Nuclear program of Iran

{{Short description|none}} <!-- "none" is preferred when the title is sufficiently descriptive; see WP:SDNONE --> {{protection padlock|small=yes}} {{NPOV|date=March 2026}} {{Use dmy dates|date=August 2021}} {{Use American English|date=August 2021}} thumb|Map of reported nuclear-related sites in Iran<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/nuclear/ncri-report-irans-covert-nuclear-warhead-program-and-missile-sites-exposed/ |title=NCRI Report: Iran's Covert Nuclear Warhead Program and Missile Sites Exposed |website=ncr-iran.org |date=February 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.iaea.org/topics/monitoring-and-verification-in-iran |title=Monitoring and Verification in Iran |website=iaea.org |date=19 September 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/yazd-radiation-processing-center |title=Yazd Radiation Processing Center |website=iranwatch.org}}</ref> {{Nuclear power in Iran}}

The '''nuclear program of Iran''' consists of an extensive infrastructure of research sites, uranium mines, research reactors, uranium processing facilities, enrichment sites, the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant—the country’s sole operational power reactor, currently expanding with two additional units—and the developing Darkhovin Nuclear Power Plant in Khuzestan. The program’s research capabilities are anchored by several facilities, most notably the Tehran Research Reactor and the heavy water reactor at Khondab. Its uranium processing infrastructure is centered in Isfahan, which serves as a hub for conversion and fuel fabrication, while primary enrichment activities are conducted at Natanz, Fordow, and within the Isfahan complex. Iran’s stated objective is a self-sufficient nuclear energy cycle to diversify its power grid and produce medical radioisotopes, citing a legal right to peaceful technology under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While viewed as a cornerstone of Iranian technological nationalism, the program has been the subject of a decades-long diplomatic and military standoff, particularly with the United States and Israel, culminating in large-scale conflicts in 2025 and 2026.

The program began in 1957 as part of the US-led Atoms for Peace initiative and expanded significantly during the 1970s under the Pahlavi era, which saw the start of the Bushehr project with Western assistance. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the program was initially deprioritized but was revived in the late 1980s. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Iran developed several undeclared sites, which were identified by international observers in 2002 and 2009. Following the collapse of negotiations with the EU-3 in 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement,<ref name="IAEAIran2005">{{cite web |title=IAEA Board of Governors: "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (September 2005)|url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf|access-date=23 November 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=IAEA Board of Governors: "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (February 2006)|url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf|access-date=23 November 2011}}</ref><ref>[http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement Resolution 1696 (2006)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070625160823/http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement|date=25 June 2007}}</ref> leading the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pass a series of resolutions between 2006 and 2010 demanding a suspension of Iran's enrichment-related activities and targeting Iran’s banking, trade, and energy sectors.<ref>{{cite web |title=Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm|access-date=23 November 2011|publisher=United Nations}}</ref><ref name="UNNews2">{{cite web |date=23 December 2006|title=Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for failure to halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously adopting Resolution 1737 (2006)|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm}}</ref><ref name="IranSanction2">{{cite web |date=24 March 2007|title=Security Council tightens sanctions against Iran over uranium enrichment|url=https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21997&Cr=Iran&Cr1}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran's Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance Over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm|access-date=23 November 2011|publisher=United Nations}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=27 September 2008|title=''UN'': Security Council calls on Iran to comply with nuclear obligations|url=https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28329&Cr=Iran&Cr1=nuclear|access-date=23 November 2011|publisher=United Nations}}</ref> While Western intelligence agencies assessed that a dedicated weaponization project, the AMAD Project, was discontinued in 2003, Iran's ongoing enrichment activities led to a decades-long cycle of international sanctions and a sustained campaign of covert sabotage, including the 2009 Stuxnet cyberattack, multiple assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, and strikes on facilities in 2020 and 2021, which Iran characterized as "nuclear terrorism."

In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed by Iran, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US, and Germany, under which Iran agreed to strict enrichment limits and extensive international monitoring at its nuclear facilities in exchange for sanctions relief. Although the JCPOA briefly stabilized the situation, this period of oversight ended in 2018 following the unilateral withdrawal of the United States and the subsequent "Maximum Pressure" campaign. In response to the US withdrawal, and citing ongoing acts of US and Israeli sabotage, Iran incrementally reduced its compliance and raised enrichment levels to 60%,{{Efn|Uranium is considered weapons-grade at 90% enrichment.|name=HEU}} a move the Iranian government characterized as diplomatic leverage to secure the removal of reinstated sanctions.<ref name="Byman">{{Cite journal |last=Byman|first=Daniel|date=13 June 2025|title=What to Know About the Israeli Strike on Iran|url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-know-about-israeli-strike-iran|url-status=live|journal=Center for Strategic and International Studies|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250613161942/https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-know-about-israeli-strike-iran|archive-date=13 June 2025}}</ref><ref name="sweeping">{{Cite web |last1=Burrowa|first1=Emma|last2=Liechtenstein|first2=Stephanie|date=14 June 2025|title=Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear program are sweeping but can they decimate it?|url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-nuclear-attack-uranium-enrichment-radiation-5ded3c224531adf510668c5860801882|access-date=22 June 2025|website=AP News|language=en}}</ref><ref name="know">{{Cite web |last1=Salem|first1=Mostafa|last2=Regan|first2=Helen|last3=Robinson|first3=Lou|date=13 June 2025|title=Everything you need to know about Iran's nuclear program|url=https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/13/middleeast/iran-nuclear-program-explainer-intl-dg|access-date=22 June 2025|website=CNN|language=en}}</ref><ref name="happens">{{Cite web |date=16 June 2025|title=Israel strikes Iran. What happens next?|url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/israel-strikes-iran-what-happens-next/|access-date=22 June 2025|website=Brookings Institution|language=en-US}}</ref> In August 2025, France, Germany, and the UK triggered the snapback mechanism,<ref name=":42">{{Cite web |date=2025-08-28|title=European nations start process to impose 'snapback' sanctions on Iran|url=https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/28/european-nations-start-process-to-impose-snapback-sanctions-on-iran-over-nuclear-programme|access-date=2025-08-31|website=euronews|language=en}}</ref> reinstating UN sanctions, and, that October, Iran, Russia, and China declared they viewed JCPOA terminated and the UN sanctions legally void.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Iran, Russia, China send letter to UN declaring nuclear deal with Tehran terminated|url=https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/iran-russia-china-send-letter-to-un-declaring-nuclear-deal-with-tehran-terminated/3720768|access-date=2025-10-24|website=www.aa.com.tr}}</ref>

The standoff escalated into direct military conflict with the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 and a larger joint U.S.-Israeli campaign in February 2026 targeting nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure. These strikes, which included the assassination of high-ranking Iranian officials, were justified by the U.S. and Israel as preemptive measures to prevent a nuclear breakout.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-02-28|title=Trump announces "major combat operations" in Iran. Watch the full video and read his statement. - CBS News|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-full-statement-on-us-iran-attack-major-combat-operations/|access-date=2026-02-28|website=www.cbsnews.com|language=en-US}}</ref> Following a Pakistan-mediated ceasefire in April 2026, the parties entered high-level negotiations in Islamabad. However, a lasting settlement remains elusive; while the U.S. has demanded a permanent end to all uranium enrichment, Iran maintains its legal right to a civilian program. Analysts remain divided on the long-term impact of the conflict, debating whether the physical damage has permanently delayed the program or instead incentivized a transition from nuclear latency to the pursuit of a completed deterrent.<ref name="The Guardian Attacking Iran Incentivizes Weaponizing">{{cite web |last1=Borger |first1=Julian |title=Attacking Iran’s nuclear programme could drive it towards a bomb, experts warn |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/04/us-israel-strikes-iran-nuclear-program-could-backfire |website=theguardian.com |publisher=The Guardian |access-date=27 April 2026}}</ref>{{TOC limit|5}}

==History== {{One source section|date=May 2026}} {{Main|History of the nuclear program of Iran}} {{See also|Timeline of the nuclear program of Iran}}

=== Origins under the Shah (1950s–1970s) === [[File:Atomic women Iran.JPG|thumb|An Iranian newspaper clip from 1968 reads: "A quarter of Iran's nuclear energy scientists are women." The photograph shows some female Iranian PhDs posing in front of Tehran's research reactor.]]

Iran's nuclear program began under the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with support from the United States and Western Europe. In 1957, Iran and the US signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as part of President Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program, leading to the construction of Iran's first nuclear research facility Tehran. In November 1967, the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)—a 5 megawatt thermal light-water reactor—went critical, initially fueled with 93% highly enriched uranium (HEU) provided by the US. Iran became one of the original signatories of the NPT when it entered into force in March 1970, committing as a non-nuclear-weapon state not to pursue nuclear arms.<ref name="iranwatch20231219">{{Cite web |title=A History of Iran's Nuclear Program {{!}} Iran Watch |url=https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program#:~:text=By%20the%20mid,fuel%20cycle%20in%20the%201970s |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=www.iranwatch.org}}</ref>

By the mid-1970s, the Shah expanded the program, citing the need for "alternative sources of fuel for the day when the oil reserves would be depleted."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cumings |first=Bruce |title=Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth about North Korea, Iran, and Syria |last2=Abrahamian |first2=Ervand |last3=Maʻoz |first3=Moshe |date=2004 |publisher=New Press: Distributed by W.W. Norton |isbn=978-1-56584-904-4 |location=New York |pages=137}}</ref> In 1974 he established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and announced plans to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity from a network of nuclear power plants over 20 years. Contracts were signed with Western firms: Iran paid over $1 billion for a 10% stake in the French Eurodif consortium's uranium enrichment plant, and West Germany's Kraftwerk Union agreed to build two 1,200 MWe pressurized water reactors at Bushehr. Construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant began in 1975, and Iran also negotiated with France's Framatome to supply additional reactors. Plans were made for a full domestic nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and fuel fabrication, with a new Nuclear Technology Center established at Isfahan.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

=== Post-revolution revival and war impact (1979–1980s) === This ambitious program slowed dramatically after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Shah was deposed and Iran's new leaders under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were initially hostile to nuclear technology, seeing it as a symbol of Western influence. Many ongoing nuclear projects were shelved or canceled. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) derailed the nuclear program: resources were diverted to the war effort, and Iraq targeted Iran's nuclear infrastructure. The partially built Bushehr reactor site was bombed multiple times by Iraqi warplanes, and Siemens withdrew from the project, leaving the reactor shells heavily damaged. By the late 1980s, Iran's nuclear program had effectively been put on hold.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

=== Secret expansion and weaponization efforts (1990s–2002) === By the early 1990s, Iran's nuclear program accelerated on two parallel tracks: one overtly civilian and one covert. Openly, Iran continued working with Russia and China to build peaceful nuclear infrastructure. Bushehr's reactor project moved forward under Russian engineers (though plagued by delays until it finally came online in 2011), and China helped Iran with nuclear research and uranium mining expertise.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Less transparently, Iran was building a secret enrichment capability and exploring technologies relevant to nuclear weapons, away from the eyes of inspectors.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

