Agency (philosophy)

{{Short description|Capacity of an actor to act in a given environment}} {{About|the philosophical concept|the legal concept|Law of agency|other uses of the term|Agency (sociology)}} {{More citations needed|date=July 2013}} {{Agency sidebar}} '''Agency''' is the capacity of an actor to act in a given environment. In some contexts, the exercise of agency is linked to questions of moral responsibility, and may pertain to questions of moral agency.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sugarman |first=Jeff |date=2005-12-01 |title=Persons and Moral Agency |url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354305059333 |journal=Theory & Psychology |language=EN |volume=15 |issue=6 |pages=793–811 |doi=10.1177/0959354305059333 |issn=0959-3543|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shapiro |first=Paul |date=2006-10-01 |title=Moral Agency in Other Animals |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-006-9010-0 |journal=Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics |language=en |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=357–373 |doi=10.1007/s11017-006-9010-0 |pmid=16906349 |issn=1573-1200|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Parthemore |first1=Joel |last2=Whitby |first2=Blay |date=2013 |title=What makes any agent a moral agent? reflections on machine consciousness and moral agency |url=https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S1793843013500017 |journal=International Journal of Machine Consciousness |volume=05 |issue=2 |pages=105–129 |doi=10.1142/S1793843013500017 |issn=1793-8430|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Agency may either be classified as unconscious, involuntary behavior, or purposeful, goal directed activity (intentional action).{{Citation needed|date=November 2025}} An agent typically has some sort of immediate awareness of their physical activity and the goals that the activity is aimed at realizing.{{Citation needed|date=November 2025}} In 'goal directed action' an agent implements a kind of direct control or guidance over their own behavior.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/ |title=Action |last1=Wilson |first1=George |last2=Shpall |first2=Samuel |date=4 April 2012 |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy }}</ref>

==Human agency== {{See also|Action (philosophy)}} Human agency entails the claim that humans make decisions and enact them in the world, independent of whether it is deterministically or through free will.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Watson |first=Gary |date=1987 |title=Free Action and Free Will |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255145 |journal=Mind |volume=96 |issue=382 |pages=145–172 |doi=10.1093/mind/XCVI.382.145 |jstor=2255145 |issn=0026-4423}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Frankfurt |first=Harry G. |date=1969 |title=Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2023833 |journal=The Journal of Philosophy |volume=66 |issue=23 |pages=829–839 |doi=10.2307/2023833 |jstor=2023833 |issn=0022-362X}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Van Inwagen |first=Peter |date=1975 |title=The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4318929 |journal=Philosophical Studies|volume=27 |issue=3 |pages=185–199 |doi=10.1007/BF01624156 |jstor=4318929 |issn=0031-8116}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=McCall |first=Storrs |date=1985 |title=Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford1983) |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0045509100003751/type/journal_article |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |language=en |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=663–680 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1985.10715883 |issn=0045-5091|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Feldman |first=Gilad |date=2017 |title=Making sense of agency: Belief in free will as a unique and important construct |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spc3.12293 |journal=Social and Personality Psychology Compass |language=en |volume=11 |issue=1 |article-number=e12293 |doi=10.1111/spc3.12293 |issn=1751-9004|hdl=10722/250344 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lavazza |first=Andrea |date=2016-06-01 |title=Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It |journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |language=English |volume=10 |page=262 |doi=10.3389/fnhum.2016.00262 |doi-access=free |issn=1662-5161 |pmc=4887467 |pmid=27313524}}</ref> This is in contrast with objects reacting to natural forces, devoid of any thinking capacity.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dennett |first=D. C. |date=1971 |title=Intentional Systems |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025382 |journal=The Journal of Philosophy |volume=68 |issue=4 |pages=87–106 |doi=10.2307/2025382 |jstor=2025382 |issn=0022-362X}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Maturana |first1=Humberto R. |last2=Varela |first2=Francisco J. |date=1980 |title=Autopoiesis and Cognition |url=https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 |journal=Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science |volume=42 |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 |isbn=978-90-277-1016-1 |issn=0068-0346|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In this respect, agency does not necessitate free will.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hornsby |first=Jennifer |title=Actions |date=1980 |publisher=Routledge and Kegan Paul |isbn=978-0-7100-0452-9 |series=International library of philosophy |location=London}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Velleman |first1=J. David |last2=Bratman |first2=Michael E. |date=1991 |title=Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185304 |journal=The Philosophical Review |volume=100 |issue=2 |pages=277 |doi=10.2307/2185304 |jstor=2185304 |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mele |first=Alfred R. |date=1997 |title=Agency and Mental Action |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2216132 |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |volume=11 |pages=231–249 |jstor=2216132 |issn=1520-8583}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gallagher |first=Shaun |date=2007 |title=The Natural Philosophy of Agency |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00067.x |journal=Philosophy Compass |language=en |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=347–357 |doi=10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00067.x |issn=1747-9991|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Clark |first=Andy |date=2013 |title=Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X12000477/type/journal_article |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |language=en |volume=36 |issue=3 |pages=181–204 |doi=10.1017/S0140525X12000477 |issn=0140-525X}}</ref>

===In philosophy=== The philosophical discipline in charge of studying agency is action theory. In certain philosophical traditions (particularly those established by Hegel and Marx), human agency is a collective, historical dynamic, rather than a function arising out of individual behavior. Hegel's Geist and Marx's universal class are idealist and materialist expressions of this idea of humans treated as social beings, organized to act in concert. There is an ongoing debate, philosophically derived in part from the works of Hume, between determinism and indeterminacy.

Structure and agency form an enduring core debate in sociology. Essentially the same as in the Marxist conception, "agency" refers to the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices, based on their will, whereas "structure" refers to those factors (such as social class, but also religion, gender, ethnicity, subculture, etc.) that seem to limit or influence the opportunities that individuals have.

=== In sociology === Within sociology, agency occurs when an agent engages with the social structure.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last1=Emirbayer |first1=Mustafa |last2=Mische |first2=Ann |date=1998 |title=What Is Agency? |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/231294 |journal=American Journal of Sociology |volume=103 |issue=4 |pages=962–1023 |doi=10.1086/231294 |issn=0002-9602 |via=JSTOR|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Burkitt |first=Ian |date=2016-08-01 |title=Relational agency: Relational sociology, agency and interaction |url=https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431015591426 |journal=European Journal of Social Theory |language=EN |volume=19 |issue=3 |pages=322–339 |doi=10.1177/1368431015591426 |issn=1368-4310|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The primacy of the social structure vs. individual capacity regarding an agent's actions is debated within sociology.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Bourdieu |first1=Pierre |title=Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste |last2=Bourdieu |first2=Pierre |date=2002 |publisher=Harvard Univ. Press |isbn=978-0-674-21277-0 |edition=11. print |location=Cambridge, Mass}}</ref><ref name=":2" /> This debate includes influence of reflexivity on an agent's actions.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Caetano |first=Ana |date=2019 |title=Designing social action: The impact of reflexivity on practice |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jtsb.12196 |journal=Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour |language=en |volume=49 |issue=2 |pages=146–160 |doi=10.1111/jtsb.12196 |issn=1468-5914|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== In economics === Economics stresses the purposive action of economic agents, who act to advance their subjective well-being given fundamental constraints. Thus, economic models typically begin with "an agent" maximizing some objective. In contract theory, economics also addresses the problem of agents who represent another party (the principal) potentially unfaithfully.

=== In psychology === The term agency is used in different fields of psychology with different meanings. It can refer to the ability of recognizing agents or attributing agency to objects based on simple perceptual cues or principles, for instance the principle of rationality,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gergely|first1=György|last2=Nádasdy|first2=Zoltán|last3=Csibra|first3=Gergely|last4=Bíró|first4=Szilvia|date=1995|title=Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age|journal=Cognition|volume=56|issue=2|pages=165–193|doi=10.1016/0010-0277(95)00661-h|pmid=7554793|s2cid=4973766|issn=0010-0277}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gergely|first1=György|last2=Csibra|first2=Gergely|date=2003|title=Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action|journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences|volume=7|issue=7|pages=287–292|doi=10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00128-1|issn=1364-6613|pmid=12860186|s2cid=5897671}}</ref> which holds that context-sensitive, goal-directed efficient actions are the crucial characteristics of agents. This topic is thoroughly investigated by developmental to understand how an observer is able to differentiate agentive entities from inanimate objects, but it can also be related to the term of autonomous intelligent agency used in cybernetics. Agency can also imply the sense of agency, that is the feeling of ownership or control.

