Basij

{{Short description|Iranian paramilitary volunteer militia}} {{Use dmy dates|date=May 2014}} {{Infobox organization | name = Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed | named_after = | image = Flag of Basij.svg | image_size = | image_alt = | caption = Banner of Basij | native_name = {{lang|fa|سازمان بسیج مستضعفین}} | abbreviation = | predecessor = | merged_into = | successor = | formation = {{start date and age|1979|11|26|df=y}} (decreed)<ref name="IPP"/><br />{{start date and age|1980|04|30|df=y}} (founded)<ref name="IPP"/> | founder = Ruhollah Khomeini<ref name="IPP"/> | founding_location = | extinction =  | merger = | type = Paramilitary volunteer militia<ref name="IPP"/> | tax_id =  | registration_id =  | status = | purpose = "To create the necessary capabilities in all individuals believing in the constitution and goals of the Islamic revolution to defend the country, the regime of the Islamic Republic, and aid people in cases of disasters and unexpected events"<ref name="IPP"/> | headquarters = | location = | coordinates =  | region_served = | services = | products = | methods = | fields = Internal security, law enforcement, moral policing, military reserves<ref name="IPP"/> | num_members_year = | leader_title = Commander | leader_name = ''Vacant'' | key_people = | main_organ = | parent_organization = {{flag|Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps}} | subsidiaries = | secessions = | affiliations = | budget = {{increase}} $357.08 million<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.azernews.az/region/91769.html|title=Iran decreases IRGC budget for next year|date=18 January 2016|work=AzerNews Newspaper|access-date=30 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160423123358/http://www.azernews.az/region/91769.html|archive-date=23 April 2016|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> | budget_year = 2016 | num_staff = 90,000-100,000 (CSIS estimate)<ref name="IPP"/> | num_staff_year = 2005 | num_members = More than 20 million to 25 million reserves (volunteers who hold membership)<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/1388556/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B2-25-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1|title=تعداد اعضای بسیج بیش از 25 میلیون نفر|access-date=13 February 2022|archive-date=13 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220213042736/https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/1388556/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B2-25-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1|url-status=live}}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=April 2026}}<br/> 400,000 to 600,000 available for immediate call-up<ref>{{citation|author=Kenneth Katzman|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf|title=Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies|work=Congressional Research Service|publisher=Federation of American Scientists|date=6 February 2017|access-date=1 March 2017|page=24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170308055250/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf|archive-date=8 March 2017|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> | num_volunteers_year = | website = {{URL|basij.ir}} | remarks = | former_name = | footnotes = }} {{IRGC|size=200}}

The '''{{translit|fa|Basij}}''' ({{langx|fa|بسیج|lit=Mobilization}}), formally '''{{translit|fa|Sâzmân-e Basij-e Mostaz'afin}}''' ({{langx|fa|سازمان بسیج مستضعفین|lit=Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed|label=none}}),<ref name="GlobSecNiruy">{{cite web|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/basij.htm|title=GlobalSecurity.org Intelligence: Mobilisation Resistance Force|author=John Pike|access-date=10 November 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110430031747/http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/basij.htm|archive-date=30 April 2011|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.aei.org:80/outlook/28666|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20111027235354/http://www.aei.org/outlook/28666|url-status=dead|title=What Do Structural Changes in the Revolutionary Guards Mean?|first=Ali|last=Alfoneh|date=23 September 2008|archivedate=27 October 2011|website=Aei.org}}</ref> is a paramilitary volunteer militia within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and one of its five branches.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Forozan|first1=Hesam |year=2015|title=The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran: The Evolution and Roles of the Revolutionary Guards|publisher=Taylor & Francis|pages=56–58|isbn=978-1317430735}}</ref> An individual member is called ''basiji'' in the Persian language.<ref name="IPP" /><ref name="Alfoneh">{{Cite web |title=Iran Primer: The Basij Resistance Force |url=http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/iran-primer-the-basij-resistance-force.html |access-date=2024-03-21 |website=FRONTLINE - Tehran Bureau |language=en}}</ref>

Established in Iran in 1979 by order of Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Revolution, the organization originally consisted of civilian volunteers, often from poor, tribal, rural backgrounds affected by post-Revolution economic and geopolitical issues,<ref name="Reuters-specialists">{{cite news |title=Iran's Basij force: specialists in cracking down on dissent |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-basij-force-specialists-cracking-down-dissent-2022-09-22/ |access-date=29 September 2023 |work=Reuters |date=22 September 2022 |archive-date=5 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231005020602/https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-basij-force-specialists-cracking-down-dissent-2022-09-22/ |url-status=live }}</ref> who were urged by Khomeini to fight in the Iran–Iraq War.<ref name="nytimes.com/topics-basij-2-12-2011">{{cite web|date=2 December 2011|title=Basij Militia|url=http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/b/basij_militia/index.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130515230642/http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/b/basij_militia/index.html|archive-date=15 May 2013|access-date=10 November 2014|work=The New York Times|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Khomeini would occasionally refer to Basij as "The Twenty Million Army", claiming that about 75% of the population were Basijis. He would elaborate, saying that a country with 20 million of its people as their army will be undefeatable.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://irdc.ir/fa/news/6388/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1 | title=سیر تأسیس ارتش بیست میلیونی؛ از سازمان بسیج ملی تا نیروی مقاومت بسیج / روایتی از اولین مأموریت‌های بسیج در کشور | access-date=5 January 2024 | archive-date=30 March 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330145205/https://irdc.ir/fa/news/6388/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AA%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1 | url-status=live }}</ref> Basij was an independent organization until 17 February 1981, when it was officially incorporated into the Revolutionary Guards organization structure by the Iranian Parliament<ref name=":1">{{Citation|first1=Ali|last1=Alfoneh|title=Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards Is Transforming Iran from Theocracy into Military Dictatorship|publisher=AEI Press|year=2013|page=49}}</ref> in order to end the interservice rivalry between the two, according to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.<ref name="IPP">{{Citation|editor=Robin B. Wright|title= The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy|publisher=US Institute of Peace Press|year=2010|isbn=978-1601270849|pages=62–65}}</ref>

