{{short description|Paramilitary and economic organization in Xinjiang, China}} {{Use dmy dates|date=May 2020}} {{Infobox military unit | unit_name = Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps | native_name = {{ubl|{{No bold|新疆生产建设兵团}}|{{Script/Arabic|شىنجاڭ ئىشلەپچىقىرىش قۇرۇلۇش بىڭتۇەنى‎‎}}}} | image = 中華人民共和國國徽.svg | image_size = 150 | caption = National Emblem of China | dates = 1954 &ndash; present | country = {{nowrap|{{Flag|PRC|name=People's Republic of China|size=23px}}}} | allegiance = {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party.svg |size=23px}} Chinese Communist Party | branch = | type = State-owned enterprise<br>Paramilitary organisation | size = 2.6 million{{clarify|date=May 2026}} | command_structure = | garrison = Ürümqi & Xinjiang | garrison_label = Headquarters and area served | nickname = XJBT; Bingtuan | motto = | colors = | colors_label = | equipment = 14 | equipment_label = Divisions | website = {{Official URL}} | anniversaries = <!-- Commanders --> | commander1 = Chen Xiaojiang | commander1_label = First Political Commissar | commander2 = He Zhongyou | commander2_label = Political Commissar and Party Secretary | commander3 = Xue Bin | commander3_label = Commander | identification_symbol = | notable_commanders = }} {{Infobox Chinese | t = 新疆生產建設兵團 | s = 新疆生产建设兵团 | order = st | p = Xīnjiāng Shēngchǎn Jiànshè Bīngtuán | s2 = 新疆兵团 | t2 = 新疆兵團 | p2 = Xīnjiāng Bīngtuán | s3 = 兵团 | t3 = 兵團 | p3 = Bīngtuán | l3 = The Corps | s4 = 中国新建集团 | t4 = 中國新建集團 | p4 = Zhōngguó Xīnjiàn Jítuán | altname4 = China Xinjian Group | uig = شىنجاڭ ئىشلەپچىقىرىش قۇرۇلۇش بىڭتۇەنى‎ | uly = Shinjang Ishlepchiqirish Qurulush Bingtueni }} {{History of Xinjiang}} thumb|12th company, 150th regiment, 8th division, Xinjiang production and Construction Corps The '''Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps''' ('''XPCC'''), also known as '''''Bingtuan''''', trading with the external name '''China Xinjian Group''', is a state-owned enterprise and paramilitary organization in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The XPCC was established in 1954 under the orders of Chinese leader Mao Zedong, and developed sparsely populated areas in its early decades, taking the model of the traditional ''tuntian'' system of setting military units in frontier areas. The XPCC was severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution, and was outright abolished in 1975, before being re-established in 1981, partly due to the Soviet–Afghan War. It re-established its economic dominance over Xinjiang afterwards, also being responsible for maintenance against the "three evils" (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism). In its history, the XPCC has built farms, towns, and cities, provided land and employment to disbanded military units, and re-settled Han migrants from other parts of China in what has been called a campaign of assimilation and Sinicization of the local Uyghur population.

The XPCC is under both the Central People's Government and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional People's Government. headed by the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, while XPCC's own party secretary typically concurrently serves as its political commissar and acts as its highest day-to-day authority, and is considered to be the second most-powerful person in Xinjiang after the Party Secretary. The XPCC operates cities, where it provides prisons, healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education, and has stakes in numerous publicly traded companies. It is extensively involved in economic, political and military affairs of Xinjiang, being called a "state in a state".

== History == {{See also|Migration to Xinjiang}}

The XPCC draws from the traditional Chinese ''tuntian'' system, a policy of settling military units in frontier areas so that they become self-sufficient in food, and similar policies in the Tang and Qing dynasties.<ref name="Rossabi"/> Construction corps were set up for sparsely populated frontier regions, including Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang.

