{{Short description|Movement for self-determination and sovereignty of Palestine}} {{broader|History of Palestinian nationality}} {{pp-extended|small=yes}} {{Palestinian nationalism sidebar}} <!--No citations are required in the article lead per [[MOS:LEADCITE]], as long as the content is cited in the article body, as it should be. Do not add missing-citation tags like {{cn}} to the lead. If necessary, {{not verified in body}} can be used, or the content removed.--> '''Palestinian nationalism''' is the [[national movement]] of the [[Palestinian people]] that espouses [[Palestinian self-determination|self-determination]] and [[sovereignty]] over the [[region of Palestine]].<ref name="Waartp223">de Waart, 1994, [https://books.google.com/books?id=FMxKEAAAQBAJ&dq=%22armed+struggle%22+%22self-determination%22+palestinian&pg=PA223 p. 223]. Referencing Article 9 of ''The [[Palestinian National Charter]] of 1968''. The [[Avalon Project]] has a copy here [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/plocov.asp]</ref> Originally formed in the early 20th century [[Anti-Zionism|in opposition]] to [[Zionism]], Palestinian nationalism later internationalized and attached itself to other ideologies;<ref>Joffe, Alex. [https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/palestinians-internationalization-means-ends/ "Palestinians and Internationalization: Means and Ends."] ''[[Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies]]''. 26 November 2017. 28 November 2017.</ref> it has thus rejected the [[Israeli-occupied territories|occupation]] of the [[Palestinian territories]] by the government of [[Israel]] since the [[Six-Day War|1967 Six-Day War]].<ref>{{cite web |date=2 January 2015 |title=No UN Vote Can Deny the Palestinian People Their Right to Self Determination |url=http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/john-wight/palestine-state_b_6406308.html |access-date=13 October 2024 |work=[[The Huffington Post]]}}</ref> Palestinian nationalists often draw upon broader political traditions in their [[ideology]], such as [[Arab socialism]] and [[ethnic nationalism]] in the context of Muslim [[religious nationalism]]. Related beliefs have shaped the [[government of Palestine]] and continue to do so.
In the broader context of the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]] in the 21st century, Palestinian nationalist aims have included an end to the [[Palestinian refugee|refugee status of individuals]] separated from their native lands during the [[1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight]], advocates stating that a "[[Palestinian right of return|right of return]]" exists either to the occupied territories or to both those areas plus places within Israel itself. Nationalists have additionally worked to advance specific causes in terms of current residents' lives such as [[freedom of assembly]], [[labor rights]], the [[right to health care]], and the [[right to travel]]. Divisions exist between nationalists over particular ideological goals, an example being the gulf between [[Islamism|Islamist]] Palestinians favoring a more [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]] state compared to [[Centrism|centrist]] and [[Secularism|secular]] Palestinians supporting [[Democracy|democratic]] [[self-determination]]. Palestinian nationalists are also divided by preferred tactics; some favor [[nonviolent resistance]] while others advocate for and engage in [[Palestinian political violence|political violence both inside and outside Israel]].<ref>Ibish, Hussen. [https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/10/anti-semitism-poison-palestinian-cause/684473/ "Anti-Semitism Is Poison for the Palestinian Cause."] ''The Atlantic''. 7 October 2025. 7 October 2025.</ref>
[[File:Flag of Palestine.svg|thumb|right|260x260px|[[Flag of Palestine]]]]
==Origins==
[[File:Palestine 1930.jpg|thumb|left|A 1930 protest in [[Jerusalem]] against the British Mandate by Palestinian women. The sign reads "No dialogue, no negotiations until termination [of the Mandate]".]] {{Palestinians}}
Israeli historian Haim Gerber, a professor of Islamic History at [[Hebrew University of Jerusalem]], traces Arab nationalism back to a 17th-century religious leader, [[Mufti]] [[Khayr al-Din al-Ramli]] (1585–1671) who lived in [[Ramla]]. Khayr al-Din al-Ramli's religious edicts (''[[fatwa]]'', plural ''fatawa''), collected into final form in 1670 under the name ''al-Fatawa al-Khayriyah'', mentions the concepts ''Filastin'', ''biladuna'' (our country), ''[[al-Sham]]'' (Syria), ''Misr'' ([[Egypt]]), and ''diyar'' ([[country]]), in senses that appear to go beyond objective geography. Gerber describes this as "embryonic territorial awareness, though the reference is to social awareness rather than to a political one".<ref name="Gerber 1998">{{cite journal |title="Palestine" and Other Territorial Concepts in the 17th Century |journal=International Journal of Middle East Studies |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=563–572 |jstor=164341 |last1=Gerber |first1=Haim |year=1998|doi=10.1017/S0020743800052569|s2cid=162982234}}</ref> [[Baruch Kimmerling]] and [[Joel Migdal]] suggest a singular Palestinian identity was first prefigured in the inter-community coalitions which emerged in the region after the [[Palestinian Arab revolt 1834|1834 Palestinian Arab revolt]] against Egyptian conquest and conscription.<ref name=Kimmerling6>Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel S, (2003) ''The Palestinian People: A History, Cambridge, Harvard University Press'', {{ISBN|0-674-01131-7}} pp. 6–11</ref>
[[File:Khalil Beidas 1898 use of the word Palestinians in the preface to his translation of Akim Olesnitsky's A Description of the Holy Land.png|thumb|[[Khalil Beidas]]'s 1898 use of the word "Palestinians" in the [[preface]] to his translation of [[w:ru:Олесницкий, Аким Алексеевич|Akim Olesnitsky's]] [[:File:Olesnitsky A. The Holy Land. Vol. 1 (Russian).djvu|A Description of the Holy Land]]<ref name=Fos />]]
Zachary J. Foster suggests the first recorded use of the term "Filastini" ({{lit|Palestinian}}) to describe the region's Arab inhabitants dates to 1898, when [[Khalil Beidas]] used it in the [[preface]] to a book he translated from Russian to Arabic.{{efn|In the book, [[:ru:Олесницкий, Аким Алексеевич|Akim Olesnitsky's]] [[:File:Olesnitsky A. The Holy Land. Vol. 1 (Russian).djvu|''A Description of the Holy Land'']], Beidas explained that the summer agricultural work in Palestine began in May with the wheat and barley harvest. After enduring the entire summer with no rain at all—leaving the water cisterns depleted and the rivers and springs dry—"the Palestinian peasant waits impatiently for winter to come, for the season's rain to moisten his fossilized fields."<ref name=Fos />}} Foster said that the term "Palestinian" had already been used decades earlier in Western languages by the 1846–1863 British Consul in Jerusalem, [[James Finn]]; the German [[Lutheran]] missionary Johann Ludwig Schneller (1820–1896), founder of the [[Schneller Orphanage|Syrian Orphanage]]; and the American James Wells.<ref name=Fos>Zachary Foster, [http://blog.palestine-studies.org/2016/02/18/who-was-the-first-palestinian-in-modern-history "Who Was The First Palestinian in Modern History"] {{webarchive |url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160229164114/http://blog.palestine-studies.org/2016/02/18/who-was-the-first-palestinian-in-modern-history |date=29 February 2016}} ''The Palestine Square'', 18 February 2016</ref> Foster also records early usage of the term by Farid Georges Kassab, "a [[Beirut]]-based [[Eastern Orthodox Church|Orthodox Christian]]" in 1909. Kassab refers to the Arabic-speaking locals as Palestinians throughout his book, ''Palestine, Hellenism, and Clericalism'', but also says that "the Orthodox Palestinian Ottomans call themselves Arabs".<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-03-11/whats-palestinian|title=What's a Palestinian?|first=Zachary J.|last=Foster|date=6 October 2015|magazine=Foreign Affairs}}</ref> From 1911, the Palestinian Arab Christian newspaper ''[[Falastin]]'' also addressed its readers as Palestinians.<ref name="AAP1">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MHa3AwAAQBAJ|title=The PFLP's Changing Role in the Middle East|page=36|author=Harold M. Cubert|publisher=Routledge|date=3 June 2014|isbn=978-1-135-22022-8 |accessdate=31 December 2023|quote=That year, Al-Karmil was founded in Haifa 'with the purpose of opposing Zionist colonization...' and in 1911, Falastin began publication, referring to its readers, for the first time, as 'Palestinians'.}}</ref><ref name="AAP2">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kdnxxIskv_MC|title=The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I|page=128|author=Neville J. Mandel|year=1976|accessdate=31 December 2023|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-02466-3 |quote=As befitted its name, Falastin regularly discussed questions to do with Palestine as if it were a distinct entity and, in writing against the Zionists, addressed its readers as "Palestinians".}}</ref>
[[File:Filastin 1936 issue (cropped).png|thumb|1936 issue of the Palestinian Arab Christian ''[[Falastin]]'' newspaper addressed its readers as "Palestinians" since its establishment in 1911.<ref name="AAP1"/><ref name="AAP2" />]]
In his 1997 book, ''Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness'', historian [[Rashid Khalidi]] says that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" playing an important role.<ref name=Khalidip19>Khalidi, 1997, p. 19–21.</ref> Khalidi describes the Arab population of British [[Mandatory Palestine]] as having "overlapping identities", with some or many expressing loyalties to villages, regions, a projected nation of Palestine, an alternative of inclusion in a [[Greater Syria]], an Arab national project, as well as to [[Islam]];<ref>Provence, Michael (2005) ''The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism'', University of Texas Press, {{ISBN|0-292-70680-4}} p. 158</ref> and that this had not yet evolved into "nation-state [[nationalism]]".<ref>Rashid Khalidi (1997) ''Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|0-231-10515-0}} p. 32</ref> He says that modern-day Palestinian identity is informed by the history of Palestine—encompassing the Biblical, Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, Fatimid, Crusader, Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman periods—as Palestinians have come to understand it over the last century,<ref name=Khalidip18>Khalidi, 1997, p. 18.</ref> but says that Palestinian nationalist consciousness is in fact "relatively modern".<ref>Khalidi, 1997, p. 149.</ref> Khalidi suggests the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in nationalist discourses that emerged among the peoples of the [[Ottoman Empire]] in the late 19th century, which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in the [[Middle East]] after [[World War I]].<ref name=Khalidip19/> [[James L. Gelvin]] suggests the emergence of Palestinian nationalism during the [[interwar period]] was a "response to Zionist immigration and settlement".<ref name="Gelvin 92">Gelvin, 2005, pp. 92–93.</ref> He says this does not make Palestinian identity any less legitimate "or make it less valid than Zionism", since "all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose".<ref name="Gelvin 92" /> Khalidi also says that [[Zionism]] played a role in shaping the Palestinian identity, but says "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism".<ref name=Khalidip19 />
