{{Short description|Concept in human demographics}} {{About|human population decline|radical losses in any particular species|endangered species|losses in fauna|defaunation}} {{Use dmy dates |date=April 2024}} [[File:Population Growth Rates, 2021.png|thumb|upright=1.8|Global rates of population growth and decline (2021–2022); population growth rate takes birth, death, and migration rates into account. Future projections are based on the United Nations World Population Prospects (from 1950 until 2100).<ref>{{cite web |author1-last=Roser |author1-first=Max |author1-link=Max Roser |author2-last=Rodés-Guirao |author2-first=Lucas |date=May 2024 |title=Population growth rate, 2021 |url=https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population-growth-rates?tab=map&year=2021 |url-status=live |website=www.ourworldindata.org |location=Oxford, England |publisher=Our World in Data |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240520222646/https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population-growth-rates?tab=map&year=2021 |archive-date=20 May 2024 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref>]]

'''Population decline''', also known as '''depopulation''', is a reduction in a human population size.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="excess-mortality-covid"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Coleman-2011"/>}} Earth's total human population continues to grow, as it has done throughout history, but projections suggest this long-term trend may be coming to an end.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Coleman-2011"/>}} From antiquity (10th century BCE–500 CE) until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in early modern Europe (late 18th–early 19th centuries), the global population grew very slowly, at about 0.04% per year. After about 1800 the growth rate accelerated to a peak of 2.1% annually during the mid-20th-century baby boom (1945–1968 period),{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Coleman-2011"/>}} but since then, due to the worldwide collapse of the total fertility rate, it has slowed to 0.9% as of 2023.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> The global growth rate in absolute numbers accelerated to a peak of 92.8 million in 1990, but has since slowed to 70.4 million in 2023.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a">{{cite web |author=Population Division |year=2024 |title=World Population Prospects 2024: Standard Projections, Most Used, Compact File, Estimates tab, Population Change column |url=https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used |url-status=live |website=www.population.un.org |location=New York City, U.S. |publisher=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250409154927/https://population.un.org/wpp/ |archive-date=9 April 2025 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref>

Long-term projections indicate that the growth rate of the human population on the planet will continue to slow down,<ref name="Aitken 2024"/> and that before the end of the 21st century it will reach growth zero.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> Examples of this emerging trend are Japan, whose population is currently (2023) declining at the rate of 0.5% per year,<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> and China, whose population has peaked and is currently (2023) declining at the rate of about 0.2% per year.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> By 2050, Europe's population is projected to be declining at the rate of 0.3% per year.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> Population growth has declined mainly due to the abrupt decline in the global total fertility rate, from 5.3 in 1963 to 2.2 in 2023.<ref name="UN DESA-2024b"/> The decline in the total fertility rate has occurred in every region of the world and is a result of a process known as demographic transition. To maintain its population, ignoring migration, a country on average requires a minimum fertility rate of 2.2 children per woman of childbearing age<ref name="Eberstadt 2024">{{cite magazine |author-last=Eberstadt |author-first=Nicholas |author-link=Nicholas Eberstadt |date=10 October 2024 |title=The Age of Depopulation: Surviving a World Gone Gray |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/age-depopulation-surviving-world-gone-gray-nicholas-eberstadt |url-status=live |editor-last=Kurtz-Phelan |editor-first=Daniel |magazine=Foreign Affairs |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Council on Foreign Relations |volume=103 |issue=6 |issn=0015-7120 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241106080030/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/age-depopulation-surviving-world-gone-gray-nicholas-eberstadt |archive-date=6 November 2024 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref> (the number is slightly greater than two because not all children live to adulthood). However, most societies experience a drop in fertility to well below two as they grow wealthier.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Coleman-2011"/>}}

Birth dearth, a closely related demographic phenomenon which refers to the declining fertility rates observed in many modern industrialized, affluent societies, affects countries and geographic regions that are currently experiencing the highest rates of declining populations, such as Western Europe, Japan, the Russian Federation, and South Korea.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Coleman-2011"/>}} Populations in other industrialized countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, and developing, poorer regions of the world, including the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa, are also being impacted.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/>}} For instance, the tendency of women in wealthier countries to have fewer children is attributed to a variety of reasons, such as lower infant mortality and a reduced need for children as a source of family labor or retirement welfare, both of which reduce the incentive to have many children.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/>}} Better access to education for young women, which broadens their job prospects, is also often cited by some demographers, journalists, and political economists.<ref name="The Economist">{{cite news |author=<!-- not stated --> |date=31 January 2019 |url=https://www.economist.com/international/2019/02/02/thanks-to-education-global-fertility-could-fall-faster-than-expected |url-status=live |title=Thanks to education, global fertility could fall faster than expected |editor-last=Beddoes |editor-first=Zanny M. |editor-link=Zanny Minton Beddoes |newspaper=The Economist |location=London, U.K. |issn=0013-0613 |oclc=1081684 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190201233053/https://www.economist.com/international/2019/02/02/thanks-to-education-global-fertility-could-fall-faster-than-expected |archive-date=1 February 2019 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref>

Possible consequences of long-term national population decline can be net positive or negative, both on world economy and individual countries themselves.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Coleman-2011"/>}} If a country can increase its workforce productivity faster than its population decline, the results, in terms of its national economy, the quality of life of its citizens, and the environment, can be net positive.<ref name="Aitken 2024"/> If it cannot increase workforce productivity faster than its population decline, the results can be negative. So far, national efforts to confront a declining population to date have been focused on the possible negative economic consequences and have been centered on increasing the size and productivity of the workforce through various means.

==Causes== A reduction over time in a region's population can be caused by sudden, adverse events such as economic crises, outbursts of infectious diseases,{{refn|<ref name="excess-mortality-covid"/><ref name="Barry 2021"/><ref name="Plague 2020"/><ref name="Nat. Microbiol."/><ref name="origins.osu.edu"/><ref name="Crosby 1967"/>}} climate change, famines, poverty, war, existential risks due to social and economic inequalities, and wealth disparities;{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Econ. Hum. Biol."/>}} long-term demographic trends such as birth dearth, sub-replacement fertility, persistently low birth rates, high mortality rates, increase of drug abuse, violent crimes, and political violence;{{refn|<ref name="Econ. Hum. Biol.">{{cite journal |author1-last=Wijesinghe |author1-first=M. D. J . W. |author2-last=Cameron |author2-first=M. P. |author3-last=Olivia |author3-first=S. |author4-last=Oxley |author4-first=L. |date=November 2025 |title=State level differences in life expectancy and lifespan inequality: Is it a matter of socioeconomic inequalities? |editor1-last=Averett |editor1-first=S. |editor2-last=Baten |editor2-first=J. |editor2-link=Jörg Baten |editor3-last=Chatterji |editor3-first=P. |journal=Economics and Human Biology |location=Amsterdam, Netherlands |publisher=Elsevier |volume=59 |article-number=101555 |doi=10.1016/j.ehb.2025.101555 |doi-access=free |issn=1873-6130 |pmid=41319627}}</ref><ref name="PNAS 2025">{{cite journal |author1-last=Thompson |author1-first=Andrew I. |author2-last=McCabe |author2-first=Stefan D. |date=November 2025 |title=The importance of local racial demographic changes in democratic erosion in the mass American public |editor-last=Berenbaum |editor-first=May |editor-link=May Berenbaum |journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=United States National Academy of Sciences |volume=122 |issue=48 |article-number=e2501150122 |doi=10.1073/pnas.2501150122 |doi-access=free |issn=1091-6490 |pmc=12684897 |pmid=41289398}}</ref><ref name="Annu Rev Clin Psychol">{{cite journal |author1-last=Kim |author1-first=Su Y. |author2-last=Schwartz |author2-first=Seth J. |author3-last=Perreira |author3-first=Krista M. |author4-last=Juang |author4-first=Linda P. |date=May 2018 |title=Culture's Influence on Stressors, Parental Socialization, and Developmental Processes in the Mental Health of Children of Immigrants |editor-last=Cannon |editor-first=Tyrone D. |editor-link=Tyrone Cannon |journal=Annual Review of Clinical Psychology |location=San Mateo, California |publisher=Annual Reviews |volume=7 |issue=14 |pages=343–370 |doi=10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050817-084925 |doi-access=free |issn=1548-5951 |pmc=6589340 |pmid=29401046}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author1-last=Akers |author1-first=Timothy A. |author2-last=Potter |author2-first=Roberto H. |author3-last=Hill |author3-first=Carl V. |year=2013 |chapter=Criminality, Substance Abuse, and Mental Health: An Epidemiological Criminology Framework |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Qscj0NrHIGcC&pg=PA237 |title=Epidemiological Criminology: A Public Health Approach to Crime and Violence |location=Hoboken, New Jersey |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |pages=237–250 |isbn=978-1-118-22083-2 |lccn=2012033731}}</ref>}} continued emigration of native citizens to foreign countries;{{refn|<ref name="SD 2025">{{cite journal |author1-last=Carracedo |author1-first=Patricia |author2-last=Puertas |author2-first=Rosa |author3-last=Miró |author3-first=Pau |author4-last=Hervás |author4-first=David |date=June 2025 |title=Sustainable Migration and Depopulation: A Methodological Proposal From the Perspective of the SDGs |editor-last=Welford |editor-first=Richard |journal=Sustainable Development |location=Chichester, West Sussex |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |volume=33 |issue=3 |pages=4577–4588 |doi=10.1002/sd.3356 |doi-access=free |issn=1099-1719 |s2cid=275887241}}</ref><ref name="Theor. Popul. Biol.">{{cite journal |author-last=Márton |author-first=Lőrinc |date=December 2022 |title=Modeling and migration-based control of depopulation |editor-last=Van Cleve |editor-first=Jeremy |journal=Theoretical Population Biology |location=Amsterdam, Netherlands |publisher=Elsevier |volume=148 |pages=86–94 |doi=10.1016/j.tpb.2022.11.002 |doi-access=free |issn=1096-0325 |lccn=73019414 |pmid=36379299}}</ref><ref name="AJS 2020">{{cite journal |author1-last=Entwisle |author1-first=Barbara |author2-last=Verdery |author2-first=Ashton |author3-last=Williams |author3-first=Nathalie |date=May 2020 |title=Climate Change and Migration: New Insights from a Dynamic Model of Out-Migration and Return Migration |editor-last=Martin |editor-first=John L. |editor-link=John Levi Martin |journal=American Journal of Sociology |location=Chicago, Illinois |publisher=University of Chicago Press for the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago |volume=125 |issue=6 |pages=1469–1512 |doi=10.1086/709463 |issn=1537-5390 |lccn=05031884 |pmc=7406200 |pmid=32773842}}</ref>}} persistent and unresolved societal issues,{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/>}} including low fertility rates, lack of cohabitation and/or domestic partnership between spouses, declining marriage rates, increase of annulment and divorce cases, marital abuse, abandonment of children, childbirth by a single person or single-person adoption;{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/>}} and lifestyle choices associated with being single, urbanization, individualism, celibacy, social isolation, unemployment, and voluntary childlessness.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus">{{cite magazine |author-last=Lewis-Kraus |author-first=Gideon |date=3 March 2025 |title=The End of Children: Birth rates are crashing around the world. What does that mean for our future? |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/03/03/the-population-implosion |url-status=live |magazine=The New Yorker |publisher=Condé Nast |issn=0028-792X |oclc=320541675 |pages=28–41 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250224143805/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/03/03/the-population-implosion |archive-date=24 February 2025 |access-date=14 August 2025 |quote=A population will be stable if it reproduces at the "replacement rate", or about 2.1 babies per mother. [...] Today, declining fertility is a near-universal phenomenon. Albania, El Salvador, and Nepal, none of them affluent, are now below replacement levels. Iran's fertility rate is half of what it was thirty years ago. Headlines about "Europe's demographic winter" are commonplace. Giorgia Meloni, the Prime Minister of Italy, has said that her country is "destined to disappear". One Japanese economist runs a conceptual clock that counts down to his country's final child: the current readout is January 5, 2720. It will take a few years before we can be sure, but it’s possible that 2023 saw the world as a whole slump beneath the replacement threshold for the first time. There are a couple of places where fertility remains higher—Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa—but even there the rates are generally diminishing. Paranoia has ensued. [...] South Korea has a fertility rate of 0.7. This is the lowest rate of any nation in the world. It may be the lowest in recorded history. If that trajectory holds, each successive generation will be a third the size of its predecessor.}}</ref><ref name="www.ourworldindata.org">{{cite web |author1-last=Herre |author1-first=Bastian |author2-last=Samborska |author2-first=Veronika |author3-last=Ortiz-Ospina |author3-first=Esteban |author4-last=Roser |author4-first=Max |author4-link=Max Roser |date=February 2025 |title=Marriages and Divorces |url=https://ourworldindata.org/marriages-and-divorces |url-status=live |website=www.ourworldindata.org |location=Oxford, England |publisher=Our World in Data |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250930205047/https://ourworldindata.org/marriages-and-divorces |archive-date=30 September 2025 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref><ref name="Atlantic 2024">{{cite magazine |author-last=Emba |author-first=Christine |date=1 August 2024 |title=The Real Reason People Aren't Having Kids |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2024/08/fertility-crisis/679319/ |url-status=live |magazine=The Atlantic |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Emerson Collective |issn=2151-9463 |oclc=936540106 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240804125136/https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2024/08/fertility-crisis/679319/ |archive-date=4 August 2024 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref><ref name="Aitken 2024">{{cite journal |author-last=Aitken |author-first=R. J. |author-link=John Aitken (biologist) |date=April 2024 |title=What is driving the global decline of human fertility? Need for a multidisciplinary approach to the underlying mechanisms |editor1-last=Livadas |editor1-first=S. |editor2-last=Schuppe |editor2-first=H.-C. |editor3-last=Pineau |editor3-first=C. |journal=Frontiers in Reproductive Health |location=Lausanne, Switzerland |publisher=Frontiers Media |volume=6 |article-number=1364352 |doi=10.3389/frph.2024.1364352 |doi-access=free |pmc=11079147 |pmid=38726051 |s2cid=269394126}}</ref><ref name="CNN 2022">{{cite news |author-last=Hancocks |author-first=Paula |date=4 December 2022 |title=South Korea spent $200 billion, but it can't pay people enough to have a baby |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/03/asia/south-korea-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-intl-hnk-dst |url-status=live |work=CNN World |location=Hong Kong and New York |publisher=Warner Bros. Discovery |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221204093904/https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/03/asia/south-korea-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-intl-hnk-dst/ |archive-date=4 December 2022 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref><ref name="Hellstrand 2022">{{cite journal |author1-last=Hellstrand |author1-first=J. |author2-last=Nisén |author2-first=J. |author3-last=Myrskylä |author3-first=M. |date=February 2022 |title=Less Partnering, Less Children, or Both? Analysis of the Drivers of First Birth Decline in Finland Since 2010 |editor-last=Lappegård |editor-first=T. |journal=European Journal of Population |location=Cham, Switzerland |publisher=Springer Nature |volume=38 |issue=2 |doi=10.1007/s10680-022-09605-8 |doi-access=free |pages=191–221 |issn=1572-9885 |pmc=9127029 |pmid=35619740 |s2cid=234846576}}</ref><ref name="Coleman-2011"/>}}

===Short-term population shocks=== [[File:Acuna-Soto EID-v8n4p360 Fig1.png|thumb|250px|right|Population collapse in the history of Mexico (16th–17th centuries), attributed to repeated epidemics of smallpox and ''cocoliztli'' viruses.<ref name="Crosby 1967"/> The viral outbreaks were caused by the Spanish invasion and colonization of Central America.<ref name="Crosby 1967">{{cite journal |author-last=Crosby |author-first=Alfred W. |date=August 1967 |title=Conquistador y Pestilencia: The First New World Pandemic and the Fall of the Great Indian Empires |journal=The Hispanic American Historical Review |location=Durham, North Carolina |publisher=Duke University Press on behalf of the Conference on Latin American History |volume=47 |issue=3: ''Biological Consequences of European Expansion, 1450–1800'' |pages=321–337 |doi=10.1215/00182168-47.3.321 |doi-access=free |issn=1527-1900 |s2cid=222402216}}</ref> (''See also'': History of smallpox in Mexico).]]