Today, the force consists of young Iranians, a significant portion drawn from the traditionally Shia cleric religious and politically loyalist parts of Iran's society,<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/> who volunteer, often in exchange for official benefits. With branches in "virtually every" city and town in Iran,<ref name="IPP"/><ref>Molavi, Afshin, ''The Soul of Iran'', W.W. Norton, (2005), p.88</ref> the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in enforcing state control over society,<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran|last=Golkar|first=Saeid|publisher=Woodrow Wilson Center Press|year=2015|isbn=978-0-231-80135-5|location=Washington, DC}}</ref> acting as a morality police at checkpoints and parks, and suppressing dissident gathering,<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/> as well as serving as law enforcement auxiliary, providing social services, and organizing public religious ceremonies.<ref>Molavi, Afshin, ''The Soul of Iran'', W. W. Norton, (2005), p. 88, 316–318</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/world/middleeast/19basij.html?_r=1&ref=global-home|title=Shadowy Iranian Vigilantes Vow Bolder Action|work=The New York Times|author=Neil MacFarquhar|access-date=19 June 2009|date=19 June 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170930110540/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/world/middleeast/19basij.html?_r=2|archive-date=30 September 2017|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The force was often present and reacting to the widespread 2009 Iranian election protests, 2017–18 Iranian protests, and the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini protests.<ref>{{cite news|date=23 June 2009|title=Amnesty urges Iran to stop using Basij militia|work=The Gazette|url=https://montrealgazette.com/news/Amnesty+urges+Iran+stop+using+Basij+militia/1723947/story.html|access-date=23 September 2009}}{{dead link|date=April 2016}}</ref> The Basij are subordinate to and receive their orders from the IRGC and the Supreme Leader of Iran.<ref name="nytimes.com/topics-basij-2-12-2011"/><ref name="english.khamenei.ir" /> They are said to be "tightly affiliated" with the Islamic Republic's "hardline" political faction,<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/> and "routinely" praised by the Supreme Leader,<ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022">{{cite news |title=What we know about the Basij, the paramilitary volunteer group cracking down on protesters in Iran |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-13/what-we-know-about-the-basij-in-iran/101534184 |access-date=29 September 2023 |agency=ABC News (Australian Broadcasting) |date=13 October 2022 |archive-date=6 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231106031635/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-13/what-we-know-about-the-basij-in-iran/101534184 |url-status=live }}</ref> but also called a "profound source of disquiet and rancor" among the general public in Iran.<ref name=tk/> Following Operation Midnight Hammer in 2025, Basij forces significantly increased their urban patrols, especially at night to “ensure security".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-22 |title=Iran says Basij paramilitary forces step up urban patrols |url=https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/06/22/iran-says-basij-paramilitary-forces-step-up-urban-patrols- |access-date=2025-06-22 |website=Al Arabiya English |language=en}}</ref>

As part of the IRGC's sphere, the Basij are indirectly designated as a terrorist organization by the governments of the United States, the EU, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.<ref>{{Cite news|url = https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-bahrain-security-iran/saudi-bahrain-add-irans-revolutionary-guards-to-terrorism-lists-idUSKCN1MX288|title = Saudi, Bahrain add Iran's Revolutionary Guards to terrorism lists|newspaper = Reuters|date = 23 October 2018|access-date = 9 March 2019|archive-date = 8 April 2019|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190408154459/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-bahrain-security-iran/saudi-bahrain-add-irans-revolutionary-guards-to-terrorism-lists-idUSKCN1MX288|url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=EU terrorist list: Council designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation |url=https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/19/eu-terrorist-list-council-designates-the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-as-a-terrorist-organisation/ |access-date=2026-03-11 |website=Consilium |language=en}}</ref> The Basij has been frequently implicated in human rights violations, including torture,<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.amnesty.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Iran-They-Violently-Raped-me-Sexual-violence-weaponized-to-crush-Irans-Woman-Life-Freedom-uprising.pdf|title="They Violently Raped Me"}}</ref> as well as enforcing aspects of sharia law on citizens such as the mandatory wearing of the hijab.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-04-25 |title=Iran: Security Forces Kill, Torture, Abuse Children {{!}} Human Rights Watch |url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/25/iran-security-forces-kill-torture-abuse-children |access-date=2025-06-24 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite web |date=2023-12-06 |title=Iran: Security forces used rape and other sexual violence to crush "Woman Life Freedom" uprising with impunity |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/iran-security-forces-used-rape-and-other-sexual-violence-to-crush-woman-life-freedom-uprising-with-impunity/ |access-date=2025-06-24 |website=Amnesty International |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-02-23 |title=Basij Thugs Attack Girls Language School In Iran To Enforce Hijab |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302232318 |access-date=2025-06-24 |website=www.iranintl.com |language=en}}</ref>

== Terminology == ''Basij'' ({{langx|fa|بسيج}}) is a Persian word defined variously as mobilization, public preparation, national will and popular determination, and the unity and preparation of the people to do important works.<ref>[https://abadis.ir/fatofa/%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC/ بسیج] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221106072703/https://abadis.ir/fatofa/%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC/ |date=6 November 2022 }} abadis.ir</ref>

==History== === Iran–Iraq War === {{See also|Martyrdom in Islam#Willingness to die in battle}} thumb|Basij volunteers during the Iran–Iraq War

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the foundation of a youth militia in November 1979, during the Iranian Revolution.<ref name=GlobSecNiruy/> The Basij was established on 30 April 1980.<ref name="Alfoneh" /> It was open to those above the age of 18 and below the age of 45.

During the Iran–Iraq War hundreds of thousands volunteered for the Basij, including children as young as 12 and unemployed old men, some in their eighties.{{citation needed|date=August 2025}} According to Mehran Riazaty, these volunteers were swept up in Shi'a love of martyrdom and the atmosphere of patriotism of the war mobilization; most often they came from poor, peasant backgrounds. They were encouraged through visits to schools and an intensive media campaign. During the war, the Revolutionary Guard Corps used Basiji members as a pool from which to draw manpower.<ref>''Khomeinis Warriors: Foundation of Irans Regime, Its Guardians, Allies around the World, War Analysis, and Strategies'' by Mehran Riazaty, {{ISBN|978-1514470336}}</ref> According to Baqer Moin, the Basij are known for their employment of human wave attacks which cleared minefields or drew the enemy's fire.<ref name=moin>[https://books.google.com/books?id=b2OL9IEXaAgC ''Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah''] by Baqer Moin</ref>

The typical human wave tactic was for Basijis (often very lightly armed and unsupported by artillery or air power) to march forward in straight rows. While casualties were high, the tactic often worked when employed against poorly trained members of the Iraqi regular army.<ref>Cited in: Erich Wiedemann, "Mit dem Paradies-Schlüssel in die Schlacht", in: ''Der Spiegel'', no. 31/1982, p. 93.</ref><ref>''Iran at War: 1500–1988'' (Pg. 363) By Kaveh Farrokh</ref>

According to Dilip Hiro, by the spring of 1983 the Basij had trained 2.4 million Iranians in the use of arms and sent 450,000 to the front.<ref>Hiro, Dilip, ''Iran under the Ayatollahs'', Routledge and Kegan, 1985, p.237</ref> In 1985 the IRNA put the number of Basijis at 3 million, quoting from Hojjatoleslam Rahmani.<ref name=GlobSecNiruy/> ''Tehran Bureau'' estimates the peak number of Basijis at the front at 100,000 by December 1986.<ref name="Alfoneh"/>

According to Radio Liberty, by the end of the Iran-Iraq war, most of the Basijis left the service and were reintegrated back into their lives, often after years of being in the front.<ref name="rferl"/> By 1988, the number of Basij checkpoints dramatically decreased,<ref name="GlobSecUnrest" /> but the Basij were still enforcing the hijab, arresting women for violating the dress code, and arresting youths for attending mixed gender parties or being in public with unrelated members of the opposite sex.<ref name="Molavi, 2005 p.89">Molavi, ''The Soul of Iran'' (2005), p. 89</ref>

In 1988, college Basiji organizations were established on college campuses to fight "Westoxification" and potential student agitation against the government.<ref name="Molavi, 2005 p.89" />

===Revival=== thumb|Gathering of Basij volunteers, 2013 Whether the Basij remained intact since their founding or were disbanded and revived is disputed. According to Reuters, the Basij were not disbanded after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, but continued as a loyalist and religious paramilitary group that provides the regime "with manpower and a heavy presence during pro-government rallies".<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/> But according to ''The New York Times'', the Basij were reactivated in the late 1990s when the spontaneous celebrations following Iran winning a spot in the 1998 FIFA World Cup, and the student protests in July 1999, gave the Islamic government the feeling that it had lost control of the streets.<ref name="nytimes.com/topics-basij-2-12-2011"/> (Giving a slightly different timeline, GlobalSecurity.org reports that it was revived around 2005.<ref name="GlobSecUnrest">{{Cite web |title=Iran: Paramilitary Force Prepares For Urban Unrest |url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2005/iran-050930-rferl01.htm |access-date=2024-03-21 |website=www.globalsecurity.org}}</ref>)

Part of the Basij revival was an emphasis on concepts such as Development Basij (Basij-e-Sazandegi),<ref name="GlobSecUnrest" /> but protecting the regime from unrest was a high priority. Along with the Iranian riot police and the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, the Basij have been active in suppressing student demonstrations in Iran. The Basij are sometimes differentiated from the Ansar in being more "disciplined" and not beating, or at least not being as quick to beat demonstrators.<ref>Molavi, ''The Soul of Iran'' (2005), p. 318</ref> Other sources describe the Ansar-e-Hezbollah as part of the Basij.<ref name="nytimes.com/topics-basij-2-12-2011"/>

Some believe the change in focus of the Basij from its original mission of fighting to defend Iran in the Iran-Iraq War to its current internal security concerns has led to a loss in its prestige and morale.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0616/p01s04-wome.html|title=Iran's angry young adults erupt in political protest 16.6.2003|author=Scott Peterson|journal=The Christian Science Monitor|date=16 June 2003|access-date=10 November 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141110152706/http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0616/p01s04-wome.html|archive-date=10 November 2014|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Syrian Civil War, 2011–2021=== {{Further|Iranian support for Syria in the Syrian Civil War}} One foreign conflict the Basij were involved in was on the side of the IRI's ally the Syrian Baathist regime. A Western analyst believed thousands of Iranian paramilitary Basij fighters were stationed in Syria as of December 2013.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2014-02-21 |title=Iran boosts support to Syria |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10654144/Iran-boosts-support-to-Syria.html |access-date=2024-03-21 |website=The Telegraph |language=en}}</ref> Syria's geopolitical importance to Iran and its role as one of Iran's crucial allies prompted the involvement of Basij militiamen in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. The Basij militia, similar to Hezbollah fighters, work with the Syrian army against rebel forces. Such involvement poses new foreign policy challenges for a number of countries across the region, particularly Israel and Turkey as Iran's influence becomes more than just ideological and monetary on the ground in the Syrian conflict.{{Clarify|date=July 2019}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://jcpa.org/iranian-forces-on-the-golan/|title=Iranian Forces on the Golan?|date=29 May 2013|publisher=Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs|access-date=10 November 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130813064804/http://jcpa.org/iranian-forces-on-the-golan/|archive-date=13 August 2013|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The Basij involvement in the Syrian Civil War reflects previous uses of the militia as a proxy force for Iranian foreign policy in an effort to assert Iranian dominance in the region<ref>{{cite web|url=http://jcpa.org/article/the-arab-world-fears-the-safavid/|title=The Arab world fears the 'Safavid'|publisher=Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs|access-date=10 November 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141110161049/http://jcpa.org/article/the-arab-world-fears-the-safavid/|archive-date=10 November 2014|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and frightens Salim Idriss, head of the Free Syrian Army.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/world/middleeast/iran-and-hezbollahs-support-for-syria-complicates-us-strategy-on-peace-talks.html?pagewanted=all |work=The New York Times |first1=Michael R. |last1=Gordon |title=Iran and Hezbollah's Support for Syria Complicates U.S. Strategy on Peace Talks |date=21 May 2013 |access-date=24 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170307100819/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/world/middleeast/iran-and-hezbollahs-support-for-syria-complicates-us-strategy-on-peace-talks.html?pagewanted=all |archive-date=7 March 2017 |url-status = live|df=dmy-all }}</ref>

===Protest movements=== {{Further information|Political repression in the Islamic Republic of Iran}}Iran has seen a series of political/social/economic protest movements during the 21st century that its security forces have been active in crushing—the July 1999 student protests, 2009 presidential election protests, protests in 2011–2012, 2019–2020 and the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests. When protests erupt, the Basij often act as the state's "iron fist".<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/>

====2009 election protests==== The Basij have reportedly become "more important", more powerful, since the 2009 Iranian election—despite their "poor handing" of the protests over the election results.<ref name="IPP"/> Mir Hussein Moussavi, opposition presidential candidate in 2009, decried violent attacks by the Basij during the 2009 Iranian election protests.<ref name="nytimes.com/topics-basij-2-12-2011"/> There were also reports of poor performance by Basij after the 2009 election.<ref name="Alfoneh"/> This was thought to be a reason for the replacement of commander Hossein Taeb and the Basij's formal integration into the Revolutionary Guards ground forces in October 2009.<ref name="Alfoneh"/> Following the protests, Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb, commander of the Basij, stated that eight people were killed and 300 wounded in the violence.<ref>[https://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSDAH316769 Iran opposition says 72 died in post-poll unrest] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200511105904/https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSDAH316769 |date=11 May 2020 }} Reuters. 3 September 2009</ref>

In 2010, an anonymous Norwegian student doing research in Iran claims he witnessed gruesome atrocities inside a Basij camp after being abducted by the unit while riding on a bus. According to the account the student gave to Norwegian embassy officials, he witnessed detained political dissidents being 'disemboweled', burned to death, and deliberately crushed by a riot control truck.<ref>{{cite web |date=9 February 2020 |title=From American Embassy Oslo to RUEHC/Secretary of State Washington DC 0021 Info European Political Collective Iran Collective Islamic Collective Confidential |url=https://ia801301.us.archive.org/20/items/10OSLO67/10OSLO67.pdf |access-date=29 September 2023 |website=us.archive.org}}</ref>

During the protests, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei created the Haydaryan, a new paramilitary force specifically dedicated to preserving his position; several of the founding Haydaryan members came from the Basij.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-supreme-leaders-new-security-force|title=Iran: The Supreme Leader's New Security Force|access-date=2017-09-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170901200929/https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-supreme-leaders-new-security-force|archive-date=1 September 2017|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

====Mahsa Amini protests==== {{main|Mahsa Amini protests}}

According to Reuters, Basij were at the "forefront" of the Islamic Republic's efforts to stamp out the protests over the death of Mahsa Amini and related lack of political and social freedoms the country.<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/> According to Tara Kangarlou of Time magazine, the Basij were responsible for most imprisonments, injuries, and killings of protesters.<ref name=tk>{{cite news |last1=Kangarlou |first1=Tara |title=The Brutal Militia Trained to Kill for Iran's Islamic Regime |url=https://time.com/6238623/iran-basij-militia-meaning-mahsa-amini/ |access-date=30 September 2023 |work=Time magazine |date=5 December 2022 |archive-date=24 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230924221626/https://time.com/6238623/iran-basij-militia-meaning-mahsa-amini/ |url-status=live }}</ref> These protests, starting in September 2022 and dying out the following spring, led to over 500 deaths, including the deaths of 68 minors {{As of|2023|09|15|lc=y}} according to the non-profit organization Iran Human Rights.<ref name="IHR551">{{cite news |date=15 September 2023 |title=One Year Protest Report: At Least 551 Killed and 22 Suspicious Deaths |url=https://iranhr.net/en/articles/6200/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230930043258/https://iranhr.net/en/articles/6200/ |archive-date=30 September 2023 |access-date=29 September 2023 |agency=Iran Human Rights}}</ref> Unlike some earlier protests they were "nationwide, spread across social classes, universities, the streets [and] schools".<ref name="Guardian6November">{{cite news |title=Fresh protests erupt in Iran's universities and Kurdish region |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/06/iran-fresh-protests-universities-kurdish-region |access-date=7 November 2022 |agency=The Guardian |date=6 November 2022 |archive-date=26 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221126042440/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/06/iran-fresh-protests-universities-kurdish-region |url-status=live }}</ref>

Journalists and human rights activists have catalogued a number of serious human rights violations used to crush the unrest by the Basij and other IRI security forces. These included forced confessions, threats to uninvolved family members, and torture, including electric shocks, controlled drowning, and mock execution (based on CNN interviews);<ref>{{cite news |date=20 October 2022 |title=Stalked, tortured, disappeared: Iranian authorities have a playbook for silencing dissent, and they're using it again |language=en |work=CNN |url=https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/19/middleeast/iran-protesters-repression-investigation-intl-cmd |access-date=20 October 2022 |archive-date=16 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230116180513/https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/19/middleeast/iran-protesters-repression-investigation-intl-cmd |url-status=live }}</ref> sexual violence/rape (based on testimony and social media videos corroborated by a CNN investigation),<ref>{{cite news |title=CNN investigates female and male protesters' accounts of sexual assault in Iranian detention centers |url=https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2022/11/middleeast/iran-protests-sexual-assault/index.html |access-date=26 November 2022 |work=www.cnn.com |date=2022 |archive-date=16 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230116180513/https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2022/11/middleeast/iran-protests-sexual-assault/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> “systematic" attempts to blind protesters by shooting at their eye with projectiles such as "pellets, teargas canisters, paintball bullets" (activist media group IranWire documented at least 580 cases).<ref name="Pourahmadi-CNN">{{cite news |last1=Pourahmadi |first1=Adam |last2=El Sirgany |first2=Sarah |last3=Karadsheh |first3=Jomana |title=One year since Mahsa Amini's death, a protester shot in the eye during Iran's crackdown continues her struggle from exile |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/16/middleeast/iran-mahsa-amini-anniversary-protester-mime-intl/index.html |access-date=28 September 2023 |agency=CNN |date=16 September 2023 |archive-date=28 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230928011229/https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/16/middleeast/iran-mahsa-amini-anniversary-protester-mime-intl/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Using ambulances to transport security forces and kidnapped protesters under the guise of rushing injured civilians to receive emergency medical attention.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Tabrizy |first1=Nilo |last2=Jhaveri |first2=Ishaan |title=How Iran's Security Forces Use Ambulances to Suppress Protests |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/23/world/middleeast/iran-protesters-detained-ambulance.html |access-date=26 November 2022 |work=The New York Times |date=23 November 2022 |archive-date=26 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221126022000/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/23/world/middleeast/iran-protesters-detained-ambulance.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=UNHRC to hold special session on Iran, human rights violations |url=https://www.jpost.com/international/article-723006 |access-date=26 November 2022 |work=The Jerusalem Post |date=2022 |archive-date=16 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230116175935/https://www.jpost.com/international/article-723006 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The Iranian state media reports that security forces such as the Basij were targeted and killed by "rioters and gangs" mainly the members of a specific unknown organization that orchestrated this whole protest<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/> in their efforts to restore order and stop the destruction of public property by protesters,<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/> and that by 6 January 2023, at least 68 security force members were killed in the unrest.<ref name="Reuters12345">{{cite news |title=Iran hangs two men accused of killing security agent during protests |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-hangs-two-men-alleged-crimes-committed-during-protests-judiciary-2023-01-07/ |access-date=17 January 2023 |work=Reuters |date=7 January 2022 |archive-date=16 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230116235320/https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-hangs-two-men-alleged-crimes-committed-during-protests-judiciary-2023-01-07/ |url-status=live }}</ref> However, according to BBC Persian service, these figures may not be reliable as some of those reported by state media to be loyalist Basij militiamen killed by the "rioters", were actually protesters killed by security forces, whose families were pressured by security forces to go along with the false reporting, threatening them with death if they failed to cooperate.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Ghobadi |first1=Parham |title=Iran security forces and state media cover up protester's death – source |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63504452 |access-date=4 November 2022 |agency=BBC |date=4 November 2022 |archive-date=16 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230116172212/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63504452 |url-status=live }}</ref>