After the Chinese Communist Party took control of Xinjiang in 1949, People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces deployed into Xinjiang were commanded to start production in the area. In 1953, PLA there were separated into National Defense and Production Divisions. XPCC was formed from soldiers from First Field Army, Kuomintang,<ref name="Rossabi" /> and from the local Ili National Army.<ref name="O'Neill">{{Cite news|url=http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1148&Itemid=31|title=The Conqueror of China's Wild West|last=O'Neill|first=Mark|date=2008-04-13|access-date=2011-04-22|publisher=Asia Sentinel|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130921061414/http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1148&Itemid=31|archive-date=21 September 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref>

In October 1954 the Production Division was ordered by the Mao Zedong to form People's Liberation Army Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, tasked to "Integrate labor with violent, colonize and populate the frontier" in 1954.<ref name="XPCCwhitepaper">{{cite web |date=2014-10-05 |editor=康小兰 |title=新疆生产建设兵团的历史与发展 |url=http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/Document/1382608/1382608.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170320052558/http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/Document/1382608/1382608.htm |archive-date=2017-03-20 |accessdate=2014-10-12 |publisher=State Council Information Office}}</ref><ref name="Gao">"Tao Zhiyue 1892 – 1988)" in James Z. Gao: Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949), p. 358, 2009, Scarecrow Press</ref><ref>[https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/11/the-xinjiang-production-construction-corps-key-policy-tool-from-mao-to-xi/ Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps: Key Policy Tool from Mao to Xi] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200827034212/https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/11/the-xinjiang-production-construction-corps-key-policy-tool-from-mao-to-xi/ |date=27 August 2020 }} Andrew Erickson, 16 November 2019</ref> XPCC was founded by Wang Zhen. It initially comprised 175,000 military personnel, led by Tao Zhiyue as its first commander.<ref name="O'Neill" />

XPCC was initially focused on settling, cultivating, and developing sparsely populated areas, such as the fringes of the Taklamakan Desert and the Gurbantünggüt Desert, under the principle of "not competing for benefits with the local people".<ref name="ix">{{cite web|url=http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/9.htm|title=IX. Establishment, Development and Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps|date=May 2003|series=History and Development of Xinjiang|publisher=State Council of the People's Republic of China|access-date=2010-10-31|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172801/http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/9.htm|archive-date=3 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> It provided a reserve military force, although they were not called upon.<ref name="O'Neill" /><ref name="Rossabi" /> XPCC was expanded by youth from other parts of China, to equalize its sex ratio and include members with better education. In 1962, after the Sino-Soviet split, rioting occurred in Yining and 60,000 ethnic minorities living near the border fled to the Soviet Union. The Chinese government feared that the USSR was trying to destabilize China<ref name="Rossabi" /> and start a war.<ref name="O'Neill" /> XPCC was ordered to cultivate the farms of the exiles.<ref name="O'Neill" />

The XPCC was severely damaged by the Cultural Revolution. In 1975 it was abolished completely. Its powers were transferred to the government of Xinjiang and regional authorities.<ref name="ix" /> After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and the Islamic movements gained force, fears of Soviet encirclement and Islamic fundamentalism led to the re-establishment of the XPCC in 1981<ref name="ix" /> as well as the cultivation of frontier lands and economic development.<ref name="ix" /> During the 1990s, XPCC began to contribute significantly to Xinjiang's economy, producing 40% of the region's cotton in 1997.<ref name="NB2000">{{cite journal |last1=Becqelin |first1=Nicolas |title=Xinjiang in the Nineties |journal=The China Journal |date=July 2000 |volume=44 |issue=44 |pages=65–90 |doi=10.2307/2667477 |publisher=University of Chicago Press|jstor=2667477 |s2cid=144549708 }}</ref> After 2008, as a result of improvements in farm mechanization, students were no longer compelled to pick the cotton crop.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Douclose |first=Eva |date=2020-08-22 |title=Sanctions on China's top cotton supplier weave a tangled web for fashion brands |language=en |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sanctions-china-cotton-xinjiang-uighurs-fashion/2020/08/20/188ec374-dd48-11ea-b4f1-25b762cdbbf4_story.html |url-status=live |access-date=2020-08-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200822233108/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sanctions-china-cotton-xinjiang-uighurs-fashion/2020/08/20/188ec374-dd48-11ea-b4f1-25b762cdbbf4_story.html |archive-date=22 August 2020}}</ref>

Starting in the 1980s, a stated task has been to prevent and break down "destructive activities of the three forces", (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism), in order to protect social stability and national unity.<ref name="XPCCwhitepaper" /> In 2012, XPCC generated 11.1 billion yuan from the 37 settlements they control, "allowing the Corps to spread advanced culture and Chinese culture, while taking in and infusing culture of ethnic minority in Xinjiang".<ref name="XPCCwhitepaper" />