''Emergent interactive agency'' defines Bandura's view of agencies, where human agency can be exercised through direct personal agency.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Bandura|first1=A.|title=Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective|journal=Asian Journal of Social Psychology|date=1999|volume=2|pages=21–41|url=https://www.uky.edu/~eushe2/Bandura/Bandura1999AJSP.pdf|access-date=27 September 2016|doi=10.1111/1467-839X.00024|s2cid=11573665 }}</ref> Bandura formulates his view of agency as a socio-cognitive one, where people are self-organizing, proactive, self-regulating, and engage in self-reflection, and are not just reactive organisms shaped and shepherded by external events. People have the power to influence their own actions to produce certain results. The capacity to exercise control over one’s thought processes, motivation, affect, and action operates through mechanisms of personal agency. Such agencies are emergent and interactive, apply perspectives of social cognition, and make causal contributions to their own motivations and actions using ‘reciprocal causation’.<ref>Bandura, A. (1986). Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ Bormann, 1996</ref>

=== In social cybernetics === ''Autonomous agency'' is able to embrace the concepts of both the economic agency and the emergent interactive agency. An autonomous system is self-directed, operating in, and being influenced by, interactive environments. It usually has its own inherent dynamics that impact the way it interacts. It is also adaptable and (hence viable thus having a durable existence), proactive, self-organizing, self-regulating and so forth, participates in creating its own behavior, and contributes to its life circumstances through cognitive and cultural functionality. Autonomous agency may also be concerned with the relationship between two or more agencies in a mutual relationship with each other and their environments, with imperatives for an agency's behavior within an interactive context due to immanent emergent attributes.<ref>Guo, K.J., Yolles, M., Fink, G., Iles, P., 2016, The Changing Organisation: Agency Theory in a Cross-cultural Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press</ref>

=== In political economy === Human agency refers to the ability to shape one’s life and a few dimensions can be differentiated. Individual agency is reflected in individual choices and the ability to influence one’s life conditions and chances. The individual agency differs strongly within society across age, gender, income, education, personal health status, position in social networks, and other dimensions. Collective agency refers to situations in which individuals pool their knowledge, skills, and resources and act in concert to shape their future. Everyday agency refers to consumer and daily choices, and finally strategic agency refers to the capacity to affect the wider system change. Political economy approaches can be used to conceptualize the agency enabling or limiting rule system, which constitutes the “grammar” for social action and that is used by the actors to structure and regulate their transactions with one another in defined situations or spheres of activity.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Otto |first1=Ilona M. |title=Human Agency in the Anthropocene |journal=Ecological Economics |date=January 2020 |volume=167 |article-number=106463 |doi=10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106463 |doi-access=free |bibcode=2020EcoEc.16706463O }}</ref>

==References== {{Reflist}}

==Further reading== * {{cite journal|last1=Bandura|first1=A.|title=Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective|journal=Annual Review of Psychology|date=2001|volume=52|issue=1|pages=1–26|doi=10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.1|pmid=11148297|s2cid=11573665 |url=https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/psychology/article/view/23964 |url-access=subscription}} – Describes the form of agency. *Juarrero, Alicia (1999). ''Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System'' (MIT Press). Examines agency from the perspective of complexity theory. Reconceptualizes intentional causality in terms of whole-part context-sensitive constraints. * {{cite IEP |url-id=responsi/#SH2a |title=Agency (philosophy)}} * {{PhilPapers|category|agency}}

Category:Action (philosophy) Category:Free will Category:Personhood Category:Sociological theories Category:Concepts in social philosophy Category:Concepts in ethics Category:Metaphysical properties