{{Short description|Iranian-made drone}} {{Infobox weapon | name = Shahed 131 | image = File:Shahed-131-draw.svg | caption = [[Orthographic projection]] of a Shahed-131/Geran-1 | origin = {{flag|Iran}} | designer = [[Shahed Aviation Industries]] | wingspan = {{cvt|2.2|m|ft}} | type = [[One-way attack drone]] | used_by = {{flag|Iran}}<br/>{{flag|Russia}} (as Geran-1) | is_missile = Yes | filling_weight = {{convert|15|kg}} | vehicle_range = {{convert|900|km|mi|0|abbr=on}} | weight = {{cvt|135|kg|lb}} | length = {{cvt|2.6|m|ft}} | guidance = [[Satellite navigation|GNSS]], [[Inertial navigation system|INS]] }}
The '''Shahed 131''' ({{langx|fa|شاهد ۱۳۱}}, literally "[[Shahada#Terminology and significance|Witness]] 131"), or '''Geran-1''' ({{langx|ru|Герань-1}}, literally "[[Geranium]]-1") in Russian service, is an [[Iran]]ian-made [[one-way attack drone]] which came to prominence in October 2022 during the [[Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present)|Russo-Ukrainian war]],<ref name="#D600e">{{Cite news|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-missiles-russia-air-campaign-ukraine/32095930.html|title=Iranian Missiles Threaten To Boost Russia's Deadly Air Campaign In Ukraine|website=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty|last1=Scollon |first1=Michael }}</ref><ref name="#D600f">{{Cite news|url=https://kyivindependent.com/national/russias-gambit-to-exhaust-ukraines-air-defense-with-iranian-kamikaze-drones|title=How Russia uses Iranian drones to try to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense|first=Igor|last=Kossov|date=October 24, 2022|website=The Kyiv Independent}}</ref><ref name="#D600g">{{Cite web|url=https://gagadget.com/en/180209-the-afu-captured-a-kamikaze-drone-shahed-131-a-smaller-version-of-shahed-136-weighing-135-kg-warhead-weighing-15-kg-and-a/|title=The AFU captured a kamikaze drone Shahed-131 - a smaller version of Shahed-136, weighing 135 kg, warhead weighing 15 kg and a launch range of 900 km|first=Maksim|last=Panasovskyi|website=gagadget.com}}</ref> when it was used by Russia to attack critical Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian targets.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-18 |title=Russia increases arms trade with UN-embargoed nations to feed Ukraine war |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-increases-arms-trade-with-un-embargoed-nations-to-feed-ukraine-war/7868778.html |access-date=2025-05-20 |website=Voice of America |language=en}}</ref> It is powered by a [[Wankel engine]] model [[Shahed Aviation Industries|Shahed]]-783/788.<ref name="#D600b">{{Cite web|url=https://mil.in.ua/en/news/russians-began-to-use-shahed-131-kamikaze-drones/|title=Russians began to use Shahed-131 kamikaze drones |work=mil.in.ua |date=13 October 2022 |access-date=18 December 2022}}</ref>
==Design== [[File:Shahed-131 (Geran-1) components.jpg|thumb|Photograph and sketch of a Shahed-131 recovered in the Middle East]] [[File:National Aerospace Park in September 2023 (13).jpg|thumb|A black Shahed-131 exhibitited in Iran next to the larger Shahed-136 in 2023]] The Shahed-131 is powered by the Serat-1 Wankel engine, a 38-horsepower unit that is a copy of the Beijing Micropilot UAV Control System Ltd MDR-208 Wankel engine and is derived from the British AR 731 engine.<ref name="#F700a">{{cite news |url=https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/11/takeaways-from-iranian-national.html |title=Takeaways from Iranian National Aerospace Exhibition 2014 |work=www.uskowioniran.com |date=25 November 2014 |access-date=18 December 2022}}</ref><ref name="#2800a">{{cite tweet |author=Mehdi H. |user=mhmiranusa |number=1207749048960245760 |date=19 December 2019 |title=New pictures by @Reuters from US report to @UN Security Council on the UAV used for Aramco attack in Abqaiq. Shows its engine & vertical gyro compared to the ones from Iranian Shahed-123 UAV and a far picture of that delta wing UAV in an IRGC exhibition. https://t.co/kJrMtb7goz |language=en |access-date=2 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220120174526/https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/1207749048960245760 |archive-date=20 January 2022 |url-status=live}}</ref> An engine of this type was used for the drone in the [[2019 Aramco attack in Abqaiq]],<ref name="#2800a"/> which was referred to the UN Secretariat as part of the [[Resolution 2231]] [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231#2020 drone attacks|2020 investigations]]. The airframe is constructed from lightweight composite materials, including carbon fiber cloth or fiberglass with a honeycomb core, which contributes to its low radar cross-section.<ref name="RUSI_Profile">{{cite web |url=https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile |title=Russia's Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile |last=Rubin |first=Uzi |publisher=Royal United Services Institute |date=13 January 2023 |access-date=17 September 2023}}</ref>
The Shahed-131 flight control unit was found to be able to connect with [[Iridium satellites]], which in theory allows the flight path to be altered mid flight.<ref name=deua-20221006>{{cite web |url=https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/an_advanced_radio_communication_device_on_american_processors_found_in_the_shahed_136-4446.html |title=An Advanced Radio Communication Device on American Processors Found in the Shahed-136 |website=Defense Express |location=Kyiv |date=6 October 2022 |access-date=19 October 2022}}</ref><ref name="#8800a">{{cite web |url=https://defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/ne_tilki_shahed_136_zjavilos_detalne_doslidzhennja_sche_odnogo_iranskogo_drona_kamikadze_jakij_vikoristovuje_rf-9033.html |language=uk |title=Не тільки Shahed-136, з'явилось детальне дослідження ще одного іранського дрона камікадзе, який використовує РФ |trans-title=Not only Shahed-136, a detailed study of another Iranian kamikaze drone used by the Russian Federation has appeared |website=Defense Express |location=Kyiv |access-date=18 December 2022}}</ref> The flight controller has a backup [[inertial navigation system]] by [[Vibrating structure gyroscope#MEMS gyroscopes|MEMS gyroscope]]. Its primary instructions are derived from a commercial-grade GPS unit, which in later versions deployed by Russia has reportedly been modified with anti-deception algorithms to mitigate GPS signal alterations.<ref name="#8800a"/>
Designs for the [[Kentron (company)|Kentron]] ARD-10 loitering drone were sold to [[Iran Aviation Industries Organization]] in 2004/5 and used by [[Shahed Aviation Industries]] to develop the Shahed 131 and [[Shahed 136]] drones, according to ''Air Forces Monthly'' magazine.<ref>{{cite magazine |magazine=Air Forces Monthly|publisher=Key Publishing Ltd |title=South African heritage |date=December 2022 |page=23}}</ref> However a [[Royal United Services Institute]] article states the origins of the Shahed 131 are obscure.<ref name=rusi-20230113/>
The Shahed 131 is visually distinguished by having [[vertical stabiliser]]s that extend only upwards from the ends of the wings, while on the larger Shahed 136 they extend both up and down.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-details-of-iranian-attack-uav-released |title=Ukraine conflict: Details of Iranian attack UAV released |last=Binnie |first=Jeremy |publisher=IHS |work=Janes |date=29 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220929163405/https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-details-of-iranian-attack-uav-released|archive-date=29 September 2022|access-date=21 October 2022}}</ref> It has a forward-mounted warhead compartment capable of accommodating 10 to 20 kg of explosives, enabling it to function as a kamikaze drone upon target impact. Warhead configurations observed include high-explosive charges with pre-formed fragmentation casings for area effects or shaped charge warheads for anti-armor capability.<ref name="#D600g"/><ref name=rusi-20230113>{{cite web |url=https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile |title=Russia's Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile |last=Rubin |first=Uzi |publisher=Royal United Services Institute |date=13 January 2023 |access-date=17 September 2023}}</ref><ref name="OSMP_Warhead">{{Cite web|url=https://osmp.ngo/model/shahed-131-series/|title=Shahed-131 series - Open Source Munitions Portal|access-date=2025-11-30}}</ref>
==Operational history== {{See also|Abqaiq–Khurais attack}} It has been alleged the drone was first seen in the Arabian Peninsula when it was used to attack Saudi targets by the [[Houthi rebels]].<ref name="#D600e"/> However ''[[The Washington Post]]'' reported that other types of drone were used in that attack.<ref name=wp-20221020>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/10/20/russia-iran-kamikaze-drones/ |title=U.S. has viewed wreckage of kamikaze drones Russia used in Ukraine |last1=Harris |first1=Shane |last2=Lamothe |first2=Dan |last3=Horton |first3=Alex |last4=DeYoung |first4=Karen |newspaper=Washington Post |date=20 October 2022 |access-date=25 October 2022 |quote=The Houthis claimed to have used Samad-3 drones to attack a refinery in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, last spring, and launched Samad-1 drones at Saudi Aramco facilities in other parts of the country. Those drones are distinct from the weapons used by Russia in Ukraine.}}</ref>
=== Russo-Ukrainian war === {{See also|2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|Iran and the Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present)}} It was used in the [[Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present)|Russo-Ukrainian war]],<ref name="#D600b"/> under a Russian name Geran-1.<ref name="#D600a">{{Cite web|url=https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/a_younger_version_geran_1_shahed_131_kamikaze_drone_spotted_after_night_attack_from_crimea-4624.html|title=A "Younger" Version Geran-1 (Shahed-131) Kamikaze Drone Spotted After Night Attack From Crimea | Defense Express|website=en.defence-ua.com |access-date=18 December 2022}}</ref> A simplified version is also called Geran-3 where the diesel{{clarification needed|reason=What diesel engine? Wankel engine is spark ignition gasoline engine|date=February 2025}} engine has been replaced with a DLE-60 twin gasoline engine.<ref>{{Cite web |title=First Deployment of Italmas or Geran-3 Drones in Ukraine Took Place Today, russians Say {{!}} Defense Express |url=https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/first_deployment_of_italmas_or_geran_3_drones_in_ukraine_to_place_today_russians_say-8341.html |access-date=2023-10-25 |website=en.defence-ua.com |language=en}}</ref> The use of the Shahed-131/Geran-1 by Russia is part of a strategy to employ economical, expendable platforms for precision strikes, often launched in swarms to overwhelm air defenses.<ref name="RUSI_Profile"/>
In addition to supplying these drones to Russia, Iran has trained thousands of Russian personnel to operate the Shahed 131 drones. This includes hundreds of Russian pilots, communications specialists, technicians, and handlers. Iran has also established specialized mobile command-and-control communications stations to assist Russia with efficiently using the drones across the vast space of Ukraine. A "relatively large" number of engineers and technicians have also accompanied the drones to Russia to handle equipment issues.<ref>{{cite report |last=Farzin |first=Nadimi |date=August 1, 2022 |title=Iranian Drones to Russia: Capabilities and Limitations |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/17563/en |work=Policy Analysis |location= |publisher=The Washington Institute |docket=3634 |access-date=May 11, 2026}}</ref> Prior to the war, Russia has had a history of underperforming drones in their military; the Russian indigenous drone fleet was "light and small", with low range and limited flight capacity. The initiation of the Ukraine war in February 2022 put them in dire need of various types of drones, including bombers, suicide (kamikaze) drones, and surveillance drones. Iran's provision of more advanced and versatile drones was therefore a great benefit to Russia in its military actions in Ukraine.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Eslami |first1=Mohammad |last2= |first2= |date=November 2022 |title=Iran’s Drone Supply to Russia and Changing Dynamics of the Ukraine War |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2022.2149077 |journal=Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament |volume=5 |issue=2 |publisher= |pages=1-12 |doi=10.1080/25751654.2022.2149077 |access-date=May 11, 2026|doi-access=free }}</ref>
=== Iran war 2026 === {{See also|2026 Iran war}}Iran extensively used Shahed 131 along with [[HESA Shahed 136|Shahed 136]] drones to carry out large scale attacks on U.S. bases along the [[Persian Gulf]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-03-02 |title=What We Know About Drone Use in the Iran War |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/03/iran-drones-shahed-us-lessons |access-date=2026-05-24 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |language=en}}</ref>
== Operators == * {{flag|Iran}}: By [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force|IRGCASF/NEHSA]] and [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy|IRGCN/NEDSA]] * {{flag|Russia}}: Used as the Geran-1, with domestic production in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) building upon Iranian designs.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a43043216/russia-using-iranian-shahed-131-drone-warhead/ | title=How Russia's Newest Drone Warhead Can Ruthlessly Destroy Energy Infrastructure in Ukraine | date=24 February 2023 }}</ref><ref name="ASEZ">{{Cite web|url=https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/|title=Adversary Entente Cooperation at Russia's Shahed Factory Threatens Global Security|access-date=2025-11-30}}</ref>
===Non-state actors=== * [[Houthis]]<ref>{{cite web | url=https://defense-update.com/20220927_yemeni-houthis-display-iranian-drones-and-loitering-missiles.html#.ZBhTYPZBy38 | title=Yemeni Houthis Display Iranian Drones and Loitering Missiles - Defense Update | date=27 September 2022 }}</ref> * [[Islamic Resistance in Iraq]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ari |first=Lior Ben |date=2024-05-15 |title=Terrorists in Iraq claim to launch Shahad 131 UAV toward Israel |url=https://www.ynetnews.com/article/syoqn3b7r |access-date=2024-10-24 |work=Ynetnews |language=en}}</ref> * [[Saraya Ababil]]: Used as Murad-6<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-27 |title=Drone attack on Turkish bases in Iraq with Murad-6 drone! (Video) - Islamic World News |url=https://english.iswnews.com/24453/drone-attack-on-turkish-bases-in-iraq-with-murad-6-drone-video/ |access-date=2023-09-06 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-27 |title=Ababil Brigades Pro-Iran Iraqi Militias showcase a "Murad-6" delta wing drone |url=https://cybershafarat.com/2022/07/26/ababil-brigades-pro-iran-iraqi-militias-showcase-a-murad-6-delta-wing-drone/ |access-date=2023-09-06 |website=The Cyber Shafarat - Treadstone 71 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Pro-Iran Iraqi Militia Posts Video Showing Preparations For Drone Attack On Turkish Forces |url=https://www.memri.org/cjlab/pro-iran-iraqi-militia-posts-video-showing-preparations-drone-attack-turkish-forces |access-date=2023-09-06 |website=MEMRI |language=en}}</ref>
==Global impact== Iran's low-cost Shahed drones have created a global market for low-cost, high performing versatile drones that can be used in attritional combat scenarios. Shahed series drones appear to cost approximately US$20,000, whereas air-to-air missiles or ground-based interceptors cost between US$400,000 to US$1.2 million each.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Knights |first1=Michael |last2=Almeida |first2=Alex |date=November 10, 2022 |title=What Iran’s Drones in Ukraine Mean for the Future of War |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-irans-drones-ukraine-mean-future-war |website=The Washington Institution |location=Washington D.C. |publisher= |access-date=May 11, 2026}}</ref> Through the expansion of drone supplying via provision of drones to Russia, Iran has also expanded its global market share, gaining credibility for its military technology, along with increased reputation on the global scene.<ref>{{cite report |last=de Henning Michaëlis |first=Satcha |date=January 2023 |title=Turkey’s And Iran’s Drone Supply In The War In Ukraine |url=https://ras-nsa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Policy-Report-21-Turkeys-And-Irans-Drone-Supply-In-The-War-In-Ukraine.pdf |work=Policy Report |location= |publisher=Network for Strategic Analysis |docket=21 |access-date=May 11, 2026}}</ref>
The sophistication and dissemenation of these drones in the global military marketplace, most notably seen in the [[Russo-Ukrainian war]], are theorized by scholars to go beyond this specific conflict and cause Western powers to begin more advanced drone developments to keep up: {{blockquote|Just as with Western support for Ukraine, the Iranian drone build-up will have implications that go beyond this specific conflict. Iranian drones are increasing not only in number, but also sophistication and lethality, a development that concerns the United States and Europe. In response, we can expect Western actors to prioritise the production and export of low-cost defence systems able to counter the mass-produced drones directed by Iran, Iranian proxies, and other adversaries.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Renic |first1=Neil |last2=Christensen |first2=Johan |date=2024 |title=DRONES, THE RUSSO‒UKRAINIAN WAR, AND THE FUTURE OF ARMED CONFLICT |publisher=Djøf Publishing |location=Denmark |isbn=9788757461978 |page=39 |url=https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/droner-krigen-i-ukraine-og-fremtidens-konflikter/Drones__the_Russo-Ukrainian_War__And_the_Future_of_Armed_Conflict.pdf |access-date=May 11, 2026}}</ref>}}
==See also== * {{lwc|HESA Shahed 136}} * {{lwc|IAI Harpy}}
==References== {{reflist}}
==External links== {{Commons category-inline}}
{{Shahed aircraft}}
[[Category:HESA aircraft|Shahed 136]] [[Category:Shahed aircraft|149]] [[Category:Military equipment of Iran]] [[Category:Unmanned military aircraft of Iran]] [[Category:Aircraft manufactured in Iran]] [[Category:One-way attack drones]] [[Category:Single-engined pusher aircraft]] [[Category:Military equipment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine]] [[Category:Tailless delta-wing aircraft]] [[Category:Wankel-engined aircraft]]