[[Bernard Lewis]] says Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I", and therefore Palestinians could not oppose Zionism based on Palestinian nationalism, since it did not yet exist.<ref name=Lewis>{{cite book |title=Semites and Anti-Semites, An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice |author=Bernard Lewis |publisher=W.W. Norton and Company |year=1999 |page=169 s|isbn=978-0-393-31839-5}}</ref> [[Benny Morris]] suggests that the Arabs in Palestine remained part of a larger [[Pan-Islamist]] or [[Pan-Arab]] national movement until 1920.<ref>[[Benny Morris]], ''Righteous Victims'', pp. 40–42 in the French edition.</ref> Morris says the emergence of the Palestinian national identity can be traced through the successive postwar [[Palestine Arab Congress]]es: in January 1919, the [[Palestine Arab Congress#First congress: Jerusalem, 1919|First Congress]] saw "Palestine as part of Arab Syria"; in December 1920, the [[Palestine Arab Congress#Third congress: Haifa, 1920|Third Congress]] called upon the British to establish a "native government", making no further mention of "Southern Syria".<ref>[[Benny Morris]], ''Righteous Victims'', p.36</ref> [[Daniel Pipes]] suggests that, as a result of the carving of the [[Mandatory Palestine|British Mandate of Palestine]] out of [[Greater Syria]], the Arabs of the new Mandate were forced to make the best they could of their situation, with a distinctly "Palestinian Arab" identity emerging by the end of 1920.<ref>"The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine", by Daniel Pipes, ''The Jerusalem Post'', 13 September 2000 [http://www.danielpipes.org/352/the-year-the-arabs-discovered-palestine]</ref>
==Late Ottoman context== The collapse of the [[Ottoman Empire]] was accompanied by an increasing sense of [[Arab]] identity in the Empire's Arab provinces, most notably [[Syria (region)|Syria]], considered to include both northern [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]] and [[Lebanon]]. This development is often seen as connected to the wider reformist trend known as ''[[al-Nahda]]'' ("awakening", sometimes called "the Arab [[renaissance]]"), which in the late 19th century brought about a redefinition of Arab cultural and political identities with the unifying feature of [[Arabic]].<ref>Gudrun Krämer and Graham Harman (2008) A history of Palestine: from the Ottoman conquest to the founding of the state of Israel Princeton University Press, {{ISBN|0-691-11897-3}} p 123</ref>
Under the Ottomans, Palestine's Arab population mostly saw themselves as Ottoman subjects. In the 1830s however, Palestine was occupied by the Egyptian vassal of the Ottomans, [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt|Muhammad Ali]] and his son [[Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt|Ibrahim Pasha]]. The [[1834 Palestinian Arab revolt|Palestinian Arab revolt]] was precipitated by popular resistance against heavy demands for conscripts, as peasants were well aware that conscription was little more than a death sentence. Starting in May 1834 the rebels took many cities, among them [[Jerusalem]], [[Hebron]] and [[Nablus]]. In response, Ibrahim Pasha sent in an army, finally defeating the last rebels on 4 August in Hebron.<ref name=Kimmerling6/>
[[File:Flag of Hejaz (1917).svg|thumb|right|The [[Flag of the Arab Revolt|flag]] of the [[Arab Revolt]] against the [[Ottoman Empire]] is a prominent symbol of Arab nationalism. Its design and [[Pan-Arab colors|colors]] are the basis of many of the [[Arab states]]' [[List of Arab flags|flags]].]] While [[Arab nationalism]], at least in an early form, and [[Syrian nationalism]] were the dominant tendencies along with continuing loyalty to the Ottoman state, Palestinian politics were marked by a reaction to foreign predominance and the growth of foreign immigration, particularly [[Zionism|Zionist]].<ref>Foreign predominance and the rise of Palestinian nationalism *[[James L. Gelvin|Gelvin, James L.]] [https://books.google.com/books?id=wfIFVze1MqQC&dq=%22Golda+Meir%22+%22full+text%22&pg=PA93 "The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One ..."] ''[[Google Book Search]]''. 5 February 2009. *Palestine: a study of Jewish, Arab, and British policies By Esco Foundation for Palestine, inc Published by Yale university press, 1947 p 1058</ref>
The Egyptian occupation of Palestine in the 1830s resulted in the destruction of [[Acre, Israel|Acre]] and thus, the political importance of Nablus increased. The Ottomans wrested back control of Palestine from the Egyptians in 1840–41. As a result, the Abd al-Hadi clan, who originated in [[Arraba, Jenin|Arrabah]] in the [[Sahl Arraba]] region in northern [[Samaria]], rose to prominence. Loyal allies of Jezzar Pasha and the Tuqans, they gained the governorship of Jabal Nablus and other ''sanjaqs''.<ref name="Doumani4">Doumani, 1995, Chapter: Egyptian rule, 1831-1840.</ref>
In 1887 the [[Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem|Mutassariflik (Mutasarrifate) of Jerusalem]] was constituted as part of an Ottoman government policy dividing the [[vilayet]] of [[Syria Vilayet|Greater Syria]] into smaller administrative units. The administration of the mutasarrifate took on a distinctly local appearance.<ref>Jacob Lassner, Selwyn Ilan Troen (2007), ''Jews and Muslims in the Arab world: haunted by pasts real and imagined'', Rowman & Littlefield, {{ISBN|0-7425-5842-8}}, p. 70</ref>
[[Michelle Compos]] records that "Later, after the founding of [[Tel Aviv]] in 1909, conflicts over land grew in the direction of explicit national rivalry."<ref>Sandra Marlene Sufian and Mark LeVine (2007) ''Reapproaching borders: new perspectives on the study of Israel-Palestine'', Rowman & Littlefield, "Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict", by Michelle Compos {{ISBN|0-7425-4639-X}}, p. 48</ref> Zionist ambitions were increasingly identified as a threat by Palestinian leaders, while cases of purchase of lands by Zionist settlers and the subsequent eviction of Palestinian peasants aggravated the issue.
The programmes of four Palestinian nationalist societies ''jamyyat al-Ikha’ wal-‘Afaf'' (Brotherhood and Purity), ''al-jam’iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya'' (Islamic Charitable Society), ''Shirkat al-Iqtissad al-Falastini al-Arabi'' ({{lit|Arab Palestinian Economic Association}}) and ''Shirkat al-Tijara al-Wataniyya al-Iqtisadiyya'' ({{lit|National Economic Trade Association}}) were reported in the newspaper ''[[Filastin (newspaper)|Filastin]]'' in June 1914 by letter from R. Abu al-Sal’ud. The four societies has similarities in function and ideals; the promotion of patriotism, educational aspirations and support for national industries.<ref>Kayyālī, ʻAbd al-Wahhāb (1978) Palestine: a modern history Routledge, {{ISBN|0-85664-635-0}} p 33</ref>
==Nationalist groups built around notables== Palestinian Arab ''A’ayan'' ("Notables") were a group of urban elites at the apex of the Palestinian socio-economic pyramid where the combination of economic and political power dominated Palestinian Arab politics throughout the British Mandate period. The dominance of the A’ayan had been encouraged and utilised during the Ottoman period and later, by the British during the Mandate period, to act as intermediaries between the authority and the people to administer the local affairs of Palestine.{{cn|date=March 2026}}
=== Al-Husseini === The [[al-Husayni]] family were a major force in rebelling against [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt|Muhammad Ali]] who governed [[Egypt]] and Palestine in defiance of the [[Ottoman Empire]]. This solidified a cooperative relationship with the returning Ottoman authority. The family took part in fighting the [[Qaisi]] family in an alliance with a rural lord of the [[Jerusalem]] area [[Suba, Jerusalem|Mustafa Abu Ghosh]], who clashed with the tribe frequently. The feuds gradually occurred in the city between the clan and the Khalidis that led the Qaisis however these conflicts dealt with city positions and not Qaisi-Yamani rivalry.<ref name="Pappe">{{cite web|author = Illan Pappe|url = http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/details.php?cat=4&id=107|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070928031217/http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/details.php?cat=4&id=107|url-status = dead|archive-date = 28 September 2007|title=The Rise and Fall of the Husainis (Part 1)|work=jerusalemquarterly.org}}</ref>
The Husaynis later led resistance and propaganda movements against the [[Young Turks]] who controlled the Ottoman Empire and more so against the British Mandate government and early Zionist immigration.<ref name="Pappe"/> [[Jamal al-Husayni]] was the founder and chairman of the [[Palestine Arab Party]] (PAP) in 1935. [[Emil Ghoury]] was elected as General Secretary, a post he held until the end of the British Mandate in 1948. In 1948, after [[Jordan]] had occupied Jerusalem, [[Abdullah I of Jordan|King Abdullah of Jordan]] removed [[Mohammad Amin al-Husayni|Hajj Amīn al-Husayni]] from the post of [[Grand Mufti of Jerusalem]] and banned him from entering Jerusalem.{{cn|date=March 2026}}
=== Nashashibi === The [[Nashashibi]] family had particularly strong influence in Palestine during the British Mandate Period from 1920 until 1948.<ref>[http://www.jerusalemites.org/people_and_land/families/1.htm Jerusalemites] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080922130607/http://www.jerusalemites.org/people_and_land/families/1.htm |date=22 September 2008 }} Families of Jerusalem and Palestine</ref> Throughout this period, they competed with the Husaynis, for dominance of the Palestinian Arab political scene.<ref>Don Peretz (1994) The [[Middle East]] today Greenwood Publishing Group, {{ISBN|0-275-94576-6}} p 290</ref> As with other A’ayan their lack of identification with the Palestinian Arab population allowed them to rise as leaders but not as representatives of the Palestinian Arab community.<ref>Ilan Pappé (2004) A history of modern Palestine: one land, two peoples Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|0-521-55632-5}} p 103</ref> The Nashashibi family was led by [[Raghib Nashashibi]], who was appointed as Mayor of Jerusalem in 1920.<ref>Meron Benvenisti (1998) City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem University of California Press, {{ISBN|0-520-20768-8}} p 119</ref> Raghib was an influential political figure throughout the British Mandate period, and helped form the [[National Defence Party (Palestine)|National Defence Party]] in 1934.<ref>Issa Khalaf, Issa (1991) ''Politics in Palestine: Arab factionalism and social disintegration, 1939-1948,'' State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|0-7914-0708-X}} p 79</ref> He also served as a minister in the Jordanian government, governor of the West Bank, member of the Jordanian Senate, and the first military governor in Palestine.