At the end of the 20th century, XPCC's military role was given instead to the Xinjiang Military District, a part of the current Western Theater Command that includes all of western China. XPCC military personnel are mostly reservists or militia.{{citation needed|date=June 2022}}

=== Sanctions ===

==== United States ==== {{See also|Persecution of Uyghurs in China|Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act|United States sanctions against China}}

XPCC was sanctioned by the United States in 2020, citing alleged human rights abuses. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Commissioner Nury Turkel remarked, "Now, no business can claim ignorance of China's oppression of the Uyghur people. We hope the sanctions signal to other Chinese officials that there are costs associated with taking part in the Communist Party's repression of religion. The world is watching and we know which officials and entities are responsible for the abuses against the Uyghur people."<ref>{{Cite news|author=Linda Lew|date=24 August 2020|title=Xinjiang's sprawling conglomerate may be biggest ever to face US sanctions|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3098490/xinjiangs-sprawling-conglomerate-may-be-biggest-ever-face-us|access-date=24 August 2020|website=South China Morning Post|archive-date=24 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200824050523/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3098490/xinjiangs-sprawling-conglomerate-may-be-biggest-ever-face-us|url-status=live}}</ref> Turkel added:

{{blockquote|The XPCC is essentially a parallel government in Xinjiang and has been directly involved in implementing the surveillance, mass detention, and forced labor of Uyghurs.<ref name="keygroup"/>}}

In July 2020, the United States announced Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on XPCC in connection with human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Allen-Ebrahimian |first=Bethany |date=2020-07-31 |title=U.S. sanctions China's paramilitary in Xinjiang |work=Axios |url=https://www.axios.com/us-sanctions-china-paramilitary-xinjiang-xpcc-41e29c92-9649-4e47-9e91-a7f78330d4d8.html |url-status=live |access-date=2020-07-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200823234328/https://www.axios.com/us-sanctions-china-paramilitary-xinjiang-xpcc-41e29c92-9649-4e47-9e91-a7f78330d4d8.html |archive-date=23 August 2020}}</ref><ref name="keygroup">{{Cite news |last=Lipes |first=Joshua |date=2020-07-31 |title=US Sanctions Key Paramilitary Group, Officials Over Abuses in China's Xinjiang Region |work=Radio Free Asia |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xpcc-07312020143418.html |url-status=live |access-date=2020-07-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200731210506/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xpcc-07312020143418.html |archive-date=31 July 2020}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite web |date=2020-07-31 |title=Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order |url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200823234326/https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073 |archive-date=23 August 2020 |access-date=2020-07-31 |website=U.S. Department of the Treasury}}</ref> XPCC was alleged to run many internment camps,<ref>{{Cite web |title=On Sanctioning Human Rights Abusers in Xinjiang, China |url=https://www.state.gov/on-sanctioning-human-rights-abusers-in-xinjiang-china/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200804164951/https://www.state.gov/on-sanctioning-human-rights-abusers-in-xinjiang-china/ |archive-date=4 August 2020 |access-date=2020-08-06 |website=United States Department of State |language=en-US}}</ref> as well as implementing the CCP's efforts to settle ethnic Han in the region.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2020-07-31 |title=U.S. imposes sanctions on Chinese company over abuse of Uighurs |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trump-idUSKCN24W29O |url-status=live |access-date=2020-08-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200803032940/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trump-idUSKCN24W29O |archive-date=3 August 2020}}</ref><ref name=":3" />

In December 2020, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection announced that XPCC-produced cotton and cotton products would be prohibited from import into the U.S. due to forced labor concerns.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Lawder|first=David|date=2020-12-03|title=U.S. bans cotton imports from China producer XPCC citing Xinjiang 'slave labor'|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-idUSKBN28C38V|access-date=2020-12-03|archive-date=3 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201203021952/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-idUSKBN28C38V|url-status=live}}</ref> In June 2021, the United States Department of Commerce placed XPCC on the Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List.<ref>{{Cite news|date=June 23, 2021|title=U.S. restricts exports to 5 Chinese firms over rights violations|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/business/us-restricts-exports-5-chinese-firms-over-rights-violations-2021-06-23/|url-status=live|access-date=June 23, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210623235311/https://www.reuters.com/business/us-restricts-exports-5-chinese-firms-over-rights-violations-2021-06-23/|archive-date=June 23, 2021}}</ref>