Iran's covert procurement of enrichment technology bore fruit in the 1990s. Thousands of centrifuge components, tools, and technical drawings obtained from A.Q. Khan proliferation network were used to set up secret pilot enrichment workshops.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Experiments with uranium hexafluoride gas were conducted in undeclared facilities in Tehran (such as the Kalaye Electric Company) in the late 1990s.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In 2000, Iran completed a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, based on a Chinese design, to produce uranium hexafluoride feedstock for enrichment.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> It also developed domestic sources of uranium: the Saghand mine in Yazd province (with Chinese assistance) and the Gchine mine and mill near the Gulf coast. The Gchine uranium mine became operational in 2004 and is now believed to have originally been part of a military-run nuclear effort, kept hidden from the IAEA until revealed in 2003. These steps gave Iran independent access to the raw materials and precursor processes for a weapons-capable nuclear fuel cycle.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

In the late 1990s Iran launched a nuclear weapons research program, codenamed the AMAD Project, under the aegis of the Iranian Ministry of Defense. According to later IAEA findings, the AMAD Project (led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a top nuclear scientist) aimed to design and build an arsenal of five nuclear warheads by the mid-2000s.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Between 1999 and 2003, this secret program managed to acquire warhead design (reportedly and possibly including an engineered Pakistan design from KRL– although Pakistan disputed this claim), conducting high-explosive tests and detonator development for an implosion-type bomb, manufacturing some nuclear weapon components with surrogate materials, and integrating a warhead design into Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile system.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The main thing Amad lacked was fissile material, since Iran had not yet produced weapons-grade uranium or plutonium for a bomb core. Still, the scope of Amad demonstrated that Iran was exploring the bomb option in violation of its NPT obligations.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

Throughout the 1990s, Iranian entities also received steady assistance from foreign sources. Some Russian and Chinese companies provided Iran with expertise and equipment for its nuclear projects.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> For example, Chinese technicians conducted uranium exploration in Iran and allegedly supplied blueprints that aided Iran's construction of the Isfahan conversion facility.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran's scientists also gained know-how from Pakistan's secret network and from academic exchanges abroad. That enabled Iran to secretly establish the critical facilities that could produce weapons-usable material: large uranium enrichment plants and a heavy-water reactor project.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

By the early 2000s, two key clandestine facilities were nearing completion: a uranium enrichment center at Natanz (in central Iran), built to house thousands of centrifuges, and a heavy water production plant alongside a 40 MW heavy-water reactor (IR-40) near Arak. These facilities, which had been kept secret from the IAEA, were intended for ostensibly civilian purposes but had clear weapons potential. Enrichment at Natanz could yield high-enriched uranium for bombs, while the Arak reactor (once operational) could produce plutonium in its spent fuel, and the heavy water plant would supply the reactor's coolant.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In August 2002, an exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), exposed the existence of Natanz and Arak.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Satellite imagery soon confirmed construction at these sites. The revelation that Iran had built major nuclear facilities in secret, without required disclosure to the IAEA, ignited an international crisis and raised questions about the program's true aim.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

=== Exposure and International Confrontation (2002–2013) === {{See also|Ali Khamenei's fatwa against nuclear weapons}} [[File:Tehran_Declaration_-_21_October_2003_-_Joschka_Fischer,_Hassan_Rouhani,_Dominique_de_Villepin_and_Jack_Straw.png|thumb|The Tehran Declaration on 21 October 2003, from right to left: Joschka Fischer, Hassan Rouhani, Dominique de Villepin and Jack Straw.]] In late 2003, Iran was facing the prospect of censure and agreed to a degree of cooperation. In October 2003, Iran and the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany (the "EU-3") struck the Tehran Agreement: Iran pledged to temporarily suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, allow more intrusive inspections by signing the Additional Protocol, and clarify past nuclear work.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> This deal, reached just ahead of an IAEA Board of Governors deadline, was intended to build confidence while a longer-term solution was negotiated.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> However, Iran's cooperation was halting and incomplete.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

In 2004 and 2005, the IAEA uncovered inconsistencies and omissions in Iran's disclosures, such as experiments with plutonium separation and advanced P-2 centrifuge designs that Iran had failed to report.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran's suspension of enrichment proved short-lived as soon it resumed certain nuclear activities.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In June 2004, the IAEA's Board rebuked Iran for not fully cooperating.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> By September 2005, the Board found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards (a formal trigger for UN Security Council involvement).<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran reacted by ceasing voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and restarting enrichment work. In April 2006, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had enriched uranium to 3.5% U-235, low enriched uranium suitable for nuclear fuel, using a cascade of 164 centrifuges at Natanz.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> This marked Iran's first public entry into the nuclear fuel-cycle capability club.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

The international community responded firmly. In July 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1696 under Chapter VII, demanding Iran suspend all enrichment-related activities or face sanctions.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> When Iran defied this demand, the Security Council proceeded to adopt a series of escalating sanctions between 2006 and 2010.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The first, Resolution 1737 in December 2006, imposed sanctions targeting sensitive nuclear and missile programs and banned nuclear-related trade with Iran.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023">{{Cite web |title=Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, 1967-2023 {{!}} Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/timeline-nuclear-diplomacy-iran-1967-2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250603131932/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/timeline-nuclear-diplomacy-iran-1967-2023 |archive-date=2025-06-03 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=www.armscontrol.org |language=en}}</ref> Further resolutions (1747 in 2007, 1803 in 2008, and 1929 in June 2010) broadened the sanctions to include arms embargoes, asset freezes on key individuals and entities, and restrictions on financial dealings.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023" /> These measures, backed by the US, Russia, China, and the EU alike, aimed to pressure Iran to halt enrichment. In parallel, the US and EU introduced their own sanctions, including US laws penalizing Iran's oil and gas investment (e.g. the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996) and European moves to restrict trade and eventually embargo Iranian oil by 2012.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023" />

Diplomatic efforts during 2005–2006 tried to resolve the standoff. The newly formed P5+1 group (China, Russia, France, the UK, the US, plus Germany) offered Iran a package of incentives in mid-2006 to halt enrichment – including nuclear fuel guarantees and economic benefits.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran, under the hardline Ahmadinejad administration, rejected the offer, insisting on its "right" to enrich under the NPT. As talks faltered, Iran steadily expanded its enrichment work. By 2007, Iran had installed roughly 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and was enriching larger quantities of uranium.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In 2007, a US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed with high confidence that while Iran had halted its structured nuclear weapons program in 2003, it was continuing to develop technical capabilities applicable to nuclear weapons.<ref name="armscontroljanuary2023" /> This finding somewhat tempered the urgency of the crisis, but concerns remained over Iran's growing stockpile of enriched uranium and its long-term intentions.

====Secret enrichment site==== A significant development came in September 2009, when Western leaders exposed yet another secret Iranian facility. US President Barack Obama, joined by France's Nicolas Sarkozy and Britain's Gordon Brown, revealed intelligence on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, an underground enrichment site being built deep inside a mountain near Qom. Iran had not declared Fordow to the IAEA, violating its safeguards duty to report new facilities at the planning stage.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

Fordow's secret construction (begun in 2006) and fortified location heightened fears that Iran sought a secret bomb program resilient to military attack. Iran defended Fordow as a backup enrichment plant and belatedly declared it to the IAEA, but confidence in Iran's transparency was further eroded. The Fordow revelation galvanized international unity for tougher sanctions, manifested in Resolution 1929 (June 2010), which severely tightened economic restrictions on Iran.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

Meanwhile, covert operations also targeted the program. The Stuxnet cyberattack, a sophisticated computer worm widely attributed to the US and Israel, was discovered in 2010 after it disrupted the control systems at Natanz, crippling a large number of Iran's spinning centrifuges.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Between 2010 and 2012, four Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in Tehran, killings Iran blamed on Israeli and Western agents.

By mid-2013, Tehran had installed over 18,000 centrifuges (mostly IR-1 models) at Natanz and Fordow, including some 1,000+ more advanced IR-2m machine.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Its stockpile had grown to nearly 10,000&nbsp;kg of 3.5% low-enriched uranium and about 370&nbsp;kg of 20% medium-enriched uranium – the latter quantity almost enough, if further enriched to weapons-grade, for one nuclear bomb.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The world's concern was that Iran's "breakout" time, i.e. the time to produce bomb-grade uranium for a weapon, had shrunk to a matter of a few months.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

=== Diplomatic efforts and the JCPOA (2013–2018) === {{main|Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action}}

{{See also|Correspondence between Barack Obama and Ali Khamenei|Joint Plan of Action}} In 2013, Iran's newly elected president, Hassan Rouhani, a centrist cleric and former nuclear negotiator, campaigned on ending sanctions through diplomacy. He had cautious backing from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama, having already authorized secret backchannel talks with Iranian officials in Oman in 2012, was open to a diplomatic solution.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Formal multilateral negotiations resumed in October 2013 between Iran and the P5+1. By November 24, they reached the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), an interim agreement that froze key elements of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Iran halted enrichment above 5% U-235, neutralized its 20% stockpile through dilution or conversion, suspended centrifuge installation, and agreed not to fuel or operate the Arak heavy-water reactor. In return, it received access to about $4.2 billion in frozen assets and limited relief on petrochemical and precious metals trade.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> The JPOA, which began in January 2014, was extended several times while talks continued toward a final accord.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" />

thumb|upright=1.5|Negotiations about Iranian Nuclear Program, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Other Officials of the P5+1 and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran and EU in Lausanne, April 2015After 20 months, the parties reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> Under this framework Iran agreed tentatively to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, all of which would last for at least a decade and some longer, and to submit to an increased intensity of international inspections. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was finally reached on 14 July 2015.<ref>{{cite news |first=Pamela |last=Dockins |title=Iran Nuclear Talks Extended Until July 7 |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/zarif-rejoins-iran-nuclear-talks/2842656.html |publisher=Voice of America |date=30 June 2015 |access-date=30 June 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |first=Paul |last=Richter |url=https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-nuclear-talks-extended-20150707-story.html |title=Iran nuclear talks extended again; Friday new deadline |date=7 July 2015 |work=Los Angeles Times |access-date=8 July 2015}}</ref> The final agreement is based upon "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the IAEA safeguards system".<ref name="Carnegie">{{cite web | first1=George | last1=Perkovich | first2=Mark | last2=Hibbs | first3=James M. | last3=Acton | first4=Toby | last4=Dalton | url=http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/06/parsing-iran-deal/iec5 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150907182841/http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/06/parsing-iran-deal/iec5 | url-status=dead | archive-date=7 September 2015 | title=Parsing the Iran Deal | publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | date=8 August 2015}}</ref>

Enrichment was capped at 3.67% for 15 years, and the enriched uranium stockpile limited to 300&nbsp;kg. Only 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges could operate at Natanz, and Fordow was repurposed for non-enrichment research. The Arak IR-40 reactor was to be redesigned and rebuilt, with its original core removed and filled with concrete to eliminate plutonium production capability. Iran agreed to provisionally implement the IAEA Additional Protocol, and accepted enhanced verification, including continuous surveillance of enrichment and conversion facilities, monitoring of uranium mines and mills, and oversight of centrifuge manufacturing. Iran's excess enriched uranium, including the bulk of its 20% material, was to be shipped abroad or down-blended. Over 13,000 centrifuges were dismantled. Limited R&D on advanced centrifuges was allowed under controlled conditions without accumulating enriched uranium.