=== Tuqan === The [[Tuqan]] family, originally from northern Syria, was led by [[List of Governors of Gaza and Jaffa|Hajj Salih Pasha Tuqan]] in the early eighteenth century and were the competitors of the Nimr family in the ''Jabal'' Nablus (the sub-district of Nablus and Jenin). Members of the Tuqan family held the post of ''mutasallim'' (sub-district governor) longer than did any other family in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.The rivalry between the Tuqans and Nimr family continued until the 1820s.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft896nb5pc&chunk.id=s1.1.6&toc.depth=1&toc.id=s1.1.6&brand=eschol;query=Qasim#1|title=Rediscovering Palestine|work=escholarship.org}}</ref>
=== Abd al-Hadi === [[Awni Abd al-Hadi]] of the ‘Abd al Hadi family. The Abd al-Hadis were a leading landowning family in the Palestinian districts of [[Afula]], [[Baysan]], Jenin, and Nablus. Awni established the ''Hizb al-Istiqlal'' ([[Independence Party (Palestine)|Independence Party]]) as a branch of the pan-Arab party. [[Rushdi Abd al-Hadi]] joined the British administrative service in 1921. [[Amin Abd al-Hadi]] joined the SMC in 1929, and Tahsin Abd al-Hadi was mayor of Jenin. Some family members secretly sold their shares of Zirʿin village to the Jewish National Fund in July 1930 despite nationalist opposition to such land sales. [[Tarab Abdul Hadi|Tarab ‘Abd al Hadi]] feminist and activist was the wife of Awni ‘Abd al Hadi, [[Abd al-Hadi Palace]] built by Mahmud ‘Abd al Hadi in Nablus stands testament to the power and prestige of the family.
=== Khalidiy, al-Dajjani, al-Shanti === Other A’ayan were the Khalidi family, al-Dajjani family, and the al-Shanti family. The views of the A’ayan and their allies largely shaped the divergent political stances of Palestinian Arabs at the time. In 1918, as the Palestinian Arab national movements gained strength in Jerusalem, [[Jaffa]], [[Haifa]], [[Acre, Israel|Acre]] and [[Nablus]], Aref al-Aref joined Hajj Amīn, his brother Fakhri Al Husseini, Ishaaq Darweesh, Ibrahim Darweesh, [[Jamal al-Husayni]], [[Kamel Al Budeiri]], and Sheikh Hassan Abu Al-So’oud in establishing the Arab Club.
==British Mandate period== ===1918–1920 nationalist activity=== Following the arrival of the British a number of [[Muslim-Christian Associations]] were established in all the major towns. In 1919 they joined to hold the first [[Palestine Arab Congress]] in Jerusalem. Its main platforms were a call for representative government and opposition to the [[Balfour Declaration]].
The [[Faisal-Weizmann Agreement]] led the Palestinian Arab population to reject the Syrian-Arab-Nationalist movement led by Faisal (in which many previously placed their hopes) and instead to agitate for Palestine to become a separate state, with an Arab majority. To further that objective, they demanded an elected assembly.<ref>Porath, chapter 2</ref> In 1919, in response to Palestinian Arab fears of the inclusion of the Balfour declaration to process the secret society ''al-Kaff al-Sawada’'' (the Black-hand, its name soon changed to ''al-Fida’iyya'', The Self-Sacrificers) was founded, it later played an important role in clandestine anti-British and anti-Zionist activities. The society was run by the ''al-Dajjani'' and ''al-Shanti'' families, with Ibrahim Hammani in charge of training; ‘Isa al-Sifri developed a secret code for correspondence. The society was initially based in Jaffa but moved its headquarters to [[Nablus]], the Jerusalem branch was run by ''Mahmud Aziz al-Khalidi''.<ref>Eliezer Tauber, ''The Formation of Modern Iraq and Syria'', Routledge, London 1994 pp.105-109</ref>
[[File:Nebi Musa riots, The Times, Thursday, Apr 08, 1920.png|thumb|''[[The Times]]'' report of the riots, 8 April 1920]] After the April riots an event took place that turned the traditional rivalry between the Husayni and Nashashibi clans into a serious rift,<ref>Eliezer Tauber, ''The Formation of Modern Iraq and Syria'', Routledge, London 1994 p.102</ref> with long-term consequences for al-Husayni and Palestinian nationalism. According to [[Louis Bols|Sir Louis Bols]], great pressure was brought to bear on the military administration from Zionist leaders and officials such as David Yellin, to have the Mayor of Jerusalem, [[Musa al-Husayni|Mousa Kazzim]] al-Husayni, dismissed, given his presence in the [[1920 Palestine riots|Nabi Musa riots]] of the previous March. Colonel [[Ronald Storrs|Storrs]], the Military Governor of Jerusalem, removed him without further inquiry, replacing him with Raghib. This, according to the Palin report, 'had a profound effect on his co-religionists, definitely confirming the conviction they had already formed from other evidence that the Civil Administration was the mere puppet of the Zionist Organization.'<ref>Palin Report, pp. 29-33. Cited Huneidi p.37.</ref>
===Supreme Muslim Council under Hajj Amin (1921–1937)=== The [[Mandatory Palestine#British High Commissioners for Palestine|High Commissioner of Palestine]], [[Herbert Samuel, 1st Viscount Samuel|Herbert Samuel]], as a counterbalance the Nashashibis gaining the position of Mayor of Jerusalem, pardoned Hajj Amīn and Aref al-Aref and established a [[Supreme Muslim Council]] (SMC), or Supreme Muslim Sharia Council, on 20 December 1921.<ref>Cleveland, William L.(2000) A history of the modern Middle East Westview Press, {{ISBN|978-0-8133-3489-9}}</ref> The SMC was to have authority over all the Muslim ''[[Waqf]]s'' (religious endowments) and ''[[Sharia]]'' (religious law) Courts in Palestine. The members of the council were to be elected by an electoral college and appointed Hajj Amīn as president of the council with the powers of employment over all Muslim officials throughout Palestine.<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/59a92104ed00dc468525625b00527fea!OpenDocument UN Doc] {{webarchive |url= https://web.archive.org/web/20081220135900/http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/59a92104ed00dc468525625b00527fea!OpenDocument |date= 20 December 2008 }}</ref> The Anglo American committee termed it a powerful political machine.<ref name=KSMC66/>
The Hajj Amin rarely delegated authority, consequently most of the council's executive work was carried out by Hajj Amīn.<ref name=KSMC66>Kupferschmidt, Uri M. (1987) The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam Under the British Mandate for Palestine {{ISBN|90-04-07929-7}} pp 66-67</ref> Nepotism and favoritism played a central part to Hajj Amīn's tenure as president of the SMC, Amīn al-Tamīmī was appointed as acting president when the Hajj Amīn was abroad, The secretaries appointed were ‘Abdallah Shafĩq and Muhammad al’Afĩfĩ and from 1928 to 1930 the secretary was Hajj Amīn's relative [[Jamal al-Husayni|Jamāl al-Husaynī]], Sa’d al Dīn al-Khaţīb and later another of the Hajj Amīn's relatives ‘Alī al-Husaynī and [[‘Ajaj Nuwayhid]], a [[Druze]] was an adviser.<ref name=KSMC66/>
====Politicisation of the Wailing Wall==== It was during the [[Mandatory Palestine|British mandate]] period that politicisation of the [[Western Wall|Wailing Wall]] occurred.<ref>[http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/details.php?cat=4&id=23 Jerusalemite] Institute of Jerusalem Studies: Heritage, Nationalism and the Shifting Symbolism of the Wailing Wall by Simone Ricca</ref>{{Explain|date=May 2025}} The disturbances at the Wailing wall in 1928{{Which|date=May 2025}} were repeated in 1929, however the violence in the [[1929 Palestine riots|riots that followed]], that left 116 Palestinian Arabs, 133 Jews dead and 339 wounded, were surprising in their intensity.<ref>1929 Palestine riots *Sandra Marlene Sufian and Mark LeVine (2007) -Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict by Michelle Compos p 54 *''San Francisco Chronicle'', 9 August 2005, "A Time of Change; Israelis, Palestinians and the Disengagement" *NA 59/8/353/84/867n, 404 Wailing Wall/279 and 280, Archdale Diary and Palestinian Police records.</ref>
====Black Hand gang==== [[Izz ad-Din al-Qassam]] established the [[Black Hand (Palestine)|Black Hand gang]] in 1935. Izz ad-Din died in a shootout against the British forces.<ref>Fereydoun Hoveyda, National Committee on American Foreign Policy (2002) The broken crescent: the "threat" of militant Islamic fundamentalism Greenwood Publishing Group, {{ISBN|0-275-97902-4}} p 11</ref><ref>Sylvain Cypel (2006) p 340</ref> He has been popularised in Palestinian nationalist folklore for his fight against [[Zionism]].<ref>Abdullah Franji (1983) p 87</ref>
===1936–1939 Arab revolt=== [[1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine|The Great revolt of 1936–1939]] was an uprising by Palestinian Arabs in the British Mandate of Palestine in protest against mass Jewish immigration.
