'''Platform evangelism''' (also called '''developer relations''',<ref>{{Cite web | title = LinkedIn: People with a job title that includes ''developer relations'' | url = http://www.linkedin.com/search/fpsearch?type=people&keywords=developer+relations | access-date = 12 October 2012}}</ref> '''developer and platform evangelism''',<ref>{{Cite web | title = Microsoft Creates New Division to Step Up Focus on Software Developers | website = Microsoft | url = http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2001/oct01/10-16newdivisionpr.mspx | access-date = 29 June 2010}}</ref> '''developer advocacy''',<ref>{{Cite web | title = LinkedIn: People with a job title that includes ''developer advocate'' | url = http://www.linkedin.com/search/fpsearch?type=people&keywords=developer+advocate | access-date = 12 October 2012}}</ref> or '''API evangelism'''<ref>{{Cite web | title = API Evangelism is Equal Parts Internal, Partner and Public Outreach | url = http://www.apievangelist.com/2011/09/29/api-evangelism-is-equal-parts-internal,-partner-and-public-outreach/ | access-date = 12 October 2012}}</ref>) is the application of technology evangelism to a multi-sided platform. It seeks to accelerate the growth of a platform's commercial ecosystem of complementary goods, created by independent ([http://www.sp.se/EN/PRESS/GLOSSARY/Sidor/default.aspx third-party]) developers, as a means to the end of maximizing the platform's market share. This initiative focuses on providing developers the resources to innovate, participate, and provide feedback to grow the platform.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://hbr.org/2016/03/6-reasons-platforms-fail|title=6 Reasons Platforms Fail|last1=Alstyne|first1=Marshall W. Van|date=2016-03-31|work=Harvard Business Review|access-date=2019-11-09|last2=Parker|first2=Geoffrey G.|issn=0017-8012|last3=Choudary|first3=Sangeet Paul}}</ref>
==Multi-sided platforms== {{Main| Two-sided market}} A multi-sided platform creates value by bringing together two or more different groups who can create more value together than apart.<ref>{{cite journal | first1=Thomas | last1= Eisenmann | first2=Geoffrey | last2= Parker | first3=Marshall W. | last3= Van Alstyne | title=Strategies for Two-Sided Markets | journal=Harvard Business Review | issue=October 2006 | url=http://hbr.org/2006/10/strategies-for-two-sided-markets/ar/1 | date=October 2006 }}</ref> Examples include buyers and sellers at an auction; readers and advertisers of a newspaper; and people at an online dating service. The platform vendor can profit by capturing a portion of the money that changes hands.<ref>{{cite journal | first1=Jean | last1=Rochet | first2= Jean | last2= Tirole | title=Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets | journal=[http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea Journal of the European Economic Association] | issue=October 2006 | url=http://idei.fr/CORE/articles/rochet_tirole.pdf | access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref> Platform vendors can serve as ''de facto'' regulators of their markets.<ref name="Boudreau2008">{{cite book | first1=Kevin | last1=Boudreau | first2=Andrei | last2=Hagiu | title=Platforms, Markets and Innovation | chapter =Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators | chapter-url =http://www.kevinboudreau.com/PAPER%20Platform%20Rules.pdf | publisher = Edward Elgar | year=2010 | isbn =978-1-84844-070-8 }}</ref>
An example of platform evangelism is the Developer and Platform Evangelism Division at Microsoft, which coordinates the personal computer (PC) and server's programming model.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-veteran-guggenheimer-takes-over-developer-evangelism-team/|title=Microsoft veteran Guggenheimer takes over Developer Evangelism team|last=Foley|first=Mary Jo|date=October 3, 2012|website=ZDNet|language=en|access-date=2019-11-09}}</ref> It also provides tools for the Microsoft.NET platform, facilitating synergies between this system's Enterprise Server products and the Windows platform.<ref name=":0" /> According to Jim Allchin, the former Platforms Group Vice President, the division also provides support to millions of software developers focused on high-performance and affordable technologies.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Software Evangelism and the Rhetoric of Morality: Coding Justice in a Digital Democracy|last=Maher|first=Jennifer Helene|date=2016|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780415704243|location=New York|pages=3}}</ref>