In exchange, the UN, US, and EU committed to stepwise sanctions relief: UN Security Council Resolution 2231 endorsed the JCPOA. It retained a conventional arms embargo for five years and ballistic missile restrictions for eight, and introduced a "snapback" mechanism allowing reimposition of sanctions in case of noncompliance. US and EU sanctions targeting Iran's energy, finance, shipping, and trade sectors were suspended. On "Implementation Day" (January 16, 2016), the IAEA verified Iranian compliance, leading to the unfreezing of billions in Iranian assets and restoration of access to international banking (e.g., SWIFT).<ref name="Nasrella">{{cite news |last1=Nasrella |first1=Shadia |date=16 January 2016 |title=Iran Says International Sanctions To Be Lifted Saturday |url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iran-sanctions-lifted_569a3500e4b0ce496424a2b2 |access-date=16 January 2016 |work=HuffPost |agency=Reuters}}</ref><ref name="Chuck">{{cite news |last1=Chuck |first1=Elizabeth |date=16 January 2016 |title=Iran Sanctions Lifted After Watchdog Verifies Nuclear Compliance |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nuclear-sanctions-be-lifted-iran-fm-zarif-n497861 |access-date=16 January 2016 |work=NBC News |agency=Reuters}}</ref><ref name="Melvin">{{cite news |last1=Melvin |first1=Dan |title=UN regulator to certify Iran compliance with nuke pact |url=http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/16/middleeast/vienna-iran-iaea-nuclear-deal/ |access-date=16 January 2016 |publisher=CNN}}</ref> Some US sanctions tied to terrorism and human rights remained in force.

=== United States withdrawal and Iranian violations (2018–2025) === {{main|United States sanctions against Iran|United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action}}

In 2018, the Mossad reportedly stole nuclear secrets (a cache of documents from Iran's weaponization program) from a secure warehouse in the Turquzabad district of Tehran. According to reports, the agents came in a truck semitrailer at midnight, cut into dozens of safes with "high intensity torches", and carted out "50,000 pages and 163 compact discs of memos, videos and plans" before leaving in time to make their escape when the guards came for the morning shift at 7 am.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020">{{cite magazine |last1=Filkins |first1=Dexter |title=TheTwilight of the Iranian Revolution |magazine=The New Yorker |date=18 May 2020 |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/the-twilight-of-the-iranian-revolution |access-date=7 June 2020 }}</ref><ref name="NYT-sanger-15-7-2018">{{cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Bergman |first2=Ronen |title=How Israel, in Dark of Night, Torched Its Way to Iran's Nuclear Secrets |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/us/politics/iran-israel-mossad-nuclear.html |access-date=9 June 2020 |work=The New York Times |date=15 July 2018}}</ref><ref>[https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/the-iaea-mossad-iran-dance-analysis-661468 How Mossad turned the IAEA around on Iran with evidence - analysis], Yonah Jeremy Job, Jerusalem Post, 9 March 2021.</ref> According to a US intelligence official, an "enormous" Iranian "dragnet operation" was unsuccessful in recovering the documents, which escaped through Azerbaijan.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020"/> According to the Israelis, the documents and files, which it shared with European countries and the United States,<ref>[https://www.timesofisrael.com/european-intelligence-officials-briefed-in-israel-on-irans-nuclear-archive/ European intelligence officials briefed in Israel on Iran's nuclear archive] ''The Times of Israel'', 5 May 2018</ref> demonstrated that the AMAD Project aimed to develop nuclear weapons,<ref>[https://www.timesofisrael.com/mossads-stunning-op-in-iran-casts-giant-shadow-over-the-intelligence-it-stole/ Mossad's stunning op in Iran overshadows the actual intelligence it stole] ''The Times of Israel'', 1 May 2018</ref> that Iran had a nuclear program when it claimed to have "largely suspended it", and that there were two nuclear sites in Iran that had been hidden from inspectors.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020" /> Iran claims "the whole thing was a hoax".<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020" /> This influenced Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions on Iran.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-recording-netanyahu-boasts-israel-convinced-trump-to-quit-iran-nuclear-deal/amp/|title=In recording, Netanyahu boasts Israel convinced Trump to quit Iran nuclear deal|last=Fulbright|first=Alexander|date=17 July 2018|work=The Times of Israel}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46071747|title=Trump administration to reinstate all Iran sanctions|date=3 November 2018|work=BBC News}}</ref>

In 2018, the United States withdrew from JCPOA, with President Donald Trump stating that "the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction: that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program".<ref name="nytimes20180508">{{Cite news |date=2018-05-08 |title=Read the Full Transcript of Trump's Speech on the Iran Nuclear Deal |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-iran-deal.html |access-date=2025-04-28 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The US also contended that the agreement was inadequate because it did not impose limitations on Iran's ballistic missile program,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Landler |first=Mark |date=2018-05-08 |title=Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html |access-date=2025-04-28 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> and failed to curb its backing of proxy groups.<ref name="Washington Post 2015">{{cite news |date=2015-07-14 |title=Read: An open letter from retired generals and admirals opposing the Iran nuclear deal |url=https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-an-open-letter-from-retired-generals-and-admirals-opposing-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1703/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018132614/https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-an-open-letter-from-retired-generals-and-admirals-opposing-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1703/ |archive-date=2017-10-18 |access-date=2018-01-14 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>

In February 2019, the IAEA certified that Iran was still abiding by the international Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015.<ref name=ReutersFeb19>{{cite web |last1=Murphy |first1=Francois |title=Iran still holding up its end of nuclear deal, IAEA report shows |date=22 February 2019 |url=https://news.yahoo.com/iran-still-holding-end-nuclear-deal-iaea-report-161005676.html |agency=Reuters |access-date=16 May 2019}}</ref> However, on 8 May 2019, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of some parts of the JCPOA, threatening further action in 60 days unless it received protection from US sanctions.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear-deal-iran-announces-partial-withdrawal-2015-pact/|title=Iran news: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces partial withdrawal from 2015 nuclear deal|work=CBS News|date=8 May 2019 |language=en-US|access-date=8 May 2019}}</ref> In July 2019, the IAEA confirmed that Iran has breached both the 300&nbsp;kg enriched uranium stockpile limit and the 3.67% refinement limit.<ref>{{cite news |title=Why do the limits on Iran's uranium enrichment matter? |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48776695 |access-date=10 November 2019 |work=BBC News |date=5 September 2019}}</ref> On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Iran will enrich uranium to 5% at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, adding the country had the capability to enrich uranium to 20% if needed.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Iran-will-enrich-uranium-to-5-percent-at-Fordow-nuclear-site-official-606964|title=Iran will enrich uranium to 5% at Fordow nuclear site -official|date=5 November 2019|website=The Jerusalem Post {{pipe}} JPost.com}}</ref> Also in November, Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated that Iran can enrich up to 60% if needed.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-enrichment-idUSKBN1XJ0D5 |title=Iran able to enrich uranium up to 60%, says atomic energy agency spokesman|date=9 November 2019|work=Reuters|access-date=12 January 2020|language=en}}</ref> President Hassan Rouhani declared that Iran's nuclear program would be "limitless" while the country launches the third phase of quitting from the 2015 nuclear deal.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.post-gazette.com/business/powersource/2019/09/04/Iran-nuclear-deal-US-oil-sanctions-Iranian-network-Syria/stories/201909040207|title= Iran announces the 3rd phase of its nuclear-deal withdrawal amid new U.S. sanctions|access-date=5 September 2019|website=Pittsburgh Post-gazettel}}</ref>

On January 3, 2020, the US assassinated Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, and Iran responded with missile strikes on US. bases. Two days later, Iran's government declared it would no longer observe any JCPOA limits on uranium enrichment capacity, levels, or stockpile size.<ref>[https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2020/01/iran-preserves-options-over-jcpoa Iran preserves options over the nuclear deal], Mark Fitzpatrick and Mahsa Rouhi, IISS, 6 January 2020.</ref> In March 2020, the IAEA said that Iran had nearly tripled its stockpile of enriched uranium since early November 2019.<ref name="IAEA March 2020">{{cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-stockpile-of-enriched-uranium-has-jumped-u-n-atomic-agency-says-11583243861 |title=Iran's Stockpile of Enriched Uranium Has Jumped, U.N. Atomic Agency Says |date=3 March 2020 |last1=Norman |first1=Laurence |last2=Gordon |first2=Michael R. |access-date=3 March 2020 |work=The Wall Street Journal}}</ref> In late June and early July 2020, there were several explosions in Iran, including one that damaged the Natanz enrichment plant (see 2020 Iran explosions). In September 2020, the IAEA reported that Iran had accumulated ten times as much enriched uranium as permitted by the JCPOA.<ref>[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54033441 "Iran's enriched uranium stockpile '10 times limit'"], ''BBC News'', 4 September 2020</ref> On 27 November 2020, Iran's top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in Tehran. Fakhrizadeh was believed to be the primary force behind Iran's covert nuclear program for many decades. The New York Times reported that Israel's Mossad was behind the attack and that Mick Mulroy, the former Deputy Defense Secretary for the Middle East said the death of Fakhirizadeh was "a setback to Iran's nuclear program and he was also a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and that "will magnify Iran's desire to respond by force."<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Fassihi |first1=Farnaz |last2=Sanger |first2=David E. |last3=Schmitt |first3=Eric |last4=Bergman |first4=Ronen |date=27 November 2020 |title=Iran's Top Nuclear Scientist Killed in Ambush, State Media Say |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-scientist-assassinated-mohsen-fakhrizadeh.html |newspaper=The New York Times}}</ref>

Throughout 2021 and 2022, Iran installed cascades of advanced centrifuges (IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6) at Natanz and Fordow, significantly increasing its enrichment output.<ref name="jp160321">{{Cite web |date=17 March 2021 |title=Iran using advanced uranium enrichment at previously exploded facility |url=https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/iran-enriching-uranium-with-new-machine-at-underground-plant-iaea-662235 |website=The Jerusalem Post {{pipe}} JPost.com}}</ref><ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> In February 2021, the IAEA reported that Iran stopped allowing access to data from nuclear sites, as well as plans for future sites.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wintour |first=Patrick |date=2025-06-13 |title=Is Iran as close to building a nuclear weapon as Netanyahu claims? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/13/is-iran-as-close-to-building-a-nuclear-weapon-as-netanyahu-claims |access-date=2025-06-15 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> In April 2021, a sabotage attack struck the Natanz enrichment plant, causing an electrical blackout and damaging centrifuges. Iran responded by further upping enrichment: days later, it began producing 60% enriched uranium, an unprecedented level for Iran, just short of weapons-grade (90% and above). This 60% enrichment took place at Natanz, and later at Fordow as well, yielding a stockpile that as of early 2023 exceeded ~70&nbsp;kg of 60% uranium.<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> If Iran chose to enrich this material to 90%, it would be sufficient for several nuclear warheads. The UK, France, and Germany said that Iran has "no credible civilian use for uranium metal" and called the news "deeply concerning" because of its "potentially grave military implications" (as the use of metallic enriched uranium is for bombs).<ref>{{cite news |last1=Natasha Turak |date=16 February 2021 |title=Iran's uranium metal production is 'most serious nuclear step' to date, but deal can still be saved |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/16/iran-nuclear-deal-uranium-metal-production-called-provocative.html |agency=CNBC}}</ref> On 25 June 2022, in a meeting with the senior diplomat of the EU, Ali Shamkhani, Iran's top security officer, declared that Iran would continue to advance its nuclear program until the West modifies its "illegal behavior".<ref>{{cite news |date=25 June 2022 |title=Iran says its nuclear development to continue until the West changes its "illegal behaviour" |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-its-nuclear-development-continue-until-west-changes-its-illegal-2022-06-25/ |access-date=27 June 2022 |work=Reuters |publisher=Reuters |agency=Reuters}}</ref>

