{{Short description|Post-1991 social phenomenon}} {{Use dmy dates|date=October 2024}} {{Use Oxford spelling|date=October 2024}} [[File:Minsk2019 USSR flags.PNG|thumb|Belarusian Honor Guard carrying the national flags of Belarus and the Soviet Union, as well as the Soviet victory banner, during the Minsk Independence Day Parade, 2019.]] [[File:2014-03-08. Митинг в Донецке 006.jpg|thumb|Protest against Ukrainian decommunization policies in Donetsk, 2014. The red banner reads, "Our homeland is the USSR".]]
The social phenomenon of nostalgia for the Soviet Union ({{langx|ru|Ностальгия по СССР|Nostal'giya po SSSR}}) can include sentimental attitudes towards its politics, its society, its culture and cultural artifacts, its superpower status, or simply its aesthetics.<ref>{{cite news |author-last=Taylor |author-first=A. |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/06/09/calls-for-a-return-to-stalingrad-name-test-the-limits-of-putins-soviet-nostalgia/ |title=Calls for a return to 'Stalingrad' name test the limits of Putin's Soviet nostalgia |newspaper=Washington Post |date=9 June 2014 |access-date=6 September 2017 |archive-date=11 May 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150511084209/http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/06/09/calls-for-a-return-to-stalingrad-name-test-the-limits-of-putins-soviet-nostalgia/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.businessinsider.com/why-russia-backs-the-eurasian-union-2014-8 |title=Why Russia Backs The Eurasian Union |work=Business Insider |publisher=The Economist |date=22 August 2014 |quote=Often seen as an artefact of Vladimir Putin's nostalgia for the Soviet Union, the Eurasian Union has been largely ignored in the West. |access-date=29 March 2015 |archive-date=6 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190406050550/https://www.businessinsider.com/why-russia-backs-the-eurasian-union-2014-8 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author-last=Nikitin |author-first=V. |url=http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/putin-is-exploiting-the-legacy-of-the-soviet-union-to-further-russias-ends-in-ukraine-9170539.html |title=Putin is exploiting the legacy of the Soviet Union to further Russia's ends in Ukraine |work=The Independent |date=5 March 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150329133906/http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/putin-is-exploiting-the-legacy-of-the-soviet-union-to-further-russias-ends-in-ukraine-9170539.html |archive-date=29 March 2015 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
Modern cultural expressions of Soviet nostalgia also emphasize the former Soviet Union's scientific and technological achievements, particularly during the Space Age, and value the Soviet past for its futuristic aspirations.<ref name="Hutton">{{cite book|title =The Memory Phenomenon in Contemporary Historical Writing: How the Interest in Memory Has Influenced Our Understanding of History |first= Patrick|last= Hutton |page=143|publisher =Palgrave-Macmillan|location=New York| year=2016 |isbn = 978-1137494641}}</ref><ref name=Majsova1>{{cite book|last=Majsova|first= Natalija|title=Soviet Science Fiction Cinema and the Space Age: Memorable Futures|date=2021|pages=xvi–xxv|publisher=Lexington Books|location=Lanham|isbn=978-1-7936-0931-1}}</ref>
An analysis by the Harvard Political Review found that sociological explanations for Soviet nostalgia vary from "reminiscing about the USSR's global superpower status" to the "loss of financial, political and social stability" which accompanied the Soviet dissolution in many post-Soviet states.<ref name=Harvard>{{cite web|url=https://harvardpolitics.com/soviet-nostalgia/ |title=The Wake-Up Call for Soviet Nostalgics |publisher=Harvard Political Review |date=30 April 2022 |access-date=4 March 2023 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221104000133/https://harvardpolitics.com/soviet-nostalgia/ |archive-date=4 November 2022 }}</ref>
==Polling history==
=== Armenia === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Armenia}}
=== Azerbaijan === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Azerbaijan}}
=== Belarus === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Belarus}}
=== Estonia === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Estonia}}
=== Georgia === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Georgia}}
=== Kazakhstan === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Kazakhstan}}
=== Kyrgyzstan === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Kyrgyzstan}}
=== Latvia === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Latvia}}
=== Lithuania === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Lithuania}}
=== Moldova === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Moldova}}
=== Russia === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Russia}}
=== Tajikistan === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Tajikistan}}
=== Turkmenistan === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Turkmenistan}}
=== Ukraine === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Ukraine}}
=== Uzbekistan === {{Excerpt|Communist nostalgia|Uzbekistan}}
==Sociology and economics== [[File:Traktir Soviet Times Banner.jpg|thumb|Wall advertisement at the "Soviet Times" pub in Moscow]]
According to the Levada Center's polls, the primary reasons cited for Soviet nostalgia are the advantages of the shared economic union between the Soviet republics, including perceived financial stability.<ref name="WaPo2016">{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/12/21/why-do-so-many-people-miss-the-soviet-union/ |title=Why do so many people miss the Soviet Union? |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=21 December 2016 |access-date=24 December 2016 |archive-date=18 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201218031512/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/12/21/why-do-so-many-people-miss-the-soviet-union/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This was referenced by up to 53% of respondents in 2016.<ref name="WaPo2016"/> At least 43% also lamented the loss of the Soviet Union's global political superpower status.<ref name="WaPo2016"/> About 31% cited the loss of social trust and capital.<ref>{{cite news |title=The Fall of the Soviet Union |url=https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/01/09/the-fall-of-the-soviet-union/ |publisher=Levada.ru |date=9 January 2017 |access-date=20 December 2018 |archive-date=12 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112020133/https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/01/09/the-fall-of-the-soviet-union/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The remainder of the respondents cited a mix of reasons ranging from practical travel difficulties to a sense of national displacement.<ref name="WaPo2016"/> A 2019 poll found that 59% of Russians felt that the Soviet government "took care of ordinary people".<ref name="MoscowTimes2019">{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=24 June 2019 |title=Most Russians Say Soviet Union 'Took Care of Ordinary People' – Poll |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/06/24/most-russians-say-soviet-union-took-care-of-ordinary-people-poll-a66125 |work=The Moscow Times |access-date=25 June 2019 |archive-date=30 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201130060800/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/06/24/most-russians-say-soviet-union-took-care-of-ordinary-people-poll-a66125 |url-status=live }}</ref> When asked to name positive associations with the Soviet Union in 2020, 16% of the Levada Center's respondents pointed to "future stability and confidence", 15% said they associated it with "a good life in the country", and 11% said they associated it with personal memories from their childhood or youth.