{{Short description|none}} {{pp-semi-indef}} {{Cleanup rewrite|date=June 2025|Same content covered in multiple instances under different sections, article needs to be concise and specific to the topic of interest}} {{Use Pakistani English|date=January 2014}} {{Use dmy dates|cs1-dates=ly|date=January 2014}} {{Infobox nukes | image_location = File:PAK orthographic.svg | map_caption = {{Legend|#336830|Territory controlled by Pakistan}}{{Legend|#61E760|Territory claimed but not controlled<br />([[Kashmir conflict|Kashmir]], [[Annexation of Junagadh|Junagadh]], and [[Sir Creek#Indo-Pakistani border dispute|Sir Creek]])}} | country_name=[[Pakistan|Islamic Republic of Pakistan]] | program_start=20 January 1972 | first_test=28 May 1998 ([[Chagai-I]])<ref name="FAS (Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology)">{{cite web |title=Pakistan Nuclear Weapons – A Chronology |url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/chron.htm|work=Federation of American Scientists (FAS) |publisher=FAS (Pakistan Nuclear Weapons – A Chronology)|access-date=5 May 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120427000543/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/chron.htm |archive-date=27 April 2012}}</ref> | last_test=30 May 1998 ([[Chagai-II]]) | largest_yield=40 [[Kilotons|kt]]<br />([[Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission|PAEC]] claim)<ref name="fas" /><ref>{{cite web|last=Sublette|first=Carey|date=10 September 2001|title=1998 Year of Testing |publisher=Nuclear Weapon Archives |url=http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html |access-date=12 January 2013 |url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130101191609/http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html |archive-date=1 January 2013}}</ref><ref>Approximating and calculating the exact, accurate and precise yields are difficult to calculate. Even under very controlled conditions, precise yields can be very hard to determine, and for less controlled conditions the margins of error can be quite large. There are a number of different ways that the yields can be determined, including calculations based on blast size, blast brightness, seismographic data, as well as the strength of the shock wave. The Pakistani Government authorities puts up the yield range from 20-~40kt (as noted by Carey Sublette of the Nuclear Weapon Archives in her report. The explosion measured 5.54 degrees on the Richter magnitude scale, the PAEC provided the data as public domain in the KNET sources.</ref><ref name=pakfas>{{Cite web |title=Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program |url=http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/ |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |date=11 December 2002 |access-date=30 October 2019}}</ref> | total_tests=6 detonations<ref name="FAS (Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology)"/> | peak_stockpile=170 warheads <small>(2025 estimate)</small><ref>{{cite web|url=https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-09/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-2023/ |title=Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023 |date=11 September 2023 }}</ref> | current_stockpile=170 warheads <small>(2025 estimate)</small><ref>{{cite web|url=https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-09/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-2023/ |title=Nuclear Notebook: Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023 |date=11 September 2023 }}</ref> | maximum_range=2750 km ([[Shaheen-III]])<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mid-day.com/articles/test-launch-of-pakistans-shaheen-iii-surface-to-surface-ballistic-missile-successful/16046188|title=Test launch of Pakistan's 'Shaheen-III' surface-to-surface ballistic missile successful|date=9 March 2015|work=mid-day|access-date=26 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304051851/http://www.mid-day.com/articles/test-launch-of-pakistans-shaheen-iii-surface-to-surface-ballistic-missile-successful/16046188|archive-date=4 March 2016}}</ref> | nuclear_triad = Yes | NPT_party='''No''' |image_photo=IRBM of Pakistan at IDEAS 2008.jpg|caption=Pakistani [[ballistic missile]]s on display, including a [[Shaheen-I]] (center), and a [[Ghauri-I]] (right)}} {{Weapons of mass destruction}}{{nuclear weapons}} [[Pakistan]] is one of [[List of states with nuclear weapons|nine states]] that possess [[nuclear weapon]]s. Pakistan is not party to the [[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons|Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]]. Pakistan's arsenal is estimated at 170 nuclear weapons as of 2025.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023 |url=https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-09/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-2023/ |access-date=2025-06-08 |website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |date=11 September 2023 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Status of World Nuclear Forces |url=https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/ |access-date=2025-06-08 |website=Federation of American Scientists |language=en-US}}</ref> Pakistan carried out two [[nuclear tests]], [[Chagai-I]] and [[Chagai-II]], both in 1998 and [[Underground nuclear weapons testing|underground]].
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program began in 1972 under Prime Minister [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]] following Pakistan's defeat in the [[Indo-Pakistani War]] of 1971 and India's advancing nuclear program. The program was developed through a combination of domestic scientific research, clandestine procurement networks associated with [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]], as well as external political and financial support.
During its early development, the government sought political and financial backing from several [[Muslim-majority countries]] and Arab states in the [[MENA]] region. Scholars identify [[Saudi Arabia]] as providing prolonged financial assistance that helped sustain the program during periods of economic pressure and international sanctions, while [[Libya]] under then dictator [[Muammar Qaddafi]] is described as having provided both financial and material support during the program's formative period.<ref name="Weissman 1981 45">{{cite book |last=Weissman |first=Steve R. |title=The Islamic Bomb |last2=Krosney |first2=Herbert |publisher=Times Books |year=1981 |page=45 |quote=Bhutto sought financial backing from several Arab states, including Libya and Saudi Arabia, to help finance Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.}}</ref>{{sfnq|Khan|2012|p=|q=Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue.}}{{pn|date=March 2026}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Levy |first=Adrian |title=Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons |last2=Scott-Clark |first2=Catherine |publisher=Walker & Company |year=2007 |pages=57–60}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Corera |first=Gordon |title=Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2006 |pages=29–31}}</ref>
Pakistan's nuclear weapons doctrine, [[full spectrum deterrence]], officially rejects [[no first use]], promising to use "any weapon in its arsenal" to protect its national interests in the event of an attack.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Doctrine {{!}} Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-10/features/pakistans-evolving-nuclear-doctrine |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250604143126/https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-10/features/pakistans-evolving-nuclear-doctrine |archive-date=2025-06-04 |access-date=2025-06-08 |website=www.armscontrol.org |language=en |url-status=live }}</ref> Pakistan's primary strategic concern is potential [[Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts|conflict with India]], which also [[India and weapons of mass destruction|possesses nuclear weapons]].
Pakistan operates approximately 126 land-based missiles, primarily [[Ballistic missile|ballistic]], of various [[Short-range ballistic missile|short]], [[Medium-range ballistic missile|medium]], and [[Intermediate-range ballistic missile|intermediate ranges]]. Approximately 36 bombs and [[Ra'ad (air-launched cruise missile)|Ra'ad I]]/[[Ra'ad-II]] cruise missiles are assigned to [[Dassault Mirage III|Mirage III]] and [[Dassault Mirage 5|Mirage 5]] fighter aircraft. The [[Babur (cruise missile)#Babur-III|Babur-III]] [[submarine-launched cruise missile]] is under development.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2025|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2025.2543685|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|date=2025-09-03|issn=0096-3402|pages=386–408|volume=81|issue=5|doi=10.1080/00963402.2025.2543685|language=en|first1=Hans M.|last1=Kristensen|first2=Matt|last2=Korda|first3=Eliana|last3=Johns|first4=Mackenzie|last4=Knight-Boyle |bibcode=2025BuAtS..81e.386K }}</ref> Pakistan may possess smaller [[Boosted fission|boosted fission weapons]], but is not believed to have tested [[thermonuclear weapon]]s.<ref name="n520">{{cite news |last=Taylor |first=Adam |date=2016-01-06 |title=Map: The countries believed to have tested hydrogen bombs |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/06/map-the-countries-believed-to-have-tested-hydrogen-bombs/ |access-date=2025-12-12 |newspaper=The Washington Post}}</ref>
Since 2001, US officials have prioritized safeguarding Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from potential [[nuclear terrorism]], supplying equipment and training, and drafting military contingency plans.
Pakistan is not widely suspected of either producing biological weapons or having an offensive biological programme. Pakistan is a party to the [[Geneva Protocol]], [[Chemical Weapons Convention]], as well as the [[Biological Weapons Convention]].<ref name="NTI Research on Countries">{{cite web | last =NTI | first =Nuclear Threat Initiatives | title =Pakistan: Biological Review | publisher =NTI Research on Countries | url =http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html | url-status =dead | archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20110507043625/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html | archive-date =7 May 2011 | access-date =13 January 2015}}</ref><ref name="NTI Research on Countries with Chemical facilities and capabilities." />
== History == {{See also|Project-706}}After the [[Partition of India]] in 1947, India and Pakistan have been in conflict over several issues, including the disputed territory of [[Jammu and Kashmir (union territory)|Jammu and Kashmir]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Ganguly |first1=Šumit |last2=Kapur |first2=S. Paul|title=India, Pakistan, and the bomb debating nuclear stability in South Asia|year=2010|publisher=Columbia University Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0231512824 |url=https://archive.org/details/indiapakistanbom00gang|url-access=registration}}</ref> [[Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts|Multiple wars and conflicts]], especially the [[Indo-Pakistani war of 1971|1971 Indo-Pakistan War]] and the subsequent [[India and weapons of mass destruction|Indian nuclear tests]] motivated Pakistan to become a [[Nuclear power in Pakistan|nuclear power]] as part of its defence and energy strategies.<ref name="Dawn Newspapers, 1995">{{cite news |last=Siddiqi |first=Muhammad Ali |date=20 April 1995 |title=N-deterrent vital to security, says PM Benazir Bhutto |url=http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1995/20Ap95.html#ndet |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120609132144/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1995/20Ap95.html#ndet |archive-date=9 June 2012 |access-date=13 May 2012 |newspaper=Dawn Newspapers, 1995 |pages=3–6 |quote=Pakistanis are "security conscious" because of the 1971 trauma and the three wars with India. Pakistan's programme was peaceful but was "a deterrent to India" because New Delhi had detonated a nuclear device. Pakistan, thus, had to take every step to ensure its territorial integrity and sovereignty |agency=Dawn Media Group}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cheema |first=Pervaiz Iqbal |date=2011 |title=Anatomizing Pakistan's Motivations for Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24711174 |journal=Pakistan Horizon |volume=64 |issue=2 |pages=5–19 |jstor=24711174 |issn=0030-980X}}</ref> Pakistan's subsequent pursuit of nuclear weapons was supported not only by domestic scientific development but also by financial assistance from several allied states during the early stages of the program, including [[Libya]] and [[Saudi Arabia]].<ref name="Chakma 2011 42">{{cite book |last=Chakma |first=Bhumitra |title=The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia |publisher=Ashgate |year=2011 |page=42 |quote=Bhutto sought financial assistance from several Muslim countries including Libya and Saudi Arabia to support Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.}}</ref>
===Initial non-weapon policy (Pre-1971)=== {{Main|Nuclear energy in Pakistan}}
In 1953, Foreign Minister [[Muhammad Zafarullah Khan]] publicly stated that "Pakistan does not have a policy towards the atom bombs".<ref name="NTI Pakistan Overview (1950s activities)"/> Following the announcement, on 11 August 1955, the United States and Pakistan reached an understanding concerning the peaceful and industrial use of nuclear energy which also included a [[swimming pool reactor|pool-type reactor]] worth $350,000.<ref name="NTI Pakistan Overview (1950s activities)">{{cite news |last=NTI|title=1950s Nuclear Policy of Pakistan|work=Resources obtained from Shahid-ur-Rehman, "Z.A. Bhutto, A Man in Hurry for the Bomb," Long Road to Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), p. 22.|publisher=NTI Pakistan Overview (1950s activities)}}<!-- |access-date=13 May 2012 --></ref> Pakistan's nuclear energy programme was established and started in 1956, following the establishment of [[Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission]] (PAEC).<ref name="New York: Croom Helm, 1987),">{{cite web |last1=Kapur |first1=Ashok |author2=U.N. Media release |date=8 December 1953 |title=Origins and Early history of Pakistan's cover nuclear development |url=http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130930175130/http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791 |archive-date=30 September 2013 |access-date=21 March 2014 |work=Atom for Peace: Eisenhowever's UN Speech |publisher=New York: Croom Helm, 1987) |location=New York, United States}}</ref> Pakistan became a participant in US President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]]'s [[Atoms for Peace]] program. Although proposals to develop nuclear weapons were made in the 1960s by several officials and senior scientists, Pakistan followed a strict non-nuclear weapon policy from 1956 until 1971, as PAEC under its chairman [[Ishrat Hussain Usmani]] made no efforts to acquire [[nuclear fuel cycle]] technology for the purposes of an active nuclear weapons programme.<ref name="NTI Pakistan Overview (1950s activities)"/>[[File:Ali Bhutto Karachi 1969.jpg|thumb|left|250px|{{small|Bhutto in 1969. Pakistan began development of nuclear devices under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's leadership with a commitment to having the [[Nuclear weapon design|design]] of device ready by 1976–77 to avert further foreign threat from India.}}]] The first thing that was to be undertaken was the search for uranium, which continued from 1960 to 1963. Uranium deposits were discovered, and the first-ever national award was given to the PAEC. Mining of uranium began in the same year. Dr. [[Abdus Salam]] and Dr. [[Ishrat Hussain Usmani]] also sent a large number of scientists to pursue doctorate degrees in the field of [[nuclear technology]] and [[nuclear reactor technology]]. The next landmark under Abdus Salam was the establishment of PINSTECH – [[Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology]], at [[Nilore, Islamabad|Nilore]] near Islamabad. The principal facility there was a 5[[Megawatt|MW]] research reactor, commissioned in 1965 and consisting of the [[Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor#PARR-I Reactor|PARR-I]], which was upgraded to 10 MWe by Nuclear Engineering Division under Munir Ahmad Khan in 1990.<ref name="Argonne National Laboratory">{{cite web |last1 = Pervez |first1 = S. |author2 = M. Latif, I.H. Bokhari and S.Bakhtyar |title = Performance of PARR-I reactor with LEU fuel |work = Nuclear Engineering Division of Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, Nuclear Engineering Division at Argonne National Laboratory (U.S. Department of Energy) |publisher = Argonne National Laboratory |year = 2004 |url = http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR26/Abstracts/42-Pervez.html |access-date = 11 November 2011 |url-status = live |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170218063210/http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR26/Abstracts/42-Pervez.html |archive-date = 18 February 2017 }}</ref> The PARR-I reactor was, under the agreement signed by PAEC and ANL, provided by the US Government in 1965, and scientists from PAEC and [[Argonne National Laboratory|ANL]] had led the construction.<ref name="Argonne National Laboratory" /> The Ayub Khan Military Government made then-[[Ministry of Science and Technology (Pakistan)#Science Advisors|science advisor]] to the Government, Abdus Salam, head of the IAEA delegation. Abdus Salam began lobbying for commercial nuclear power plants, and tirelessly advocated for nuclear power in Pakistan.<ref>[[Michael Duff (physicist)|Duff, Michael]] (2007). Salam + 50: proceedings of the conference, §''Abdus Salam and Pakistan''. London, United Kingdom: Imperial College Press. pp. 42.</ref> In 1965, Salam's efforts finally paid off, and a [[Atomic Energy of Canada Limited|Canadian firm]] signed a deal to provide the 137MWe [[CANDU reactor]] in [[Paradise Point, Pakistan|Paradise Point, Karachi]].