====2025–2026 Iranian protests==== {{Main article|2025–2026 Iranian protests}}

The Basij militia were reported to play a central role in suppressing the 2025–2026 protests, often operating alongside other Iranian security forces in crowd control, arrests, and enforcement actions against demonstrators. As in previous protest waves, journalists and human rights organizations alleged the use of excessive force, arbitrary detention, and intimidation tactics, including the violent dispersal of protests and the targeting of activists and perceived organizers. Observers noted continuity with earlier crackdowns, particularly in the Basij's decentralized deployment in urban areas and its role in monitoring and controlling civilian activity.<ref>{{cite web |title=Iran: Deaths and injuries rise amid authorities’ renewed cycle of protest bloodshed |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-injuries-authorities-protest-bloodshed/ |website=Amnesty International |date=8 January 2026 |access-date=17 March 2026}}</ref>

==== 2026 Iran war ==== As a result of the 2026 Iran war, during which Israel struck their bases, the Basij has "been broken into tens of thousands" of cells, which "fanned out across mosques, schools, and encampments under bridges."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2026-03-25 |title=The Revolutionary Guards are taking over Iran |url=https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/03/25/the-revolutionary-guards-are-taking-over-iran |access-date=2026-03-26 |work=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>

A few weeks into the conflict, an Iranian military official stated on state television that security forces were recruiting children as young as 12 to aid in the monitoring of checkpoints and perform other duties as part of the Basij in Tehran.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-03-26 |title=Iran recruits children as young as 12 for checkpoints in Tehran |url=https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/03/26/iran-recruits-children-as-young-as-12-for-checkpoints-in-tehran |access-date=2026-03-26 |website=Al Arabiya English |language=en}}</ref>

Rahim Nadali, an IRGC official in Tehran, announced the launch of the initiative "For Iran" which recruits 12 year olds into the Basij militia for them to assist in manning "operational patrols" and checkpoints, as well as providing logistical support and performing other duties.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web |date=2026-03-26 |title=Children as young as 12 can join war support, IRGC says |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603265637 |access-date=2026-03-27 |website=Iran International |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite web |date=2026-03-26 |title=Iran recruits children as young as 12 for checkpoints in Tehran |url=https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/03/26/iran-recruits-children-as-young-as-12-for-checkpoints-in-tehran |access-date=2026-03-27 |website=Al Arabiya |language=en}}</ref> This move contradicts Iran's commitment to abstain from the use of children in military activities under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, Nadali justified to move stating "Given that the age of those coming forward has dropped and they are asking to take part, we lowered the minimum age to 12".<ref name=":02" /><ref name=":12" /> According to Al-Arabiya, from the beginning of the war, Tehran residents reported of untrained teenagers and youths armed with Uzi sub-machine guns and Kalshnikov rifles, stopping vehicles, shouting orders, and firing warning shots into the air.<ref name=":12" />

==Organization, membership, duties, activities== thumb|Basij 'Ashura Corps' exercise in Tehran

===Organization=== thumb|Basij volunteers setting up a mobile kitchen as part of its community service program.

Basij form the fifth branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Different sources divide the Basij into different categories. As of 2011, according to Saeid Golkar, there are "seventeen different Basij suborganizations (for students, workers, employees, engineers, etc.)".<ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012"/> Members fall into a hierarchy of "regular, active, and special".<ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012"/>

* regular members are at the lowest level and have "basic" ideological and military training.<ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012"/> * active members must pass a 45-day ideological and military training program and are "more engaged" in the organization's activities.<ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012"/> * special members are actually full-time IRGC members serving in the Basij.<ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012"/> Dealing with security threats are the Imam Hossein Brigades and the Imam Ali Brigades.<ref name="Alfoneh" /> Its security apparatus includes armed brigades, anti-riot police and an extensive network of informers.<ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022"/>

Subgroupings of the Basij include:

* Primary Schools Basij Cadets [''Basij-e Danesh-Amouzi''], (also reportedly called ''Omidan'' or Hopes)<ref name="Aryan-Brainwashed-RFERL-2010">{{cite web |last1=Aryan |first1=Hossein |title=How Schoolchildren Are Brainwashed In Iran |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/Commentary_How_Schoolchildren_Are_Brainwashed_In_Iran/2054304.html |website=RFERL |access-date=11 November 2025 |date=27 May 2010}}</ref> * Middle schools basij, ''Pouyandegan'' or Seekers<ref name="Aryan-Brainwashed-RFERL-2010"/> * High school Basij, ''Pishgaman'' or Standard Bearers<ref name="Aryan-Brainwashed-RFERL-2010"/> * the Students Basij Cadets [''Basij-e Daneshjouyi''] * the University Basij Cadets * the Public Service Basij (''Basij-e Edarii'') * the Tribal Basij<ref name="rferl">{{cite web|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/Irans_Basij_Force_Mainstay_Of_Domestic_Security/1357081.html|title=Iran's Basij Force – The Mainstay Of Domestic Security|date=15 January 2009|publisher=Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty|access-date=10 November 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120110190716/http://www.rferl.org/content/Irans_Basij_Force_Mainstay_Of_Domestic_Security/1357081.html|archive-date=10 January 2012|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

thumb|Basij soldiers doing military exercises in Babolsar.

They are subdivided into units of "Omidan" (Hopes, in elementary schools); "Pouyandegan" (Seekers, in middle schools) and "Pishgaman" (Standard Bearers, in high schools). Those subdivisions are similar to the Young Pioneers and Komsomol in the Soviet Union.