Historical episodes of short-term human population decline have been common and they have been caused by several factors.

High mortality rates caused by: * Disease: for example, the Black Death that devastated Eurasia<ref name="Plague 2020">{{cite journal |author1-last=Barbieri |author1-first=R. |author2-last=Signoli |author2-first=M. |author3-last=Chevé |author3-first=D. |author4-last=Costedoat |author4-first=C. |author5-last=Tzortzis |author5-first=S. |author6-last=Aboudharam |author6-first=G. |author7-last=Raoult |author7-first=D. |author8-last=Drancourt |author8-first=M. |date=December 2020 |title=Yersinia pestis: the Natural History of Plague |journal=Clinical Microbiology Reviews |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=American Society for Microbiology |volume=34 |issue=1 |article-number=e00044-19 |doi=10.1128/CMR.00044-19 |issn=1098-6618 |pmc=7920731 |pmid=33298527 |s2cid=228089370}}</ref> (14th–17th centuries), the arrival and spread of Old World diseases in the Americas during the European colonization<ref name="Crosby 1967"/> (late 15th–19th centuries), and the Spanish flu pandemic in the aftermath of World War I<ref name="Barry 2021">{{cite book |author-last=Barry |author-first=John M. |author-link=John M. Barry |year=2021 |orig-year=2004 |title=The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History |title-link=The Great Influenza |location=London, U.K. |publisher=Penguin Books |pages=397–398 |isbn=978-0-14-303649-4}}</ref> (1918–1920); * Drug epidemic: for example, the current opioid epidemic in the United States that began in the late 1990s,{{refn|<ref name="NBK537318"/><ref name="Earnshaw 2020"/><ref>{{cite book |author1-last=Beardsley |author1-first=P. M. |author2-last=Zhang |author2-first=Y. |date=September 2018 |chapter=Review: Synthetic Opioids |editor1-last=Maurer |editor1-first=H. H. |editor2-last=Brandt |editor2-first=S. D. |title=New Psychoactive Substances: Pharmacology, Clinical, Forensic and Analytical Toxicology |location=Cham, Switzerland |publisher=Springer Nature |series=Handbook of Experimental Pharmacology |volume=252 |pages=353–381 |doi=10.1007/164_2018_149 |isbn=978-3-030-10561-7 |issn=1865-0325 |pmid=30242482 |s2cid=52312555 |quote=According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, almost 12 million years were estimated loss of "healthy" life resulting in premature death and disability attributable to global opioid abuse just in 2015.}}</ref>}} according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).{{refn|<ref name="NBK537318">{{cite book |author1-last=Preuss |author1-first=C. V. |author2-last=Kalava |author2-first=A. |author3-last=King |author3-first=K. C. |date=July 2025 |title=Prescription of Controlled Substances: Benefits and Risks |url=https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK537318/ |url-status=live |location=Treasure Island, Florida |publisher=StatPearls Publishing |pmid=30726003 |s2cid=81146288 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250826091040/https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK537318/ |archive-date=26 August 2025 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref><ref name="Earnshaw 2020">{{cite journal |author-last=Earnshaw |author-first=V. A. |date=December 2020 |title=Stigma and substance use disorders: A clinical, research, and advocacy agenda |journal=American Psychologist |publisher=American Psychological Association |volume=75 |issue=9 |pages=1300–1311 |doi=10.1037/amp0000744 |doi-access=free |issn=1935-990X |pmc=8168446 |pmid=33382299 |s2cid=229930928}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author1-last=Bettinger |author1-first=J. J. |author2-last=Amarquaye |author2-first=W. |author3-last=Fudin |author3-first=J. |author4-last=Schatman |author4-first=M. E. |date=April 2022 |title=Misinterpretation of the "Overdose Crisis" Continues to Fuel Misunderstanding of the Role of Prescription Opioids |journal=Journal of Pain Research |location=Princeton, New Jersey |publisher=Dove Medical Press |volume=5 |issue=15 |pages=949–958 |doi=10.2147/JPR.S367753 |doi-access=free |issn=1178-7090 |pmc=8994995 |pmid=35414752 |s2cid=247958640}}</ref>}} * Famine: for example, the Great Irish Famine caused by the infection of potato crops by the blight in British-ruled Ireland<ref name="Ó Gráda">{{cite book |author-last=Ó Gráda |author-first=Cormac |author-link=Cormac Ó Gráda |year=2006 |title=Ireland's Great Famine: Interdisciplinary Perspectives |location=Dublin, Ireland |publisher=University College Dublin Press |page=7 |isbn=978-1-904558-57-6}}</ref> (1845–1852), and the Great Chinese Famine caused by the Great Leap Forward in communist China<ref name="disasterrelief"/> (1958–1962); the former caused the Irish population to decline by 20–25% between 1841 and 1871,<ref name="Kinealy 1994">{{cite book |author-last=Kinealy |author-first=Christine |author-link=Christine Kinealy |year=1994 |title=This Great Calamity: The Irish Famine, 1845–52 |url=https://archive.org/details/thisgreatcalamit0000kine_k9h1 |location=Dublin, Ireland |publisher=Gill & Macmillan |page=357 |isbn=0-7171-1881-9 |via=Internet Archive}}</ref> while the latter caused approximately 25 millions of deaths among the Chinese people and is considered to be the largest or second-largest famine in recorded history.<ref name="disasterrelief">{{cite encyclopedia |author-last=Kte'pi |author-first=Bill |year=2011 |title=Chinese Famine (1907) |url=https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/disasterrelief/n31.xml |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Disaster Relief |location=Thousand Oaks, California |publisher=SAGE Publications |doi=10.4135/9781412994064 |isbn=978-1412971010 |pages=70–71 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201201022144/http://sk.sagepub.com/Reference/disasterrelief/n31.xml |archive-date=1 December 2020 |access-date=23 November 2025 |quote=The Chinese Famine of 1907 is the second-worst famine in recorded history, with an estimated death toll of around 25 million people; this exceeds the lowest estimates for the death toll of the later Great Chinese Famine, meaning that the 1907 famine could actually be the worst in history.}}</ref> * War: for example, the devastating consequences of the Mongol invasion of Central and Eastern Europe during the Late Middle Ages (13th century), which may have reduced the population of medieval Hungary by 20–40%;<ref>{{cite book |author1-last=Tóth |author1-first=Pál Péter |author2-last=Valkovics |author2-first=Emil |year=1997 |title=Demography of Contemporary Hungarian Society |location=New York City, U.S. |publisher=Social Science Monographs/Columbia University Press |series=Atlantic Studies on Society in Change |pages=14–15 |isbn=9780880333580}}</ref> * Social unrest: for example, the displacement and forced migration of millions of Syrian citizens caused by the Syrian Civil War (2011–2024), the inception of an ongoing, international humanitarian crisis;<ref>{{cite web |author=<!-- not stated --> |date=14 January 2025 |title=Crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic |url=https://www.iom.int/crisis-syrian-arab-republic |website=www.iom.int |location=Geneva, Switzerland |publisher=International Organization for Migration |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250130063637/https://www.iom.int/crisis-syrian-arab-republic |archive-date=30 January 2025 |access-date=23 November 2025 |quote=Following nearly 14 years of conflict, over 16 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance and 90 per cent of the population is living in poverty. More than 6 million people had left the country and 7.4 million people were internally displaced prior to the latest developments, with 2.3 million still residing in camps according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.}}</ref> * A combination of these: the first half of the 20th century in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union was marked by a succession of major wars, alongside famines and natural disasters, which caused large-scale population losses (approximately 60 million excess deaths).<ref>{{cite book |author-last=Merridale |author-first=Catherine |author-link=Catherine Merridale |year=2009 |orig-year=1999 |chapter=War, death, and remembrance in Soviet Russia |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZK2A5x7E8IkC&pg=PA64 |url-status=live |editor1-last=Winter |editor1-first=Jay |editor1-link=Jay Winter |editor2-last=Sivan |editor2-first=Emmanuel |title=War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century |location=Cambridge, U.K. |publisher=Cambridge University Press |series=Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare |volume=5 |page=64 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511599644.005 |isbn=9780511599644 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904015129/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZK2A5x7E8IkC&pg=PA64 |archive-date=4 September 2015 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author-last=Harrison |author-first=Mark |year=2010 |orig-year=1996 |chapter=War losses |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yJcD7_Q_rQ8C&pg=PA167 |url-status=live |title=Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940–1945 |location=Cambridge, U.K. |publisher=Cambridge University Press |series=Cambridge Russian, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Studies |volume=99 |page=167 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511523625.011 |isbn=9780511523625 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170326081855/https://books.google.com/books?id=yJcD7_Q_rQ8C&pg=PA167 |archive-date=26 March 2017 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref>

Some population declines result from indeterminate causes, such as the Late Bronze Age collapse (12th century BCE), a period of societal collapse in the Mediterranean basin which has been described as the worst disaster in ancient history.{{refn|<ref>{{cite journal |author1-last=Knapp |author1-first=A. Bernard |author2-last=Manning |author2-first=Sturt W. |date=January 2016 |title=Crisis in Context: The End of the Late Bronze Age in the Eastern Mediterranean |journal=American Journal of Archaeology |volume=120 |issue=1 |location=Chicago, U.S. |publisher=University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Archaeological Institute of America |pages=99–149 |doi=10.3764/aja.120.1.0099 |doi-access=free |issn=1939-828X}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author-last=Middleton |author-first=Guy D. |date=September 2012 |title=Nothing Lasts Forever: Environmental Discourses on the Collapse of Past Societies |journal=Journal of Archaeological Research |volume=20 |issue=3 |location=Cham, Switzerland |publisher=Springer Nature |pages=257–307 |doi=10.1007/s10814-011-9054-1 |issn=1573-7756 |jstor=41680526 |jstor-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author-last=Drews |author-first=Robert |author-link=Robert Drews |year=1996 |orig-year=1993 |chapter=THE CATASTROPHE AND ITS CHRONOLOGY |title=The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. |location=Princeton, New Jersey |publisher=Princeton University Press |edition=3rd |pages=3–7 |doi=10.2307/j.ctvx5wbmc.6 |isbn=9780691209975}}</ref>}} More frequently, short-term population declines are caused by warfare, famines, and large-scale epidemics, such as the Great Irish Famine (1845–1852), whose proximate cause for the famine was the infection of potato crops by the blight<ref name="Ó Gráda"/> throughout Europe during the 1840s. Impact on food supply by the blight infection caused 100,000 deaths outside Ireland, and influenced much of the social unrest that culminated in the Revolutions of 1848.<ref>{{cite conference |author1-last=Ó Gráda |author1-first=Cormac |author1-link=Cormac Ó Gráda |author2-last=Vanhaute |author2-first=Eric |author3-last=Paping |author3-first=Richard |date=August 2006 |title=The European subsistence crisis of 1845–1850: a comparative perspective |url=http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Vanhaute.pdf |url-status=live |conference=XIV International Economic History Congress of the International Economic History Association: Session 123 |location=Helsinki, Finland |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170417175737/http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Vanhaute.pdf |archive-date=17 April 2017 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref> The famine and its effects permanently changed the island's demographic, political, and cultural landscape, producing an estimated 2 million refugees and spurring a century-long population decline.<ref>{{cite journal |author1-last=Kelly |author1-first=M. |author2-last=Fotheringham |author2-first=A. Stewart |date=April 2012 |title=The online atlas of Irish population change 1841–2002: A new resource for analysing national trends and local variations in Irish population dynamics |journal=Irish Geography |location=Dublin, Ireland |publisher=Geographical Society of Ireland |volume=44 |issue=2–3 |pages=215–244 |doi=10.1080/00750778.2011.664806 |doi-access=free |issn=1939-4055 |s2cid=131648986 |quote=[Irish] population declining dramatically from 8.2 million to 6.5 million between 1841 and 1851 and then declining gradually and almost continuously to 4.5 million in 1961}}</ref>