==Developers and consumers== Many platforms have only two sides: one of consumers and the other of independent ([http://www.sp.se/EN/PRESS/GLOSSARY/Sidor/default.aspx third-party]) developers. Independent developers produce and sell complementary goods, also called "platform applications," directly to the platform's consumers. These applications rely on the platform's services to function. Generally speaking, consumers prefer a platform with more and higher-value applications, while developers prefer a platform with more and higher-paying consumers.<ref>{{cite journal | first=Andrei | last=Haigu | title=Optimal Platform Pricing in Two-Sided Markets | journal=[http://www.rje.org the RAND Journal of Economics] | issue=2004 | url=http://evan.lunarmania.com/~idei002/doc/conf/tsm/papers_2004/hagiu.pdf | access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref>
Recent examples of two-sided platforms that successfully attracted both consumers and developers include Apple iPhone,<ref>{{cite journal | first= Yoni | last= Heisler | title=iPhone App Store Hits 100K, Leaves Others in the Dust | journal=[http://www.pcworld.com PC World] | date=November 7, 2009 | url=http://www.pcworld.com/article/181643/iphone_app_store_hits_100k_leaves_others_in_the_dust.html | access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | title=Apple announces App Store downloads top 3 billion | journal=[http://www.appleinsider.com AppleInsider] | date=January 5, 2010 | url=http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/10/01/05/apple_announces_app_store_downloads_top_3_billion.html | access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref> Nintendo Wii,<ref>{{cite journal | first= Douglas | last= McIntyre | title=Nintendo Wii Sales Soar Again | journal=[http://www.dailyfinance.com DailyFinance] | date=January 6, 2010 | url=http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/company-news/nintendo-wii-sales-soar-again/19304757/ | access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref> Adobe Flash,<ref>{{cite web | title=Flash Player Version Penetration | date=March 2010 | url=http://www.adobe.com/products/player_census/flashplayer/version_penetration.html | access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref> and Microsoft Windows.<ref>{{cite journal | first= Gregg | last= Keizer | title=Windows market share slide resumes | journal=Computerworld | date=January 3, 2010 | url=http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9142978/Windows_market_share_slide_resumes | access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref>
Other examples include household electricity (for appliances), the farm tractor's three-point hitch (for farming implements), camera lens mounts (for interchangeable lenses), the Picatinny rail (for gun-mounted accessories), and media players such as record players, CD players, and DVD players (for media content).
==Functions== Platform evangelism establishes and nurtures a platform ecosystem,<ref>{{cite journal | first = Gediminas | last = Adomavicius |date=June 2007 | title = Technology Roles and Paths of Influence in an Ecosystem Model of Technology Evolution | journal = Information Technology and Management | volume = 8 | issue = 2 | pages = 185–202 | doi = 10.1007/s10799-007-0012-z | s2cid = 33156757 | url = http://www.misrc.umn.edu/workingpapers/fullpapers/2005/0504_030305.pdf }}</ref> which requires five simultaneous activities: 1) sales, 2) enablement, 3) feedback, 4) intelligence, and 5) regulation.
===Ecosystem sales=== Ecosystem sales is the attempt to convince third parties to develop complementary goods for the platform's commercial ecosystem. The characteristics of successful platform evangelists<ref name="Conwell">{{cite web |first=Frederic |last=Lucas-Conwell |title=Technology Evangelists: A Leadership Survey |url=https://www.gri.co/pub/res/pdf/TechEvangelist.pdf |access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref> and salespersons<ref name="salespersons">{{cite web |first1=Amanda |last1=Ruth |first2=Allen |last2= Wysocki |title=Top Sellers: Characteristics of a Superior Salesperson (SN004) |url=http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/SN/SN00400.pdf |publisher=University of Florida IFAS Extension |access-date=21 June 2010}}</ref> are essentially identical, including deep product knowledge, empathy, humor, integrity, communication skills, positive attitude, infectious enthusiasm, a sincere desire to help others, etc. The primary difference is in "hunger for money" among salespersons.<ref name=salespersons /> This is unlikely to be satisfied by technology evangelism, which is more likely to be a cost center than a profit center, and hence incapable of paying sales-like commissions.
====Developer enablement resources==== This aspect of platform evangelism can be seen as vendor-sponsored change agency in the diffusion of an innovation (the platform). As such, platform evangelism is responsible for creating the resources that enable developers to progress swiftly through the innovation adoption process ("developer enablement resources").
Each different phase of the platform adoption process requires different developer enablement resources. It is the responsibility of the platform evangelist to ensure that each developer enablement resource comes into existence in a timely manner.
===Ecosystem feedback=== Because developers will often choose an inferior platform if its rate of improvement suggests that it will soon become the superior platform,<ref>{{cite journal |first = James |last = Plamondon |date = November 1991 |title = Apologia Windowia |journal = Frameworks Magazine |url = http://s.www.mactech.com/articles/frameworks/5_5/Apologia_Plamondon.html |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110714013317/http://s.www.mactech.com/articles/frameworks/5_5/Apologia_Plamondon.html |archive-date = 2011-07-14 }}</ref> even the superior platform must improve rapidly. To facilitate this rapid improvement, platform evangelism organizes and champions the feedback of ecosystem developers within the platform vendor.
===Ecosystem intelligence=== Ecosystem intelligence gathers information about the activities and intentions of other platform vendors from sources in and around the developer ecosystem.
===Ecosystem regulation=== To avoid the market failure of multi-sided platforms,<ref name="Stupidity">{{Cite book | first = Merrill | last = Chapman | title = In Search of Stupidity: Over 20 Years of High-Tech Marketing Disasters | publisher = Apress | date = 9 July 2003 | isbn = 978-1-59059-104-8 | url = https://archive.org/details/insearchofstupid00merr }}</ref> platform evangelism will often engage in ''de facto'' regulation of the commercial ecosystem that surrounds its platform.<ref name=Boudreau2008/> Such regulation combines legal, technological, informational, and other instruments (along with price setting) to minimize the costs of externalities, complexity, uncertainty, information asymmetry, and coordination problems.
==Platform competition and platform evangelism== Often, many competing two-sided platforms―each offering roughly the same benefits on the developer side―start diffusing through a market at approximately the same time.<ref name=Armstrong>{{cite journal | first = Mark | last = Armstrong | title = Competition in Two-Sided Markets | url = http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/487/Two-sided.pdf | year = 2005 | journal = [http://www.rje.org The RAND Journal of Economics] | access-date = 20 June 2010 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110519173743/http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/487/Two-sided.pdf | archive-date = 19 May 2011 | url-status = dead }}</ref> Each platform's vendor competes<ref name="Shapiro">{{cite journal |first1=Carl |last1=Shapiro |first2=Hal |last2=Varian |title=The Art of Standards Wars |journal=California Management Review |date=Winter 1999 |volume=41 |issue=2 |pages=25 |doi=10.2307/41165984 |jstor=41165984 |s2cid=154820597 |url=http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/wars.pdf}}</ref> with the other vendors, via platform evangelism, to gain market share among the market's potential developers.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/487/Two-sided.pdf | title = Two-sided competition of proprietary vs. open source technology platforms and the implications for the software industry (Working Paper #05-02) | date = May 2005 | access-date = 20 June 2010 | last = Economides | first = Nicholas | author2 = Katsamakas, Evangelo | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110519173743/http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/487/Two-sided.pdf | archive-date = 19 May 2011 | url-status = dead }}</ref>
== Self-fulfilling prophecy == If it is expensive to re-develop an application to target a second (or third) platform, then developers will tend to adopt, first, the platform which they believe has the highest lifetime profit opportunity. This tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the platform which is initially perceived to have the highest lifetime profit opportunity tends to accumulate the most applications, which then makes it more attractive to consumers, which makes it more attractive to developers, etc., in a virtuous cycle, until a critical mass (also known as a tipping point) is reached, such that it out-competes the other platforms…and eventually does indeed come to offer the highest lifetime profit potential, as prophesied. This makes it very important for a platform vendor to convince developers ''from the outset'', even before the platform becomes commercially available to consumers,<ref name=Armstrong /> that its platform will have the highest lifetime profit potential. This contributes to the high-tech industry's hype cycle.