<ref name="TMT">{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=20 March 2020 |title=75% of Russians Say Soviet Era Was 'Greatest Time' in Country's History – Poll |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/24/75-of-russians-say-soviet-era-was-greatest-time-in-countrys-history-poll-a69735 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230209105256/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/24/75-of-russians-say-soviet-era-was-greatest-time-in-countrys-history-poll-a69735 |archive-date=9 February 2023 |access-date=4 March 2023 |location=Moscow}}</ref> [[File:Izhory Leningrad stele.jpg|thumb|260px|LENINGRAD sign at the {{interlanguage link|Izhory|ru|Ижоры (платформа)|lt=Izhory station}} on the outskirts of Saint Petersburg.<br/>The sign was restored in 2020.]] Levada Center sociologist Karina Pipiya observed that the economic factors played the most significant role in rising nostalgia for the Soviet Union, as opposed to loss of prestige or national identity.<ref name="Balmforth">{{cite news |author-last=Balmforth |author-first=Tom |date=19 December 2018 |title=Russian nostalgia for Soviet Union reaches 13-year high |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-sovietunion/russian-nostalgia-for-soviet-union-reaches-13-year-high-idUSKBN1OI20Q |work=Reuters |access-date=23 December 2018 |archive-date=10 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201210195537/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-sovietunion/russian-nostalgia-for-soviet-union-reaches-13-year-high-idUSKBN1OI20Q |url-status=live }}</ref> Pipiya also suggested a secondary factor was that a majority of Russians "regret that there used to be more social justice and that the government worked for the people and that it was better in terms of care for citizens and paternalistic expectations."<ref name="Balmforth"/>
In 2022, Oxford University professors Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield carried out an analysis of polling data which studied continued identification with the Soviet Union among adult Russian citizens.<ref name="Oxford21">{{cite news |last1=Chaisty |first1=Paul |last2=Whitefield |first2=Stephen |date=21 April 2022 |title=Expert Comment: Putin's Russia: people increasingly identify with the Soviet Union – here's what that means |url=https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2022-04-21-expert-comment-putin-s-russia-people-increasingly-identify-soviet-union-here-s-what#:~:text=By%202021%2C%20almost%2050%25%20of,responses%20are%20reported%20in%20percentages. |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220421155257/https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2022-04-21-expert-comment-putin-s-russia-people-increasingly-identify-soviet-union-here-s-what |archive-date=21 April 2022 |access-date=4 March 2024 |work=News Office of Oxford University |location=Oxford}}</ref> Chaisty and Whitefield noted that those who identified most with the Soviet Union were likely to be elderly and less affluent.<ref name="Oxford21"/> Contributing factors included "nostalgia for Soviet era economic and welfare policies as well as a cultural nostalgia for a particular Soviet 'way of life' and traditional values."<ref name="Oxford21"/> Other common reasons Russians cited nostalgia for the Soviet Union included hostility towards Western countries, hostility towards capitalism and the market economy, and a desire to re-assert Russian military and political ascendancy over the former Soviet space.<ref name="Oxford21"/>
Gallup observed in its data review that "For many, life has not been easy since the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. Residents there have lived through wars, revolutions, coups, territorial disputes, and multiple economic collapses...Older residents...whose safety nets, such as guaranteed pensions and free healthcare, largely disappeared when the union dissolved are more likely to say the breakup harmed their countries."<ref name="Gallup">{{Cite web |last1=Esipova |first1=Neli |last2=Ray |first2=Julie |date=2013-12-19 |title=Former Soviet Countries See More Harm From Breakup |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/166538/former-soviet-countries-harm-breakup.aspx |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111230251/https://news.gallup.com/poll/166538/former-soviet-countries-harm-breakup.aspx |archive-date=2020-11-11 |access-date=2023-01-17 |website=Gallup.com |language=en}}</ref>
In her examination of identities in post-Soviet Ukraine, historian Catherine Wanner concurs that the loss or reduction of social benefits has played a major role in Soviet nostalgia among older residents.<ref name=Wanner>{{cite book|last=Wanner|first=Catherine|title=Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine|date=1998|pages=70, 160–167|publisher=The Pennsylvania State University Press|location=University Park, Pennsylvania|isbn=0-271-01793-7}}</ref> Describing elderly female pensioners who expressed nostalgia for the Soviet era, Wanner writes:
{{blockquote|They had relied all their lives on the ruling [Communist] Party structure and hierarchy...and with it now absent, they have no recourse of their own...to stave off hardship. As meager as pensions and salaries are, they become indispensable when they are the sole source of income. Once again, these women do not have the networks and the contacts to overcome logistical obstacles to securing alternative employment. Without the protection of the Soviet state and its roster of cradle-to-grave allotments, in this new social Darwinian post-Soviet world without vital ''blat'' connections they are left highly vulnerable to poverty. They blame their incomprehensible woes and the elusiveness of a solution on the breakdown of the Soviet state. They recognize that recreating the Soviet Union and the economic and political systems that characterized it is an option that exists only in their dreams. But it is one that exerts tremendous nostalgic appeal.<ref name=Wanner/>}}
An analysis of Soviet nostalgia in the Harvard Political Review found that "the rapid transition from a Soviet-type planned economy to neoliberal capitalism has imposed a high financial burden on the population of these fifteen newly independent post-Soviet states. This period brought a sharp decline of living standards, a reduction in social benefits, and a rise in unemployment and poverty rates. The frustration of ordinary citizens only grew, as they witnessed the creation of an oligarchic elite that was getting richer while everyone else was becoming poorer. Under these circumstances, nostalgia for the Soviet Union is a direct consequence of people's disappointment with their countries’ political and economic performance."<ref name=Harvard/> The following joke illustrates this reason of communist nostalgia: Q: What did capitalism accomplish in one year that communism could not do in seventy years? A: Made communism look good.<ref>{{cite book |title=Blackshirts and Reds: Rational Fascism and the Overthrow of Communism|date=1997|first=Michael|last=Parenti|publisher=City Lights Publishers|page=116}}</ref>