In July 2022, according to an IAEA report seen by Reuters, Iran had increased its uranium enrichment through the use of sophisticated equipment at its underground Fordow plant in a configuration that can more quickly vary between enrichment levels.<ref>{{cite news |title=Exclusive: Iran escalates enrichment with adaptable machines at Fordow, IAEA reports |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-escalates-enrichment-with-adaptable-machines-fordow-iaea-reports-2022-07-09/ |access-date=11 July 2022 |work=Reuters |agency=Reuters |publisher=Reuters |date=9 July 2022}}</ref> In September 2022, Germany, United Kingdom and France expressed doubts over Iran's sincerity in returning to the JCPOA after Tehran insisted that the IAEA close its probes into uranium traces at three undeclared Iranian sites.<ref>{{cite news |title=Iran: Germany, France, UK raise concerns on future of nuclear deal |url=https://www.dw.com/en/iran-germany-france-uk-raise-concerns-on-future-of-nuclear-deal/a-63078519 |access-date=11 September 2022 |agency=Deutsche Welle |date=10 September 2022}}</ref> The IAEA said it could not guarantee the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, stating there had been "no progress in resolving questions about the past presence of nuclear material at undeclared sites".<ref>{{cite news |title=IAEA 'cannot assure' peaceful nature of Iran nuclear programme |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/7/iaea-cannot-assure-peaceful-nature-of-iran-nuclear-programme |access-date=11 September 2022 |agency=Al Jazeera |date=7 September 2022}}</ref> United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres urged Iran to hold "serious dialogue" about nuclear inspections and said IAEA's independence is "essential" in response to Iranian demands to end probes.<ref>{{cite news |title=UN chief urges Iran to hold 'serious dialogue' on nuclear inspections|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-urges-iran-to-hold-serious-dialogue-on-nuclear-inspections/|access-date=15 September 2022 |agency=Times of Israel |date=14 September 2022}}</ref> In February 2023, the IAEA reported having found uranium in Iran enriched to 84%.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://m.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-732083/amp|title=IAEA finds uranium enriched to 84% in Iran, near bomb-grade|website=Jerusalem Post|access-date=21 February 2023|archive-date=21 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230221094946/https://m.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-732083/amp|url-status=dead}}</ref> The Iranian government has claimed that this is an "unintended fluctuation" in the enrichment levels, though the Iranians have been openly enriching uranium to 60% purity, a breach of the 2015 nuclear deal.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-03-01 |title=Iran nuclear: IAEA inspectors find uranium particles enriched to 83.7% |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64810145 |access-date=2023-03-01}}</ref> In 2024, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian expressed interest in reopening discussions with the United States on the nuclear deal.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Toossi |first=Sina |date=2025-03-20 |title=Iran's New Outreach to the West Is Risky |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/27/iran-pezeshkian-united-nations-nuclear-deal-outreach/ |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-09-16 |title=Iran's president insists Tehran wants to negotiate over its nuclear program |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-program-masoud-pezeshkian-cf64d84ddba7f1c439d513f640671ba2 |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref>

In late October 2024, during a series of Israeli airstrikes in Iran carried out in response to a ballistic missile attack earlier that month, Israel reportedly destroyed a top-secret nuclear weapons research facility known as the Taleghan 2 building, located within the Parchin military complex.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ravid |first=Barak |date=2024-11-15 |title=Officials say Israel destroyed active nuclear weapons research facility in Iran strike |url=https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Axios |language=en}}</ref> In November 2024, Iran announced that it would make new advanced centrifuges after IAEA condemned Iran's non-compliance and secrecy.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Tawfeeq |first1=Mohammed |last2=Kourdi |first2=Eyad |last3=Yeung |first3=Jessie |date=2024-11-22 |title=Iran says it is activating new centrifuges after being condemned by UN nuclear watchdog |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/22/world/iran-iaea-centrifuges-censure-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=2024-11-22 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-22 |title=Iran to launch 'advanced centrifuges' in response to IAEA censure |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241122-iran-to-launch-advanced-centrifuges-in-response-to-iaea-censure |access-date=2024-11-22 |website=France 24 |language=en}}</ref>

=== Current status and recent escalations (2025–present) === {{main|2025–2026 Iran–United States negotiations|Twelve-Day War|List of airstrikes during the Twelve-Day War|American strikes on Iranian nuclear sites|l4 = Operation Midnight Hammer}}

In January 2025, the exiled opposition group NCRI alleged that Iran is developing long-range missile technology under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with some designs based on North Korean models. The NCRI said that these missiles, such as the Ghaem-100 and Simorgh, could carry nuclear warheads and reach targets as far as {{convert|3,000|km}} away, including parts of Europe.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Barnes |first=Joe |date=2025-01-31 |title=Iran 'secretly building nuclear missiles that can hit Europe' |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/01/31/iran-nuclear-warhead-europe-revolutionary-guard-north-korea/ |access-date=2025-04-28 |work=The Telegraph |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | last=Hakamian | first=Mahmoud | title=NCRI Report: Iran's Covert Nuclear Warhead Program and Missile Sites Exposed | website=NCRI | date=2025-02-01 | url=https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/nuclear/ncri-report-irans-covert-nuclear-warhead-program-and-missile-sites-exposed/ | access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref> These allegations have not been independently confirmed, but given that several past NCRI claims were later verified by inspectors, they warrant investigation.<ref>{{cite web | author=The DEFCON Warning System | title=Does Iran Already Have a Nuclear Weapon? Exploring Experts' Views and Clues | website=The DEFCON Warning System Shop | date=2025-06-25 | url=https://defconwarningsystem.com/2025/06/25/iran-nuclear-weapon-analysis-2025/ | access-date=2025-08-23}}</ref>

In March 2025, US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Ali Khamenei seeking to reopen negotiations.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Fassihi |first2=Farnaz |last3=Broadwater |first3=Luke |date=2025-03-08 |title=Trump Offers to Reopen Nuclear Talks in a Letter to Iran's Supreme Leader |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-talks.html |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-03-07 |title=Trump sends letter to Iran's supreme leader amid tensions over country's nuclear program |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-sends-letter-to-irans-supreme-leader-amid-tensions-over-countrys-nuclear-program |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=PBS News |language=en-us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-03-07 |title=Trump wrote to Iran's leader about that country's nuclear program and expects results 'very soon' |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-trump-letter-khamenei-f78aeb869d146978b6d377184e236ef9 |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> Ayatollah Ali Khamenei later said, "Some bullying governments insist on negotiations not to resolve issues but to impose their own expectations," which was seen as in response to the letter.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sampson |first=Eve |date=2025-03-08 |title=Iran's Leader Rebuffs Trump's Outreach Over Its Nuclear Program |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-leader-response.html |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Bigg |first=Matthew Mpoke |date=2025-03-10 |title=Iran Signals Openness to Limited Nuclear Talks With U.S. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/10/world/europe/iran-nuclear-trump-us.html |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Garrett |first=Luke |date=2025-03-09 |title=Trump rebuffed by Iran's leader after sending letter calling for nuclear negotiation |url=https://www.npr.org/2025/03/09/g-s1-52882/trump-iran-nuclear |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=NPR |language=en}}</ref>

In late March 2025, Khamenei's top advisor Ali Larijani said Iran would have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States, Israel or its allies.<ref name="fr24-nukes-01apr25">{{cite news |title=Iran will have 'no choice' but to get nukes if attacked, says Khamenei adviser |url=https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20250401-iran-will-have-no-choice-but-to-get-nukes-if-attacked-khamenei-adviser-usa-trump-nuclear-weapons-deal-bombing-threats |access-date=22 June 2025 |work=France 24 |date=1 April 2025 |language=en}}</ref>

In April 2025, Trump revealed that Iran had decided to undertake talks with the United States for an agreement over its nuclear program.<ref>[https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-is-giving-talks-with-us-genuine-chance-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-says-2025-04-11/ Iran says it will give US talks about nuclear plans a 'genuine chance'], Nayera Abdallah, Reuters, 11 April 2025.</ref> On 12 April, both countries held their first high-level meeting in Oman,<ref>{{Cite web |date=12 April 2025 |title=US and Iran hold 'constructive' first round of nuclear talks |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g2eggzvjgo |access-date=19 April 2025 |website=BBC |language=en}}</ref> followed by a second meeting on 19 April in Italy.<ref>{{Cite web |date=19 April 2025 |title=Iran, US conclude second round of high-stakes nuclear talks in Rome |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250419-iran-us-to-hold-second-round-of-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-rome |access-date=19 April 2025 |website=France 24 |language=en}}</ref> On May 16, Trump sent Iran an offer and said they have to move quickly or else bad things would happen.<ref>{{Cite web |date=May 16, 2025 |title=Trump administration live updates: President says U.S. offered a nuclear proposal to Iran and inks AI deal with UAE |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/live-blog/trump-administration-live-updates-president-trump-set-end-mideast-trip-rcna206143 |website=NBC News}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Miller |first1=Zeke |last2=Gambrell |first2=Jon |date=2025-05-16 |title=Trump says Iran has a proposal from the US on its rapidly advancing nuclear program |url=https://www.ksnt.com/news/international/ap-trump-says-iran-has-a-proposal-from-the-us-on-its-rapidly-advancing-nuclear-program/ |website=KSNT}}</ref> On May 17, Khamenei condemned Trump, saying that he lied about wanting peace and that he was not worth responding to, calling the US demands "outrageous nonsense".<ref>{{cite web |date=May 20, 2025 |title=Iran's Khamenei slams 'outrageous' US demands in nuclear talks |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-reviewing-proposal-5th-round-nuclear-talks-2025-05-20/ |website=Reuters}}</ref> Khamenei also reiterated that Israel is a "cancerous tumour" that must be uprooted.<ref>{{cite news |title=Khamenei: Trump lied when he said he wants peace; Israel 'cancerous tumor' in region |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/khamenei-trump-lied-when-he-said-he-wants-peace-israel-cancerous-tumor-in-region/ |access-date=2025-05-20 |website=The Times of Israel |language=en-US |agency=Reuters |issn=0040-7909}}</ref>

On May 31, 2025, IAEA reported that Iran had sharply increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity, just below weapons-grade, reaching over 408 kilograms, a nearly 50% rise since February.<ref name="apnews20250612">{{Cite web |date=2025-06-12 |title=UN nuclear watchdog board censures Iran, which retaliates by announcing a new enrichment site |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-sanctions-728b811da537abe942682e13a82ff8bd |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> The agency warned that this amount is enough for multiple nuclear weapons if further enriched. It also noted that Iran remains the only non-nuclear-weapon state to produce such material, calling the situation a "serious concern".<ref name="apnews20250612" /> In June 2025, the NCRI said Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons through a new program called the "Kavir Plan". According to the NCRI, the new project involves six sites in Semnan province working on warheads and related technology, succeeding the previous AMAD Project.<ref>{{cite web |title=Iran Nuclear Espionage Battle Intensifies with New Leak Claims |date=10 June 2025 |url=https://www.newsweek.com/iran-nuclear-espionage-battle-intensifies-new-leak-claims-2083594 |publisher=Newsweek}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Exiled opposition group says Iran hid nuclear weapons hub in desert |date=10 June 2025 |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/202506102992 |publisher=Iran International}}</ref>

On June 10, Trump stated that Iran was becoming "much more aggressive" in the negotiations.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-10 |title=Donald Trump says Iran is becoming more aggressive in nuclear talks |url=https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-857235 |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=The Jerusalem Post |language=en}}</ref> On 11 June, the Iranian regime threatened US bases in the Middle East, with Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh stating, "If a conflict is imposed on us... all US bases are within our reach, and we will boldly target them in host countries."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-06-11 |title=Iran threatens to strike US bases in region if military conflict arises |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-threatens-us-bases-region-if-military-conflict-arises-2025-06-11/ |access-date=2025-06-11 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> The US embassy in Iraq evacuated all personnel.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/11/iran-threatens-to-strike-us-bases-if-conflict-erupts-over-nuclear-programme | title=Iran threatens to strike US bases if conflict erupts over nuclear programme | website=Al Jazeera English | date=11 June 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-he-is-less-confident-about-iran-nuclear-deal-2025-06-11/ | title=Trump says he's less confident about nuclear deal with Iran | work=Reuters | date=11 June 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.newsweek.com/iraq-us-embassy-evacuated-iran-nuclear-talks-2084155 | title=US embassy in Middle East prepares to evacuate after warning from Iran | website=Newsweek | date=11 June 2025 }}</ref> The Iran-backed Yemen-based Houthi movement threatened to attack the United States if a strike on Iran were to occur.<ref>{{Cite news | title=U.S. shrinks presence in Middle East amid fears of Israeli strike on Iran | newspaper=The Washington Post | url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/11/us-israel-iran-attack-fears/ | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250611220030/https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/11/us-israel-iran-attack-fears/ | access-date=2025-06-14 | archive-date=2025-06-11}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-houthis-warn-us-israel-war-if-iran-attacked-2084306 | title=Exclusive: Houthis Warn US and Israel of 'War' If Iran Attacked | website=Newsweek | date=11 June 2025 }}</ref> CENTCOM presented a wide range of military options for an attack on Iran.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5342574-centcom-commander-gave-trump-wide-range-of-military-options-if-iran-talks-fail/amp/ | title=CENTCOM Commander gave Trump 'wide range' of military options if Iran talks fail | date=10 June 2025 }}</ref> UK issued threat advisory for ships on Arabian Gulf.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-israel-evacuations/ | title=Update: US warnings, evacuations came only a day before attacks | website=Responsible Statecraft }}</ref> US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told Congress that Iran was attempting a nuclear breakout.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/06/hegseth-tells-congress-indications-iran-moving-toward-nuclear-weapon | title=Hegseth tells Congress 'indications' Iran moving toward nuclear weapon | website=AL-Monitor: The Middle East's leading independent news source since 2012 }}</ref>

On 12 June 2025, IAEA found Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations for the first time in 20 years.<ref name="euronews20250612">{{Cite web |title=UN nuclear watchdog finds Iran in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations |url=https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/12/un-nuclear-watchdog-finds-iran-in-non-compliance-with-nuclear-obligations |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Euro News |date=12 June 2025 }}</ref> Iran retaliated by announcing it would launch a new enrichment site and install advanced centrifuges.<ref name="cnn20250612">{{Cite web |last1=Salem |first1=Mostafa |last2=Pleitgen |first2=Frederik |date=2025-06-12 |title=Iran threatens nuclear escalation after UN watchdog board finds it in breach of obligations |url=https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/12/middleeast/iran-threatens-nuclear-escalation-iaea-intl |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref>

In the early hours of June 13, Israel initiated Operation Rising Lion, a large‑scale aerial assault targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, missile factories, military sites, and commanders across cities including Tehran and Natanz, marking the start of what would come to be known as the Twelve-Day War of 13 to 24 June 2025.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-06-13 |title=Israel hits Iran nuclear facilities, missile factories; Tehran launches drones |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-it-strikes-iran-amid-nuclear-tensions-2025-06-13/?utm_ |work=Reuters}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-13 |title=Israel attacks Iran's nuclear and missile sites and kills top military officials |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-explosions-israel-tehran-00234a06e5128a8aceb406b140297299 |access-date=2025-06-13 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> Iranian forces said they had shot down an Israeli drone.<ref name=reuters-damage-13jun25>{{cite news |last1=Brunnstrom |first1=David |last2=Martina |first2=Michael |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/damage-iranian-nuclear-sites-so-far-appears-limited-experts-say-2025-06-13/ |title=Damage to Iranian nuclear sites so far appears limited, experts say |access-date=2025-06-23 |publisher=Reuters |date=2025-06-14}}</ref>

On 21 June, the US bombed the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology/Research Center in an operation code named Operation Midnight Hammer.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Nagourney |first1=Eric |last2=Haberman |first2=Maggie |date=2025-06-21 |title=U.S. Enters War With Iran, Striking Fordo Nuclear Site: Live Updates |url=https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/21/world/iran-israel-trump |access-date=2025-06-22 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In an address from the White House, Trump claimed responsibility for the destruction of the Fordow facility, stating "Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated."<ref name="abc-obliterated-22jun25">{{cite news |last1=Hair |first1=Jonathan |last2=Palmer |first2=Alex |last3=Doman |first3=Mark |last4=Harrison |first4=Dan |title=Inside the Iranian nuclear bunker Trump claims to have 'obliterated' |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-06-22/inside-iran-fordow-nuclear-bunker-bombed-by-us/105446636 |access-date=2025-06-22 |work=ABC NEWS Verify and Digital Story Innovations |publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation |date=2025-06-22 |language=en-AU}}</ref>

In early July 2025, Iran suspended co-operation with the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).<ref name="abc-no-iaea-2jul25">{{cite news |title=Iran suspends cooperation with UN nuclear watchdog IAEA |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-07-03/iran-suspends-cooperation-with-nuclear-watchdog/105488370 |access-date=2025-07-05 |work=ABC News |publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation |date=2025-07-02 |language=en-AU}}</ref> and all IAEA inspectors left Iran by July 4.<ref name="reuter-insp-out-5jul25">{{cite news |last1=Murphy |first1=Francois |title=IAEA pulls inspectors from Iran as standoff over access drags on |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-pulls-inspectors-iran-standoff-over-access-drags-2025-07-04/ |access-date=2025-07-05 |work=Reuters |date=2025-07-05 }}</ref>

In August 2025, Iran and European nations reached an agreement to recommence discussions focused on the complete restoration of Tehran's nuclear enrichment operations.

France, Britain, and Germany have indicated that they may reinstate UN sanctions on Iran through a "quick return" mechanism should Tehran fail to engage in negotiations.<ref>{{cite web |title=Iran will stand up to US demands to be 'obedient', says Khamenei |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/24/iran-will-not-be-obedient-to-us-nuclear-demands-says-khamenei |website=aljazeera}}</ref>

On August 28, 2025, E3 members, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, initiated the process of the snapback mechanism, with the prospect of freezing Iranian overseas assets, blocking arms deals with Iran, imposing penal action against development of Iran's ballistic missile program and further restricting Iran's military and nuclear activities.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=2025-08-28 |title=European nations start process to impose 'snapback' sanctions on Iran |url=https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/28/european-nations-start-process-to-impose-snapback-sanctions-on-iran-over-nuclear-programme |access-date=2025-08-31 |website=euronews |language=en}}</ref> In a letter addressed to the president of the UN Security Council, the foreign ministers of the E3 stated that since 2019, Iran had "increasingly and deliberately ceased performing its JCPOA commitments", including "the accumulation of a highly enriched uranium stockpile which lacks any credible civilian justification and is unprecedented for a state without a nuclear weapons program". The letter detailed additional Iranian violations of the agreement despite the fact that the E3 "have consistently upheld their agreements under the terms of the JCPOA".<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |title=Iran nuclear: E3 foreign ministers' letter announcing triggering of snapback, 28 August 2025 |url=https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/iran-nuclear-e3-foreign-ministers-letter-announcing-triggering-of-snapback-28-august-2025 |access-date=2025-08-31 |website=GOV.UK |language=en}}</ref> The activation opened a 30-day window, intended to reengage Iran, "whose refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) inspectors started the crisis", in diplomatic negotiations before full restoration of sanctions. According to Euronews, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that it was "unjustified, illegal, and lacking any legal basis" and promised that "The Islamic Republic of Iran will respond appropriately".<ref name=":4"/>

In September 2025, Iran signed a $25 billion agreement with Russia to build four nuclear reactors in Sirik in Iran. The Generation III reactors are expected to produce 5 GW of electricity. Iran, which suffers power shortages at times of high demand, currently has one operating nuclear power plant, in Bushehr. Also built by Russia, it has a capacity of 1 GW.<ref>{{cite web | title=Iran and Russia sign $25bn nuclear plant deal | website=Al Jazeera | date=2025-09-26 | url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/26/iran-and-russia-sign-25bn-nuclear-plant-deal | access-date=2025-09-27}}</ref> On 28 September, UN sanctions were officially reimposed on Iran.<ref>{{#invoke:Cite|news|title=European Powers Warn Iran Against 'Escalatory' Acts As Snapback Sanctions Take Force|url= https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-snapback-sanctions-european-e3-un-nuclear/33543002.html |date=26 September 2025|work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty}}</ref>

In October 2025, former defence minister and current political adviser to the Supreme Leader, Ali Shamkhani, stated "If I returned to the defence portfolio, I would move toward building an atomic bomb",<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-10-13 |title=Why Did Shamkhani Speak of Building an Atomic Bomb? |url=https://wanaen.com/why-did-shamkhani-speak-of-building-an-atomic-bomb/ |access-date=2025-10-15 |website=WANA |language=en-US}}</ref> and declared that if he could return to the 1990s, "we would definitely build the atomic bomb".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-10-12 |title=Shamkhani: "If We Returned To 1990s, We Would Definitely Build Nukes" - Iran Front Page |url=https://ifpnews.com/shamkhani-if-we-returned-to-1990s-we-would-definitely-build-nukes/ |access-date=2025-10-15 |website=ifpnews.com |language=en-US}}</ref>

On 3 March 2026, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that while recent bombings had failed to destroy the Natanz nuclear facility, the significant damage which had been done to its entrance buildings had now made it inaccessible.<ref name=natanzinaccessible />

=== Authorisation of miniaturised nuclear warhead development === According to the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), sources in Tehran reported that in October 2025, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had authorised the development of miniaturised nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles, despite denials issued at earlier dates.<ref name=":04">{{Cite web |title=Crisis to Watch in 2026: Iran |url=https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/crisis-to-watch-in-2026-iran-226527 |access-date=2025-12-26 |website=ISPI |language=en-US}}</ref> The report stated that although such warheads would require uranium enriched to 90%, this could be achieved in a matter of weeks if Iran were to process its existing stockpile of 441&nbsp;kg of 60% uranium with its advanced IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges;<ref name=":04" /> and circulated accounts indicate the existence of an ultra-secret enrichment program at one of Iran's covert nuclear sites, to which the IAEA has not been given access.<ref name=":04" />

In February 2025, ''The New York Times'' reported that a "secret team" of Iranian engineers and scientists were seeking a more efficient process of development for nuclear weapons which would allow them to produce them "in a matter of months".<ref name=":12">{{Cite news |date=2025-02-03 |title=Iran Is Developing Plans for Faster, Cruder Weapon, U.S. Concludes |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20251027043757/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html |archive-date=2025-10-27 |access-date=2025-12-26 |language=en}}</ref> However, according to a US official, the methods Iran had been exploring at the time could produce a nuclear weapon, though not one which could be delivered by a ballistic missile.<ref name=":12" />

== Main facilities == {{Main|Nuclear facilities in Iran}}

=== Natanz === {{Main|Natanz Nuclear Facility}}

Natanz, located about {{convert|220|km}} south-east of Tehran, is Iran's main uranium enrichment site.<ref name="apnews20250522">{{Cite web |date=2025-05-22 |title=Iran has several major nuclear program sites, now the subject of negotiations with the US |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-sites-explained-us-negotiations-cb602a7b53f9314dfba7e35a889fc086 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> The facility includes an underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) housing large cascades of gas centrifuges, as well as a smaller Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) above the ground. Iran has installed thousands of first-generation ''IR-1'' centrifuges and more advanced models (''IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6'') here. {{As of|2025}}, Natanz was enriching uranium up to 60% {{chem|Uranium|235}}, a level approaching weapons-grade.<ref name="reuters20241128">{{Cite news |last=Murphy |first=Francois |date=2024-11-28 |title=Iran plans new uranium-enrichment expansion, IAEA report says |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-plans-uranium-enrichment-expansion-natanz-fordow-iaea-report-says-2024-11-28/ |access-date=2025-06-12 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref>

In the past, the site saw multiple sabotage attacks, including the US-Israeli Stuxnet cyberattack, and explosions in 2020 and 2021, both attributed to Israel.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> On 13 June 2025, the site was struck by Israeli airstrikes during the opening stages of the Twelve-Day War (Operation Rising Lion).<ref>{{Cite web |title=IAEA Says Natanz Is Among Iranian Sites That Were Hit |url=https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-strike-conflict/card/iaea-says-natanz-is-among-iranian-sites-that-were-hit-ZlgPnqnyEHkctTYvlFI9 |access-date=2025-06-13 |website=WSJ |language=en-US}}</ref> On 22 June 2025, the facility was bombed by the United States military. On 2 March 2026, the facility was again bombed by the United States, with its entrance buildings suffering significant damage.<ref name=natanzinaccessible>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iaea-confirms-entrances-irans-natanz-enrichment-plant-were-bombed-2026-03-03/|title=IAEA confirms entrances to Iran's Natanz enrichment plant were bombed|publisher=Reuters|date=3 March 2026|access-date=3 March 2026}}</ref> While the facility, which is based underground, remains intact, the significant damage to the entrance buildings which was sustained in these bombings also made it now no longer able to be accessible.<ref name=natanzinaccessible /> On 21 March 2026, the U.S. carried out strikes again at Natanz.<ref>{{Cite news |title=US strikes Iran’s Natanz nuclear site with bunker-buster bombs|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/03/21/us-strikes-irans-natanz-nuclear-site-bunker-buster-bombs/ |access-date=23 March 2026 |work=The Telegraph |date=21 March 2026 |language=en}}</ref>

==== Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La ("Pickaxe Mountain") ==== Another site excavated by Iran is described as a future centrifuge assembly facility deep beneath ''Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā'' ("Pickaxe Mountain"), near the Natanz nuclear complex. The installation, which has been under construction, has been reinforced and gradually expanded since around 2021.<ref name="apnews20250522" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last=Madadi |first=Afshin |date=2025-06-25 |title=Pickaxe mountain: Iran's new hidden nuclear fortress |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/06/25/pickaxe-mountain-iran-hidden-nuclear-fortress-trump-bomb/ |access-date=2025-06-30 |work=The Daily Telegraph |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235}}</ref>

According to an analysis of satellite images by the Washington Post, after the American strikes on June 22, Iran began accelerating construction on the underground site of Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā tunneled into the Zagros mountain range approximately one mile (1.5&nbsp;km) to the south of the Natanz nuclear facility.<ref name=":02">{{Cite news |date=2025-09-26 |title=After U.S. strikes, Iran increases work at mysterious underground site |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/09/26/iran-underground-nuclear-us/ |access-date=2025-09-28 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> Although work on the site began in 2020, international inspectors were never given access,<ref name=":02" /> and when IAEA director Rafael Grossi enquired about the site, he was answered with "It's none of your business".<ref name=":1" /> According to analysts who monitor the site's development, its depth may exceed that of the Natanz Site, at {{convert|260|–|330|feet}},<ref name=":02" /> significantly reducing the effect of non-nuclear bunker-buster bombs, such as those dropped on Fordow.<ref name=":1" /> The mountain above the site is nearly 650&nbsp;metres taller than that over Fordow,<ref name=":1" /> providing more protection and larger chambers for nuclear operations,<ref name=":1" /> and it is potentially intended for the secure storage of Iran's stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium or for covert uranium enrichment.<ref name=":02" /> The site's footprint aboveground covers an area of approximately one square mile, and features two pairs of entrance tunnels, one to the east and one to the west.<ref name=":02" /> Satellite images reveal major changes made to the site between 30 June and 18 September: construction of a {{convert|4000|foot|adj=on}} security wall which completed the enclosure, reinforcement of one of the tunnel entrances, increased piles of excavated spoil indicating underground expansion, as well as the grading of the road parallel to the perimeter.<ref name=":02" />

=== Fordow === {{Main|Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant}}

Fordow (near the city of Qom, approximately 100&nbsp;km southwest of Tehran) is an underground enrichment site built inside a mountain.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Originally designed to host about 3,000 centrifuges, Fordow was revealed in 2009 and appears engineered to withstand airstrikes.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> It was re-purposed under the 2015 nuclear deal as a research facility with no enrichment, but Iran resumed enrichment at Fordow after 2019. By 2025, Fordow was enriching uranium up to 60% U-235 as well, deploying advanced IR-6 centrifuges.<ref name="reuters20241128" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=UN nuclear watchdog board finds Iran in breach of non-proliferation duties |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/12/un-nuclear-watchdog-says-iran-non-compliant-of-nuclear-safeguards |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> Fordow's smaller size and heavy fortification make it a particular proliferation concern. The IAEA still inspects Fordow, but Iran's suspension of the Additional Protocol means inspectors no longer have daily access.<ref name="armscontrolfebruary2025">{{Cite web |title=The Status of Iran's Nuclear Program {{!}} Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250601063215/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1 |archive-date=2025-06-01 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=www.armscontrol.org |language=en}}</ref> In June 2025, Iran revealed plans to install advanced centrifuges at the facility.<ref name="apnews20250612" /> However, following the June 2025 United States airstrikes, Institute for Science and International Security analysts David Albright and Spencer Faragrasso noted that because a penetration hole found above the facility's enrichment hall on satellite images indicated that Fordow was now "likely destroyed and knocked out of operation."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities#:~:text=The%20site%20was%20attacked%20again,Kolang%20Gaz%20La.|title=Post-Attack Assessment of the First 12 Days of Israeli and U.S. Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities|first1=David|last1=Albright|first2=Spencer|last2=Faragasso|publisher=Institute for Science and International Security|date=June 24, 2025|access-date=March 3, 2026}}</ref> In September 2025, IAEA head Rafael Grossi confirmed that the Fordow facility had in fact sustained significant damage in the June 2025 U.S. strike, including total destruction of "almost all" of the site's "sensitive equipment."<ref>{{Cite web |last=hejazi |date=2025-09-26 |title=Grossi: “Almost all sensitive equipment” at Fordow nuclear site destroyed |url=https://wanaen.com/grossi-almost-all-sensitive-equipment-at-fordow-nuclear-site-destroyed/ |access-date=2025-03-04 |website=WANA |language=en-US}}</ref>

=== Bushehr === {{Main|Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant}}

Bushehr is Iran's only commercial nuclear power station, situated on the Persian Gulf coast in southern Iran.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> The site's first unit, a 1000 MWe pressurized water reactor (VVER-1000) built with Russian assistance, began operation in 2011–2013. Russia supplies the enriched fuel for Bushehr-1 and removes the spent fuel, an arrangement that minimizes proliferation risk.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Iran is constructing two additional VVER-1000 reactors at Bushehr with Russian collaboration, slated to come online in the late 2020s.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Bushehr is under full IAEA safeguards. Its operation is closely monitored by the Agency, and Iran, like any NPT party, must report and permit inspection of the reactor and its fuel.<ref name="apnews20250522" />

=== Arak === {{Main|IR-40}}

[[File:Arak_Heavy_Water4.JPG|thumb|Arak IR-40 complex, a heavy water reactor and production plant]] Arak, about 250&nbsp;km southwest of Tehran, is the site of Iran's IR-40 heavy water reactor and associated heavy water production plant.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> The 40 MW (thermal) reactor, still under construction, is designed to use natural uranium fuel and heavy water moderation, which would produce plutonium as a byproduct in the spent fuel.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> In its original configuration, the Arak reactor could have yielded enough plutonium for roughly 1–2 nuclear weapons per year if Iran built a reprocessing facility (which it does not have).<ref name="world-nuclear">{{Cite web |title=Nuclear Power in Iran - World Nuclear Association |url=https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/iran |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=world-nuclear.org}}</ref> Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to halt work on Arak and redesign the reactor to a smaller, proliferation-resistant version. In January 2016, Iran removed and filled Arak's original reactor core with concrete, disabling it.<ref name="world-nuclear" /> As of mid-2025, Iran, with international input, has been modifying the reactor design to limit its plutonium output, and the reactor has not yet become operational.<ref name="armscontrolfebruary2025" /> A heavy water production plant at the Arak site continues to operate (25 tons/year capacity), supplying heavy water for the reactor and medical research; Iran's heavy water stockpile is under IAEA monitoring per its safeguards commitments.<ref name="world-nuclear" /> In July 2025, the site was hit in an Israeli Defense Forces air strike which ensured that Arak could not again be usable for nuclear development.<ref name="hammadi2025"> {{cite journal | author = Hammadi, Oday A. | issn = 3006-6042 | issue = special | journal = Iraqi Journal of Materials | title = Challenges of Hazardous and Harmful Materials to Release from Destroyed Iran Nuclear Reactors and to Reach Iraqi Cities | volume = 4 | page = 6 | year = 2025}}</ref>

=== Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center === {{Main|Isfahan Nuclear Technology/Research Center}}

Isfahan, located ~350&nbsp;km south of Tehran, is another major hub of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and research activities. The site hosts the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) where yellowcake (uranium ore concentrate) is converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) gas – the feedstock for enrichment.<ref name="world-nuclear" /> The UCF at Isfahan has produced hundreds of tons of UF₆ for Natanz and Fordow.<ref name="world-nuclear" /> Isfahan also houses a Fuel Fabrication Plant for producing nuclear fuel (e.g. fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor and prototype fuel for Arak).<ref name="world-nuclear" /> In addition, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center includes laboratories and several small research reactors, supplied by China, used for research and isotope production.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> The facility sustained significant damage, in two separate bombings which were carried out in June 2025, first carried out by Israel on 13 June 2025, which damaged or destroyed Isfahan's Uranium Conversion facility and also damaged both the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant and a fourth critical building,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Institute for the Study of War |url=http://dev-isw.bivings.com/ |access-date=2025-03-03 |website=Institute for the Study of War |language=en |archive-date=2022-03-25 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220325065358/https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-15 |title=Satellite imagery reveals damage to key Iran nuclear sites |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7808xvv737o |access-date=2026-03-03 |website=www.bbc.com |language=en-GB}}</ref> and then by the United States on 22 June 2025.<ref name="Times-20252">{{Cite news |last=Times |first=The New York |date=2025-06-13 |title=The U.S. Enters Israel's War Against Iran: What to Know |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/12/world/middleeast/israel-iran-strikes.html |access-date=2025-03-03 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Magid |first1=Jacob |last2=Agencies |title=US bombs Fordo, 2 other nuclear facilities, joining Israel's war in Iran |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-strikes-irans-elusive-fordo-facility-joining-israels-fight-against-nuclear-program/ |access-date=2025-03-03 |website=The Times of Israel |language=en-US |issn=0040-7909}}</ref>

=== Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) === Located in Tehran at the headquarters of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Tehran Research Reactor is a 5 MW pool-type research reactor.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> It was provided by the United States in 1967 as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program.<ref name="apnews20250522" /> Originally fueled with highly enriched uranium (HEU), the TRR was converted in 1987 to use 19.75% enriched uranium (LEU).<ref name="apnews20250522" /> The TRR is used to produce medical isotopes (such as molybdenum-99) and for scientific research. Its need for 20% LEU fuel became a point of contention when Iran's external fuel supply ran low in 2009, prompting the decision to enrich uranium to 20%.<ref name="world-nuclear" />

=== Other sites === According to a May 2025 report by IAEA, several undeclared locations in Iran remain at the center of its investigation into uranium traces from Iran's past nuclear activities. These include Turquzabad, first identified publicly in 2018 when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed it was a secret nuclear warehouse. Inspectors later detected undeclared man-made uranium particles there in 2019.<ref name="apnews20250531">{{Cite web |date=2025-05-31 |title=Iran has amassed even more near weapons-grade uranium, UN watchdog says |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> Two other sites, Varamin and Marivan, also yielded undeclared man-made uranium particles when IAEA inspectors were granted access in 2020.<ref name="apnews20250531" /> A fourth site, Lavisan-Shian, has been under scrutiny as well, though inspectors were never able to visit it because it was demolished after 2003.<ref name="apnews20250531" /> IAEA concluded that these locations, and possibly others too, were part of an undeclared nuclear program conducted by Iran up until the early 2000s.<ref name="apnews20250531" /> In June 2025, concerning the same report,<ref>{{cite web |title=Board of Governors GOV/2025/25 Date: 31 May 2025 Original: English |url=https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-25.pdf |website=IAEA |access-date=25 May 2026}}</ref> China, Russia, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua echoed Iran's perspective of "UNSC Resolution 2231 remain[ing] valid and [it having to] be implemented by all countries" with "[t]he unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA [being] the primary cause of the [then] current situation." Concerning the specifics of concerns over the uranium particles detected at three sites, the countries believed in the ability of the organization to "verify the non-diversion of nuclear material" arising from pre-2003 nuclear safeguards issues refuted in an IAEA December 2015 resolution, and discounted the report due to not being mandated by IAEA director Rafael Grossi and instead by a November 2024 "politically-motivated, non-consensus resolution".<ref>{{cite news |title=Joint Statement by Six Countries in Support of Iran’s Position at the IAEA Board of Governors |url=https://wanaen.com/joint-statement-by-six-countries-in-support-of-irans-position-at-the-iaea-board-of-governors/ |access-date=25 May 2026 |work=WANA News Agency |date=11 June 2025}}</ref>

On 12 June 2025, a day before the start of the Twelve-Day War, Iran announced the activation of a third main uranium enrichment site with active centrifuges following the IAEA's first formal censure of Iran in two decades. While the location has not been disclosed, Iranian officials described it as "secure and invulnerable".<ref name="apnews20250612" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=12 June 2025 |title=Iran announces a new nuclear enrichment site after UN watchdog censure |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-sanctions-728b811da537abe942682e13a82ff8bd |website=AP News}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Norman |first=Laurence |title=Iran Says It Will Open Secret New Enrichment Site After U.N. Atomic Agency Censure |url=https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-it-will-scale-up-nuclear-work-after-u-n-atomic-agency-vote-66dc9bcb |website=WSJ |date=12 June 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=12 June 2025 |title=Iran says it will create a new uranium enrichment facility after a vote at the IAEA |url=https://www.npr.org/2025/06/12/nx-s1-5431395/iran-nuclear-enrichment-un-compliance |work=NPR}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Salem |first1=Mostafa |last2=Pleitgen |first2=Frederik |date=12 June 2025 |title=Iran threatens nuclear escalation after UN watchdog board finds it in breach of obligations |url=https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/12/middleeast/iran-threatens-nuclear-escalation-iaea-intl |website=CNN}}</ref><ref name="nuclearweapon">{{Cite news |last=Barnes |first=Julian E. |date=22 June 2025 |title=After U.S. Strikes, Iran May Be Determined to Build a Nuclear Weapon |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250622175638/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/22/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html |archive-date=22 June 2025 |access-date=24 June 2025 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In response to Grossi's 19 June 2025 remark "[w]e did not have any evidence of a systematic effort [by Iran] to move into a nuclear weapon" in regard to concerns raised by the May 2025 report, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei decried its timing, linking the "absolutely biased report" with Israel's subsequent attacks against "peaceful nuclear facilities [and] innocent civilians".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kestler-D'Amours |first1=Alastair McCready,Stephen Quillen,Urooba Jamal,Nils Adler,Ali Harb,Jillian |title=Updates: Trump to decide whether US to attack Iran ‘within two weeks’ |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/6/19/live-israel-attacks-iran-security-agency-trump-mulls-joining-conflict?update=3785702 |access-date=25 May 2026 |work=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> Iran has vowed to continue enriching uranium following the Twelve-Day War.<ref>{{Cite web |date=3 July 2025 |title=Iran won't retaliate against U.S. — but will keep enriching uranium, top official says |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-nuclear-trump-talks-uranium-strikes-rcna216689 |website=www.nbcnews.com}}</ref>

== Costs ==

=== Direct financial expenditures === Estimating the direct costs of Iran's nuclear program is complicated by secrecy, but available assessments suggest significant expenditures. {| class="wikitable" |+ !Category !Estimated cost !{{Reference column heading}} |- |Bushehr nuclear plant |>$10 billion (vs $2B official) |<ref name="iranfocus20250415">{{Cite web |last=Rajabi |first=Sia |date=2025-04-15 |title=Iran's Nuclear Power Dream: From Fantasy to Reality |url=https://iranfocus.com/nuclear/53948-irans-nuclear-power-dream-from-fantasy-to-reality/ |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=Iran Focus |language=en-US}}</ref> |- |Broader nuclear infrastructure |>$100 billion |<ref name="iranfocus20250415" /> |- |Eurodif take (1970s) |$1 billion |<ref name="iranwatch20231219" /> |- |Hormozgan plant (planned) |>$20 billion |<ref name="iaea20250531">{{Cite web |date=31 May 2025 |title=Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) |url=https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf}}</ref> |- |Annual operational costs |$250–$300 million |<ref name="iaea20250531" /><ref name="carnegieendowment20130425">{{Cite web |title=Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: Costs, Risks, and Motivations |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/events/2013/04/irans-nuclear-ambitions-costs-risks-and-motivations?lang=en |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |language=en}}</ref> |- |Total spending estimate |>$30 billion |<ref name="carnegieendowment20130425" /> |}

=== Indirect economic burdens and opportunity costs === The sanctions and lost economic opportunities far outweigh direct spending: {| class="wikitable" |+ !Cost area !Estimated value !{{Reference column heading}} |- |Lost economic opportunity |$2–3 trillion |<ref name="iranfocus20250415" /> |- |Lost oil revenues |>$450 billion |<ref name="iaea20250531" /> |- |Lost foreign investment |>$100 billion |<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-13 |title=How the militaries of Israel and Iran compare |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-militaries-mideast-us-613e71aff67f6e1701981583bf699bc6 |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> |- |Rial devaluation (2014–2025) |~95% |<ref>{{Cite web |title=How Much The Nuclear Program Has Impoverished Iran |date=5 December 2021 |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/20211205244208}}</ref> |- |Energy renovation cost (alternative) |~$54 billion |<ref name="gulfif20210425">{{Cite web |last=Al Qaed |first=Anas |date=2021-04-25 |title=Iran's Nuclear Program Might Not Be Worth the Cost |url=https://gulfif.org/irans-nuclear-program-might-not-be-worth-the-cost/ |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=Gulf International Forum |language=en}}</ref> |}

Despite the vast reserves of natural gas and abundant solar and renewable energy potential, Iran continues to invest in extremely high-cost nuclear projects. Former Foreign Minister Zarif admitted that financial expenditures spent on nuclear projects could have upgraded the entire energy sector over 20 times.<ref name="gulfif20210425" />

== Analysis == {{See also|Views on the nuclear program of Iran}}

Iran's nuclear program is commonly viewed as serving several purposes, according to widely cited analyses.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" /> In September 2025, the GAMAAN Institute conducted a survey involving around 30,000 Iranians over the age of 15. The results indicated that 47% agreed that "to prevent another war, the Islamic Republic should stop enriching uranium", while 36% disagreed. Additionally, 49% of surveyed individuals opposed Iran developing nuclear weapons, and 36% disagreed.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 12-Day War – Gamaan |url=https://gamaan.org/2025/11/05/12-day-war-survey-english/ |access-date=2025-11-09 |website=gamaan.org}}</ref> The program has also been closely tied to Iranian techno-nationalist pride, symbolizing scientific progress and national independence.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" />

Throughout the early 2010s, US,<ref name="autogenerated4">[https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/world/middleeast/iran-will-soon-move-uranium-work-underground-official-says.html?pagewanted=2 Iran Trumpets Nuclear Ability at a Second Location], ''The New York Times'', 8 January 2012.</ref> EU,<ref>{{cite news |last=Broad|first=William J.|author2=DAVID E. SANGER|date=3 October 2009|title=Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/world/middleeast/04nuke.html|access-date=25 October 2009|work=The New York Times}}</ref> Russian<ref name="autogenerated4" /> and Chinese<ref name=":11">{{Cite web |title=China and the Iran Nuclear Issue: Beyond the Limited Partnership |url=https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/WUTHNOW_final%20testimony.pdf |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250616012355/https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/WUTHNOW_final%20testimony.pdf |archive-date=2025-06-16 |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=www.uscc.gov}}</ref> officials and analysts said Iran was pursuing nuclear latency, developing the technical infrastructure to assemble a weapon on short notice while refraining from actual production.<ref>{{bulleted list||{{cite journal |last1=Bowen |first1=Wyn |last2=Moran |first2=Matthew |location=King's College London |date=7 March 2014 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2014.884338 |title=Iran's Nuclear Programme: A Case Study in Hedging? |journal=Contemporary Security Policy |volume=35 |issue=1 |pages=26–52 |doi=10.1080/13523260.2014.884338 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |issn=1743-8764 |quote=this assessment is further complicated by Iran's domestic political context, which has engendered an approach that is as much 'hedging by default' as it is 'hedging by design'. This approach allows Tehran to reconcile restraint with domestic consensus on nuclear advancement.}}|{{cite journal |last1=Bowen |first1=Wyn |last2=Moran |first2=Matthew |year=2015 |url=https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/INTA91_4_01_BowenMoran.pdf |title=Living with nuclear hedging: the implications of Iran's nuclear strategy |journal=International Affairs |volume=91 |issue=4 |page=688-paragraph 2 |publisher=The Royal Institute of International Affairs: John Wiley & Sons |doi=10.1111/1468-2346.12337 |quote=There is much evidence to suggest Iran is engaged in a more nuanced strategy based on nuclear hedging, rather than outright pursuit of the bomb.}}|{{cite web |last=Eisenstadt |first=Michael |date=29 November 2022 |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-nuclear-hedging-strategy-shaping-islamic-republics-proliferation-calculus |title=Iran's Nuclear Hedging Strategy: Shaping the Islamic Republic's Proliferation Calculus |website=The Washington Institute for Near East Policy}}|{{cite journal |last=Gettel |date=December 2024 |first=Christopher |location=George Mason University |url=https://doaj.org/article/852466ce63b74e73a6608e21d8369846 |title=Why Iran is Choosing Nuclear Hedging |journal=Panoply Journal |volume=5 |publisher=Center for International Relations and International Security Inc |doi=10.71166/2x5v5824 |issn=2766-2594 |doi-access=free}}|{{cite book |last=Volpe |first=Tristan |location=Naval Postgraduate School |date=23 February 2023 |chapter-url=https://academic.oup.com/book/45573/chapter-abstract/394740928?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false |title=Leveraging Latency: How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology |chapter=Chapter 6: Iran: Abstract |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197669532.003.0006 |publisher=Oxford University Press |quote=Iran developed its nuclear program from 1953 to 2002 and then botched a deception campaign before reconfiguring around a safer hedge posture.}}}}</ref><ref name=":11" /> Such latency is believed to support nuclear deterrence, dissuading foreign powers from attempts at aggression or domination, projecting Iranian power in the region.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Eslami |first=Mohammad |date=2024-01-02 |title=Exploring the Driving Forces Behind Iran's Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: A Novel Methodological Approach |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2024.2319381 |journal=Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament |language=EN |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=211–235 |doi=10.1080/25751654.2024.2319381 |issn=2575-1654 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250725082348/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2024.2319381 |archive-date=2025-07-25|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite news |last=Wintour |first=Patrick |date=2025-06-23 |title=Why is Iran's nuclear programme so essential to its identity? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/23/why-iran-nuclear-programme-essential-to-its-identity |access-date=2026-03-01 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite web |last=Azodi |first=Sina |date=2021-02-16 |title=What does the history tell us about Iran's nuclear intentions? |url=https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/what-does-the-history-tell-us-about-irans-nuclear-intentions/ |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=Nuclear Network |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite report |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2013/05/think-again-a-nuclear-iran.html |title=Think Again: A Nuclear Iran |last=Nader |first=Alireza |date=2013-05-29 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="AllinSimon2010">{{Cite book |last1=Allin |first1=Dana H. |title=The sixth crisis: Iran, Israel, America, and the rumors of war |last2=Simon |first2=Steven |date=2010 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-975449-6 |location=Oxford & New York |pages=24}}</ref> The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists said that Iran was using its enrichment program and uranium stockpiles for leverage in international negotiations, and was willing to dilute or export its higher-level enriched uranium in exchange for sanctions relief and prevention of future attacks.<ref>{{#invoke:cite |web |date=26 February 2026 |title=Give negotiations a chance: How to turn Iran's claimed right to enrich uranium into a new deal—and avoid a war |url=https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/give-negotiations-a-chance-how-to-turn-irans-claimed-right-to-enrich-uranium-into-a-new-deal-and-avoid-a-war/ |access-date=5 March 2026 |website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |language=en |quote=Iran has used its enrichment program for leverage in international negotiations.}}</ref><ref>[https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/how-iran-overplayed-its-hand/ How Iran Overplayed its Hand], Michal Smetana, War on the Rocks, July 14, 2025.</ref> Others in the West have cited US and Israeli aggression toward Iran, especially after the 2025 and 2026 escalations, as a strong incentive to weaponize.<ref name="Time Attacking Iran Incentivizes Weaponizing">{{cite web |last1=Campbell |first1=Charlie |title=Trump Says His Goal Is to Stop Iran Getting a Nuclear Bomb. But the Result Might Be Lots More Nukes Across the Globe |url=https://time.com/article/2026/03/27/us-iran-war-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-deterrent-trump/ |website=time.com |publisher=Time |access-date=28 April 2026}}</ref><ref name="The Guardian Attacking Iran Incentivizes Weaponizing" /> Jeffrey Lewis said that Iran was "likely to reach the same conclusion that North Korea reached, that it’s a dangerous world out there with the United States, and it’s better to go nuclear."<ref name="The Guardian Attacking Iran Incentivizes Weaponizing" /> Ramesh Thakur said, "For Iran, nuclear weapons are now the only thing that will guarantee regime survival. So why wouldn’t they get them?"<ref name="Time Attacking Iran Incentivizes Weaponizing" />

Many Western analysts believe a nuclear-armed Iran would pose significant global security risks and undermine Middle Eastern stability. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi said that an Iranian nuclear weapon could trigger broad nuclear proliferation, as other countries, particularly in the Middle East, may seek similar capabilities in response. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have indicated they might pursue nuclear capabilities if Iran were to develop them.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Khan |first=Saira |title=The Iran Nuclear Deal: Non-Proliferation and US-Iran Conflict Resolution |date=2024 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-3-031-50195-1 |series=Studies in Iranian Politics Series |location=Cham |pages=176}}</ref> Some scholars have argued that Israel's nuclear weapons may have incentivized Iran to pursue its own, risking a regional nuclear arms race.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Cordesman |first=Anthony H. |date=9 March 2015 |title=Judging a P5+1 Agreement with Iran: The Key Technical and Strategic Issues |url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/judging-p51-agreement-iran-key-technical-and-strategic-issues |journal=Center for Strategic and International Studies |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite journal |last=Maher |first=Nora |date=14 March 2020 |title=Balancing deterrence: Iran-Israel relations in a turbulent Middle East |journal=Review of Economics and Political Science |volume=8 |issue=3 |pages=226–245 |doi=10.1108/reps-06-2019-0085 |hdl=10419/316081 |issn=2356-9980 |hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last=Sariolghalam |first=Mahmood |date=2001 |title=Israeli-Turkish Military Cooperation: Iranian Perceptions and Responses |journal=Journal of Political & Military Sociology |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=293–304 |issn=0047-2697 |jstor=45293807}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |title=An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: Seeds of Instability |url=https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-iran-balance-nuclear-deterrence-seeds-instability/ |access-date=26 March 2026 |website=INSS |language=en-US}}</ref>

[[File:Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Army_Day_2016_(189).jpg|thumb|The words "Death to Israel" in Persian displayed on a parade in Iran. Some analysts view Iran's nuclear program as a threat to Israel's security.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" />]]

Other proposed motivations include expanding Iran's alleged support for non-state militant actors or threats against Israel,<ref name="AllinSimon2010" /> with concerns that Iranian nuclear assets could, in the event of internal instability or regime change, fall into the hands of extremist factions or non-state actors,<ref name="Freilich 2018 83–85">{{Cite book |last=Freilich |first=Charles David |title=Israeli National Security: a New Strategy for an Era of Change |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-060293-2 |location=New York |pages=83–85}}</ref> heightening fears of nuclear terrorism.<ref name="Wilner2012">{{Cite journal |last=Wilner |first=Alex S. |date=2012-01-01 |title=Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2012.647539 |journal=Comparative Strategy |volume=31 |pages=18–40 |language=EN |doi=10.1080/01495933.2012.647539 |issn=0149-5933|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Alireza Nader argued that a nuclear-armed Iran could feel emboldened to increase its support for non-state militant groups while deterring retaliation through its newfound nuclear leverage.<ref name="Nader2013">{{Citation |last=Nader |first=Alireza |title=Nuclear Iran and Terrorism |date=2013 |work=Iran After the Bomb |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhtg2.10 |access-date=2025-02-24 |series=How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave? |pages=25–30 |publisher=RAND Corporation |jstor=10.7249/j.ctt5hhtg2.10 }}</ref> Some analysts and US officials maintain that a nuclear-capable Iran would likely attempt to destroy Israel or threaten its existence.<ref name="AllinSimon2010" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=Sharma |first=Anu |title=Through the looking glass: Iran and its foreign relations |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |isbn=978-1-032-23149-5 |location=London New York, NY |pages=63}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Goldberg |first=Jeffrey |date=2015-03-09 |title=The Iranian Regime on Israel's Right to Exist |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/Iranian-View-of-Israel/387085/ |access-date=2025-06-05 |website=The Atlantic |language=en}}</ref> In the 21st century, many Western and Israeli politicians have stated "Iran can never have a nuclear weapon", a political slogan of Israel's government and its international supporters.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web |title=President Bush and Chancellor Schröder Discuss Partnership|url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050223-4.html|access-date=2026-04-06|website=georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Inbar|first=Prof Efraim|date=2005-12-15|title=The Imperative to Use Force Against Iranian Nuclearization|url=https://besacenter.org/the-imperative-to-use-force-against-iranian-nuclearization/|access-date=2026-04-06|website=Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":22">{{Cite web |date=2025-06-17|title=G7 leaders: ‘Iran can never have a nuclear weapon’|url=https://www.politico.eu/article/g7-leaders-iran-can-never-have-a-nuclear-weapon/|access-date=2026-04-06|website=POLITICO|language=en-GB}}</ref>

==See also== {{stack|{{Portal|Iran|Energy|Nuclear technology}}}}

* Timeline of the nuclear program of Iran * Nuclear weapons and Israel * Iran and weapons of mass destruction * Israel and weapons of mass destruction * Twelve-Day War * Iran's ballistic missiles program * Israeli missile program * Iran and state-sponsored terrorism * Israel and state-sponsored terrorism * Iran can never have a nuclear weapon * Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare '''Malware:''' * Duqu * Flame (malware) * Stuxnet

'''People''' * Akbar Etemad, the "father of Iran's nuclear program" * Mehdi Sarram, nuclear scientist * List of Iranian nuclear negotiators

=== Security ===

* Nuclear Security & Protection Corps

==Notes== {{notelist}}

==References== {{reflist|30em}}

==External links== {{wikiquote}} {{Commons category|Nuclear program of Iran}} * [https://web.archive.org/web/20091026213523/http://geocities.com/csafdari/ The first-ever English-language website about Iran's nuclear energy program] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20080205201053/http://www.aeoi.org.ir/ Iran's Atomic Energy Organization] * [http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml In Focus: IAEA and Iran], IAEA * [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html Iran's Nuclear Program] collected news and commentary at ''The New York Times'' * [http://www.parstimes.com/nuclear/ Iran Nuclear Resources], parstimes.com * [https://web.archive.org/web/20130423113515/http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=indian*nuclear*weapons*program&creator=&title=&media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15 Annotated bibliography for the Iranian nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues]

{{Energy in Iran}} {{Nuclear power by country}} {{Iran–United States relations}} {{Iran–Israel proxy conflict}} {{Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy war}} {{2026 Iran war}} {{Nuclear weapons by country}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Nuclear Program Of Iran}} Category:Nuclear program of Iran Category:Iran–European Union relations Category:Iran–Israel proxy conflict Category:Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy war Category:Iran–United States relations Category:Nuclear energy in Iran Category:Politics of Iran Category:Underground construction