{{Short description|Drift towards authoritarianism}} {{Use dmy dates|date=January 2021}} [[File:Number of countries experiencing autocratization and democratization, 1900–2019.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|Since {{circa|2010}}, the number of countries autocratizing (blue) has been higher than those democratizing (yellow).<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Boese |first1=Vanessa A. |last2=Lindberg |first2=Staffan I. |last3=Lührmann |first3=Anna |date=2021-08-18 |title=Waves of autocratization and democratization: a rejoinder |journal=Democratization |volume=28 |issue=6 |pages=1202–1210 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2021.1923006 |issn=1351-0347}}</ref>]] {{Democracy sidebar}}
'''Democratic backsliding{{efn|Other names include democratic decline,<ref name=Mietzner>{{cite journal |last1=Mietzner |first1=Marcus |title=Sources of resistance to democratic decline: Indonesian civil society and its trials |journal=Democratization |date=2021 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=161–178 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1796649|s2cid=225475139 }}</ref> de-democratization,<ref>Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017) ''Populism: a Very Short Introduction''. New York: Oxford University Press. pp.86-96. {{isbn|978-0-19-023487-4}}</ref> democratic erosion,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Laebens |first1=Melis G. |last2=Lührmann |first2=Anna |title=What halts democratic erosion? The changing role of accountability |journal=Democratization |date=2021 |volume=28 |issue=5 |pages=908–928 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2021.1897109|s2cid=234870008 }}</ref> democratic decay,<ref name="Daly">{{cite journal |last1=Daly |first1=Tom Gerald |title=Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field |journal=Hague Journal on the Rule of Law |date=2019 |volume=11 |pages=9–36 |doi=10.1007/s40803-019-00086-2 |s2cid=159354232 }}</ref> democratic recession,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Huq |first1=Aziz Z |title=How (not) to explain a democratic recession |journal=International Journal of Constitutional Law |date=2021 |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=723–737 |doi=10.1093/icon/moab058}}</ref> democratic regression,<ref name=Mietzner/> and democratic deconsolidation.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chull Shin |first1=Doh |title=Democratic deconsolidation in East Asia: exploring system realignments in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan |journal=Democratization |date=2021 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=142–160 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1826438|s2cid=228959708 }}</ref> <!-- ordered by frequency in Google Scholar results since 2021. These are fairly self explanatory and less common than the first two; democratic deconsolidation? -->}}''' is a form of '''autocratization''', a process of structural government transition toward authoritarianism in which the exercise of political power becomes less limited and more arbitrary and repressive.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hyde |first1=Susan D. |date=2020 |title=Democracy's backsliding in the international environment |journal=Science |volume=369 |issue=6508 |pages=1192–1196 |bibcode=2020Sci...369.1192H |doi=10.1126/science.abb2434 |pmid=32883862 |s2cid=221472047}}</ref><ref name="Skaaning">{{cite journal |last1=Skaaning |first1=Svend-Erik |date=2020 |title=Waves of autocratization and democratization: a critical note on conceptualization and measurement |url=https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/211506495/Waves_of_autocratization_and_democratization_Accepted_manuscript_2020.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Democratization |volume=27 |issue=8 |pages=1533–1542 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1799194 |s2cid=225378571 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230206094411/https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/211506495/Waves_of_autocratization_and_democratization_Accepted_manuscript_2020.pdf |archive-date=6 February 2023 |access-date=7 November 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lührmann |first1=Anna |last2=Lindberg |first2=Staffan I. |date=2019 |title=A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it? |journal=Democratization |volume=26 |issue=7 |pages=1095–1113 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029 |s2cid=150992660 |quote=The decline of democratic regime attributes – autocratization |doi-access=free}}</ref> Democratic backsliding specifically assumes a starting point of a democratic system. The process typically restricts the space for public contest and political participation in the process of government selection.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Cassani |first1=Andrea |last2=Tomini |first2=Luca |title=Autocratization in post-Cold War Political Regimes |date=2019 |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-030-03125-1 |pages=15–35 |language=en |chapter=What Autocratization Is}}</ref><ref name="Lust-E-2018">{{Cite journal |author=Walder, D. |author2=Lust, E. |date=2018|title=Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=21|issue=1|pages=93–113|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628|doi-access=free|quote=Backsliding entails deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within any regime. In democratic regimes, it is a decline in the quality of democracy; in autocracies, it is a decline in democratic qualities of governance.}}</ref> Democratic backsliding involves the weakening of democratic institutions, such as the peaceful transition of power or free and fair elections, or the violation of individual rights that underpin democracies, especially freedom of expression.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Lindberg|first=Staffan I.|title=The Nature of Democratic Backsliding in Europe|url=https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/07/24/nature-of-democratic-backsliding-in-europe-pub-76868|access-date=2021-01-27|website=Carnegie Europe|language=en|archive-date=13 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413075045/https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/07/24/nature-of-democratic-backsliding-in-europe-pub-76868|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Rocha Menocal 29–40">{{Cite journal|last1=Rocha Menocal|first1=Alina|last2=Fritz|first2=Verena|last3=Rakner|first3=Lise|date=June 2008|title=Hybrid regimes and the challenges of deepening and sustaining democracy in developing countries1|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220460802217934|journal=South African Journal of International Affairs|language=en|volume=15|issue=1|pages=29–40|doi=10.1080/10220460802217934|s2cid=55589140|issn=1022-0461|archive-date=21 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200121122048/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220460802217934|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Democratic backsliding is the opposite of democratization.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}}
Democratic backsliding is a gradual process, composed of instances of decline.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} It is not sudden nor dramatic, and typically follows legal processes to weaken democratic institutions.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} The Democratic Erosion Consortium categorizes these events of erosion into precursors, symptoms, acts of resistance to backsliding, and destabilizing events.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}}
Proposed causes of democratic backsliding include economic inequality, unemployment, culture wars, culturally conservative reactions to societal changes, populist or personalist politics, and external influence from great power politics. Economic inequality is strongly associated with democratic backsliding in the 21st century, even in wealthy democracies.<ref>{{Cite journal | last1 = Rau | first1 = E. G. | last2 = Stokes | first2 = S. | title = Income inequality and the erosion of democracy in the twenty-first century | journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | date = 2025 | volume = 122 | issue = 1 | article-number = e2422543121 | doi = 10.1073/pnas.2422543121 | pmid = 39793070 | pmc = 11725924 }}</ref> During crises, backsliding can occur when leaders impose autocratic rules during states of emergency that are either disproportionate to the severity of the crisis or remain in place after the situation has improved.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Pandemic Backsliding|publisher=V-Dem|url=https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding/|access-date=23 January 2021|website=www.v-dem.net|archive-date=21 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201221152151/https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding/}}</ref>
During the Cold War, democratic backsliding occurred most frequently through coups. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic backsliding has occurred more frequently through the election of personalist leaders or parties who subsequently dismantle democratic institutions.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Frantz |first1=Erica |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/56389 |title=The Origins of Elected Strongmen: How Personalist Parties Destroy Democracy from Within |last2=Kendall-Taylor |first2=Andrea |last3=Kendall-Taylor |first3=Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program Andrea |last4=Wright |first4=Joe |date=2024 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-888807-9 |language=en}}</ref> During the third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century, many new, weakly institutionalized democracies were established; these regimes have been most vulnerable to democratic backsliding.<ref name="Rocha Menocal 29–40" /><ref name="Bermeo-2016">{{Cite journal|last=Bermeo|first=Nancy|date=January 2016|title=On Democratic Backsliding|url=https://sites.unimi.it/carbone/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Democratic-backsliding-Bermeo-JOD-2016.pdf|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=27|issue=1|pages=5–19|doi=10.1353/jod.2016.0012|s2cid=155798358|issn=1086-3214|access-date=26 April 2019|archive-date=29 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210329004055/https://sites.unimi.it/carbone/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Democratic-backsliding-Bermeo-JOD-2016.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> The third wave of autocratization has been ongoing since 2010 after the Great Recession, when the number of liberal democracies was at an all-time high.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Maerz|first1=Seraphine F.|last2=Lührmann|first2=Anna|last3=Hellmeier|first3=Sebastian|last4=Grahn|first4=Sandra|last5=Lindberg|first5=Staffan I.|date=2020-05-18|title=State of the world 2019: autocratization surges – resistance grows|journal=Democratization|volume=27|issue=6|pages=909–927|doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1758670|issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Boese |first1=Vanessa A. |last2=Lundstedt |first2=Martin |last3=Morrison |first3=Kelly |last4=Sato |first4=Yuko |last5=Lindberg |first5=Staffan I. |date=2022 |title=State of the world 2021: autocratization changing its nature? |journal=Democratization |volume=29 |issue=6 |pages=983–1013 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2022.2069751 |s2cid=249031421 |issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free }}</ref> More than half of all autocratization episodes over 1900–2023 have a U-turn shape in which the autocratization is closely followed by and linked to subsequent democratization.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Nord |first1=Marina |last2=Angiolillo |first2=Fabio |last3=Lundstedt |first3=Martin |last4=Wiebrecht |first4=Felix |last5=Lindberg |first5=Staffan I. |date=2025 |title=When autocratization is reversed: episodes of U-Turns since 1900 |journal=Democratization |volume=32 |issue=5 |pages=1136–1159 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2024.2448742 |issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free }}</ref>
In recent years, democratic backsliding has increasingly been observed not only in newer or weakly institutionalized democracies but also in long-established democratic systems. According to the V-Dem Institute's Democracy Report 2026, nearly a quarter of the world's countries were undergoing autocratization in 2025, including several in Europe and North America. The report also highlights growing concerns about declines in democratic quality and increasing pressures on media and journalists worldwide.<ref>{{cite report |title=Democracy Report 2026 |author=V-Dem Institute |publisher=University of Gothenburg}}</ref>
