Command of the sea

[[File:USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) underway in the South China Sea on 8 May 2006 (060508-N-4166B-030).jpg|thumb|right|[[USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)|USS ''Abraham Lincoln'']], a [[United States Navy]] [[aircraft carrier]], a means of global maritime [[power projection]]]] {{war}}

'''Command of the sea''' (also called '''control of the sea''' or '''sea control''') is a naval military concept regarding the strength of a particular [[navy]] to a specific naval area it controls. A navy has command of the sea when it is so strong that its rivals cannot attack it directly. This dominance may apply to its surrounding waters (i.e., the [[littoral]]) or may extend far into the oceans, meaning the country has a [[blue-water navy]]. It is the naval equivalent of [[air supremacy]].

With command of the sea, a country (or alliance) can ensure that its own military and merchant ships can move around at will, while its rivals are forced either to stay in port or to try to evade it. It also enables free use of [[Amphibious warfare|amphibious operations]] that can expand ground-based strategic options. The British [[Royal Navy]] held command of the sea for most of [[Pax Britannica|the period]] between the 18th to the early 20th centuries, allowing Britain and its allies to trade and to move troops and supplies easily in wartime, while its enemies could not. In the post-[[World War II]] period, the [[United States Navy]] has had command of the sea.

Few countries can operate blue-water navies, but many states are converting [[Green-water navy|green-water navies]] to [[Blue-water navy|blue-water navies]] and this will increase military use of foreign [[Exclusive economic zone|exclusive economic zones]] (littoral zone to 200 nautical miles (370 km)) with possible repercussions for the EEZ regime.<ref name=Skaridov>{{citation |url=http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/ScienceDirect%20-%20Marine%20Policy%20%20Naval%20activity%20in%20the%20foreign.htm |title=Naval activity in the foreign EEZ—the role of terminology in law regime |first=Alexander S. |last=Skaridov |publisher=St. Petersburg Association of the Law of the Sea, 7 Kazanskaya St., St. Petersburg 191186, Russia, Available online 11 November 2004 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061017183601/http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/ScienceDirect%20-%20Marine%20Policy%20%20Naval%20activity%20in%20the%20foreign.htm |archive-date=17 October 2006 }}</ref>

==Historic command of the sea during the age of sail== [[File:Britannia rules the waves IMG 2210.JPG|thumb|''Britannia rule the waves'': decorated plate made in Liverpool circa 1793-1794 ([[Musée de la Révolution française]]).]]

===National capabilities=== Historically, many powers attempted to extend command of the sea into peacetime, imposing taxes or other restrictions on shipping using areas of open sea. For example, [[Republic of Venice|Venice]] claimed the [[Adriatic Sea]], and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating its [[Gulf of Venice|northern waters]]. [[Republic of Genoa|Genoa]] claimed significant control over the [[western Mediterranean]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Genova |url=https://www.eliovittorini.edu.it/supporto/multimedia/comunimedievali/genova.htm |access-date=2026-03-25 |website=www.eliovittorini.edu.it}}</ref> [[Denmark]] and [[Sweden]] claimed to share the [[Baltic Sea]] between them. [[Spanish Empire|Spain]] claimed dominion over the [[Pacific Ocean]] and the [[Gulf of Mexico]], and [[Portuguese Empire|Portugal]] over the [[Indian Ocean]] and all the [[Atlantic Ocean]] south of [[Morocco]] (Hall, 148-9).<ref>{{EB1911 |wstitle=Sea, Command of the |volume=24 |page=529 |inline=1 |first=Cyprian Arthur George |last=Bridge |author-link=Cyprian Bridge}}</ref>

===Asymmetric countermeasures=== During the [[age of sail]], there were two primary counter measures to another power holding control of the sea: [[smuggling]], and [[privateering]]. Smuggling helped to ensure that a country could continue trading (and obtaining food and other vital supplies) even when under blockade, while privateering allowed the weaker power to disrupt the stronger power's trade. As these measures, which are examples of [[asymmetric warfare]], came from non-governmental and sometimes criminal organizations, they fell into disfavor with stronger governments. The 1856 [[Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law]] banned privateering. That treaty was ratified by relatively few countries, but has become the customary law of the sea.

==Historic command of the sea in the era of steam== A more modern countermeasure, similar to privateering, was the use of [[submarine warfare]] by Germany during [[World War I]] and [[World War II]] to attack allied merchant shipping primarily in the [[Atlantic Ocean]], [[Mediterranean Sea]], and [[Baltic Sea]].

==Historic command of the sea in the era of naval aviation== During [[World War II]], [[aircraft]] also became an effective countermeasure to command of the sea, since ships could not defend themselves well against air attack. The [[Battle of Britain]] was largely an attempt by Germany to eliminate the [[Royal Air Force]], so that it would not be able to defend the [[Royal Navy]] from air attack and even to allow a [[Operation Sea Lion|maritime invasion of Great Britain proper]].{{citation needed|date=June 2012}} The entire Japanese naval strategy during World War II in the Pacific was to acquire command of the sea by largescale destruction of Allied naval power, until their fleet was either destroyed or rendered irrelevant by the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]] giving command of the sea to the Allies.

==Modern command of the sea== [[File:Royal Navy Type 45 destroyer HMS Daring MOD 45154175.jpg|thumb|right|[[HMS Daring (D32)|HMS ''Daring'']], a [[Royal Navy]] [[Type 45 destroyer|Type 45]] [[guided missile destroyer]]]] Advanced navies, with access to [[surveillance satellites]] and large-scale submarine detection systems, can rarely be surprised at sea, but cannot be everywhere. Individual ships of advanced navies can be vulnerable at sea (e.g., the {{USS|Stark|FFG-31|6}} hit by an [[Ba'athist Iraq|Iraqi]] aircraft-delivered anti-ship missile while patrolling the [[Persian Gulf]]) or in port (e.g., by the [[suicide attack]] on the {{USS|Cole|DDG-67|6}}.)

"[[Blue-water navy|Blue-water]]" naval capability <ref name=Storey2004>{{citation | url =https://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_57/ai_113755343 | title = China's aircraft carrier ambitions: seeking truth from rumors | journal = Naval War College Review | date = Winter 2004 |first1 = You | last1 =Storey | last2 = Ji}}</ref> means that a fleet is able to operate on the "[[high seas]]." While traditionally a distinction was made between the coastal [[brown-water navy]], operating in the [[littoral|littoral zone]] to 200 nautical miles (370 km), and a seagoing blue-water navy, a new term, "[[green-water navy]]," has been created by the U.S. Navy,<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051013.txt |title=Q&A with Adm. Michael G. Mullen 2006 CNO's Guidance Release Media Roundtable Pentagon, Washington, DC 13 October 2005 |access-date=4 February 2008 |archive-date=15 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191015040114/https://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051013.txt |url-status=dead }}</ref> which refers to the coastal submarines and fast attack boats of many nations, the larger littoral combat corvettes and similar vessels of a substantial number of powers, and amphibious vessels ranging from elderly [[Landing Ship, Tank|LST]]s to complex S/VTOL carriers and other specialized ships.

In modern warfare blue-water navy implies self-contained force protection from sub-surface, surface and airborne threats and a sustainable logistic reach, allowing a persistent presence at range. In some maritime environments such a defence is given by natural obstacles, such as the [[Arctic]] [[ice shelf]].

The [[US Navy]] studied a concept for an economically priced ship capable of surface and subsurface sea control with ASW helicopters and STOVL fighters for light air defense but not large enough to be well suited to power projection known as a [[Sea Control Ship]]. This small aircraft carrier was not built by the US although a long deck [[Amphibious assault ship]] equipped with STOVL fighters and ASW helicopters instead of its primary transport helicopters is operating in a secondary sea control role.

===Requirements for modern sea control===

During the [[Falklands War]], the British lacked long-range [[Airborne Early Warning and Control|Airborne Warning and Control System]] (AWACS), which led to ship losses and major damage to others, when the [[Argentina|Argentinian]] attack aircraft came into the view of ship radar at approximately the same time they would fire antiship missiles, and only a short time before they made bombing attacks. A number of navies have learned this lesson. Many navies with [[STOVL]] carriers have developed helicopter-mounted AWACS like the British and Spanish [[Westland Sea King#Airborne surveillance and area control|Westland Sea King AEW]], Italian [[AgustaWestland EH101|EH-101 AEW]], and the Russian [[Kamov Ka-27|Ka-31 AEW helicopter]]. Recently the French with a new larger CATOBAR [[aircraft carrier]] obtained the US [[E-2 Hawkeye]] AWACS aircraft.

An example for the difference between a blue-water navy and a green-water navy: "...The first should be a 'green-water active defense' that would enable the [[People's Liberation Army Navy]] to protect [[People's Republic of China|China's]] territorial waters and enforce its sovereignty claims in the [[Taiwan Strait]] and the [[South China Sea]]. The second phase would be to develop a blue-water navy capable of projecting power into the western Pacific . . . Liu [commander in chief of the PLAN 1982-88 and vice chairman of the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] 1989-97] believed that in order to fulfill a blue-water capability, the PLAN had to obtain aircraft carriers . . ."<ref name=Storey2004 /> [[Aircraft carrier]]s are deployed with other specialized vessels in [[carrier battle group]]s, providing protection against sub-surface, surface and airborne threats.

As there is no clear definition of a blue-water navy, the status is disputed. Given the importance of naval aviation, the term may be considered to be strongly linked to the maintenance of aircraft carriers capable of operating in the oceans. "In the early 80s there was a bitter and very public battle fought over whether or not to replace [[Australia]]'s last aircraft carrier, [[HMAS Melbourne (R21)|HMAS ''Melbourne'']]. Senior [[Royal Australian Navy]] personnel warned without a carrier, Australia would be vulnerable to all types of threat. One ex-Chief of Navy went so far as to claim that we" (the Australians) "would no longer have a blue-water navy (one capable of operating away from friendly coasts)."<ref>[https://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2104 Why buy Abrams Tanks? We need to look at more appropriate options By Gary Brown - posted Wednesday, 31 March 2004]</ref> Yet although the [[Royal Thai Navy]] operates a sea-going carrier, the RTN is not absolutely a "blue-water navy."{{citation needed|date=June 2013}}

===Countermeasures to imposed command=== While a ''blue-water navy'' can project sea control power into another nation's littoral, it remains susceptible to threats from less capable forces. Sustainment and logistics at range yield high costs and there may be a saturation advantage over a deployed force through the use of land-based air or [[surface-to-surface missile]] assets (whether on terrain-following or ballistic trajectories), [[Diesel-electric#Submarines|diesel-electric submarines]], or asymmetric tactics such as Fast Inshore Attack Craft. An example of this vulnerability was the October 2000 [[USS Cole bombing|USS ''Cole'' bombing]] in [[Aden]].<ref>[http://www.edp24.com/Content/Frontline/2003/030607HMSnorfolk1.asp EDP24 Frontline – the gateway to East Anglia's Armed Forces] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071130041633/http://www.edp24.com/Content/Frontline/2003/030607HMSnorfolk1.asp |date=2007-11-30 }}</ref><ref>[http://proceedings.ndia.org/5560/Wednesday/Session_III-A/Heijster.pdf TNO Presentation]</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0107/news/110107_fiac.htm |title=Protecting Naval Surface Ships from Fast Attack Boat Swarm Threats |access-date=2008-02-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070116024340/http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0107/news/110107_fiac.htm |archive-date=2007-01-16 |url-status=dead }}</ref> In response to these threats, the U.S. Navy has developed the [[Littoral Combat Ship]] (LCS).

==See also== {{portal|Oceans}} * ''[[Battleplan]]'' (documentary TV series) *[[Air supremacy]] *[[Naval blockade]] *[[Sea denial]] *[[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] *[[Maritime republics]] *[[Maritime power]] *[[Thalassocracy]]

==References==

===Notes=== {{reflist}}

===Sources=== *[[William Edward Hall|WE Hall]], ''Treatise on International Law'', 4th ed., 1895. ==Further reading==

* Baer, George W. ''One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990'' (Stanford University Press, 1993). * Beiriger, Eugene Edward. “Building a Navy ‘Second to None’: The U.S. Naval Act of 1916, American Attitudes toward Great Britain, and the First World War," ''British Journal for Military History'' 3, no. 3 (2017): 4–29. https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/view/755/877. * Bruns, Sebastian. ''US Naval Strategy and National Security: The Evolution of American Maritime Power'' (Routledge, 2018). * Caverley, Jonathan D., and Peter Dombrowski. "Too important to be left to the admirals: the need to study maritime great-power competition." ''Security Studies'' 29#4 2020 pp.579–600 https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1811448 * Gray, Colin S. ''The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War'' (Free Press, 1992) * Grove, Eric. ''The future of sea power'' (Taylor & Francis, 2021) [https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=TGoIEQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%22sea+power%22&ots=Iv3-L8kJd0&sig=mYxqFgiKEY3Eeu-hGfJ2aYbTtag online]. * Grygiel, Jakub J. "The Limits of Sea Power." ''Naval War College Review'' 74.4 (2021): 95–110. [https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8223&context=nwc-review online] * Heginbotham, Eric. and Richard J. Samuels. “Active Denial: Redesigning Japan’s Response to China’s Military Challenge,” ''International Security'' 42#4 (2018): 128–69.

* Hou, Kuang-hao. "The Social Construction of the Ocean, Sea Power, and Maritime Transformation." ''Journal of Political & Military Sociology'' 50.1 (2023).

* Kennedy, Paul. “The Influence and the Limitations of Sea Power,” ''International History Review'' 10#1 (1988): 2–17. * Kirchberger, Sarah. ''Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications'' (Springer-Verlag GmbH, 2018). * Lambert, Nicholas A. ''The Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power'' (Naval Institute Press, 2024). * Lambert, Nicholas A. ''Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War'' (Harvard University Press, 2012). * Lambert, Andrew. ''Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict that Made the Modern World'' (Yale UP, 2018) * Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ''Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan'' (Naval Institute Press, 1991). * Mahan, Alfred Thayer. ''The Influence of Sea Power upon History'' (1890) * Morton, John Fass. ''Sea Power and the American Interest: From the Civil War to the Great War'' (Naval Institute Press, 2024) [https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=61080 online review of this book] * Semmel, Bernard. ''Liberalism and naval strategy: ideology, interest and sea power during the Pax Britannica'' (Routledge, 2023). * Till, Geoffrey. ''Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century'' (2nd ed. Routledge, 2009) * Young, Thomas-Durell. “NATO’s Selective Sea Blindedness: Assessing the Alliance’s New Navies,” ''Naval War College Review'' 72#3 (2019): 13–39.

* Zafar, Javed. "The Elements of Sea Power and the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the West Asian Region." ''MJIR| Malaysian Journal of International Relations'' 11.1 (2023): 20–42. [https://malindojournal.um.edu.my/index.php/mjir/article/download/40490/16402 online]

[[Category:Naval warfare]] [[Category:Military doctrines]]