==== Canada ==== Following the U.S. footsteps, Global Affairs Canada imposed sanctions against the XPCC in January 2021 due to human rights abuses.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2022-03-10 |title=Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Committee of the Whole – Portfolio list – Briefing material |url=https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/briefing-documents-information/parliamentary-committee-comite-parlementaire/2021-12-07-cw-pl-lp-cp.aspx?lang=eng |access-date=2023-03-30 |website=Global Affairs Canada |archive-date=3 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230203123420/https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/briefing-documents-information/parliamentary-committee-comite-parlementaire/2021-12-07-cw-pl-lp-cp.aspx?lang=eng |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== European Union ==== In March 2021, the Council of the European Union listed the XPCC public security bureau as an entity subject to restrictive measures.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-03-23 |title=Statement: EU sanctions to four Chinese individuals and a Chinese entity on human rights violations; Counter-sanctions by the PRC |language=en |website= |publisher=European Parliament |url=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/231386/03_23_D-CN_Chair%27s%20statement_Chinese%20counter-sanctions_Uyghurs.pdf |url-status=live |access-date=25 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220621005735/https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/231386/03_23_D-CN_Chair%27s%20statement_Chinese%20counter-sanctions_Uyghurs.pdf |archive-date=21 June 2022}}</ref> The reason given for this listing was that this entity is "responsible for serious human rights violations, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities".<ref>{{Cite news|date=2021-03-22|title=Official Journal of the European Union, L 99 I, Vol. 64, p.12|language=en|url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:099I:FULL&from=EN#page=12|website=EUR Lex Access to European Union Law|access-date=25 September 2022|archive-date=26 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210326175005/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:099I:FULL&from=EN#page=12|url-status=live}}</ref>

== Organization and function == The XPCC is a ministerial-level institution under the Central People's Government and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional People's Government.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |title=Decoding Chinese Politics |url=https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/decoding-chinese-politics |access-date=2 October 2023 |website=Asia Society |archive-date=3 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231003235654/https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/decoding-chinese-politics |url-status=live }}</ref> It has administrative authority over medium-sized cities, settlements and farms in Xinjiang. It provides services such as healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education. Nominally subject to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, its internal affairs, including city and reclaimed land administration, are separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government. The XPCC has been described to operate as a "state within a state"<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: an Insider's Perspective |url=https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/node/3661 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616002211/https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/node/3661 |archive-date=16 June 2018 |access-date=2020-08-06 |website=www.bsg.ox.ac.uk |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last= |date=2020-07-31 |title=US imposes sanctions on Chinese 'state-within-a-state' linked to Xinjiang abuses |language=en-GB |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/31/us-sanctions-china-xinjiang-uighurs |access-date=2023-06-24 |issn=0261-3077 |archive-date=10 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200810000555/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/31/us-sanctions-china-xinjiang-uighurs |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Allen-Ebrahimian |first=Bethany |date=2022-07-26 |title=Xinjiang paramilitary group plays "critical role" in Uyghur repression, report finds |url=https://www.axios.com/2022/07/26/uyghur-genocide-xinjiang-paramilitary-china-xpcc |access-date=2022-07-27 |website=Axios |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Murphy |first1=Laura T. |author-link1=Laura Murphy (academic) |last2=Elimä |first2=Nyrola |last3=Tobin |first3=David |date=July 2022 |title=Until Nothing Is Left: China's Settler Corporation and its Human Rights Violations in the Uyghur Region. A Report on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps |url=https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/until-nothing-is-left |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220727004102/https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/until-nothing-is-left |archive-date=27 July 2022 |access-date=26 July 2022 |website=Helena Kennedy Centre |publisher=Sheffield Hallam University}}</ref> and has been considered by scholars as acting as a de facto prefecture-level governmental entity.<ref name=":2">Murphy, L and Elimä, N. (2021). "In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains." Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice</ref>

The XPCC's internal affairs, including the administration of its cities and reclaimed land, is separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-05/BSG-WP-2018-023.pdf|title=The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps|last1=Bao|first1=Yajun|website=Oxford University BSG|access-date=19 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200501161414/https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-05/BSG-WP-2018-023.pdf|archive-date=1 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref> It has sub-provincial powers on par with sub-provincial cities. The XPCC is headed by the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, who is "executive political commissar" ''ex officio.'' The XPCC's own party secretary, usually a ministerial-level official,<ref name=":4" /> typically concurrently serves as its political commissar and acts as its highest day-to-day authority, and is considered to be the second most-powerful person in Xinjiang after the CCP secretary.<ref>{{Cite news |date=9 January 2020 |title=Dismantling China's Muslim gulag in Xinjiang is not enough |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/01/09/dismantling-chinas-muslim-gulag-in-xinjiang-is-not-enough |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=2020-01-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200119100700/https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/01/09/dismantling-chinas-muslim-gulag-in-xinjiang-is-not-enough |archive-date=19 January 2020 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> Additionally XPCC has a commander, usually a deputy-ministerial level official.<ref name=":4" />

Headquartered in Ürümqi, XPCC is subdivided into divisions, then regiments. Each XPCC division corresponds to a prefecture-level administrative division, and are in themselves of sub-prefectural rank. In addition to regiments, the XPCC also administers regiment-level farms and ranches ({{lang|zh|团场}}). Frontier regiment farms (边疆农场) served a secondary function of preventing defection and were created along the border after the Yi–Ta incident in 1962.<ref name="Lei 2016">{{cite book|last=高華|chapter=代序：一個外逃者眼中的蘇聯|title=蘇聯流亡記：一個中國「外逃者」的回憶錄|trans-chapter=Foreword|trans-title=Exile to the Soviet Union: memoir of a Chinese intellectual|editor-last=雷光漢|editor-last2=蕭默|publisher=Chinese University of Hong Kong Press|date=2016|page=xxi–xxxvii|chapter-url=https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/image/data/preview/9789629966980_Preface.pdf |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230803020353/https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/image/data/preview/9789629966980_Preface.pdf|archivedate=2023-08-03}}</ref><ref>{{cite thesis |last= Shalimujiang|first=Gulidana |degree=PhD |title=Finding Kazakh Women in the Chinese State: Embodiment and the Politics of Memory |date= 2018 | page=107, 119, 130 |url= https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/stream/pdf/24/1.0366124/3 |publisher=University of British Columbia |archive-date=2024-02-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240216164618/https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/stream/pdf/24/1.0366124/3 }}</ref><ref name="Mao 2017">{{Cite thesis|title=Frontier Politics and the Sino-Soviet Relations: A Study of Northwestern Xinjiang, 1949–1963|date= 2017|first=Sheng|last= Mao |degree=PhD|publisher= University of Pennsylvania|page=71, 224–225, 236–241| url=https://repository.upenn.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/1782c69c-87b0-4da3-b247-77f676a78540/content |archiveurl= https://web.archive.org/web/20250209171736/https://repository.upenn.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/1782c69c-87b0-4da3-b247-77f676a78540/content |archivedate=2025-02-09}}</ref> XPCC and each individual division are headed by three leaders: a first political commissar, a political commissar, and a commander. The first political commissars of each XPCC division are their committee secretaries.{{citation needed|date=June 2023}}

=== Administrative structure === The XPCC's 14 divisions which are then subdivided into 185 regiment-level entities (including regiments, farms, and ranches), scattered throughout Xinjiang, mostly in previously unpopulated or sparsely populated areas.

The divisions are: {| class="wikitable" ! Name !! Founded !! Location (approximate) !! Headquarters |- | 1st Division || 1953 || Aksu Prefecture || Aral |- | 2nd Division|| 1953 || Bayingolin Autonomous Prefecture || Tiemenguan |- | 3rd Division|| 1966 || Kashgar Prefecture || Tumxuk |- | 4th Division|| 1953 || Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture <br /> (southern, directly administered portion) || Kokdala |- | 5th Division|| 1953 || Bortala Autonomous Prefecture || Shuanghe |- | 6th Division|| 1953 || Changji Autonomous Prefecture || Wujiaqu |- | 7th Division || 1953 || Ili Autonomous Prefecture <br>and Karamay || Huyanghe |- | 8th Division || 1953 || area east of Karamay || Shihezi |- | 9th Division|| 1962 || Tacheng Prefecture || Emin County |- | 10th Division|| 1959 || Altay Prefecture || Beitun |- |11th Division<br> the former ''Construction Division'' || 1953 || Ürümqi|| Xinshi, Ürümqi |- | 12th Division|| 1982 || Ürümqi || Ürümqi |- | 13th Division|| 1982 || Hami|| Hami |- | 14th Division|| 1982 || Hotan Prefecture || Kunyu |}