Tehran Bureau also lists a "Guilds Basij Division" (''Basij-e Asnaf''), and a "Labor Basij" (''Basij-e Karegaran'').<ref name="Alfoneh" /> Australian Broadcasting Corporation lists them as having branches across the country, as well as "student organisations, trade guilds, and medical faculties".<ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022"/>

The Fatehin serves as the Basij's special forces unit.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://iranfocus.com/iran-general/49219-basij-special-unit-fatehin-and-its-role-in-quelling-irans-protests/ | title=Basij Special Unit Fatehin and Its Role in Quelling Iran's Protests | date=13 December 2022 }}</ref>

===Size, bases=== Estimates of the number of Basij vary, with its leadership giving higher figures than outside commentators. Official estimates are as high as 23.8 million.<ref name="Fars news agency">[http://www.farsnews.ir/newstext.php?nn=13940902000053 سردار نقدی در برنامه تلویزیونی «متن – حاشیه»:23 میلیون و 800 هزار نفر عضو بسیج هستند/ از کسی تا کنون شکایت نکرده ایم/ رابطه بسیج با این دولت مانند دولت قبل است] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160223172202/http://www.farsnews.ir/newstext.php?nn=13940902000053 |date=23 February 2016 }}, Fars news agency, 23 November 2015</ref> A scholar of the Basij, Saeid Golkar, estimates their total membership at approximately one million, and their security forces in the tens of thousands.<ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022"/> As of 2020 there were reportedly between 40,000<ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022"/> and 54,000 Basij bases (''Paygha-e Basij'') around Iran.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/01/26/2243709/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D9%87%D8%B1-54-%D9%87%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%DA%A9%D9%85%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF/ |title=سردار سپهر: ۵۴ هزار پایگاه بسیج برای رزمایش کمک مومنانه فعالیت می کنند |work=خبرگزاری تسنیم | Tasnim |access-date=12 November 2020 |archive-date=12 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112190557/https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/01/26/2243709/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D9%87%D8%B1-54-%D9%87%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%DA%A9%D9%85%DA%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Economic power=== According to the US Treasury, the Basij have a multi-billion-dollar "covert network" of businesses.<ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022"/> According to Saeid Golkar, the influence of the Basij in the Iranian economy, has grown to extend to "every sector", from "construction and real estate to the stock market".<ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012">{{cite journal |last1=Golkar |first1=Saeid |title=Paramilitarization of the Economy : The Case of Iran's Basij Militia |journal=Armed Forces & Society |date=October 2012 |volume=38 |issue=4 |pages=625–648 |doi=10.1177/0095327X12437687 |jstor=48609114 |s2cid=155010870 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609114 |access-date=30 September 2023 |archive-date=13 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231013130520/https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609114 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> In 1996, six organizations were put under the control of the Basij Cooperative Foundation (BCF):

# The Basijis Housing Institution (''Moassesseh-ye Tamin-e Maskan-e Basijian'') # The Basijis Medical Institution (''Moassesseh-ye Tamin-e darman-e Basijian'') # The Basijis No-Interest Loan Institute (''Moassesseh-ye Gharz al-Hassaneh-ye Basijian'') # The Basijis Consumer-Goods Provision Institution (''Moassesseh-ye Tamin-e Aghlam-e Masrafi-ye Basijian'') # The Cultural Artistic Institute of the Warriors of Islam (''Moassesseh-ye Farhangi Honari-ye Razmandegan-e Eslam'') # The Scientific and Pedagogic Services Institute of the Fighters (''Moassesseh-ye Khadamat-e Elmi va Amouzeshi-ye Razmandegan'')<ref>S. M. Torabi and N. Rohi, (Persian), Basij in the Ray of Law (Tehran: Aye Cultural Publication, 2000), 219.</ref><ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012"/>

As the government privatized companies under president Hashemi Rafsanjani, The Basij Cooperative Foundation became the Basij's main mechanism for "purchasing entire industries on the cheap".<ref name="Golkar-AF&S-2012"/>

===Duties and activities=== Duties vary by province. Basij are deployed against drug traffickers in the eastern border regions and smugglers in Hormozgan and Bushehr, and on the border with Iraq.<ref name="RFERL">{{Cite news |last=Aryan |first=Hossein |date=2009-02-05 |title=Pillar Of The State |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/Irans_Basij_Force_Mainstay_Of_Domestic_Security/1357081.html |access-date=2024-03-21 |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |language=en}}</ref>

The Ashura Brigades were created in 1993. These Islamic brigades were made up of both Revolutionary Guards and the Basij and by 1998 numbered 17,000.<ref name= GlobSecNiruy/>

According to Golkar,<ref name=":0" /> the Basij are used to spread the state's ideology, serve as propaganda machine in political campaigns, justify clerical rule, protect politicians, and enforce Islamic morality and rules. They are part of the Islamic Republic's of Iran's overall avowed plan to have millions of informers. The Basiji also undermine dissent; for instance, they play a key role in suppressing uprisings and demonstrations.<ref name=":0" />

Basij are present at every Iranian university to monitor morality (primarily dress) and behaviour. (In part this is because Universities and other places of post-secondary education are where Iranian males and females "meet for the first time in a mixed educational environment").<ref name="Reuters-specialists"/>

==== Role in higher education ==== Basij-affiliated networks have played an increasing role in Iranian higher education, particularly since the early 2000s. Reports indicate that university hiring and administrative practices have, at times, been influenced by the IRGC, with some academics removed from their positions and replaced by individuals affiliated with the organization. This trend intensified following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, during which professors from institutions such as the University of Tehran, Allameh Tabataba’i University, and Teacher Training University were reportedly suspended or encouraged to retire early. In this context, Basij members have expanded their presence within universities. According to statements by officials, there are approximately 11,000 Basiji lecturers across Iranian universities, compared to only a small number of religious lecturers about 20 years earlier. The Basij established the Lecturers’ Basij Organization (LBO) to consolidate its academic presence. The LBO reportedly has more than 15,000 members, and its leadership has claimed that 25 percent of Iranian lecturers are affiliated with it. In addition to providing career support, the organization has been described as playing a role in shaping university curricula, particularly by promoting religious and Islamic cultural content. The Student Basij Organization (SBO) functions as the primary body for mobilizing students. It includes approximately 650,000 student members and operates across 700 universities. The organization serves as a liaison between the IRGC and the university environment. Its activities on campuses have included promoting conservative values and, in some cases, opposing reformist student movements.<ref>Wehrey, Frederic, et al. “[http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg821osd.11 Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGCʹs Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities].” ''The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps'', RAND Corporation, 2009, pp. 35–54. ''JSTOR''. Accessed 22 Mar. 2026.</ref>