Less frequently, short-term population declines are caused by genocide and/or ethnic cleansing. For example, during the early 20th century, the percentage of Christians in the Middle East mainly fell as a result of the late Ottoman genocides:{{refn|<ref name="Bulut 2024">{{cite magazine |author-last=Bulut |author-first=Uzay |date=30 August 2024 |title=Turkey: Ongoing Violations against Greek Christians |url=https://europeanconservative.com/articles/analysis/turkey-ongoing-violations-against-greek-christians/ |url-status=live |magazine=The European Conservative |location=Budapest, Brussels, Rome, and Vienna |publisher=Center for European Renewal |issn=2590-2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830090504/https://europeanconservative.com/articles/analysis/turkey-ongoing-violations-against-greek-christians/ |archive-date=30 August 2024 |access-date=30 August 2024}}</ref><ref name="Morris-Zeevi 2021">{{cite news |author1-last=Morris |author1-first=Benny |author1-link=Benny Morris |author2-last=Ze'evi |author2-first=Dror |author2-link=Dror Ze'evi |date=4 November 2021 |title=Then Came the Chance the Turks Have Been Waiting For: To Get Rid of Christians Once and for All |url=https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2021-11-04/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/then-came-the-chance-the-turks-have-been-waiting-for-to-get-rid-of-christians/0000017f-f0ac-da6f-a77f-f8ae1c9c0000 |url-status=live |work=Haaretz |location=Tel Aviv |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211104172307/https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT.MAGAZINE-then-came-the-chance-the-turks-have-been-waiting-for-to-get-rid-of-christians-1.10354739 |archive-date=4 November 2021 |access-date=5 November 2021}}</ref><ref name="Morris-Zeevi 2019">{{cite book |last1=Morris |first1=Benny |last2=Ze'evi |first2=Dror |year=2019 |title=The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |publisher=Harvard University Press |pages=3–5 |isbn=978-0-674-24008-7}}</ref><ref name="Gutman 2019">{{cite journal |author-last=Gutman |author-first=David |year=2019 |title=The thirty year genocide: Turkey's destruction of its Christian minorities, 1894–1924 |journal=Turkish Studies |location=London and New York |publisher=Routledge on behalf of the Global Research in International Affairs Center |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=1–3 |doi=10.1080/14683849.2019.1644170 |eissn=1743-9663 |issn=1468-3849 |s2cid=201424062}}</ref><ref name="Bardakçı 2017">{{cite book |author1-last=Bardakçı |author1-first=Mehmet |author2-last=Freyberg-Inan |author2-first=Annette |author2-link=Annette Freyberg-Inan |author3-last=Giesel |author3-first=Christoph |author4-last=Leisse |author4-first=Olaf |year=2017 |chapter=The Ambivalent Situation of Turkey's Armenians: Between Collective Historical Trauma and Psychological Repression, Loyal Citizenship and Minority Status, Social Integration and Discrimination, Assimilation and Self-assertion |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=olQLDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA133 |title=Religious Minorities in Turkey: Alevi, Armenians, and Syriacs and the Struggle to Desecuritize Religious Freedom |location=London and New York |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |pages=133−154 |doi=10.1057/978-1-137-27026-9_5 |isbn=978-1-137-27026-9 |lccn=2016961241}}</ref><ref name="Erol 2015">{{cite journal |author-last=Erol |author-first=Su |date=2015 |title=The Syriacs of Turkey: A Religious Community on the Path of Recognition |url=https://journals.openedition.org/assr/27027 |url-status=live |journal=Archives de sciences sociales des religions |location=Paris, France |publisher=Éditions de l'EHESS |issue=171 |pages=59–80 |doi=10.4000/assr.27027 |isbn=9782713224706 |issn=1777-5825 |doi-access=free |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190626131739/https://journals.openedition.org/assr/27027 |archive-date=26 June 2019}}</ref><ref name="Smith 2015">{{cite journal |author-last=Smith |author-first=Roger W. |date=Spring 2015 |title=Introduction: The Ottoman Genocides of Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks |journal=Genocide Studies International |location=Toronto |publisher=University of Toronto Press |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=1–9 |doi=10.3138/GSI.9.1.01 |issn=2291-1855 |jstor=26986011 |s2cid=154145301}}</ref><ref name="Roshwald 2013">{{cite book |author-last=Roshwald |author-first=Aviel |author-link=Aviel Roshwald |year=2013 |chapter=Part II. The Emergence of Nationalism: Politics and Power – Nationalism in the Middle East, 1876–1945 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IlNoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA220 |editor-last=Breuilly |editor-first=John |title=The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism |location=Oxford and New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=220–241 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199209194.013.0011 |isbn=9780191750304 |access-date=January 2, 2023 |archive-date=January 15, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230115215620/https://books.google.com/books?id=IlNoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA220 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Üngör 2008">{{cite journal |author-last=Üngör |author-first=Uğur Ümit |author-link=Uğur Ümit Üngör |date=June 2008 |title=Seeing like a nation-state: Young Turk social engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913–50 |journal=Journal of Genocide Research |location=London and New York |publisher=Routledge |volume=10 |issue=1 |pages=15–39 |doi=10.1080/14623520701850278 |issn=1469-9494 |oclc=260038904 |s2cid=71551858}}</ref><ref name="İçduygu 2008">{{cite journal |last1=İçduygu |first1=Ahmet |last2=Toktaş |first2=Şule |last3=Ali Soner |first3=B. |date=February 2008 |title=The politics of population in a nation-building process: Emigration of non-Muslims from Turkey |url=https://www.academia.edu/761694 |journal=Ethnic and Racial Studies |location=London and New York |publisher=Routledge |volume=31 |issue=2 |pages=358–389 |doi=10.1080/01419870701491937 |issn=1466-4356 |oclc=40348219 |s2cid=143541451 |via=Academia.edu |access-date=August 2, 2020 |archive-date=March 25, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200325053206/https://www.academia.edu/761694/The_Politics_of_Population_in_a_Nation_Building_Process_Emigration_of_Non-Muslims_from_Turkey |url-status=live |hdl=11729/308 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>}} the Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian genocides which were committed by the Ottoman Turks and their allies,{{refn|<ref name="Bulut 2024"/><ref name="Morris-Zeevi 2021"/><ref name="Morris-Zeevi 2019"/><ref name="Gutman 2019"/><ref name="Bardakçı 2017"/><ref name="Erol 2015"/><ref name="Smith 2015"/><ref name="Roshwald 2013"/><ref name="Üngör 2008"/><ref name="İçduygu 2008"/>}} which caused millions of deaths and forced the surviving Christian populations to flee and emigrate to Iraq, Syria, North America, and Western Europe (1910s–1920s).<ref name="Üngör 2008"/><ref name="İçduygu 2008"/><ref>{{cite journal |url=http://www.meforum.org/487/editors-introduction-why-a-special-issue |title='Editors' Introduction: Why a Special Issue?: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East |journal=Middle East Quarterly |access-date=June 11, 2013 |year=2001 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130511085730/http://www.meforum.org/487/editors-introduction-why-a-special-issue |archive-date=May 11, 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> It has been estimated that the Holocaust and other industrial-scale genocides which Nazi Germany perpetrated against European Jews, Romani people, Poles, Serbs, German citizens with disabilities, and many other groups caused more than 13 million deaths in Nazi-occupied Europe during World War II (1939–1945),<ref name="Kay 2021">{{cite book |author-last=Kay |author-first=Alex J. |author-link=Alex J. Kay |year=2021 |title=Empire of Destruction: A History of Nazi Mass Killings |location=New Haven, Connecticut |publisher=Yale University Press |page=284 |isbn=978-0-300-26253-7}}</ref> while the population of Cambodia declined by 25% (1.5 to 2 million deaths) due to the Cambodian genocide, the large-scale executions which were carried out by the Khmer Rouge (1975–1979).<ref name="UN DESA-2024e" />

In the contemporary world, the AIDS pandemic,{{refn|<ref name="origins.osu.edu"/><ref name="Wang-Maher 2019"/>}} originated by the emergence and spread of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),{{refn|<ref name="origins.osu.edu">{{Cite web |author-last=McDow |author-first=Thomas F. |date=October 2018 |title=A Century of HIV |url=https://origins.osu.edu/article/century-hiv-world-aids-day-africa-actup-unaids?language_content_entity=en |url-status=live |location=Columbus, Ohio |publisher=Ohio State University |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220121155732/https://origins.osu.edu/article/century-hiv-world-aids-day-africa-actup-unaids?language_content_entity=en |archive-date=21 January 2022 |access-date=28 June 2022}}</ref><ref name="Wang-Maher 2019">{{cite journal |author1-last=Wang |author1-first=S.-C. |author2-last=Maher |author2-first=B. |date=December 2019 |title=Substance Use Disorder, Intravenous Injection, and HIV Infection: A Review |journal=Cell Transplantation |location=Thousand Oaks, California |publisher=SAGE Publications |volume=28 |issue=12 |pages=1465–1471 |doi=10.1177/0963689719878380 |doi-access=free |issn=1555-3892 |pmc=6923556 |pmid=31547679 |s2cid=202746148}}</ref>}} and the COVID-19 pandemic,<ref name="Nat. Microbiol."/> originated by the emergence and spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2),<ref name="Nat. Microbiol.">{{cite journal |author=Coronaviridae Study Group of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses |date=April 2020 |title=The species Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus: classifying 2019-nCoV and naming it SARS-CoV-2 |journal=Nature Microbiology |location=London, U.K. |publisher=Nature Portfolio |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=536–544 |doi=10.1038/s41564-020-0695-z |issn=2058-5276 |pmc=7095448 |pmid=32123347 |s2cid=211729429}}</ref> have caused short-term drops in fertility<ref>{{Cite web|date=August 2021|title=The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on fertility|url=https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/files/documents/2021/Aug/undesa_pd_egm_feretility_2020_key_messages_23aug.2021.pdf|website=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs}}</ref> and significant excess mortality in a number of countries.<ref name="excess-mortality-covid">{{cite web |author1-last=Giattino |author1-first=Charlie |author2-last=Ritchie |author2-first=Hannah |author2-link=Hannah Ritchie |author3-last=Roser |author3-first=Max |author3-link=Max Roser |author4-last=Ortiz-Ospina |author4-first=Esteban |author5-last=Hasell |author5-first=Joe |date=November 2024 |title=Excess mortality during the Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) |url=https://ourworldindata.org/excess-mortality-covid/ |url-status=live |website=www.ourworldindata.org |location=Oxford, England |publisher=Our World in Data |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241117012717/https://ourworldindata.org/excess-mortality-covid |archive-date=17 November 2024 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref>

=== Long-term historic trends in world population growth === {{Main|Population ageing|Population density|Population dynamics|Population growth}} {{Further|Demographic history|Estimates of historical world population|World population}} [[File:Total Fertility Rate Map by Country.svg|thumb|upright=1.8|Map of countries by total fertility rate (2022–2023), referring to the average number of children that are born to a woman over her lifetime, according to the Population Reference Bureau.<ref>{{cite web |editor1-last=Kaneda |editor1-first=Toshiko |editor2-last=Greenbaum |editor2-first=Charlotte |editor3-last=Haub |editor3-first=Carl |date=October 2022 |title=2022 World Population Data Sheet |url=https://2022-wpds.prb.org/ |url-status=live |website=2022-wpds.prb.org |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Population Reference Bureau |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221007213329/https://2022-wpds.prb.org/ |archive-date=7 October 2022 |access-date=23 November 2025}}</ref>]]

In spite of these short-term population shocks, world population has continued to grow. From around the 10th century BCE to the beginning of the early modern period (15th–19th centuries CE), world population grew very slowly, around 0.04% per year. During that period, population growth was governed by conditions now labeled the "Malthusian trap".

After 1800, driven by increases in human productivity due to the Industrial Revolution, particularly the increase in agricultural productivity,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Peterson|first=E. Wesley|date=October 11, 2017|title=The Role of Population in Economic Growth|journal=SAGE Open|volume=7|issue=4|article-number=2158244017736094 |doi=10.1177/2158244017736094|s2cid=158150556|doi-access=free}}</ref> population growth accelerated to around 0.6% per year, a rate that was over ten times the rate of population growth of the previous 12,000 years. This rapid increase in global population caused Malthus and others to raise the first concerns about overpopulation.

In the aftermath of World War I, birth rates in the United States and many European countries fell below replacement level. This prompted concern about population decline.<ref name="Coleman-2011">{{cite journal |author-last=Coleman |author-first=David |author-link=David Coleman (demographer) |date=January 2011 |title=Who's afraid of population decline? A critical examination of its consequences |journal=Population and Development Review |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Population Council |volume=37 |issue=Suppl 1 |pages=217–248 |issn=1728-4457 |citeseerx=10.1.1.700.5979 |doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00385.x |pmid=21280372 |s2cid=2979501}}</ref> The recovery of the birth rate in most Western countries around 1940 that produced the "baby boom", with annual growth rates in the 1.0 – 1.5% range, and which peaked during the period 1962–1968 at 2.1% per year,<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> temporarily dispelled prior concerns about population decline, and the world was once again fearful of overpopulation. After 1968, the global population growth rate started a long decline. The Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) has reported that in the year 2023 it had dropped to about 0.9%,<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> less than half of its peak between 1962 and 1968. Although still growing, the UN predicts that global population will level out around 2084,<ref name="UN DESA-2024d">{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=World Population Prospects 2024, Standard Projections, Most Used, Compact File, Medium variant tab, Population Growth Rate (percentage) column |url=https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used |website=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division}}</ref> and some sources predict the start of a decline before then.<ref name="Coleman-2011"/><ref>{{cite journal |author1-last=Vollset |author1-first=E. |author2-last=Goren |author2-first=E. |author3-last=Yuan |author3-first=C.-W. |date=October 2020 |title=Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study |journal=The Lancet |location=London and New York |publisher=Elsevier |volume=396 |issue=10258 |pages=1285–1306 |doi=10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30677-2 |issn=1474-547X |lccn=sf82002015 |oclc=01755507 |pmc=7561721 |pmid=32679112 |s2cid=220516456}}</ref>

The principal cause of this phenomenon is the abrupt decline in the global total fertility rate, from 5.3 in 1963 to 2.2 in 2023, as the world continues to move through the stages of the demographic transition.<ref name="UN DESA-2024b">{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=World Population Prospects 2024, Standard Projections, Most Used, Compact File, Estimates tab, Total Fertility Rate column |url=https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used |website=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division}}</ref> The decline in the total fertility rate has occurred in every region of the world and has brought renewed concern for population decline, sparked by some demographers, journalists, politicians, and political economists.{{refn|<ref name="Lewis-Kraus"/><ref name="excess-mortality-covid"/><ref name="Atlantic 2024"/><ref name="Aitken 2024"/><ref name="CNN 2022"/><ref name="Hellstrand 2022"/><ref name="Coleman-2011"/><ref name="Eberstadt 2024"/><ref name="The Economist"/>}} The era of rapid global population increase, and concomitant concern about a population explosion, has been short compared with the span of human history.<ref name="Coleman-2011"/>

==Long-term future trends== {{Main|Human population projections}}

A long-term population decline is typically caused by sub-replacement fertility, coupled with a net immigration rate that fails to compensate for the excess of deaths over births.<ref name="Bonin">{{cite book|last=Bonin|first=Holger|title=Generational accounting: theory and application|publisher=Springer|year=2001|isbn=978-3-540-42266-2}}</ref> A long-term decline is accompanied by population aging and creates an increase in the ratio of retirees to workers and children.<ref name="Bonin"/> When a sub-replacement fertility rate remains constant, population decline accelerates over the long term.<ref name="Bonin"/> Because of the global decline in the fertility rate, projections published by the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) on the future of global population show a marked slowing of population growth and the possibility of long-term decline.<ref name="UN DESA-2024d"/>