==Manifestations== Democratic backsliding occurs when essential components of democracy are threatened. Examples of democratic backsliding include:<ref name="DemDigest">{{Cite web|url=http://www.demdigest.org/democratic-backsliding-happens/|title=How democratic backsliding happens|work=Democracy Digest|date=21 February 2017|access-date=23 June 2017|archive-date=17 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200417061220/https://www.demdigest.org/democratic-backsliding-happens/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Waldner-2018">{{Cite journal|last1=Waldner|first1=David|last2=Lust|first2=Ellen|date=11 May 2018|title=Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=21|issue=1|pages=93–113|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref> * Free and fair elections are degraded;<ref name="DemDigest" /> * Liberal rights of freedom of speech, press<ref name="Diamond-2020">{{Cite journal|last=Diamond|first=Larry|date=15 September 2020|title=Democratic regression in comparative perspective: scope, methods, and causes|journal=Democratization|volume=28|pages=22–42|doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1807517|issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free}}</ref> and association decline, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government, hold it to account, and propose alternatives to the current regime;<ref name="DemDigest" /><ref name="Diamond-2020" /> * The rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government) is weakened,<ref name="DemDigest" /> such as when the independence of the judiciary is threatened, or when civil service tenure protections are weakened or eliminated.<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox">{{cite news |first1=Aziz |last1=Huq |first2=Tom |last2=Ginsburg |url=https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/21/14664568/lose-constitutional-democracy-autocracy-trump-authoritarian |title=How to lose a constitutional democracy |work=Vox' |date=21 February 2017 |access-date=5 September 2017 |archive-date=16 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216171856/https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/21/14664568/lose-constitutional-democracy-autocracy-trump-authoritarian |url-status=live }}</ref>. A weakening in the rule of law can produce uncertainty that leads to self-censorship.<ref name="Brancati-2026">{{Cite book|last1=Brancati|first1=Dawn|last2=Sika|first2=Nadine|date=2026|title=Fuzzy Authoritarian Rule|location=New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press}}</ref> * An over-emphasis on national security as response to acts of terrorism or perceived antagonists.<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox" />
==Forms== {{further|Hybrid regime}} Democratic backsliding can occur in several common ways. Backsliding is often led by democratically elected leaders, who use "incremental rather than revolutionary" tactics.<ref name="Kyle-2018">{{Cite web|url=https://institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-Empirical-Assessment.pdf|title=The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment|last1=Kyle|first1=Jordan|last2=Mounk|first2=Yascha|date=December 2018|publisher=Tony Blair Institute for Global Change|access-date=17 May 2019|archive-date=30 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210130094058/https://institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-Empirical-Assessment.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> As emphasized by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, it is difficult to pinpoint a single specific moment at which a government is no longer democratic, given that this process of decline manifests "slowly, in barely visible steps".<ref name="Levitsky-2018" /> Ozan Varol uses the phrase ''stealth authoritarianism'' to describe the practice of an authoritarian leader (or a potential authoritarian leader) using "seemingly legitimate legal mechanisms for anti-democratic ends ... concealing anti-democratic practices under the mask of law."<ref name="Varol">{{Cite encyclopedia|author=Ozan O.Varol|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e5WRDwAAQBAJ|title=Stealth Authoritarianism in Turkey|encyclopedia=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?|date=23 August 2018|editor=Mark A. Graber|editor2=Sanford Levinson|editor3=Mark V. Tushnet|isbn=978-0-19-088898-5|publisher=Oxford University Press|oclc=1030444422|pages=339–354|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161150/https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> Together with Juan Linz (1996),<ref>"Linz, J. and Stepan, A., 1998. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, p.38."</ref> Levitsky and Ziblatt developed and agreed upon their "litmus test", which includes what they believe to be the four key indicators of authoritarian behavior. These four factors are: rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the system, denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, toleration or encouragement of violence, and readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. Varol describes the manipulation of libel laws, electoral laws, or "terrorism" laws as tools to target or discredit political opponents, and the employment of democratic rhetoric as a distraction from anti-democratic practices, as manifestations of stealth authoritarianism.<ref name="Varol" /> In addition to these key signs derived from the behavior of leaders, Samuel P. Huntington also describes culture as a main contributor to democratic backsliding, and goes on to argue that certain cultures are particularly hostile to democracy, but they do not necessarily prohibit democratization.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6REC58gdt2sC&pg=PA23 |last=Huntington |first=Samuel P. |date=2005 |title=Democracy's Third Wave |publisher=University of Oklahoma Press |page=23 |isbn=978-0-8061-2516-9 |access-date=23 February 2021 |archive-date=17 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317162749/https://books.google.com/books?id=6REC58gdt2sC&pg=PA23 |url-status=live }}</ref> Fabio Wolkenstein also cautions that some measures taken to weaken democracy can shift or concentrate power in longer-lasting ways that may not be easily reversed in the next election.<ref name="Wolkenstein-2022">{{Cite journal |last=Wolkenstein |first=Fabio |date=May 11, 2022 |title=What is democratic backsliding? |journal=Constellations |language=en |volume=30 |issue=3 |pages=261–275 |doi=10.1111/1467-8675.12627 |issn=1351-0487|doi-access=free }}</ref>
===Promissory coups=== In a promissory coup, an incumbent elected government is deposed in a coup d'état by coup leaders who claim to defend democracy and promise to hold elections to restore democracy. In these situations, coup-makers emphasize the temporary and necessary nature of their intervention to ensure democracy in the future.<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /> This is unlike the more open-ended coups that occurred during the Cold War. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo says that "The share of successful coups that falls into the promissory category has risen significantly, from 35 percent before 1990 to 85 percent afterward."<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /> Examining 12 promissory coups in democratic states between 1990 and 2012, Bermeo found that "Few promissory coups were followed quickly by competitive elections, and fewer still paved the way for improved democracies."<ref name="Bermeo-2016" />
===Executive aggrandizement=== In political science, executive aggrandizement refers to the expansion of the leader's power beyond the "checks and balances" provided by the legislature and the judiciary, or by interfering with the independence of the public service. Even a legitimately elected leader can undermine democracy or cause a democratic backlash by using government resources to weaken his political opposition.<ref>Williamson, Vanessa (2023). [https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-democratic-decline-in-the-united-states/ Understanding democratic decline in the United States] ''brookings.edu''.</ref>
This process contains a series of institutional changes by elected executives, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government and hold it to account.<ref name="Wolkenstein-2022" /> The most important feature of executive aggrandizement is that the institutional changes are made through legal channels, making it seem as if the elected official has a democratic mandate.<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /><ref name="Levitsky-2018">{{Cite book|title=How Democracies Die|last1=Levitsky|first1=Steven|last2=Ziblatt|first2=Daniel|publisher=Crown|year=2018|location=United States|pages=76–78}}</ref> Some examples of executive aggrandizement are the decline of media freedom and the weakening of the rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government), such as when judicial autonomy is threatened.<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Scheppele |first=Kim Lane |date=2018 |title=Autocratic Legalism |journal=The University of Chicago Law Review |volume=85 |issue=2 |pages=545–584 |jstor=26455917 |issn=0041-9494}}</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-14439, Rede Adolf Hitlers zum Ermächtigungsgesetz.jpg|thumb|Hitler gives a speech to the Reichstag in support of the Enabling Act. The collapse of the Weimar Republic into Nazi Germany is perhaps the most infamous example of democratic backsliding.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Levitsky|first1=Steven|title=How Democracies Die|last2=Ziblatt|first2=Daniel|publisher=Crown|year=2018|isbn=978-1-5247-6293-3|location=New York|page=95}}</ref> |260x260px]]
Over time, there has been a decline in active coups (in which a power-seeking individual, or small group, seizes power through force, violently removing an existing government) and self-coups (involving "a freely elected chief executive suspending the constitution outright in order to amass power in one swift sweep") and an increase in ''executive aggrandizement''.<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /> Political scientist Nancy Bermeo notes that executive aggrandizement occurs over time, through institutional changes legitimized through legal means, such as new constituent assemblies, referendums, or "existing courts or legislatures ... in cases where supporters of the executive gain majority control of such bodies."<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /> Bermeo notes that these methods mean that the aggrandizement of the executive "can be framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate."<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /> Populist rhetoric, which frames the executive as the sole legitimate representative of the people, has been shown to increase public support for executive aggrandizing actions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bessen |first1=Brett R. |date=2024 |title=Populist Discourse and Public Support for Executive Aggrandizement in Latin America |journal=Comparative Political Studies |volume=57 |issue=13 |pages=2118–2151 |doi=10.1177/00104140231223738 |doi-access=free }} </ref> Executive aggrandizement is characterized by the presence of distress in axes of democracy, including institutional or horizontal accountability;<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/legitimacy-9780198825265?cc=nl&lang=en&|title=Legitimacy: The State and Beyond|date=1 April 2019|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-882526-5|editor-last=Sadurski|editor-first=Wojciech|editor-link=Wojciech Sadurski|location=Oxford, New York|editor-last2=Sevel|editor-first2=Michael|editor-last3=Walton|editor-first3=Kevin}}</ref> and executive or discursive accountability.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Issacharoff |first=Samuel |year=2018 |chapter=III Factors, 25 Populism versus Democratic Governance|title=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? |editor1-last=Graber |editor1-first=Mark A. |editor2-last=Levinson |editor2-first=Sanford |editor3-last=Tushnet |editor3-first=Mark |doi=10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-088898-5 |chapter-url=https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001/law-9780190888985-chapter-25 |url-status=live |access-date=15 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116125232/https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001/law-9780190888985-chapter-25 |archive-date=16 January 2021}}</ref>
===Legislative authoritarianism=== {{More citations needed|section|date=April 2026}} Legislative authoritarianism is the use of elected legislatures to consolidate power and undermine democratic accountability while upholding formal democratic processes. Governments pursuing democratic backsliding increasingly depend on legislatures to enact laws that limit opposition participation, erode oversight institutions, or solidify the power of ruling parties in the political system rather than avoiding parliaments. The swift enactment of complicated laws, restrictions on parliamentary debate, diminished authority for minority parties, and the reorganization of legislative committees to support ruling coalitions are some examples of these tactics.
Because legislative authoritarianism operates through legally sanctioned procedures and maintains the external appearance of democratic governance, scholars point out that it is particularly challenging to identify. But over time, these actions may weaken legislative checks on executive power and diminish parliaments' ability to function as autonomous forums for political debate. Rather than sudden regime change, this type of erosion is most frequently seen in instances of democratic backsliding.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sosa-Villagarcia |first1=Paolo |last2=Incio |first2=José |last3=Arce |first3=Moisés |date=April 2025 |title=The Rise of Legislative Authoritarianism |journal=Journal of Democracy |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=106–117 |doi=10.1353/jod.2025.a954567 |issn=1086-3214}}</ref>
===Incremental election subversion=== {{More citations needed|section|date=April 2026}} This form of democratic backsliding entails the subversion of free and fair elections by, for example, blocking media access, disqualifying opposition candidates and voter suppression. This form of backsliding typically takes place before Election Day and now tends to be done in a slower and more incremental way that the changes may even seem not urgent to counter, making it tougher for watchdogs like the media to find and broadcast the cumulative threat of all the mostly small, but significant misconducts.<ref name="Bermeo-2016" /> While the accumulation of power is more likely to start with this slower linear progression, it can accelerate once voter power seems too divided or weakened to repair all the damage done to institutions.