[[Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni]], a leader of the revolt, was a member of the [[Palestine Arab Party]] who had served as its Secretary-General and had become editor-in-chief of the party's paper ''Al-Liwa’''<ref>Levenberg, 1993, p. 6.</ref> as well as of other newspapers, including ''Al-Jami’a Al-Islamiyya''.<ref>Kabahā, Muṣṭafá (2007), ''The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929–39: Writing Up a Storm'', Vallentine Mitchell, {{ISBN|0-85303-672-1}} p. 71</ref> In 1938, Abd al-Qadir was exiled and in 1939 fled to [[Iraq]] where he took part in the [[Iraq coup (1941)|Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup]].
[[Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari]], who had started his career as a devoted follower of Hajj Amin, broke with the influential Husayni family in the early 1940s.<ref name=morris1948>Benny Morris (2008) ''1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War''. Yale University Press {{ISBN|978-0-300-12696-9}} pp. 88–89.</ref> The British estimated the strength of the [[al-Najjada]] paramilitary scout movement, led by Al-Hawari, at 8,000 prior to 1947.<ref name="IK1">Khalaf, 1991, p 143.</ref>
====1937 Peel Report and its aftermath==== The [[Nashashibi family|Nashashibi]] clan broke with the [[Arab High Committee]] and [[Amin al-Husseini|Hajj Amīn]] shortly after the contents of the [[Peel Commission|Palestine Royal Commission report]] compiled by the Peel Commission were released on 7 July 1937, announcing a territorial partition plan.<ref name=TS177181 /> The Nashashibis, the Arab [[Palestine Communist Party|Palestinian Communist Party]], and many other Palestinians accepted the plan, but the split in the ranks between rejectionists and pro-partitionists led to Hajj Amin taking control of the Arab High Committee. He, with the support of the [[Arab League]], rejected the plan.<ref>[[Benny Morris|Morris, Benny]]. ''The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited'' (Cambridge, 2004), p. 588. qtd. by [http://oslo.mfa.gov.il/mfm/Data/143057.doc Susser].
*[[John Quigley (academic)|Quigley, John]]. [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/3337 "Israel and the Palestinians: An Exchange."] ''[[The New York Review of Books]]''. 7 March 1991. 17 March 2009. *[https://web.archive.org/web/20080511200200/http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/981931.html ''Haaretz''] "The real Nakba", Shlomo Avineri, 9 May 2008 *Shlaim, Avi (reprint 2004) ''The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921–1951'', Oxford University Press {{ISBN|0-19-829459-X}} p 104 *Morris, Benny, (second edition 2004 third printing 2006) ''The Birth Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited'', Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|0-521-00967-7}} p. 23. The divide between the Husseinis and the Opposition had relatively clear geographical as well as familial-clan demarcations, both reflecting and intensifying the regionalism that had characterised Palestinian society and politics for centuries, Husseini strength lay in Jerusalem and its surrounding villages, rural Samaria and Gaza; the Opposition was strong in [[Hebron]], the [[Galilee]], [[Tiberias]] and [[Beisan]], [[Nablus]], [[Jenin]] and [[Haifa]].</ref>
====Results==== The revolt of 1936–1939 led to an imbalance of power between the Jewish community and the Palestinian Arab community, as the latter had been substantially disarmed.<ref name=TS177181>Ted Swedenburg. (1988)</ref> The British also greatly reduced Zionist immigration to appease the Arab Middle East with a confrontation with [[Nazi Germany]] looming.<ref name="morrisarabrevolt">{{cite book |last1=Morris |first1=Benny |title=Righteous victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881 - 2001 |date=1999 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group |location=Westminster |isbn=9780679744757 |pages=157–158}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Zipperstein |first1=Steven E. |title=Zionism, Palestinian nationalism and the law: 1939-1948 |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |location=London New York |isbn=9781000484380 }}</ref> A further offer was made to the Palestinians in the British "[[White Paper of 1939]]", which proposed a ceiling of 75,000 on Jewish migration into Palestine over the next five years, after which Arab agreement would be required. It additionally proposed severely limiting Jewish land purchases, and offered an Arab-majority Palestinian state within ten years. This offer was rejected by the [[Arab Higher Committee]].<ref name="morrisarabrevolt" /><ref>{{harvnb|Zipperstein|2022}}: "The White Paper adopted nearly all the Arab demands for Palestine, laying the groundwork for a future one-state solution by dramatically restricting Jewish immigration and land purchases. The Arabs received an absolute veto over future Jewish immigration after the initial five-year period, thereby locking in a two-to-one Arab majority throughout Palestine. Significantly, the White Paper did not give the Jews ''any'' ability to veto or postpone the creation of the independent Palestine State after ten years, abandoning MacDonald's initial concept of a reciprocal veto structure, in which the Arab veto of future Jewish immigration would be offset by a Jewish veto over Palestine statehood.<br/> "[...] The Palestinian Arabs, dissatisfied at not receiving everything they had demanded, publicly denounced the White Paper for failing to halt Jewish immigration immediately and for failing to confer immediate statehood on Palestine and its existing Arab majority. "</ref>
==1947–1948 war== Al-Qadir moved to [[Egypt]] in 1946, but secretly returned to Palestine to lead the [[Army of the Holy War]] (AHW) in January 1948, and was killed during hand-to-hand fighting against [[Haganah]]; where AHW captured [[Al Qastal, Jerusalem|Qastal Hill]] on the [[Tel Aviv]]–[[Jerusalem]] road, on 8 April 1948.<ref>al-Qadir dies at Qastal *Morris, (2003), pp. 234–235. *''[https://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30D1FFA395B177A93CBA9178FD85F4C8485F9&scp=1&sq=Dana%20Adams%20Schmidt,%20%27Arabs%20Win%20Kastel%20But%20Chief%20is%20Slain&st=cse New York Times]'', "Arabs Win Kastel But Chief is Slain; Kader el-Husseini, a Cousin of Mufti, Falls as His Men Recapture Key Village", by Dana Adams Schmidt, 9 April 1948. *Benveniśtî, (2002), p.111.</ref> al-Qadir's death was a factor in the loss of morale among his forces, Ghuri, who had no experience of military command was appointed as commander of the AHW. [[Fawzi al-Qawuqji]], at the head of the [[Arab Liberation Army]] remained as the only prominent military commander.<ref>Gelber, Yoav (2001) pp 89–90</ref>
==1948–1964== [[File:Husayni meeting Abdel Nasser.jpg|thumb|upright|Haj Amin al-Husseini meeting with [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]], the future Egyptian president, in 1948]] In September 1948, the [[All-Palestine Government]] was proclaimed in Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, and immediately won the support of Arab League members except Jordan. Though jurisdiction of the Government was declared to cover the whole of the former [[Mandatory Palestine]], its effective jurisdiction was limited to the [[Gaza Strip]].<ref name=gelber177>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcSUgrDsD_sC&q=all+palestine+government&pg=PA364|title=Palestine, 1948: War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem|first=Yoav|last=Gelber|date=21 May 2006|publisher=Sussex Academic Press|isbn=9781845190750 |via=Google Books}}</ref> The Prime Minister of the Gaza-seated administration was named [[Ahmed Hilmi Pasha]], and the President was named [[Hajj Amin al-Husseini]], former chairman of the [[Arab Higher Committee]].<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YAd8efHdVzIC&q=al-husseini+president+%22all-palestine+government%22&pg=PA464|title=Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, The: A Political, Social, and ...|isbn=9781851098422|last1=Tucker|first1=Spencer C.|last2=Roberts|first2=Priscilla|date=12 May 2008|publisher=Abc-Clio }}</ref>
The All-Palestine Government however lacked any significant authority and was in fact seated in Cairo. In 1959 it was officially merged into the [[United Arab Republic]] by the decree of Nasser, crippling any Palestinian hope for self governance. With the establishment in 1948 of the [[State of Israel]], along with the [[1948 Palestinian exodus]], the common experience of the [[Palestinian refugee]] Arabs was mirrored in a fading of Palestinian identity.<ref>Rashid Khalidi (1998) ''Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness''. Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|0-231-10515-0}} p 178</ref> The institutions of a Palestinian nationality emerged slowly among [[Palestinian refugees]] in the diaspora. In 1950 [[Yasser Arafat]] founded ''Ittihad Talabat Filastin''.<ref>Khalidi (1998) p 180</ref> After the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]], most of the Husseini clan relocated to [[Jordan]] and the [[Arab states of the Persian Gulf|Gulf States]]. Many family heads that remained in the Old City and the northern neighborhoods of [[East Jerusalem]] fled due to hostility with the Jordanian government, which controlled that part of the city.<ref name="Rubenstein">[http://www.kokhavivpublications.com/2001/israel/june/10/0106061229.html "Arab Hebronites who came to Jerusalem after 1948 dominate Jerusalem Arab society today"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926220821/http://www.kokhavivpublications.com/2001/israel/june/10/0106061229.html |date=26 September 2007 }} [[Danny Rubenstein]], ''[[Haaretz]]''; 6 June 2001</ref>
The [[Fatah]] movement, which espoused a Palestinian nationalist [[ideology]] in which Palestinians would be liberated by the actions of Palestinian Arabs, was founded in 1954 by members of the Palestinian diaspora—principally professionals working in the Gulf States who had been refugees in [[Gaza City|Gaza]] and had gone on to study in [[Cairo]] or [[Beirut]]—including [[Yasser Arafat]] who was head of the [[General Union of Palestinian Students]] (GUPS) (1952–1956) in [[Cairo University]], [[Salah Khalaf]], [[Khalil al-Wazir]], [[Khaled Yashruti]] was head of the GUPS in Beirut (1958–1962).<ref name="Aburish">Aburish, Said K. (1998) ''Arafat, From Defender to Dictator''. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, pp.41–90. {{ISBN|1-58234-049-8}}.</ref>
==PLO until the First Intifada (1964–1988)== The [[Palestine Liberation Organisation]] was founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964, following an earlier decision of the [[Arab League]]. Issued on 28 May, the PLO's founding charter sought a [[one-state solution]] within the boundaries of [[Mandatory Palestine]], with a [[right of return]] and [[self-determination]] for Palestinians.<ref>Helena Cobban,''The Palestinian Liberation Organisation''(Cambridge University Press, 1984) p.30</ref><ref>See articles 1, 2 and 3 in the [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/plocov.asp Palestinian National Charter (1968)] as published by [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/default.asp The Avalon Project] at Yale Law School</ref> The charter also called for the dissolution of Israel and the expulsion of all Jews that had arrived after the [[Balfour Declaration]], with any remaining Jews considered part of a single democratic state.<ref>{{harvnb|Ross|2005|ps=: "The PLO has its own policy of denial and rejection. Its charter called for the eradication of the Zionist entity (i.e., Israel); the departure from Palestine of all the Jews who arrived after the Balfour Declaration; and the creation of a binational democratic state in which Palestinians would be the decisive majority and Jews a distinct minority."}}{{pb}}{{harvnb|Sayigh|1997|ps=: "The outlines of Fateh's political thinking took shape as these various strands came together. Its ultimate goal was clear: to liberate the whole of Palestine and destroy the foundations of what it termed a colonialist, Zionist occupation state and society. In short, Fateh sought to destroy Israel as an economic, political, and military entity and restore Palestine as it still existed in the mind of most Palestinians, the homeland that was before 1948. [...] Here was little room for the Jews in this outlook. The original Jewish community in Palestine, that pre-dated the [[Mandatory Palestine|British mandate]], could remain but would do so under unequivocally Arab sovereignty. The majority of the Israeli population were an 'alien human assembly', however."}}{{pb}}{{harvnb|PLO|1968|ps=: "The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians. [...] Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong."}}{{harvnb|Morris|2013|ps=: "The Palestinian national movement started life with a vision and goal of a Palestinian Muslim Arab-majority state in all of Palestine—a one-state 'solution'—and continues to espouse and aim to establish such a state down to the present day. Moreover [...] the PLO, which led the national movement from the 1960s to Arafat's death in November 2004 [...] sought and seek to vastly reduce the number of Jewish inhabitants in the country, in other words, to ethnically cleanse Palestine. Al-Husseini and the PLO explicitly declared the aim of limiting Palestinian citizenship to those Jews who had lived in Palestine permanently before 1917 (or, in an-other version, to limit it to those fifty thousand-odd Jews and their descendants). This goal was spelled out clearly in the Palestinian National Charter and in other documents."}}{{pb}}{{harvnb|Morris|2013|ps=: "But clearly Fatah's leaders had some level of expulsionist intent. As [[Salah Khalaf]] ('Abu Iyad') put in (in ''A Dialogue about the Principal Issues''), hinting, or more than hinting, at the goal, the movement had asked the Arab states 'to allow former Jewish Nationals to reclaim their citizenship and property, with the aim of opening a floodgate for "reverse emigration" from Israel.'"}}</ref> The charter also sought to "prohibit... the existence and activity" of Zionism.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cyberus.ca/~baker/covenant.htm|title=Articles 2 and 23 of the Palestinian National Covenant}}</ref>
Following the defeat of the Arab states in the June 1967 [[Six-Day War]], the [[West Bank]], [[East Jerusalem]] and the [[Gaza Strip]] came under Israeli military control and occupation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Imseis |first=Ardi |date=2020-08-01 |title=Negotiating the Illegal: On the United Nations and the Illegal Occupation of Palestine, 1967–2020 |url=https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/31/3/1055/5903619 |journal=European Journal of International Law |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=1055–1085 |doi=10.1093/ejil/chaa055 |issn=0938-5428}}</ref> Following the [[Battle of Karameh]] in May 1968, which Yasser Arafat claimed as a victory (in [[Arabic language|Arabic]], "karameh" means "dignity"), Arafat quickly became a Palestinian national hero. Masses of young Arabs joined the ranks of his group Fatah. Under pressure, [[Ahmad Shukeiri]] resigned from the PLO leadership and in July 1969, Fatah joined and soon controlled the PLO. The fierce Palestinian guerrilla fighting and the Jordanian Artillery bombardment forced the IDF withdrawal and gave the Palestinian Arabs an important morale boost. Israel was calling their army the indomitable army but this was the first chance for Arabs to claim victory after defeat in 1948, 1953, and 1967. After the battle, Fatah began to engage in communal projects to achieve popular affiliation.<ref name="kurz55">Kurz (2006), p. 55</ref> After the Battle of Karameh there was a subsequent increase in the PLO's strength.<ref name="telegraph">{{cite news |title=1968: Karameh and the Palestinian revolt |work=The Daily Telegraph |access-date=3 September 2008 |date=16 May 2002 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1400177/1968-Karameh-and-the-Palestinian-revolt.html}}</ref><ref name="pollack335">Pollack (2002), p. 335</ref>
In 1974 the PLO called for an independent state in the territory of [[Mandatory Palestine|Mandate Palestine]].<ref name=plo1974>[http://www.mideastweb.org/plo1974.htm The PNC Program of 1974], 8 June 1974. On the site of MidEastWeb for Coexistence R.A. – Middle East Resources. Page includes commentary. Retrieved 5 December 2006.</ref> The group used [[terrorist|guerilla]] tactics to attack Israel from their bases in [[Jordan]], [[Lebanon]], and [[Syria]], as well as from within the Gaza Strip and West Bank.<ref>[http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761588322_2/arab-israeli_conflict.html Arab-Israeli Conflict] {{webarchive |url= https://web.archive.org/web/20091028083130/http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761588322_2/Arab-Israeli_Conflict.html |date= 28 October 2009 }}, [[Encarta]]</ref>
In 1988, the PLO officially endorsed a [[two-state solution]], with Israel and Palestine living side-by-side contingent on specific terms such as making [[East Jerusalem]] capital of the Palestinian state and giving Palestinians the [[right of return]] to land occupied by Palestinians prior to the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel.<ref>William L. Cleveland, ''A History of the Modern Middle East'', Westview Press (2004). {{ISBN|0-8133-4048-9}}.</ref> Some scholars, journalists and politicians doubted the honesty in these declarations, and viewed the ambiguity in them as prevarications directed to a Western audience.<ref>{{bulleted list| |{{harvnb|Shindler|2013|p=210-211}}: "At the nineteenth PNC in Algiers in November 1988, Arafat publicly accepted UN Resolution 242, albeit with qualifications, and denounced all forms of terrorism. Yet to appease his opponents, Arafat also refused to give up 'the armed struggle against the Zionist entity'. The Palestinian Declaration of Independence was read out. It was stated that UN Resolution 181 which proclaimed the partition of Palestine into two states in 1947 provided 'the conditions of international legitimacy' to the Palestinian people. There was no mention of Israel or a direct recognition of Israel. [...]<br/> "The Americans were ready to engage the PLO in dialogue, yet Arafat's approach was implicit and indirect. At the beginning of December 1988, Arafat privately gave assurances to US Jewish peace activists in Stockholm, but publicly he was ambiguous about renouncing terrorism and accepting partition. Arafat's address to the UN General Assembly in Geneva on 13 December 1988 recognized an Arab state based on UN Resolution 181 and also UN Resolution 194 which, he argued, provided for 'the Palestinians' right to return to their homeland and property. He spoke about creating peace, 'the peace of the brave'. Arafat refused to say the words which were demanded of him, that 'the existence (of the Palestinians) does not destroy the existence of the Israelis'. Arafat could no longer maintain his lifelong balancing act. He was eventually forced to choose between offending his opponents in the PLO, the advocates of armed struggle, and opening a new chapter in talking to the Americans. After numerous postponements, he finally renounced all forms of terrorism at a press conference in Geneva. The US-PLO dialogue started straight away. Habash and Hawatmeh duly condemned Arafat's words and stated that his statement did not bind them or the PLO. Shamir, on the other hand, said that it was 'a deceitful PLO act of momentous proportions'." |{{harvnb|Morris|2013}}: "Nevertheless, during the following decade, the PLO appeared to inch significantly toward a two-state solution and acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy. On 13 December 1988, speaking before the UN General Assembly convened in Geneva, Arafat spoke of making "peace based on justice." But he failed to address Israel’s right to exist or to dispel the ambiguities relating to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which provided the accepted international basis for a negotiated peace. Two days later, at a press conference, Arafat declared that the PNC had accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for negotiations—in truth, it had not—and he renounced "all types of terrorism." During the following months, Arafat—located between a rock (PLO rejectionist-eliminationist ideology vis-à-vis Israel) and a hard place (American and West Bank–Gaza Palestinian demands for a moderation of the PLO’s position)—continued to play duplicitous word games." }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Segal |first1=Jerome M. |last2=Chomsky |first2=Noam |title=The olive branch from Palestine: the Palestinian declaration of independence and the path out of the current impasse |date=2022 |publisher=University of California Press |location=Oakland, California |isbn=9780520381308}}</ref>
==First Intifada (1987–1993)== ===Local leadership=== The [[First Intifada]] (1987–1993) would prove another watershed in Palestinian nationalism, as it brought the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to the forefront of the struggle. The [[Unified National Leadership of the Uprising]] (UNLU; Arabic {{Transliteration|ar|al-Qiyada al Muwhhada}}) mobilised grassroots support for the uprising.<ref name="Arafat obituary"/>
In 1987, the Intifada caught the PLO by surprise; the leadership abroad could only indirectly influence the events.<ref name="Arafat obituary">[http://www.socialistworld.net/eng/2004/11/11arafat.html Yasser Arafat obituary] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170111102436/http://www.socialistworld.net/eng/2004/11/11arafat.html |date=11 January 2017 }}, socialistworld.net (Committee for a Worker's International).</ref> A new local leadership, the UNLU, emerged, consisting of many leading Palestinian factions. The initially spontaneous disturbances soon came under local leadership from groups and organizations loyal to the PLO that operated within the Occupied Territories: Fatah, the [[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]], the [[Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine]] and the [[Palestine Communist Party]].<ref name="Int39">Zachary Lockman, Joel Beinin (1989) ''Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation'', South End Press, {{ISBN|0-89608-363-2}} p 39</ref> The UNLU was the focus of the social cohesion that sustained the persistent disturbances.<ref>Joel Beinin, Joe Stork, Middle East Report (1997) Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report I.B.Tauris, {{ISBN|1-86064-098-2}} p 194</ref>
After King [[Hussein of Jordan]] proclaimed the administrative and legal separation of the West Bank from Jordan in 1988, the UNLU organised to fill the political vacuum.<ref>King Hussein, [http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html Address to the Nation], Amman, Jordan, 31 July 1988. The Royal Hashemit Court's tribute to King Hussein</ref><ref>Suha Sabbagh (1998) Palestinian women of Gaza and the West Bank. [[Indiana University Press]], {{ISBN|0-253-33377-6}}. p. 48.</ref>
===Emergence of Hamas=== In 1987, Palestinian Islamic scholar [[Ahmed Yassin]] founded the Islamic Resistance Movement, also known as [[Hamas]],<ref name="MERIP 1989">{{cite magazine |last=Taraki |first=Lisa |date=January–February 1989 |title=The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising |url=https://merip.org/1989/01/the-islamic-resistance-movement-in-the-palestinian-uprising/ |url-status=live |magazine=[[Middle East Report]] |location=Tacoma, WA |publisher=[[Middle East Research and Information Project|MERIP]] |issue=156 |pages=30–32 |doi=10.2307/3012813 |issn=0899-2851 |jstor=3012813 |oclc=615545050 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220201212246/https://merip.org/1989/01/the-islamic-resistance-movement-in-the-palestinian-uprising/ |archive-date=1 February 2022 |access-date=1 February 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title= HAMAS |date= September 2022 |accessdate= 4 February 2024 |website= [[National Counterterrorism Center]] |publisher=[[Director of National Intelligence#Office of the Director of National Intelligence]] |url= https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hamas_fto.html |archive-date= 1 November 2023 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20231101140852/https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/hamas_fto.html |url-status= live }}</ref> after the outbreak of the [[First Intifada]] against the [[Israeli occupied territories|Israeli occupation]]. It emerged as a distinct [[Sunni Islam|Sunni]] [[Islamism|Islamist]] organisation<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lopez |first1=Anthony |title=The Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding |last2=Ireland |first2=Carol |last3=Ireland |first3=Jane |last4=Lewis |first4=Michael |publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]] |year=2020 |isbn=9780429588952 |pages=239 |quote=The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas, which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s.}}</ref> from his 1973 [[Mujama al-Islamiya]] Islamic charity affiliated with the [[Muslim Brotherhood]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Higgins |first=Andrew |date=24 January 2009 |title=How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123275572295011847 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=25 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090926212507/http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123275572295011847.html |archive-date=26 September 2009 |quote=When Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza in the 1970s and '80s, they seemed focused on studying the Quran, not on confrontation with Israel. The Israeli government officially recognized a precursor to Hamas called Mujama Al-Islamiya, registering the group as a charity. It allowed Mujama members to set up an Islamic university and build mosques, clubs and schools. Crucially, Israel often stood aside when the Islamists and their secular left-wing Palestinian rivals battled, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank.}}</ref> According to their founding documents, including their first communique in 1987, and their 1988 charter, Hamas was borth with the goals of waging holy war against Zionism, opposing the peace process, and increase religiosity amongst the youth.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Harub |first1=Khalid |title=Hamas: political thought and practice |date=2002 |publisher=Institute for Palestine studies |location=Washington, D.C |isbn=0-88728-276-8}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Janssen |first1=Floor |title=Hamas and its Positions Towards Israel |date=January 2009 |publisher=Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael |location=The Hague |isbn=9789050311380 |url=https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20090200_cscp_security_paper_jansen.pdf}}</ref> The organization advocated for "martyrdom" as the ideal objective in their struggle against Israel.<ref>{{bulleted list| |{{harvnb|Morris|1999}}: "On December 14, 1987, the six-man steering committee put out a flyer listing the Brotherhood’s goals in the rebellion. (Later it was referred to as the first Hamas leaflet, though the first one actually carrying the name “Hamas” appeared in January 1988.’) And here, for the first time, the word “Intifada” appeared in print. The goals were: to wage a holy war against the Zionist enemy, to oppose any peace efforts, and to convert the Arab states to the way of Islam and to draw them into the conflict. The flyer spoke of the ideal Muslim youngsters as those more eager to enter paradise by way of martyrdom in the struggle against Israel “than is our enemy to continue living in this world.”" |{{harvnb|Paz|2017}}: "Seeking to build up popular support for suicide attacks, Hamas exerted every effort to cultivate a culture of martyrdom. According to Hamas leader ʿAbd al-Aziz al-Rantisi (d. 2004), the culture of martyrdom distinguishes the Palestinian people from others and represents the strongest weapon the Palestinians possess – a weapon no one can defeat or take away from them. It is not an imported weapon and it does not require foreign experts to operate, as it has emerged from the depths of the Palestinian soul, suffering, and heroism. Thanks to it, and in contrast to the past, the Palestinians are now able to control events." }} </ref> During the intifada, Hamas ended the PLO's monopoly as sole political representative of the Palestinian people.<ref>Mishal, Shaul and Sela, Avraham (2000) ''The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|0-231-11675-6}} p 1</ref>
===Peace process=== Some Israelis had become tired of the constant violence of the First Intifada, and many were willing to take risks for peace.<ref name="autogenerated2">''The Israel-Palestine Conflict'', James L. Gelvin</ref> Some wanted to realize the economic benefits in the new global economy. The [[Gulf War]] (1990–1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value of territory had been overstated, and that the [[Iraqi invasion of Kuwait]] psychologically reduced their sense of security.<ref>''The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order'', [[Lawrence Freedman]] and [[Efraim Karsh]]</ref>
[[File:Bill Clinton, Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat at the White House 1993-09-13.jpg|thumb|[[Yitzhak Rabin]], [[Yasser Arafat]] and [[Bill Clinton]] at the signing of the [[Oslo Accords]], 13 September 1993]]
A renewal of the Israeli–Palestinian quest for peace began at the end of the [[Cold War]] as the United States took the lead in international affairs. After the collapse of the [[Soviet Union]], Western observers were optimistic, as [[Francis Fukuyama]] wrote in an article, titled "[[The End of History and the Last Man|The End of History]]". The hope was that the end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a new international order. President [[George H. W. Bush]], in a speech on 11 September 1990, spoke of a "rare opportunity" to move toward a "[[New world order (politics)|New world order]]" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the new world is struggling to be born".<ref>[http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm President Bush's speech to Congress] {{webarchive |url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110531214717/http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm |date= 31 May 2011 }} al-bab.com</ref>
====1993 Oslo Agreement==== [[File:Channel2 - Oslo Accords.webm|250px|thumb|right|Signing of the accords]] The demands of the local Palestinian and Israeli populations somewhat differed from those of the Palestinian diaspora, which had constituted the main base of the PLO until then, in that they were primarily interested in [[independence]], rather than the [[right of return]] for refugees. The resulting 1993 [[Oslo Agreement]] cemented the belief in a [[two-state solution]] in the mainstream Palestinian movement, as opposed to the PLO's original goal, a [[one-state solution]] which entailed the destruction of Israel and its replacement with a secular, democratic Palestinian state.<ref>{{cite news |title=Text: 1993 Declaration of Principles |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682727.stm |work=Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements |publisher=BBC |date=29 November 2001}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GkbzYoZtaJMC&pg=PA66 |title=Encyclopedia of the Palestinians – Google Books |isbn=978-0-8160-6986-6 |access-date=2013-10-30|last1=Mattar |first1=Philip |year=2005 |publisher=Infobase }}</ref><ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/2537930?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents ''4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not to Declare?'']. Azmi Bishara, Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 1999), pp. 5–16</ref>
The two-state solution had first been seriously discussed in the 1970s, when [[Said Hammami]] said the PLO would be willing to accept a two-state solution, on at least an interim basis.<ref>Ayoob, Mohammed. ''The Middle East in world politics''. 1981, p. 90</ref><ref>{{cite web|first1=Ḥusayn|last1=Āghā|first2=Shai|last2=Feldman|first3=Aḥmad|last3=Khālidī|first4=Zeev|last4=Schiff|title=Track-II diplomacy: lessons from the Middle East|url=https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/track-ii-diplomacy-lessons-middle-east|publisher=[[Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center]]|date=2003|page=11}}</ref> By 1982, the PLO had officially committed to recognising a two-state solution based on a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. By the mid-1980s, the two-state solution became the negotiating position of the PLO leadership, with leader [[Yasser Arafat]] and King Hussein of Jordan attempting to persuade the United States of the Palestinians' right to self-determination in return for acceptance of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]], and therefore implicit acceptance of Israel's existence.<ref name="PLO recognition of Israel">{{cite book |first=Mark A. |last=Tessler |title=A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict |publisher=[[Indiana State University]] |location=Bloomington |date=1994 |isbn=978-0253208736 |page=720 |quote=Inhabitants of the occupied territories and other Palestinians had shown serious interest in a two-state solution since the mid-1970s, and the mainstream of the PLO had since the 1982 Arab summit in Fez been officially committed to mutual recognition between Israel and a Palestinian state located in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Support for a two-state solution had also informed PLO diplomacy in the mid-1980s, when Yasir Arafat worked with King Hussein in an effort to persuade the United States to recognize the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in return for PLO acceptance of UN [Resolution] 242.}}{{pb}}{{cite web|url=http://www.carim.org/public/polsoctexts/PS2PAL005_EN.pdf |title=The Historic Compromise: The Palestinian Declaration of Independence and the Twenty-Year Struggle for a Two-State Solution |author=PLO Negotiations Affairs Department |date=13 November 2008 |access-date=6 February 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120426022554/http://www.carim.org/public/polsoctexts/PS2PAL005_EN.pdf |archive-date=26 April 2012 }}{{pb}}{{Cite book |last=Quigley |first=John |url=http://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/969/The-Case-for-PalestineAn-International-Law |title=The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective |date=2005 |publisher=Duke University Press |isbn=978-0-8223-3527-6 |language=en |doi=10.1215/9780822386766 |page=212}}</ref> In 1988, the [[Palestine National Council]] (PNC) published the first official Palestinian statement recognising a two-state solution, which called only for withdrawal from [[East Jerusalem]] and the [[occupied Palestinian territories]].<ref>[http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal4.htm Political communique] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20010420191313/http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal4.htm |date=2001-04-20 }} Palestine National Council. Algiers, November 15, 1988. Official translation.</ref> Together with Arafat's later statements in Geneva, this was accepted by the United States as a basis for dialogue.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/arafat88-en |title=Yasser Arafat, Speech at UN General Assembly |date=13 December 1988 |website=Le Monde diplomatique |language=fr |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120119053745/http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/arafat88-en |archive-date=19 January 2012 }}{{pb}}{{cite journal |last=Rabie |first=Mohamed|date=Summer 1992|title=The U.S.-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection |journal= Journal of Palestine Studies|volume=21|issue=4|pages=54–66|doi=10.1525/jps.1992.21.4.00p0140g |jstor=2537663}}{{pb}}{{cite book |author=Quandt, William B. | author-link = William B. Quandt |title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967 |publisher=Brookings Institution |location=Washington |year=1993 |pages=367–375, 494 |isbn=978-0-520-08390-5}}</ref>
==Palestinian National Authority (1993)== In 1993 with the transfer of increased control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem from Israel to the Palestinians, PLO [[Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization|chairman]] Yasser Arafat appointed [[Sulaiman Ja'abari]] as Grand Mufti. When he died in 1994, Arafat appointed [[Ekrima Sa'id Sabri]]. Sabri was removed in 2006 by [[Palestinian National Authority]] [[President of the Palestinian National Authority|president]] [[Mahmoud Abbas]], who was concerned that Sabri was involved too heavily in political matters. Abbas appointed [[Muhammad Ahmad Hussein]], who was perceived as a political moderate.{{citation needed|date=May 2025}}
==Goals== [[File:Demonstrations in solidarity with Sheikh Jarrah in Amman, Jordan (9 May 2021) 45.jpg|thumb|Demonstration in Amman, Jordan, during the [[2021 Israel–Palestine crisis]]]]
===Palestinian statehood=== {{Main|History of the State of Palestine}} Contemporary proposals for a Palestinian state include establishment of an [[State of Palestine|independent state]] for the Palestinian people in [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]] on land that was [[Israeli-occupied territories|occupied by Israel]] since the [[Six-Day War]] of 1967 and prior to that year by [[Egypt]] ([[Gaza City|Gaza]]) and by [[Jordan]] ([[West Bank]] and [[East Jerusalem]]). The proposals include the [[Gaza Strip]], which is controlled by the [[Hamas]] faction of the [[Palestinian National Authority]]; the West Bank, which is administered by the [[Fatah]] faction of the [[Palestinian National Authority]]; and [[East Jerusalem]], which was unilaterally annexed by Israel in 1980 and remains under Israeli control.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1025411.html |work=Haaretz |title=Olmert: Israel must quit East Jerusalem and Golan |access-date=24 October 2014 }}{{pb}}{{cite report |author=<!-- not stated --> |date=1997 |title=The Status of Jerusalem |url=https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-Status-of-Jerusalem-Engish-199708.pdf |location=New York, NY, USA |publisher=United Nations |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250429134748/https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-Status-of-Jerusalem-Engish-199708.pdf |archive-date=2025-04-29 |access-date=2025-05-17 }}{{pb}}{{cite news |url=https://apnews.com/article/icj-court-israel-palestinians-settlements-2d5178500c0410341b252335859f2316 |title=Top UN court says Israel's presence in occupied Palestinian territories is illegal and should end }}{{pb}}{{Cite web |date=2022-12-23 |title=The Illegality of the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza: What the International Court of Justice Will Have to Determine in its Advisory Opinion for the United Nations General Assembly |url=http://opiniojuris.org/2022/12/23/the-illegality-of-the-israeli-occupation-of-the-palestinian-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-and-gaza-what-the-international-court-of-justice-will-have-to-determine-in-its-advisory-opinion-for-th/ |access-date=2023-01-03 |website=Opinio Juris |language=en-US |archive-date=3 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230103164733/http://opiniojuris.org/2022/12/23/the-illegality-of-the-israeli-occupation-of-the-palestinian-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-and-gaza-what-the-international-court-of-justice-will-have-to-determine-in-its-advisory-opinion-for-th/ |url-status=live }}{{pb}}{{Cite web |title=East Jerusalem - OCHA |url=https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/wb_thematic_9_0.pdf |access-date=3 January 2023 |archive-date=3 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230103164736/https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/wb_thematic_9_0.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> A minority of Palestinians and Israelis support a [[one-state solution]] instead throughout the region of British Mandatory Palestine, which would include all of Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel.{{efn|According to the most recent joint survey of the Palestinian–Israeli Pulse in 2023, support for a democratic one-state solution stands at 23% among Palestinians and 20% among [[Israeli Jews]]. A non-equal non-democratic one-state solution remains more popular among both populations, supported by 30% of Palestinians and 37% of Israeli Jews.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |date=24 January 2023 |title=The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll, 2022 |url=https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241109042512/https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928 |archive-date=9 November 2024 |access-date=11 December 2023 |website=[[Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research]] |language=en}}</ref> A Palestinian poll in September 2024 revealed that only 10% of respondents supported a single state that would provide equal rights for both Israelis and Palestinians.<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 October 2024 |title=Has the war in Gaza radicalised young Palestinians? |url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/10/03/has-the-war-in-gaza-radicalised-young-palestinians |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241107084019/https://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/10/03/has-the-war-in-gaza-radicalised-young-palestinians |archive-date=7 November 2024 |access-date=5 October 2024 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>}}
===From the river to the sea=== {{main|From the river to the sea}} "From the river to the sea" is, and forms part of, a popular Palestinian political slogan. It references the land which lies between the [[Jordan River]] and the [[Mediterranean Sea]] and has been frequently used in statements by Arab leaders.<ref name="Rosenbaum2007">{{cite book|author=Ron Rosenbaum|title=Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ye8altBfGJYC&pg=PA85|date=18 December 2007|publisher=Random House Publishing Group|isbn=978-0-307-43281-0|page=85|quote=Only two years ago he [Saddam Hussein] declared on Iraqi television: 'Palestine is Arab and must be liberated from the river to the sea and all the Zionists who emigrated to the land of Palestine must leave.'}}</ref><ref name="Dowty2008">{{cite book|author=Alan Dowty|title=Israel/Palestine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RrcoTW_vKDUC&pg=PA160|year=2008|publisher=Polity|isbn=978-0-7456-4243-7|page=160|quote=One exception was Faysal al- Husayni, who stated in his 2001 Beirut speech: 'We may lose or win [tactically] but our eyes will continue to aspire to the strategic goal, namely, to Palestine from the river to the sea.'}}</ref> It is also chanted at pro-Palestinian protests and demonstrations,<ref name="Rubin2010">{{cite book|author=Barry Rubin|title=The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=so3GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA124|date=25 May 2010|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=978-0-230-10687-1|page=124|quote=Thus, the MAB slogan 'Palestine must be free, from the river to the sea' is now ubiquitous in anti-Israeli demonstrations in the UK ...}}</ref> where it is often followed or preceded by the phrase "Palestine will be free".<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/23/river-to-sea-jews-and-arabs-must-forge-shared-future |title=From the river to the sea, Jews and Arabs must forge a shared future |date= 23 May 2021 |work=The Guardian}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://jewishjournal.com/commentary/opinion/337807/the-real-meaning-of-from-the-river-to-the-sea/ |title=The Real Meaning of 'From the River to the Sea' |date=16 June 2021 |work=The Jewish Journal}}</ref>
From its establishment in 1964 until the 1980s, the PLO claimed "Palestine from the river to the sea" as its territory.<ref name="PLO recognition of Israel" /><ref name=plo1974 /><ref name="PLOletter">{{Cite web|url=https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/36917473237100e285257028006c0bc5 |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150504194404/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/36917473237100E285257028006C0BC5|url-status=dead|title=United Nations Maintenance Page|archivedate=4 May 2015|publisher=United Nations}}</ref> In a slightly different fashion, "Palestine from the river to the sea" is still claimed by [[Hamas]], referring to all areas of former [[Mandatory Palestine]].<ref>{{cite web |title=The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)|publisher=MidEast Web |date=18 August 1988 |url=http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Sales |first=Ben |date=2023-11-08 |title='From the river to the sea': The slogan that led to Rashida Tlaib's censure, explained |url=https://forward.com/fast-forward/568788/from-the-river-to-the-sea-the-slogan-that-led-to-rashida-tlaibs-censure-explained/ |access-date=2025-05-19 |website=The Forward |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Morris|2013}}</ref>
==Other nationalisms==
=== Pan-Arabism ===
[[File:PFLP-group-1969.jpg|thumb|A PFLP patrol in Jordan, 1969]] Some groups within the PLO hold a more [[pan-Arabist]] view than Fatah, and Fatah itself has never renounced [[Arab nationalism]] in favour of a strictly Palestinian nationalist ideology. Some of the pan-Arabist members justifying their views by claiming that the Palestinian struggle must be the spearhead of a wider, pan-Arab movement. For example, the Marxist [[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine|PFLP]] viewed the "Palestinian [[revolution]]" as the first step to Arab unity as well as inseparable from a global [[anti-imperialist]] struggle. This said, however, there seems to be a general consensus among the main Palestinian factions that national liberation takes precedence over other loyalties, including Pan-Arabism, Islamism and [[proletarian internationalism]].{{Citation needed|date=December 2019}}
=== Pan-Islamism === [[File:Flag of al-Qassam Brigades.svg |thumb| The [[Hamas]] flag. ]] {{see also| Palestinian Islamic Jihad | Palestinian Mujahideen Movement | Islamist anti-Hamas groups in the Gaza Strip }}
In a later repetition of these developments, the [[pan-Islamic]] sentiments embodied by the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] and other [[religious]] movements, would similarly provoke conflict with Palestinian nationalism. About 90% of Palestinians are [[Sunni Muslims]],{{where|date=August 2024}}{{cn|date=August 2024}} and while never absent from the [[rhetoric]] and thinking of the [[secularism|secularist]] PLO factions, Islamic political doctrines, or [[Islamism]], did not become a large part of the Palestinian movement until the 1980s rise of [[Hamas]].{{citation needed|date=January 2024}}
By early Islamic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting "the [[nation]]" for [[God]] as an object of worship and reverence. The struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively through a religious prism, as a struggle to retrieve [[Muslim]] land and the holy places of [[Jerusalem]]. However, later developments, not least as a result of Muslim sympathy with the Palestinian struggle led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a legitimate ideology. In the case of Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.{{citation needed|date=January 2024}}
==See also== {{Portal |History |Israel |Palestine |Politics }} {{div col}} * '''Concepts and events''': ** [[The Global Campaign to Return to Palestine]] ** [[History of Palestine]] ** [[History of Palestinian nationality]] ** [[Israeli–Palestinian conflict]] ** [[Palestinian Declaration of Independence]] ** [[Timeline of the name "Palestine"]] ** [[List of national symbols of Palestine]] * '''Individuals''': ** [[Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni]] (1907–1948), military leader ** [[Izz ad-Din al-Qassam]] (1881–1935), Muslim religious and guerilla leader ** [[Khalil al-Sakakini]] (1878–1953), Christian teacher, scholar, poet, and Arab nationalist ** [[Musa al-Husayni]] (1853–1934), mayor of Jerusalem ** [[Yousef al-Khalidi]] (1829–1906), Ottoman politician and mayor of Jerusalem ** [[Zuheir Mohsen]] (1936–1979), pro-Syria PLO leader {{div col end}}
== Notes == <references group="lower-alpha" /> ==References== {{Reflist}}
== Bibliography == *[[George Antonius|Antonius, George]] (1938) ''The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement''. Hamish Hamilton. (1945 edition) *Benvenisti, Meron (1998) ''City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem'', University of California Press, {{ISBN|0-520-20768-8}} *Cypel, Sylvain (2006) ''Walled: Israeli Society at an Impasse'', Other Press, {{ISBN|1-59051-210-3}} *[[Abdullah Franji|Franji, Abdullah]] (1983) ''The PLO and Palestine'', Zed Books, {{ISBN|0-86232-195-6}} *{{cite book |last=Gresh |first=Alain |year=1985 |title=The PLO: The Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State |publisher=The University of Michigan |isbn=9780862322724}} *{{cite web |author=Hamas |year=1988 |title=Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement |publisher=[[Yale Law School]] |url=https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp}} *Hoveyda, Fereydoun of National Committee on American Foreign Policy (2002) ''The Broken Crescent: The "Threat" of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism'', Greenwood Publishing Group, {{ISBN|0-275-97902-4}} *Khalaf, Issa (1991) ''Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948'', SUNY Press {{ISBN|0-7914-0707-1}} *Khalidi, Rashid (1997) ''Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|0-231-10515-0}} *{{cite book |last1=Karsh |first1=Efraim |editor1-last=Karsh |editor1-first=Efraim |editor1-link=Efraim Karsh |title=Israel at Sixty: Rethinking the birth of the Jewish state |date=2013 |publisher=Taylor and Francis |isbn=9781317967767 |pages=30–48 |chapter=Zionism and the Palestinians}} *Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel S, (2003) ''The Palestinian People: A History'', Cambridge, Harvard University Press, {{ISBN|0-674-01131-7}} *Kupferschmidt, Uri M. (1987) ''The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam Under the British Mandate for Palestine'' {{ISBN|90-04-07929-7}} *Kurz, Anat N. (2006-01-30). ''Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle''. Sussex Academic Press. p. 228. {{ISBN|1-84519-032-7}} *Lassner, Jacob (2000) ''The Middle East Remembered: Forged Identities, Competing Narratives, Contested Spaces'', University of Michigan Press, {{ISBN|0-472-11083-7}} *Levenberg, Haim (1993). ''Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945–1948''. London: Routledge. {{ISBN|0-7146-3439-5}} *Mishal, Shaul and Sela, Avraham (2000) ''The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|0-231-11675-6}} *Morris, Benny (2008) ''1948: A History of the First Arab–Israeli War''. Yale University Press {{ISBN|978-0-300-12696-9}} *Morris, Benny, (second edition 2004 third printing 2006) ''[[The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited]]'', Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|0-521-00967-7}}*{{cite book |last=Morris |first=Benny |year=2013 |title=One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=9780300164442}} *Morris, Benny (2001) ''Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001.'' Vintage {{ISBN|978-0-679-74475-7}} *{{cite book |last1=Paz |first1=Reuven |author1-link=Reuven Paz |editor1-last=Hatina |editor1-first=Meir |editor2-last=Litvak |editor2-first=Meir |title=Martyrdom and sacrifice in Islam: theological, political and social contexts |date=2017 |publisher=I. B. Tauris |location=London |isbn=9781784535087 |chapter=Hamas Suicide Attacks: Sublime Islamic Goal or Merely another Weapon?}} *{{cite book |author=Peel Commission |year=1937 |title=Palestine Royal Commission Report |publisher=His Majesty's Stationery Office |url=https://ecf.org.il/media_items/290}} *{{cite web |author=PLO |year=1968 |title= The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 1-17, 1968 |publisher=[[Yale Law School]] |url=https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/plocov.asp}} *Sufian, Sandra Marlene, and LeVine, Mark (2007) ''Reapproaching borders: new perspectives on the study of Israel-Palestine'', Rowman & Littlefield, {{ISBN|0-7425-4639-X}} *Swedenburg, Ted (1988) "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt 1936–1939", in ''Islam, Politics, and Social Movements'', edited by Edmund Burke III and Ira Lapidus. Berkeley: University of California Press. {{ISBN|0-520-06868-8}} pp 189–194 & [[Marvin Gettleman|Marvin E. Gettleman]], Stuart Schaar (2003) The Middle East and Islamic world reader, Grove Press, {{ISBN|0-8021-3936-1}} pp 177–181 *Pappé Ilan (2004) ''A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples'', Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|0-521-55632-5}} *Peretz, Don (1994) ''The Middle East Today'', Greenwood Publishing Group, {{ISBN|0-275-94576-6}} *Provence, Michael (2005) ''The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism'', University of Texas Press, {{ISBN|0-292-70680-4}} *{{cite book |last=Ross |first=Dennis |year=2005 |title=The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace |publisher= Farrar, Straus and Giroux |isbn=9780374708085}} *{{cite book |last=Sayigh |first=Yezid |year=1997|title=Armed Struggle and the Search for State:The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=9780198292654}} *{{cite book |last1=Shindler |first1=Colin |title=A history of modern Israel |date=2013 |publisher=Cambridge university press |location=Cambridge |isbn=9781107028623 |edition=2nd}} *Shlaim, Avi (reprint 2004) ''The Politics of Partition; King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921–1951'', Oxford University Press {{ISBN|0-19-829459-X}} *Winter, Dave (1999) ''Israel Handbook: With the Palestinian Authority Areas'', Footprint Travel Guides, {{ISBN|1-900949-48-2}}
{{Palestine topics}} {{Foreign relations of Palestine}} {{Ethnic nationalism}} {{Arab nationalism}} {{Authority control}}
[[Category:Anti-Israeli sentiment in Palestine]] [[Category:Palestinian nationalism| ]] [[Category:Politics of Palestine]] [[Category:History of the Palestinian refugees]]