The table below summarizes the UN projections for future population growth. Any such long-term projections are necessarily highly speculative. The UN divides the world into six regions. Under their projections, during the period 2045–2050, Europe's population will be in decline and all other regions will experience significant reductions in growth; then, by the end of the 21st century (the period 2095–2100), three of these regions will be showing population decline and global population will have peaked and started to decline. {| class="wikitable sortable" |+Annual percent change in population for three periods in the future<ref name="UN DESA-2024d"/> !Region !2022–27 !2045–50 !2095–2100 |- |Africa |2.3 |1.6 |0.4 |- |Asia |0.6 |0.2 | −0.5 |- |Europe | −0.1 | −0.3 | −0.3 |- |Latin America & the Caribbean |0.6 |0.1 | −0.6 |- |Northern America |0.6 |0.3 |0.2 |- |Oceania |1.1 |0.7 |0.3 |- |The World |0.9 |0.5 | - 0.1 |}

Note: the UN's methods for generating these numbers are explained at this reference.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=Methodology of the United Nations population estimates and projections |url=https://population.un.org/wpp/methodology |website=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs}}</ref>

The table shows UN predictions of long-term decline of population growth rates in every region; however, short-term baby booms and healthcare improvements, among other factors, can cause reversals of trends. Population declines in Russia (1994–2008), Germany (1974–1984), and Ireland (1850–1961) have seen long-term reversals.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> The United Kingdom, having seen almost zero growth during the period 1975–1985, is now (2015–2020) growing at 0.6% per year.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/>

Some scholars believe there exists a form of "cultural selection" that will significantly affect future demographics due to significant differences in fertility rates between cultures, such as within certain religious groups, that cannot be explained by factors such as income.<ref>{{cite journal |author1-last=Kolk |author1-first=M. |author2-last=Cownden |author2-first=D. |author3-last=Enquist |author3-first=M. |date=January 2014 |title=Correlations in fertility across generations: can low fertility persist? |editor-last=Hillston |editor-first=Jane |editor-link=Jane Hillston |journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |location=London |publisher=Royal Society |volume=281 |issue=1779 |article-number=20132561 |doi=10.1098/rspb.2013.2561 |issn=1471-2946 |pmc=3924067 |pmid=24478294}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author1-last=Burger |author1-first=Oskar |author2-last=DeLong |author2-first=John P. |date=March 2016 |title=What if fertility decline is not permanent? The need for an evolutionarily informed approach to understanding low fertility |editor-last=Hillston |editor-first=Jane |editor-link=Jane Hillston |journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |location=London |publisher=Royal Society |volume=371 |issue=1692 |article-number=20150157 |doi=10.1098/rstb.2015.0157 |issn=1471-2946 |pmid=27022084 |pmc=4822437}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=<!-- not stated --> |date=9 August 2008 |title=Population paradox: Europe's time bomb |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/population-paradox-europes-time-bomb-888030.html |url-status=live |editor-last=Alton |editor-first=Roger |editor-link=Roger Alton |work=The Independent |location=London |publisher=Independent Digital News & Media Ltd |issn=1741-9743 |oclc=185201487 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210415134227/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/population-paradox-europe-s-time-bomb-888030.html |archive-date=15 April 2021 |access-date=28 April 2026}}</ref> In the book ''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?'', Eric Kaufmann argues that demographic trends point to religious fundamentalists greatly increasing as a share of the population over the next century.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Shall the religious inherit the earth?|url=https://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/shall_the_religious_inherit_the_earth/|date=April 6, 2010|website=Mercator Net|access-date=February 27, 2020|archive-date=June 23, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190623040350/https://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/shall_the_religious_inherit_the_earth/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=McClendon|first=David|date=Autumn 2013|title=Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, by ERIC KAUFMANN|url=https://academic.oup.com/socrel/article-abstract/74/3/417/1640161|journal=Sociology of Religion|volume=74|issue=3|pages=417–9|doi=10.1093/socrel/srt026|url-access=subscription}}</ref> From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, it is expected that selection pressure should occur for whatever psychological or cultural traits maximize fertility.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Clarke | first1 = Alice L. | last2 = Low | first2 = Bobbi S. | year = 2001 | title = Testing evolutionary hypotheses with demographic data |journal = Population and Development Review | volume = 27 | issue = 4| pages = 633–660 | doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2001.00633.x| url = https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/74296/1/j.1728-4457.2001.00633.x.pdf | hdl = 2027.42/74296| hdl-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Daly |first1= Martin |last2=Wilson |first2=Margo I |title=Human evolutionary psychology and animal behaviour |journal= Animal Behaviour |url= http://courses.washington.edu/evpsych/Daly%26Wilson-HEP-AB1999.pdf |publisher= Department of Psychology, McMaster University |access-date=14 November 2018 |date=26 June 1998|volume= 57 |issue= 3 |pages= 509–519 |doi= 10.1006/anbe.1998.1027 |pmid= 10196040 |s2cid= 4007382 }}</ref><ref name="bbc_sure">[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19923200 Can we be sure the world's population will stop rising?], BBC News, 13 October 2012</ref>

==Possible consequences== {{Main|Economic consequences of population decline}} {{Further|Dependency ratio|Pensions crisis}}

Predictions of economic and other effects from a slow population decline due to low fertility rates are theoretical since such a phenomenon is unprecedented. Many studies say that the impact of population growth on economic growth is generally small and can be positive, negative, or nonexistent. A 2009 meta-study found no relationship between population growth and economic growth.<ref>{{cite journal|author1=Derek D. Headey|author2=Andrew Hodge|date=2009|title=The Effect of Population Growth on Economic Growth: A Meta-Regression Analysis of the Macroeconomic Literature|journal=Population and Development Review|volume=35|issue=2|pages=221–248|doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2009.00274.x|jstor=25487661}}</ref>

=== Possible negative effects === The effects of a declining population can be negative. As a country's population declines, GDP growth may grow even more slowly or decline. If that condition continues, a country would experience an economic recession. If these conditions become permanent, the country could find itself in a permanent recession.

Other possible negative impacts of a declining population are:

* A rise in the dependency ratio which would increase the economic pressure on the workforce * A loss of culture and the diminishment of trust among citizens<ref>{{Cite web|first=Robert|last=Putnam|date=2000|title=Bowling Alone|url=http://bowlingalone.com/}}</ref> * A crisis in end-of-life care for the elderly because there are insufficient caregivers for them<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kim|first=Tammy|date=Jan 25, 2011|title=Americans Will Struggle to Grow Old at Home|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-02-09/americans-will-struggle-to-grow-old-at-home|website=Bloomberg Businessweek}}</ref> * Difficulties in funding entitlement programs because there are fewer workers relative to retirees<ref name="Kotkin-2017">{{Cite web|last=Kotkin|first=Joel|date=Feb 1, 2017|title=Death Spiral Demographics: The Countries Shrinking The Fastest|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2017/02/01/death-spiral-demographics-the-countries-shrinking-the-fastest/#6ae9b591b83c|website=Forbes}}</ref> * A decline in military strength<ref name="Coleman-2011" /> * A decline in innovation since change comes from the young<ref name="Kotkin-2017"/> * A strain on mental health caused by permanent recession<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zivkin|first=K|date=Sep 14, 2010|title=Economic Downturns and Population Mental Health: Research Findings, Gaps, Challenges and Priorities|journal=Psychological Medicine|volume=41|issue=7|pages=1343–8|doi=10.1017/S003329171000173X|pmc=3846090|pmid=20836907}}</ref> * Deflation caused by the aging population<ref>{{Cite web|last=Anderson|first=Derek|date=Aug 4, 2014|title=Is Japan's Population Aging Deflationary?|url=https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14139.pdf|website=International Monetary Fund}}</ref>

All these negative effects could be summarized under the heading of "underpopulation". Underpopulation is usually defined as a state in which a country's population has declined too much to support its current economic system.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Rogers |first1=Alisdair |title=underpopulation |date=2013-09-19 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199599868.001.0001/acref-9780199599868-e-1945 |work=A Dictionary of Human Geography |access-date=2023-09-13 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |doi=10.1093/acref/9780199599868.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-959986-8 |last2=Castree |first2=Noel |last3=Kitchin |first3=Rob|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Population decline can cause internal population pressures that then lead to secondary effects such as ethnic conflict, forced refugee flows, and hyper-nationalism.<ref name="Nichiporuk-2000">{{Cite journal|title=The Evolving View of Population as a National Security Variable|url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1088/MR1088.chap2.html|website=Rand Corporation|date=January 2000|last1=Nichiporuk|first1=Brian}}</ref> This is particularly true in regions where different ethnic or racial groups have different growth rates.<ref name="Nichiporuk-2000" /> Low fertility rates that cause long-term population decline can also lead to population aging, an imbalance in the population age structure. Population aging in Europe due to low fertility rates has given rise to concerns about its impact on social cohesion.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Neyer|first=Gerda|date=June 3, 2003|title=Family Policies and Low Fertility in Western Europe|url=http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_6/3.Neyer.pdf|website=Journal of Population and Social Security (Population)}}</ref>

A smaller national population can also have geo-strategic effects, but the correlation between population and power is a tenuous one. Technology and resources often play more significant roles. Since World War II, the "static" theory saw a population's absolute size as being one of the components of a country's national power.<ref name="Nichiporuk-2000" /> More recently, the "human capital" theory has emerged. This view holds that the quality and skill level of a labor force and the technology and resources available to it are more important than simply a nation's population size.<ref name="Nichiporuk-2000" /> While there were in the past advantages to high fertility rates, that "demographic dividend" has now largely disappeared.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Adjusting to the fertility bust. What is the best response to declining populations?|last=Smeeding|first=Timothy M.|journal=Science|date=October 10, 2014|volume=346|issue=6206|pages=163–164|doi=10.1126/science.1260504|pmid=25301602|pmc=6102710}}</ref>

=== Possible positive effects === The effects of a declining population can be positive. The single best gauge of economic success is the growth of GDP per person, not total GDP.<ref name="The Economist-2008">{{cite news |date=13 March 2008 |title=Grossly distorted picture |url=http://www.economist.com/finance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=10852462 |access-date=16 September 2017 |newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> GDP per person (also known as GDP per capita or per capita GDP) is a rough proxy for average living standards.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Roser |first=Max |date=2019 |title=Economic Growth |url=https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth |journal=Our World in Data}}</ref> A country can both increase its average living standard and grow its total GDP even though its population growth is low or even negative. The economies of both Japan and Germany went into recovery around the time their populations began to decline (2003–2006). In other words, both the total and per capita GDP in both countries grew more rapidly after 2005 than before. Russia's economy also began to grow rapidly from 1999 onward, even though its population had been shrinking since 1992–93.<ref>Nicholas Eberstadt. 2005. "Russia, the Sick Man of Europe". Public Interest, Winter 2005 {{cite web |title=Russia, the sick man of Europe &#124; Public Interest &#124; Find Articles at BNET |url=http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0377/is_158/ai_n8680968 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080807171449/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0377/is_158/ai_n8680968 |archive-date=2008-08-07 |access-date=2008-09-26}}</ref> Many Eastern European countries have been experiencing similar effects to Russia. Such renewed growth calls into question the conventional wisdom that economic growth requires population growth, or that economic growth is impossible during a population decline.

More recently (2009–2017) Japan has experienced a higher growth of GDP per capita than the United States, even though its population declined over that period.<ref name="The Economist-2008"/> In the United States, the relationship between population growth and growth of GDP per capita has been found to be empirically insignificant.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Florida |first1=Richard |date=30 September 2013 |title=The Great Growth Disconnect: Population Growth Does Not Equal Economic Growth |url=https://www.citylab.com/life/2013/09/great-growth-disconnect-population-growth-does-not-equal-economic-growth/5860/ |newspaper=Bloomberg.com}}</ref> This evidence shows that individual prosperity can grow during periods of population decline.

Attempting to better understand the economic impact of these pluses and minuses, Lee et al. analyzed data from 40 countries. They found that typically fertility well above replacement and population growth would be most beneficial for government budgets. Fertility near replacement and population stability, however, would be most beneficial for standards of living when the analysis includes the effects of age structure on families as well as governments. Fertility moderately below replacement and population decline would maximize per capita consumption when the cost of providing capital for a growing labor force is taken into account.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Ronald |last2=Mason |first2=Andrew |last3=members of the NTA Network |date=10 October 2014 |title=Is Low Fertility Really a Problem? Population Aging, Dependency, and Consumption |url=http://ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/Science |journal=Science |volume=346 |issue=6206 |pages=229–234 |bibcode=2014Sci...346..229L |doi=10.1126/science.1250542 |pmc=4545628 |pmid=25301626}}</ref>

A focus on productivity growth that leads to an increase in both per capita GDP and total GDP can bring other benefits to:

*the workforce through higher wages, benefits and better working conditions *customers through lower prices *owners and shareholders through higher profits *the environment through more money for investment in more stringent environmental protection *governments through higher tax proceeds to fund government activities

Another approach to possible positive effects of population decline is to consider Earth's human carrying capacity. Global population decline would begin to counteract the negative effects of human overpopulation. There have been many estimates of Earth's carrying capacity, each generally predicting a high-low range of maximum human population possible. The lowest low estimate is less than one billion, the highest high estimate is over one trillion.<ref name="Cohen-1995">{{cite journal |last=Cohen |first=Joel E. |date=1995 |title=Population Growth and Earth's Human Carrying Capacity |url=http://lab.rockefeller.edu/cohenje/PDFs/226CohenHumanCacience19951.pdf |journal=Science |volume=269 |issue=5222 |pages=341–346 |bibcode=1995Sci...269..341C |doi=10.1126/science.7618100 |pmid=7618100}}</ref> A statistical analysis of these historical estimates revealed that the median of high estimates of all of the ranges would be 12 billion, and the median of low estimates would be about 8 billion.<ref name="Cohen-1995" /> According to this analysis, this planet may be entering a zone where its human carrying capacity could be exceeded.<ref name="Cohen-1995" /> However, the large variance in the estimates found in these studies diminishes our confidence in them, as such estimates are very difficult to make with current data and methods.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Carrying Capacity |url=https://worldpopulationhistory.org/carrying-capacity/ |access-date=2023-02-06 |website=World Population |language=en-US}}</ref>

==National efforts to confront declining populations== {{Further|Natalism|Artificial womb|Child tax credit}}

A country with a declining population will struggle to fund public services such as health care, old age benefits, defense, education, water and sewage infrastructure, etc.<ref name="The Economist-2018">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/international/2018/05/05/many-countries-suffer-from-shrinking-working-age-populations|title=Many countries suffer from shrinking working-age populations|date=May 5, 2018|newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> To maintain some level of economic growth and continue to improve its citizens' quality of life, national efforts to confront declining populations will tend to focus on the threat of a declining GDP. Because a country's GDP is dependent on the size and productivity of its workforce, a country confronted with a declining population, will focus on increasing the size and productivity of that workforce.