In the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]], which was the second of four openly declared [[Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts]], Pakistan solicited [[Central Treaty Organization]] (CENTO) assistance,<ref>CENTO nation help sought by Pakistan. Chicago Tribune. 7 September 1965 {{cite web |url=http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1965/09/07/page/3/article/cento-nation-help-sought-by-pakistan |title=Chicago Tribune - Historical Newspapers |access-date=2015-06-19 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150909011614/http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1965/09/07/page/3/article/cento-nation-help-sought-by-pakistan/ |archive-date=9 September 2015}}</ref> but came under arms supply embargo in [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 211]].<ref>The India-Pakistan War of 1965. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State {{cite web |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war |title=Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian |access-date=2015-06-19 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150708043508/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war |archive-date=8 July 2015}}</ref> [[Foreign Minister of Pakistan|Foreign minister]] (later Prime minister) [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]] aggressively began the advocating the option of "nuclear weapons programmes" but such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister [[Muhammad Shoaib (politician)|Muhammad Shoaib]] and chairman [[Ishrat Hussain Usmani]].<ref name="NTI Pakistan Overview (1950s activities)"/> Pakistani scientists and engineers' working at [[International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA]] became aware of advancing Indian nuclear program towards making the bombs. Therefore, In October 1965, Munir Khan, director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with Bhutto on an emergency basis in Vienna, revealing the facts about the Indian nuclear programme and [[Bhabha Atomic Research Centre]] in Trombay. At this meeting Munir Khan concluded: "a (nuclear) India would further undermine and threaten Pakistan's security, and for her survival, Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent...".{{Citation needed|date=November 2012}}
In 1969, after a long negotiation, the [[United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority]] (UKAEA) signed a formal agreement to supply Pakistan with a [[nuclear fuel reprocessing]] plant capable of extracting {{convert|360|g}} of weapons-grade plutonium annually.<ref name="New York: Croom Helm, 1987)," /> PAEC selected a team five senior scientists, including [[geophysicist]] Dr. Ahsan Mubarak,<ref name="New York: Croom Helm, 1987)," /> who were sent to [[Sellafield]] to receive technical training.<ref name="New York: Croom Helm, 1987)," /> Later Mubarak's team advised the government not to acquire the whole reprocessing plant, only key parts important to building the weapons, while the plant would be built indigenously.<ref name="New York: Croom Helm, 1987)," /> The PAEC in 1970 began work on a pilot-scale plant at [[Dera Ghazi Khan]] for the concentration of uranium ores. The plant had a capacity of 10,000 pounds a day.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1989/890516-cr.htm |title=NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION (Senate – May 16, 1989) |publisher=Fas.org |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100830214026/http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1989/890516-cr.htm |archive-date=30 August 2010}}</ref>
=== Development of nuclear weapons (Post-1971) === {{Main|Bangladesh liberation war|Indo-Pakistani War of 1971|Project-706}}
[[File:Chagaiatomictests.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.35|Image showing uplift of granite mountains as a result of Chagai-I test.<ref name="Nuclear weapon archives">{{cite web |last=Sublette |first=Carey |title=Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan |url=http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/AQKhan.html |work=Nuclear Weapon Archives, Reuters and Los Angeles Times news reports were used in preparing this article. |publisher=Nuclear weapon archives |access-date=18 October 2012|display-authors=etal |page=1 |date=2 January 2002}}</ref>]]
The [[Bangladesh Liberation War]] was a defeat for Pakistan, which led to it losing roughly {{convert|56000|sqmi|km2}} of territory as well as losing more than half its population to the newly independent state of [[Bangladesh]].<ref name="mosq-mill">{{cite book |last=Haqqani |first=Hussain |title=Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&pg=PP1 |year=2005 |publisher=United Book Press |isbn=978-0-87003-214-1 |access-date=2020-10-27 |archive-date=2023-02-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173053/https://books.google.com/books?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&pg=PP1 |url-status=live }}, Chapter 3, p. 87.</ref> In addition to the psychological setback for Pakistan,<ref name="mosq-mill"/> it had failed to gather any significant material support or assistance from its key allies, the United States and the People's Republic of China.<ref name="William Langewiesche of The Atlantic">{{cite web| last=Langewiesche| first=William| title=The Wrath of Khan| work=The Atlantic| date=November 2005| access-date=10 August 2011| url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/4333/3/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110824213019/http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/4333/3| archive-date=24 August 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=India's First Bomb: 1967–1974|publisher=India's First Bomb: 1967–1974 |url=http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaFirstBomb.html |access-date=14 January 2013|url-status=live|archive-date=2 January 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130102122629/http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaFirstBomb.html}}</ref> Pakistan seemed to be isolated internationally, and in great danger; it felt that it could rely on no one but itself.<ref name="William Langewiesche of The Atlantic"/> Prime Minister [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]] was "obsessed" with [[India and weapons of mass destruction|India's nuclear program]], famously declaring that "We will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will have our own nuclear bomb."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bangash |first=Yaqoob Khan |date=2015-01-23 |title=Eating grass |url=https://tribune.com.pk/story/826538/eating-grass |access-date=2025-06-08 |website=The Express Tribune |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Stengel |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Stengel |title=Who has the Bomb? |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time magazine]] |pages=7–13 |date=3 June 1985 |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761-7,00.html|access-date=23 February 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110519084415/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761-7,00.html |archive-date=19 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}</ref> During this early phase of the program Bhutto also sought financial and political support from friendly Muslim and Arab states, and countries such as [[Libya]] and [[Saudi Arabia]] provided financial assistance that helped sustain Pakistan's nuclear effort.<ref name="Weissman 1981 45"/>{{sfn|Khan|2012|p=}}{{pn|date=March 2026}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Corera |first=Gordon |title=Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2006}}</ref> At a [[United Nations Security Council]] meeting, Bhutto drew comparisons between the [[Instrument of Surrender (1971)|Instrument of Surrender]] that ended the 1971 war, and the [[Treaty of Versailles]], which Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There, Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat.
Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of the [[Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission]] (PAEC) [[Munir Ahmad Khan]] with a commitment to having the device ready by the end of 1976.<ref>Weissman, Steve R. and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb. New York: Times Book). 1981: page 45.</ref><ref>Chakma, Bhumitra, pg 42, The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, VT, USA, 2011</ref><ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite web |author=A. Q. Khan |date=January 19, 2015 |title=An indomitable man |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-296851-An-indomitable-man |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150725155450/http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-296851-An-indomitable-man |archive-date=25 July 2015 |access-date=26 April 2016 |work=The News International}}</ref> At the Multan meeting on 20 January 1972, Bhutto stated, "What [[Raziuddin Siddiqui]], a Pakistani, contributed for the United States during the [[Manhattan Project]], could also be done by scientists in Pakistan, for their own people".<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=21–23}}</ref> Siddiqui was a Pakistani [[theoretical physicist]] who, in the early 1940s, worked on both the [[Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom|British nuclear program]] and the Manhattan Project.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|loc="A Manhattan Project Scientist"|p=23}}</ref>
In December 1972, Dr. [[Abdus Salam]] directed a secretly coded memo to Pakistani scientists working at the [[International Centre for Theoretical Physics]] (ICTP) in Italy to report to the Chairman of the [[Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission]] (PAEC), [[Munir Ahmad Khan]], informing them about the program what was to be equivalent of the US "[[Manhattan Project]]."<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=177–178}}</ref> In an effort to instill a sense of pride, Salam noted that the heads of the Manhattan Engineer District were theoreticians, and informed the scientists at ICTP that a similar division was being established at PAEC; this marked the beginning of the "Theoretical Physics Group" (TPG).<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|p=178}}</ref><ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=38–39}}</ref> Other [[theoretical physics|theoreticians]] at [[Quaid-e-Azam University]] would also join the TPG, then led by Salam who had done ground-breaking work for TPG.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=39–40}}</ref> Among them was [[Riazuddin (physicist)|Riazuddin]], [[Fayyazuddin]], [[Masud Ahmad]], and [[Faheem Hussain]] who were the cornerstone of the TPG.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=41–42}}</ref><ref name="Pervez Hoodbhoy, Newsweek">{{cite web |last1=Hoodbhoy |first1=Pervez |author-link1=Pervez Hoodbhoy |title=The Man who Designed the Bomb |url=http://newsweekpakistan.com/the-man-who-designed-pakistans-bomb/ |website=newsweekpakistan.com |publisher=Newsweek |access-date=23 June 2015 |location=Islamabad, Pakistan |date=13 November 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150815202340/http://newsweekpakistan.com/the-man-who-designed-pakistans-bomb/ |archive-date=15 August 2015}}</ref>
Tedious mathematical work on [[fast neutron calculations]], [[Theory of relativity|relativity]], complex [[hydrodynamics]] and [[quantum mechanics]] were conducted by the TPG led by Salam until 1974 when he left Pakistan in protest, though he kept close contact with TPG.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=42–43}}</ref> No such endeavours of the kind had taken place in the country and [[computerized numerical control]] (CNC) and basic computing facilities were non-existent at that time (though later acquired).<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=180–181}}</ref> For this purpose, the calculations on the [[high-performance computing]] and [[numerical analysis]] were performed by Dr. Tufail Naseem, a [[Doctor of Philosophy|PhD graduate]] in mathematics from [[Cambridge University]], assisted by other members of Mathematics Division– the division of [[pure mathematics]] at PAEC under Dr. Raziuddin Siddiqui and [[Asghar Qadir]].<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=44–45}}</ref> About the lack of CNC facilities, Munir Ahmad Khan famously marked: "If the [[United States|Americans]] could do it without CNC machines in the 1940s, why can't we do the same now.".<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|p=180}}</ref> With [[Abdus Salam]] departing, Munir Ahmad eventually led the TPG and assisted in the calculations.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|loc="Professor Abdus Salam and Pakistan's Fission Weapons Programme"|pp=51–89}}</ref> Two types of weapon design were analyzed: the [[Gun-type fission weapon]] and the [[implosion nuclear weapon]].<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=53–55}}</ref> The program turned to the more technically difficult implosion-type weapon design, contrary to the relatively simple 'gun-type' weapon.<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=177–176}}</ref>
Since PAEC, which consisted of over twenty laboratories and projects under [[Nuclear reactor physics|reactor physicist]] Munir Ahmad Khan,<ref name="MA Chaudhry">{{cite web |last=Chaudhry |first=MA |date=10 June 2006 |others=Posted by A. Gill |title=Pakistan's Nuclear History: Separating Myth from Reality |url=http://owlstree.blogspot.com/2006/06/pakistani-nuclear-program-2-5.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131106153611/http://owlstree.blogspot.com/2006/06/pakistani-nuclear-program-2-5.html |archive-date=6 November 2013 |access-date=9 January 2013 |via=Owl's Tree |orig-year=originally published in Defense Journal on May 2006}}</ref> was falling behind schedule and having considerable difficulty producing [[fissile material]], [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]], a metallurgist working on centrifuge enrichment for [[Urenco Group|Urenco]], joined the program at the behest of the Bhutto administration by the end of 1974. Producing fissile material was pivotal to the [[Kahuta Project]]'s success and thus to Pakistan obtaining the capability to detonate a nuclear weapon by the end of 1984.<ref name="Levy page 112">Levy, Adrian and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons. New York. Walker Publishing Company. 1977: page 112. Print.</ref><ref name="ReferenceC">{{cite web |author=A. Q. Khan |date=May 26, 2014 |title=A historic day (Part - I) |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-252241-A-historic-day |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140810150255/http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-252241-A-historic-day |archive-date=10 August 2014 |access-date=26 April 2016 |work=The News International}}</ref> He pushed for the feasibility of [[highly enriched uranium]] (HEU) fissile material and collaborated under [[Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood|Bashiruddin Mahmood]] at the PAEC, a move that irked A. Q. Khan.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=72–80}}</ref> Preliminary studies on [[Gas centrifuge|gaseous centrifuge]] were already studied by PAEC in 1967 but yielded few results.<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=141–142}}</ref> A. Q. Khan advanced [[uranium enrichment]] from the expertise he had from the [[Urenco Group]] in the Netherlands. Under A. Q. Khan's supervision, the [[Kahuta Research Laboratories]] (KRL) was set-up and engaged in clandestine efforts to obtain the necessary [[materials technology]] and [[electronic components]] for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.<ref name="fas.org">{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/ |title=Pakistan Nuclear Weapons |publisher=Fas.org |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100829173237/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/ |archive-date=29 August 2010}}</ref>
The TPG succeeded in the earlier implosion-type weapon design in 1977–78, with the first [[Subcritical testing|cold test]] conducted in 1983 by [[Ishfaq Ahmad]].<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=184–183}}</ref> The program evolved towards the [[boosted fission weapon]] designs that were eventually used in the [[Chagai-I]] tests in 1998.<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=281–282}}</ref> Enormous production was undertaken by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for feasibility of [[weapons grade plutonium]] but parallel efforts were mounted toward [[weapons-grade|weapons-grade uranium]] after India's test, the [[Smiling Buddha]], in 1974.<ref>Munir Ahmad Khan, "How Pakistan made its nuclear fuel cycle", ''The Nation'', (Islamabad) 7 and 9 February 1998.</ref>
In 1983, Khan was [[Trial in absentia|convicted in absentia]] by the Court of Amsterdam for stealing centrifuge blueprints, though the conviction was overturned on a [[legal technicality]].<ref name="GSO 1">{{cite web|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm|title=A.Q. Khan|publisher=globalsecurity.org|access-date=10 April 2009|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090422074606/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm|archive-date=22 April 2009}}</ref> A [[nuclear proliferation]] ring was established by Khan through Dubai to smuggle [[URENCO]] nuclear technology to KRL after founding the [[Zippe-type centrifuge|Zippe method]] for the [[gas centrifuge]]<ref name="GSO 1"/><ref name="bomb">{{cite book |title=America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise |last1=Armstrong |first1=David |author2=Joseph John Trento, National Security News Service|year=2007 | publisher=Steerforth Press, 2007 |isbn=9781586421373|page=165}}</ref><ref name="cbsnews">{{cite news | url=https://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=3483035n&tag=mncol;lst;3 | publisher=CBS News | title=Eye To Eye: An Islamic Bomb | url-status=live | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101110160556/http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=3483035n | archive-date=10 November 2010}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/Lankan-Muslims-in-Dubai-supplied-Nmaterials-to-Pak-A-Q-Khan/514870/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113203148/http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Lankan-Muslims-in-Dubai-supplied-Nmaterials-to-Pak-A-Q-Khan/514870/|url-status=dead|title=Lankan Muslims in Dubai supplied N-materials to Pak: A Q Khan - Indian Express|archive-date=13 January 2012|website=archive.indianexpress.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3481499.stm | work=BBC News | title=On the trail of the black market bombs | date=12 February 2004 | url-status=live | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111109101458/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3481499.stm | archive-date=9 November 2011}}</ref>
On 11 March 1983, PAEC, led by Munir Ahmad Khan, carried out its first [[subcritical testing]] of a working nuclear device. This is also called a cold test, and was codenamed ''[[Kirana-I]]''. There were 24 more cold tests from 1983 to 1994.<ref name="Samar Mubarakmand">{{Cite news|author=Mubarakmand, Samar (former Technical member and former director of Fast-Neutron Physics Group) | title =Pakistan became nuclear state in 1983| newspaper =The News International | location =Karachi | pages =1–2 |publisher =Jang Group of Newspapers | year =2004}}</ref>