==Network effects, path dependence, and ''de facto'' standards== If the market has strong network effects, then those platforms which gain the fewest early adopters may cease to exist, making them unavailable to later potential adopters. This is path dependence.<ref name="Arthur">{{cite book |first=Brian W. |last=Arthur |title=Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy |year=1994 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-472-09496-7}}</ref> If the number of reasonable platform choices in a market falls to 1, then that "only reasonable choice" becomes the market's ''de facto'' standard (also known as its Dominant Design) by definition.
==Switching costs, lock-in, and profitability== If the cost of switching away from a ''de facto'' standard to a new alternative exceeds the benefit gained by the earliest market participants who make that switch, then the market will tend to become locked into the ''de facto'' standard, with its market share approaching 100%.<ref name=Arthur /> Markets that are highly interconnected are more resistant to change than less interconnected markets.<ref name="SlowPace">{{cite book | first=Bhaskar | last=Chakravorti | title=The Slow Pace of Fast Change: Bringing Innovations to Market in a Connected World | year=2003 | publisher=Harvard Business School Press | isbn=978-1-57851-780-0}}</ref> Lock-in tends to make a ''de facto'' standard impervious to incremental competition, such that only a disruptive innovation can displace it.<ref>{{cite book |last=Christensen |first=Clayton |title=The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Companies to Fail |year=1997 |publisher=Harvard Business School Press |isbn=978-0-87584-585-2 |url=https://archive.org/details/innovatorsdilem000chri }}</ref> Owning a locked-in ''de facto'' standard can be a license to print money for a very long time.<ref>{{cite book | first=Clayton | last=Christensen | title=The Innovator's Solution | year=2003 | publisher=Harvard Business School Press | page=[https://archive.org/details/innovatorssoluti00chri/page/151 151] | isbn=978-1-57851-852-4 | url=https://archive.org/details/innovatorssoluti00chri/page/151 }}</ref>
==Mature share== Not all markets become locked into a ''de facto'' standard, and indeed, many factors act against such an outcome.<ref name=Weyl>{{cite web |last=Weyl |first=E. Glen |author-link=Glen Weyl |title=Monopolies in Two-Sided Markets: Comparative Statics and Identification |url=http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/soliveros/documents/EAP%20Seminar%2009/Weyl.pdf |access-date=21 June 2010 |date=October 2008}}</ref> However, owning the first platform to establish a critical mass of complementary goods, with high switch-out costs, can create first-mover advantages that can go a long way towards ensuring that one gets a viable share of the mature market.<ref>{{cite book | first=Oz| last=Shy | title=The Economics of Network Industries | publisher = Cambridge University Press | year=2001 | isbn =978-0-521-80095-2 }}</ref>
==Means to an end== Therefore, with regard to a two-sided platform's developer side, it is platform evangelism's responsibility to: * Increase the quantity and quality of the platform's complementary goods; * Provide potential developers of complementary goods with a compelling opportunity for profit; * Increase awareness of this opportunity among potential developers of complementary goods; * Reduce the cost and risk associated with developing complementary goods; * Increase the percentage of the market's complementary goods that are developed ''first'', ''best'', or ''only'' for its platform; * Increase the network effects generated by its platform and its complementary goods; * Increase the platform's switching-out costs, while decreasing its switching-in costs; * Oppose the efforts of competing platform vendors to do likewise.
In short, it is platform evangelism's responsibility to design, develop, maintain, and extend the size and health of the platform's ecosystem, such that potential developers will choose to participate ''first'', ''best'', or ''only'' in that ecosystem.
Ultimately, these are all means to the end of gaining the highest possible share of the developer side of the targeted market. Whether this is, in turn, a means to the end of maximizing share on the market's consumer side, or ''vice versa'', depends on the platform vendor's pricing strategy. * If the platform vendor profits primarily from the developer side (as Adobe does with Flash), then maximizing developer share is the ultimate end. * If the platform vendor profits primarily from the consumer side (as Microsoft does with Windows), then maximizing developer share is a means to the ultimate end of maximizing consumer share.
==Theory and management== The economics of multi-sided markets have only recently been subject to academic scrutiny,<ref>{{Cite news | first1 = Geoffrey | last1 = Parker | first2 = Marshall | last2 = Van Alstyne | author-link2 = Marshall_Van_Alstyne | title = Innovation, Openness and Platform Control | publisher = ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce | year = 2010 | isbn = 978-1-60558-822-3 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book | first = Annabelle | last = Gawer | author-link = Annabelle Gawer | title = Platforms, Markets and Innovation | publisher = Edward Elgar | date = February 2010 | isbn = 978-1-84844-070-8 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book | first1 = David S. | last1 = Evans | first2 = Andrei | last2 = Hagiu | first3 = Richard | last3 = Schmalensee | title = Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries | publisher = The MIT Press | date = April 2008 | isbn = 978-0-262-55068-0 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book | first = Annabelle | last = Gawer | author-link = Annabelle Gawer | title = Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco Drive Industry Innovation | publisher = Harvard Business Press | date = April 2002 | isbn = 978-1-57851-514-1 }}</ref> so the theory underpinning platform evangelism's regulatory function is likely to be poorly understood by its practitioners—a situation that has contributed to many disastrous market failures.<ref name=Stupidity/>
More generally, evangelizing the developer side of a multi-sided platform can be seen as using social influence to accelerate the diffusion of an innovation, within a dynamic system, in the presence of network effects, for economic gain (to the platform vendor or to society as a whole). Therefore, a solid understanding of the theory and practice of social influence, diffusion of innovations, system dynamics, innovation dynamics, network effects, innovation economics, and the economics of multi-sided platforms is essential to the design and management of efficient and effective platform evangelism campaigns.
Most of the theory and practice of platform evangelism, as influenced by these theoretical underpinnings, has yet to be comprehensively documented, and is therefore not available to novice evangelists or their managers. Because the development of expertise in any domain takes considerable time and practice,<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1037/0033-295X.100.3.363 |first1=K. Anders |last1=Ericsson |first2=Ralf Th. |last2=Krampe |first3=Clemens |last3=Tesch-Römer |title=The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance |journal=Psychological Review |year=1993 |volume=100 |issue=3 |pages=363–406 |s2cid=11187529 |url=http://projects.ict.usc.edu/itw/gel/EricssonDeliberatePracticePR93.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1=Ericsson | first1=Anders K. | last2=Prietula | first2=Michael J. | last3=Cokely | first3=Edward T. | year=2007 | title=The Making of an Expert | journal=Harvard Business Review | volume=85 | issue=July–August 2007 | pages=114–21, 193 | pmid=17642130 | url=http://www.coachingmanagement.nl/The%20Making%20of%20an%20Expert.pdf | access-date=2010-06-21 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120224161037/http://www.coachingmanagement.nl/The%20Making%20of%20an%20Expert.pdf | archive-date=2012-02-24 | url-status=dead }}</ref> vendors of new platforms cannot reasonably be expected to have in-house expertise in designing and managing effective platform evangelism campaigns.
==See also== * Evangelism marketing * Technology evangelism * Technology evangelist * Apple evangelist * Network effect * Vendor lock-in * System dynamics * Innovation economics * Diffusion of innovations * Two-sided markets * Community organizing * Sales * Marketing
==References== {{reflist}}
Category:Technology evangelism