{{Short description|American academic (born 1939)}} {{Use dmy dates|date=July 2025}} '''Donald L. Horowitz''' (born 1939) is James B. Duke Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science at Duke Law School and Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, United States.
He earned his PhD from Harvard University in 1968 and also holds degrees from Syracuse University. He is a specialist in the study of ethnic conflict and author of the books ''Ethnic Groups in Conflict'' (University of California Press, 1985),<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/10/books/ties-of-blood-rivers-of-blood.html|first=Arend|last=Lijphart|title=Ties of blood, rivers of blood|work=New York Times|date=10 November 1985|accessdate=17 March 2016}}</ref> ''A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society'' (University of California Press, 1991), ''The Deadly Ethnic Riot'' (University of California Press, 2001) and ''Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia'' (Cambridge University Press, 2013).<ref>{{cite news|url=https://law.duke.edu/news/horowitz-examines-indonesia-s-transition-democracy-new-book/|title=Horowitz examines Indonesia's transition to democracy in new book|publisher=Duke Law School|date=10 January 2013|accessdate=17 March 2016}}</ref> Writing about ''Ethnic Groups in Conflict'', political scientist Ashutosh Varshney states that it "was a seminal text", and that: "For the first time in scholarly history, a book on ethnic conflict covered a whole variety of topics, ranging from concepts and definitions to those spheres of institutional politics (party politics, military politics, affirmative action) in which the power of ethnicity had become obvious and could no longer be ignored".<ref>{{cite book|first=Ashutosh|last=Varshney|chapter=Ethnicity and ethnic conflict|editor-link1=Carles Boix|editor-first1=Carles|editor-last1=Boix|editor-link2=Susan Stokes (political scientist)|editor-first2=Susan C.|editor-last2=Stokes|title=The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics|year=2007|location=Oxford|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0199278480|pages=274–294}}</ref>
Horowitz has acted as a consultant on the problems of divided societies and on policies to reduce ethnic conflict in locations including Russia, Romania, Nigeria, Tatarstan and Northern Ireland. In 2006, he was appointed to Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.law.duke.edu/features/2006/horowitzappt|title=Professor Donald Horowitz appointed to Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion|publisher=Duke Law School|accessdate=17 March 2016}}</ref>
== Centripetalism == Centripetalism, sometimes called integrationism,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Anderson |first=Liam D. |title=Federal solutions to ethnic problems: accommodating diversity |date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-78161-9 |series=Exeter studies in ethno politics |location=New York |chapter=4 Territorial federalism and the logic of centripetalism |quote=often termed “integrationism,” but is also sometimes referred to as “centripetalism.” Though the two terms are often used interchangeably, McGarry et al. (2008, Chapter 2) argue, convincingly, that they are analytically distinct and should be dealt with as such.}}</ref> developed out of the criticism of consociationalism by Horowitz. It is a form of democratic power sharing for divided societies (usually along ethnic, religious or social lines) which aims to encourage the parties towards moderate and compromising policies and to reinforce the center of a divided political spectrum. Both models aim to provide institutional prescriptions for divided societies. While consociationalism aims to give inclusion and representation to each ethnic group, centripetalism aims to depoliticize ethnicity and to encourage the establishment of multi-ethnic parties.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Reilly |first=Benjamin |date=June 2012 |title=Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Communalism Compared |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1057/eps.2011.36 |journal=European Political Science |language=en |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=259–270 |doi=10.1057/eps.2011.36 |issn=1680-4333 |s2cid=256508316 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>
Centripetalist institutions and voting systems are quite rare and there are not many examples of their use. The most famous examples come from Fiji (1997-2006), Northern Ireland (June 1973 to May 1974), Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka,<ref name=":0" /> Indonesia, Kenya, and Nigeria.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=McCulloch |first=Allison |date=June 2013 |title=Does Moderation Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449057.2012.658002 |journal=Ethnopolitics |language=en |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=111–132 |doi=10.1080/17449057.2012.658002 |issn=1744-9057 |s2cid=144570242 |url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Coakley |first1=John |last2=Fraenkel |first2=Jon |date=June 2014 |title=Resolving conflict in bipolar societies: The fate of political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032318714531979 |journal=Political Science |language=en |volume=66 |issue=1 |pages=23–45 |doi=10.1177/0032318714531979 |issn=0032-3187 |s2cid=54946790}}</ref>
=== Instruments === Centripetalism is associated with institutions that provide incentives for elite cooperation such as vote pooling. Vote pooling occurs when politicians need to attract voters from the different groups in order to win the elections. For example, if some ethnic group is not large enough to get their own ethnic political representative, voters from that group would prefer to cast their second preference to the moderate politicians of the other ethnicity, rather than to the radical politician of the other ethnicity. In this theoretical model, vote pooling gives advantages to the moderate politicians aiming to attract the votes from the other groups because of the electoral system allowing voters to indicate preferences. This model incentivizes the formation of pre-electoral coalitions across conflict lines.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Horowitz |first1=Donald L. |title=A democratic South Africa? : constitutional engineering in a divided society |date=1991 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0520073425 |location=Berkeley}}</ref>