=== Increase the size of the workforce === A country's workforce is that segment of its working-age population that is employed. Working age population is generally defined as those people aged 15–64.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://data.oecd.org/pop/working-age-population.htm|title=Working age population|date=2020|website=OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)}}</ref>

Policies that could increase the size of the workforce include:

==== Natalism ==== Natalism is a set of government policies and cultural changes that promote parenthood and encourage women to bear more children. These generally fall into three broad categories:<ref>{{Cite web|last=Straughan|first=Paulin Tay|date=2008|title=Very low fertility in Pacific Asian Countries: Causes and policy responses|url=https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3467&context=soss_research|website=Singapore Management University|page=8}}</ref>

# Financial incentives. These may include child benefits and other public transfers that help families cover the cost of children. # Support for parents to combine family and work. This includes maternity-leave policies, parental-leave policies that grant (by law) leaves of absence from work to care for their children, and childcare services. # Broad social change that encourages children and parenting

For example, Sweden built up an extensive welfare state from the 1930s and onward, partly as a consequence of the debate following "Crisis in the Population Question", published in 1934. Today, (2017) Sweden has extensive parental leave that allows parents to share 16 months of paid leave per child, the cost divided between both employer and State.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Crisp|first=James|date=December 20, 2017|title=Take five months parental leave, Swedish fathers told|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/19/take-five-months-parental-leave-swedish-fathers-told/ |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/19/take-five-months-parental-leave-swedish-fathers-told/ |archive-date=2022-01-12 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|website=The Telegraph}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

Other examples include Romania's natalist policy during the 1967–90 period and Poland's 500+ program.<ref>{{Cite web|date=March 19, 2019|title=Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki: The "500+" Programme is an investment in Poland's future|url=https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-the-500-programme-is-an-investment-in-polands-future.html|website=premier.gov.pl}}</ref>

==== Encourage women to join the workforce ==== Encouraging those women in the working-age population who are not working to find jobs would increase the size of the workforce.<ref name="The Economist-2018" /> Female participation in the workforce currently (2018) lags men's in all but three countries worldwide.<ref name="The Economist-2018" /> Among developed countries, the workforce participation gap between men and women can be especially wide. For example, currently (2018), in South Korea 59% of women work compared with 79% of men,<ref name="The Economist-2018" /> and currently (2023) in India, only 33% of women are working.<ref>{{Cite news |date=Apr 25, 2024 |title=Can women-only factories help more Indian women into work? |url=https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/04/25/can-women-only-factories-help-more-indian-women-into-work |newspaper=The Economist}}</ref>

However, even assuming that more women would want to join the workforce, increasing their participation would give these countries only a short-term increase in their workforce, because at some point a participation ceiling is reached, further increases are not possible, and the impact on GDP growth ceases.

==== Stop the decline of men in the workforce ==== In the United States, the labor force participation of men has been falling since the late 1960s.<ref name="Rothstein-2019">{{Cite web|last=Rothstein|first=Donna|date=August 2019|title=Men who do not work during their prime years: What do the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth data reveal?|url=https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-8/male-nonworkers-nlsy.htm|publisher=U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics}}</ref> The labor force participation rate is the ratio between the size of the workforce and the size of the working-age population. In 1969 the labor force participation rate of men in their prime years of 25–54 was 96% and in 2023 was 89%.<ref name="Rothstein-2019" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=Aug 29, 2024 |title=Employment Projections |url=https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm |website=Bureau of Labor Statistics}}</ref>

==== Raise the retirement age ==== Raising the retirement age has the effect of increasing the working-age population,<ref name="The Economist-2018" /> but raising the retirement age requires other policy and cultural changes if it is to have any impact on the size of the workforce:

# Pension reform. Many retirement policies encourage early retirement. For example, in 2018 less than 10% of Europeans between ages 64–74 were employed.<ref name="The Economist-2018" /> Instead of encouraging work after retirement, many public pension plans restrict earnings or hours of work.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fitzpatrick|first=Maria D.|date=November 2018|title=Pension Reform and Return to Work Policies|url=https://www.nber.org/papers/w25299|website=The National Bureau of Economic Research|series=Working Paper Series |doi=10.3386/w25299|s2cid=239843977|url-access=subscription}}</ref> # Workplace cultural reform. Employer attitudes towards older workers must change. Extending working lives will require investment in training and working conditions to maintain the productivity of older workers.<ref name="The Economist-2018" />

One study estimated that increasing the retirement age by 2–3 years per decade between 2010 and 2050 would offset declining working-age populations faced by "old" countries such as Germany and Japan.<ref name="The Economist-2018" /> ==== Increase immigration ==== A country can increase the size of its workforce by importing more migrants into their working age population.<ref name="The Economist-2018" /> Even if the indigenous workforce is declining, qualified immigrants can reduce or even reverse this decline. However, this policy can only work if the immigrants can join the workforce and if the indigenous population accepts them.<ref name="The Economist-2018" />

For example, starting in 2019 Japan, a country with a declining workforce, will allow five-year visas for 250,000 unskilled guest workers. Under the new measure, between 260,000 and 345,000 five-year visas will be made available for workers in 14 sectors suffering severe labor shortages, including caregiving, construction, agriculture and shipbuilding.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Rich|first=Motoko|date=December 7, 2018|title=Bucking a Global Trend, Japan Seeks More Immigrants. Ambivalently.|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/world/asia/japan-parliament-foreign-workers.html|website=The New York Times}}</ref>

==== Reduce emigration ==== Long-term persistent emigration, often caused by what is called "Brain Drain", is often one of the major causes of a county's population decline. However, research has also found that emigration can have net positive effects on sending countries, so this would argue against any attempts to reduce it.

=== Increase the productivity of the workforce === {{See also|Automation}}

Development economists would call increasing the size of the workforce "extensive growth". They would call increasing the productivity of that workforce "intensive growth". In this case, GDP growth is driven by increased output per worker, and by extension, increased GDP/capita.<ref name="The Economist-2013">{{Cite news|date=January 12, 2013|title=Has the ideas machine broken down?|url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2013/01/12/has-the-ideas-machine-broken-down|newspaper=The Economist}}</ref>

In the context of a stable or declining population, increasing workforce productivity is better than mostly short-term efforts to increase the size of the workforce. Economic theory predicts that in the long term, most growth will be attributable to intensive growth, that is, new technology and new and better ways of doing things plus the addition of capital and education to spread them to the workforce.<ref name="The Economist-2013" />

Increasing workforce productivity through intensive growth can only succeed if workers who become unemployed through the introduction of new technology can be retrained so that they can keep their skills current and not be left behind. Otherwise, the result is technological unemployment.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Brynjolfsson|first1=Erik|title=Race Against The Machine: How the Digital Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy|last2=McAfee|first2=Andrew|publisher=Digital Frontier Press|year=2011}}</ref> Funding for worker retraining could come from a robot tax, although the idea is controversial.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Rubin|first=Richard|date=January 8, 2020|title=The "Robot Tax" Debate Heats Up|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-robot-tax-debate-heats-up-11578495608|website=The Wall Street Journal}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Delaney|first=Kevin|date=February 17, 2017|title=The robot that takes your job should pay taxes, says Bill Gates|url=https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes/|website=QUARTZ}}</ref>

==Contemporary decline by country== The table below shows the countries that have been affected by population decline between 2010 and 2020. The term "population" used here is based on the ''de facto'' definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. This means that population growth in this table includes net changes from immigration and emigration. For a table of natural population changes, see the list of countries by natural increase.

{| class="wikitable sortable" |+Population decline by country !rowspan=2|Country<br />or region !rowspan=2 data-sort-type="number"|2010 population estimate !rowspan=2 data-sort-type="number"|2020 population estimate !colspan=2|Average annual rate of<br />population change (%) |- !2010–2015<ref name="UN DESA-2024a" /> !2015–2020<ref name="UN DESA-2024a" /> |- |{{flagicon|Andorra}} Andorra | 73,600 |77,543 | −0.2 | +1.5 |- |{{flagicon|Albania}} Albania | 2,913,018 |2,877,797 | −0.2 | −0.1 |- |{{flagicon|Armenia}} Armenia | 3,073,000 |2,959,000 | −0.0 | −0.0 |- |{{flagicon|Belarus}} Belarus | 9,495,608 |9,410,259 | −0.1 | −0.1 |- |{{flagicon|Bosnia-Herzegovina}} Bosnia and Herzegovina | 3,488,441 | 3,276,845 | −1.6 | −1.2 |- |{{flagicon|Bulgaria}} Bulgaria | 7,504,868 |6,520,314 | −0.8 | −0.9 |- |{{flagicon|Croatia}} Croatia | 4,295,427 |4,105,267 | −0.5 | −0.8 |- |{{flagicon|Cuba}} Cuba | 11,167,934 |11,181,595 | +0.1 | −0.1 |- |{{flagicon|Estonia}} Estonia | 1,332,000 | 1,326,804 | −0.2 | +0.2 |- |{{flagicon|Georgia}} Georgia<ref group="Note" name="tablenote-georgia"/> | 4,087,379 |3,989,167 | −0.3 | −0.0 |- |{{flagicon|Greece}} Greece | 11,119,102 |10,423,054 | −0.4 | −0.6 |- |{{flagicon|Hungary}} Hungary | 10,014,000 |9,660,351 | 0.3 | −0.2 |- |{{flagicon|Italy}} Italy | 59,277,000 |60,461,826 | +0.1 | −0.3 |- |{{flagicon|Japan}} Japan | 128,057,352 |126,476,461 | −0.1 | −0.3 |- |{{flagicon|Latvia}} Latvia | 2,120,504 |1,864,884 | −1.1 | −1.0 |- |{{flagicon|Lithuania}} Lithuania | 3,141,976 |2,678,864 | −1.2 | −1.0 |- |{{flagicon|Moldova}} Moldova<ref group="Note" name="tablenote-moldova"/> | 4,081,000 |3,100,930 | −2.2 | −1.2 |- |{{flagicon|North Macedonia}} North Macedonia | 1,946,298 |1,856,124 | −0.3 | −0.6 |- |{{flagicon|Poland}} Poland | 38,529,866 |37,846,611 | −0.0 | −0.1 |- |{{flagicon|Portugal}} Portugal | 10,572,721 |10,196,709 | −0.4 | −0.1 |- |{{flagicon|Puerto Rico}} Puerto Rico | 3,722,000 |3,285,874 | −1.4 | −1.1 |- |{{flagicon|Romania}} Romania | 20,246,798 |19,237,691 | −0.5 | −0.5 |- |{{flagicon|Serbia}} Serbia | 7,291,436 | 6,740,936 | −0.4 | −0.4 |- |{{flagicon|Spain}} Spain | 46,486,621 | 46,745,896 | −0.0 | +0.3 |- |{{flagicon|Syria}} Syria | 22,338,000 | 18,207,894 | −2.6 | +1.3 |- |{{flagicon|Ukraine}} Ukraine | 45,962,947 | 41,390,728 | −0.3 | −0.5 |- |{{flagicon|Venezuela}} Venezuela | 27,244,464 | 28,609,886 | +1.2 | −1.1 |- | Total | 489,583,360 | 474,509,310 |}

<references group="Note"> <ref name="tablenote-georgia">Figure includes Abkhazia and South Ossetia.</ref> <ref name="tablenote-moldova">Includes the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.</ref>

</references>

===East Asia===

==== China ==== China's population peaked at 1.43 billion in 2021 and began declining in 2022.<ref name="UN DESA-2024c"/><ref>{{Cite web |last=Gorvett |first=Zaria |date=January 18, 2023 |title=What will China's population drop mean for the world? |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20230118-is-chinas-population-decline-surprising |website=BBC Future}}</ref> China recorded more deaths than births for the first time in 2022 with a net decrease of 850,000 and this trend continued in 2023 when deaths overnumbered births by a margin of more than 1 million<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gorvett |first=Zaria |date=January 17, 2024 |title=China population decline accelerates as birthrate hits record low |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/17/china-population-decline-accelerates-as-birthrate-hits-record-low# |website=The Guardian}}</ref> and in 2024 with deaths overnumbering births by 1.4 million.<ref>{{Cite web |date=January 17, 2025 |title=China's population falls for a third consecutive year |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-population-falls-third-consecutive-year-2025-01-17/ |website=Reuters}}</ref> The Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, assuming that China's total fertility rate will rise from 1.0 in 2023 to 1.35 by 2100, projects its population to fall to 639 million by 2100, a decline of about 54%.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/><ref name="UN DESA-2024c"/>

====Japan==== {{main|Aging of Japan}} [[File:Abandoned House Collapsed from snow Hokkaido.jpg|thumb|An abandoned house in Yubari district, Hokkaido, an area which has suffered sharp population decline]]

Though Japan's natural increase turned negative as early as 2005,<ref>{{cite news |title=Japan's Population Fell This Year, Sooner Than Expected |work=The New York Times |date=24 December 2005}}</ref> the 2010 census result figure was slightly higher, at just above 128 million,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/Csvdl.do?sinfid=000008640423|title=政府統計の総合窓口 GL08020104|website=www.e-stat.go.jp|access-date=2 March 2011|archive-date=6 March 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110306160500/http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/Csvdl.do?sinfid=000008640423|url-status=dead}}</ref> than the 2005 census. Factors implicated in the puzzling figures were more Japanese returnees than expected as well as changes in the methodology of data collection. However, the official count put the population as of October 1, 2015, at 127.1 million, down by 947,000 or 0.7% from the previous quinquennial census.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-shrinking-of-japan-1456482692|title=Japan's Net Loss: 947,000 People|first=Jun|last=Hongo|newspaper=Wall Street Journal|date=26 February 2016|access-date=16 September 2017|via=www.wsj.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/tsuki/index.htm|title=Statistics Bureau Home Page/Population Estimates Monthly Report|website=www.stat.go.jp|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> The gender ratio is increasingly skewed; some 106 women per 100 men live in Japan. In 2019, Japan's population fell by a record-breaking 276,000; if immigration is excluded from the figures, the drop would have been 487,000.<ref>{{cite news|title=Japan's shrinking population suffers new record decline|work=The Times|access-date=May 8, 2020|url=https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/world/japans-population-on-course-to-fall-by-a-third-in-50-years-vrp7t0kks|last1=Parry|first1=Richard Lloyd}}</ref> Given the population boom of the 1950s and 1960s, the total population is still 52% above 1950 levels.<ref name="geohive"/> The UN's Population Division, assuming that Japan's total fertility rate will rise from 1.2 in 2023 to 1.47 by 2100, projects its population to fall to 77 million by 2100, a decline of about 38%.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/><ref name="UN DESA-2024c"/>

====South Korea==== {{see also|Demographics of South Korea}} South Korea's total fertility rate has been consistently lower than that of Japan, breaking below 1 in 2018, and fell to 0.778 in 2022. As a result, its population fell in 2020 for the first time in the country's history from 51.8 million in 2020 to 51.6 in 2022.<ref>{{Cite web|date=February 24, 2021|title=South Korea's fertility rate falls to lowest in the world|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-fertility-rate-idUSKBN2AO0UH|website=Reuters}}</ref> The UN's Population Division, assuming that South Korea's total fertility rate will rise from 0.72 in 2023 to 1.3 by 2100, projects its population to fall to nearly 22 million by 2100, a decline of about 58%.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/><ref name="UN DESA-2024c"/>

====Taiwan==== {{see also|Demographics of Taiwan}} Taiwan recorded more deaths than births for the first time in 2020, despite recording virtually no COVID-19 deaths,<ref>{{cite news |title=Taiwan saw 12,000 more deaths than births in first quarter of 2021 |url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4173614 |access-date=29 July 2021 |agency=Taiwan News |date=10 April 2021}}</ref> thus starting an era of demographic decline for the foreseeable future. Taiwan's population fell from 23.6 million in 2020 to 23.4 in 2023, while the total fertility rate decreased from 1.05 in 2020 to 0.85 in 2023. The UN's Population Division, assuming that Taiwan's total fertility rate will rise from 0.87 in 2023 to 1.33 by 2100, projects its population to fall to 10 million by 2100, a decline of about 57%.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/><ref name="UN DESA-2024c"/>

====Thailand==== {{see also|Demographics of Thailand}}

Thailand's total fertility rate has been consistently lower than the replacement rate of 2.1 since the beginning of the 1990s and reached a new low in 2022, at 1. Thailand's population decline started in 2020 and Thailand for the first time recorded more deaths than births in 2021. This negative natural population change amplified in 2022 and 2023 and, in the absence of substantial immigration, this trend will continue in the coming years due to the very low fertility rate.

===Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics=== {{main|Aging of Europe|Russian Cross}} [[File:Countries by rate of natural increase.svg|thumb|The natural population change, from the CIA World Factbook, 2025: {| border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:100%;" |- |valign="top"| {{Legend|#8B0000|35 and up}} {{Legend|#D32F2F|30 to 34.9}} {{Legend|#E57373|25 to 29.9}} {{Legend|#FF8A65|20 to 24.9}} {{Legend|#FFB74D|15 to 19.9}} {{Legend|#FFD54F|10 to 14.9}} |valign="top"| {{Legend|#FFEE58|5 to 9.9}} {{Legend|#FFF9C4|0 to 4.9}} {{Legend|#A6CEE3|-5 to -0.1}} {{Legend|#4F81BD|-10 to -5.1}} {{Legend|#1C4E80|-11.4 (Ukraine)}} {{Legend|#C0C0C0|No data}} |} ]] Population in the ex-USSR and Eastern Europe is rapidly shrinking due to low birth rates, very high death rates (linked to alcoholism<ref>{{cite news |title=Communism continues to cause heavy drinking in Eastern European countries |url=https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-10-heavy-eastern-european-countries.html |access-date=8 May 2020 |publisher=University of Kent |date=18 October 2018}}</ref> and high rates of infectious diseases such as AIDS<ref>{{cite web |title=HIV and AIDS in Eastern Europe & Central Asia Overview |url=https://www.avert.org/hiv-and-aids-eastern-europe-central-asia-overview |website=www.avert.org |date=4 April 2017 |publisher=Avert |access-date=8 May 2020}}</ref> and TB<ref>{{cite news |title=Report: Tuberculosis still raging in Eastern Europe |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/health-consumers/news/report-tuberculosis-still-raging-in-eastern-europe/ |access-date=8 May 2020 |publisher=Euractiv |date=17 March 2015}}</ref>), as well as high emigration rates. In Russia and the former communist bloc, birth rates fell abruptly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and death rates generally rose sharply. In addition, in the 25 years after 1989, some 20 million people from Eastern Europe are estimated to have migrated to Western Europe or the United States.<ref>{{cite web |title=Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe |url=https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2016/12/31/Emigration-and-Its-Economic-Impact-on-Eastern-Europe-42896|publisher=International Monetary Fund |access-date=8 May 2020}}</ref>

====Belarus==== Belarus's population peaked at 10,151,806 in the 1989 Census and declined to 9,480,868 as of 2015 as estimated by the state statistical service.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.belta.by/en/news/society?id=688366|archive-url=https://archive.today/20121203093137/http://news.belta.by/en/news/society?id=688366|archive-date=2012-12-03|title=Belarus population at 9,457,500 as of 1 July 2012 - Society / News / …}}</ref> This represents a 7.1% decline since the peak census figure.

====Estonia==== In the last Soviet census of 1989, it had a population of 1,565,662, which was close to its peak population.<ref name="citypop estonia">{{cite web|url=http://www.citypopulation.de/Estonia.html|title=Estonia: Regions, Municipalities, Cities and Towns – Population Statistics in Maps and Charts|website=www.citypopulation.de|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> The state statistics reported an estimate of 1,314,370 for 2016.<ref name="citypop estonia"/> This represents a 19.2% decline since the peak census figure.

====Georgia==== In the last Soviet census of 1989, it had a population of 5,400,841, which was close to its peak population.<ref name="citypop georgia">{{cite web|url=http://www.citypopulation.de/Georgia.html|title=Georgia: Regions, Major Cities & Urban Settlements – Population Statistics in Maps and Charts|website=www.citypopulation.de|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> The state statistics reported an estimate of 4,010,000 for the 2014 Census, which includes estimated numbers for quasi-independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<ref name="citypop georgia"/> This represents a 25.7% decline since the peak census figure, but nevertheless somewhat higher than the 1950 population.

====Latvia==== When Latvia split from the Soviet Union, it had a population of 2,666,567, which was very close to its peak population.<ref name="citypop latvia">{{cite web|url=http://www.citypopulation.de/Latvia.html|title=Latvia: Regions, Municipalities, Cities and Towns – Population Statistics in Maps and Charts|website=www.citypopulation.de|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> The latest census recorded a population of 2,067,887 in 2011, while the state statistics reported an estimate of 1,986,086 for 2015.<ref name="citypop latvia"/> This represents a 25.5% decline since the peak census figure, with only one of two nations worldwide falling below 1950 levels. The decline is caused by both a negative natural population growth (more deaths than births) and a negative net migration rate. As of 1 May 2024, Latvia had a total population of 1,862,700.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://data.stat.gov.lv/pxweb/en/OSP_PUB/START__POP__IR__IRS/IRS010m/table/tableViewLayout1/|title=Latvijas oficiālā populācijas statistika|website=data.stat.gov.lv|access-date=1 May 2024}}</ref>

====Lithuania==== When Lithuania split from the Soviet Union, it had a population of 3.7 million, which was close to its peak population.<ref name="bizweek">{{cite web |url=http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9N8JV6G0.htm |title=Lithuanian census shows steep fall in population - BusinessWeek |access-date=2011-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110525021143/http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9N8JV6G0.htm |archive-date=2011-05-25 }}</ref> The latest census recorded a population of 3.05 million in 2011, down from 3.4 million in 2001,<ref name="bizweek"/> further falling to 2,988,000 on September 1, 2012.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/31907/ |title=Lithuania's population less than 3 million}}</ref> This represents a 23.8% decline since the peak census figure, and some 13.7% since 2001.

====Ukraine==== [[File:MALTESER Ukrainehilfe (51926526000).jpg|thumb|upright|Ukrainian refugees entering Romania, 5 March 2022]]

The Ukrainian census in 1989 resulted in 51,452,034 people.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_79.php |title=Демоскоп Weekly - Приложение. Справочник статистических показателей |access-date=2009-01-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100324145212/http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_79.php |archive-date=2010-03-24 }}</ref> Ukraine's own estimates show a peak of 52,244,000 people in 1993;<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/ds/nas_rik/nas_e/nas_rik_e.html |title=Population |access-date=2012-08-05 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120805214701/http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/ds/nas_rik/nas_e/nas_rik_e.html |archive-date=2012-08-05 }}</ref> however, this number has plummeted to 45,439,822 as of December 1, 2013.<ref>[http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2013/fin/ds/kn/kn_e/kn0213_e.html]{{dead link|date=October 2016}} Statistical Table Dec 2013</ref> Having lost Crimean territory to Russia in early 2014 and subsequently experiencing war, the population dropped to 42,981,850 as of August 2014.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2014/ds/kn/kn_e/kn0814_e.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141013202407/http://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2014/ds/kn/kn_e/kn0814_e.html|url-status=usurped|archive-date=13 October 2014|title=Population (by estimate) as of August 1, 2014. Average annual populations January–July 2014|website=ukrstat.org|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> This represents a 19.7% decrease in total population since the peak figure, but 16.8% above the 1950 population even without Crimea.<ref name="geohive">{{cite web|url=http://www.geohive.com/|title=registered through Argeweb|website=www.geohive.com}}</ref> Its absolute total decline (9,263,000) since its peak population is the highest of all nations; this includes loss of territory and heavy net emigration. Eastern Ukraine may yet lose many Russian-speaking citizens due to the new Russian citizenship law.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://rbth.com/international/2014/07/09/un_confirms_flight_of_500000_ukrainian_refugees_to_russia_38063.html|title=UN confirms flight of Ukrainian refugees to Russia|first=Marina|last=Obrazkova|date=9 July 2014|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> An editorial projects significant gender and age imbalance in the population in Ukraine as a substantial problem if most refugees, as in other cases, do not return over time.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Matsuura |first1=Hiroaki |title=Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the future demographic crisis |journal=Biodemography and Social Biology |date=2 January 2022 |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=1–2 |doi=10.1080/19485565.2022.2061524 |pmid=35379045 |s2cid=247953665 |issn=1948-5565|doi-access=free }}</ref> Approximately 3.8 million more people have left the country during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine,<ref name="UNHCR-numbers">{{cite web|title=Refugees fleeing Ukraine (since 24 February 2022)|work=UNHCR|url=https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine|date=2022|access-date=23 March 2022|archive-date=10 March 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220310051210/https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine|url-status=live}}</ref> and thousands have died in the conflict.<ref>{{cite news |title='Terrible toll': Russia's invasion of Ukraine in numbers |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/terrible-toll-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-in-numbers/ |work=Euractiv |date=14 February 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Hussain |first1=Murtaza |title=The War in Ukraine Is Just Getting Started |url=https://theintercept.com/2023/03/09/ukraine-war-russia-iran-iraq/ |work=The Intercept |date=9 March 2023}}</ref>

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine considerably deepened the country's demographic crisis. The birth rate in Ukraine was 28% lower in the first six months of 2023 compared to the same period in 2021.<ref>{{cite news |title=Ukraine's birth rate plummets in aftermath of Russian invasion, data shows |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/02/ukraines-birth-rate-plummets-in-aftermath-of-russian-invasion-data-shows |work=The Guardian |date=2 August 2023}}</ref> A July 2023 study by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies stated that "[r]egardless of how long the war lasts and whether or not there is further military escalation, Ukraine is unlikely to recover demographically from the consequences of the war. Even in 2040 it will have only about 35 million inhabitants, around 20% fewer than before the war (2021: 42.8 million) and the decline in the working-age population is likely to be the most severe and far-reaching."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Knapp |first1=Andreas |title=Ukraine: Population loss endangers reconstruction |url=https://wiiw.ac.at/ukraine-population-loss-endangers-reconstruction-n-603.html |website=WIIW |date=13 July 2023}}</ref>

====Hungary==== Hungary's population peaked in 1980, at 10,709,000,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_long/h_wdsd001a.html|title=STADAT – 1.1. Population, vital statistics (1900–)|website=portal.ksh.hu|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> and has continued its decline to under 10 million as of August 2010.<ref>{{cite news| url=https://blogs.wsj.com/new-europe/2010/10/28/hungarian-population-falls-below-10-million/ | work=The Wall Street Journal | first=Veronika | last=Gulyas | title=Hungarian Population Falls Below 10 Million | date=October 28, 2010}}</ref> This represents a decline of 7.1% since its peak; however, compared to neighbors situated to the East, Hungary peaked almost a decade earlier yet the rate has been far more modest, averaging −0.23% a year over the period.

===Balkans===

====Albania==== Albania's population in 1989 recorded 3,182,417 people, the largest for any census. Since then, its population declined to an estimated 2,893,005 in January 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.citypopulation.de/Albania.html|title=Albania: Prefectures, Municipalities, Municipal Units, Cities and Agglomerations – Population Statistics in Maps and Charts|website=www.citypopulation.de|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> The decline has since accelerated with a 1.3% drop in population reported in 2021 leaving a total population of 2.79 million.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.instat.gov.al/media/9828/popullsia-me-1-janar-2022_final-15-04-2022.pdf|title=Popullsia e Shqipërisë|website=www.instat.gov.al/|access-date=17 April 2021}}</ref> This represents a decrease of 12% in total population since the peak census figure.

====Bosnia and Herzegovina==== Bosnia and Herzegovina's population peaked at 4,377,033 in the 1991 Census, shortly before the Yugoslav wars that produced tens of thousands of civilian victims and refugees. The latest census of 2016 reported a population of 3,511,372.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bhas.ba/tematskibilteni/DEM_00_2016_TB_0_BS.pdf|title=Demography 2016|access-date=24 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181114162731/http://www.bhas.ba/tematskibilteni/DEM_00_2016_TB_0_BS.pdf|archive-date=14 November 2018}}</ref> This represents a 19.8% decline since the peak census figure.

====Bulgaria==== Bulgaria's population declined from a peak of 9,009,018 in 1989 and since 2001, has lost yet another 600,000 people, according to 2011 census preliminary figures to no more than 7.3 million,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.sofiaecho.com/2011/03/01/1052038_bulgarian-population-shrinks-by-about-600-000|title=Kapital Quarterly|last=Capital.bg|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> further down to 7,245,000. This represents a 24.3% decrease in total population since the peak and a −0.82% annual rate in the last 10 years.

The Bulgarian population has fallen by more than 844,000 people, or 11.5 percent, in the last decade, the National Institute of Statistics in Sofia said during a presentation of the results so far of the 2021 census, the first since 2011. The country currently employs just over 6.5 million people, compared to 7.3 million in the previous workforce.

====Croatia==== Croatia's population declined from 4,784,265 in 1991<ref>Croatian Bureau of Statistics [http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/pxweb2003/database/Naselja%20i%20stanovnistvo%20Republike%20Hrvatske/Naselja%20i%20stanovnistvo%20Republike%20Hrvatske.asp Naselja i stanovništvo Republike Hrvatske 1857.-2001. (eng. Settlements and Population of Croatia 1857–2001) (in Croatian)] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120505110305/http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/pxweb2003/database/Naselja%20i%20stanovnistvo%20Republike%20Hrvatske/Naselja%20i%20stanovnistvo%20Republike%20Hrvatske.asp |date=May 5, 2012 }}, retrieved 7 July 2013</ref> to 4,456,096<ref>Croatian Bureau of Statistics [http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/SI-1441.pdf Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011, First Results by Settlements (PDF file)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140819030849/http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/SI-1441.pdf |date=19 August 2014 }}, retrieved 7 July 2013</ref> (by the old statistical method) of which 4,284,889<ref name="Census 2011 counties">{{Croatian Census 2011|S}}</ref> are permanent residents (by the new statistical method), in 2011, a decline of 8% (11.5% by the new definition of permanent residency in 2011 census). The main reasons for the decline since 1991 are: low birth rates, emigration and war in Croatia. From 2001 and 2011 main reason for the drop in population is due to a difference in the definition of permanent residency used in censuses till 2001 (censuses of 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001) and the one used in 2011.<ref name="Notes on methodology Census 2011">Croatian Bureau of Statistics [http://www.dzs.hr/Eng/censuses/census2011/results/censusmetod.htm Notes on methodology (Census 2011)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210925211344/https://www.dzs.hr/Eng/censuses/census2011/results/censusmetod.htm |date=25 September 2021 }}, retrieved 7 July 2013</ref> By 2021 the population dropped to 3,888,529, a 9.25% decrease from 2011 numbers.

====Greece==== Greece's population declined by about half a million people between its 2011 and 2021 censuses. The main drivers are increased emigration rates and lower birth rates following the 2008 financial crisis.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://greekreporter.com/2021/10/02/greek-population-declined-half-a-million-decade/|title=Greek Population Has Declined by Up to Half a Million in a Decade|publisher=Greek Reporter|date=2 October 2021|access-date=6 December 2021}}</ref>

====Romania==== Romania's 1991 census showed 23,185,084 people, and the October 2011 census recorded 20,121,641 people, while the state statistical estimate for 2014 is 19,947,311.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://citypopulation.de/Romania-Cities.html|title=Romania: Counties and Major Cities – Population Statistics in Maps and Charts|website=citypopulation.de|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> This represents a decrease of 16.2% since the historical peak in 1991.

====Serbia==== Serbia recorded a peak census population of 7,822,795 in 1991 in the Yugoslav era, falling to 7,186,862 in the 2011 census.<ref>{{cite book |url=http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/userFiles/file/Aktuelnosti/Nacionalna%20pripadnost-Ethnicity.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121202075324/http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/userFiles/file/Aktuelnosti/Nacionalna%20pripadnost-Ethnicity.pdf |archive-date=2 December 2012 |trans-title=Ethnicity: Data by municipalities and cities |date=2012 |script-title=sr:НАЦИОНАЛНА ПРИПАДНОСТ: Подаци по општинама и градовима |publisher=Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia |isbn=978-86-6161-025-7 |language=sr,en |page=14 |access-date=9 January 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> That represents a decline of 5.1% since its peak census figure.

=== Other ===

==== Italy ==== Although Italy had recorded more deaths than births continuously since 1993, the country's population only peaked in 2015 at 60,796,000 due to substantial immigration. The Italian population fell by a record amount in 2020,<ref>{{cite news|last=Salzano|first=Giovanni|date=March 26, 2021|title=Italy's Population Fell the Most in Over 100 Years in 2020|work=Bloomberg|agency=|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-26/italy-s-population-falls-most-in-over-100-years-in-2020|access-date=29 July 2021}}</ref> and in 2021, it recorded the lowest number of births since its unification in 1861 at only 399,431, with its population being projected to shrink to 47.2 million in 2070, a decline of nearly 20 percent.<ref>{{cite news |date=22 September 2022 |title=Italy's population could shrink by 11.5 mln by 2070 - statistics agency|publisher=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-population-could-shrink-by-115-mln-by-2070-statistics-agency-2022-09-22/ |access-date=2024-07-17}}</ref>

As of April 2024, Italian population stands at 58,968,501 inhabitants.<ref>{{cite news |date=30 April 2024 |title=Italy population 2024 |publisher=Istat. Instituto Nazionale di Statistica |url=https://demo.istat.it/app/?l=en&a=2024&i=D7B |access-date=2024-03-27}}</ref> The UN's Population Division, assuming that Italy's total fertility rate will rise from 1.2 in 2024 to 1.5 by 2100, projects its population to be 35.5 million by 2100, a decline of about 40%.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/>

==== Uruguay ==== Uruguay's fertility rate had been consistently low in Latin America since the 20th century at 3 children per women, with the fertility rates in Latin American countries converging at 2 children beginning in the 1990s, but Uruguay's fertility rate declined sharply from 2 in 2015 to 1.28 in 2022, largely due to decreased births to women under 20.<ref>{{Cite web |date=6 March 2024 |title=The big decline: Lowest-low fertility in Uruguay (2016–2021) |url=https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol50/16/50-16.pdf|website=Demographic Research}}</ref> Uruguay recorded more deaths than births for the first time in 2021 and the population decline has been only offset slightly by immigration.<ref>{{Cite web |date=6 December 2023 |title=Are Uruguayans on the verge of extinction?|url=https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-12-05/are-uruguayans-on-the-verge-of-extinction.html|website=El País}}</ref>

==== Venezuela ==== In spite of a positive natural increase of almost 1% per year,<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> Venezuela's population has declined during the 2015-20 period due to emigration caused by threats of violence as well as shortages of basic needs.<ref>{{Cite web |date=September 21, 2022 |title=Explainer: So, why are so many Venezuelans leaving their country? |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/explainer-so-why-are-so-many-venezuelans-leaving-their-country/ |website=CBS Miami}}</ref>

==Resumed declines==

=== Russia === {{Further|Russian Cross|Aging of Russia}} [[File:Deserted village at Sukhona River.jpg|thumb|Thousands of abandoned villages are scattered across Russia.<ref>{{cite news |title=Russia's decaying villages |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2014/5/2/russias-decaying-villages |work=Al Jazeera |date=2 May 2014}}</ref>]] [[File:№ 3009 А.И. Старчков.jpg|thumb|Stamp depicting Russian soldier killed in Ukraine. The war in that country has further exacerbated Russia's demographic crisis.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kolesnikov |first1=Andrei |title=Russia's Second, Silent War Against Its Human Capital |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/01/russias-second-silent-war-against-its-human-capital?lang=en |work=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=8 February 2023}}</ref>]] The decline in Russia's total population is among the largest in numbers, but not in percentage. After having peaked at 148,689,000 in 1991, the population then decreased, falling to 142,737,196 by 2008.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://cbsd.gks.ru/|title=Интерактивная витрина|website=cbsd.gks.ru|access-date=16 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170130012026/http://cbsd.gks.ru/|archive-date=30 January 2017}}</ref> This represents a 4.0% decrease in total population since the peak census figure. However, the Russian population then rose to 146,870,000 in 2018. This recent trend can be attributed to a lower death rate, higher birth rate, the annexation of Crimea and continued immigration, mostly from Ukraine and Armenia. It is some 40% above the 1950 population.<ref name="geohive"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.com/society/1041670|title=How Russia's population changed over the years|website=TASS}}</ref>

Russia has become increasingly reliant on immigration to maintain its population; 2021 had the highest net immigration since 1994,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2022/0937/barom01.php |title=Миграция в России, предварительные итоги 2021 года (Migration in Russia, preliminary results of 2021) |publisher=Институт демографии НИУ ВШЭ имени А.Г. Вишневского (Institute of Demography, National Research University A.G. Vishnevsky) |date=2022 |access-date=2022-03-26}}</ref> despite which there was a small overall decline from 146.1 million to 145.4 million in 2021, the largest decline in over a decade.<ref name="interfaxru2022">{{cite web |url=https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/75708/ |title=Natural population decrease in Russia down by 21% in Jan 2022 vs Jan 2021, but twice higher than in Jan 2020 - Rosstat |date=6 March 2022 |publisher=Interfax News Agency |access-date=2022-03-26}}</ref> The natural death rate in January 2020, 2021, and 2022 have each been nearly double the natural birth rate.<ref name="interfaxru2022" />

In March 2023, ''The Economist'' reported that "Over the past three years the country has lost around 2 million more people than it would ordinarily have done, as a result of war [<nowiki/>in Ukraine], disease and exodus."<ref name="economist-2023">{{Cite news |date=March 4, 2023 |title=Russia's population nightmare is going to get even worse |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/04/russias-population-nightmare-is-going-to-get-even-worse}}</ref> According to Russian economist Alexander Isakov, "Russia's population has been declining and the war will reduce it further. Reasons? Emigration, lower fertility and war-related casualties."<ref>{{cite news |title=Putin's War Escalation Is Hastening Demographic Crash for Russia |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-18/putin-s-war-escalation-is-hastening-demographic-crash-for-russia |work=Bloomberg |date=18 October 2022}}</ref>

According to the analysis of economists Oleg Itskhoki and Maxim Mironov, Russia may lose more than 10% of men aged 20–29 as a result of losses in the war and emigration.<ref>{{Cite web |date=25 September 2022 |title=Призванная республика – Из-за войны Россия может потерять больше 10% молодых мужчин. Анализ экономистов Олега Ицхоки и Максима Миронова |url=https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/25/prizvannaia-respublika |access-date=2022-09-26 |website=Новая газета. Европа}}</ref> In June 2024, it was estimated that approximately 2% of all Russian men between the ages of 20 and 50 may have been killed or seriously wounded in Ukraine since February 2022.<ref>{{cite Q|Q127275136|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

The UN is projecting that the decline that started in 2021 will continue, and if current demographic conditions persist, Russia's population would be 120 million in fifty years, a decline of about 17%.<ref name="UN DESA-2024c"/><sup>,</sup><ref name="economist-2023" /> The UN's 2024 scenarios project Russia's population to be between 74 million and 112 million in 2100, a decline of 25 to 50%.<ref>{{cite web |title=World Population Prospects 2024 |url=https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/world-population-prospects-2024 |publisher=United Nations |page=16}}</ref>

=== Portugal === Between 2011 and 2021, Portugal's population declined from 10.56 to 10.34 million people.<ref>{{cite web |title=Resident population (No.) by Place of residence, Sex and Age group |url=https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_indicadores&contecto=pi&indOcorrCod=0011166&selTab=tab0 |publisher=Instituto Nacional de Estatística |access-date=2022-03-24}}</ref> The fertility rate has been consistently below 2 since the early 1980s, and the gap is increasingly being made up by immigrants.<ref>{{cite news |date=18 Jun 2021 |title=Brazilians flock into Portugal for the fourth straight year |work=MercoPress |publisher=South Atlantic News Agency |url=https://en.mercopress.com/2021/06/18/brazilians-flock-into-portugal-for-the-fourth-straight-year |access-date=2022-03-24}}</ref>

== Purportedly halted declines == ===Armenia=== Armenia's population peaked at 3,604,000 in 1991<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.armstat.am/en/|title=Armenian Statistical Service of Republic of Armenia|website=www.armstat.am|access-date=16 September 2017}}</ref> and declined to a post-Soviet low of 2,961,500 at the beginning of 2020, in spite of a continuous natural population increase. This represented a 17.2% decrease in the total population since the peak census figure. Armenia's population began to increase again to 2,962,300 in 2021; 2,969,200 in 2022 and 2,990,900 in 2023. As of the beginning of 2024 the population had rebounded to 3,015,400 at 1978 levels.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.armstat.am/en/?nid=12&thid=demo&type=0&submit=Search|title=Statistical Indicators - Demography|website=www.armstat.am|access-date=17 July 2024}}</ref>

=== Germany === In Germany, a continuously low birth rate has been offset by waves of immigration. From 2002 to 2011 the population declined by 2 million, the most since the Cold War.<ref name="destatis">{{cite web |url=https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online?operation=previous&levelindex=2&step=2&titel=Result&levelid=1650152682238&acceptscookies=false |title=Population of Germany, 1950-2020 |publisher=Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) |date=2020 |access-date=2022-04-16 }}</ref> The 2011 national census recorded a population of 80.2 million people,<ref>{{cite web|title=Census Population (Germany): Federal States, Cities and Communes – Population Statistics, Charts and Map|url=http://www.citypopulation.de/php/germany-census.php|access-date=16 September 2017|website=www.citypopulation.de}}</ref> following which official estimates showed an increase of 3 million over the next decade. The official estimate for 2020 was a slight decrease from 2019.<ref name="destatis" /> Third-party estimates show a slight increase, instead.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/germany/population |title=Germany Population |publisher=CEIC |date=2022 |access-date=2022-04-16 }}</ref>

=== Ireland === In the current area of the Republic of Ireland, the population has fluctuated dramatically. The population of Ireland was 8 million in 1841, but it dropped due to the Irish famine and later emigration. The population of the Republic of Ireland hit a bottom at 2.8 million in the 1961 census, but it then rose and in 2011 it was 4.58 million. As of 2020, it is estimated to be just under 5 million according to the country's Central Statistics Office.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/pme/populationandmigrationestimatesapril2019/|title=Population and Migration Estimates April 2019 - CSO - Central Statistics Office| date=27 August 2019 }}</ref>

=== Poland === The population of Poland in the last 20 years has caused many years of recorded growth and decline with the population. The recorded population of Poland between 2002 and 2006 had shown a decreasing trend while between 2007 and 2012 the population had an increasing trend.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Fertility rate: children per woman |url=https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-born-per-woman |access-date=2022-12-31 |website=Our World in Data}}</ref> Though since 2020, COVID-19 has started to cause the population to decline rapidly, with over 117,000 people reportedly dying from COVID-19 in Poland by October 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Poland: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard With Vaccination Data |url=https://covid19.who.int/ |access-date=2022-12-31 |website=covid19.who.int |language=en}}</ref> However, Poland also saw a large number of Ukrainian Refugees move into Poland, with over 7.8 million people having crossed the border by October 2022 between Poland and Ukraine since the war began, of which 1.4 million have stayed in Poland.<ref>{{Cite web |date=August 2022 |title=Refugees from Ukraine in Poland, profiling update August 2022 |url=https://reliefweb.int/attachments/0c529dc9-1524-444f-899a-0ab9f3e61e8d/REACH_Protection_Profiling_August_2022.pdf |access-date=2023-01-01 |website=Reliefweb.Int}}</ref>

=== Syria === Syria's population declined during the period 2012 - 2018 due to an ongoing civil war. During that period many Syrians emigrated to other Middle Eastern countries. The civil war makes an accurate count of the Syrian population difficult, but the UN estimates that it peaked in 2012 at 22.9 million and dropped to 18.9 million in 2018, a decline of 17%.<ref name="UN DESA-2024e">{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=World Population Prospects 2024, Standard Projections, Compact File, Estimates tab, Total Population, as of 1 January column |url=https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used |website=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division}}</ref> Since then Syria's population has resumed growing, and the UN projects that by 2025 it will have reached 24.9 million.<ref name="UN DESA-2024c">{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=World Population Prospects 2024, Standard Projections, Compact File, Medium Variant tab, Total Population, as of 1 January column |url=https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used |website=United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division}}</ref>

==Declines within regions or ethnic groups of a country== {{See also|Majority minority|White flight|New Great Migration|Antinatalism|White demographic decline}}

===United States=== {{See also|Aging of the United States|Demographics of the United States}}

{{multiple image | height = 150 | footer = | image1 = US population growth rates since 1900.jpg | alt1 = | caption1 = US population growth rates since 1900 | image2 = US population birth, death, and growth rates since 2000.jpg | alt2 = | caption2 = US population change and the components of change since 2000 }}

In spite of a growing population at a national level, some formerly large American municipalities have dramatically shrunk after the Second World War, and in particular during the 1950s–1970s, due to suburbanization, urban decay, race riots, high crime rates, deindustrialization and emigration from the Rust Belt to the Sun Belt. For instance, Detroit's population peaked at almost 2 million in 1953,<ref>{{cite book |last1=Jacobs |first1=Andrew James |title=The world's cities: contrasting regional, national, and global perspectives |date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |location=New York |isbn=978-0-415-89485-2 |page=355 |edition=1st}}</ref> and then declined to less than 700,000 by 2020. Other cities whose populations have dramatically shrunk since the 1950s include Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Flint, Gary, New Orleans, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Youngstown and Wilmington (Delaware). In addition, the depopulation of the Great Plains, caused by a very high rate of rural flight from isolated agricultural counties, has been going on since the 1930s.

In addition, starting from the 1950s, the United States has witnessed the phenomenon of the white flight or white exodus,<ref>{{cite book|editor1=Barry C. Feld|editor2=Donna M. Bishop|title=The Oxford Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice|date=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-933827-6|quote=The Kerner Commission report ... concluded that "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white" ... Black urban in-migration and White exodus had developed concentrations of impoverished persons.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Robert W. Kweit|title=People and Politics in Urban America, Second Edition|date=2015|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-138-01202-8|quote=The U.S. court of Appeals ruled that Norfolk was rightly concerned with the white exodus from public schools and that the decision to end mandatory busing was not based on discriminatory intent, but on the desire to keep enough whites in the school system to prevent resegregation.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Timothy J. Minchin|author2=John A. Salmond|title=After the Dream: Black and White Southerners since 1965 (Civil Rights and Struggle)|date=2011|publisher=University Press of Kentucky|chapter=Chapter 8 'Mixed Outcomes'|isbn=978-0-8131-2978-5|quote=Even success in desegregating downtown stores and buses was now undercut by the white exodus. As they fled the cities, many whites lost interest in the civil rights issue.}}</ref> the large-scale migration of people of various European ancestries from racially mixed urban regions to more racially homogeneous suburban or exurban regions. The term has more recently been applied to other migrations by whites, from older, inner suburbs to rural areas, as well as from the U.S. Northeast and Midwest to the warmer climate in the Southeast and Southwest.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society |editor-first=Richard T.|editor-last=Schaefer |year=2008 |publisher=SAGE publications}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Merriam-Webster Dictionary |url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/white%20flight |title=white flight}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=Armor, David J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BJuAZpULzAsC&q=%22causes+white+flight%22+armor&pg=PA177 |title=Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law |publisher=Oxford University Press US |year=1986 |isbn=978-0-1953-58179}}</ref> Migration of middle-class white populations was observed during the Civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s out of cities such as Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City and Oakland, although racial segregation of public schools had ended there long before the Supreme Court of the United States' decision ''Brown v. Board of Education'' in 1954. In the 1970s, attempts to achieve effective desegregation (or "integration") using forced busing in some areas led to more families moving out of former areas.<ref>{{cite book |author=Clotfelter, Charles T. |title=After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation |url=https://archive.org/details/afterbrownrisere00clot |url-access=registration |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2004|isbn=978-0-691-11911-3 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Ravitch |first=Diane |title=The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945–1980 |year=1983 |publisher=Basic Books |place=New York |isbn=978-0-4650-87570 |page=[https://archive.org/details/troubledcrusadea00ravi/page/177 177] |quote=School desegregation and White Flight }}</ref> More recently, as of 2018, California had the largest ethnic/racial minority population in the United States; Non-Hispanic whites decreased from about 76.3 – 78% of the state's population in 1970<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tab19.xls|title=Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, California|website=Census.gov|access-date=October 7, 2017}}</ref><!-- Bowman cite mentions 43% in 2006, but not 80% in 1970 --> to 36.6% in 2018 and 39.3% of the total population was Hispanic-Latino (of any race).<ref name=CensusACS2018>{{cite web|url=https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B03002&tid=ACSDT1Y2018.B03002&lastDisplayedRow=20&hidePreview=true&vintage=2018&layer=county&cid=B03002_001E&g=0400000US06|title=B03002 HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN BY RACE – California – 2018 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates|date=July 1, 2018 |publisher=U.S. Census Bureau |access-date=November 25, 2019}}</ref>

A combination of long-term trends, housing affordability, falling birthrates and rising death rates from the COVID-19 pandemic have caused as many as 16 US states to start declining in population.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Census Estimates Show Population Decline in 16 States|url=https://pew.org/2LTnp8a|access-date=2021-07-04|website=pew.org|date=21 January 2021 }}</ref>

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's population peaked in 2000 at 3.8 million and has since declined to 3.3 million in 2020, due to a negative natural change, and emigration, due to natural disasters and economic difficulties.

===France===

The term 'Empty diagonal' is used for French departments that have low or declining populations. Due to continued emigration, many departments in France are seeing declines in population, including: Aisne, Allier, Ardennes, Cantal, Charente, Cher, Corrèze, Creuse, Dordogne, Eure, Eure-et-Loir, Haute-Marne, Haute-Saône, Haute-Vienne, Indre, Jura, Loir-et-Cher, Lot-et-Garonne, Lozère, Manche, Marne, Mayenne, Meuse, Moselle, Nièvre, Orne, Paris, Sarthe, Somme, Territoire de Belfort, Vosges and Yonne. For more information, see the List of French departments by population.

===South Africa===

The term 'white flight' has also been used for large-scale post-colonial emigration of whites from Africa, or parts of that continent,<ref name=Hammer2010>{{cite news |title=(Almost) Out of Africa: The White Tribes |work=World Affairs Journal |author=Joshua Hammer |date=May–June 2010 |url=http://worldaffairsjournal.org/article/almost-out-africa-white-tribes |access-date=2020-05-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160330032448/http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/almost-out-africa-white-tribes |archive-date=2016-03-30 |url-status=usurped }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Mosiuoa 'Terror' Lekota threatens to topple the ANC |author=Johnson, RW |date=October 19, 2008 |work=The Times |url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article4969026.ece |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110430101911/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article4969026.ece |archive-date=30 April 2011 |location=London}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=The atlas of changing South Africa |edition=2nd |author=Christopher, A.J. |year=2000 |publisher=Routledge |page=213 |isbn=978-0-2031-85902}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=The uncertain promise of Southern Africa |editor1-first=York W. |editor1-last=Bradshaw |editor2-first=Stephen N. |editor2-last=Ndegwa |year=2001 |publisher=Indiana Univ. Press |page=6}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |editor1-last=Reinhardt |editor1-first=Steven G. |editor2-first=Dennis P. |editor2-last=Reinhartz |title=Transatlantic history |year=2006 |publisher=Texas A&M University Press |isbn=978-1-5854-44861 |edition=1st |pages=[https://archive.org/details/transatlantichis0000unse/page/149 149–150] |url=https://archive.org/details/transatlantichis0000unse/page/149 }}</ref> driven by levels of violent crime and anti-colonial state policies.<ref name="White-flight" /> In recent decades, there has been a steady and proportional decline in South Africa's white community, due to higher birth rates among other South African ethnic groups, as well as a high rate of emigration. In 1977, there were 4.3 million White South Africans, constituting 16.4% of the population at the time. An estimated 800,000 emigrated between 1995 and 2016,<ref name="White-flight">[https://www.economist.com/briefing/2008/09/25/between-staying-and-going White flight from South Africa | Between staying and going] , The Economist, 25 September 2008</ref> citing crime and a lack of employment opportunities.<ref>{{cite web|title=Million whites leave SA – study|url=http://www.fin24.com/articles/default/display_article.aspx?ArticleId=1518-25_2003186|publisher=24.com|access-date=5 June 2013|author=Peet van Aardt|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080416135445/http://www.fin24.com/articles/default/display_article.aspx?ArticleId=1518-25_2003186|archive-date=16 April 2008|date=24 September 2006}}</ref> It may also be noted that in recent times, a large proportion of white South African emigrants have chosen to return home. For instance, in May 2014, Homecoming Revolution estimated that around 340,000 white South Africans had returned to South Africa in the preceding decade.<ref name="BBCFlanagan">{{cite news|author=Jane Flanagan|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27252307|title=Why white South Africans are coming home|publisher=Bbc.co.uk|date=3 May 2014|access-date=15 January 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://archive.today/20140503091419/http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27252307|archive-date=3 May 2014}}</ref> Furthermore, immigration from Europe has also supplemented the white population. The 2011 census found that 63,479 white people living in South Africa were born in Europe; of these, 28,653 had moved to South Africa since 2001.<ref name=superwebmigr>{{cite web|title=Community Profiles > Census 2011 > Migration |url=http://interactive.statssa.gov.za/ |publisher=Statistics South Africa |access-date=31 August 2013}}{{dead link|date=April 2017}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

=== India === The Parsis of India have one of the lowest fertility rates in the world (0.8 children per woman in 2017); this coupled with emigration has resulted in population decline at least since the 1940s. Their population has more than halved from its peak.<ref>{{cite web|last=Dore|first=Bhavya|date=21 July 2017|title=Glimmer of hope at last for India's vanishing Parsis|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40628310|publisher=BBC}}</ref>

=== Lebanon === Lebanon has recorded major waves of emigration from the late 19th century to early 20th century and during the Lebanese Civil War which led to the exodus of almost one million people from Lebanon.<ref>Byman, Daniel, and Kenneth Michael Pollack. ''Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War''. p. 139</ref> Due to the Syrian refugee crisis, according to the UN's population division, Lebanon's population increased massively from 5.05 million in 2011 to 6.5 million in 2015, but the population began declining again in 2016, with a total population of 6.26 million, 6.11 million in 2017, 5.95 million in 2018, and 5.76 million in 2019.<ref name="UN DESA-2024a"/> Between 2018 and 2023, the decline in the number of Lebanese accelerated from 25,000 per year to 78,000 due to massive emigration caused by the Lebanese liquidity crisis.<ref>{{cite web |title=Study warns of 'drastic change in Lebanon's demographic fabric'|date=11 January 2024 |url=https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1363988/groundbreaking-study-warns-of-drastic-change-in-lebanons-demographic-fabric.html |publisher=L'Orient-Le Jour |access-date=2024-07-16}}</ref>

However, the number of births to refugees has been increasing and the country hosts a large population of unregistered refugees, other illegal residents, and other people without legal documentation, making it difficult to count the population of Lebanon. Dr. Ali Faour, a population affairs researcher, estimates the Lebanese population including undocumented migrants to be 8 million. Regardless, the population of Lebanese nationality continues to age and decline as financial struggles increase emigration and decrease marriages. Consequentially, the share of Lebanese nationals in Lebanon may have decreased to between 45 and 50 percent, a sharp decline from 80 percent in 2004, although a 2024 report estimated the share at 65 to 69 percent of the resident population.

Regionally, the mountainous and Christian-majority areas have low fertility rates comparable to European nations, with most of the population increase being concentrated in northern Lebanon.<ref>{{cite web |title=Lebanon in 2023: A demographic bomb on verge of exploding|url=https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/press/679956/lebanon-in-2023-a-demographic-bomb-on-verge-of-exploding/en|publisher=Lebanon Broadcasting Corporation International |access-date=2024-07-16}}</ref>

==See also== {{colbegin}} * Antinatalism * Birth dearth * Climate crisis * Counterurbanization * Ghost town * Holocene extinction * Human extinction * Human overpopulation * Human population planning * List of countries by rate of natural increase * List of countries by population growth rate * Negative Population Growth * Political demography * Population ageing * Population cycle * Population growth * Rural flight * Societal collapse * Steady-state economy * Sub-replacement fertility * Total fertility rate * Urban decay * Zero population growth {{colend}}

'''Case studies:''' * Aging of Europe * Aging of Japan * Aging of South Korea * Aging of the United States * Empty diagonal * History of Easter Island#Destruction of society and population * List of sovereign states and dependencies by total fertility rate * Russian Cross

==References== {{Reflist|30em}}

{{Population}} {{Population country lists}} {{Human impact on the environment}} {{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Population Decline}} Category:Aftermath of war Category:Aftermath of World War I Category:Aftermath of World War II Category:Ageing Category:Contemporary history Category:Control of demographics Category:Demographic economic problems Category:Economic globalization Category:Emigration Category:Human overpopulation Category:International development Category:Population decline Category:Post–Cold War era Category:Social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic Category:Urban decay Category:World economy