In May 1953, the PLA's 25th, 26th and 27th Divisions from the 9th Corps were reorganized as 7th, 8th and 9th Agriculture Construction Division of the XPCC, respectively.{{citation needed|date=July 2017}}

=== Settlements === The XPCC has settled Han in Xinjiang<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|date=2019-11-16|work=The New York Times|access-date=2019-11-16|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222022035/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|archive-date=22 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> and has built eleven medium-sized cities during its history, and now controls ten of them.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |date=9 January 2020 |title=Many Han Chinese don't mind the gulag for their Uighur neighbours |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2020/01/09/many-han-chinese-dont-mind-the-gulag-for-their-uighur-neighbours |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=2020-01-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200112203900/https://www.economist.com/china/2020/01/09/many-han-chinese-dont-mind-the-gulag-for-their-uighur-neighbours |archive-date=12 January 2020 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> The governments of these cities are combined entirely with the division that controls them. For example, the division headquarters is the same entity as the city government, the division political commissar the same person as the city committee secretary, the division commander the same person as the city's mayor, and so forth. Ten XPCC-administered cities are nominally listed as "sub-prefectural-level cities" of Xinjiang, but the local government is usually not involved in the administration of these cities.

{| class="wikitable" ! colspan="3"| Name !! Dates of official<br>designation as a "city" !! Governing period !! Division |- |colspan="2"| Kuytun<ref name="O'Neill"/> || 奎屯市 || August 29, 1975 || 1953–1975 ||rowspan="2"| 7th |- |↳ || Tianbei New Area || 天北新区 || – || 2002–2019 |- |colspan="2"| Shihezi<ref name="ix"/> || 石河子市 || January 2, 1976 || 1953–1975, 1980–present || 8th |- |colspan="2"| Aral || 阿拉尔市 || January 19, 2004 || 1953–1975, 1980–present || 1st |- |colspan="2"| Wujiaqu<ref name="ix"/> || 五家渠市 || January 19, 2004 || 1953–1975, 1980–present || 6th |- |colspan="2"| Tumxuk || 图木舒克市 || January 19, 2004 || 1966–1975, 1980–present || 3rd |- |colspan="2"| Beitun || 北屯市 || November 28, 2011 || 2002–present || 10th |- |colspan="2"| Tiemenguan || 铁门关市 || December 30, 2012 || 2002–present || 2nd |- |colspan="2"| Shuanghe || 双河市 || February 26, 2014 || 2002–present || 5th |- |colspan="2"| Kokdala || 可克达拉市 || March 18, 2015 || 2003–present || 4th |- |colspan="2"| Kunyu || 昆玉市 || January 20, 2016 || 2003–present || 14th |- |colspan="2"| Huyanghe || 胡杨河市 || December 6, 2019 || 2010–present || 7th |- |colspan="2"| Xinxing || 新星市 || February 4, 2021 || 2010–present || 13th |- |colspan="2"| Baiyang || 白杨市 || January 20, 2023 || 2010–present || 9th |- |colspan="2"| Caohu || 草湖市 || April 17, 2026 || 2014–present || 41st Regiment Farm of 3rd Division |- |colspan="2"| ''Beiting'' || 北亭市 || TBD || 2010–present || 12th |}

=== Demographics === {{update|part=recent population numbers and trends &ndash; they have yearly official reports, see e.g. [http://www.tjcn.org/tjgb/31xj/35518.html 2017]|date=May 2022}} The XPCC is predominantly composed of Chinese citizens of Han ethnicity.<ref name=":4" /> While the Han are by far the largest group of XPCC workers, their relative numbers have declined: from 1980 to 1993 the overall population remained constant, while Han membership declined slightly from 90% to 88%.<ref name="Rossabi">{{Cite book|title=Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers|first=Morris|last=Rossabi|publisher=University of Washington Press|year=2005|pages=157–158}}</ref>

{| class="wikitable" ! align=center colspan=3 | Ethnic groups in XPCC, 2002 estimate<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.bingtuan.gov.cn/gaikuang/f_filelist_v.asp?p_index=251020&p_id=1644 |title=Source |access-date=2 July 2005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929093410/http://www.bingtuan.gov.cn/gaikuang/f_filelist_v.asp?p_index=251020&p_id=1644 |archive-date=29 September 2007 |url-status=dead }}</ref> |- ! Nationality !! Population !! Percentage |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Han || 2,204,500 || 88.1 |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Uyghur || 165,000 || 6.6 |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Hui || 64,700 || 2.6 |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Kazakh|| 42,700 || 1.7 |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Mongol|| 6,200 || 0.3 |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Others || 18,100 || 0.7 |}

=== Economic activity === XPCC created many publicly traded subsidiary companies.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Feng |first=Emily |date=23 May 2018 |title=China tightens grip on restive western region |url=https://www.ft.com/content/60fbc746-1d34-11e8-956a-43db76e69936 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190920180954/https://www.ft.com/content/60fbc746-1d34-11e8-956a-43db76e69936 |archive-date=20 September 2019 |access-date=2020-01-19 |website=Financial Times}}</ref> XPCC uses the name "China Xinjian Group" for its economic activities.<ref name="ix" /><ref>{{cite web |title=Establishment, Development and Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps |url=http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/9.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172801/http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/9.htm |archive-date=3 March 2016 |access-date=31 October 2010 |website=China Internet Information Center}}</ref> XPCC plays an outsized role in Xinjiang's economy; in 2022, the organization produced {{CNY|350 billion}} ({{US$|52 billion}}), or around 19.7% of Xinjiang's economy, while the per capita GDP was {{CNY|98,748}} ({{US$|14,680}}).<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 March 2023 |title=新疆生产建设兵团2022年国民经济和社会发展统计公报 |url=https://www.btdsys.gov.cn/zyxw/tzgg/5647.html#:~:text=%E5%85%A8%E5%B9%B4%E4%BA%BA%E5%9D%87%E7%94%9F%E4%BA%A7%E6%80%BB,%E5%B9%B4%E6%9C%AB%E5%A2%9E%E5%8A%A012.00%E4%B8%87%E4%BA%BA%E3%80%82 |access-date=2023-06-22 |website=www.btdsys.gov.cn |archive-date=22 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230622141953/https://www.btdsys.gov.cn/zyxw/tzgg/5647.html#:~:text=%E5%85%A8%E5%B9%B4%E4%BA%BA%E5%9D%87%E7%94%9F%E4%BA%A7%E6%80%BB,%E5%B9%B4%E6%9C%AB%E5%A2%9E%E5%8A%A012.00%E4%B8%87%E4%BA%BA%E3%80%82 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Primary source inline|date=June 2023}} The area and population of the XPCC are generally given as part of Xinjiang's total figures, but XPCC's GDP is generally reported separately.<ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last=Olesen |first=Alexa |date=8 October 2014 |title=China's Vast, Strange, and Powerful Farming Militia Turns 60 |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/chinas-vast-strange-and-powerful-farming-militia-turns-60/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191230134739/https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/chinas-vast-strange-and-powerful-farming-militia-turns-60/ |archive-date=30 December 2019 |access-date=2020-01-19 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}}</ref>

XPCC's primary economic activity remains agriculture, including cotton, fruit, vegetables, food crops, vegetable oils, and sugar beets. Important products are cotton, tomatoes, ketchup, Korla pears, Turpan grapes, and wine. In 2018 the XPCC produced 30% of China's cotton output.<ref name=":2" /> XPCC has a mix of factory farming and smaller farms. XPCC dominates Xinjiang's agriculture and controls nearly a quarter of Xinjiang's arable land.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Allen-Ebrahimian |first=Bethany |date=26 July 2022 |title=Report: Xinjiang paramilitary group has "central role" in genocide |work=Axios |url=https://www.axios.com/2022/07/26/uyghur-genocide-xinjiang-paramilitary-china-xpcc |access-date=22 June 2023}}</ref> During its history, XPCC established significant mining and mining-related industries, most of which subsequently were handed over to the Xinjiang government. XPCC is also involved in tertiary industries, including trade, distribution, real estate, tourism, construction and insurance.<ref name=":0" />

==== Subsidiaries ==== The XPCC has thousands of subsidiary companies. The Center for Advanced Defense Studies has identified 2,923 subsidiaries.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Rajagopalan |first1=Megha |date=10 August 2021 |title=Goods Linked To A Group That Runs Chinese Detention Camps May Be Ending Up In US Stores |url=https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-xinjiang-banned-goods-united-states |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210903162819/https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-xinjiang-banned-goods-united-states |archive-date=3 September 2021 |access-date=3 September 2021 |website=BuzzFeed News |publisher=}}</ref> Currently the XPCC has eleven publicly traded subsidiaries.{{Citation needed|date=December 2020}} They are: *Xinjiang Baihuacun Co., Ltd. (新疆百花村股份有限公司) (百花村, 600721.SS) – primarily information technology *Xinjiang Tianye Co., Ltd. (新疆天业股份有限公司) (新疆天业, 600075.SS) – primarily plastics<ref>{{Cite web |date=June 14, 2022 |title=Built on Repression: PVC Building Materials' Reliance on Labor and Environmental Abuses in the Uyghur Region |url=https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/built-on-repression |website=Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice |access-date=22 June 2022 |archive-date=23 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220623044111/https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/built-on-repression |url-status=live }}</ref> *Suntime International Economic-Trading Co., Ltd. (新天国际经贸股份有限公司) (新天国际, 600084.SS) – primarily international trade *Xinjiang Talimu Agriculture Development Co., Ltd. (新疆塔里木农业综合开发股份有限公司) (新农开发, 600359.SS) – primarily cotton *Xinjiang Yilite Industry Co., Ltd. (新疆伊力特实业股份有限公司) (伊力特, 600197.SS) – primarily alcohol *Xinjiang Chalkis Co., Ltd (新疆中基实业股份有限公司) (新中基, 000972.SZ) – primarily tomatoes and related industries *Xinjiang Tianhong Papermaking Co., Ltd. (新疆天宏纸业股份有限公司) (新疆天宏, 600419.SS) – paper manufacturing *Xinjiang Tianfu Energy Co., Ltd. (新疆天富能源股份有限公司) (天富能源, 600509.SS) – electricity *Xinjiang Guannong Fruit & Antler Co., Ltd. (新疆冠农果茸股份有限公司) (冠农股份, 600251.SS) – fruits; animal husbandry *Xinjiang Qingsong Cement Co., Ltd. (新疆青松建材化工股份有限公司) (青松建化, 600425.SS) – cement *Xinjiang Sayram Modern Agriculture Co., Ltd. (新疆赛里木现代农业股份有限公司) (新赛股份, 600540.SS) – primarily cotton

=== Education and media === XPCC operates its own educational system covering primary, secondary and tertiary education (including two universities, Shihezi University and Tarim University); its own daily newspaper, ''Bingtuan Daily''; and its own TV stations at both provincial and division levels.{{Citation needed|date=January 2020}}

== See also ==

* Central Symposium on Work in Xinjiang

== References == {{Reflist}}

=== Sources === {{Library resources box}} {{refbegin}} * ''Originally translated from the Chinese Wikipedia article'' * Becquelin, Nicolas. "Xinjiang in the Nineties." ''The China Journal'', no. 44 (2000): 65–90. * Desai, Sohum, [https://web.archive.org/web/20051122225252/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/Volume12/desai.html Study of the Infrastructure of Xinjiang], Security Research Review. * McMillen, Donald H. "Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organisation in a Non-Han Region." ''The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs'', no. 6 (1981): 65–96. * O'Neill, Mark, [http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1148&Itemid=31 "The Conqueror of China's Wild West"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130921061414/http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1148&Itemid=31 |date=21 September 2013 }} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130921061414/http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1148&Itemid=31 |date=21 September 2013 }}, Asia Sentinel, 13 April 2008. * For additional information, see James D. Seymour, "Xinjiang's Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan", ''Inner Asia,'' 2, 2000, pp.&nbsp;171–193. {{refend}}

== External links == * {{Official website}} {{in lang|zh-hans}}

{{Clear}} {{Xinjiang}} {{Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps cities}} {{Xinjiang topics}}

{{authority control}}

Category:Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Category:Construction and civil engineering companies of China Category:Companies based in Xinjiang Category:Government-owned companies of China Category:Paramilitary organizations based in China Category:Government paramilitary forces Category:Ürümqi Category:Construction and civil engineering companies established in 1954 Category:1954 establishments in China Category:Non-combatant military personnel Category:Organizations associated with the Chinese Communist Party Category:Chinese companies established in 1954 Category:Settler colonialism in Asia Category:Chinese entities subject to U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions