Vivid designator

{{Short description|Concept in the philosophy of language}} In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a '''vivid designator''' is a term which is ''believed'' to designate the same thing in all possible worlds<ref name="quine">Quine, W.V.O., ''Quintessence: Intensions Revisited'', 2004, pp. 356–357</ref> and nothing else where such an object does not exist in a possible world. It is the analogue, in the sense of believing, of a rigid designator,<ref>D. Kaplan, ''Quantifying In'', 1969</ref> which ''is'' (refers to) the same in all possible worlds, rather than is just ''believed'' to be so.

== Willard Van Orman Quine == Willard Van Orman Quine credits David Kaplan (who in turn credits Montgomery Furth) for the term "vivid designator" in his 1977 paper "Intensions Revisited". He examines the separation between ''de re'' and ''de dicto'' and does away with ''de re'' statements, because ''de re'' statements can only work for names that are used referentially.<ref>Andrea Bonomi, ''On Quine: Transparency and Specificity in Intentional Contexts'', 1995, p. 183.</ref> In fact, both rigid designators and vivid designators are similarly dependent on context and empty otherwise. The same is true of the whole quantified modal logic of necessity because it collapses if essence is withdrawn.<ref>Quine, W.V.O., ''Quintessence: Intensions Revisited'', 2004, pp. 356–357.</ref>

== References == <references/>

Category:Possible world Category:Philosophy of language Category:Semantics Category:Formal semantics (natural language)