===Motivation=== While some joined the Basij because of genuine religious convictions, or loyalty to their pro-regime and traditional religious family and community background, others reportedly join Basij only to take advantage of the benefits of membership and to get admission to university or as a tool to get promotion in government jobs.<ref name=":0" /><ref name="Angus">{{cite journal|last=McDowall|first=Angus|date=21 Jun 2009|title=Iran's Basij force: the shock troops terrorising protesters|journal=Daily Telegraph|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/5588291/Irans-Basij-force-the-shock-troops-terrorising-protesters.html|location=London|access-date=2 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180529200759/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/5588291/Irans-Basij-force-the-shock-troops-terrorising-protesters.html|archive-date=29 May 2018|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022"/>

Benefits for members of the Basij reportedly include exemption from the 21 months of military service required for Iranian men, reserved spots in universities, and a small stipend.<ref name="nytimes.com/topics-basij-2-12-2011"/>

In addition, recruits are also "put through heavy indoctrination", including an initial month and a half of "military and ideological training".<ref name="what we know basij ABC-2022"/>

==Commanders== The Basij was most recently commanded by Gholamreza Soleimani, who replaced Gholamhossein Gheybparvar in 2019, and who was killed in an Israeli strike in March 2026.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/437666/Ayatollah-Khamenei-names-new-military-commanders | title=Ayatollah Khamenei names new military commanders | publisher=Tehran Times | date=2 July 2019 | access-date=6 July 2019 | archive-date=6 July 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190706080811/https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/437666/Ayatollah-Khamenei-names-new-military-commanders | url-status=live }}</ref>

{{Officeholder table start | showorder = y | showimage = y | image_title = Portrait | officeholder_title = Commander | showtermlenght = y | showparty = n | showdefencebranch = n | showref = y }} {{Officeholder table | order = 1 | image = | military_rank = | officeholder = Amir Majd | officeholder_sort = Majd, Amir | born_year = | died_year = | term_start = December 1979 | term_end = December 1981 | timeinoffice = {{age in years and months|1979|12|1|1981|12|1}} | ref = <ref name="RAND">{{citation|author=Nikola B. Schahgaldian, Gina Barkhordarian|title=The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic|url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3473.pdf|publisher=RAND|isbn=0-8330-0777-7|date=March 1987|access-date=15 January 2017|archive-date=3 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170203123820/https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3473.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> }} {{Officeholder table | order = 2 | image = Ahmad Salek 1.jpg | military_rank = | officeholder = Ahmad Salek | officeholder_sort = Salek, Ahmad | born_year = {{circa}} 1946 | died_year = | term_start = December 1981 | term_end = 16 February 1984 | timeinoffice = {{age in years and months|1981|12|1|1984|2|16}} | ref = <ref name="RAND"/> }} {{Officeholder table | order = 3 | image = Mohammad Ali Rahmani 2018-06-09.jpg | military_rank = | officeholder = Mohammad-Ali Rahmani | officeholder_sort = Rahmani, Mohammad-Ali | born_year = 1953 | died_year = | term_start = 16 February 1984 | term_end = January 1990 | timeinoffice = {{age in years and months|1984|2|16|1990|1|1}} | ref = <ref name="RAND"/><ref name="G">{{cite book|last1=Golkar|first1=Saeid|title=Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran|date=2015|publisher=Columbia University Press|location=Washington D.C.|pages=15, 18}}</ref> }} {{Officeholder table | order = 4 | image = Alireza Afshar 2018-07-08.jpg | military_rank = Brigadier general | officeholder = Alireza Afshar | officeholder_sort = Afshar, Alireza | born_year = {{circa}} 1951 | died_year = 2025 | term_start = January 1990 | term_end = 1998 | timeinoffice = {{age in years|1990|1998}} years | ref = – }} {{Officeholder table | order = 5 | image = Seyed Mohammad Hejazi 2014-04-28.jpg | military_rank = Brigadier general | officeholder = Mohammad Hejazi | officeholder_sort = Hejazi, Mohammad | born_year = 1956 | died_year = 2021 | term_start = 1998 | term_end = 2007 | timeinoffice = {{age in years|1998|2007}} years | ref = – }} {{Officeholder table | order = 6 | image = Hossein Taeb02.jpg | military_rank = | officeholder = Hossein Taeb | officeholder_sort = Taeb, Hossein | born_year = 1963 | died_year = | term_start = 2007 | term_end = 2009 | timeinoffice = {{age in years|2007|2009}} years | ref = – }} {{Officeholder table | order = 7 | image = Naqdi press conf.jpg | military_rank = Brigadier general | officeholder = Mohammad Reza Naqdi | officeholder_sort = Naqdi, Mohammad Reza | born_year = {{circa}} 1952 or 1961 | died_year = | term_start = 2009 | term_end = 2016 | timeinoffice = {{age in years|2009|2016}} years | ref = – }} {{Officeholder table | order = 8 | image = Gholamhossein Gheybparvar 2018.jpg | military_rank = Brigadier general | officeholder = Gholamhossein Gheybparvar | officeholder_sort = Gheybparvar, Gholamhossein | born_year = 1962 | died_year = 2025 | term_start = 2016 | term_end = 2019 | timeinoffice = {{age in years|2016|2019}} years | ref = – }} {{Officeholder table | order = 9 | image = Gholamreza Soleimani 01 (1).jpg | military_rank = Brigadier general | officeholder = Gholamreza Soleimani | officeholder_sort = Soleimani, Gholamreza | born_year = 1964 | died_year = 2026 | died = y | term_start = 2019 | term_end = 17 March 2026 | timeinoffice = {{age in years|2019|2026}} years | ref = – }} {{Officeholder table end}}

===Timeline=== {{#tag:timeline |ImageSize = width:900 height:auto barincrement:16 PlotArea = top:10 bottom:80 right:150 left:20 AlignBars = late

Define $now = {{#time:Y}}

Colors = id:bs value:Darkblue legend:Basij

id:gray1 value:gray(0.75) id:gray2 value:gray(0.90)

DateFormat = yyyy Period = from:1979 till:$now TimeAxis = orientation:horizontal ScaleMajor = gridcolor:gray1 unit:year increment:5 start:1980 ScaleMinor = gridcolor:gray2 unit:year increment:1 start:1979

Legend = columns:1 left:150 top:35 columnwidth:170

TextData = pos:(20,38) textcolor:black fontsize:M text:"Affiliation:"

BarData = bar:Majd bar:Salek bar:Rahmani bar:Afshar bar:Hejazi bar:Taeb bar:Naqdi bar:Gheybparvar bar:Soleimani

PlotData = width:5 align:left fontsize:9 shift:(5,-4) anchor:till

bar: Majd from: 1979 till: 1981 color:bs text:"Amir Majd" bar: Salek from: 1981 till: 1984 color:bs text:"Ahmad Salek" bar: Rahmani from: 1984 till: 1990 color:bs text:"Mohammad-Ali Rahmani" bar: Afshar from: 1990 till: 1998 color:bs text:"Alireza Afshar" bar: Hejazi from: 1998 till: 2007 color:bs text:"Mohammad Hejazi" bar: Taeb from: 2007 till: 2009 color:bs text:"Hossein Taeb" bar: Naqdi from: 2009 till: 2016 color:bs text:"Mohammad Reza Naqdi" bar: Gheybparvar from: 2016 till: 2019 color:bs text:"Gholamhossein Gheybparvar" bar: Soleimani from: 2019 till: 2026 color:bs text:"Gholamreza Soleimani"

}}

==Politics== In theory, the Basij are banned from involvement in politics by the Iranian constitution, but its leadership is considered active, particularly during and after the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.<ref name="Alfoneh"/> In past elections militia members have voted for both hardliners and reformists. President Ahmadinejad received significant support from militia members, many of whom have benefited from his policies during his presidency.<ref>{{cite news|title=Profile: Basij militia force|work=BBC News|access-date=27 June 2009|date=18 June 2009|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8106699.stm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090622151024/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8106699.stm|archive-date=22 June 2009|url-status = live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Supreme Leader Khamenei described Basij as "the greatest hope of the Iranian nation" and "an immaculate tree".<ref name="english.khamenei.ir">{{cite web|url=http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=781&Itemid=4 |title=Supreme Leader's Speech to Basij Members |publisher=Khamenei.ir |date=3 May 2008 |access-date=8 April 2013 |url-status = dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131112211620/http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=781&Itemid=4 |archive-date=12 November 2013 |df=dmy}}</ref>

== Controversy == The Basij militia has long been a source of domestic and international controversy due to its central role in suppressing dissent and enforcing ideological conformity in Iran. While officially tasked with promoting Islamic values and supporting public order, the force has been widely criticized for its involvement in human rights abuses.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-09-22 |title=Iran's Basij force: specialists in cracking down on dissent |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-basij-force-specialists-cracking-down-dissent-2022-09-22/ |access-date=2025-06-24 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Kangarlou |first=Tara |date=2022-12-05 |title=The Brutal Militia Trained to Kill for Iran's Islamic Regime |url=https://time.com/6238623/iran-basij-militia-meaning-mahsa-amini/ |access-date=2025-06-24 |magazine=TIME |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Iran |url=https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/ |access-date=2025-06-24 |website=United States Department of State |language=en-US}}</ref>

Allegations against the Basij include arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual violence, and the targeting of minors. Additionally, the group's role in enforcing hijab laws and monitoring civilian behavior has raised serious concerns about privacy, bodily autonomy, and freedom of expression. International organizations such as Amnesty International and the United Nations have documented numerous cases in which Basij members used excessive and, at times, lethal force during protests, most notably during the 2009 Green Movement and the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini protests.The Basij's close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and protection from legal accountability have further fueled criticism, leading many observers to view the organization not as a civilian force, but as a powerful instrument of state repression.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-10-06 |title=Iran unlawfully detaining human rights activists, including new Nobel peace laureate, UN expert says |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-human-rights-nobel-un-mohammadi-amini-f2c979e1c7ee3b380b09c36047445241 |access-date=2025-06-24 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref>

Amnesty International reports include 45 survivors, ranging from children to adults (aged 12–48), who endured rape (including multilateral or gang rape) and other forms of sexual assault, perpetrated with objects like batons and hosepipes, by state agents including Basij members.<ref name=":2" />

The Basij's role was also scrutinized in connection with the 2026 Iran massacres. Reports from human rights groups and international observers have linked Basij units to participation in or support of large-scale violent crackdowns during this period. Allegations include involvement in mass detentions, coordinated use of lethal force against civilians, and cooperation with other security bodies in suppressing unrest.<ref>{{cite web |title=What happened at the protests in Iran? |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/01/what-happened-at-the-protests-in-iran/ |website=Amnesty International |date=26 January 2026 }}</ref>

===Other paramilitary groups=== * ''Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista'' (Spain) * Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Argentina) * ''Colectivos'' (Venezuela) * Extermination battalions (Soviet Union) * Petrus (Indonesia, under Suharto) * Janjaweed and Rapid Support Forces (Sudan) * Red Guards (China) * ''Schutzstaffel'' (Nazi Germany) * ''Shabiha'' (Ba'athist Syria) * Tonton Macoute (Duvalier Haiti)

==References== {{reflist|30em}}

==Further reading== * Golkar, Saeid (2012). "[http://afs.sagepub.com/content/38/4/625.abstract Paramilitarization of the Economy: The Case of Iran's Basij Militia]". ''Armed Forces & Society'', Vol. 38, No. 4. * Golkar, Saeid (2015). "[http://cup.columbia.edu/book/captive-society/9780231704427 Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran]". Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Columbia University Press.

==External links== * [http://irannegah.com/video_browse.aspx?keyword=basij Video Archive of Basij] * {{YouTube|aqtsGAYk6QU|Letters from Iran}} – The Basij in the Universities * [http://bso.ir/BSO/Index.htm Basij Students Organization official website]; {{Webarchive |access-date=2007-04-16 |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040803084837/http://bso.ir/BSO/Index.htm |date=3 August 2004 |df=dmy }} * [http://roozonline.com/11english/012011.shtml Heavy Weapons for Baseej Volunteer Militia]; {{Webarchive |access-date=2006-04-16|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060423040814/http://roozonline.com/11english/012011.shtml |date=23 April 2006 |df=dmy }} From ''Rooz Online''. * {{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/iran-primer-the-basij-resistance-force.html|title=Iran Primer: The Basij Resistance Force|first=Ali|last=Alfoneh|publisher=PBS |date=21 October 2010}}

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