==Causes and characteristics== The V-Party Dataset demonstrated a greater statistical significance of autocratization for victorious parties with very high populism, high anti-pluralism, lack of commitment to the democratic process, and incitement or acceptance of political violence.<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Medzihorsky, Juraj |author2=Lindberg, Staffan I |title=Walking the Talk: How to Identify Anti-Pluralist Parties |journal=Party Politics |date=2023 |volume=30 |issue=3 |pages=420–434 |doi=10.1177/13540688231153092 |pmid=38711799 |pmc=11069453 |hdl=2077/68137 |s2cid=265727508 |url=https://v-dem.net/media/publications/working_paper_116_final.pdf}}</ref>
===Populism=== Pippa Norris of the Harvard Kennedy School and the University of Sydney argues that the two "twin forces" pose the largest threat to Western liberal democracies: "sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security, and the rise of populist-authoritarian forces, which feed parasitically upon these fears."<ref name="Norris">{{Cite web |url=http://journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/media/Journal%20of%20Democracy%20Web%20Exchange%20-%20Norris_0.pdf |title=Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks |last=Norris |first=Pippa |author-link=Pippa Norris |date=April 2017 |website=Journal of Democracy |series=Online Exchange on "Democratic Deconsolidation" |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press |language=en |type=Scholarly response to column published online |access-date=28 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180411111001/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/media/Journal%20of%20Democracy%20Web%20Exchange%20-%20Norris_0.pdf |archive-date=11 April 2018 }}</ref> Norris defines populism as "a governing style with three defining features": #A rhetorical emphasis on the idea that "legitimate political authority is based on popular sovereignty and majority rule"; #Disapproval of, and challenges to the legitimacy of, established holders of "political, cultural, and economic power"; #Leadership by "maverick outsiders" who claim "to speak for the ''vox populi'' and to serve ordinary people."<ref name="Norris"/> Some, but not all, populists are authoritarian, emphasizing "the importance of protecting traditional lifestyles against perceived threats from 'outsiders', even at the expense of civil liberties and minority rights."<ref name="Norris"/> According to Norris, the reinforcement of the insecurities from the "twin forces" has led to more support for populist-authoritarian leaders, and this latter risk was especially pronounced in the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. For example, Norris argues that Trump benefited from the mistrust of "the establishment" and that he continuously sought to undermine faith in the legitimacy of the media and the independence of the courts.<ref name="Norris"/>
In 2017, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser wrote:
<blockquote>Populism does not have the same effect in each stage of the democratization process. In fact, we suggest that populism tends to play a positive role in the promotion of electoral or minimal democracy, but a negative role when it comes to fostering the development of a full-fledged liberal democratic regime. Consequently, while populism tends to favor the democratization of authoritarian regimes, it is prone to diminish the quality of liberal democracies. Populism supports popular sovereignty, but it is inclined to oppose any limitations on majority rule, such as judicial independence and minority rights. Populism-in-power has led to processes of de-democratization (e.g., [[Viktor Orban|[Viktor] Orbán]] in Hungary or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela) and, in some extreme cases, even to the breakdown of the democratic regime (e.g., [[Alberto Fujimori|[Alberto] Fujimori]] in Peru).<ref>Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017) ''Populism: a Very Short Introduction''. New York: Oxford University Press. pp.95–96. {{isbn|978-0-19-023487-4}}</ref></blockquote>
A 2018 analysis by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Jordan Kyle links populism to democratic backsliding, showing that since 1990, "13 right-wing populist governments have been elected; of these, five brought about significant democratic backsliding. Over the same time period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number, five, brought about significant democratic backsliding."<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Mounk |first1=Yascha |last2=Kyle |first2=Jordan |date=26 December 2018 |title=What Populists Do to Democracies |website=The Atlantic |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ |url-status=live |access-date=27 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309020711/https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ |archive-date=9 March 2021}}</ref>
A December 2018 report by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change concluded that populist rule, whether left- or right-wing, leads to a significant risk of democratic backsliding. The authors examine the effect of populism on three major aspects of democracy: the quality of democracy in general, checks and balances on executive power, and citizens' right to politically participate in a meaningful way. They conclude that populist governments are four times more likely to cause harm to democratic institutions than non-populist governments. Also, more than half of populist leaders have amended or rewritten the countries' constitution, frequently in a way that eroded checks and balances on executive power. Lastly, populists attack individual rights such as freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights.<ref name="Kyle-2018" />
In a 2018 journal article on democratic backsliding, scholars Licia Cianetti, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley argued that the emergence of populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Andrej Babiš's ANO in the Czech Republic, are "a potentially ambiguous phenomenon, articulating genuine societal demands for political reform and pushing issues of good governance centre stage, but further loosening the weak checks and balances that characterise post-communist democracy and embedding private interests at the core of the state."<ref name="Cianetti"/>
In a 2019 paper, presented to the International Society of Political Psychologists, Shawn Rosenberg argues that right-wing populism is exposing a vulnerability in democratic structures and that "democracy is likely to devour itself."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Democracy Devouring Itself: The Rise of the Incompetent Citizen and the Appeal of Right-Wing Populism|last=Rosenberg, S|date=1 January 2019|publisher=eScholarship, University of California|oclc=1055900632}}</ref>
Around the world, citizens are voting away the democracies they claim to cherish. Scholars present evidence that this behaviour is driven in part by the belief that their opponents will undermine democracy first. In experimental studies, they revealed to partisans that their opponents are more committed to democratic norms than they think. As a result, the partisans became more committed to upholding democratic norms themselves and less willing to vote for candidates who break these norms. These findings suggest that aspiring autocrats may instigate democratic backsliding by accusing their opponents of subverting democracy and that we can foster democratic stability by informing partisans about the other side's commitment to democracy.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Braley |first1=Alia |last2=Lenz |first2=Gabriel S. |last3=Adjodah |first3=Dhaval |last4=Rahnama |first4=Hossein |last5=Pentland |first5=Alex |title=Why voters who value democracy participate in democratic backsliding |journal=Nature Human Behaviour |date=2023 |volume=7 |issue=8 |pages=1282–1293 |doi=10.1038/s41562-023-01594-w|pmid=37217740 |s2cid=258842427 }}</ref>
The term "populism" has been criticized as a misleading term for phenomena such as nativism and intentional promotion of authoritarianism by political elites.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Art |first1=David |title=The Myth of Global Populism |journal=Perspectives on Politics |date=2022 |volume=20 |issue=3 |pages=999–1011 |doi=10.1017/S1537592720003552|s2cid=228858887 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Moffitt |first1=Benjamin |title=The Populism/Anti-Populism Divide in Western Europe |journal=Democratic Theory |date=2018 |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=1–16 |doi=10.3167/dt.2018.050202 |s2cid=158084905 |url=https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/5/2/dt050202.xml |issn=2332-8894|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
===Economic issues=== Many political economy scholars, such as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, have investigated the effect of income inequality on the democratic breakdown.<ref name="Lust-E-2018" /> Studies of democratic collapse show that economic inequality is significantly higher in countries that eventually move towards a more authoritarian model.<ref name="Huq-2018" />
Adolf Hitler's rise to power was connected to high unemployment rate.<ref name="leopold">{{Cite web|url=https://www.huffingtonpost.com/les-leopold/why-are-we-afraid-to-crea_b_487041.html|first=|last=|title=Why are We Afraid to Create the Jobs We Need?|website=Les Leopold|date=5 March 2010}}</ref> Hungary is another example of a country where a large share of unemployed people, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, contributed to popular support for a national-populist party.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Greskovitz|first=Béla|date=2015|title=The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East-Central Europe|journal=Global Policy|volume=6|issue=1|pages=28–37|doi=10.1111/1758-5899.12225}}</ref>
===Institutional reforms=== Recent research on Latin America shows that institutional reforms, often introduced during crises, sometimes worsen democratic backsliding. Reforms intended to strengthen presidential powers or address public discontent can fragment political landscapes, leaving democracies vulnerable to instability and populist pressures.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Buben |first1=Radek |last2=Kouba |first2=Karel |date=April 2024 |title=Democracy and Institutional Change in Times of Crises in Latin America |journal=Journal of Politics in Latin America |language=en |volume=16 |issue=1 |pages=90–109 |doi=10.1177/1866802X241226986 |issn=1866-802X|doi-access=free }}</ref>
===Loneliness=== Loneliness can be associated with support of authoritarianism.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Langenkamp |first=Alexander |date=2025 |title=Linking social deprivation and loneliness to right-extreme radicalization and extremist antifeminism |journal=Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences |volume=63 |article-number=101525 |doi=10.1016/j.cobeha.2025.101525 |issn=2352-1546|doi-access=free }}</ref>
===Personalism=== {{See also|Business-firm party}} A 2019 study found that personalism had an adverse impact on democracy in Latin America: "presidents who dominate their own weakly organized parties are more likely to seek to concentrate power, undermine horizontal accountability, and trample the rule of law than presidents who preside over parties that have an independent leadership and an institutionalized bureaucracy."<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Rhodes-Purdy |first1=Matthew |last2=Madrid |first2=Raúl L. |date=27 November 2019 |title=The perils of personalism |journal=Democratization |volume=27 |issue=2 |pages=321–339 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2019.1696310 |s2cid=212974380 |issn=1351-0347}}</ref> The same thing is also true in the Middle East, its most prevalent example being seemingly Turkey and consolidation of power in the hands of the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who has been in power since 2003.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Demir |first=Vedat |date=2024 |title=Public Diplomacy and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: A Retrospective Look at Government Investment in Soft Power |journal=Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=42–57 |doi=10.29333/ejecs/2017 |jstor=48778813 |issn=2149-1291|doi-access=free }}</ref>
===COVID-19=== {{Main article|Political impact of the COVID-19 pandemic|Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on journalism}}
Many national governments worldwide delayed, postponed or canceled a variety of democratic elections at both national and subnational governmental levels, resulting in the COVID-19 pandemic opening gaps in the action of democracy.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections |title=Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections |website=www.idea.int |access-date=28 January 2021 |archive-date=13 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210313030648/https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lewkowicz |first1=Jacek |last2=Woźniak |first2=Michał |last3=Wrzesiński |first3=Michał |date=January 2022 |title=COVID-19 and erosion of democracy |journal=Economic Modelling |volume=106 |article-number=105682 |doi=10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105682 |pmid=34776576 |pmc=8571542}}</ref>
