertions about the existence of general principles, and in refutation Dignāga asserted that generalities were mere mental features and not truly existent. To do this he introduced the idea of ''Apoha'', that the way the mind recognizes is by comparing and negating known objects from the perception. In that way, the general idea or categories of objects has to do with differences from known objects, not from identification with universal truths. So one knows that a perceived chariot is a chariot not because it is in accord with a universal form of a chariot, but because it is perceived as different from things that are not chariots. This approach became an essential feature of Buddhist epistemology.<ref>Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 35–37</ref>
===Madhyamaka=== The contemporary of Dignāga but before Dharmakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, incorporated a logical approach when commenting upon Nāgārjuna. He also started with a Sautrāntika approach when discussing the way appearances appear, to debate with realists, but then took a Middle Way view of the ultimate nature of phenomenon. But he used logical assertions and arguments about the nature of that ultimate nature.<ref name="Shantarakshita32" />
His incorporation of logic into the Middle Way system was later critiqued by Candrakīrti, who felt that the establishment of the ultimate way of abiding since it was beyond thought and concept was not the domain of logic. He used simple logical consequence arguments to refute the views of other tenet systems, but generally he thought a more developed use of logic and epistemology in describing the Middle Way was problematic. Bhāvaviveka's use of autonomous logical arguments was later described as the Svātantrika approach.<ref name="Shantarakshita32" />
===In Tibet=== Modern Buddhist schools employ the 'three spheres' (Sanskrit: trimaṇḍala; Tibetan: 'khor gsum): #subject #object, #action.<ref>Thub-bstan-chos-kyi-grags-pa, Chokyi Dragpa, Heidi I. Koppl, Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche (2004). ''Uniting Wisdom and Compassion: Illuminating the thirty-seven practices of a bodhisattva''. Wisdom Publications. {{ISBN|0-86171-377-X}}. Source: [https://books.google.com/books?id=FF8vymsxTwMC&dq=trimandala+three+vajra&pg=PA202] (accessed: February 4, 2009) p.202</ref>
When Madhyamaka first migrated to Tibet, Śāntarakṣita established a view of Madhyamaka more consistent with Bhāvaviveka while further evolving logical assertions as a way of contemplating and developing one's viewpoint of the ultimate truth.<ref name="Shantarakshita32" />
In the 14th century Je Tsongkhapa presented a new commentary and approach to Madhyamaka, which became the normative form in Tibet. In this variant, the Madhyamaka approach of Candrakīrti was elevated instead of Bhāvaviveka's yet Tsongkhapa rejected Candrakirti's disdain of logic and instead incorporated logic further.<ref name="Shantarakshita32" />
The exact role of logic in Tibetan Buddhist practice and study may still be a topic of debate,<ref name="Shantarakshita37" /> but it is definitely established in the tradition. Ju Mipham remarked in his 19th-century commentary on Śāntarakṣita's ''Madhyamakālaṅkāra'': {{cquote|The Buddha's doctrine, from the exposition of the two truths onward, unerroneously sets forth the mode of being of things as they are. And the followers of the Buddha must establish this accordingly, through the use of reasoning. Such is the unerring tradition of Śakyamuni. On the other hand, to claim that analytical investigation in general and the inner science of pramana, or logic, in particular are unnecessary is a terrible and evil spell, the aim of which is to prevent the perfect assimilation, through valid reasoning, of the Buddha's words<ref name="Shantarakshita">Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 38–39</ref>}}
==See also==
*Buddhist logic *Epistemology *Hindu philosophy *Metaphysics *Nyaya *Philosophy of Perception *Śāstra pramāṇam in Hinduism
==Notes== {{notelist}}
==References== {{reflist|30em}}
==Sources== {{refbegin}} * {{Citation | last =Puligandla | first =Ramakrishna | year =1997 | title =Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy | place =New Delhi | publisher =D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd.}} {{refend}}
==Bibliography== *Śāntarakṣita (author); Mipham (commentator); Padmākara Translation Group (translators)(2005). ''The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham.'' Boston, Massachusetts, US: Shambhala Publications, Inc. {{ISBN|1-59030-241-9}} (alk. paper)
==External links== *[http://sarit.indology.info/pramanamimamsa-and-vrtti.xml?view=page Pramāṇamīmāṃsā: Devanagari], A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation *[http://sarit.indology.info/pramanavarttikaparisista-1.xml?view=page Pramāṇavārttika Pariśiṣṭa 1: Devanagari], A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation *[http://sarit.indology.info/pramanavarttikavrtti.xml?view=page Pramāṇavārttika: Devanagari], A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation *[http://sarit.indology.info/pramanavarttikasvavrttitika.xml?view=page Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā: Devanagari], A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation *[https://sarit.indology.info/pramanavarttikalankarabhasya.xml?view=page Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra: Devanagari], A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation *[http://sarit.indology.info/pramanantarbhava.xml?view=page Pramāṇāntarbhāva: Devanagari], A SARIT Initiative, German Research Foundation *[https://archive.org/details/historyofthemedi031568mbp Vidhabhusana, Satis Chandra (1907). History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. Calcutta University.]
{{DEFAULTSORT:Pramana}} Category:Sources of knowledge Category:Concepts in epistemology Category:Hindu philosophical concepts Category:Buddhist logic Category:Epistemology literature