British journalist Anatol Lieven linked the phenomenon of Soviet nostalgia directly to the age structure of populations in the former Soviet republics. Lieven wrote in 1998 that nostalgia often "takes the form of a deep yearning for stability and order, which is exactly what one would expect from an elderly population. It is in terms of a nostalgia for this past security, rather than a desire for national conquests, power, and glory, that Soviet restorationist feeling in Russia should mainly be seen."<ref name=Lieven>{{cite book|last=Lieven|first=Anatol|title=Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian power|date=1998|pages=193–194|publisher=Yale University Press|location=New Haven|isbn=978-0300078817}}</ref> He also added that "Soviet nostalgia is likely to diminish as the older generation dies off and the age structure of society assumes a less top-heavy form."<ref name=Lieven/> Lieven claimed that economic and physical insecurity were the primary drivers of Soviet nostalgia among the elderly, since many believed that "in Soviet days they lived better and more securely", with less crime, ethnic strife, or unemployment.<ref name=Lieven/> However, he also observed in his research of polling data that there was little enthusiasm for Soviet nostalgia among post-Soviet youth in the late 1990s, and younger people were more drawn to various strains of post-Soviet nationalism in their respective countries.<ref name=Lieven/> [[File:Grafitio kun Stalin sur kamiono en Tjumeno.jpg|thumb|Graffiti of Joseph Stalin spotted on a truck in Tyumen, 2024. Beneath is written: ''"Under me, there was no such bullsh*t"'']] Ekaterina Kalinina, a researcher on post-Soviet culture and media at the University of Copenhagen, concurred with other findings that Soviet nostalgia is driven primarily by the collapse of the former regime's welfare state.<ref name="Christie">{{cite news |title=Exploring the rise of Soviet nostalgia in Russia |last=Christie |first=Caroline|url=https://www.documentjournal.com/2019/01/exploring-the-rise-of-soviet-nostalgia-in-russia/ |work=Document Journal |location=New York |date=24 January 2019 |access-date=29 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240329234008/https://www.documentjournal.com/2019/01/exploring-the-rise-of-soviet-nostalgia-in-russia/ |archive-date=29 March 2024}}</ref> Kalinina pointed out that Soviet nostalgia had the greatest appeal to those "who find themselves in more vulnerable economic and social positions" in the post-Soviet era.<ref name="Christie"/> Per Kalinina, these individuals are nostalgic for "economic security and social welfare."<ref name="Christie"/>
Many of the ex-Soviet republics suffered economic collapse upon the dissolution, resulting in lowered living standards, increased mortality rates, devaluation of national currencies, and rising income inequality.<ref name="WaPo2016"/><ref>{{cite journal|author-last=Ciment |author-first=James |date=21 August 1999 |title=Life expectancy of Russian men falls to 58 |journal=BMJ: British Medical Journal |volume=319 |issue=7208 |pages=468 |doi=10.1136/bmj.319.7208.468a |issn=0959-8138 |pmc=1116380 |pmid=10454391}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|author-last1=Men |author-first1=Tamara |author-last2=Brennan |author-first2=Paul |author-last3=Boffetta |author-first3=Paolo |author-last4=Zaridze |author-first4=David |date=25 October 2003 |title=Russian mortality trends for 1991–2001: analysis by cause and region |journal=BMJ: British Medical Journal |volume=327 |issue=7421 |pages=964–0 |doi=10.1136/bmj.327.7421.964 |issn=0959-8138 |pmid=14576248 |pmc=259165}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author-last=Izyumov |author-first=Alexei |date=2010 |title=Human Costs of Post-communist Transition: Public Policies and Private Response |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/41288494 |journal=Review of Social Economy |volume=68 |issue=1 |pages=93–125 |doi=10.1080/00346760902968421 |jstor=41288494 |s2cid=154520098 |issn=0034-6764 |access-date=2021-01-22 |archive-date=2020-11-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124032308/https://www.jstor.org/stable/41288494 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|date=1 May 2017 |title=The effect of rapid privatisation on mortality in mono-industrial towns in post-Soviet Russia: a retrospective cohort study |journal=The Lancet Public Health |language=en |volume=2 |issue=5 |pages=e231–e238 |doi=10.1016/S2468-2667(17)30072-5 |issn=2468-2667 |doi-access=free |author-last1=Azarova |author-first1=Aytalina |author-last2=Irdam |author-first2=Darja |author-last3=Gugushvili |author-first3=Alexi |author-last4=Fazekas |author-first4=Mihaly |author-last5=Scheiring |author-first5=Gábor |author-last6=Horvat |author-first6=Pia |author-last7=Stefler |author-first7=Denes |author-last8=Kolesnikova |author-first8=Irina |author-last9=Popov |author-first9=Vladimir |author-last10=Szelenyi |author-first10=Ivan |author-last11=Stuckler |author-first11=David |author-last12=Marmot |author-first12=Michael |author-last13=Murphy |author-first13=Michael |author-last14=McKee |author-first14=Martin |author-last15=Bobak |author-first15=Martin |author-last16=King |author-first16=Lawrence |pmid=28626827 |pmc=5459934}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Ghodsee |first1=Kristen |title=Taking Stock of Shock: Social Consequences of the 1989 Revolutions |last2=Orenstein |first2=Mitchell A. |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0197549247 |location=New York |pages=195–196 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197549230.001.0001 |quote=In the mortality belt of the European former Soviet Union, an aggressive health policy intervention might have prevented tens of thousands of excess deaths, or at least generated a different perception of Western intentions. Instead, Western self-congratulatory triumphalism, the political priority to irreversibly destroy the communist system, and the desire to integrate East European economies into the capitalist world at any cost took precedence.}}</ref> Chaotic neoliberal market reforms, privatization, and austerity measures urged by Western economic advisers, including Lawrence Summers, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were often blamed by the populace of the former Soviet states for exacerbating the problem.<ref name="Mattei">{{cite book|last=Mattei|first=Clara E.|date=2022|title=The Capital Order: How Economists Invented Austerity and Paved the Way to Fascism|pages=301–303|url=https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo181707138.html|location=|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0226818399|quote="If, in 1987–1988, 2 percent of the Russian people lived in poverty (i.e., survived on less than $4 a day), by 1993–1995 the number reached 50 percent: in just seven years half the Russian population became destitute.|access-date=2023-01-02|archive-date=2023-01-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230104180917/https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo181707138.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Scheidel |first=Walter |author-link=Walter Scheidel |title=The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0691165028 |pages=51, 222–223 |quote=Following the dissolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and then of the Soviet Union itself in late 1991, exploding poverty drove the surge in income inequality: within three years, the proportion of people living in poverty had tripled to more than a third of Russia's population. By the time of the 1998 Russian financial crisis, their share had grown to almost 60%. Yet over the longer term, rising inequality has been boosted by the decompression of wage incomes, much of it resulting from growing regional variation. Strongly disproportionate income growth in Moscow and in oil-and-gas-rich parts of the country point to the successful capture of rents by those in the highest income-brackets. Wealth concentration at the very top had been made possible by the transfer of state assets to private owners.}}</ref> Between 1991 and 1994, a third of Russia's population was plunged into poverty, and between 1994 and 1998 this figure increased to over half the population.<ref name="Mattei"/> Most of the Soviet state enterprises were acquired and liquidated by Russian business oligarchs as part of the privatization campaign, which rendered large segments of the ex-Soviet workforce unemployed and impoverished.<ref name="Mattei"/> Capital gains made in post-Soviet Russia during the 1990s were mostly concentrated in the hands of oligarchs who benefited from the acquisition of state assets, while the majority of the population suffered severe economic hardship.<ref name="Mattei"/>
According to Kristen Ghodsee, a researcher on post-communist Eastern Europe: {{blockquote|Only by examining how the quotidian aspects of daily life were affected by great social, political and economic changes can we make sense of the desire for this collectively imagined, more egalitarian past. Nobody wants to revive 20th century totalitarianism. But nostalgia for communism has become a common language through which ordinary men and women express disappointment with the shortcomings of parliamentary democracy and neoliberal capitalism today.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.wamc.org/academic-minute/2011-11-01/dr-kristen-ghodsee-bowdoin-college-nostalgia-for-communism|title=Dr. Kristen Ghodsee, Bowdoin College – Nostalgia for Communism|date=1 November 2011|website=WAMC Northeast Public Radio|access-date=2022-03-03|archive-date=2022-05-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220504212449/https://www.wamc.org/academic-minute/2011-11-01/dr-kristen-ghodsee-bowdoin-college-nostalgia-for-communism|url-status=live}}</ref>}} [[File:Abandoned factory. Kiev, Ukraine. 2008.jpg|thumb|left|250px|Abandoned Soviet factory in Kyiv. The USSR's collapse was accompanied by deindustrialization and mass unemployment, feeding Soviet nostalgia in the working class.<ref name=Budraitskis/>]] Among the working poor, Soviet nostalgia is often directly linked to the guarantee of state employment and regular salaries.<ref name="WB">{{cite book | title = When Things Fall Apart: Qualitative Studies of Poverty in the Former Soviet Union | date = December 2002 | last1 = Dudwick | first1 = Nora | last2 = Kuehnast | first2 = Kathleen | last3 = Gomart | first3 = Elizabeth | last4 = Marc | first4 = Alexandre | location = Washington DC | publisher = The World Bank | isbn = 0-8213-5067-6| pages= 53, 213–219}}</ref> The collapse of Soviet state enterprises and contraction of the public sector after the dissolution resulted in widespread unemployment.<ref name="WB"/> With the disappearance of the Soviet industrial complex, as much as half the working class of the former USSR lost their jobs during the 1990s.<ref name=Budraitskis>{{cite book|last=Budraitskis|first=Ilya|title=Dissidents Among Dissidents: Ideology, Politics and the Left in Post-Soviet Russia|date=2022|page=175|publisher=Verso/New Left Books|location=London|isbn=978-1839764189}}</ref> One study of rural Georgians in the early 2000s found that the vast majority yearned for a return to the security of their public sector jobs, even those that did not favor a return to the centrally planned economy.<ref name="WB"/> They attributed their poverty to the demise of the Soviet state, which in turn resulted in the widespread association of stability with the Soviet era and lack of confidence in the post-Soviet governments.<ref name="WB"/> A related study of working class Kyrgyz women in the same time frame found that most remembered the Soviet era primarily for its low levels of unemployment.<ref name="WB"/>
Security historian Matthew Sussex wrote the 1990s were a period of "social and economic malaise experienced across the former USSR".<ref name=Sussex>{{cite book|last=Sussex|first=Matthew|title=Conflict in the Former USSR|year=2012|pages=2–4, 208|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge|isbn=978-0521763103}}</ref> Upon the Soviet dissolution, "rampant inflation within many newly independent states quickly became coupled to the rise of financial oligarchs...[while] uneven transitions to democracy and the institutionalization of organized crime became the norm."<ref name=Sussex/> Furthermore, Sussex surmised, the post-Soviet space became politically unstable and prone to armed conflict as a result of the dissolution.<ref name=Sussex/> With the collapse of the Soviet military and security organs, a security vacuum emerged which was quickly filled by extremist political and religious factions as well as organized crime, further exacerbated by tensions between the various post-Soviet states over the ownership of the defunct USSR's energy infrastructure.<ref name=Sussex/> Sussex claimed that "during its existence the USSR enforced order upon what are today recognized as numerous ethnic, religious, and geostrategic trouble spots," and "although few observers lament the passing of the USSR, even fewer would argue that the area of its former geographical footprint is more secure today than it was under communism."<ref name=Sussex/> In Armenia, where the dissolution was followed by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan, Soviet nostalgia was closely tied to a longing for a return to peace and public order.<ref name="WB"/>
In a 2020 editorial, Russian-born American journalist Andre Vltchek suggested that Soviet nostalgia may also be closely tied to aspects of Soviet society and public life—for example, he claimed the Soviet Union had an extensive public works program, heavily subsidized public facilities and transportation, high levels of civic engagement, and support for the arts. Without state subsidies and central planning, Vltchek insisted that these aspects of society disappeared or became severely diminished in the post-Soviet space. Vltchek lamented the apparent loss or decay of Soviet-era public amenities and cultural spaces which followed the dissolution.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Vltchek |first=Andre |author-link=Andre Vltchek |date=2022-04-06 |title=How we sold Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia for plastic shopping bags |url=https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/134280 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220406225957/https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/134280#How-we-sold-Soviet-Union-and-Czechoslovakia-for-plastic-shopping-bags |archive-date=6 April 2022 |access-date=2023-09-25 |publisher=China Daily}}</ref>
Anthropologist Alexei Yurchak described modern Soviet nostalgia as "a complex post-Soviet construct" based on the "longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded – often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals – and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation."<ref name=Yurchak>{{cite book|last=Yurchak|first=Alexei|title=Everything was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation |date=2006|page=8|publisher=Princeton University Press|location=Princeton, New Jersey|isbn=0-691-12116-8}}</ref> Yurchak observed that localized community bonds and social capital were much stronger during the Soviet era due to various practical realities, and theorized that this was an "undeniable constitutive part" of nostalgia as expressed by the last Soviet generation.<ref name=Yurchak/>
==Cultural impact== [[File:MoSAM in St.Petersburg (Soda water machines).jpg|thumb|Vending machines and a photo kiosk from the Soviet era in the Museum of Soviet Arcade Machines.]] ===Aesthetics===
According to Ukrainian journalist Oksana Forostyna, positive cultural depictions of Soviet life emphasizing its modernization and progressivism were common until the late 1980s.<ref name="Forostyna">{{cite news |title=Reinvention of Pro-Russian Politics in Ukraine without Russia: Old and New Adversaries of the EU Integration |last=Forostyna |first=Oksana |url=https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/reinvention-of-pro-russian-politics-in-ukraine |work=Europe's Futures |location=Vienna |date=8 July 2024 |access-date=20 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240802141412/https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/reinvention-of-pro-russian-politics-in-ukraine |archive-date=2 August 2024}}</ref> This cultural narrative was largely abandoned during perestroika.<ref name="Forostyna"/> However, Forostyna observes that it returned to the post-Soviet space during the late 2000s, resulting in a new "glamorization of Soviet aesthetics".<ref name="Forostyna"/> Among many young Russians who could not remember the Soviet era, this manifested as an interest in Soviet cultural artifacts, such as art, clothing, designs, and memorabilia.<ref name="Christie"/> Soviet Space Age imagery and art experienced a major resurgence in particular due to nostalgia for that era's perceived optimism and utopian speculations.<ref name="Majsova2">{{cite web|title=Making the Most of a Past's Futures: Soviet Space Science Fiction between Projection and Recollection|last=Majsova|first=Natalija|url=https://www.alternator.science/en/long/making-the-most-of-a-pasts-futures-soviet-space-science-fiction-between-projection-and-recollection/|location=Ljubljana|publisher=Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts |date=17 June 2021|access-date=13 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230914021554/https://www.alternator.science/en/long/making-the-most-of-a-pasts-futures-soviet-space-science-fiction-between-projection-and-recollection/|archive-date=14 September 2023}}</ref>
In 2007, the Museum of Soviet Arcade Machines was established to recreate the experience of Soviet arcades and early gaming culture for visitors.<ref name="Christie"/>
In 2019, virtual reality tours of Moscow began to be offered which recreated the aesthetics and architecture of the city during the Soviet era.<ref name="Christie"/>
===Soviet holidays=== {{main|Victory Day (9 May)}}
During the 1990s, most key holidays linked to the national and ideological charter of the Soviet Union were eliminated in the former Soviet republics, with the exception of Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany in World War II (also known in the Soviet and Russian space as the Great Patriotic War).<ref name=Wanner/> The commemorations of Victory Day have not changed radically in most of the post-Soviet space since 1991.<ref name=Wanner/> Catherine Wanner asserts that Victory Day commemorations are a vehicle for Soviet nostalgia, as they "kept alive a mythology of Soviet grandeur, of solidarity among the ''Sovietskii narod'', and of a sense of self as citizen of a superpower state".<ref name=Wanner/>
Russian Victory Day parades are organized annually in most cities, with the central military parade taking place in Moscow (just as during the Soviet times).<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Maynes |first1=Charles |url=https://www.npr.org/2022/05/08/1097184192/russia-victory-day-2022 |title=Russia's Victory Day celebrations take on new importance for the Kremlin this year |website=NPR |date=8 May 2022 |access-date=2023-03-20 |archive-date=2023-03-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230320012103/https://www.npr.org/2022/05/08/1097184192/russia-victory-day-2022 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68366|title=Victory Parade on Red Square|date=9 May 2022|website=President of Russia|access-date=20 March 2023|archive-date=25 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230125152948/http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68366|url-status=live}}</ref> Additionally, the recently introduced Immortal Regiment on 9 May sees millions of Russians carry the portraits of their relatives who fought in the war.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/the-immortal-regiment-the-pride-and-prejudice-of-russia/|title=The Immortal Regiment: the pride and prejudice of Russia|website=Elcano Royal Institute|access-date=2023-03-20|archive-date=2023-03-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230320012104/https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/the-immortal-regiment-the-pride-and-prejudice-of-russia/|url-status=live}}</ref> Russia also retains other Soviet holidays, such as the Defender of the Fatherland Day (23 February), International Women's Day (8 March), and International Workers' Day.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ru.usembassy.gov/holiday-calendar/|title=U.S. & Russian Holidays in 2023 & 2024|website=U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia|access-date=2023-03-20|archive-date=2023-03-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230320013608/https://ru.usembassy.gov/holiday-calendar/|url-status=live}}</ref>
===Sports===
During the 2019 Euro Hockey Tour's Channel One Cup, the Russia men's national ice hockey team competed in the uniforms of the old Soviet men's national ice hockey team.<ref name="EHT1">{{cite news |title=Russia's hockey team sports Soviet uniforms, riling its European neighbors |last=Clark |first=Joseph |url=https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/dec/21/russias-hockey-team-sports-soviet-uniforms-riling-/|work=The Washington Times |location=Washington DC |date=21 December 2021 |access-date=8 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211231075408/https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/dec/21/russias-hockey-team-sports-soviet-uniforms-riling-/ |archive-date=31 December 2021}}</ref> A spokesperson for the team stated that these were specifically adopted to commemorate the 75th anniversary of organized ice hockey sports in Russia.<ref name="EHT1"/> In support of the team's gesture, many of the Russian spectators present at the Channel One Cup that year displayed Soviet national flags.<ref name="EHT2">{{cite news |title=Thirty years after the Soviet Union collapsed, Putin exploits nostalgia for the old regime |last=Kolesnikov |first=Andrei |url=https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/25/opinions/30th-anniversary-soviet-union-collapse-andrei-kolesnikov/index.html|work=CNN |location=Atlanta |date=26 December 2021 |access-date=8 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211231152559/https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/25/opinions/30th-anniversary-soviet-union-collapse-andrei-kolesnikov/index.html |archive-date=31 December 2021}}</ref>
===Media===
In 2004, a cable station devoted to the music, culture, and arts of the Soviet Union, known as ''Nostalgiya'', was launched in Russia.<ref name="Christie"/> Aside from Soviet era TV shows and movies, ''Nostalgiya'' also broadcasts a panel show, "Before and After", in which guests discuss various historical events from Soviet history.<ref name="Christie"/>
==Political impact== ===Neo-Soviet politics=== {{main|Neo-Sovietism}} Writing in the Harvard Political Review, analyst Mihaela Esanu stated that Soviet nostalgia has contributed to a revival in neo-Soviet politics.<ref name=Harvard/> Yearning for the Soviet past in various post-Soviet republics, Esanu argued, has contributed greatly to the rise of neo-Soviet political factions committed to increasing economic, military, and political ties with Russia, the historic center of the power in the USSR, as opposed to the West.<ref name=Harvard/> Esanu argued that appeals to Soviet nostalgia are especially prominent with pro-Russian parties in Belarus and Moldova.<ref name=Harvard/>
Journalist Pamela Druckerman asserts that another aspect of neo-Sovietism is support for the central role of the state in civil society, political life, and the media.<ref name="Druckerman">{{cite news|last=Druckerman|first=Pamela|author-link=Pamela Druckerman|date=2014-05-08|title=The Russians Love Their Children, Too|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/druckerman-the-russians-love-their-children-too.html|work=The New York Times|access-date=2015-12-27|archive-date=2021-02-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210227181006/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/druckerman-the-russians-love-their-children-too.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Druckerman claimed that neo-Soviet policies resulted in a return to statist philosophy in the Russian government.<ref name="Druckerman"/>
===Communist Party of the Russian Federation=== thumb|left|270px|Supporters of the Russian Communist Party demonstrate in Moscow, 2012. Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, is a harsh critic of President Vladimir Putin, but states that his recipes for Russia's future are true to his Soviet roots. Zyuganov hopes to renationalise all major industries and he believes the USSR was "the most humane state in human history".<ref>{{cite news|date=9 February 2012|title=Kremlin has plan B for poll run-off|url=https://www.ft.com/content/3c6abd0c-5309-11e1-8aa1-00144feabdc0|work=Financial Times|access-date=19 December 2020|url-access=subscription|archive-date=11 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111003631/https://www.ft.com/content/3c6abd0c-5309-11e1-8aa1-00144feabdc0|url-status=live}}</ref>
===Russo-Ukrainian War=== {{main|Soviet imagery during the Russo-Ukrainian War}} [[File:Polutorka, DOSAAF building, Kazan (2022-05-23) 03.jpg|thumb|left|The Victory Banner and a Z symbol on a Russian military vehicle in Kazan.]]
Russia has extensively relied on possible nostalgia for the USSR to support its war effort during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.<ref name="The Observers - France 24">{{cite news |last1=Young |first1=Pareisa |title=Ukraine: Russian troops flying Soviet flag, symbol of 're-establishing Russian domination' |url=https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220311-ukraine-ussr-soviet-flag-russia-troops |access-date=4 May 2022 |work=The Observers – France 24 |date=11 March 2022 |archive-date=27 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220427075026/https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220311-ukraine-ussr-soviet-flag-russia-troops |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="The Guardian">{{cite news |last1=Harding |authorlink1=Luke Harding |first1=Luke |title=Back in the USSR: Lenin statues and Soviet flags reappear in Russian-controlled cities |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/23/back-in-the-ussr-lenin-statues-and-soviet-flags-reappear-in-russian-controlled-cities |access-date=4 May 2022 |work=The Guardian |date=23 April 2022 |archive-date=4 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220504233450/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/23/back-in-the-ussr-lenin-statues-and-soviet-flags-reappear-in-russian-controlled-cities |url-status=live }}</ref>
Following the invasion, many Russian tanks were shown flying the old flag of the Soviet Union alongside the pro-war Z military symbol. American political scientist Mark Beissinger told France 24 that the purpose of using these symbols was not necessarily to do with the ideology of communism, but rather a desire to re-establish "Russian domination over Ukraine", noting that the use of Soviet symbols in most post-Soviet states (with the exception of Russia and Belarus) is often seen as a deliberate provocative act rather than actually wanting to establish communism.<ref name="The Observers - France 24"/> Other observers noted that the Russian propaganda incorporates the Soviet symbols as a reference to the former Soviet power, alluding to its possible return.<ref name="Meduza"/>
Some suggest that the toponymic policy of the Russian forces is a manifestation of nostalgia{{cn|date=July 2025}}: the settlements in the occupied Ukrainian territories are renamed to their Soviet names. These artificial names, created by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and 1930s, were often references to communist leaders as a way to propagate the communist ideology.<ref name="ukr-topo-decom">{{cite journal|title=Decommunization of urban toponymy in Ukraine: causes and consequences|journal=Journal of Geography Politics and Society|first1=Aleksander|last1=Kuczabski|first2=Alina|last2=Boychuk|volume=10|date=December 2020|issue=4 |pages=8–16|doi=10.26881/jpgs.2020.4.02|doi-access=free}}</ref> Ukraine has changed them, usually restoring the historic toponyms, during the decommunization process.<ref name="ukr-topo-decom"/> Russian forces would again impose the Soviet names, for example: Artemivsk instead of Bakhmut, Krasny ({{langx|ru|Red}}) Liman instead of Lyman, Volodarske (a reference to V. Volodarsky) instead of Nikolske, Stakhanov (a reference to Alexei Stakhanov) instead of Kadiivka, etc.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://portal.lviv.ua/news/2022/05/05/na-okupovanij-donechchyni-rosiiany-povertaiut-stari-nazvy-selyshcham|title=На окупованій Донеччині росіяни повертають старі назви селищам|website=portal.lviv.ua|access-date=2023-02-08|archive-date=2023-03-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230327224940/https://portal.lviv.ua/news/2022/05/05/na-okupovanij-donechchyni-rosiiany-povertaiut-stari-nazvy-selyshcham|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/a8cf4e22|title=ВФУ обстреляли Красный Лиман, есть жертвы|date=26 September 2022|website=Красная весна|access-date=8 February 2023|archive-date=26 November 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221126084955/https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/a8cf4e22|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ua-football.com/ukrainian/news/1651924609-rossiyskie-okkupanty-9-maya-zaplanirovali-vernut-lugansku-ego-sovetskoe-nazvanie.html|title=Российские оккупанты 9 мая запланировали вернуть Луганску его советское название|website=www.ua-football.com|date=7 May 2022 |access-date=2023-11-12|archive-date=2022-10-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221005231925/https://www.ua-football.com/ukrainian/news/1651924609-rossiyskie-okkupanty-9-maya-zaplanirovali-vernut-lugansku-ego-sovetskoe-nazvanie.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Other researchers argue that the Russian toponymic policy is primarily a Russification policy, rather than an effort driven by nostalgia.<ref>{{citation|title=Russification in Occupied Ukraine|url=https://investigations.news-exchange.ebu.ch/russification-in-occupied-ukraine/index.html|date=16 November 2023|access-date=18 July 2025|publisher=European Broadcasting Union}}</ref>
====Events==== [[File:День Победы в Сакском районе, 2022, 33.jpg|thumb|"Grandmother with a red flag" poster was used by Russian propaganda, as a reference to The Motherland Calls (a prominent World War II monument).]]
In April 2022, a video of a Ukrainian woman named Anna Ivanovna<ref name="PravdaUA">{{Cite web |last1=Karlovsky |first1=Denis |title="Бабця з прапором СРСР" кляне російську армію, бо та зруйнувала її дім |trans-title="Grandmother with the flag of the USSR" swears at the Russian army, because it destroyed her house |url=https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/05/5/7344253/ |website=Ukrayinska Pravda |accessdate=2022-05-05 |language=uk |archive-date=2022-05-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220505143053/https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/05/5/7344253/ |url-status=live }}</ref> greeting Ukrainian soldiers at her home near Dvorichna, whom she thought to be Russian, with a Soviet flag went viral on pro-Russian social media, and featured on Russian state-controlled media. The woman said that she and her husband had "waited, prayed for them, for Putin and all the people".<ref name="Sorokina"/> The Ukrainian soldiers gave her food, but went on to mock her and trample on her Soviet flag, after which she gave the food back and said "my parents died for that flag in World War Two".<ref name="Bettiza">{{cite news |last1=Bettiza |first1=Sofia |last2=Khomenko |first2=Svyatoslav |title=Babushka Z: The woman who became a Russian propaganda icon |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61757667 |access-date=5 July 2022 |work=BBC News |date=15 June 2022 |archive-date=19 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221019161433/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61757667 |url-status=live }}</ref> This was used by Russian propagandists to prove that the Russian invasion had popular support, in spite of the fact that most Ukrainians – even in Russian-speaking regions – opposed the invasion.<ref name="Bettiza" /> In Russia, murals, postcards, street art, billboards, chevrons and stickers depicting the woman have been created.<ref name="Sorokina">{{cite news |last1=Sorokina |first1=Yanina |title=Explainer: How a Ukrainian Pensioner Became a Pro-War Symbol in Russia |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/04/explainer-how-a-ukrainian-pensioner-became-a-pro-war-symbol-in-russia-a77573 |access-date=4 May 2022 |work=The Moscow Times |date=4 May 2022 |archive-date=4 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220504233426/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/04/explainer-how-a-ukrainian-pensioner-became-a-pro-war-symbol-in-russia-a77573 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Mohan |first1=Geeta |title=Old woman with red flag is now the face of Russian loyalty in this war |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/world/russia-ukraine-war/story/old-woman-with-red-flag-is-now-the-face-of-russian-loyalty-in-this-war-1945349-2022-05-04 |access-date=4 May 2022 |work=India Today |date=4 May 2022 |archive-date=4 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220504233422/https://www.indiatoday.in/world/russia-ukraine-war/story/old-woman-with-red-flag-is-now-the-face-of-russian-loyalty-in-this-war-1945349-2022-05-04 |url-status=live }}</ref> In Russian-controlled Mariupol, a statue of her was unveiled.<ref name="Bettiza" /> She has been nicknamed "Grandmother ({{langx|ru|бабушка|babushka}}) Z",<ref name="Sorokina" /> and the "Grandmother with a red flag" by Russians. Sergey Kiriyenko, a senior Russian politician, referred to her as "Grandma Anya".<ref name="Meduza">{{cite news |title='It's a reference to the USSR — to its return' Why is the Kremlin incorporating Soviet symbols into its war propaganda? |url=https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/05/05/it-s-a-reference-to-the-ussr-to-its-return |access-date=5 May 2022 |work=Meduza |date=5 May 2022 |language=en |archive-date=5 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220505190445/https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/05/05/it-s-a-reference-to-the-ussr-to-its-return |url-status=live }}</ref>
Anna told the ''Ukrayinska Pravda'' that she met the soldiers with a Soviet flag not out of sympathy, but because she felt the need to reconcile with them so that they would not "destroy" the village and Ukraine after her house was shelled, but now feels like a "traitor" due to the way her image has been used by Russia.<ref name="PravdaUA"/> According to Ukrainian journalists, Anna and her son later fled to Kharkiv after their house was being shelled by the Russians.<ref>{{cite news |title="Россия пошла на нас злом таким, паршиво". Украинские журналисты нашли бабушку с красным флагом, которую использует российская пропаганда |trans-title="Russia went at us with such evil, lousy." Ukrainian journalists found the grandmother with a red flag used by Russian propaganda |url=https://theins.ru/news/250979 |access-date=5 May 2022 |work=The Insider |date=5 May 2022 |language=ru |archive-date=25 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220525070607/https://theins.ru/news/250979 |url-status=live }}</ref>
On 9 May 2022, Vladimir Putin utilized Victory Day festivities and military parades to further justify his cause. As his response to the ongoing conflict during Victory Day, he stated "Russia has given a preemptive response to aggression. It was forced, timely and the only correct decision."<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |date=2022-05-09 |title=As Putin marks Victory Day, his troops make little war gains |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-germany-moscow-f3e25a88fb947ada8f2710f664fd3604 |access-date=2023-03-07 |website=AP NEWS |language=en |archive-date=2023-03-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230307005752/https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-germany-moscow-f3e25a88fb947ada8f2710f664fd3604 |url-status=live }}</ref> He avoided directly mentioning the war and even refrained from using the word "Ukraine" in his response to the conflict during the Victory Day parade.<ref name=":0" /> Putin also drew parallels between the current Ukrainian government and that of Nazi Germany,<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{cite news |title=Russia marks WWII victory overshadowed by Ukraine |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-world-war-ii-2d4f0f3a1e59cdad92b26c521ed08669 |access-date=9 May 2022 |work=AP News |date=9 May 2022 |archive-date=9 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220509065436/https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-world-war-ii-2d4f0f3a1e59cdad92b26c521ed08669 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Rosenberg |first1=Steve |author1-link=Steve Rosenberg |title=Ukraine War: Putin gives few clues in Victory Day speech |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61380727 |access-date=9 May 2022 |work=BBC News |date=9 May 2022 |archive-date=9 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220509112031/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61380727 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title='The West has decided to cancel these thousand-year-old values' An excerpt from Vladimir Putin's Victory Day speech |url=https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/05/09/the-west-has-decided-to-cancel-these-centuries-old-values |access-date=9 May 2022 |work=Meduza |date=9 May 2022 |archive-date=9 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220509083423/https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/05/09/the-west-has-decided-to-cancel-these-centuries-old-values |url-status=live }}</ref> praising Russia's military, saying that present troops were "fighting for the motherland, for her future, and so that nobody forgets the lessons of World War II".<ref name="MT">{{cite news |date=9 May 2022 |title=Putin Hails Soldiers Fighting in Ukraine at Russia's Victory Day Parade |work=The Moscow Times |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/09/putin-hails-soldiers-fighting-in-ukraine-at-russias-victory-day-parade-a77623 |access-date=20 March 2023 |archive-date=20 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230320012604/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/09/putin-hails-soldiers-fighting-in-ukraine-at-russias-victory-day-parade-a77623 |url-status=live }}</ref>
On 26 August 2022, the Soviet Victory banner was hoisted over the village Pisky, a fortified area just off Donetsk whose capture is strategic for Russia, further pushing Ukrainian forces away from Donbas.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Stepanenko |first1=Kateryna |last3=Kagan |first3=Frederick W. |last4=Barros |first4=George |last2=Hird |first2=Karolina |date=25 August 2022 |title=Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25 |url=https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25 |publisher=Institute for the Study of War |access-date=26 August 2022 |archive-date=26 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220826225612/https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25 |url-status=live }}</ref>
Many Lenin statues, which had been taken down by Ukrainian activists in the preceding years, were re-erected by Russian occupiers in Russian-controlled areas.<ref name="The Guardian"/><ref>{{cite news |last1=Fink |first1=Andrew |title=Lenin Returns to Ukraine |url=https://thedispatch.com/p/lenin-returns-to-ukraine |access-date=4 May 2022 |work=The Dispatch |date=20 April 2022 |archive-date=23 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220423185553/https://thedispatch.com/p/lenin-returns-to-ukraine |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Bowman |first1=Verity |title=Kyiv pulls down Soviet-era monument symbolising Russian-Ukrainian friendship |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/04/27/kyiv-pulls-soviet-era-monument-symbolising-russian-ukrainian/ |access-date=4 May 2022 |work=The Telegraph |date=27 April 2022 |archive-date=27 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220427204034/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/04/27/kyiv-pulls-soviet-era-monument-symbolising-russian-ukrainian/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Trofimov |first1=Yaroslav |authorlink1=Yaroslav Trofimov |title=Russia's Occupation of Southern Ukraine Hardens, With Rubles, Russian Schools and Lenin Statues |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-occupation-of-southern-ukraine-hardens-with-rubles-russian-schools-and-lenin-statues-11651403176 |access-date=4 May 2022 |work=The Wall Street Journal |date=1 May 2022 |archive-date=3 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220503233746/https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-occupation-of-southern-ukraine-hardens-with-rubles-russian-schools-and-lenin-statues-11651403176 |url-status=live }}</ref>
==See also== {{Portal|Communism|Politics|Soviet Union|Europe|Russia|Ukraine|Belarus}} *Communist chic *Hauntology *History of communism in the Soviet Union *National Bolshevism *Neo-Sovietism *Neo-Stalinism *Sovietwave, a Russian musical subgenre of synthwave *Soviet patriotism *Soviet imagery during the Russo-Ukrainian War
===Communist nostalgia in Europe=== *Communist nostalgia, generally for the ideology *Ostalgie, in the former East Germany *PRL nostalgia, in the former Polish People's Republic *Yugo-nostalgia, in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
==References== {{reflist}}
==Further reading== *Satter, D. ''It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past''. Yale University Press. New Haven, 2012. {{ISBN|0300111452}}. *Boffa, G. ''[http://www.scepsis.ru/library/id_894.html From the USSR to Russia. History of unfinished crisis. 1964—1994]'' *Mydans, S. ''[https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/europe/19russia.html?_r=0 20 Years After Soviet Fall, Some Look Back Longingly]''. New York Times. 18 August 2011 *Weir, F. ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20150329135221/http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2009/1223/Why-nearly-60-percent-of-Russians-deeply-regret-the-USSR-s-demise Why nearly 60 percent of Russians 'deeply regret' the USSR's demise]''. The Christian Science Monitor. 23 December 2009. *Houslohner, A. ''[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/young-russians-never-knew-the-soviet-union-but-they-hope-to-recapture-days-of-its-empire/2014/06/09/66a3e1a4-684a-4ab8-9261-04b7d1b59dad_story.html Young Russians never knew the Soviet Union, but they hope to recapture days of its empire]''. Washington Post. 10 June 2014 *Weir, F. ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20180507205139/https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2016/0129/Maybe-the-Soviets-weren-t-so-bad-Russian-nostalgia-for-USSR-on-the-rise Maybe the Soviets weren't so bad? Russian nostalgia for USSR on the rise]''. The Christian Science Monitor. 29 January 2016. *[https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/kurt-biray/communist-nostalgia-in-eastern-europe-longing-for-past Communist nostalgia in Eastern Europe: longing for the past]. openDemocracy. 10 November 2015 * Ghodsee, Kristen R. ''[https://www.dukeupress.edu/red-hangover Red Hangover: Legacies of Twentieth-Century Communism]''. Duke University Press, 2017. {{ISBN|978-0822369493}}. *2024: ''Unstuck in Time: On the Post-Soviet Uncanny'' *:The book is about Soviet nostalgia in Russian literary fiction
==External links== {{Commons category|Nostalgia for the Soviet Union}}
===News=== *Blundy, A. ''[http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/08/nostalgia-soviet-era-sweeps-internet-261963.html Nostalgia for the Soviet Era Sweeps the Internet]''. Newsweek. 30 July 2014. *Pippenger, N. ''[https://newrepublic.com/blog/the-study/93939/why-are-so-many-russians-nostalgic-the-ussr Why Are So Many Russians Nostalgic For The USSR?]'' New Republic. 19 August 2011. *[http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/29/in-russia-nostalgia-for-soviet-union-and-positive-feelings-about-stalin/ In Russia, nostalgia for Soviet Union and positive feelings about Stalin]. Pew Research Center. 29 June 2017. *[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-16/russian-support-for-soviet-tyrant-stalin-hits-record-poll-shows Russian Support for Stalin Surges to Record High, Poll Says]. Bloomberg. 16 April 2019.
{{Soviet Union topics}}
Category:Nostalgia for the Soviet Union Category:Dissolution of the Soviet Union Category:Neo-Sovietism Category:Nationalism in the Soviet Union Category:Retro style