According to the V-Dem Institute, only 39% of all countries have committed no or only minor violations of democratic standards in response to COVID-19.<ref>B. Edgell, A., Grahn, S., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A. and F. Maerz, S. (2021). [https://web.archive.org/web/20210131170154/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b9/2e/b92e59da-2a06-4d2e-82a1-b0a8dece4af7/v-dem_policybrief-24_update-pandemic-backsliding_200702.pdf "An Update on Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy Four Months After the Beginning of the Covid-19 Pandemic".] V-dem.net. Accessed 31 January 2021.</ref> According to Ingo Keilitz, both authoritarian leaders and surveillance capitalists used the pandemic to "make massive shifts and reprogramming of our sensibilities about privacy and civil liberties that may not be reversible". Keilitz saw this as a threat to judicial independence.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Keilitz |first1=Ingo |title=Illiberalism Enabled by the Coronavirus Pandemic: An Existential Threat to Judicial Independence |journal=International Journal for Court Administration |date=10 August 2020 |volume=11 |issue=2 |article-number=2 |doi=10.36745/ijca.339 |s2cid=225514092 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
===Great power politics=== Great power transitions have contributed to democratic backsliding and the spread of authoritarianism in two ways: "First, the sudden rise of autocratic Great Powers led to waves of autocracy driven by conquest but also by self-interest and even admiration, as in the fascist wave of the 1930s or the post-1945 communist wave. Second, the sudden rise of democratic hegemons led to waves of democratization, but these waves inevitably overextended and collapsed, leading to failed consolidation and rollback."<ref>{{cite book |last=Gunitsky|first=Seva|chapter=Great Powers and the Spread of Autocracy Since the Cold War|date=2021|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/before-and-after-the-fall/great-powers-and-the-spread-of-autocracy-since-the-cold-war/D7F3EC6F0C4B41F5742693AB13DE28AD|title=Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War|pages=225–243|editor-last=Bartel|editor-first=Fritz|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108910194.014|isbn=978-1-108-90677-7|s2cid=244851964|editor2-last=Monteiro|editor2-first=Nuno P.|access-date=17 December 2021|archive-date=11 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220111013819/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/before-and-after-the-fall/great-powers-and-the-spread-of-autocracy-since-the-cold-war/D7F3EC6F0C4B41F5742693AB13DE28AD|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
===Authoritarian values=== Global variation in democracy is primarily explained by variance between popular adherence to authoritarian values vs. emancipative values, which explains around 70 percent of the variation of democracy between countries every year since 1960. Emancipative values, as measured by the World Values Survey, have been consistently rising over time in response to increasing economic prosperity.<ref name=Welzel/>
A 2020 study, which used World Values Survey data, found that cultural conservatism was the ideological group most open to authoritarian governance within Western democracies. Within English-speaking Western democracies, "protection-based" attitudes combining cultural conservatism and leftist economic attitudes were the strongest predictor of support for authoritarian modes of governance.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Malka|first1=Ariel|last2=Lelkes|first2=Yphtach|last3=Bakker|first3=Bert N.|last4=Spivack|first4=Eliyahu|date=2020|title=Who Is Open to Authoritarian Governance within Western Democracies?|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/who-is-open-to-authoritarian-governance-within-western-democracies/0ADCD5FFE5B7E9267E8283C7561FB6BE|journal=Perspectives on Politics|volume=20 |issue=3 |language=en|pages=808–827|doi=10.1017/S1537592720002091|s2cid=225207244|issn=1537-5927|access-date=9 September 2020|archive-date=28 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210128174710/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/who-is-open-to-authoritarian-governance-within-western-democracies/0ADCD5FFE5B7E9267E8283C7561FB6BE|url-status=live}}</ref>
Professor Jessica Stern and the political psychologist Karen Stenner write that international research finds that "perceptions of sociocultural threat" (such as rising ethnic diversity and tolerance for LGBT people) are more important in explaining how democracies turn authoritarian compared to economic inequality (though they include economic threats such as globalization and the rising prosperity of other ethnic groups).<ref>{{cite news |title=How to Live With Authoritarians |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/11/capitol-insurrection-trump-authoritarianism-psychology-innate-fear-envy-change-diversity-populism/ |magazine=Foreign Policy |author2=Jessica Stern |author1=Karen Stenner |date=February 11, 2021 |access-date=17 January 2022 |archive-date=12 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220112134405/https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/11/capitol-insurrection-trump-authoritarianism-psychology-innate-fear-envy-change-diversity-populism/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Stern and Stenner say about a third of the population in Western countries is predisposed to favor homogeneity, obedience, and strong leaders over diversity and freedom.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} In their view, authoritarianism is only loosely correlated with conservatism, which may defend a liberal democracy as the status quo.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}}
Political scientist Christian Welzel argues that the third wave of democratization overshot the demand for democracy in some countries. Therefore, Welzel sees the current autocratization trend as regression to the mean, but expects that it too will reverse in response to long-term changes in values.<ref name=Welzel>{{cite journal |last1=Welzel |first1=Christian |title=Why The Future Is Democratic |journal=Journal of Democracy |date=2021 |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=132–144 |doi=10.1353/jod.2021.0024 |s2cid=234920048 |url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-the-future-is-democratic/ |issn=1086-3214 |access-date=28 February 2022 |archive-date=28 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220228041154/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-the-future-is-democratic/ |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>
===Polarization, misinformation, incrementalism, and multi-factor explanations===
The 2019 Annual Democracy Report of the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg identified three challenges confronting global democracy: (1) "Government manipulation of media, civil society, rule of law, and elections"; (2) rising "toxic polarization", including "the division of society into distrustful, antagonistic camps"; diminishing "respect for opponents, factual reasoning, and engagement with society" among political elites; and increasing use of hate speech by political leaders; and (3) foreign disinformation campaigns, primarily digital, and mostly affecting Taiwan, the United States, and former Soviet bloc nations such as Latvia.<ref name="2019VDem">{{Cite report|url=https://v-dem.net/documents/16/dr_2019_CoXPbb1.pdf|title=Democracy Facing Global Challenges: V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019|publisher=V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg|date=May 2019|access-date=9 April 2024}}</ref>
According to Suzanne Mettler and Robert C. Lieberman, four characteristics have typically provided the conditions for democratic backsliding (alone or in combination): political polarization, racism and nativism, economic inequality, and excessive executive power.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mettler|first=Suzanne|title=Four Threats: The Recurring Crises of American Democracy|publisher=St. Martin's Press|year=2020|isbn=978-1-250-24442-0|location=New York|oclc=1155487679}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=History tells us there are four key threats to U.S. democracy|author=Farrell, Henry|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=14 August 2020|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/14/history-tells-us-there-are-four-key-threats-us-democracy/|access-date=14 August 2020|archive-date=18 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210118163030/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/14/history-tells-us-there-are-four-key-threats-us-democracy/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Lieberman|first=By Suzanne Mettler and Robert C.|date=10 August 2020|title=The Fragile Republic|url=https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2020/08/10/the-fragile-republic/content.html|access-date=15 August 2020|website=Foreign Affairs|language=en-GB|archive-date=6 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201106005911/https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2020/08/10/the-fragile-republic/content.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman highlight three key causes of backsliding: "the pernicious effects of polarization; realignments of party systems that enable elected autocrats to gain legislative power; and the incremental nature of derogations, which divides oppositions and keeps them off balance."<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Haggard|first1=Stephan|last2=Kaufman|first2=Robert|date=2021|title=Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/backsliding/CCD2F28FB63A56409FF8911351F2E937|access-date=21 January 2021|publisher=Cambridge University Press|language=en|doi=10.1017/9781108957809|isbn=978-1-108-95780-9|s2cid=242013001|archive-date=3 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303135223/https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/backsliding/CCD2F28FB63A56409FF8911351F2E937|url-status=live}}</ref> A 2022 study linked polarization to support for undemocratic politicians.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Orhan |first=Yunus Emre |date=2022 |title=The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence |url=|journal=Democratization |volume=29 |issue=4 |pages=714–735 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2021.2008912 |s2cid=248304434 |issn=1351-0347}}</ref>
====Civil society==== In the context of strong political polarization, civil society can contribute to democratic backsliding. In 1997, political scientist Sheri Berman argued that civil society does not necessarily strengthen a democracy, and pointed to a particular case in which civil society weakened democracy: "a robust civil society helped scuttle the twentieth century's most critical democratic experiment, Weimar Germany".<ref name="Berman1997_civil_society_collapse_Weimar">{{cite Q|Q139703533|url-access=subscription}}</ref> In 2021, she argued that citizens' associations weakened the Weimar Republic as a democracy in two ways: they strengthened "social divisions and animosities" in the equivalent of internet-epoch filter bubbles rather than bridging social divides; and the associations' organisational infrastructure was used by the Nazi Party to gain electoral power. Berman argued that for civil society in the United States (US), the political polarization of 2021 was qualitatively similar to that of the Weimar Republic, and she recommended that people "concerned with democracy" in the US should "figur[e] out how to promote the types of networks and associations that can help Americans bridge their current divides".<ref name="Berman2021_revisiting_civil_society">{{cite Q|Q139714341|url-status=live}}</ref>
===Effects of judicial independence=== A 2011 study examined the effects of judicial independence in preventing democratic backsliding. The study, which analyzed 163 countries from 1960 to 2000, concluded that established independent judiciaries are successful at preventing democracies from drifting to authoritarianism, but that states with newly formed courts "are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and non-democracies".<ref>{{cite journal |author=Douglas M. Gibler |author2=Kirk A. Randazzo |title=Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=55|issue=3|pages=696–709|date=2011|jstor=23024945|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x}}</ref> In the early 2020s, studies of V-Dem Democracy Indices found that judicial interventions played a role in democratic resilience.<ref name="Boese2021_two_stage_process">{{cite Q|Q139719252|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Wiebrecht2023_state_world_2022">{{cite Q|Q139719232|url-status=live}}</ref>
==Psychological impact== {{More citations needed|section|date=April 2026}} Research into the psychological effects of democratic backsliding has highlighted the complex relationship between political events and individual well-being. A 2020 multi-method investigation into the "Trump Depression" phenomenon following the 2016 United States election revealed a disconnect between perceived and actual psychopathology<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Simchon |first1=Almog |last2=Guntuku |first2=Sharath Chandra |last3=Simhon |first3=Rotem |last4=Ungar |first4=Lyle H. |last5=Hassin |first5=Ran R. |last6=Gilead |first6=Michael |date=November 2020 |title=Political depression? A big-data, multimethod investigation of Americans' emotional response to the Trump presidency |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology. General |volume=149 |issue=11 |pages=2154–2168 |doi=10.1037/xge0000767 |issn=1939-2222 |pmid=32309988}}</ref>. While liberal citizens reported significantly higher levels of depression when asked directly about the election, big-data analyses of Google searches, Twitter discourse, and antidepressant consumption showed no corresponding aggregate increase in clinical depression indicators. The authors suggested that reports of "political depression" might reflect a "concept creep" where negative emotions are reframed as mental illness, or serve a value-expressive function to signal group identity.
Later research conducted during the early months of the second Trump presidency in 2025 examined well-being during a period explicitly characterized by democratic backsliding and sweeping executive actions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Wu |first1=Deborah J. |last2=Law |first2=Kyle F. |last3=Syropoulos |first3=Stylianos |last4=Perry |first4=Sylvia P. |date=2026-01-14 |title=The politics of well-being during democratic backsliding: How partisan affiliation and support for government actions relate to happiness and life satisfaction |journal=Advances.in/Psychology |language=en-US |volume=1 |pages=e569295 |doi=10.56296/aip00051 |issn=2976-937X|doi-access=free }}</ref> The study found that Republicans reported higher life satisfaction and happiness than Democrats, a gap that widened as Republicans' well-being increased over time. Crucially, higher well-being was positively associated with support for the administration's actions, while opposition to these actions was correlated with lower well-being. The findings indicated that while alignment with a backsliding government can offer psychological comfort through "person-environment fit," resisting democratic erosion imposes psychological costs, though opponents may eventually adapt and rebound in well-being.
==Prevalence and trends== {{see also|Democratic backsliding by country}} [[File:Countries democratizing or autocratizing substantially and significantly 2010–2020.svg|thumb|upright=1.35|Countries autocratizing (red) or democratizing (blue) substantially and significantly (2010–2020), according to the V-Dem Democracy indices. Countries in grey are substantially unchanged.<ref>Nazifa Alizada, Rowan Cole, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Sebastian Hellmeier, Palina Kolvani, Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Shreeya Pillai, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2021. Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210914030243/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf |date=14 September 2021 }}</ref>]] A study by the V-Dem Democracy indices by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, which contains more than eighteen million data points relevant to democracy, measuring 350 highly specific indicators across 174 countries as of the end of 2016, found that the number of democracies in the world modestly declined from 100 in 2011 to 97 in 2017; some countries moved toward democracy, while other countries moved away from democracy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mechkova|first1=Valeriya|last2=Lührmann|first2=Anna|last3=Lindberg|first3=Staffan I.|s2cid=158736288|date=2017|title=How Much Democratic Backsliding?|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=28|issue=4|pages=162–169|doi=10.1353/jod.2017.0075|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> V-Dem's 2019 Annual Democracy Report found that the trend of autocratization continued, while "24 countries are now severely affected by what is established as a 'third wave of autocratization{{'"}} including "populous countries such as Brazil, Bangladesh and the United States, as well as several Eastern European countries" (specifically Bulgaria and Serbia).<ref name=2019VDem/> The report found that an increasing proportion of the world population lived in countries undergoing autocratization (2.3 billion in 2018).<ref name=2019VDem/> The report found that while the majority of countries were democracies, the number of liberal democracies declined to 39 by 2018 (down from 44 a decade earlier).<ref name=2019VDem/> The research group Freedom House, in reports in 2017 and 2019, identified democratic backsliding in a variety of regions across the world.<ref name="Freedom-House-2019">{{Cite report|url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|title=Democracy in Retreat|date=2019|publisher=Freedom House|access-date=17 May 2019|archive-date=15 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190215005216/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Esther King|url=http://www.politico.eu/article/democratic-backsliding-threatens-international-order-report/|title=Democratic backsliding threatens international order|date=31 January 2017|work=Politico|access-date=23 June 2017|archive-date=29 July 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170729092311/http://www.politico.eu/article/democratic-backsliding-threatens-international-order-report/|url-status=live}}</ref> Freedom House's 2019 ''Freedom in the World'' report, titled ''Democracy in Retreat'', showed freedom of expression declining each year over the preceding 13 years, with sharper drops since 2012.<ref>{{Cite report|url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|title=Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019|year=2020|publisher=Freedom House|access-date=17 May 2019|archive-date=15 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190215005216/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat|url-status=live}}</ref> [[File:BTI 2022 DEM.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35| Global trend report Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2022<ref name="BTI 2022a">{{cite web | title=Global Dashboard | website=BTI 2022 | url=https://bti-project.org/en/reports/global-dashboard?&cb=00000 | access-date=Apr 17, 2023 | archive-date=17 April 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230417052038/https://bti-project.org/en/reports/global-dashboard?&cb=00000 | url-status=live }}</ref>]] Scholarly work in the 2010s detailed democratic backsliding, in various forms and to various extents, in Hungary and Poland,<ref name="Cianetti">{{Cite journal|title=Rethinking "democratic backsliding" in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland |author=Licia Cianetti |author2=James Dawson |author3=Seán Hanley |journal=East European Politics|volume=34|issue=3|date=2018|pages=243–256|quote=Over the past decade, a scholarly consensus has emerged that that democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is deteriorating, a trend often subsumed under the label 'backsliding'. ... the new dynamics of backsliding are best illustrated by the one-time democratic front-runners Hungary and Poland.|doi=10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401|doi-access=free}}</ref> the Czech Republic,<ref name=Hanley>{{Cite journal|author=Seán Hanley & Milada Anna Vachudova|title=Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic|journal=East European Politics|volume=34|issue=3|pages=276–296|date=2018|doi=10.1080/21599165.2018.1493457|doi-access=free}}</ref> Turkey,<ref name=Tansel>{{Cite journal|author=Cemal Burak Tansel|title=Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress|volume=23|issue=2|journal=South European Society and Politics|date=2018|pages=197–217|doi=10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=AkyuzHess>{{Cite journal|author=Kadir Akyuz & Steve Hess|s2cid=158084228|title=Turkey Looks East: International Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in a Hybrid Regime|journal=Mediterranean Quarterly|volume=29|issue=2|date=2018|pages=1–26|doi=10.1215/10474552-6898075}}</ref> Brazil, Venezuela,<ref name="Laura-Gamboa-2017">{{Cite journal|title=Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela|author=Laura Gamboa|s2cid=157426820|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=49|issue=4|date=2017|pages=457–477|doi = 10.5129/001041517821273044}}</ref><ref name="Sabatini">{{cite news|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2016-11-01/final-blow-venezuelas-democracy|title=The Final Blow to Venezuela's Democracy: What Latin America Can Do About It|last=Sabatini|first=Christopher|work=Foreign Affairs|date=1 November 2016|language=en-US|issn=0015-7120|access-date=27 May 2019|archive-date=25 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225184836/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2016-11-01/final-blow-venezuelas-democracy|url-status=live}}</ref> and India.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2021/02/05/democratic-erosion-in-india-a-case-study/|title=Democratic Erosion in India: A Case Study|website=www.democratic-erosion.com|date=5 February 2021 |access-date=14 March 2021|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317155809/https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2021/02/05/democratic-erosion-in-india-a-case-study/|url-status=live}}</ref> The scholarly recognition of the concept of democratic backsliding reflects a reversal from older views, which held "that democracy, once attained in a fairly wealthy state, would become a permanent fixture."<ref name="DemDigest"/> This older view came to be realized as erroneous beginning in the mid-2000s, as multiple scholars acknowledged that some seemingly-stable democracies have recently faced a decline in the quality of their democracy.<ref name="Huq-2018">{{Cite journal|last1=Huq|first1=Aziz|last2=Ginsburg|first2=Tom|date=2018|title=How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy|url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/uclalr65&div=5|journal=UCLA Law Review|volume=65|pages=78–169|access-date=15 May 2023|archive-date=15 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230515200309/https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/uclalr65&div=5|url-status=live}}</ref> Huq and Ginsburg identified in an academic paper "37 instances in 25 different countries in the postwar period in which democratic quality declined significantly (though a fully authoritarian regime didn't emerge)", including countries that were "seemingly stable, reasonably wealthy" democracies.<ref name="HuqGinsburgVox"/> The V-Dem Democracy Report identified for the year 2025 24 cases of stand-alone autocratization and 20 cases of bell-turn autocratization.<ref name=VDEM_Report_2026/>
{|class="wikitable sortable" style="margin:1em auto;" !width=200px|Country !width=75px|Backsliding since !Ruling group or person !{{Refh}} |- |{{flag|Albania}} |2013 |Socialist Party of Albania, under Edi Rama |<ref name = Mayr>{{Cite news |last=Mayr |first=Walter |date=20 September 2024 |title=A Blind Eye?: Albanian Leader Rama a Darling of Europe Despite Corruption Back Home |url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-blind-eye-albanian-leader-rama-a-darling-of-europe-despite-corruption-back-home-a-616a6ee1-f4bb-4ec9-8669-4e1ffd42ae00 |access-date=8 December 2024 |work=Der Spiegel |language=en |issn=2195-1349}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Myftari |first=J. |year=2024 |title=Fading freedoms: democratic decline in Albania |journal=Democratization |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=495–512 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2024.2377340}}</ref> |- |- |{{flag|Central African Republic}} |2019 |United Hearts Movement, under Faustin-Archange Touadéra |<ref name=VDEM_Report_2026/> |- |{{flag|El Salvador}} |2019 |Nuevas Ideas, under Nayib Bukele |<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/18/bukele-el-salvador-biden-human-rights-watch-authoritarianism/|title=The U.S. can stop El Salvador's slide to authoritarianism. Time to act.|last1=Vivanco|first1=José Miguel|last2=Pappier|first2=Juan|access-date=22 June 2021|date=18 May 2021|newspaper=The Washington Post|archive-date=22 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210622221805/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/18/bukele-el-salvador-biden-human-rights-watch-authoritarianism/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.undispatch.com/better-know-nayib-bukele-the-hipster-millennial-and-authoritarian-president-of-el-salvador/|title=Better Know Nayib Bukele, the Hipster, Millennial and Authoritarian President of El Salvador|last=Goldberg|first=Mark Leon|date=20 June 2021|website=UN Dispatch|access-date=20 June 2021|archive-date=22 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210622222353/https://www.undispatch.com/better-know-nayib-bukele-the-hipster-millennial-and-authoritarian-president-of-el-salvador/|url-status=live}}</ref> |- |{{flag|Ethiopia}} |2018 |Prosperity Party, under Abiy Ahmed |<ref>{{Cite web |date=2020-09-25 |title=Ethiopia's PM Abiy Ahmed loses his shine |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/the-shine-comes-off-ethiopias-pm-abiy-ahmed/ |access-date=2023-08-09 |website=POLITICO |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Teshome |first=Moges Zewdu |date=2023-06-15 |title=Charming Abiy Ahmed, a very modern dictator |url=https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2023/06/15/charming-abiy-ahmed-a-very-modern-dictator/ |access-date=2023-08-09 |website=Ethiopia Insight |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Mackintosh |first=Eliza |date=2021-09-07 |title=From Nobel laureate to global pariah: How the world got Abiy Ahmed and Ethiopia so wrong |url=https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/07/africa/abiy-ahmed-ethiopia-tigray-conflict-cmd-intl/index.html |access-date=2023-08-09 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> |- |{{flag|Georgia}} |2019 |Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia, especially under Irakli Kobakhidze |<ref name="announcement">{{Cite web|url=https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80542|title=Georgia's Dangerous Slide Away From Democracy|website=Carnegie Europe|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205095701/https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80542|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://civil.ge/archives/611904 |title=BREAKING: US State Department Implements First Tranche of Sanctions against Georgian Individuals |publisher=Civil.ge |date=6 June 2024 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2024-10-09 |title=EP adopts resolution on decline of democracy in Georgia with 495 votes |url=https://georgiatoday.ge/ep-adopts-resolution-on-decline-of-democracy-in-georgia-with-495-votes/ |access-date=2024-10-09 |website=Georgia Today |language=en-US}}</ref> |- |{{flag|Hungary}} |2010 |Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance, under Viktor Orbán |<ref name="democratization2019">{{cite journal |last1=Maerz |first1=Seraphine F. |last2=Lührmann |first2=Anna |last3=Hellmeier |first3=Sebastian |last4=Grahn |first4=Sandra |last5=Lindberg |first5=Staffan I. |title=State of the world 2019: autocratization surges – resistance grows |journal=Democratization |date=17 August 2020 |volume=27 |issue=6 |pages=909–927 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1758670|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Rohac">{{Cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/hungary-and-poland-arent-democratic-theyre-authoritarian/|title=Hungary and Poland Aren't Democratic. They're Authoritarian.|last=Rohac|first=Dalibor|website=Foreign Policy|date=5 February 2018 |language=en-US|access-date=2019-10-23|archive-date=2018-02-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180205090730/https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/hungary-and-poland-arent-democratic-theyre-authoritarian/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/the-re-election-of-hungarys-authoritarian-prime-minister-disproves-everything-we-thought-we-knew-about-democracy.html|title=Hungary's Election Was a Milestone in the Decline of Democracy|last=Mounk|first=Yascha|date=2018-04-09|website=Slate Magazine|language=en|access-date=2019-10-23|archive-date=2018-04-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180410091123/https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/the-re-election-of-hungarys-authoritarian-prime-minister-disproves-everything-we-thought-we-knew-about-democracy.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="AtlanticHungaryAntisemitic">[https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/viktor-orban-and-anti-semitic-figyelo-cover/578158/ Viktor Orbán Is Exploiting Anti-Semitism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200618115639/https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/viktor-orban-and-anti-semitic-figyelo-cover/578158/ |date=2020-06-18 }}. Ira Forman, ''The Atlantic'', 14 December 2018</ref> |- |{{flag|India}} |2014 |Bharatiya Janata Party, under Narendra Modi |<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Ding |first1=Iza |last2=Slater |first2=Dan |date=2 January 2021 |title=Democratic decoupling |url=|journal=Democratization |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=63–80 |doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1842361 |issn=1351-0347 |s2cid=231643689}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Welzel |first=Christian Peter |date=2017 |title=A Tale of Culture-Bound Regime Evolution |url=http://fox.leuphana.de/portal/de/publications/a-tale-of-culturebound-regime-evolution-the-centennial-democratic-trend-and-its-recent-reversal(2b6baaf4-3942-4491-92ca-55782d455a62).html |journal=Democratization |language=en |doi=10.1080/13510347.2018.1542430 |issn=1351-0347 |s2cid=148625260|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Finzel |first=Lydia |date=24 February 2020 |title=Democratic Backsliding in India, the World's Largest Democracy {{!}} V-Dem |url=https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/democratic-backsliding-india-worlds-largest-democracy/ |access-date=27 November 2020 |website=www.v-dem.net |publisher=V-Dem Institute |archive-date=27 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210227182459/https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/democratic-backsliding-india-worlds-largest-democracy/ }}</ref> |- |{{flag|Israel}} |2018 |Likud – National Liberal Movement, under Benjamin Netanyahu |<ref>{{cite news|last1=Eshman|first1=Rob|title=When did Zionists become snowflakes?|url=https://forward.com/opinion/532939/anti-israel-protest-campus-zionists-palestine-snowflakes/|newspaper=The Forward|date=21 January 2023|access-date=7 July 2023}}</ref><ref>{{Cite encyclopedia|author=Yaniv Roznai|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e5WRDwAAQBAJ|date=2018|title=Israel: A Crisis of Liberal Democracy?|encyclopedia=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?|editor=Mark A. 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Tushnet|isbn=978-0-19-088898-5|publisher=Oxford University Press|oclc=1030444422|pages=355–376|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161150/https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite report|author=Tamara Cofman Wittes and Yael Mizrahi-Arnaud|title=Is Israel in democratic decline?|date=March 2019|url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190318_israel_decline_wittes_mizrahi-arnaud.pdf|publisher=Brookings Institution|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=19 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201219232431/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190318_israel_decline_wittes_mizrahi-arnaud.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author=Zack Beauchamp|title=Israeli democracy is rotting from the inside|date=10 April 2019|url=https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/10/18304567/israel-election-results-2019-democracy-palestinian|work=Vox|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=10 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201210232545/https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/10/18304567/israel-election-results-2019-democracy-palestinian|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author=Zack Beauchamp|url=https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/2/27/21075868/israeli-democracy-war-netanyahu|title=The war on Israeli democracy|work=Vox|date=27 February 2020|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=1 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210101152002/https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/2/27/21075868/israeli-democracy-war-netanyahu|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author=Albert B. Wolf|url=https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2020/06/the-dangers-of-israels-new-coalition?lang=en|publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|date=27 May 2020|title=The Dangers of Israel's New Coalition|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=18 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210118064332/https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/81920|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>Aeyal Gross, [https://verfassungsblog.de/does-the-end-of-the-netanyahu-government-mark-the-end-of-democratic-backsliding-in-israel/ Does the End of the Netanyahu Government Mark the End of "Democratic Backsliding" in Israel?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210614125948/https://verfassungsblog.de/does-the-end-of-the-netanyahu-government-mark-the-end-of-democratic-backsliding-in-israel/ |date=14 June 2021 }}, ''Verfassungsblog'' (June 14, 2021).</ref><ref>Ayala Panievsky & Julius Maximilian Rogenhofer, [https://www.populismstudies.org/benjamin-netanyahu-likud-and-the-uncertain-fate-of-israels-democracy/ Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud and the uncertain fate of Israel's democracy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210525184150/https://www.populismstudies.org/benjamin-netanyahu-likud-and-the-uncertain-fate-of-israels-democracy/ |date=25 May 2021 }}, ''Populism Studies'' (February 2, 2021).</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Keller-Lynn |first=Carrie |title='I've done it': Netanyahu announces his 6th government, Israel's most hardline ever |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-announces-his-sixth-government-israels-most-hardline-yet/ |access-date=2022-12-22 |website=The Times of Israel |date=21 December 2022 |language=en-US}}</ref>{{Excessive citations inline|date=April 2026}} |- |{{flag|Kyrgyzstan}} |2019 |Mekenchil, under Sadyr Japarov |<ref name=VDEM_Report_2026/> |- |{{flag|Mexico}} |2020 | |<ref name=VDEM_Report_2026/> |- |{{flag|Nicaragua}} |1996 |Sandinista National Liberation Front, under Daniel Ortega |<ref name=VDEM_Report_2026/> |- |{{flag|Serbia}} |2012 |Serbian Progressive Party, under Aleksandar Vučić |<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36122928|title=Serbia election: Pro-EU Prime Minister Vucic claims victory|date=24 April 2016|publisher=BBC|access-date=12 December 2018|archive-date=24 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160424043621/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36122928|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/opinion/a-serbian-election-erodes-democracy.html|title=A Serbian Election Erodes Democracy|date=9 April 2017|work=The New York Times|access-date=12 December 2018|archive-date=15 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181215172022/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/opinion/a-serbian-election-erodes-democracy.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/thousands-march-against-serbian-presidents-autocratic-rule/2018/12/08/a7b93022-fb1b-11e8-8642-c9718a256cbd_story.html|title=Thousands march against Serbian president's autocratic rule|date=8 December 2018|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=12 December 2018|archive-date=9 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181209000751/https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/thousands-march-against-serbian-presidents-autocratic-rule/2018/12/08/a7b93022-fb1b-11e8-8642-c9718a256cbd_story.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/09/how-aleksandar-vucic-became-europes-favorite-autocrat/|title=How Aleksandar Vucic Became Europe's Favorite Autocrat|first=Aleks|last=Eror|date=9 March 2018|publisher=Foreign Policy|access-date=12 December 2018|archive-date=9 March 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180309220537/https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/09/how-aleksandar-vucic-became-europes-favorite-autocrat/|url-status=live}}</ref> |- |{{flag|Slovakia}} |2023 |Direction – Social Democracy, under Robert Fico |<ref name="auto">{{Cite web |title=U.S. Democratic Backsliding in Comparative Perspective |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/us-democratic-backsliding-in-comparative-perspective?lang=en |access-date=2025-09-25 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | date=25 August 2025 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="auto1">{{Cite news |date=2025-09-11 |title=US democratic backsliding under Trump encourages autocrats globally, democracy watchdog says |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-democratic-backsliding-under-trump-encourages-autocrats-globally-democracy-2025-09-11/ |access-date=2025-09-25 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> |- |{{flag|Turkey}} |2013 |Justice and Development Party, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan |<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Esena |first1=Berk |last2=Gumuscu |first2=Sebnem |year=2016|title=Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey |journal=Third World Quarterly |volume=37|issue=9|pages=1581–1606|doi=10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732 |hdl=11693/36632 |s2cid=155983134 |hdl-access=free}}; Ramazan Kılınç, [https://www.opendemocracy.net/ramazan-k-l-n/turkey-from-conservative-democracy-to-popular-authoritarianism Turkey: from conservative democracy to popular authoritarianism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160722133458/https://www.opendemocracy.net/ramazan-k-l-n/turkey-from-conservative-democracy-to-popular-authoritarianism |date=2016-07-22 }}, openDemocracy (December 5, 2015).</ref><ref name=":1" /> |- |{{flag|United States}} |2024/2025 |Republican Party, under Donald Trump |<ref name="auto"/><ref name="auto1"/><ref name=VDEM_Report_2026/> |} The 2020 report of the Varieties of Democracy Institute found that the global share of democracies declined from 54% in 2009 to 49% in 2019, and that a greater share of the global population lived in autocratizing countries (6% in 2009, 34% in 2019).<ref name=VDem2020>''[https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf Autocratization Surges–Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200330123413/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf |date=30 March 2020 }}'', V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg (March 2020).</ref> The 10 countries with the highest degree of democratizing from 2009 to 2019 were Tunisia, Armenia, The Gambia, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Myanmar, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan, Ecuador, and Niger; the 10 countries with the highest degree of autocratizing from 2009 to 2019 were Hungary, Turkey, Poland, Serbia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Mali, Thailand, Nicaragua, and Zambia.<ref name=VDem2020/> However, the institute found that signs of hope in an "unprecedented degree of mobilization for democracy" as reflected in increases in pro-democracy mass mobilization; the proportion of countries with "substantial pro-democracy mass protests" increased to 44% in 2019 (from 27% in 2009).<ref name=VDem2020/> According to a 2020 study, "Democratic backsliding does not necessarily see all democratic institutions erode in parallel fashion... we establish that elections are improving and rights are retracting in the same time period, and in many of the same cases."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ding|first1=Iza|last2=Slater|first2=Dan|date=23 November 2020|title=Democratic decoupling|journal=Democratization|volume=28|pages=63–80|doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1842361|issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free}}</ref> Democracy indices with varying democracy concepts and measurement approaches show different extents of recent global democracy decline.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Knutsen |first1=Carl Henrik |last2=Marquardt |first2=Kyle L. |last3=Seim |first3=Brigitte |last4=Coppedge |first4=Michael |last5=Edgell |first5=Amanda B. |last6=Medzihorsky |first6=Juraj |last7=Pemstein |first7=Daniel |last8=Teorell |first8=Jan |last9=Gerring |first9=John |last10=Lindberg |first10=Staffan I. |date=2024 |title=Conceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing Democratic Backsliding |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S104909652300077X/type/journal_article |journal=PS: Political Science & Politics |language=en |volume=57 |issue=2 |pages=162–177 |doi=10.1017/S104909652300077X |issn=1049-0965}}</ref>
==Case studies== ===Asia=== Democratic backsliding is occurring in some parts of Asia. According to Our World in Data, the region's average democracy score has fallen 0.45 points in the decade from 2014 to 2024; the world average fell 0.38 points in the same timeframe.<ref>"Democracy Index." Our World in Data, last updated 5 March 2025. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/democracy-index-eiu?tab=chart&time=earliest..2024®ion=Asia&facet=none&country=OWID_ASI~OWID_WRL~CHN~JPN~KOR~PRK~IDN~VNM~LAO~THA~KHM~PHL~TWN~MNG~MYS~HKG&focus=OWID_WRL~OWID_ASI#explore-the-data. </ref> The COVID-19 pandemic is often held to have contributed to these trends, as national leaders made use of the "securitization of social issues" to justify authoritarian practices and suspension of rights as sacrifices in the "war" against the pandemic;<ref>Ford, Lindsay W., and Ryan Hass. "Democracy in Asia." ''Brookings'', Commentary, 22 January 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-in-asia/.</ref> the most famous example of this is China's "Zero-COVID" policy.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}}
Various external factors are often credited with the democratic backsliding, and accompanying hardening of authoritarian regimes,<ref name=":0" /> in the region, including the rising influence of China and other authoritarian states, the decline of democracy promotion by the US and other actors, and the worldwide increase in misinformation and political polarization due to social media.<ref>Kurlantzick, Joshua. "BACKSLIDING IN MOTION." ''Addressing the Effect of COVID-19 on Democracy in South and Southeast Asia''. Council on Foreign Relations, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27672.4.</ref> Some scholars, however, consider domestic factors to be more significant causally. Regardless of causation, multiple forms of democratic backsliding can be observed to have taken place in East Asia from the mid-2010s to the present.{{cn|date=November 2025}}
Executive aggrandizement can be found in the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea, albeit in differing forms. Duterte's "war on drugs", which is a specific form of aggrandizement referred to as grievance-fueled illiberalism,<ref name=":0">Carothers, Thomas, and Benjamin Press. "Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 October 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/10/understanding-and-responding-to-global-democratic-backsliding?lang=en. </ref> resulted in an expansion of executive and police power. Rodrigo Duterte emphasized the threat of criminal drug activity and the failure of the establishment to punish those responsible, and was elected on promises to make sure drug criminals were punished;<ref name=":0"/> the resulting campaign has resulting in the deaths of over 12,000 Filipinos, at least 2,555 of which can be attributed to the Philippine National Police, and which some human rights organizations say could amount to crimes against humanity.<ref>"Philippines' 'War on Drugs.'" ''Human Rights Watch''. https://www.hrw.org/tag/philippines-war-drugs. </ref> Meanwhile, Joko Widodo expanded executive power and military influence in Indonesia to the point where he was compared with its infamous dictator Suharto.<ref>Yuniar, Resty Woro (10 November 2020). "'Little Suharto'? Indonesian leader Widodo's places Twitter personalities, allies in key posts, sparking backlash". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 10 November 2020. Retrieved 10 November 2020.</ref> On December 3, 2024, South Korea's then-President Yoon declared martial law and attempted to disband its representative body in an instance of executive aggrandizement specifically referred to as opportunistic authoritarianism.<ref name=":0" /> Yoon's coup was thwarted by the strength of South Korea's democratic institutions, and he is currently facing a criminal trial for charges of insurrection.<ref>Seo-in, Choi. "Indignant Yoon denies insurrection charges in criminal trial." ''Korea JoongAng Daily'', 14 April 2025. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-14/national/politics/Indignant-Yoon-denies-insurrection-charges-in-criminal-trial/2284890. </ref>
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar is an example of "Entrenched-Interest Revanchism," in which an entrenched interest group displaced by a country's democratic transition use undemocratic means to reassert its claims.<ref name=":0" /> Myanmar experienced elite-driven democratization between 2011 and 2015, and held its first general elections in 2015, resulting in a victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD won an even greater margin of victory over the military's proxy party in the 2020 elections, which prompted a 2021 coup that re-established military rule through a military junta. The military government has since engaged in an ethnic-cleansing campaign against the country's Rohingya minority.<ref>"Myanmar: Events of 2024." ''Human Rights Watch'', https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/myanmar. </ref>
Hong Kong has also witnessed democratic backsliding in the last decade, although it has mostly been orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party. The most obvious instance of this is the Chinese government's repeated attempts to establish criteria for candidates to run in Hong Kong elections that favored those sympathetic to the CCP,<ref>Maizland, Lindsay, and Clara Fong. "Hong Kong's Freedoms: What China Promised and How It's Cracking Down." ''Council on Foreign Relations'', last updated 19 March 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown. </ref> an instance of strategic election manipulation.<ref>Bermeo, Nancy. "On Democratic Backsliding." ''Journal of Democracy'' 27, no. 1 (2016): 5-19. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012.</ref>
===Central and Eastern Europe=== {{See also|Polish constitutional crisis|Democratic backsliding in Europe by country}}
In the 2010s, a scholarly consensus developed that the Central and Eastern Europe region was experiencing democratic backsliding, most prominently in Hungary and Poland,<ref name="Cianetti" /> and the European Union (EU) failed to prevent democratic backsliding in some of its other member states.<ref name="Kelemen-2020">{{Cite journal|last=Kelemen|first=R. Daniel|date=February 2020|title=The European Union's Authoritarian Equilibrium|language=en|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455?journalCode=rjpp20|volume=20|journal=Journal of European Public Policy|issue=3|pages=481–499|doi=10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455|s2cid=221055795|archive-date=29 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201129184117/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455?journalCode=rjpp20|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Kelemen|first=R. Daniel|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/02/eu-is-supposed-promote-democracy-so-why-do-anti-democratic-politicians-thrive-within-it/|newspaper=Washington Post|date=2 December 2019|title=The E.U. is supposed to promote democracy. So why do anti-democratic politicians thrive within it?|access-date=25 August 2020|archive-date=2 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210302014859/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/02/eu-is-supposed-promote-democracy-so-why-do-anti-democratic-politicians-thrive-within-it/|url-status=live}}</ref> Rutgers University political scientist R. Daniel Kelemen argues that EU membership has enabled an "authoritarian equilibrium" and may even make it easier for authoritarian-minded leaders to erode democracy due to the EU's system of party politics, a reluctance to interfere in domestic political matters; appropriation of EU funds by backsliding regimes; and free movement for dissatisfied citizens, which allows citizens to leave backsliding regimes and deplete the opposition while strengthening the regimes.<ref name="Kelemen-2020" /> According to a 2020 poll by Dalia Research, only 38 percent of Polish citizens and 36 percent of Hungarian citizens believed that their countries were democratic, while the rest said that they would like their countries to be more democratic.<ref>{{cite news |title=Most Poles, Hungarians don't think their countries are democratic: poll |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/minorities-in-poland-hungary-think-their-countries-are-democratic-report/ |access-date=4 November 2020 |work=Politico |date=15 June 2020 |archive-date=17 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161215/https://www.politico.eu/article/minorities-in-poland-hungary-think-their-countries-are-democratic-report/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
Similar concerns about democratic backsliding and institutional erosion have also been raised in EU candidate countries and the Western Balkans, including Turkey, Albania, and Serbia, where issues such as executive concentration of power and the functioning of judicial and political institutions have attracted scrutiny. In Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has found violations related to pre-trial detention, ruling in some cases that such detention was “unlawful and arbitrary” and lacked reasonable suspicion, raising broader concerns about due process and judicial independence.<ref>{{cite web |title=Taner Kılıç (no. 2) v. Turkey |url=https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ |publisher=European Court of Human Rights |date=31 May 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=European Court of Human Rights ruled Turkey's pre-trial detention of human rights defender Taner Kılıç unlawful |url=https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/european-court-human-rights-ruled-turkeys-pre-trial-detention-human-rights-defender-taner-kilic |website=Front Line Defenders}}</ref> In Albania, concerns have been raised regarding the implementation of judicial reforms and the use of pre-trial detention.<ref>{{cite web |title=Strasbourg ruling throws cold water on SPAK's pre-trial detention practices |url=https://albaniantimes.al/strasbourg-ruling-throws-cold-water-on-spaks-pre-trial-detention-practices/ |website=Albanian Times |date=25 February 2025 }}</ref> The Venice Commission has cautioned that extensive or disproportionate use of pre-trial detention risks undermining the presumption of innocence, stifling political pluralism, and limiting democratic debate.<ref>{{cite web |title=Opinion on Türkiye (CDL-AD(2025)045) |url=https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2025)045-e |publisher=Venice Commission |date=2025}}</ref> In Serbia, analysts have pointed to democratic decline, including weakened judicial independence, constraints on media, and irregularities in electoral processes, contributing to concerns about the erosion of democratic checks and balances.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Nix |first1=Stephen |last2=Tamisiea |first2=Megan |title=Democracy at a crossroads: Rule of law and the case for US engagement in the Balkans |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/democracy-at-a-crossroads-rule-of-law-and-the-case-for-us-engagement-in-the-balkans/ |website=Atlantic Council |date=29 October 2025}}</ref>
===United States=== {{multiple image | total_width=450 | image1 = V-Dem Electoral and Liberal Democracy Indices for the United States since 1900.svg |caption1= The V-Dem Institute said in 2026 regarding Trump's presidency that "the speed with which American democracy is currently dismantled is unprecedented in modern history".<ref name=VDEM_Report_2026/> The institute noted executive overreach undermining the rule of law, suppression and intimidation of media and dissenting voices, loss of legislative constraints, and declining civil rights, equality, and freedom of expression.<ref name=VDEM_Report_2026>{{cite web |title=Democracy Report 2026 / Unraveling The Democratic Era? |url=https://www.v-dem.net/documents/75/V-Dem_Institute_Democracy_Report_2026_lowres.pdf |publisher=V-Dem Institute |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260320121434/https://www.v-dem.net/documents/75/V-Dem_Institute_Democracy_Report_2026_lowres.pdf |archive-date=March 20, 2026 |page=33 In Focus: Autocratization in the USA |date=March 2026 |url-status=live}}<br>●{{nbsp}}Raw data presented at: {{cite web |title=Country Graph |url=https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/ |publisher=V-Dem Institute |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260301172546/https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/ |archive-date=March 1, 2026 |date=March 2026 |url-status=live}} (Choose "United States of America" and select "Election Democracy Index" and "Liberal Democracy Index".)</ref> | image2= 20260513 Autocracy index - markers of democratic erosion.svg |caption2= In October 2025, ''The New York Times'' editorial board created an Autocracy Index showing erosion of US democracy using various benchmarks, offering "a way to understand how much Mr. Trump is eroding American democracy" since his January 2025 inauguration. Illustrated benchmark values are those published in May 2026.<ref name=NYTimes_20260513>{{cite news |author1=The Editorial Board |title=The Iran War Worsens America’s Democratic Erosion |url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/05/13/opinion/iran-war-democracy-america.html |date=May 13, 2026 |work=The New York Times}} The editorial board wrote that "clearest sign that a democracy has died is that a leader and his party make it impossible for their opponents to win an election and hold power".</ref> }} {{Excerpt|Democratic backsliding in the United States|only=paragraphs}}
==See also== *{{anl|Conservative wave}} *{{anl|Constitutional crisis}} *{{anl|Corporatocracy}} *{{anl|Declinism}} *{{anl|Rotation of Power}} *{{anl|Slippery slope}}
==Notes== {{notelist}}
==References== {{Reflist}}
==Sources== <!--Section required for short footnotes imported via United States excerpt--> * {{cite journal |last1=Jardina |first1=Ashley |last2=Mickey |first2=Robert |title=White Racial Solidarity and Opposition to American Democracy |journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |date=2022 |volume=699 |issue=1 |pages=79–89 |doi=10.1177/00027162211069730 |s2cid=247499954}} *{{cite book |last1=Rowland |first1=Robert C.|author-link1=Robert C. Rowland|title=The Rhetoric of Donald Trump: Nationalist Populism and American Democracy |date=2021 |publisher=University Press of Kansas |isbn=978-0-7006-3196-4 |language=en}}
==Further reading== {{Refbegin}} * {{cite journal |last1=Andersen |first1=David |title=Comparative Democratization and Democratic Backsliding: The Case for a Historical-Institutional Approach |journal=Comparative Politics |date=July 2019 |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=645–663 |doi=10.5129/001041519X15647434970117 |doi-broken-date=14 May 2026 |jstor=26663952 |s2cid=201373568 }} * {{cite book |last1=Bieber |first1=Florian|author-link=Florian Bieber |title=The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans |date=2019 |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-22149-2 |language=en}} * {{cite book |last1=Cheeseman |first1=Nic |author-link1=Nic Cheeseman |first2=Brian |last2=Klaas |title=How to Rig an Election |location=New Haven |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-20443-8 |date=2018}} * {{cite journal |last1=Daly |first1=Tom Gerald |title=Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field |journal=Hague Journal on the Rule of Law |date=April 2019 |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=9–36 |doi=10.1007/s40803-019-00086-2|s2cid=159354232 }} * {{Cite book |last1=Geddes |first1=Barbara |title=How Dictatorships Work |last2=Wright |first2=Joseph |last3=Frantz |first3=Erica |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2018 |isbn=978-1-107-11582-8}} * Grillo, Edoardo; Luo, Zhaotian; Nalepa, Monika; Prato, Carlo (2024). "Theories of Democratic Backsliding". ''Annual Review of Political Science''. * {{cite book |last1=Haggard |first1=Stephan |last2=Kaufman |first2=Robert |title=Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World |date=2021 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-95840-0 |language=en}} * {{cite journal |first1=Roberto Stefan |last1=Foa |first2=Yascha |last2=Mounk |author-link2=Yascha Mounk |url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/danger-deconsolidation-democratic-disconnect |title=The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect |journal=Journal of Democracy |volume=27 |issue=3 |year=2016 |pages=5–17 |doi=10.1353/jod.2016.0049 |s2cid=156622248 |access-date=25 June 2018 |archive-date=11 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190311093027/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/danger-deconsolidation-democratic-disconnect |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }} * {{cite book |title=Liberalism and Its Discontents |author-link=Francis Fukuyama|first=Francis |last=Fukuyama |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |year=2022 |isbn=978-0-374-60671-8}} * Jee, Haemin; Lueders, Hans; Myrick, Rachel (2021). "Towards a unified approach to research on democratic backsliding". ''Democratization'' * {{cite book |last1=Klaas |first1=Brian |title=Despot's Accomplice: How the West is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy |date=2016 |publisher=Hurst Publishers |isbn=978-1-84904-930-6}} * Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Marquardt, Kyle L.; Seim, Brigitte; Coppedge, Michael; Edgell, Amanda B.; Medzihorsky, Juraj; Pemstein, Daniel; Teorell, Jan; Gerring, John; Lindberg, Staffan I. (11 January 2024). "Conceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing Democratic Backsliding". ''PS: Political Science & Politics''. doi:10.1017/S104909652300077X. * {{cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |last2=Ziblatt |first2=Daniel |author1-link=Steven Levitsky |author2-link=Daniel Ziblatt |title=How Democracies Die |date=2018 |publisher=Crown |location=New York |isbn=978-1-5247-6293-3}} * {{cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |last2=Way |first2=Lucan A. |title=Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War |date=2010 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511781353|isbn=978-0-511-78135-3 }} * Przeworski, Adam. 2019. ''Crises of Democracy''. Cambridge University Press. * {{cite journal |last1=Waldner |first1=David |last2=Lust |first2=Ellen |title=Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |date=11 May 2018 |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=93–113 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628|doi-access=free }} * {{cite journal |last1=Abadía |first1=Adolfo A. |last2=Rouvinski |first2=Vladimir |title=Editorial: Exploring the global erosion of democracy: understanding multicausal threats and international dynamics |journal=Frontiers in Political Science |year=2025 |volume=7 |article-number=1694804 |doi=10.3389/fpos.2025.1694804|doi-access=free|issn=2673-3145 |language=en }} {{refend}}
==External links== * {{Commonscatinline|Democratic backsliding}} * ''[https://www.democratic-erosion.com Democratic Erosion Consortium],'' a "partnership of researchers, students, policymakers, and practitioners committed to marshaling evidence and learning to address the growing crisis of democratic erosion worldwide" * [https://democracyparadox.com/the-democracy-paradox-podcast/ Podcast: Democracy Paradox], hundreds of interviews with democracy experts around the world, including exploring democratic breakdowns
Category:Democratic backsliding Category:Authoritarianism Category:Democracy Category:Human rights concepts Category:Political science terminology