Some centripetalists have advocated voting systems like the alternative vote or single transferable vote on these grounds;<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Bogaards |first=Matthijs |date=December 2019 |title=Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes? |journal=Swiss Political Science Review |language=en |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=519–537 |doi=10.1111/spsr.12371 |hdl=20.500.14018/13828 |issn=1424-7755 |doi-access=free |hdl-access=free}}</ref> however, the alternative vote does not necessarily advantage moderate politicians compared to proportional representation, as it suffers from the center squeeze effect.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Fraenkel |first1=Jon |last2=Grofman |first2=Bernard |date=2006-06-01 |title=Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies?: The Case of Fiji |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414005285032 |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=en |volume=39 |issue=5 |pages=623–651 |doi=10.1177/0010414005285032 |issn=0010-4140 |url-access=subscription |quote=Fiji’s objective of ameliorating ethnic divisions by the adoption of AV was not successful. In elections in 1999 and 2001, moderate parties would have fared better under a proportional representation system}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Horowitz |first=Donald L. |date=2006-06-01 |title=Strategy Takes a Holiday: Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414005285034 |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=en |volume=39 |issue=5 |pages=652–662 |doi=10.1177/0010414005285034 |issn=0010-4140 |url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Fraenkel |first1=Jon |last2=Grofman |first2=Bernard |date=2006-06-01 |title=The Failure of the Alternative Vote as a Tool for Ethnic Moderation in Fiji: A Rejoinder to Horowitz |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414005285035 |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=en |volume=39 |issue=5 |pages=663–666 |doi=10.1177/0010414005285035 |issn=0010-4140 |url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Foley |first=Edward B. |date=2024-08-17 |title=What is "Centripetalism" and Why Does It Matter? |url=https://edwardbfoley.substack.com/p/what-is-centripetalism-and-why-does?r=2p29wg |access-date=2024-08-18 |website=Common Ground Democracy |quote=Instant Runoff Voting, however, achieves the most centripetal result (when it does) only by happenstance, not intrinsically, and fails to do so when the electorate is especially polarized}}</ref>
=== Criticism === One of the main problems of the theory is the lack of empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of centripetalism.<ref name=":1" /> Centripetalist institutions do not work in the electoral systems in which electoral districts are homogenous, because in those cases politicians would not have incentives to create multi-ethnic parties as they do not need to appeal to the voters outside of their group.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bogaards |first=Matthijs |date=November 2003 |title=Electoral choices for divided societies: Multi-ethnic parties and constituency pooling in Africa |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662040412331310201 |journal=Commonwealth & Comparative Politics |language=en |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=59–80 |doi=10.1080/14662040412331310201 |issn=1466-2043 |s2cid=154817047 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> Some evidence suggests that centripetal institutions lead to more instability and extremism.<ref name=":2" />
Strong supporters of consociationalism argue that centripetalism does not provide enough guarantees of representation and argue that what groups want is representation and not an indirect influence of majority decisions.<ref>{{cite book |last1=McCulloch |first1=Allison |title=Power-sharing: Empirical and normative challenges |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367173784 |editor1-last=McCulloch |editor1-first=Allison |location=London |page=5 |editor2-last=McGarry |editor2-first=John}}</ref> O'Leary also notes that "centripetal vote-pooling institutions unfairly privilege the majority or largest group; politicians from such groups have to pool fewer votes to win office than do politicians from smaller groups.”<ref>{{cite book |last1=O'Leary |first1=Brendan |title=Power sharing in deeply divided places: An advocate's introduction |date=2013 |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press |location=Philadelphia}}</ref> McGarry also criticises that centripetalism tends to leave hardliners outside of the political system, which polarizes the political environment, making it impossible for moderates in the government to compromise. The moderates thus become more hardline.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McGarry |first1=John |date=2019 |title=Classical Consociational Theory and Recent Consociational Performance |journal=Swiss Political Science Review |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=538–555 |doi=10.1111/spsr.12378 |s2cid=211380638 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
==References== {{reflist}}
==External links== *[https://www.law.duke.edu/fac/horowitz Donald Horowitz's official homepage at Duke University]
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Horowitz, Donald}} Category:Duke University faculty Category:Duke University School of Law faculty Category:Harvard University alumni Category:Living people Category:American political scientists Category:Jewish American social scientists Category:Syracuse University alumni Category:1939 births Category:Scholars of nationalism Category:Academic staff of Reichman University Category:Academic staff of Central European University Category:Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows