The government of the People's Republic of China has imposed financial and trade restrictions against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions whose actions it has determined to be contrary to certain national interests. China maintains three unilateral sanctions programs in addition to implementing the multilateral sanction decisions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

China's three unilateral sanctions programs are separately administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and the Taiwan Affairs Office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains a sanctions list that imposes travel, trade, and financial restrictions against targeted individuals and entities accused of interfering with China's domestic affairs or endangering China's interests.[1] The Ministry of Commerce maintains the Unreliable Entity List, which heavily restricts allowable business and investment activity in China by listed entities.[2] The Taiwan Affairs Office implements sanctions against Taiwan and targets entities and individuals accused of promoting Taiwanese independence.[3]

Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common instrument in China's foreign policy, particularly as the country's economic power has grown in recent years. Compared to Western sanctions—typically led by the United States and the European Union—China's use of economic sanctions exhibits several notable differences. Influenced by international norms, domestic political and economic structures, and concerns over its international reputation, China tends to employ sanctions in a more restrained and low-profile manner.[4] Although the frequency of Chinese sanctions has risen significantly in recent years, it remains relatively rare for China to impose sanctions as proactively or publicly as Western powers. Several key characteristics distinguish Chinese economic sanctions:[5][6]

Ambiguous and informal announcements

Unlike in Western countries, Chinese sanctions are not typically imposed through clear legal or administrative orders. Instead, they are often announced via statements by relevant government agencies, serving to create a sense of threat or coercion. For this reason, scholars frequently describe Chinese sanctions as "informal sanctions". A notable example is the dispute between China and South Korea over the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in 2016. In response, Chinese authorities ordered the suspension of 74 Lotte supermarkets for fire safety violations and informally blacklisted several South Korean companies, effectively halting commercial interactions.[7] These measures lacked formal legal basis but had tangible punitive effects.

This ambiguity allows the Chinese government greater policy flexibility. However, the pattern began to shift following the U.S.–China trade war, as China introduced a series of legal instruments—such as the Unreliable Entity List and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law—to formalize and legitimize its use of sanctions.[8] Despite these developments, many sanctions continue to be issued through diplomatic statements without formal legal codification.

In September 2020, the Ministry of Commerce issued new rules allowing for the creation of the Unreliable Entity List, and the National People's Congress followed up soon after in June 2021 by promulgating the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, which established a legal framework for maintaining previous sanctions. The law also allowed Chinese ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Taiwan Affairs Office, to implement new blocking sanctions against foreign individuals and entities.[9] The Taiwan Affairs Office announced a sanction under the new law in November 2021,[10] and the Ministry of Commerce announced its first Unreliable Entity List designation in February 2023.[11]

Focus on specific issues

Chinese sanctions are often closely tied to issues of diplomacy and national sovereignty; for example, the rare earth export ban on Japan amid the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute[6] and agriculture import ban on Taiwan during Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan.[12] In practice, Chinese economic sanctions tend to be more symbolic than substantive—frequently described as "more bark than bite." They are often short in duration but intense in impact, aiming to compel the target to yield quickly under pressure.

Focus on individuals, corporations, and public mobilization

Chinese sanctions are primarily directed at foreign individuals and companies, rather than foreign governments—a notable contrast to the approaches of the United States or the European Union, which sometimes target entire governments. In addition, China often encourages its domestic population to reduce consumption of goods from the targeted country, thereby enhancing the impact of sanctions through patriotic appeals.[7] This strategy blends state action with public participation to amplify pressure on the target.

As of August 2024, over 100 individuals and entities have been sanctioned by China.[13]

Scholars have created Chinese Economic Sanctions database from 1949 to 2020, including 135 cases in which China is the sender and 88 cases in which China is the target,[14] and the dataset can be downloaded on GitHub.

Sanctions announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DateCountry/RegionIndividual/entityPosition when sanctionedRestrictions
Travel restriction[a]Prohibit contact[b]Asset freeze[c]
2 December 2019National Endowment for Democracy[15]
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
International Republican Institute
Human Rights Watch
Freedom House
13 July 2020Congressional-Executive Commission on China[16][17]
Sam BrownbackUnited States Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom
13 July 2020
10 August 2020		Marco Rubio[d]United States Senator[16][17][18]
13 July 2020
10 August 2020		Ted Cruz
13 July 2020
10 August 2020		Chris SmithMember of the U.S. House of Representatives
14 July 2020 / 26 October 2020 / 21 February 2022 / 16 February 2023Lockheed Martin CorporationU.S. defense company[19][20][21]
10 August 2020Josh HawleyUnited States Senator[18][22]
Tom Cotton
Pat Toomey
Carl GershmanPresident of the National Endowment for Democracy
Derek J. MitchellPresident of the Institute for Democracy in International Affairs
Daniel TwiningPresident of the International Republican Institute
Kenneth RothExecutive director of the Human Rights Watch
Michael AbramowitzPresident of Freedom House
26 October 2020Boeing Defense, Space & SecurityU.S. defense company[20]
26 October 2020 / 21 February 2022 / 16 February 2023Raytheon Corporation[e]
[20][21]
26 October 2020[20]
30 November 2020John KnausSenior Director of the Asia Affairs of the National Endowment for Democracy[23]
Manpreet Singh AnandAsia Project Leader of the Institute for Democracy in International Affair
Crystal RosarioHong Kong Branch Director of the Institute for Democracy in International Affairs
Kelvin Sit Tak-OHong Kong Project Director of the Institute for Democracy in International Affairs
21 January 2021Mike PompeoFormer U.S. Secretary of State[24][25]
Peter NavarroFormer Director of Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy
Robert C. O'BrienFormer U.S. National Security Advisor
David R. StilwellFormer Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Matt PottingerFormer Deputy National Security Advisor
Alex AzarFormer U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services
Keith J. KrachFormer Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment
Kelly CraftFormer U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
John BoltonFormer U.S. National Security Advisor
Steve BannonFormer Senior Counselor to the President
22 March 2021
Reinhard BütikoferMember of the European Parliament[26]
Michael Gahler[f]

Raphaël Glucksmann[f]

Ilhan Kyuchyuk[f]

Miriam Lexmann[f]
Sjoerd SjoerdsmaMember of the House of Representatives
Samuel CogolatiMember of the Chamber of Representatives[26][27]
Dovilė ŠakalienėMember of the Seimas[26]
Adrian ZenzResearcher
Björn Fredrik Jerdén
Political and Security Committee
European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights[f]
Mercator Institute for China Studies
Alliance of Democracies Foundation
26 March 2021Tom Tugendhat[g]Member of Parliament
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee		[28]
Ian Duncan Smith[g]Member of Parliament
Neil O'Brien[g]Member of Parliament
David Alton[g]Member of the House of Lords
Tim LoughtonMember of Parliament
Nus Ghani[g]Member of Parliament
Helena Kennedy[g]Member of the House of Lords
Geoffrey NiceLawyer
Joanne Smith-FinleyActivist on Uyghur issues
China Research Group
Conservative Party Human Rights Commission
Uyghur Tribunal
Essex Court Chambers
27 March 2021Gayle Conelly ManchinChair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom[29]
Tony PerkinsVice Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
Michael ChongMember of Parliament
Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development
17 April 2021Jónas HaraldssonLawyer[30][31]
26 May 2021Johnnie Moore Jr.Member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom[32]
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Wilbur RossFormer U.S. Secretary of Commerce[33][34]
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Carolyn BartholomewChairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Jonathan N. StiversFormer Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Doyun KimNational Democratic Institute
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Adam J. KingInternational Republican Institute Authorized Representative in Hong Kong
23 July 2021Sophie RichardsonHuman Rights Watch China Director[33]
Hong Kong Democracy Council
21 December 2021Nadine MaenzaChair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom[35]
Nury TurkelVice Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
Anurima BhargavaMember of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
James W. Carr
5 August 2022Nancy PelosiSpeaker of the U.S. House of Representatives[36]
12 August 2022Agnė VaiciukevičiūtėDeputy Minister of Transport and Communications[37]
16 September 2022Gregory J. HayesChairman of Raytheon Technologies
Ted ColbertPresident and CEO of Boeing Defense, Space & Security
23 December 2022Miles YuSenior Fellow at the Hudson Institute Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution[38]
Todd SteinDeputy Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
7 April 2023Sarah May SternChair of the Board of the Hudson Institute[39]
John P. WaltersDirector of the Hudson Institute
John HeubuschFormer executive director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Joanne M. DrakeChief Executive Officer of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Hudson InstituteCivil society
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Center for Public AffairsCivil society
13 April 2023Michael McCaulChair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee[40]
15 September 2023Lockheed Martin, St. Louis, Missouri BranchMilitary industry[41]
Northrop Grumman
26 December 2023KharonData enterprise[42]
Edmund XuDirector of Investigations of Kharon Corporation
Nicole MorgretResearcher at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies
7 January 2024BAE Systems Land and ArmamentMilitary industry[43]
Alliant Techsystems Operation
AeroVironment
ViaSat[h]
Data Link Solutions
11 April 2024General Dynamics Land Systems[i][44]
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI)[i]
21 May 2024Mike GallagherFormer Member of the House of Representatives[45]
22 May 2024Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire ControlMilitary industry[46]
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics
Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture
Raytheon Missile Systems
General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems
General Dynamics Information Technology
General Dynamics Mission Systems
Inter-Coastal Electronics
System Studies & Simulation
IronMountain Solutions
Applied Technologies Group
Axient
Kathy WardenChairman, CEO and President of Northrop Grumman Corporation
Matthew BrombergVice President of Global Operations of Northrop Grumman Corporation
Benjamin R. DaviesVice President and General Manager of Northrop Grumman Strategic Deterrence System
Thomas H. JonesVice President and Aviation Systems President of Northrop Grumman Corporation
Stephen O'BryanVice President and Global Business Development Officer of Northrop Grumman Corporation
Roshan RoederVice President and Defense Systems President of Northrop Grumman Corporation
Firat H. GezenVice President of General Dynamics President of General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems
Jason W. AikenExecutive Vice President for Technology, General Dynamics
Amy GillilandSenior Vice President, General Dynamics President, General Dynamics Information Technologies
Christopher J. BradyVice President, General Dynamics President, General Dynamics Mission Systems
21 June 2024Lockheed Martin Missile Systems Integration LaboratoryMilitary industry[47]
Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Laboratories
Lockheed Martin Ventures
James D. TaicletChairman, President and CEO of Lockheed Martin
Frank Andrew St. JohnChief Operating Officer of Lockheed Martin
Jesus MalaveCFO of Lockheed Martin
12 July 2024Anduril IndustriesMilitary industry[48]
Maritime Tactical Systems
Pacific Rim Defense
Aevex Aerospace
LKD Aerospace
Summit Technologies Inc.
Wahid NawabiChairman, President and chief executive officer of AeroVironment
Kevin McDonnellSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Anduril Industries
Brian William SchimpfCEO of Anduril Industries
Matthew Marley GrimmChief Operating Officer of Anduril Industries
Gregory Michael KausnerSenior Vice President of Global Defense, Anduril Industries
1 August 2024Jim McGovernMember of the House of Representatives[49]
18 September 2024Sierra Nevada CorporationMilitary industry[50]
Stick Rudder Enterprises LLC
Cubic Corporation
S3 AeroDefense
TCOM, Limited Partnership
TextOre
Planate Management Group
ACT1 Federal
Exovera
10 October 2024Edge Autonomy Operations LLCMilitary industry[51]
Huntingdon Ingalls Industries Inc.
Skydio Inc.
Steven R. RudderFounder of Stick Rudder Enterprises LLC
James William Ickes IIVice President of Sierra Nevada Corporation
David Keith SuttonLockheed Martin Asia Director
Yeong-Tae PakVice President of Aerospace Environment Corporation
Patrick Edward JankowskiDirector of Indo-Pacific Programs, Northrop Grumman Corporation
John PurvisFormer CEO of Edge Autonomous Operations
Josh BrungardtChief Operating Officer of Edge Autonomous Operations
Christopher Douglas KastnerPresident and CEO of Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc.
Adam BryCo-founder and CEO of Skydio
Tom MossGeneral Manager of Asia Pacific Region, Skydio
5 December 2024Teledyne Brown Engineering Inc.Military industry[52]
BRINC Drones Inc.
Rapid Flight LLC
Red Six Solutions
Shield AI Inc.
SYNEXXUS Inc.
Firestorm Labs Inc.
Kratos Unmanned Aerial Systems Inc.
HavocAI
Neros Technologies
Cyberlux Corporation
Domo Tactical Communications
Group W
Barbara BorgonoviPresident of Naval Power Strategic Business Unit, Raytheon
Gerard HueberVice President of Naval Power Strategic Business Unit, Raytheon
Richard D. CrawfordFounder and CEO of United Technologies Systems Operating Company
Beth EdlerPresident of the Data Link Solutions
Blake ResnickFounder and CEO of BRINC Drone Inc.
Charles WoodburnCEO of BAE Systems
21 December 2024Uyghur Rights Advocacy ProjectCivil society[53]
Canada-Tibet Committee
Mehmet TohtiExecutive Director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project
Jasmine KainthPolicy and Advocacy Director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project
David MatasLegal Advisor of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project
Sarah Teich
John Packer
Clive Ansley
Yonah Diamond
Justine Bernatchez
Linden Dales
Charles BurtonPolicy Advisor of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project
Margarett Mccuaig Johnston
Marcus Kolga
Scott Simon
Conor HealyResearch Consultant of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project
Geoffrey Aharon
Samphe LhalungpaChair of the Canada-Tibet Committee
Luisa DuranteVice Chair of the Canada-Tibet Committee
Sherap TherchinExecutive Director of the Canada-Tibet Committee
Eliza von BaeyerDirector of the Canada-Tibet Committee
Youngdoung TenzinCommunity Events Manager of the Tibet Council of Canada
27 December 2024Insitu, Inc.Military enterprises[54]
Hudson Technologies Co.
Saronic Technologies, Inc.
Raytheon Canada
Raytheon Australia
Aerkomm Inc.
Oceaneering International, Inc.
9 January 2025Ivan Meyer and his familyFederal Chairperson of the Democratic Alliance[55]
1 July 2025Francis TolentinoFormer Senate Majority Leader[56]
8 September 2025Hei SekiMember of the House of Councillors[57]
15 December 2025Shigeru IwasakiPolitical Advisor to the Executive Yuan[58]
26 December 2025Northrop Grumman Systems CorporationMilitary industry[59]
L3Harris Maritime Services
Boeing in St. Louis
Gibbs & Cox, Inc.
Advanced Acoustic Concepts
VSE Corporation
Sierra Technical Services, Inc.
Red Cat Holdings, Inc.
Teal Drones, Inc.
ReconCraft
High Point Aerotechnologies
Epirus, Inc.
Dedrone Holdings Inc.
Area-I
Blue Force Technologies
Dive Technologies
Vantor
Intelligent Epitaxy Technology, Inc.
Rhombus Power Inc.
Lazarus Enterprises Inc.
Palmer LuckeyFounder of Anduril Industries
John CantillonVice President of L3Harris Technologies, Inc., Vice President and Principal Accounting Officer of L3Harris Maritime Services
Michael J. CarnovalePresident and chief executive officer of Advanced Acoustic Concepts
John A. CuomoPresident and chief executive officer of VSE Corporation
Mitch McDonaldPresident of Teal Drones, Inc.
Anshuman RoyFounder and chief executive officer of Rhombus Power Inc.
Dan SmootPresident and chief executive officer of Vantor
Aaditya DevarakondaChief Executive Officer of Dedrone Holdings Inc.
Ann WoodPresident of High Point Aerotechnologies
Jay HoflichCo-founder and chief executive officer of ReconCraft
30 March 2026Keiji FuruyaMember of the House of Representatives[60]

Sanctions announced by the Ministry of Commerce

Countermeasures

DateCountry/RegionEntityRestrictions
Travel restrictions[j]Trade restrictions[k]Investment restrictions[l]
13 August 2025Urbo Bankas[61]
AB Mano Bankas

Enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions resolutions

Country/EntityMinistry of Foreign Affairs Notice NumberUN Security Council Resolutions
No. 3/10, 2020, No. 3, 20212509/2571[62][63][64]

al-Qaeda		No. 1 of 2019, No. 5 of 20201267/1989/2253[65][66]
No. 4, 2019, No. 8/10, 20202484/2541[63][67][68]
No. 6, 2019, No. 10/11, 20202498/2551[63][69][70]
No. 10, 20201518[63]
No. 3, 2019, No. 7/10, 20202478/2528[63][71][72]
No. 10 of 2020, No. 1 of 20212562[63][73]
No. 10, 20201988[63]
No. 10, 20202048[63]
No. 1/9/10, 20202507/2536[63][74][75]
No. 4/10, 2020, No. 2, 20212511/2564[63][76][77]
No. 2, 2019, No. 6/10, 20202471/2521[63][78][79]
International Group Letter [2013] No. 39[m]2094[80]

Other

Chinese transliteration of Rubio

Originally, some news agencies reported the Chinese transliteration of Marco Rubio was , while the Foreign Affairs Ministry used the another transliteration . When he assumed the secretary of State in January 2025, some news agencies reported that Chinese transliteration of Rubio was changed to , which under the transliteration guideline adpoted by Xinhua News Agency. Under the guideline, Ru referred to , and Lu referred to . Therefore, the standardized Chinese transliteration is "". The spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Ministry Mao Ning stated that "instead of how his name is translated in Chinese, it's his actual name in English that is more important".[81][82][83] On 12 May 2026, Rubio headed to Beijing with U.S. President Donald Trump for the first time. According to reports, this arrangement might have been made possible after China changed his name's transliteration.[84] However, The New York Times reported that this was false, noting that Xinhua News Agency had used both transliterations for about a decade.[85]

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  1. ^ Sanctioned individuals and their immediate family members are prohibited from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau
  2. ^ Prohibition of Chinese citizens and institutions from dealing with sanctioned individuals or entities
  3. ^ Freezing of assets in China
  4. ^ When he is sanctioned by the Chinese government, the Chinese translation of Rubio was . In January 2025, the Chinese translation is changed to .
  5. ^ Renamed to Raytheon Technologies Corporation in 2020
  6. ^ Cancelled on 30 April 2025
  7. ^ Cancelled on 30 January 2026
  8. ^ Cancelled on 22 July 2024
  9. ^ On 20 May 2024, the Ministry of Commerce listed the above-mentioned enterprises on the list of unreliable entities.
  10. ^ Listed companies' executives are prohibited from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, and existing work or residency permits are cancelled
  11. ^ Listed companies are prohibited from engaging in import and export trade with mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau
  12. ^ Prohibits new investments by listed companies in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau
  13. ^ Issued by the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Transport, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs