SS El Faro

{{short description|Rollon-rolloff container ship}} {{Use mdy dates|date=December 2015}} {{Infobox ship |section1={{Infobox ship/image |image=El Faro ship.jpg |image_caption= Promotional photo of ''El Faro'' by TOTE Maritime, which operates under ''Sea Star'' brand }}

|section2={{Infobox ship/career |hide_header= |country= |name=* ''Puerto Rico'' (1975–1991) * ''Northern Lights'' (1991–2006) * ''El Faro'' (2006–2015)<ref name="abs" /> |flag= |owner=TOTE Maritime |operator=Sea Star Line |registry=San Juan, Puerto Rico, {{flagu|United States}}<ref name="abs" /> |route=Jacksonville, Florida, U.S. to San Juan, Puerto Rico, U.S. |ordered=1973 |builder=Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.<ref name="abs" /> |original_cost= |yard_number=670<ref name="seaweb">{{csr|register=SEAWEB|id=7395351|shipname=El Faro|access-date=November 17, 2015}}</ref> |laid_down=April 11, 1974<ref name="seaweb" /> |launched=November 1, 1974<ref name="seaweb" /> |completed=January 16, 1975<ref name="seaweb" /> |christened= |maiden_voyage= |out_of_service=October 1, 2015<ref name=NYT151005/> |identification=* Call sign: WFJK * {{IMO Number|7395351}} * {{MMSI Number|368208000}} |fate=Sank with all hands in Hurricane Joaquin on October 1, 2015<ref name=NYT151005/> |notes= Location of wreck: {{Coord|23|22|52|N|73|54|40|W|format=dms|display=inline,title}}<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/mar1701.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=April 21, 2022 |archive-date=May 15, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220515151152/https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1701.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> }}

|section3={{Infobox ship/characteristics |hide_header= |header_caption=<ref name="abs">{{csr|register=ABS|id=7500285|shipname=El Faro|access-date=October 4, 2015}}</ref> |type=Roll-on/roll-off cargo ship |tonnage=* {{GT|31,515}} * {{NetT|21,473}} * {{DWT|14,971}} |displacement= |length={{convert|241|m|ft|abbr=on}} (after lengthening) |beam={{Convert|28.6|m|ft|abbr=on}} |height= |draught= |draft={{convert|12.8|m|ft|abbr=on}} |depth= |decks= |deck_clearance= |ramps= |power= |propulsion=Single shaft, double reduction compound steam turbine (11,190{{nbsp}}kW) |speed={{convert|22|kn}} |capacity= |crew=33 personnel (28 Americans and 5 Poles) on final voyage |notes= }} }} '''SS ''El Faro''''' was a United States-flagged, combination of roll-on/roll-off and lift-on/lift-off cargo ship crewed by U.S. merchant mariners. Built in 1975 by Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. as '''''Puerto Rico''''', the vessel was renamed '''''Northern Lights''''' in 1991 and, finally, ''El Faro'' in 2006. She sank with her entire crew of 33 on October 1, 2015, after steaming into the eyewall of Hurricane Joaquin.<ref name=RagingSea>Slade, Rachel. ''Into the Raging Sea: Thirty-Three Mariners, One Megastorm and the Sinking of the El Faro''. HarperCollins, New York, 2018.</ref>

''El Faro'' departed Jacksonville, Florida, under the command of Captain Michael Davidson, bound for San Juan, Puerto Rico, at 8:10 p.m. EST on September 29, 2015, when then-Tropical Storm Joaquin was several hundred miles to the east. Two days later, after Joaquin had become a Category 4 hurricane, the vessel likely encountered swells of {{convert|20|to|40|ft|m|0|abbr=on}} and winds over {{convert|80|kn|abbr=on}} as she sailed near the storm's eye. Around 7:30 a.m. on October 1, the ship had taken on water and was listing 15 degrees. The last report from the captain, however, indicated that the crew had contained the flooding. Shortly after that, ''El Faro'' ceased all communications with shore.<ref name=":Vanity">{{cite news |quote=A recording salvaged from three miles deep tells the story of the doomed ''El Faro'', a cargo ship engulfed by a hurricane. |first1=William |last1=Langewiesche |date=April 2018 |url=https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/04/inside-el-faro-the-worst-us-maritime-disaster-in-decades |work=Vanity Fair |title="The Clock is Ticking" Inside El Faro: The Worst U.S. Maritime Disaster in Decades |access-date=April 13, 2018 |archive-date=April 10, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180410182734/https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/04/inside-el-faro-the-worst-us-maritime-disaster-in-decades |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=RagingSea/>

On October 2, the 40-year-old ship was declared missing. An extensive search operation was launched by the United States Coast Guard, with help from the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, and the Air National Guard. During the search, another vessel, ''Emerald Express'', was discovered in the eye of the hurricane.<ref>Shipwreck by Maeve McGoran. <nowiki>https://www.audible.com/pd/B0F9HNFVVY</nowiki></ref> Searchers recovered debris and a damaged lifeboat, and spotted (but could not recover) an unidentifiable body. ''El Faro'' was declared sunk on October 5. The search was called off at sunset on October 7, by which time more than {{convert|183,000|nmi2|abbr=on}} had been covered by aircraft and ships. The Navy sent {{USNS|Apache|T-ATF-172|6}} to conduct an underwater search for ''El Faro'' on October 19, 2015.<ref name="CBS Corporation">{{cite news|agency=Associated Press|publisher=CBS News|date=October 19, 2015|access-date=October 19, 2015|title=U.S. Navy launches salvage operation for sunken cargo ship|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-navy-joins-search-for-cargo-ship-lost-near-bahamas-during-hurricane-joaquin/|location=Miami, Florida}}</ref> ''Apache'' identified wreckage on October 31 "consistent with the [''El Faro''] cargo ship ... in an upright position and in one piece".<ref name="Steve Almasy">{{cite news|author=Steve Almasy|publisher=CNN|date=October 31, 2015|access-date=October 31, 2015|title=U.S. Navy finds wreckage believed to be missing cargo ship El Faro|url=http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/31/us/el-faro-search/index.html|archive-date=November 1, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151101014238/http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/31/us/el-faro-search/index.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The next day, November 1, the Navy announced a submersible had returned images that identified the wreck as ''El Faro''.<ref>{{Cite web |first=Ashley |last=Halsey III |date=2015-11-02 |title=Navy finds ship that sank near Bahamas in Hurricane Joaquin |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/navy-finds-ship-that-sank-near-bahamas-in-hurricane-joaquin/2015/11/02/0e824e3c-8195-11e5-9afb-0c971f713d0c_story.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151103172730/https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/navy-finds-ship-that-sank-near-bahamas-in-hurricane-joaquin/2015/11/02/0e824e3c-8195-11e5-9afb-0c971f713d0c_story.html |archive-date=2015-11-03 |access-date=2024-09-27 |website=Washington Times}}</ref><ref name=RagingSea/>

==Construction, modification and earlier career== ''El Faro'' was built by the Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1975 as ''Puerto Rico''.<ref name="abs"/> As operated by the Navieras de Puerto Rico Steamship Company, ''Puerto Rico'' hauled cargo to and from the East Coast for fifteen years. In 1991, she was purchased by Saltchuk Resources, the parent company of TOTE Maritime, and renamed ''Northern Lights''. Under Saltchuk, she frequently sailed between Tacoma, Washington, and Anchorage, Alaska.<ref name="SeattleTimes1011">{{cite news |author=Coral Garnick |date=2015-10-11 |title=El Faro cargo ship was expected to make Tacoma-Alaska run this winter |url=http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/business/article38779368.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151013133251/https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/business/article38779368.html |archive-date=2015-10-13 |access-date=2015-10-13 |newspaper=The Seattle Times |publisher=The Seattle Times Company |location=Seattle, Washington}}</ref>

In 1992, the ship underwent a conversion at Atlantic Marine Shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. A 90-foot (27 meters) mid-body, which included an additional cargo hold and a spar deck, was added.<ref name="auto">{{cite web|url=https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/01/2001820187/-1/-1/0/FINAL%20PDF%20ROI%2024%20SEP%2017.PDF |website=Department of Defense |author=U.S. Coast Guard ''El Faro'' Marine Board of Investigation|title= Final Report |date=September 24, 2017 |access-date=April 13, 2018}}</ref> Between 2005 and 2006 the ship was modified a second time, also at Atlantic Marine Shipyard, to carry lift-on/lift-off cranes.<ref name="auto"/> An additional 4875 long tons (4953.2 metric tons) of fixed ballast was added, and the ship's load line was raised by about two feet so additional cargo could be carried.<ref name="auto"/> However, a required damage stability assessment was not performed.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/mar1701.pdf|title=Sinking of US Cargo Vessel SS El Faro, Atlantic Ocean, Northeast of Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas: October 1, 2015: Accident Report|website=Ntsb.gov|access-date=May 27, 2022|archive-date=May 15, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220515151152/https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1701.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

In February 2003, just before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the ship was chartered by the Military Sealift Command as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom; she ferried Marines and military equipment from San Diego, California, to Kuwait.<ref name="SeattleTimes1011"/><ref name="NDTA">{{cite journal|journal=Defense Transportation Journal|publisher=National Defense Transportation Association|date=February 2006|access-date=October 13, 2015|title=SS Northern Lights: A Lesson in Commitment|url=http://www.ndtahq.com/images/pdf/northernlights.pdf|pages=9–11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111103185926/http://www.ndtahq.com/images/pdf/NorthernLights.pdf|archive-date=November 3, 2011|df=mdy-all}}</ref> On March 19, while in the Persian Gulf, the vessel came under fire from missiles. The nearby explosions rocked the ship but caused no damage or injuries.<ref name="NDTA"/>

Through October 2005, near the end of the ship's chartered service, she made 25 voyages and 49 port calls. Collectively, 12,200 pieces of military equipment—weighing {{convert|81,000|ST|tonne}} in all—were transported by the ship. Robert Magee, then president of TOTE, and the ship's crew were praised by United States Air Force general Norton A. Schwartz: "You and your team of professionals showcased the US flag industry at its best."<ref name="NDTA"/> After completing her military services in 2006, the ship was transferred by TOTE to its subsidiary company Sea Star Lines and renamed ''El Faro''. The vessel returned to the original route and served as a "lifeline" between the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico.<ref name="SeattleTimes1011"/>

When she sank on October 1, 2015, ''El Faro'' was scheduled to return to Tacoma to relieve another vessel.<ref name="SeattleTimes1011"/>

===Vessel condition=== thumb|Wastage found of ventilation trunk on SS ''El Yunque'', sister ship of ''El Faro'' ''El Faro'' had passed two inspections, one by the United States Coast Guard, in March and June 2014.<ref>{{Cite web|title = Doomed Cargo Ship El Faro Needed Work on Boilers: NTSB|url = https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/doomed-cargo-ship-el-faro-was-due-have-boilers-serviced-n447856?cid=sm_twitter_feed_world|website = NBC News|date = October 20, 2015|access-date = November 7, 2015|archive-date = November 22, 2015|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151122113530/http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/doomed-cargo-ship-el-faro-was-due-have-boilers-serviced-n447856?cid=sm_twitter_feed_world|url-status = live}}</ref> She completed the American Bureau of Shipping class and statutory surveys in February 2015.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2015-10-20 |title=NTSB Issues Update on Investigation Into Sinking of Cargo Ship EL FARO |url=https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20151020.aspx |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204613/https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20151020.aspx |archive-date=2015-10-22 |access-date=2015-11-07 |website=www.ntsb.gov}}</ref> The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that safety drills were conducted weekly and that the ship met stability criteria when she left Jacksonville, Florida, for her fateful voyage.<ref>{{Cite web|title = El Faro captain reported hull breach, NTSB says|date = October 20, 2015|url = http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/20/us/el-faro-ntsb-investigation/index.html|publisher = CNN|access-date = November 7, 2015|archive-date = November 8, 2015|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151108045630/http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/20/us/el-faro-ntsb-investigation/index.html|url-status = live}}</ref>

Former crew members of ''El Faro'' expressed surprise and shock that the vessel had set sail with a major storm along its planned track. They said the vessel was "a rust bucket" that was not "supposed to be on the water" and that it suffered drainage problems and leaks in the galley compartment. They reported that the ship's decks were filled with holes as recently as two months before her sinking.<ref name="CNNOct9">{{cite news|author1=Steve Almasy|author2=Yasmin Khorram|name-list-style=amp|publisher=CNN|date=October 9, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=El Faro had leaks, holes, other structural issues, former crew members say|url=http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/08/us/el-faro-missing-ship/|archive-date=October 11, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151011013202/http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/08/us/el-faro-missing-ship|url-status=live}}</ref>

Following the ship's disappearance, the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Center staff examined ''El Faro''{{'}}s sister ship, ''El Yunque''. The staff found that the condition of ''El Yunque''{{'}}s cargo ventilation system was poor and likely would have been a source of intermittent flooding during rolling in 25–30 ft seas (7.6 - 9.1 meters).<ref name="ntsb.gov">[https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1701.pdf Marine Accident Report. Sinking of US Cargo Vessel SS El Faro. Atlantic Ocean, Northeast of Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas. October 1, 2015 (pdf)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220515151152/https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1701.pdf |date=May 15, 2022 }} National Transportation Safety Board</ref>

==Final voyage== {{see also|Hurricane Joaquin}} thumb|NHC Advisory for Joaquin at 11 p.m., about 3 hours after ''El Faro''{{'}}s departure On September 29, 2015, at 8:10 p.m., ''El Faro'' left Jacksonville for San Juan, Puerto Rico, carrying a cargo of 391 shipping containers, about 294 trailers and cars, and a crew of 33 people—28 Americans and 5 Poles.<ref name=NYT151005/> The decision to depart Jacksonville by the captain, Michael Davidson, was reasonable given the options available to avoid Hurricane Joaquin; however, he subsequently failed to take sufficient action to avoid the hurricane.<ref name="ntsb.gov"/>

===Vessel route=== thumb|''El Faro'' alternate, normal and accident routes, Jacksonville to San Juan Upon departure, Captain Davidson planned on using ''El Faro''{{'}}s normal, direct route to San Juan, which he expected would pass south of Hurricane Joaquin; however, tropical storm and hurricane wind fields were forecast to be near the vessel's normal route.<ref name="ntsb.gov"/>

At the time, Hurricane Joaquin was still a tropical storm, but meteorologists at the National Hurricane Center forecast that it would likely become a hurricane by the morning of October 1, on a southwest trajectory toward the Bahamas.<ref>{{cite report|author=Daniel P. Brown|date=September 30, 2015|title=Tropical Storm Joaquin Discussion Number 9|publisher=National Hurricane Center|access-date=October 7, 2015|url=http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/al11/al112015.discus.008.shtml|location=Miami, Florida}}</ref> The vessel's voyage plan took it within {{convert|175|nmi|abbr=on|sigfig=2}} of the storm, where seas in excess of {{convert|10|ft|m|0|abbr=on}} were likely.<ref name="WUnderground"/>

On September 30 at 6:40 a.m. after a review of updated weather data, Davidson and his chief mate decided to alter course slightly southward. Later, at 11:05 p.m., the third mate called Davidson and told him that maximum winds from Joaquin had increased to 100 mph and that the storm was moving toward ''El Faro''{{'}}s planned track-line. A few minutes later, at 11:13 p.m., the third mate called a second time and suggested a diversion to the south. The second mate, Danielle Randolph, also called Davidson at about 1:20 am on October 1 and suggested a course change through Crooked Island Passage.<ref name="ntsb.gov"/> Randolph voiced concern in an email to friends and family: "There is a hurricane out here and we are heading straight into it."<ref>{{cite news |author=Michael E. Miller |date=October 5, 2015 |title=Last message from El Faro: 'There is a hurricane out here and we are heading straight into it' |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/05/daughters-last-message-from-el-faro-there-is-a-hurricane-out-here-and-we-are-heading-straight-into-it/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151006132137/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/05/daughters-last-message-from-el-faro-there-is-a-hurricane-out-here-and-we-are-heading-straight-into-it/ |archive-date=2015-10-06 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>

===Hurricane Joaquin=== thumb|right|Satellite image at 11:45 UTC (7:45 a.m. EDT) on October 1 depicting the approximate final position of ''El Faro'' in relation to Hurricane Joaquin Joaquin became a hurricane by 8:00 a.m. on September 30, then rapidly intensified.<ref name="WUnderground"/><ref>{{cite report|author=Jack L. Beven|date=September 30, 2015|title=Hurricane Joaquin Public Advisory Number 10-A|publisher=National Hurricane Center|access-date=October 7, 2015|url=http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/al11/al112015.public_a.010.shtml|location=Miami, Florida|type=Advisory|archive-date=October 2, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151002172035/http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/al11/al112015.public_a.010.shtml?|url-status=live}}</ref> Throughout the rest of the day and into the morning of October 1, the storm continued to track southwest. By 11:00 pm, the storm had reached Category 3 intensity with maximum sustained winds of {{convert|100|kn|abbr=on|sigfig=3}}.<ref>{{cite report|author1=Daniel P. Brown |author2=Stacy R. Stewart |name-list-style=amp |date=September 30, 2015|title=Hurricane Joaquin Public Advisory Number 13|publisher=National Hurricane Center|access-date=October 10, 2015|url=http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/al11/al112015.public.013.shtml|location=Miami, Florida|type=Advisory}}</ref>

Ten hours after departing from Jacksonville, ''El Faro'' had deviated from her charted course. Less than twenty hours later, at around 7:30 a.m. on October 1, the Coast Guard received a satellite notification that the vessel had lost propulsion, taken on water—though flooding was contained at the time of the message—and had a 15-degree list.<ref name="USCGOct3">{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 3, 2015|access-date=October 3, 2015|title=Update 2: Coast Guard Searching for Container Ship Caught in Hurricane Joaquin|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607310/|location=Miami, Florida|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151005144311/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607310/|archive-date=October 5, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref> The Coast Guard also received a single ping from the ship's Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon.<ref name="Press-Herald">{{cite news|author1=Dennis Hoey |author2=Beth Quimby |name-list-style=amp |newspaper=Portland Press Herald|date=October 5, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=Coast Guard finds debris field of missing cargo ship with Mainers on board|url=http://www.pressherald.com/2015/10/04/search-back-on-for-lost-cargo-ship-with-mainers-on-board/}}</ref> Subsequent attempts to open communications with ''El Faro'' were unsuccessful.<ref name="USCG1" />

Marine Traffic's last reported position for ''El Faro'' was {{coord|24.2747|-74.94522|name=El Faro's position at 4:01 a.m. on October 1}} at 4:01 a.m., heading south-southeast at {{convert|19|kn|abbr=on}}.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/details/ships/shipid:454389/mmsi:368208000/imo:7395351/vessel:EL_FARO|title=El Faro|website=Marinetraffic.com|date=October 1, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015}}</ref> According to a different marine positioning database, relayed by Reuters, the final relayed position of ''El Faro'' was {{coord|23.52|-74.02|name=El Faro's position at 7:56 a.m. on October 1}} at 7:56 a.m.,<ref name="WUnderground"/> about {{convert|35|nmi|abbr=on}} northeast of Crooked Island.<ref name="NYTOct7"/> This placed the vessel within the eyewall of the hurricane, situated near {{coord|23.2|-73.7|name=Location of Hurricane Joaquin at 8:00 a.m. on October 1}} at 8:00 a.m., where winds in excess of {{convert|80|kn|abbr=on}} and waves of {{convert|20|to|30|ft|m|0|abbr=on}} likely battered the ship.<ref name="WUnderground">{{cite web |author=Jeff Masters |date=October 7, 2015 |title=Last Known Position of the Missing Ship El Faro: the Eyewall of Category 3 Joaquin |url=http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=3149 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151010003800/https://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=3149 |archive-date=October 10, 2015 |access-date=October 7, 2015 |publisher=Weather Underground}}</ref><ref>{{cite report|author=Jack L. Beven|date=October 1, 2015|title=Hurricane Joaquin Public Advisory Number 10-A|publisher=National Hurricane Center|access-date=October 10, 2015|url=http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/al11/al112015.public_a.014.shtml|location=Miami, Florida|type=Advisory|archive-date=October 5, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151005080419/http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/al11/al112015.public_a.014.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref>

thumb|Significant events between 4:20 on October 1 and the sinking, showing ''El Faro''{{'}}s heading and course over ground

==== Voyage data recorder audio ==== On December 13, 2016, the NTSB released a 500-page transcript of the conversations that occurred on the bridge in the ship's final twenty-six hours, as recorded by the vessel's voyage data recorder (VDR) and its six microphones.

The transcript described a quickly deteriorating situation. At 5:43 a.m. on the morning of the sinking, Davidson took a phone call indicating suspected flooding in the no. 3 cargo hold and sent the chief mate to investigate. The crew began taking measures to try to assess and control the flooding.<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|415–416}} Thirty minutes later, the ship lost its steam propulsion plant.<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|439}} At 6:54 a.m., Davidson took a phone call describing the situation on board:

* "It's miserable right now. We got all the uhh—all the wind on the starboard side here. Now a scuttle was left open or popped open or whatever so we got some flooding down in three hold—a significant amount. Umm, everybody's safe right now, we're not gonna abandon ship—we're gonna stay with the ship. We are in dire straits right now. Okay, I'm gonna call the office and tell 'em [unintelligible]. Okay? Umm there's no need to ring the general alarm yet—we're not abandoning ship. The engineers are trying to get the plant back. So we're working on it—okay?"<ref name=vdr>{{Cite web |url=https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58116/606566.pdf |title=VOYAGE DATA RECORDER – AUDIO TRANSCRIPT |access-date=August 29, 2017 |archive-date=November 12, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112004206/https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58116/606566.pdf }}</ref>{{rp|467}}

At 7:06 a.m., Davidson made a phone call, stating:

* "I have a marine emergency and I would like to speak with a QI (Qualified Individual). We had a hull breach- a scuttle blew open during the storm. We have water down in three hold. We have a heavy list. We've lost the main propulsion unit. The engineers cannot get it goin'. Can I speak with a QI please?"<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|475}} * "We have uhh secured the source of water coming into the vessel. Uh, A scuttle was blown open ... it's since been closed. However, uh, three hold's got a considerable amount of water in it. Uh, we have a very, very healthy port list. The engineers cannot get lube oil pressure on the plant, therefore we've got no main engine, and let me give you, um, a latitude and longitude. I just wanted to give you a heads up before I push that- push that button."<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|476}} * "The crew is safe. Right now we're trying to save the ship now, but, uh, all available hands. We are forty-eight miles east of San Salvador. We are taking every measure to take the list off. By that I mean pump out that- pump out that hold the best we can but we are not gaining ground at this time."<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|477}} * "Right now it's a little hard to tell because all the wind is ... on that side too so we got a good wind heel goin'. But it's not getting any better."<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|478}} * "[We're] gonna stay with the ship ... no one's panicking, everybody's been made aware ... Our safest bet is to stay with the ship during this particular time. The weather is ferocious out here and we're gonna stay with the ship ... swell is out the northeast, a solid ten to twelve feet (over) spray, high winds, very poor visibility ..."<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|478}}

At 7:10 a.m., Davidson told someone on the phone that the ship was caught in a 10- to 15-degree list, "but a lot of that's with the wind heel".<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|480}} He informed the person that he would be making a distress call to the Coast Guard, and then directed the second mate to activate ''El Faro''{{'}}s Ship Security Alert System and Global Maritime Distress and Safety System. He then directed the rest of the crew to wake up.<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|481–482}}

At 7:15 a.m., the chief mate returned to the bridge:

* Chief mate: "I think that the water level's rising, Captain." * Captain: "(okay). Do you know where it's comin' from?" * Chief Mate: "(At) first the Chief said something hit the fire main. Got it ruptured. Hard." * Captain: "Um, there's no way to secure that?" * Chief Mate: "We don't know if they still have any pressure on the fire main or not. Don't know where's sea – between the sea suction and the hull or what, uh, but anything I say is a guess."<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|483}} At 7:17 a.m., the chief engineer informed the chief mate and the captain over the sound-powered phone that the bilge alarm was going off in "two alpha".<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|485}} The captain asked the chief mate if he could pump out all of the cargo holds at the same time and discussed the worsening list.<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|486}} The chief mate replied that the cars were floating in the #3 cargo hold and that the fire main was below the surface of the water, so he could not see the damage or if water was still coming in.<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|487–488}} Two minutes later, after further discussion with the chief mate, the captain called the chief engineer and asked, "Can you ... isolate the fire main from down in the uh engine room? ... On the engine room side the isolation valve [on the] suction [for the] fire pump ... secure it, isolate it on your side so there's no free communication from the sea."<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|489–490}}

At 7:24 a.m., Davidson, with a crew member on the phone, said, "We still got reserve buoyancy and stability."<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|493}} He then instructed the second mate to ring the general alarm and wake up the crew.<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|493}} Davidson then gave the order to abandon ship, and about a minute later could be heard on the bridge calling out, "Bow is down, bow is down!"<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|499–500}} He then called over the UHF radio for the chief mate to "Get into your rafts! Throw all your rafts into the water! Everybody get off! Get off the ship! Stay together!"<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|501}}

For the next several minutes, Davidson tried to help a panicked helmsman get off the bridge, with alarms ringing all around.<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|502}} The captain repeatedly told the helmsman not to panic: "Work your way up here",<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|504}} "You're okay, come on",<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|505}} and "I'm not leavin' you, let's go!"<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|507}} The helmsman exclaimed, "I need a ladder! A line!"<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|506}} and "I need someone to help me!"<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|507}} The VDR recording ends at 7:39 a.m. with the captain and the helmsman still on the bridge. The final words recorded were from Davidson to the helmsman one second before the end of the recording, "It's time to come this way!"<ref name=vdr/>{{rp|509}}

===Search operations=== thumb|150px|Conditions during the search for ''El Faro'' on October 2 as seen from a Coast Guard HC-130 On October 1, WC-130J Super Hercules aircraft of the U.S. Air Force Reserve 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron tried to locate ''El Faro'' without success.<ref>{{cite news|title=Coast Guard searching for missing cargo ship out of Jacksonville|date=October 2, 2015|work=WJAX-TV|publisher=Cox Media Group|access-date=October 8, 2015|url=http://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/news/local/coast-guard-searching-missing-cargo-ship-out-jacks/nnskx/|location=Jacksonville, Florida|archive-date=October 7, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151007185912/http://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/news/local/coast-guard-searching-missing-cargo-ship-out-jacks/nnskx/}}</ref> On October 2, a Coast Guard HC-130H Hercules aircraft from Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater in Florida began a dedicated search for the ship.<ref name="USCG1">{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 2, 2015|access-date=October 8, 2015|title=Coast Guard Searching for Container Ship Caught in Hurricane Joaquin|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2606966/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151004222952/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2606966|archive-date=October 4, 2015|location=Miami, Florida}}</ref> {{USCGC|Northland|WMEC-904|6}} and an MH-60T Jayhawk helicopter from CGAS Clearwater joined search efforts later that day.<ref>{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 2, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=Update: Coast Guard searching for missing container ship caught in Hurricane Joaquin|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607214/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151005233000/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607214|archive-date=October 5, 2015|location=Miami, Florida}}</ref> MH-65C Dolphin helicopters from Coast Guard Air Station Miami in Florida and Coast Guard Air Station Borinquen in Puerto Rico, along with HC-144A Ocean Sentry fixed-wing patrol aircraft from Miami, were also present.

Throughout October 3, aircraft flew in violent hurricane conditions, characterized by winds in excess of {{convert|100|kn|abbr=on|sigfig=3}} at an altitude of {{convert|1000|ft|m|abbr=on}}, waves up to {{convert|40|ft|m|abbr=on}}, and visibility less than {{convert|1|nmi|abbr=on}}. Despite the hazardous conditions, a helicopter crew recovered a life ring from ''El Faro''.<ref>{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 3, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=Update 2: Coast Guard Searching for Container Ship Caught in Hurricane Joaquin|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607366/|location=Miami, Florida|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151008004533/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607366/|archive-date=October 8, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref> Conditions markedly improved on October 4 as Joaquin moved northeast, away from the Bahamas; winds averaged {{convert|15|kn|abbr=on}} and visibility was unlimited.<ref name="USCG4"/> Taking advantage of the clear weather, the helicopter remained in flight for eleven hours, requiring refueling twice.<ref name="NYTOct7"/> A second HC-130, {{USCGC|Charles Sexton|WPC-1108|6}}, and {{USCGC|Resolute|WMEC-620|6}} were deployed that day.<ref name="USCG4">{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 4, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=Update 4: Coast Guard Searching for Container Ship Caught in Hurricane Joaquin|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607474/|location=Miami, Florida|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151008021425/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607474/|archive-date=October 8, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

''Northland'' and ''Resolute'' continued operations overnight with engineers using night vision goggles to take part in the search.<ref name="NYTOct7">{{cite news |author=Robles |first=Frances |date=2015-10-07 |title=Coast Guard to Suspend Search for Survivors of El Faro |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/us/coast-guard-to-suspend-search-for-survivors-of-el-faro.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151010152015/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/us/coast-guard-to-suspend-search-for-survivors-of-el-faro.html |archive-date=2015-10-10 |access-date=2015-10-08 |newspaper=The New York Times |location=Jacksonville, Florida}}</ref><ref name="United States Coast Guard">{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 4, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=Update 5: Coast Guard Searching for Container Ship Caught in Hurricane Joaquin|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607510/|location=Miami, Florida|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151007195725/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2607510|archive-date=October 7, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref> The United States Navy provided P-8A Poseidon fixed wing aircraft from Naval Air Station Jacksonville to assist on October 5; three Crowley Maritime tugboats also joined.<ref name="United States Coast Guard"/><ref name="USCGfinal"/> Search operations were conducted at a near-continuous pace by this date.<ref name="NYTOct7"/>

On October 4, a Coast Guard helicopter located an unidentified corpse in an orange immersion suit presumed to be from ''El Faro''. According to the rescue diver lowered down to investigate, the corpse was in such an advanced state of decomposition that its head was three times the normal size and its gender and ethnicity was unrecognizable. The corpse was possibly Davidson, as most of ''El Faro''{{'}}s crew were mustering below decks at the time of the sinking and the bridge was the last part of the ship to go under.<ref name=":Vanity"/><ref>{{cite news |date=May 1, 2018 |title=A Disaster at Sea, Animated by 26 Hours of Black-Box Recordings |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/books/review/into-raging-sea-rachel-slade.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180503081348/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/books/review/into-raging-sea-rachel-slade.html |archive-date=May 3, 2018 |access-date=May 4, 2018 |work=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref> https://eu.jacksonville.com/story/news/2016/02/24/coast-guard-captain-speaks-difficult-search-el-faro-finding-body/15701133007/ </ref> Before the helicopter's crew could recover the corpse, they were called away to investigate a report of another immersion suit with a possible survivor inside, and left a self-locating datum marker buoy on the corpse to mark its position. However, when the helicopter returned its crew was unable to relocate the corpse due to the buoy failing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58116/598417.pdf |title=NTSB interview with USCG rescue diver |website=dms.ntsb.gov |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220124652/http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/58000-58499/58116/598417.pdf |archive-date=December 20, 2016 }}</ref><ref name="BGOct5"/> Several other unopened immersion suits were recovered.<ref name="WJXTOct10"/>

A deflated life raft and an unoccupied, heavily damaged lifeboat—one of two aboard ''El Faro'', each capable of carrying 43 people and stocked with food and water for a few days—were also found on October 5.<ref name="NYTOct7"/><ref name="BGOct5">{{cite news |last1=Dearen |first1=Jason |last2=Kay |first2=Jennifer |name-list-style=amp |date=October 5, 2015 |title=One body found, empty lifeboat located in search for crew of El Faro |url=https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/10/05/one-body-found-empty-lifeboat-located-search-for-crew-faro/oZyLZu9G2bniFQ8BTQNCqI/story.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151107175256/https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/10/05/one-body-found-empty-lifeboat-located-search-for-crew-faro/oZyLZu9G2bniFQ8BTQNCqI/story.html |archive-date=November 7, 2015 |access-date=October 8, 2015 |newspaper=The Boston Globe |publisher=John W. Henry |location=Jacksonville, Florida |agency=Associated Press}}</ref> The vessel was declared lost at sea on this day, believed to have sunk in {{convert|15,000|ft|m|abbr=on}} of water, and the search turned into a search and recovery effort.<ref name="NYT151005">{{cite news |last1=Alvarez |first1=Lizette |last2=Péréz-Peña |first2=Richard |last3=Robles |first3=Frances |name-list-style=amp |date=2015-10-05 |title=El Faro, Missing Ship, Has No Sign of Survivors |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/us/el-faro-missing-ship-hurricane-joaquin.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201108105056/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/us/el-faro-missing-ship-hurricane-joaquin.html |archive-date=2020-11-08 |access-date=2015-10-10 |newspaper=The New York Times |location=Miami, Florida}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author1=Erik Ortiz|author2=Elisha Fieldstadt|author3=Tom Winter|name-list-style=amp|work=NBC News|publisher=NBCUniversal|date=October 5, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=El Faro, Cargo Ship Carrying 28 Americans, Believed to Have Sunk|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/el-faro-cargo-ship-carrying-28-americans-believed-have-sunk-n438466|archive-date=October 7, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151007232450/http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/el-faro-cargo-ship-carrying-28-americans-believed-have-sunk-n438466?|url-status=live}}</ref>

The U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard provided three additional HC-130P/J aircraft on October 6.<ref name="USCGfinal"/><ref>{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 6, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=Update 9: Coast Guard Searching for Container Ship Caught in Hurricane Joaquin|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2608222/|location=Miami, Florida|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151009224112/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2608222|archive-date=October 9, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref> A total of {{convert|183,000|nmi2|abbr=on}} of water was covered in search of the vessel.<ref name="USCGfinal">{{cite web|publisher=United States Coast Guard|date=October 7, 2015|access-date=October 8, 2015|title=Coast Guard to suspend search for El Faro crew after 7-day search|url=http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2608214/|location=Miami, Florida|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151011013938/http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2608214|archive-date=October 11, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref> Two debris fields were discovered: one covering {{convert|260|nmi2|km2|abbr=on}} situated near ''El Faro''{{'}}s final position, and the other spanning {{convert|61|nmi2|km2|abbr=on}} located {{convert|60|nmi|km|abbr=on}} northeast of the first debris field. At sunset on October 7, the Coast Guard announced the cessation of search operations.<ref name="USCGfinal"/><ref name="CNNOct7">{{cite news|author1=Mariano Castillo|author2=Holly Yan|author3=Eliott C. McLaughlin|author4=Steve Almasy|name-list-style=amp|publisher=CNN|date=October 7, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=El Faro search ends, Coast Guard says|url=http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/us/el-faro-missing-ship/|archive-date=October 9, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151009234214/http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/us/el-faro-missing-ship|url-status=live}}</ref>

==Aftermath== On October 7, a Navy salvage team was requested to search for the wreckage at the behest of the NTSB.<ref name="CNNOct7"/> Senator Bill Nelson of Florida wrote a letter to the agency urging them to look into TOTE's policies regarding severe weather.<ref name="WJXTOct10">{{cite press release|author=Calloway, Ethan|author2=Micolucci, Vic|publisher=WJXT/Graham Media Group|date=October 10, 2015|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=Sen. Bill Nelson meets with NTSB on ''El Faro'' investigation [link to Senator Nelson's letter to the NTSB dead]|url=http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/jacksonville/sen-bill-nelson-meets-with-ntsb-on-el-faro-investigation|format=PDF|archive-date=December 10, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151210204050/http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/jacksonville/sen-bill-nelson-meets-with-ntsb-on-el-faro-investigation|url-status=live}}</ref> Nelson also cited that ''El Faro''{{'}}s lifeboats were "outdated and inadequate for the conditions the crew faced".<ref name="WJXTOct10"/> TOTE established a fund for families of the crew on October 9 through the Seamen's Church Institute of New York and New Jersey.<ref>{{cite web|author=Reiter, Emily|publisher=TOTE Maritime|website=elfaroincident.com|access-date=October 10, 2015|title=TOTE Establishes Family Relief Fund at Seamen's Church|date=October 9, 2015|url=http://elfaroincident.com/el-faro-updates/tote-establishes-family-relief-fund-at-seamens-church-institute/|location=Jacksonville, Florida|archive-date=October 12, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151012203107/http://elfaroincident.com/el-faro-updates/tote-establishes-family-relief-fund-at-seamens-church-institute/}}</ref> The Coast Guard in its enforcement activity 5752773 report recommended to fine Tote a total of $5,350 for five code violations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Frump |first=Robert |date=2020-11-05 |title=Tote Avoids Serious Civil Charges and Fines in Actions Brought by the Coast Guard for the Company's Role in the Loss of the SS El Faro and 33 Men and Women |url=https://frumpblog.com/2020/11/04/tote-avoids-serious-civil-charges-and-fines-in-actions-brought-by-the-coast-guard-for-the-companys-role-in-the-loss-of-the-ss-el-faro-and-33-men-and-women/ |access-date=2026-01-22 |website=The Frump Report |language=en-US |archive-date=September 21, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230921122040/https://frumpblog.com/2020/11/04/tote-avoids-serious-civil-charges-and-fines-in-actions-brought-by-the-coast-guard-for-the-companys-role-in-the-loss-of-the-ss-el-faro-and-33-men-and-women/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

On October 14, a $100 million lawsuit was filed against TOTE by a family member of one of the missing crew, citing negligence on the company's behalf in letting a non-seaworthy vessel sail into a hurricane.<ref>{{cite news|author=Carrero, Jacquellena|work=NBC News|publisher=NBCUniversal|date=October 14, 2015|access-date=October 18, 2015|title=Family of El Faro Crew Member Files $100M Lawsuit|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/family-el-faro-crew-member-files-100m-lawsuit-n444606|archive-date=October 18, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151018193040/http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/family-el-faro-crew-member-files-100m-lawsuit-n444606|url-status=live}}</ref> On October 28, another lawsuit was filed on behalf of the estate of a man who died in the sinking. The complaint stated that "without power, the M/V EL FARO was merely a cork in the sea as the Hurricane neared".<ref>{{cite web |author= |date=October 29, 2015 |title=Arnold & Itkin LLP Files Lawsuit for El Faro Sinking |url=http://www.offshoreinjuryfirm.com/offshore-injury-blog/2015/october/arnold-itkin-llp-files-lawsuit-for-el-faro-sinki/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160302205056/http://www.offshoreinjuryfirm.com/offshore-injury-blog/2015/october/arnold-itkin-llp-files-lawsuit-for-el-faro-sinki/ |archive-date=March 2, 2016 |website=offshoreinjuryfirm.com}}</ref> By April 19, 2016, TOTE Maritime had settled with 18 of the 33 families for more than $7 million.<ref>{{cite news|author=Kitchen, Sebastian |newspaper=The Florida Times-Union|date=March 2, 2016|access-date=April 28, 2016|title=More families of El Faro crew members settle legal claims with ship's operator, owner|url=http://jacksonville.com/news/florida/2016-03-02/story/more-families-el-faro-crew-members-settle-legal-claims-ships-operator}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|work=WJXT|publisher=Graham Media Group|date=April 19, 2016|access-date=April 28, 2016|title=18 El Faro families have settled with TOTE|url=http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/jacksonville/4-more-el-faro-families-settle-with-tote_|location=Jacksonville, Florida|archive-date=April 23, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160423141442/http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/jacksonville/4-more-el-faro-families-settle-with-tote_|url-status=live}}</ref>

{{MV|Isla Bella}} was chosen to replace ''El Faro''{{'}}s former operations.<ref>{{cite news|author=Readout, Stacey |work=WJXT|publisher=Graham Media Group|date=October 19, 2015|access-date=October 19, 2015|title=Coast Guard certifies El Faro's replacement|url=http://www.news4jax.com/news/coast-guard-certifies-el-faros-replacement/35926164|location=Jacksonville, Florida}}</ref>

Writer William Langewiesche stated that the fact that El Faro was flagged to the United States, the fact that the ship sailed into a hurricane despite having the capacity to avoid it, and that the captain was "respected", all gave "immediate attention" to the incident.<ref name=":Vanity"/>

===Search for the wreckage=== thumb|A Navy screen capture showing the stern of ''El Faro''. On October 19, {{USNS|Apache|T-ATF-172|6}} departed from Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek–Fort Story in Virginia Beach, Virginia, to conduct an underwater search for ''El Faro''. The vessel was equipped with a towed pinger locator, side-scan sonar, and a remotely operated vehicle.<ref name="CBS Corporation"/> The search crew identified a vessel on October 31 at an approximate depth of {{convert|15,400|ft|m|abbr=on}}. The hydrostatic pressure at this depth is approximately {{convert|6688|psi|MPa|sigfig=2}}.<ref name="Steve Almasy"/>

The NTSB reported that the object was "consistent with a [{{convert|790|ft|m|abbr=on}}] cargo ship ... in an upright position and in one piece".<ref name="Steve Almasy"/> On November 16, the wreck was confirmed to be ''El Faro'', and the agency announced it had completed its search of the sunken ship but did not find the VDR.<ref>{{cite web |date=November 16, 2015 |title=NTSB Completes Documentation of Sunken Cargo Ship ''EL FARO''; Voyage Data Recorder Not Located |url=https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR_20151116.aspx |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117072431/https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR_20151116.aspx |archive-date=November 17, 2015 |access-date=November 16, 2015 |website=National Transportation Safety Board}}</ref> On January 3, 2016, the NTSB opened the public accident docket on the investigation into the sinking, initially releasing underwater images and video of the vessel.<ref>{{cite web |date=January 3, 2016 |title=NTSB Opens Public Docket on Investigation Into Cargo Ship Sinking; Underwater Images and Video Released |url=https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR01032016.aspx |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160104130427/https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR01032016.aspx |archive-date=January 4, 2016 |access-date=January 5, 2016 |website=National Transportation Safety Board}}</ref>

====Second and third search effort for VDR==== thumb|The VDR sitting on the ocean floor next to the mast. On April 18, 2016, the NTSB launched a second search for the VDR, using the {{RV|Atlantis|AGOR-25|6}}, a Navy-owned vessel operated by mariners of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. On April 26, the NTSB said the VDR was found about {{convert|41|mi|km|abbr=on}} northeast of Acklins and Crooked Islands, Bahamas. The agency was unable to retrieve the recorder at that time because it was too close to the ship's mast and other obstructions.<ref name="Yahoo! News">{{cite web |url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-recovers-data-recorder-sunken-cargo-ship-el-165252731.html?nhp=1 |title=U.S. recovers data recorder from sunken cargo ship ''El Faro'' |date=August 9, 2016 |publisher=Yahoo! News |agency=Reuters |access-date=August 10, 2016 |archive-date=September 15, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160915103731/https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-recovers-data-recorder-sunken-cargo-ship-el-165252731.html?nhp=1 |url-status=live }}</ref>

On August 5, 2016, USNS ''Apache'' returned to the site and, five days later, recovered the VDR. Ten months after the sinking, the VDR was delivered to the NTSB in Mayport, Florida to continue the investigation.<ref name="Yahoo! News" />

===Findings of investigation reports=== ====U.S. Coast Guard==== The Coast Guard's ''El Faro'' Marine Board of Investigation completed its final report on September 24, 2017, and published it on October 1 in its document library.<ref>{{cite web |author=U.S. Coast Guard ''El Faro'' Marine Board of Investigation |date=September 24, 2017 |title=STEAM SHIP EL FARO (O.N. 561732) SINKING AND LOSS OF THE VESSEL WITH 33 PERSONS MISSING AND PRESUMED DECEASED NORTHEAST OF ACKLINS AND CROOKED ISLAND, BAHAMAS ON OCTOBER 1, 2015 MARINE BOARD'S REPORT |url=https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/01/2001820187/-1/-1/0/FINAL%20PDF%20ROI%2024%20SEP%2017.PDF |access-date=September 27, 2024 |website=US Coast Guard News-By-Region |archive-date=September 30, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240930013920/https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/01/2001820187/-1/-1/0/FINAL%20PDF%20ROI%2024%20SEP%2017.PDF |url-status=live }}</ref> The 199-page Marine Board's Report detailed facts, analysis, and conclusions and made safety, administrative and enforcement recommendations.<ref name="auto"/>

Coast Guard investigators placed nearly all of the blame on Captain Davidson of ''El Faro'', who had underestimated both the strength of the storm and the ship's vulnerability in rough weather, and did not take enough measures to evade the storm even though his crew raised concerns about its increasing strength and changing direction. Investigators stated that if Davidson had survived the storm, his actions would have been grounds for the Coast Guard to revoke his captain's license. Davidson "was ultimately responsible for the vessel, the crew and its safe navigation", said Capt. Jason Neubauer, who chaired the investigation.

Coast Guard investigators also noted that TOTE Maritime, ''El Faro''{{'}}s owner, made several violations regarding crew members' rest periods and work hours, had no dedicated safety officer to oversee the ship, and used outdated, "open air" lifeboats (similar to the types used on older vessels, such as ''Titanic'') instead of the modern-day enclosed survival crafts, among other violations.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.fox10tv.com/story/36494132/coast-guard-report-captain-errors-led-up-to-el-faro-sinking|title=Coast Guard report: Captain errors led up to ''El Faro'' sinking|work=Fox10 TV|access-date=October 15, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171015201752/http://www.fox10tv.com/story/36494132/coast-guard-report-captain-errors-led-up-to-el-faro-sinking|archive-date=October 15, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

Following the incident, Regional Commander of the Coast Guard Captain Jeff Dixon switched sides, despite Coast Guard lifetime ban rules on switching sides<ref>"Shipwreck" by Maeve McGoran on Audible. <nowiki>https://www.audible.com/pd/B0F9HNFVVY</nowiki></ref> and became the President of TOTE Services.<ref>{{Cite web |title=CAPTAIN JEFF DIXON TAKES OVER AS PRESIDENT OF TOTE SERVICES |url=https://www.toteservices.com/news-articles/captain-jeff-dixon-takes-over-as-president-of-tote-services |access-date=2026-01-19 |website=www.toteservices.com |archive-date=February 12, 2026 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260212223550/https://www.toteservices.com/news-articles/captain-jeff-dixon-takes-over-as-president-of-tote-services |url-status=live }}</ref>

====NTSB==== thumb|An NTSB model of ''El Faro''{{'}}s resting place on the seafloor The NTSB met in Washington, D.C., on December 12, 2017, to discuss contributing factors to the sinking as well as to "vote on recommendations to address safety issues uncovered during the investigation".<ref name="ntsbbc">{{cite press release |title=Meeting at NTSB Boardroom and Conference Center, December 12, 2017, to Discuss the October 2015 Sinking of the Cargo Ship ''El Faro'' in the Atlantic Ocean |date=September 12, 2017 |publisher=NTSB.gov |location=Washington, D.C. |url=https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2017-DCA16MM001-BMG.aspx |access-date=September 12, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170915051420/https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2017-DCA16MM001-BMG.aspx |archive-date=September 15, 2017 |author=National Transportation Safety Board}}</ref> The board meeting was webcast live.<ref name=ntsbbc/> The board's 400-page report:<ref name="NPR">{{cite news |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/12/570129286/ntsb-releases-findings-on-what-sank-the-doomed-ship-el-faro |title=NTSB releases Findings on What Sank the Doomed Ship ''El Faro'' |date=December 12, 2017 |work=The Two Way |publisher=National Public Radio |access-date=December 13, 2017 |archive-date=December 12, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171212210850/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/12/570129286/ntsb-releases-findings-on-what-sank-the-doomed-ship-el-faro |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=National Transportation Safety Board |title=Preliminary incident report |url=https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/DCA16MM01_preliminary_report.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151106081148/https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/DCA16MM01_preliminary_report.pdf |archive-date=November 6, 2015 |website=NTSB.gov}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=National Transportation Safety Board |date=December 12, 2017 |title=Presentation of Findings and Vote to Recommendations |url=http://ntsb.capitolconnection.org/ |website=Capital Connection |access-date=December 30, 2017 |archive-date=December 23, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171223040805/http://ntsb.capitolconnection.org/ }} (Archive of video from the NTSB meeting held December 12, 2017)</ref>

* criticized Captain Davidson's decision to advance into the oncoming storm, despite numerous calls from the crew to alter course, and noted he had relied on outdated weather information from a commercial service, Bon Voyage System<ref>{{cite news| url = https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/04/12/im-a-goner-inside-the-sinking-of-the-el-faro.html| title = 'I'm a goner:' Inside the sinking of the El Faro {{!}} The Star| website = Toronto Star| date = April 12, 2017| archive-date = November 11, 2020| access-date = December 8, 2020| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201111202418/https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/04/12/im-a-goner-inside-the-sinking-of-the-el-faro.html| url-status = live}}</ref> * criticized the Coast Guard's practices of grandfathering in vessels, exempting them from using closed lifeboats; the obsolete lifeboats were not properly maintained, were not launched, and in all probability would not have offered useful shelter * noted TOTE's failure to maintain a superannuated and deteriorating vessel

In their final report, the NTSB determined{{blockquote|that the probable cause of the sinking of El Faro and the subsequent loss of life was the captain's insufficient action to avoid Hurricane Joaquin, his failure to use the most current weather information, and his late decision to muster the crew. Contributing to the sinking was ineffective bridge resource management on board El Faro, which included the captain's failure to adequately consider officers' suggestions. Also contributing to the sinking was the inadequacy of both TOTE's oversight and its safety management system. Further contributing factors ... were flooding in a cargo hold from an undetected open watertight scuttle and damaged seawater piping; loss of propulsion due to low lube oil pressure to the main engine resulting from a sustained list; and subsequent downflooding through unsecured ventilation closures to the cargo holds. Also contributing ... was the lack of an approved damage control plan ... Contributing to the loss of life was the lack of appropriate survival craft for the conditions.<ref name="ntsb.gov"/>}} ====Memorials==== Twin memorials remembering ''El Faro'''s crew were erected in Jacksonville<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/four-years-later-el-faro-family-members-gather-to-remember-loved-ones/77-b38b29c7-7a31-431f-b0e3-7f68278c3e2a|date=October 1, 2019|title=Four years later El Faro family members gather to remember loved ones|author=Kenneth Amaro|website=Firstcoastnews.com}}</ref> and in San Juan.<ref>{{cite news |date=April 2017 |title=El Faro Memorial Unveiling |url=https://www.totemaritime.com/el-faro-memorial-unveiling-san-juan-puerto-rico/ |website=Totemaritime.com}}{{dead link|date=May 2024}}</ref> There is another memorial located in Rockland, Maine by artist Jay Sawyer. Five people from the Rockland-area died on the ''El Faro''.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.penbaypilot.com/article/hand-heart-and-steel-el-faro-memorial-nears-completion-dedication-ceremony-planned-se/163767 | title=Hand, heart and steel: 'El Faro' memorial nears completion; dedication ceremony planned for September | date=August 6, 2022 | access-date=August 10, 2022 | archive-date=August 9, 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220809122841/https://www.penbaypilot.com/article/hand-heart-and-steel-el-faro-memorial-nears-completion-dedication-ceremony-planned-se/163767 | url-status=live }}</ref>

A memorial plaque is also installed on the pier in Gdynia, Poland. Five of the ''El Faro'' crew were Polish nationals.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Pamięci marynarzy z "El Faro" |url=https://www.gdynia.pl/co-nowego,2774/pamieci-marynarzy-z-el-faro,539422 |access-date=2024-07-09 |website=Oficjalny serwis internetowy miasta Gdynia |language=pl |archive-date=July 9, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240709151531/https://www.gdynia.pl/co-nowego,2774/pamieci-marynarzy-z-el-faro,539422 |url-status=live }}</ref>

An El Faro Memorial was dedicated at the Star Center (located on the American Maritime Officers Plans campus) on September 29, 2018, in Dania Beach, Florida.

==References== {{Reflist}}

==Further reading== * Frump, Robert. "The Captains of Thor – What Really Caused the Loss of the SS ''El Faro''" ({Race Point} September 27, 2018) * Foy, George Michelsen. ''Run the Storm: A Savage Hurricane, a Brave Crew, and the Wreck of the SS El Faro'' (Charles Scribner's Sons, 2018) {{ISBN?}} * Korten, Tristram. ''Into the Storm: Two Ships, a Deadly Hurricane, and an Epic Battle for Survival'' (Ballantine Books, 2018) {{ISBN?}} * Slade, Rachel. ''Into the Raging Sea: Thirty-Three Mariners, One Megastorm, and the Sinking of El Faro'' (Ecco Press, 2018). ISBN 978-0-06-269970-1.

{{DEFAULTSORT:El Faro}} Category:2015 Atlantic hurricane season Category:1974 ships Category:Cargo ships of the United States Category:Maritime incidents in 2015 Category:Shipwrecks of the United States Category:Ships built by the Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Company Category:Ships lost with all hands Category:2015 disasters in the United States

SS El Faro

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