Coordination between each site was overseen by the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) under Dr. Zaman Sheikh (a [[Chemical engineering|chemical engineer]]) and [[Hafeez Qureshi]], a [[Mechanical engineering|mechanical engineer]].<ref name="Samar Mubarakmand's witness accounts"/> The DTD was established by [[Munir Ahmad Khan]] in 1974 and was tasked with development of [[Tamper (nuclear weapon)|tampers]], [[Reflection (physics)|reflective]] and [[explosive lens]]es, [[optics]], and triggering mechanisms that are crucial in [[atomic weapons]].<ref name="Samar Mubarakmand's witness accounts">{{cite web |last1=Mubarakmand |first1=Samar |title=Science Odyssey |url=http://pakdef.org/a-science-odyssey-pakistans-nuclear-emergence/ |website=pakdef.org |publisher=Samar Mubarakmand's witness accounts |access-date=23 June 2015 |location=Lahore, Punjab |date=30 November 1998 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150626133458/http://pakdef.org/a-science-odyssey-pakistans-nuclear-emergence/ |archive-date=26 June 2015}}</ref> First [[Implosion nuclear weapon|implosion design]] was built by TPG in 1977 and the DTD eventually conducted the [[Subcritical testing|cold-test]] on 11 March 1983, codename ''[[Kirana-I]]''.<ref name="Samar Mubarakmand's witness accounts"/> Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various [[nuclear weapon design]]s and shifted its focus towards [[Tactical nuclear weapon|tactical designs]] in 1987 that could be delivered by all [[Pakistan Air Force]] fighter aircraft.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm |title=When Mountains Move – The Story of Chagai |publisher=Defencejournal.com |access-date=21 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120401181303/http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm |archive-date=1 April 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref>
Dr. [[Ishrat Hussain Usmani]]'s contribution to the nuclear energy programme is also fundamental to the development of atomic energy for civilian purposes as he, with efforts led by Salam, established PINSTECH, that subsequently developed into Pakistan's premier nuclear research institution.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=19–22}}</ref> In addition to sending hundreds of young Pakistanis abroad for training, he laid the foundations of the Muslim world's first nuclear power reactor KANUPP, which was inaugurated by Munir Ahmad Khan in 1972.<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=50–70}}</ref> Scientists and engineers under Khan developed the [[nuclear capability]] for Pakistan within the late 1970s, and under his leadership PAEC had carried out a cold test of nuclear devices at [[Kirana Hills]], evidently made from non-weaponized plutonium. The former chairman of PAEC, Munir Khan, was credited as one of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a study from the London [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] (IISS), on Pakistan's atomic bomb program.<ref name="International Institute for Strategic Studies">{{cite web |title=Bhutto was father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme |url=http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2007/may-2007/bhutto-was-father-of-pakistani-bomb/?locale=en |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120314025504/http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2007/may-2007/bhutto-was-father-of-pakistani-bomb/?locale=en |archive-date=14 March 2012 |access-date=11 April 2011}}</ref>
In his semi-official works of the Pakistani nuclear program history, ''Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb'', Major General Feroz Hassan Khan wrote that Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz al Saud's visits to Pakistan's atomic facilities were not proof of a nuclear-sharing agreement between the two countries.{{sfn|Khan|2012|p=}}{{pn|date=March 2026}} However, Khan also acknowledged that "Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue."{{sfn|Khan|2012|p=}}{{pn|date=March 2026}} Scholars of Pakistan's nuclear history describe this financial assistance as part of broader strategic cooperation between [[Saudi Arabia]] and [[Pakistan]] during the Cold War period, particularly as Pakistan faced economic constraints and international pressure and sanctions while advancing its nuclear program.{{sfnq|Khan|2012|p=147|q=Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue.}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Corera |first=Gordon |title=Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2006 |pages=30–31 |quote=Pakistan’s nuclear program benefited from financial support from wealthy allies in the Middle East during its early development.}}</ref>
Following India's surprise [[nuclear test]], codenamed [[Operation Smiling Buddha|Smiling Buddha]] in 1974, the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation outside the permanent five members of the [[United Nations Security Council]], the goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable impetus.<ref name="Pakistan Military Consortium">{{Cite journal |last1=Ahmad |first1=Mansoor |last2=Shabbir |first2=Usman |last3=Khan |first3=Syed Ahmad H |year=2006 |title=Multan Conference January 1972: The Birth of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program. |url=https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache%3AOZFTUPnzBiEJ%3Awww.pakdef.info%2Fereporter%2Fpakdefereportervol1no1.pdf+Nuclear+pakdef+pdf&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESieytaoc5d0ZMNaZGigsHyiMo17j4BEBpUU-1okQ5Ri77lRJcRUqofaURTdifYPjzKobJTrdf9ZuTQv-4YafN7XZCPeQ_G7N0DvnZ3b4YzhKEX9Nclii5tMErLUiDSM4YzzDryG&sig=AHIEtbTGuqcEBbws1m56OIsaBU7jlpAoyQ |url-status=live |journal=Pakistan Military Consortium |location=Islamabad, Pakistan |volume=1 |issue=1 |page=16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319211924/http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache%3AOZFTUPnzBiEJ%3Awww.pakdef.info%2Fereporter%2Fpakdefereportervol1no1.pdf+Nuclear+pakdef+pdf&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESieytaoc5d0ZMNaZGigsHyiMo17j4BEBpUU-1okQ5Ri77lRJcRUqofaURTdifYPjzKobJTrdf9ZuTQv-4YafN7XZCPeQ_G7N0DvnZ3b4YzhKEX9Nclii5tMErLUiDSM4YzzDryG&sig=AHIEtbTGuqcEBbws1m56OIsaBU7jlpAoyQ |archive-date=2022-03-19 |access-date=10 November 2010}}</ref> Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's second nuclear test ([[Operation Shakti]]), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the [[Ras Koh Hills]] in the [[Chagai District|Chagai district]], [[Balochistan (Pakistan)|Balochistan]]. This operation was named ''[[Chagai-I]]'' by Pakistan, the underground iron-steel tunnel having been long-constructed by [[Martial Law Administrator of Balochistan|provincial martial law administrator]] General [[Rahimuddin Khan]] during the 1980s. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices. The last test of Pakistan was conducted at the sandy [[Kharan Desert]] under the codename [[Chagai-II]], also in Balochistan, on 30 May 1998. Pakistan's fissile material production takes place at Nilore, Kahuta, and [[Khushab Nuclear Complex]], where weapons-grade plutonium is refined. Pakistan thus became the seventh country in the world to successfully develop and test nuclear weapons,<ref name="Federation of American Scientists">{{cite web |title=Pakistan Nuclear Weapons |url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070220102255/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html |archive-date=20 February 2007 |access-date=22 February 2007}}</ref> although according to a letter sent by A.Q. Khan to General Zia, the capability to detonate a nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium as fissile material produced at KRL had already been achieved by KRL in 1984.<ref name="Levy page 112" /><ref name="ReferenceC" />
=== Arab financial, material and political support === During this period, some commentators and political figures referred to Pakistan's prospective nuclear capability as an “Islamic bomb,” a term used to suggest that the development of a nuclear deterrent by Pakistan could serve the broader strategic interests of the Muslim world. Bhutto encouraged political support from Muslim-majority and Arab states by presenting Pakistan's nuclear effort as an achievement for the Islamic world and as a potential counterweight to the nuclear capabilities of regional rivals.<ref>{{cite book |last=Weissman |first=Steve R. |title=The Islamic Bomb |last2=Krosney |first2=Herbert |publisher=Times Books |year=1981 |quote=Bhutto sought financial backing from several Arab states to support Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.}}</ref>
During the early stages of [[Pakistan]]'s nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, the government of [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]] sought financial and political backing from several [[Muslim-majority countries]] and Arab states following the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]]. Scholars of Pakistan's nuclear history note that Bhutto approached a number of governments in the [[Middle East]] as Pakistan accelerated its nuclear development in response to [[India]]'s strategic capabilities. Bhutto undertook a diplomatic tour of Muslim states in the Arab world and the Middle East shortly after the 1972 Multan Conference in order to mobilize political and financial support. These visits included [[Iran]], [[Saudi Arabia]], the [[United Arab Emirates]], [[Turkey]], [[Syria]], [[Morocco]], [[Egypt]], [[Algeria]], [[Tunisia]] and [[Libya]].{{sfnq|Khan|2012|p=111 |q=Soon after the Multan Conference of January 1972, Bhutto embarked on a tour of Muslim states in the Arab World and the Middle East. These countries included Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.}}<ref name="Chakma 2011 42"/>
Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons was viewed sympathetically in parts of the Muslim world during the 1970s and 1980s. In his historical study of the program, retired Pakistan Army major general and scholar Feroz Hassan Khan wrote that several Middle Eastern states, including [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Libya]], the [[United Arab Emirates]] were politically supportive of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions as the country faced increasing international nonproliferation pressure.{{sfn|Khan|2012|p=}}{{pn|date=March 2026}} Khan writes that Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates and, to some extent, Iran under the Shah were determined not to allow Pakistan's nuclear effort to fail as international restrictions on nuclear technology intensified.{{sfnq|Khan|2012|p=162|q=Saudi Arabia, Libya, the UAE, and, to an extent, Iran (under the shah) were determined not to let the Pakistani nuclear ship sink.}}
Historical studies identify [[Libya]] under [[Muammar Gaddafi]] and [[Saudi Arabia]] as among the states that provided financial assistance to Pakistan during the early development of the program.<ref name="Weissman 1981 45"/> Analysts have described this support as part of broader strategic cooperation between Pakistan and some governments in the [[Arab world]] during the [[Cold War]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Corera |first=Gordon |title=Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2006 |pages=29–31 |quote=Pakistan's nuclear program benefited from financial support from wealthy allies in the Middle East during its early development.}}</ref> Khan notes that Libya became one of Pakistan's closest partners during this period, with Libyan and Pakistani officials holding meetings in Paris in 1973 to discuss nuclear cooperation and financial assistance, and estimates of Libyan support reaching $500 million. There was also material assistance from [[Libya]] in addition to financial support. [[Libya]]n assistance reportedly included uranium ore concentrate (“yellowcake”) acquired from [[Niger]] and transferred to [[Pakistan]] between 1976 and 1982. [[Libya]] controlled uranium deposits in the Ouzo Strip in [[Chad]] during the 1970s, which may have also further contributed to its ability to supply nuclear materials.{{sfnq|Khan|2012|p=112|q=Libya’s assistance apparently involved the diversion of up to 450 tons of yellow cake, acquired from Niger, to Pakistan between 1976 and 1982.}}
In his historical study of Pakistan's nuclear program, retired [[Pakistan Army]] major general and scholar Feroz Hassan Khan wrote that Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance that helped sustain the program during periods of economic pressure and international sanctions.{{sfn|Khan|2012|p=147}} This helped Pakistan sustain the development of its nuclear program during its early years when the country faced economic constraints, sanctions and international pressure.<ref>{{cite book |last=Chakma |first=Bhumitra |title=The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia |publisher=Ashgate |year=2011 |page=42}}</ref>{{sfnq|Khan|2012|p=162|q=It was generous countries such as Libya and Saudi Arabia that financed the Pakistani economy as a whole, and mitigated the impact of Western sanctions.}}
=== Alleged Israeli interference === {{Israel and nuclear weapons}} {{Main|Operation Kahuta}}
In 1981, three [[West German]] engineering firms were targeted in bomb attacks and several others received threatening phone calls, allegedly carried out by the [[Mossad|Israeli secret service]]. All of the companies were suspected of selling [[dual use]] technology to Pakistan for use in their nuclear weapons program.<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 January 2022|url=https://www.jpost.com/international/article-691435|title=Israel's Mossad bombed German, Swiss firms to stop Pakistani nukes - report|newspaper=Jerusalem Post}}</ref> Former Pakistan Army brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan alleged that in 1982 India worked with Israel to plan an attack similar to the previous year's [[Operation Opera|surprise airstrike]] on Iraq's nuclear reactor, where Israeli [[F-16]] fighters bombers escorted by [[F-15]] air superiority aircraft would take off from [[Udhampur Air Force Station]] in [[Jammu and Kashmir (union territory)|Indian administered Kashmir]] and then fly low over [[the Himalayas]] to avoid early radar detection before attacking the Pakistani uranium enrichment centrifuge complex in the [[Rawalpindi District|Rawalpindi]] city of [[Kahuta]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 May 2021|url=https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2021/05/28/when-pakistan-feared-israel-india-would-attack-its-nuclear-weapon-sites.html|title=When Pakistan feared Israel, India would attack its nuclear weapon sites|newspaper=The Week}}</ref> Israel F-16 aircraft were also allegedly twice spotted in Pakistani air space in the days before the [[Chagai-I|1998 nuclear tests]] were carried out. Pakistan was so alarmed by the sighting that their then ambassador to [[the UN]], Ahmed Kamal, held an emergency meeting with the UN Secretary-General [[Kofi Annan]] to seek reassurance from the international community that an attack was not imminent.<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 June 1998|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/news/israelis-dismiss-claims-of-plans-to-blow-up-pakistani-nuclear-sites-1.159410|title=Israelis dismiss claims of plans to blow up Pakistani nuclear sites|newspaper=The Irish Times}}</ref>
=== Policy === {{Main|Minimum Credible Deterrence (Pakistan)}}
Pakistan is not known to have an offensive chemical weapons programme, and in 1993 Pakistan signed and ratified the [[Chemical Weapons Convention]] (CWC), and has committed itself to refrain from developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons.<ref name="NTI Research on Countries with Chemical facilities and capabilities.">{{cite web | last =NTI | first =Nuclear Threat Initiatives | title =Pakistan: Chemical Weapons Review | publisher =NTI Research on Countries with Chemical facilities and capabilities. | url =http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html | url-status =dead | archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20110507043625/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html | archive-date =7 May 2011 | access-date =13 January 2015}}</ref>
Pakistan is not a party to the [[Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT) and is not bound by any of its provisions. In 1999, Prime Ministers [[Nawaz Sharif]] of Pakistan and [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] of India signed the ''[[Lahore Declaration]],'' agreeing to a bilateral moratorium on further [[nuclear testing]]. This initiative was taken a year after both countries had publicly tested nuclear weapons. (See [[Pokhran-II]], [[Chagai-I]] and [[Chagai-II|II]])
Since the early 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities have not been without controversy. However, since the arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the government has taken concrete steps to ensure that [[Nuclear proliferation]] is not repeated and have assured the IAEA about the transparency of Pakistan's upcoming [[Chashma Nuclear Power Plant]]. In November 2006, The [[IAEA|International Atomic Energy Agency]] Board of Governors approved an agreement with the [[Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission]] to apply safeguards to new nuclear power plants to be built in the country with Chinese assistance.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://payvand.com/news/06/nov/1318.html |title=Pakistan gets IAEA approval for new N-plant |publisher=Payvand.com |date=22 November 2006 |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110727104714/http://payvand.com/news/06/nov/1318.html |archive-date=27 July 2011}}</ref>
=== Protections === In May 1999, during the anniversary of Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test, former prime minister [[Nawaz Sharif]] claimed that Pakistan's nuclear security is the strongest in the world.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C05%5C29%5Cstory_29-5-2009_pg7_1 |title=Leading News Resource of Pakistan |work=Daily Times |date=29 May 2009 |access-date=21 August 2010 |archive-date=2023-02-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230121/https://dailytimes.com.pk/ |url-status=live }}</ref> According to Dr. [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]], Pakistan's [[nuclear safety]] program and nuclear security program is the strongest program in the world and there is no such capability in any other country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=180186 |title=Security Verification |work=The News International |access-date=21 August 2010 }}{{dead link|date=June 2016|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> This claim is strongly disputed by foreign experts, citing the precedent of previous attacks of Pakistani military facilities and the nation's high level of instability.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-security-pakistan-reducing-risks-nuclear-terrorism |title=Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism |last=Mowatt-Larssen |first=Rolf |date=1 July 2009 |publisher=Arms Control Today |access-date=4 November 2018 |archive-date=2018-11-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181104085541/https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-security-pakistan-reducing-risks-nuclear-terrorism |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/opinion/the-world-must-secure-pakistans-nuclear-weapons.html |title=The World Must Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons |last=Rahmatullah |first=Nabil |date=20 April 2017 |website=New York Times |access-date=4 November 2018 |archive-date=2018-11-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181104125907/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/opinion/the-world-must-secure-pakistans-nuclear-weapons.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/just-how-secure-are-india-and-pakistans-nuclear-materials/ |title=Just How Secure Are India and Pakistan's Nuclear Materials? |last=Panda |first=Ankit |date=21 January 2016 |website=The Diplomat |access-date=4 November 2018 |archive-date=2018-11-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181104125925/https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/just-how-secure-are-india-and-pakistans-nuclear-materials/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
=== Modernisation and expansion === A Washington-based ''Nuclear Watch'' think tank of [[Boston University]] has reported that Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility.<ref>{{cite web |title=U.S. Now Believes Pakistan to use Khushab Plutonium in Bomb Program |url=http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/nucwatch/nucwatch071798.html |author=Mark Hibbs |work=Nuclear Watch |date=July 17, 1998 |publisher=Boston University |access-date=21 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605042403/http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/nucwatch/nucwatch071798.html |archive-date=5 June 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref> The sixth nuclear test (codename: [[Chagai-II]]) on 30 May 1998, at Kharan was quite a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but "powerful plutonium bomb" designed to be carried by aircraft, vessels, and missiles. These are believed to be [[tritium]]-boosted weapons. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%."<ref name="1913intel.com">{{cite web |url=http://www.1913intel.com/2008/12/27/the-dangers-of-india-pakistan-war/ |title=The dangers of India – Pakistan war |publisher=1913 Intel |access-date=21 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110707062143/http://www.1913intel.com/2008/12/27/the-dangers-of-india-pakistan-war/ |archive-date=7 July 2011 |url-status=dead}}</ref> Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is "likely finished and that the roof beams are being placed on top of the third [[Khushab Nuclear Complex|Khushab reactor hall]]".<ref>{{cite web |title='Pakistan building third nuclear reactor at Khushab' |url=http://newindianexpress.com/world/article62117.ece |work=The New Indian Express |date=25 April 2009 |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140104142251/http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/article62117.ece |archive-date=4 January 2014}}</ref> A third and a fourth<ref>{{cite web |url=http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/pakistan-appears-to-be-building-a-fourth-military-reactor-at-the-khushab-nu/12 |title=ISIS Online Jan 15 2011 |publisher=Isis-online.org |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103172554/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/pakistan-appears-to-be-building-a-fourth-military-reactor-at-the-khushab-nu/12 |archive-date=3 January 2014}}</ref> reactor and ancillary buildings are observed to be under construction at the [[Khushab Nuclear Complex|Khushab]] site.
In an opinion published in ''[[The Hindu]]'', former [[Indian Foreign Secretary]] [[Shyam Saran]] wrote that Pakistan's expanding nuclear capability is "no longer driven solely by its oft-cited fears of India" but by the "[[paranoia]] about US attacks on its strategic assets."<ref>{{cite news |title=Pakistan 'expanding nuclear arsenal to deter US attack' |newspaper=Daily News |date=7 December 2012 |location=New York |url=http://india.nydailynews.com/newsarticle/b749661854b09cc8d1ff03a5afdbe27c/pakistan-expanding-nuclear-arsenal-to-deter-us-attack |access-date=15 January 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130510025046/http://india.nydailynews.com/newsarticle/b749661854b09cc8d1ff03a5afdbe27c/pakistan-expanding-nuclear-arsenal-to-deter-us-attack |archive-date=10 May 2013}}</ref><ref name="The Hindu"/> Noting recent changes in Pakistan's [[Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan|nuclear doctrine]], Saran said "the [[Pakistan Military]] and [[The Establishment|civilian elite]] is convinced that the United States has also become a dangerous adversary, which seeks to [[Anti-nuclear|disable]], [[Denuclearization|disarm]] or take [[Nuclear espionage|forcible possession]] of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and its status as [[Nuclear power in Pakistan|nuclear power]]."<ref name="The Hindu">{{cite news|last=The Hindu|title=Dealing with Pakistan's brinkmanship |url=http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/dealing-with-pakistans-brinkmanship/article4171664.ece|access-date=15 January 2013|newspaper=The Hindu, 2012|date=7 December 2012|location=Chennai, India|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130109203159/http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/dealing-with-pakistans-brinkmanship/article4171664.ece |archive-date=9 January 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>
{{As of|2014}}, Pakistan has been reportedly developing smaller, tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://sowiport.gesis.org/search/id/gesis-ssoar-52086|title=Mishra, Sitakanta - Pakistan's Nuclear Threshold: Not as Low as Perceived - Sowiport / IndraStra Global (2017), 6, 4 p. ISSN 2381-3652|last=Sozialwissenschaften|first=GESIS Leibniz Institut für|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171203153933/http://sowiport.gesis.org/search/id/gesis-ssoar-52086|archive-date=3 December 2017|url-status=live|access-date=2017-12-03}}</ref> This is consistent with earlier statements from a meeting of the National Command Authority (which directs nuclear policy and development) saying Pakistan is developing "a full-spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of aggression."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.businessinsider.com/pakistan-is-working-to-create-tactical-nuclear-weapons-2014-9|title=Pakistan Is Working To Create Tactical Nuclear Weapons – Business Insider|author=Pierre Bienaimé|date=26 September 2014|work=Business Insider|access-date=26 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160509182527/http://www.businessinsider.com/pakistan-is-working-to-create-tactical-nuclear-weapons-2014-9|archive-date=9 May 2016}}</ref>
=== Arms control proposals === Pakistan has over the years proposed a number of bilateral or regional non-proliferation steps and confidence building measures to India, including:<ref>{{cite web |title=Pakistan Nuclear Weapons |work=Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) |publisher=GlobalSecurity.org |url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke.htm |access-date=2021-09-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210824152448/https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke.htm |archive-date=2021-08-24 |url-status=live}}</ref>
* A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, in 1978.<ref>{{cite Q|Q95399279}}<!-- FAS: Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology--></ref> * South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in 1978.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1979/100.pdf |title=Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia |access-date=2012-11-20 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120330014534/http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1979/100.pdf |archive-date=30 March 2012}}</ref> * Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities, in 1979.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eOgj3HHDnJkC&q=Mutual+inspections+by+India+and+Pakistan+of+each+others+nuclear+facilities+1979&pg=PA145 |title=Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan, and Iran |access-date=3 January 2014 |isbn=9780198292814 |last1=Arnett |first1=Eric H. |year=1997 |publisher=Oxford University Press |archive-date=2023-02-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230121/https://books.google.com/books?id=eOgj3HHDnJkC&q=Mutual+inspections+by+India+and+Pakistan+of+each+others+nuclear+facilities+1979&pg=PA145 |url-status=live }}</ref> * Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, in 1979.<ref>{{cite web |title=Introduction |url=http://www.acronym.org.uk/sppak.htm |publisher=Acronym.org.uk |date=14 May 1998 |access-date=3 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130508085949/http://www.acronym.org.uk/sppak.htm |archive-date=8 May 2013 |url-status=dead}}</ref> * A bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, in 1987.<ref>{{cite web |title=Pakistan Prime Minister Urges India To Accept Bilateral Nuclear Test Ban Pact |url=https://apnews.com/1a52fa098629fd045872b95bfd5f59b8 |publisher=Apnewsarchive.com |date=24 September 1987 |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140104030742/http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Pakistan-Prime-Minister-Urges-India-To-Accept-Bilateral-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Pact/id-1a52fa098629fd045872b95bfd5f59b8 |archive-date=4 January 2014}}</ref> * A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2jypQ7XYvTIC&q=south+asia+zero+missile+zone&pg=PA123 |title=Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes ... – Dinshaw Mistry |access-date=3 January 2014 |isbn=9780295802527 |last1=Mistry |first1=Dinshaw |date=2011-12-01 |publisher=University of Washington Press |archive-date=2023-02-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230055/https://books.google.com/books?id=2jypQ7XYvTIC&q=south+asia+zero+missile+zone&pg=PA123 |url-status=live }}</ref>
India rejected all six proposals.<ref>{{cite web |author=John Pike |title=Pakistan Nuclear Program Chronology – 1965 – 1979 |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke-chron.htm |publisher=Globalsecurity.org |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103120413/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke-chron.htm |archive-date=3 January 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=Zulfqar Khan |date=January 2005 |url=http://ipripak.org/papers/india-pakistan.shtml |title=India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence |place=Islamabad |publisher=Asia Printers |isbn=969-8721-10-X |via=Ipripak.org |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-date=4 June 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120604034533/http://ipripak.org/papers/india-pakistan.shtml}}</ref>
However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral agreements on nuclear issues. In 1989, they agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/683557/pakistan-and-india-resume-conventional-cbm-talks |title=Pakistan and India resume conventional CBM talks |work=Dawn |location=Pakistan |date=27 December 2011 |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130101134238/http://dawn.com/2011/12/27/pakistan-and-india-resume-conventional-cbm-talks/ |archive-date=1 January 2013}}</ref> Since then they have been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on 1 January of each year.<ref>{{cite web |author=APP |work=Dawn |date=1 January 2011 |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/595329/pakistan-india-exchange-lists-of-nuclear-installations |title=Pakistan, India exchange lists of nuclear installations |access-date=3 January 2014 |archive-date=2023-02-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230136/https://www.dawn.com/news/595329/pakistan-india-exchange-lists-of-nuclear-installations |url-status=live }}</ref> Another bilateral agreement was signed in March 2005 where both nations would alert the other on ballistic missile tests.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-IndiaPak |title=India, Pakistan Sign Missile Notification Pact |publisher=Arms Control Association |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103221047/http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-IndiaPak |archive-date=3 January 2014}}</ref> In June 2004, the two countries signed an agreement to set up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These were deemed essential risk reduction measures in view of the seemingly unending state of misgiving and tension between the two countries, and the extremely short response time available to them to any perceived attack. None of these agreements limits the nuclear weapons programs of either country in any way.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55542-2004Jun20.html |title=India, Pakistan to Set Up Hotline |newspaper=The Washington Post |access-date=3 January 2014 |date=21 June 2004 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150909011613/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55542-2004Jun20.html |archive-date=9 September 2015}}</ref>
=== Disarmament policy === Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a [[Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty]] as it continues to produce fissile material for weapons.<ref>{{cite news|last=Crail|first=Peter|title=Pakistan's Nuclear Buildup Vexes FMCT Talks|url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/Pakistan|access-date=18 November 2012|newspaper=Arms Control Today|date=March 2011|url-status=live|archive-date=5 January 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130105002137/http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/Pakistan}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Krepon|first=Michael|title=Pakistan and the FMCT |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/695613/pakistan-and-the-fmct |access-date=18 November 2012|newspaper=Dawn |date=15 February 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121025205553/http://dawn.com/2012/02/15/pakistan-and-the-fmct/|archive-date=25 October 2012}}</ref>
In a recent statement at the [[Conference on Disarmament]], Pakistan laid out its nuclear disarmament policy and what it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations:
* A commitment by all states to complete verifiable [[nuclear disarmament]]; * Eliminate the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime; * Normalize the relationship of the three [[Non-Proliferation Treaty|ex-NPT]] nuclear weapon states with those who are [[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons|NPT]] signatories; * Address new issues like access to [[Weapon of mass destruction|weapons of mass destruction]] by [[non-state actor]]s; * Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; * Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states; * A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of [[Anti-ballistic missile]] systems; * Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the [[Militarisation of space|militarisation of outer space]], including development of [[Anti-satellite weapon|ASATs]]; * Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional [[Tactical nuclear weapon|tactical weapons]]. * Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to address international security, disarmament and [[Nuclear proliferation|proliferation]] challenges.{{citation needed|date=November 2012}}
Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international fora like the [[Conference on Disarmament]] that it will give up its nuclear weapons only when other nuclear armed states do so, and when disarmament is universal and verifiable. It rejects any unilateral disarmament on its part.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05652.pdf |title=A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation |access-date=2012-11-18 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120611081255/http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05652.pdf |archive-date=11 June 2012}}</ref>
== Infrastructure == === Uranium === Pakistan's [[uranium]] infrastructure is based on the use of [[gas centrifuge]]s to produce [[highly enriched uranium]] (HEU) at the [[Khan Research Laboratories]] (KRL) at [[Kahuta]].<ref name="fas">{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html |title=Pakistan Nuclear Weapons |publisher=Fas.org |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=live |archive-date=23 October 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101023085132/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html}}</ref> Responding to India's [[Smiling Buddha|nuclear test]] in 1974, Munir Khan launched the uranium program, codename ''[[Project-706]]'' under the aegis of the PAEC.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=72–73}}</ref> [[Physical chemist]], Dr. [[Khalil Qureshi]], did most of the calculations as a member of the uranium division at PAEC, which undertook research on several methods of enrichment, including [[gaseous diffusion]], [[Enriched uranium#Aerodynamic processes|jet nozzle]] and [[molecular laser isotope separation]] techniques, as well as centrifuges.<ref name="MA Chaudhry"/> [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]] officially joined this program in 1976, bringing with him centrifuge designs he mastered at [[URENCO]], the Dutch firm where he had worked as a senior scientist. Later that year, the government separated the program from PAEC and moved the program to the [[Engineering Research Laboratories]] (ERL), with A.Q. Khan as its senior scientist.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=74–76}}</ref> To acquire the necessary equipment and material for this program, Khan developed a procurement ring. [[Electronic Materials|Electronic materials]] were imported from the United Kingdom by two liaison officers posted to the [[High Commission of Pakistan, London|High Commission of Pakistan]] in [[London]] and Bonn Germany.<ref name="thenews.com.pk">{{cite web |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-278025-Unsung-heroes |author=A. Q. Khan|date=October 13, 2014 |title=Unsung heroes (Part - XV)|work=The News International |access-date=26 April 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150627145342/http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-278025-Unsung-heroes |archive-date=27 June 2015}}</ref> The army engineer and ex-technical liaison officer, Major-General [[Syed Ali Nawab]] discreetly oversaw KRL operations in the 1970s including procuring the [[electronics]] that were marked as "common items."<ref name="thenews.com.pk"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-279343-Unsung-heroes |author=A. Q. Khan|date=October 20, 2014 |title=Unsung heroes (Part - XVI)|work=The News International |access-date=26 April 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150627145333/http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-279343-Unsung-heroes |archive-date=27 June 2015}}</ref> This ring was also illicitly used decades later, in the late 1980s and 1990s to provide technology to Libya (under [[Muammar Gaddafi]]), [[North Korea]], and [[Iran]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Albright|first=David|title=Holding Khan Accountable, An ISIS Statement Accompanying Release of Libya: A Major Sale at Last|url=http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/holding-khan-accountable-an-isis-statement-accompanying-release-of-libya-a-/|publisher=ISIS|access-date=22 March 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120609051043/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/holding-khan-accountable-an-isis-statement-accompanying-release-of-libya-a-/|archive-date=9 June 2012}}</ref> Despite these efforts, it is claimed Khan Research Laboratories suffered setbacks until PAEC provided technical assistance.<ref>{{harvtxt|Rehman|1999|pp=75–79}}</ref> Although, A.Q. Khan disputes it and counter claims that PAEC is merely trying to take credit for KRL's success and that PAEC hindered progress at KRL after the two programs had been separated by Bhutto in 1976.<ref name="UnsungHeroes">{{cite news |last=Khan |first=A. Quadeer |date=4 August 2014 |title=Unsung heroes |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-265190-Unsung-heroes |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140804123409/http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-265190-Unsung-heroes |archive-date=4 August 2014 |work=The News International}}</ref> In any case, KRL achieved modest enrichment of Uranium by 1978 and was ready to detonate an HEU uranium bomb by 1984. In contrast PAEC was unable to enrich any Uranium or produce weapons grade fissile material until 1998.
[[File:Pakistan Nuclear Test.jpg|thumb|The televised screen-shot of ''[[Chagai-I]]'' on 28 May 1998.]] The uranium program proved to be a difficult, challenging and most enduring approach to scale up to [[Nuclear power in Pakistan|industrial levels]] to [[Weapon-grade|military-grade]].<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment">{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=148–160|loc="7: Mastery of Uranium enrichment"}}</ref> Producing HEU as a [[fissile material]] is even more difficult and challenging than extracting [[plutonium]] and Pakistan experimented with HEU as an implosion design as contrary to other [[nuclear states]].<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|p=177}}</ref> Little and rudimentary knowledge was available of [[gas centrifuges]] at that time, and HEU fissile material was only known to the world for [[nuclear power]] usage; its military applications for [[Enriched uranium|HEU]] were non-existent.<ref>{{harvtxt|Khan|2012|pp=139–172}}</ref> Commenting on the difficulty, mathematician [[Tasneem Shah]]; who worked with A.Q. Khan, was quoted in the book ''Eating Grass'' that "[[Fluid dynamics|hydrodynamical]] problem in centrifuge was simply stated, but extremely difficult to evaluate, not only in [[order of magnitude]] but in detailing also."<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment"/> Many of Khan's fellow theorists were unsure about the feasibility of the enriched uranium on time despite Khan's strong advocacy.<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment"/> One scientist recalled his memories in ''Eating Grass'': "No one in the world has used the [gas] centrifuge method to produce weapon grade material.... [T]his was not going to work, he [A.Q. Khan] is simply wasting time."<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment"/> Despite A.Q. Khan having difficulty getting his peers to listen to him, he aggressively continued his research and the program was made feasible in the shortest time possible.<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment"/> His efforts won him praise from Pakistan's politicians and military science circles, and he was now debuted as the "father of the uranium" bomb.<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment"/> On 28 May 1998, it was the KRL's HEU that ultimately created the [[nuclear chain reaction]] which led the successful detonation of [[Boosted fission weapon|boosted fission devices]] in a scientific experiment codenamed [[Chagai-I]].<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment"/>
=== Plutonium === In July 1976 [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]] told leading Pakistani politicians that the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was completely incapable of meeting a deadline of December of that year for producing enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon. Shortly thereafter, he was placed in charge of a new organization independent of the PAEC tasked with producing plutonium for nuclear weapons.<ref name="ReferenceB"/><ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite journal |last1=Wood |first1=Houston |last2=Glaser |first2=Alexander |last3=Kemp |first3=Scott |date=September 2008 |title=The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation |journal=Physics Today |volume=61 |issue=9 |pages=40–45 |bibcode=2008PhT....61i..40W |doi=10.1063/1.2982121 |doi-access=free}}</ref> At that point, Pakistan had not yet completed the less difficult step of subcritical, [[nuclear weapons testing|cold testing]], and would not do so until 1983 in [[Kirana Hills]].
PAEC continued its research on plutonium and built the 40–50 MW (megawatt, thermal) [[Khushab Reactor Complex]] at Joharabad. In April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by Munir Khan, who informed the world that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Various Pakistani industries contributed in 82% of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was [[Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood]]. According to public statements made by the US Government officials, this [[heavy-water]] reactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of plutonium per year with increase in the production by the development of newer facilities,<ref name="NB00.25-5">{{cite web|url=http://www.world-nuclear.org/nb/nb00/nb0025.htm|title=Uranium Institute News Briefing 00.25 14–22 June 2000|access-date=7 May 2006|publisher=Uranium Institute|year=2000 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060923194947/http://www.world-nuclear.org/nb/nb00/nb0025.htm |archive-date = 23 September 2006}}</ref> sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/issues/world-plutonium-inventories-ong.htm |title=Key Issues: Nuclear Energy: Issues: IAEA: World Plutonium Inventories |publisher=Nuclearfiles.org |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140805165417/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/issues/world-plutonium-inventories-ong.htm |archive-date=5 August 2014}}</ref> The reactor could also produce [[tritium|{{SimpleNuclide|H|3}}]] if it were loaded with [[lithium-6|{{SimpleNuclide|Li|6}}]], although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern [[nuclear weapon design]]s use {{SimpleNuclide|Li|6}} directly. According to [[Joseph Cirincione|J. Cirincione]] of [[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]], Khushab's [[Plutonium]] production capacity has allowed Pakistan to develop lighter [[nuclear warheads]] that would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of the [[ballistic missile]]s.{{Citation needed|date=December 2007}}
PAEC also created a separated [[electromagnetic isotope separation]] program alongside the enrichment program, under Dr. [[GD Alam|G D Allam]], a [[theoretical physicist]].<ref name="Pakistan Military Consortium"/> The plutonium electromagnetic separation takes place at the [[Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor#PARR-III Reactor (New-Labs)|''New Laboratories'']], a reprocessing plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the [[Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology]] (PINSTECH) near [[Islamabad]], which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
In late 2006, the Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as many as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year."<ref>{{cite news |last=Jillani |first=Shahzeb |date=7 August 2006 |title=Pakistan nuclear report disputed |work=BBC News |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5251936.stm |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160108111420/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5251936.stm |archive-date=8 January 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/23/AR2006072300737.html |access-date=3 January 2014 |first=Joby |last=Warrick |date=24 July 2006 |url-status=live |archive-date=10 August 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140810014212/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/23/AR2006072300737.html }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Pakistan 'building new reactor' |work=BBC News |date=24 July 2006 |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5209894.stm |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-date=8 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160108111420/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5209894.stm}}</ref> The ''New York Times'' carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's third plutonium reactor,<ref>{{cite web|title=U.S. Group Says Pakistan Is Building New Reactor|date=23 June 2007 |work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/world/asia/23pakistan.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150605094739/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/world/asia/23pakistan.html |archive-date=5 June 2015|url-status=live|access-date=26 April 2016 |author=Jane Perlez}}</ref> signalling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads. On 30 May 1998, Pakistan proved its plutonium capability in a scientific experiment and sixth nuclear test: codename [[Chagai-II]].<ref name="Mastery of Uranium enrichment"/> There is controversy regarding environmental damage caused by the test, which dismissed by Balochistan media which worked with the government as misinformation, since the test were carried out hundred meters underground of Ras Koh hill and the explosions were not damaging any environment of the any areas in Pakistan or India.<ref name="Voice of Balochistan">{{cite news |author1=Imaan Zia |title=The Chagai Radiation Myths |url=https://voiceofbalochistan.pk/opinions-and-articles/security/the-chagai-radiation-myths/ |access-date=25 February 2022 |agency=Voice of Balochistan |publisher=Voice of Balochistan |date=2019 |language=en |archive-date=2022-01-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220128074805/https://voiceofbalochistan.pk/opinions-and-articles/security/the-chagai-radiation-myths/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
=== Stockpile === [[File:IRBM of Pakistan at IDEAS 2008.jpg|thumb|right|Pakistani Missiles on display at the [[International Defence Exhibition and Seminar|IDEAS 2008]] defence exhibition in [[Karachi]], Pakistan.]] [[File:4 Babur Cruise Missiles on a Truck at IDEAS 2008.jpg|thumb|right|A truck-mounted launch system ([[transporter erector launcher|TEL]]) armed with 4 [[Babur cruise missile]]s on display at the [[International Defence Exhibition and Seminar|IDEAS 2008]] defence exhibition in [[Karachi]], Pakistan.]] [[File:Military truck carrying IRBMs of Pakistani Army.jpg|thumb|right|Truck-mounted Missiles on display at the [[International Defence Exhibition and Seminar|IDEAS 2008]] defence exhibition in [[Karachi]], Pakistan.]]
Estimates of Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear warheads vary. The most recent analysis, published in the [[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] in 2023, estimates that Pakistan has 170 nuclear warheads.<ref name=":1" /> In 2001, the US-based [[Natural Resources Defense Council]] (NRDC) estimated that Pakistan had built 24–48 HEU-based nuclear warheads with HEU reserves for 30–52 additional warheads.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html |title=Federation of American Scientists |publisher=Fas.org |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131111192432/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html |archive-date=11 November 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Center for Defense Information|website=cdi.org |url=http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/panukes.html|access-date=10 June 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061025221908/http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef%26f/database/panukes.html|archive-date=25 October 2006 |url-status=dead}}</ref> In 2003, the US Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict estimated that Pakistan possessed between 35 and 95 nuclear warheads, with a median of 60.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/feb03/southAsia2.asp|title=US Navy Strategic Insights. Feb 2003|access-date=28 October 2006|publisher=United States Department of the Navy|year=2003|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061006052543/http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/feb03/southAsia2.asp|archive-date=6 October 2006}}</ref> In 2003, the [[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] estimated a stockpile of approximately 50 weapons. By contrast, in 2000, US military and intelligence sources estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads.<ref>{{cite web |title=Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal Underestimated, Reports Say |url=https://fas.org/news/pakistan/2000/e20000609pakistan.htm |publisher=Fas.org |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130310075333/http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/2000/e20000609pakistan.htm |archive-date=10 March 2013}}</ref> In 2018, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that the arsenal was about 120-130 warheads.<ref>{{Citation|chapter=Royal Court|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=9781137487728|doi=10.1057/9781137487728.0007|title=Royal Court: International|year=2015}}</ref>
The actual size of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is hard for experts to gauge owing to the extreme secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. However, in 2007, retired Pakistan Army's Brigadier-General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper that Pakistan had "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads."<ref>{{cite web |author=Anwar Iqbal |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/278670/impact-of-us-wargames-on-pakistan-n-arms |title=Impact of US wargames on Pakistan N-arms 'negative' -DAWN – Top Stories; 3 December 2007 |work=Dawn |location=Pakistan |date=3 December 2007 |access-date=3 January 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101031024317/http://www.dawn.com/2007/12/03/top7.htm |archive-date=31 October 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Ricks |first=Thomas E. |date=2 December 2007 |title=Calculating the Risks in Pakistan |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/01/AR2007120101618.html |access-date=3 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131025050855/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/01/AR2007120101618.html |archive-date=25 October 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref>
On 27 April 2025, in a fiery response to India's declared suspension of the [[Indus Waters Treaty]], [[Hanif Abbasi]], the Pakistani [[Ministry of Railways (Pakistan)|Minister of Railways]] warned that any attempt to cut off Pakistan's water supply could lead to full-scale war and stated Pakistan's nuclear stockpile of 130 warheads was aimed towards India.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-04-27 |title='Our nukes and missiles aren't for show, they're for India,' says Pakistan Minister |url=https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/our-nukes-and-missiles-arent-for-show-theyre-for-india-says-pak-minister/3824125/ |access-date=2025-05-01 |website=Financialexpress |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-04-28 |title=Pakistan minister's nuclear attack threat at India while his people panic over Pahalgam revenge |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/videos/pakistan-ministers-nuclear-attack-threat-at-india-while-his-people-panic-over-pahalgam-revenge-101745828002417.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250430042417/https://www.hindustantimes.com/videos/pakistan-ministers-nuclear-attack-threat-at-india-while-his-people-panic-over-pahalgam-revenge-101745828002417.html |archive-date=2025-04-30 |access-date=2025-05-01 |work=Hindustan Times |language=en-us |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Nova |first=Redazione Agenzia |date=2025-04-27 |title=Pakistan Railway Minister Threatens India: 'We Have 130 Nuclear Warheads For You' |url=https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Pakistan-Railway-Minister-Threatens-India-We-Have-130-Nuclear-Warheads-For-You/ |access-date=2025-05-01 |website=Agenzia Nova |language=en}}</ref>
Pakistan's first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested under codename [[Chagai-I]] and [[Chagai-II]]. It is reported that the yields from these tests were 12 kt, 30 to 36 kt and four low-yield (below 1 kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25 kt and 150 kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and may have 300–500 kt<ref name="defense-update.com">{{cite web |url=http://defense-update.com/analysis/analysis_pakistan_240409.html |title=Pakistan's Nukes – Al-Qaeda's Next Strategic Surprise? – Defense Update News Analysis |publisher=Defense-update.com |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101205120735/http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/analysis_pakistan_240409.html |archive-date=5 December 2010}}</ref> large-size warheads. The low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried on [[fighter-bomber]]s such as the [[Dassault Mirage III]] and fitted to Pakistan's short-range ballistic missiles, while the higher-yield warheads are probably fitted to the [[Shaheen (missile)|Shaheen]] series and [[Ghauri (missile)|Ghauri]] series ballistic missiles.<ref name="defense-update.com"/>
=== Second strike capability === According to a US congressional report, Pakistan has addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conflict through [[second strike]] capability. Pakistan has been dealing with efforts to develop new weapons and at the same time, have a strategy for surviving a nuclear war. Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/11-pakistan-enhances-second-strike-n-capability--us-report--il--12 |title=World | Pakistan enhances second strike N-capability: US report |work=Dawn |location=Pakistan |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090721120736/http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/11-pakistan-enhances-second-strike-n-capability--us-report--il--12 |archive-date=21 July 2009}}</ref> In January 2000, two years past after the atomic tests, US intelligence officials stated that previous intelligence estimates "overstated the capabilities of India's homegrown arsenal and understate those of Pakistan".<ref name="Dawn Archives January 2000">{{cite news|last=Haider|first=Moin |title=Pakistan has edge over India in Nuclear Capability|url=http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/jun10.html#hase|access-date=23 December 2012|newspaper=Dawn Archives January 2000|date=10 January 2000|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091015175639/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/jun10.html#hase|archive-date=15 October 2009}}</ref> The [[United States Central Command]] commander, General [[Anthony Zinni]]<ref name="Dawn Archives January 2000"/> told the [[NBC]] that longtime assumptions, that "India had an edge in the South Asian strategic balance of power, were questionable at best. Don't assume that Pakistan's nuclear capability is inferior to the Indians", General Zinni quoted to NBC.<ref name="Dawn Archives January 2000"/>
It was confirmed that Pakistan has built Soviet-style road-mobile missiles, state-of-the-art air defences around strategic sites, and other concealment measures. In 1998, Pakistan had 'at least six secret locations' and since then it is believed Pakistan may have many more such secret sites. In 2008, the United States admitted that it did not know where all of Pakistan's nuclear sites are located. Pakistani defence officials have continued to rebuff and deflect American requests for more details about the location and security of the country's nuclear sites.<ref>{{cite news |last=Sanger |first=David E. |date=4 May 2009 |title=Strife in Pakistan Raises U.S. Doubts Over Nuclear Arms |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/world/asia/04nuke.html?_r=1&hp |access-date=27 March 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721132532/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/world/asia/04nuke.html?_r=1&hp |archive-date=21 July 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref>
=== Personnel === In 2010, Russian foreign ministry official Yuriy Korolev stated that there are somewhere between 120,000 and 130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, a figure considered extremely large for a developing country.<ref>{{cite news |last=Rodriguez |first=Alex |date=29 November 2010 |title=Cables reveal doubts about Pakistani nuclear security |work=Los Angeles Times |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-nov-29-la-fg-wikileaks-pakistan-20101130-story.html |archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20120518023717/http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/29/world/la-fg-wikileaks-pakistan-20101130 |archive-date=18 May 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref>
=== Alleged foreign co-operation ===
==== From China ==== Historically, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been repeatedly charged with allegedly transferring missile and related materials to Pakistan.<ref name="Dawn archives 2001 August">{{cite news |title=US senators accuse China of selling arms|url=http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/aug1701.html|access-date=23 December 2012|newspaper=Dawn archives 2001 August|date=17 August 2001|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110613201329/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/aug1701.html|archive-date=13 June 2011}}</ref> Despite China strongly dismissing the charges and accusations, the United States alleged China to have played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan's atomic bomb development infrastructure.<ref name="Dawn archives 2001 August"/> There are also unofficial reports in Western media that the nuclear weapon technology and the weapon-grade [[enriched uranium]] was transferred to Pakistan by China.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111211060.html |title=Pakistani nuclear scientist's accounts tell of Chinese proliferation |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=13 November 2009 |access-date=3 January 2014 |first1=R. Jeffrey |last1=Smith |first2=Joby |last2=Warrick |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131023062610/http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-11-13/world/36899222_1_proliferation-nuclear-weapons-abdul-qadeer-khan |archive-date=23 October 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/index.htm|title=China, Pakistan, and the Bomb|access-date=26 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150320073242/http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/index.htm|archive-date=20 March 2015}}</ref> China has consistently maintained that it has not sold any weapon parts or components to Pakistan or anyone else.<ref name="Dawn archives 2001 August"/> In August 2001, it was reported that US officials confronted China numerous times over this issue and pointed out "rather bluntly"<ref name="Dawn archives 2001 August"/> to Chinese officials that the evidences from intelligence sources was "powerful."<ref name="Dawn archives 2001 August"/> But they had been rebuffed by the Chinese, who have retorted by referring to the US [[US Taiwan relations|support]] for [[Taiwan military|Taiwan's military]] build-up which Beijing says is directed against it.<ref name="Dawn archives 2001 August"/>
The former US officials have also disclosed that China had allegedly transferred technology to Pakistan and conducting [[List of nuclear weapons tests|putative test]] for it in 1980.<ref>China tested N-weapons for Pak: US insider [[The Times of India]] 6 September 2008</ref> However, senior scientists and officials strongly dismissed the US disclosure, and in 1998 interview given to [[Kamran Khan (journalist)|Kamran Khan]], Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained to the fact that, "due to its sensitivity, no country allows another country to use their tests site to explode the devices," although the UK conducted such tests in Australia and the United States.<ref name="Jang Media Group, Co."/> His statement was also traced by [[Samar Mubarakmand]] who acknowledged that cold tests were carried out, under codename ''[[Kirana-I]]'', in a test site which was built by the [[Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers|Corps of Engineers]] under the guidance of the PAEC.<ref name="Jang Media Group, Co.">{{cite web |last = Khan |first = Kamran |author-link = Kamran Khan (journalist) |title = Interview with Abdul Qadeer Khan |work = Kamran Khan, director of the News Intelligence Unit of "[[The News International]]" |publisher = Jang Media Group, Co. |date = 30 May 1998 |url = http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/KhanInterview.html |access-date = 30 May 2011 |url-status = live |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110505145800/http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/KhanInterview.html |archive-date = 5 May 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last = Mir |first = Hamid |author-link = Hamid Mir |title = Interview of Dr. Samar Mubarak – Head of Pakistan Missile Program. |work = Hamid Mir, director of the Political Intelligence Directorate of "[[The News International]]" |publisher = Geo Television Network |date = 3 May 2004 |url = http://oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/4167731/ |access-date = 13 May 2011 |url-status = live |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110719102226/http://oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/4167731/ |archive-date = 19 July 2011 }}</ref> According to a 2001 [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is a signatory.<ref>{{cite web |title=US Report: China gifted nuclear bomb and Pakistan stole the technology |publisher=TheWorldReporter.com |date=18 November 2009 |url=http://www.theworldreporter.com/2009/11/us-report-china-gifted-nuclear-bomb-and.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120313031214/http://www.theworldreporter.com/2009/11/us-report-china-gifted-nuclear-bomb-and.html |archive-date=13 March 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200110-eng.asp |title=Report No. 2001/10: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation |publisher=Csis-scrs.gc.ca |date=15 May 2008 |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120312190837/http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200110-eng.asp |archive-date=12 March 2012}}</ref> In 2001 visit to India, the [[Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress]] [[Li Peng]] rejected all the accusations against China to [[Media of India|Indian media]] and strongly maintained on the ground that "his country was not giving any nuclear arms to Pakistan nor transferring related-technology to it."<ref name="Dawn Archives January 2001">{{cite news|last=Jawed Naqvi |title=No Nuclear arms for Pakistan: Li|url=http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/jan1301.html#nonu|access-date=23 December 2012|newspaper=Dawn Archives January 2001|date=31 January 2001|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110613200922/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2001/jan1301.html#nonu|archive-date=13 June 2011}}</ref> Talking to a media correspondents and [[Indian Parliamentary Group|Indian parliamentarians]], Li Peng frankly quoted: "We do not help Pakistan in its atomic bomb projects. Pakistan is a friendly country with whom we have good economic and political relations."<ref name="Dawn Archives January 2001"/>
In 1986, it was reported that both countries have signed a mutual treaty of peaceful use of civil nuclear technology agreement in which China would supply Pakistan a civil-purpose nuclear power plant. A grand ceremony was held in Beijing where Pakistan's then-[[Minister of Foreign Affairs (Pakistan)|Foreign Minister]] [[Sahibzada Yaqub Khan|Yakub Khan]] signed on behalf of Pakistan in the presence of Munir Khan and [[Premier of the People's Republic of China|Chinese Prime Minister]]. Therefore, in 1989, Pakistan reached agreement with China for the supply of the 300-MW commercial [[Chashma Nuclear Power Plant|''CHASHNUPP-1'']] nuclear reactor.
In February 1990, President [[François Mitterrand]] of France visited Pakistan and announced that France had agreed to supply a 900 MWe commercial nuclear power plant to Pakistan. However, after the Prime Minister [[Benazir Bhutto]] was dismissed in August 1990, the French [[nuclear power plant]] deal went into cold storage and the agreement could not be implemented due to financial constraints and the Pakistani government's apathy. Also in February 1990, Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.P. Yakunin, said that the Soviet regime was considering a request from Pakistan for the supply of a nuclear power plant. The Soviet and French civilian nuclear power plant was on its way during the 1990s. However, Bob Oakley, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, expressed US displeasure at the recent agreement made between France and Pakistan for the sale of a nuclear power plant.<ref>{{cite web|title=Research Library: Country Profiles: Pakistan |publisher=NTI |url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_1990.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101108072529/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_1990.html |archive-date=8 November 2010 |url-status=dead |access-date=21 August 2010}}</ref> After the US concerns the civilian-nuclear technology agreements were cancelled by France and Soviet Union.
Declassified documents from 1982, released in 2012 under the US Freedom of Information Act, said that US intelligence detected that Pakistan was seeking suspicious procurements from Belgium, Finland, Japan, Sweden and Turkey.<ref>{{cite web |title=AFP: Reagan era envoy found Pakistan 'lied' on nukes |url=https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hzs08xWI6PIZl93fhPsO2d2fHrqg?docId=CNG.9105d2b2a4f1022f1f467afd59b97c31.31 |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120628030115/http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hzs08xWI6PIZl93fhPsO2d2fHrqg?docId=CNG.9105d2b2a4f1022f1f467afd59b97c31.31 |archive-date=28 June 2012}}</ref>
According to more recent reports, it has been alleged that North Korea had been secretly supplying Pakistan with ballistic missile technology in exchange for nuclear weapons technology.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31900.pdf |title=Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan |access-date=2015-04-04 |url-status=live |archive-date=24 September 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924135037/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31900.pdf}}</ref>
Some reports also reveal continued supply of dual-use items from China to Pakistan in recent times. In February 2020, India caught the transshipment of an industrial autoclave from [[Port of Jiangyin|Jiangyin Port]], China to Karachi. The shipment was stopped at [[Port of Kandla|Kandla Port]] in India on February 3, 2020. The autoclave on the ship was identified as an industrial dryer, a dual-use technology with relevance in the production of rocket motors for ballistic missiles.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Rajagopalan |first=Dr Rajeswari |date=2024-03-13 |title=Once Again, Concerns Arise About China-Pakistan WMD Nexus |url=https://southasianvoices.org/nuc-f-in-r-china-pakistan-wmd-nexus-03-13-2024/?s=08 |access-date=2024-10-14 |website=South Asian Voices |language=en}}</ref> On January 23, 2024, India intercepted a Malta flagged ship, CMA CGM-Attila, at Mumbai's Nhava Sheva Port, for carrying a “dual-use consignment” identified as a computer numerical control (CNC) machine, produced by an Italian company, from China to Pakistan. The shipment was being sent to “Pakistan Wings Pvt. Ltd.” in [[Sialkot]] and part of the consignment was for “Cosmos Engineering,” a Pakistani defense supplier.<ref name=":0" />
==== From the United States ====
In July 1987, the FBI arrested Arshad Z. Pervez, a Pakistani-born Canadian, as he attempted to buy twenty-five tons of a specially strengthened steel, for which the primary use would be a uranium enrichment program, according to [[Richard Barlow (intelligence analyst)|Richard Barlow]], who had been an intelligence analyst in the CIA at the time. This arrest resulted from a sting operation organized by Barlow and a counterpart from the CIA. The mark had failed to show for previous sting operations planned in joint with a representative of the US State Department.
This arrest made headlines, which led to hearings before the [[United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation|Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee]], chaired by Representative Solarz (D-NY), who had co-sponsored with Senator [[Larry Pressler]] (R-SD) the [[Larry Pressler#Pakistan and the Pressler Amendment|Pressler Amendment]]. That amendment stated that, "no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan" unless the President certifies annually "(1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid 'will reduce significantly the risk' that Pakistan will possess such a device." Senator [[John Glenn]] also said, "The Reagan and Bush administrations have practiced a nuclear nonproliferation policy bordering on lawlessness. They have undermined the respect of other countries for U.S. law and have done great damage to the nuclear nonproliferation effort."<ref><!--The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan's nuclear weapons program (Senate - July 31, 1992)-->{{cite Q|Q135898081}}</ref>
Retired Army Major General David W. Einsel, then working for the CIA, and Barlow were asked to testify. Einsel gave evasive answers when asked if Pakistan had attempted to purchase anything that would have violated US export control requirements. Barlow was then asked essentially the same question. He said that the CIA knew of "scores" of Pakistani attempts to violate American export law.<ref name=Hersh93>{{cite Q|Q88318566}}<!-- Seymour Hersh (1993) On the Nuclear Edge, The New Yorker--></ref> After that testimoney, Barlow said he was so harassed by Einsel and other senior CIA personnel that he resigned in 1988,<ref name='Hersh93' /> though not before receiving the CIA's Exceptional Accomplishment Award.<ref name='Leyton2007'>{{cite Q| Q88306915}}<!-- Leyton (2007) Whistle-Blower's Fight For Pension Drags On, WaPo --></ref>
In 1989 Barlow was hired as a proliferation analyst for the Department of Defense, where he produced a report indicating that Pakistan possessed the capability to use [[F-16]] fighters to deliver nuclear weapons, based on information about how Pakistan had modified F-16s it had received from the United States.<ref name='Leyton2007'/> Barlow then learned that Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes had stated the exact opposite in testimony before Congress, that using F-16s to deliver nuclear weapons "far exceeded the state of art in Pakistan." He found that the file copy of his report had been altered. He then told his management they should not lie to Congress. He was fired and his career destroyed.<ref name='Leyton2007'/><ref name='Hersh93' /><ref name="Econ">{{cite Q|Q88317062}}<!-- Pakistan's nuclear ambitions: The spider's stratagem, The Economist, January 3, 2008--></ref>
=== Doctrine === {{See also|Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan}}
Pakistan refuses to adopt a "[[No first use|no-first-use]]" doctrine, indicating that it would strike India with nuclear weapons even if India did not use such weapons first. Pakistan's asymmetric nuclear posture has significant influence on India's decision and ability to retaliate, as shown in [[2001 India Pakistan standoff|2001]] and [[2008 India Pakistan standoff|2008 crises]], when [[non-state actors]] carried out deadly attacks on Indian soil, only to be met with a relatively subdued response from India. A military spokesperson stated that "Pakistan's threat of nuclear first-use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes."<ref name="Narang Policy Brief">{{cite news|last=Narang|first=Vipin |title=Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability |url=http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Pakistans_Nuclear_Posture_policy_brief.pdf|access-date=4 January 2013|newspaper=Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Policy Brief|date=January 2010|url-status=live|archive-date=6 July 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120706183836/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Pakistans_Nuclear_Posture_policy_brief.pdf}}</ref> India is Pakistan's primary geographic neighbour and primary strategic competitor, helping drive Pakistan's conventional warfare capability and nuclear weapons development: The two countries share an 1800-mile border and have suffered a violent history—four wars in less than seven decades. The past three decades have seen India's economy eclipse that of Pakistan's, allowing the former to outpace the latter in defence expenditure at a decreasing share of GDP. In comparison to population, "India is more powerful than Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic, and political power—and the gap continues to grow," a [[Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs]] report claims.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Aguilar|first1=Francisco|first2=Randy|last2=Bell |first3=Natalie|last3=Black|title=An Introduction To Pakistan's Military|date=July 2011|page=8 |url=http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Pakistan-Military-final-B.pdf|access-date=4 January 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120825052611/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Pakistan-Military-final-B.pdf|archive-date=25 August 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>
=== Theory of deterrence === {{Main|N-deterrence|Nuclear deterrence}}
The theory of "N-deterrence" has been frequently being interpreted by the various government-in-time of effect of Pakistan. Although the nuclear deterrence theory was officially adopted in 1998 as part of Pakistan's defence theory,<ref>{{cite web|last=Abidi|first=Zawar Haider|date=June 14, 2012|title=Threat Reduction in South Asia|work=South Asia Fellowships Project|pages=6–15|publisher=[[Stimson Center]]|url=https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/zawarabidi.pdf|access-date=2021-09-14|archive-date=2021-09-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210914195433/https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/zawarabidi.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> on the other hand, the theory has had been interpreted by the government since in 1972. The relative weakness in defensive warfare is highlighted in Pakistan's nuclear posture, which Pakistan considers its primary deterrent from Indian conventional offensives or nuclear attack. Nuclear theorist [[Brigadier-General]] Feroz Hassan Khan adds: "The Pakistani situation is akin to [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization|NATO]]'s position in the [[Cold War]]. There are geographic gaps and corridors similar to those that existed in Europe ... that are vulnerable to exploitation by mechanized [[Indian forces]] ... With its relatively smaller conventional force, and lacking adequate technical means, especially in early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more proactive nuclear defensive policy."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Khan|first=Feroz |title=Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia|journal=Nonproliferation Review |date=Spring 2003 |volume=10|issue=1|page=65 |doi=10.1080/10736700308436917 |s2cid=7094872 |url=http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/101khan.pdf|access-date=2013-01-04|url-status=live|archive-date=2012-06-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120606194812/http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/101khan.pdf}}</ref>
American political scientist [[Vipin Narang]], however, argues that Pakistan's asymmetric escalation posture, or the rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks to deter their outbreak, increases instability in South Asia. Narang supports his arguments by noting to the fact that since India's assured retaliation nuclear posture has not deterred these provocations, Pakistan's passive nuclear posture has neutralised India's conventional options for now; limited retaliation would be militarily futile, and more significant conventional retaliation is simply off the table."<ref name="Narang Policy Brief"/>
The strategists in [[Pakistan Armed Forces]] has ceded nuclear assets and a degree of nuclear launch code authority to lower-level officers to ensure weapon usability in a "[[fog of war]]" scenario, making credible its deterrence doctrine.<ref name="Narang Policy Brief"/> On further military perspective, the [[Pakistan Air Force]] (PAF), has retrospectively contended that "theory of defense is not view to enter into a "[[nuclear race]]", but to follow a policy of "[[peaceful co-existence]]" in the region, it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."<ref name="The Yahoo News!">{{cite news|last=ANI|first=ANI|title=Peace-loving' Pakistan to continue credible minimum nuke deterrence policy.|url=http://in.news.yahoo.com/peace-loving-pak-continue-credible-minimum-nuke-deterrence-20110321-222051-561.html|access-date=21 July 2012|newspaper=The Yahoo News!|date=22 March 2011|quote=Pakistan does not wish to enter into a nuclear arms race, but will continue to maintain the policy of credible minimum deterrence, Pakistan's Air Force chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman has said|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103173305/http://in.news.yahoo.com/peace-loving-pak-continue-credible-minimum-nuke-deterrence-20110321-222051-561.html|archive-date=3 January 2014}}</ref> The [[Pakistan Government]] officials and strategists have consistently emphasised that nuclear deterrence is intended by maintaining a balance to safeguard its sovereignty and ensure peace in the region.<ref>{{cite news |last=Staff report |title=Pakistan will maintain minimum credible deterrence |url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\story_28-2-2006_pg7_24 |access-date=21 July 2012 |newspaper=Daily Times. |date=28 February 2006 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070712233956/http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C28%5Cstory_28-2-2006_pg7_24 |archive-date=12 July 2007}}</ref>
Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to allow another invasion of Pakistan.<ref>{{cite web|last=Khan|first=Abdul Qadeer|title=I saved my country from nuclear blackmail' |date=2011-05-17 |url=http://tribune.com.pk/story/170253/i-saved-my-country-from-nuclear-blackmail/ |publisher=Newsweek; The Tribune; The NTI; various others|access-date=3 December 2011|quote=The State of [P]akistan's motivation for atomic weapons arose from a need to prevent "''nuclear blackmail''" by India. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn't have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently.... If (Pakistan) had [atomic] capability [[Indo-Pakistani war of 1971|before 1971]], we [Pakistanis] would not have lost [[East Pakistan|half]] of our country after a [[Instrument of Surrender (1971)|disgraceful defeat]].<small>Professor Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan</small>|url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110918185000/http://tribune.com.pk/story/170253/i-saved-my-country-from-nuclear-blackmail/|archive-date=18 September 2011}}</ref> President [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq]] allegedly told the Indian Prime Minister [[Rajiv Gandhi]] in 1987 that, "If your forces cross our borders by an inch, we are going to annihilate your cities."<ref>{{cite web|last=Hashimi|first=Shafik H.|title=The Nuclear Danger in South Asia |publisher=Pakistan Link|url=http://pakistanlink.org/Commentary/2006/March06/03/02.HTM|access-date=22 July 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120916002338/http://pakistanlink.org/Commentary/2006/March06/03/02.HTM |archive-date=16 September 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>
Pakistan has not signed the [[Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT) or the [[Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]] (CTBT). According to the [[United States Department of Defense]] report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has responded to the report by stating that the United States itself has not ratified the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."
The [[Congressional Research Service]], in a report published on 23 July 2012, said that in addition to expanding its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could broaden the circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite news|url= http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-swelling-nuclear-arsenal-to-counter-India-says-US-Congressional-report/articleshow/15414060.cms|title= Pakistan swelling nuclear arsenal to counter India, says US Congressional report|date= 9 August 2012|work= The Times Of India|url-status= live|archive-date= 10 August 2012|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20120810024629/http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-swelling-nuclear-arsenal-to-counter-India-says-US-Congressional-report/articleshow/15414060.cms}}</ref>
=== Nuclear Command and Control === {{Main|National Command Authority (Pakistan)|Strategic Plans Division Force|Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee|National Security Council (Pakistan)|Strategic Plans Division|Defence Committee of the Cabinet (Pakistan)|Threat Matrix (database)}}
The government institutional organisation authorised to make critical decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the [[Pakistan National Command Authority]] (NCA), the genesis of which was in the 1970s and has been constitutionally established since February 2000.<ref name="Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 May 1994, Pg. 23; in NTI Nuclear and Missile Database">{{cite web|last=NTI|first=Nuclear Threat Initiatives|title=Bare All and Be Damned|url=http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791|publisher=Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 May 1994, Pg. 23; in NTI Nuclear and Missile Database|access-date=17 May 2012|page=47|date=5 May 1994|quote=The NCA determines the state of readiness which has to be maintained at all times...and lays down in great detail the policy of how the various components will be placed, protected and safeguarded|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120928060757/http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791|archive-date=28 September 2012}}</ref> The NCA is composed of two civic-military committees that advises and console both [[Prime Minister of Pakistan|Prime minister]] and the [[President of Pakistan|President]] of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the [[Khan Research Laboratories]] and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex. In November 2009, Pakistan President [[Asif Ali Zardari]] announced that he will be replaced by Prime Minister [[Yusuf Raza Gilani]] as the chairman of NCA.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINIndia-44323120091129|title=Pakistani PM takes charge of nuclear weapons|date=29 November 2009|work=Reuters|access-date=29 November 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170426060338/http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINIndia-44323120091129|archive-date=26 April 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref> The NCA consists of the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), both now chaired by the Prime Minister.<ref name="IISS Report">{{cite web|last=IISS Report|title=The Nuclear control and Command in Pakistan|url=http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversight-reforms/|publisher=IISS|access-date=2 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130307214027/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversight-reforms/|archive-date=7 March 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> The [[Foreign Minister of Pakistan|Foreign minister]] and [[Finance Minister of Pakistan|Economic Minister]] serves as a deputy chairmen of the ECC, the body which defines [[nuclear strategy]], including the deployment and employment of strategic forces, and would advise the prime minister on nuclear use. The committee includes key senior cabinet ministers as well as the respective military chiefs of staff.<ref name="IISS Report"/> The ECC reviews presentations on strategic threat perceptions, monitors the progress of weapons development, and decides on responses to emerging threats.<ref name="IISS Report"/> It also establishes guidelines for effective command-and-control practices to safeguard against the accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.<ref name="IISS Report"/>
The [[Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee|chairman]] of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee]] is the deputy chairman of the Development Control Committee (DCC), the body responsible for weapons development and oversight which includes the nation's military and scientific, but not its political, leadership.<ref name="IISS Report"/> Through DCC, the senior civilian scientists maintains a tight control of scientific and ethical research; the DCC exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and scientific research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.<ref name="IISS Report"/> Functioning through the SPD, the DCC oversees the systematic progress of weapon systems to fulfil the force goals set by the committee.<ref name="IISS Report"/>
Under the National Command Authority, its secretariat, Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is responsible for the physical protection and to ensure security of all aspects of country's nuclear arsenals and maintains [[Strategic Plans Division Force|dedicated force]] for this purpose.<ref name="Stanford University Press, (FH Khan)"/> The SPD functions under the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee]] at the [[JS HQ (Pakistan)|Joint Headquarters]] (JS HQ) and reports directly to the [[Prime Minister of Pakistan|Prime Minister]].<ref name="Stanford University Press, (FH Khan)"/> The comprehensive nuclear force planning is integrated with conventional war planning at the [[National Security Council (Pakistan)|National Security Council]] (NSC).<ref name="Stanford University Press, (FH Khan)"/> According to the officials of Pakistan's military science circles, it is the high-profile civic-military committee consisting the [[Cabinet of Pakistan|Cabinet ministers]], [[President of Pakistan|President]], [[Prime Minister of Pakistan|Prime minister]] and the four services chiefs, all of whom who reserves the right to order the deployment and the operational use of the nuclear weapons.<ref name="Stanford University Press, (FH Khan)">{{cite book|last1=Khan|first1=Feroz Hassan|title=Eating grass: the making of the Pakistani bomb|publisher=Stanford University Press, (FH Khan)|location=Stanford, California|isbn=978-0804776011|pages=210–390|author2=Feroze Hassan Khan|chapter-format=google book|chapter=Towards the Operational Deterrent|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2mnWuQAACAAJ&q=9780804776011|access-date=21 March 2014|date=2012-11-07|archive-date=2023-02-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230126/https://books.google.com/books?id=2mnWuQAACAAJ&q=9780804776011|url-status=live}}</ref> The final and executive political decisions on nuclear arsenals deployments, operational use, and nuclear weapons politics are made during the sessions of the [[Defence Committee of the Cabinet (Pakistan)|Defence Committee of the Cabinet]], which is chaired by the Prime minister.<ref name="The Nations, Pakistan">{{cite web|last=Abrar|first=Saeed|title=No diversion |date=18 April 2012 |url=https://www.nation.com.pk/18-Apr-2012/no-diversion-from-us-ties-review-dcc|publisher=The Nations, Pakistan|access-date=2 March 2013|url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120628005935/http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/18-Apr-2012/no-diversion-from-us-ties-review-dcc|archive-date=28 June 2012}}</ref> It is this DCC Council where the final political guidelines, discussions and the nuclear arsenals operational deployments are approved by the Prime minister.<ref name="The Nations, Pakistan"/> The DCC reaffirmed its policies on development of nuclear energy and arsenals through the country's [[Media of Pakistan|media]].<ref name="The Nations, Pakistan"/>
=== US security assistance === {{Main|Pakistan–United States military relations}}
From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the United States has provided helicopters, [[night vision device|night-vision goggles]] and nuclear detection equipment.<ref name="Sanger Broad 2007">{{cite web | last1=Sanger | first1=David E. | last2=Broad | first2=William J. | title=U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms | website=The New York Times | date=2007-11-18 | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html | access-date=2018-03-13 | url-status=live | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180313214327/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html | archive-date=13 March 2018}}</ref> In addition, the US has funded the creation of a nuclear security training center, fencing, intrusion detectors, and identification systems.<ref name="Richelson 2009 p. 209">{{cite book | last=Richelson | first=J. | title=Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad | publisher=W. W. Norton | year=2009 | isbn=978-0-393-06515-2 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nYlHAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA209 | access-date=2018-03-13 | page=209 | archive-date=2023-02-07 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230132/https://books.google.com/books?id=nYlHAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA209 | url-status=live }}</ref>
During this period Pakistan also began to develop a modern export control regulatory regime with US assistance. It supplements the US [[National Nuclear Security Administration]] Megaports program at [[Port Qasim]], [[Karachi]], which deployed radiation monitors and imaging equipment monitored by a Pakistani central alarm station.<ref>{{cite web|title=Nuclear Security Cooperation Between the United States and Pakistan |url=http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/06/24/6295/nuclear-security-cooperation-between-the-united-states-and-pakistan/ |access-date=26 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161019172154/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/06/24/6295/nuclear-security-cooperation-between-the-united-states-and-pakistan/|archive-date=19 October 2016 |date=2009-06-24}}</ref>
Pakistan turned down the offer of [[Permissive Action Link]] (PAL) technology, a sophisticated "weapon release" program which initiates use via specific checks and balances, possibly because it feared the secret implanting of "dead switches". But Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its own version of [[Permissive Action Link|PAL]] and US military officials have stated they believe Pakistan's nuclear arsenals to be well secured.<ref>{{cite web|title=U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html|date=18 November 2007|work=The New York Times|access-date=26 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160413002205/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html |archive-date=13 April 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversight-reforms/ |title=International Institute for Strategic Studies Pakistan's nuclear oversight reforms |publisher=Iiss.org |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=live |archive-date=24 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100824201029/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversight-reforms/}}</ref>
== Security Concerns ==
=== Security concerns of the United States === Since 2004 the US government has reportedly been concerned about the safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and weapons. Press reports have suggested that the United States has contingency plans to send in special forces to help "secure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal".<ref name="news.bbc.co.uk">[https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7190033.stm Are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe?] , [[BBC]], 23 January 2008</ref><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11pakistan-t.html Obama’s Worst Pakistan Nightmare] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170219132511/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11pakistan-t.html |date=19 February 2017 }}, [[The New York Times]], 11 January 2009</ref> In 2007, Lisa Curtis of [[The Heritage Foundation]], while giving testimony before the [[United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade]], concluded that "preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the hands of terrorists should be a top priority for the US."<ref>{{unfit|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20100203145921/http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/tst062707.cfm U.S. Policy and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Containing Threats and Encouraging Regional Security]}}, [[The Heritage Foundation]], 6 July 2007</ref> However, Pakistan's government ridiculed claims that the weapons are not secure.<ref name="news.bbc.co.uk"/>
According to documents released by the [[National Security Archive]], in 2001, [[Vladimir Putin]] expressed to [[George W. Bush]], concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program, characterizing the country as a "military junta possessing nuclear weapons" while noting its lack of democratic governance. He raised the issue during broader discussions on security and nuclear proliferation and asked why Pakistan's nuclear status wasn't criticized more openly.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |last=Padmanabhan |first=Keshav |date=2025-12-26 |title='Pakistan a junta with nuclear weapons,' a wary Putin told Bush in 2001, wanting West to do more |url=https://theprint.in/diplomacy/pakistan-a-junta-with-nuclear-weapons-a-wary-putin-told-bush-in-2001-wanting-west-to-do-more/2812920/ |access-date=2026-01-09 |website=ThePrint |language=en-US}}</ref>
Diplomatic reports published in the [[United States diplomatic cables leak]] revealed US and British worries over a potential threat posed by [[Islamists]]. In February 2009 cable from Islamabad, former US Ambassador to Pakistan [[Anne W. Patterson]] said "Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in [Pakistani government] facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon."<ref>{{cite news|last1=Leigh|first1=David|title=WikiLeaks cables expose Pakistan nuclear fears|journal=The Guardian|date=30 November 2010}}</ref>
A report published by ''[[The Times]]'' in early 2010 states that the United States is training an elite unit to recover Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organisation. This was done in the context of growing [[Anti-Americanism]] in the [[Pakistani Armed Forces]], multiple attacks on sensitive installations over the previous 2 years and rising tensions. According to former US intelligence official Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, US concerns are justified because militants have struck at several Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been denied access to most of them.<ref>[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6991056.ece Elite US troops ready to combat Pakistani nuclear hijacks] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230135/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/ |date=2023-02-07 }}, ''[[The Times]]'', 17 January 2010</ref> However, during a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the [[United States Secretary of Defense|US Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert M. Gates]] denied that the United States had plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.<ref>Elisabeth Bumiller, [https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/asia/24military.html "Gates Sees Fallout From Troubled Ties With Pakistan"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170228055027/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/asia/24military.html |date=28 February 2017 }}, ''[[The New York Times]]'', 23 January 2010. Retrieved 24 January 2010.</ref>
A study by [[Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs]] at [[Harvard University]] titled 'Securing the Bomb 2010', found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth".<ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/12/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-security-fears Pakistan nuclear weapons at risk of theft by terrorists, US study warns] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170325030334/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/12/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-security-fears |date=25 March 2017 }}, ''[[The Guardian]]'', 12 April 2010</ref>
According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US Department of Energy there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."<ref>[https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8615484.stm Could terrorists get hold of a nuclear bomb?] , [[BBC]], 12 April 2010</ref>
Nuclear weapons expert [[David Albright]] author of 'Peddling Peril' has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both the Pakistani and US governments. He stated Pakistan "has had many leaks from its program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan," However the U.S. intelligence official said there is no indication that terrorists have gotten anything from Pakistan, and added there is confidence right now in Pakistan's security apparatus. The Pakistanis store their nuclear stockpile in a way that makes it difficult to put the pieces together; that is, components are located in different places. The official said Pakistan has put the appropriate safeguards in place.<ref>[http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/04/13/nuclear.terrorists/ "Official: Terrorists seek nuclear material, but lack ability to use it"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121109024005/http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/04/13/nuclear.terrorists/ |date=9 November 2012 }}, [[CNN]], 13 April 2010</ref>
A 2010 study by the [[Congressional Research Service]] titled 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken several steps to enhance Nuclear security in recent years 'Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question.'<ref>[https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf "Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170830031216/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf |date=30 August 2017 }}, [[Congressional Research Service]], 23 February 2010</ref>
In April 2011, IAEA's deputy director general Denis Flory declared Pakistan's nuclear programme safe and secure.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=239445|title=Tehran Times|access-date=26 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425025042/http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=239445 |archive-date=25 April 2016|date=2011-04-25}}</ref><ref>[https://www.dawn.com/news/623722/iaea-declares-pakistan-nuclear-program-safe IAEA declared Pakistan's Nuke programme safe and secure] , ''Tehran Times''</ref> According to the IAEA, Pakistan is currently contributing more than $1.16 million in IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, making Pakistan the 10th largest contributor.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=14703 |title=IAEA terms Pakistan's programme, safe and secure|work=The News International|access-date=3 January 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112213342/http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=14703 |archive-date=12 January 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref>
In response to a November 2011 article in ''[[The Atlantic (magazine)|The Atlantic]]'' written by Jeffrey Goldberg highlighting concerns about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the Pakistani Government announced that it would train an additional 8,000 people to protect the country's nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the Pakistani Government also denounced the article. Training will be completed no later than 2013.<ref>{{cite web |last=Lustig |first=Robert H. |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/pakistan-announces-move-to-increase-nuclear-security/248002 |title=Pakistan Announces Move to Increase Nuclear Security – Jeffrey Goldberg |work=The Atlantic |date=7 November 2011 |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103185049/http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/pakistan-announces-move-to-increase-nuclear-security/248002/ |archive-date=3 January 2014}}</ref>
Pakistan consistently maintains that it has tightened the security over the several years.<ref name="Dawn Archives, 2010">{{cite news|last=Khan|first=Iftikhar A.|title=World must accept Pakistan as nuclear power: Gen Majid|url=https://www.dawn.com/news/846619/world-must-accept-pakistan-as-nuclear-power-gen-majid|access-date=3 December 2012|newspaper=Dawn Archives, 2010|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130121070433/http://archives.dawn.com/archives/32834 |archive-date=21 January 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2010, the [[Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee|Chairman Joint Chiefs]] General [[Tariq Majid]] exhorted to the world delegation at the [[National Defence University, Pakistan|National Defence University]] that, "World must accept Pakistan as nuclear power."<ref name="Dawn Archives, 2010"/> While dismissing all the concerns on the safety of country's nuclear arsenal, General Majid maintains to the fact: "We are shouldering our responsibility with utmost vigilance and confidence. We have put in place a very robust regime that includes "multilayered mechanisms" and processes to secure our strategic assets, and have provided maximum transparency on our practices. We have reassured the international community on this issue over and over again and our track record since the time our atomic bomb programme was made overt has been unblemished."<ref name="Dawn Archives, 2010"/>
On 7 September 2013, the [[US Department of State]] said "Pakistan has a professional and dedicated security force that fully understands the importance of nuclear security." Pakistan had earlier rejected claims in US media that the Obama administration was worried about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, saying the country has a professional and robust system to monitor its nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite web |author=Anwar Iqbal |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1040871 |title=Pakistan understands importance of N-security: US |work=Dawn |location=Pakistan |date=6 September 2013 |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103090522/http://www.dawn.com/news/1040871/pakistan-understands-importance-of-n-security-us |archive-date=3 January 2014}}</ref>
In response to a November 2025 claim by President [[Donald Trump]] that Pakistan, among other countries, had been conducting nuclear weapons tests in secret, a Pakistani official said "Pakistan was not the first to carry out nuclear tests and will not be the first to resume nuclear tests."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-11-02 |title=Read the full transcript of Norah O'Donnell's interview with President Trump here. - CBS News |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/read-full-transcript-norah-odonnell-60-minutes-interview-with-president-trump/ |access-date=2025-11-06 |website=www.cbsnews.com |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-11-03 |title=Pakistan "will not be the first to resume nuclear tests," official says in response to Trump's 60 Minutes claim - CBS News |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-nuclear-tests-trump-60-minutes/ |access-date=2025-11-06 |website=www.cbsnews.com |language=en-US}}</ref>
In December 2024, U.S. national security official Jon Finer accused Pakistan of developing long-range nuclear missiles, which he said posed an emerging security threat to the United States.<ref>[https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-01/news/us-says-pakistan-developing-long-range-missiles U.S. Says Pakistan Developing Long-Range Missiles], Kelsey Davenport and Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Today, January/February, 2025.</ref> In March 2026, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told the Senate Intelligence Committee Pakistan's development of long-range ballistic missiles, could potentially include intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking U.S. territory.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Pakistan’s Nuclear Missiles and Strategic Concerns |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-pakistan-developing-nuclear-missiles-that-put-us-within-range-intel-chief-tulsi-gabbard-11234672}}</ref>
=== Regional Security Concerns === In a 1993 article in ''[[The New Yorker]]'', investigative journalist Seymour Hersh detailed the May 1990 nuclear crisis between India and Pakistan, reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had concluded Pakistan had assembled six to ten nuclear weapons, some possibly deployed on American-supplied F-16 aircraft. He noted that Prime Minister [[Benazir Bhutto]] was either excluded from or had distanced herself from nuclear planning, leaving control with President [[Ghulam Ishaq Khan]] and Army Chief General [[Mirza Aslam Beg]]. The crisis prompted the U.S. to send Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates on a secret mission to de-escalate tensions. Hersh also suggested that the Reagan administration had previously aided Pakistan's nuclear development, and described the episode as an early example of a state potentially using nuclear capability to shield covert support for terrorism, a strategy later referred to as nuclear weapon-enabled terrorism (NWET).<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Forgotten India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis: 25 Years Later |url=https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-forgotten-india-pakistan-nuclear-crisis-25-years-later/ |access-date=2025-08-12 |website=thediplomat.com |language=en-US}}</ref>
In a 2005 discussion with [[George W. Bush]], [[Vladimir Putin]] expressed concern about nuclear proliferation links between Pakistan and Iran, citing the use of centrifuge materials of Pakistani origin, and the role of [[Abdul Qadeer Khan|A.Q. Khan]]’s network in transferring nuclear technology.<ref name=":2" />
U.S.-based analyst Michael Krepon, co-founder of the [[Stimson Center]], expressed concern over growing mistrust in the nuclear doctrines of both India and Pakistan, highlighting that by 2015, Pakistan had become the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, with the capability to produce up to 27 warheads annually. Indian officials, however, reaffirmed their adherence to a policy of credible minimum deterrence and warned that any use of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan would trigger a massive retaliatory response.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chengappa |first=Raj |date=2025-05-07 |title=From the India Today archives (2016) {{!}} Pakistan's nuke tactics: Should India worry? |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/from-the-india-today-archives-2016-pakistans-nuke-tactics-should-india-worry-2721031-2025-05-07 |access-date=2025-08-12 |website=India Today |language=en}}</ref>
During the course of [[2025 India–Pakistan conflict|2025 India-Pakistan conflict]], Pakistan's prime minister [[Shehbaz Sharif]] had reportedly called a meeting of the Pakistan National Command Authority on 10 May.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Pakistan PM calls meeting of body that oversees nuclear arsenal, says Pakistan military |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-pm-calls-meeting-body-that-oversees-nuclear-arsenal-says-pakistan-2025-05-10/ |access-date=2025-05-19 |work=Reuters}}</ref> However, after the conflict, Pakistani ministers denied that nuclear option was considered. In response, the Indian Defense Minister [[Rajnath Singh]] said Pakistan's nuclear arsenal should be under the surveillance of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-05-15 |title=India and Pakistan trade accusations of nuclear arsenal mismanagement |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250515-india-says-pakistan-nuclear-arsenal-should-be-under-un-surveillance |access-date=2025-05-20 |website=France 24 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=India and Pakistan trade accusations of nuclear weapons mismanagement |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/15/india-and-pakistan-trade-accusations-of-nuclear-weapons-mismanagement |access-date=2025-05-20 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> Later on 12 May, in his first address since the brief conflict, the Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] stated that India would not tolerate any "nuclear blackmail."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hebbar |first=Nistula |date=2025-05-12 |title=PM Modi address: India won't bend to Pakistan's nuclear blackmail; Operation Sindoor is still on |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-will-not-tolerate-any-nuclear-blackmail-pm-modi/article69568386.ece |access-date=2025-05-20 |work=The Hindu |language=en-IN |issn=0971-751X}}</ref>
According to the United States [[Defense Intelligence Agency]]’s 2025 [https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2025_dia_statement_for_the_record.pdf Worldwide Threat Assessment], Pakistan regarded India as an existential threat and pursued the modernization of its military capabilities, with particular emphasis on its nuclear weapons program. The report noted that Pakistan focused on the development of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons as a means to offset India’s conventional military superiority. It further stated that Pakistan had not adopted a “No First Use” nuclear policy and was expanding its nuclear arsenal, which was estimated to comprise approximately 170 warheads in 2024, with projections suggesting a potential increase to 200 by 2025. The assessment also highlighted that Pakistan's deepening defense cooperation with China served as a principal source of materials and technologies supporting Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction programs.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Jacob |first=Jayanth |date=2025-05-25 |title=Pakistan modernising nuclear arsenal; views India as 'existential threat', says US intelligence |url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2025/May/25/pakistan-modernising-nuclear-arsenal-views-india-as-existential-threat-says-us-intelligence |access-date=2025-05-27 |website=The New Indian Express |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-05-25 |title=Pakistan considers India as existential threat, relies on China for military, economic support: US report |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pakistan-considers-india-existential-threat-nuclear-relies-on-china-military-economic-us-defence-report-101748167209932.html |access-date=2025-05-27 |work=Hindustan Times}}</ref>
In August 2025, Pakistan's army chief Field Marshal [[Asim Munir]] reportedly issued a nuclear threat against India during a dinner in Tampa, Florida, stating that Pakistan would "take half the world down" if faced with an "existential threat".<ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-08-11 |title=India decries 'sabre rattling' after Pakistan army chief's reported nuclear remarks |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-decries-sabre-rattling-after-pakistan-army-chiefs-reported-nuclear-remarks-2025-08-11/ |access-date=2025-08-12 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Swami |first=Praveen |date=2025-08-10 |title=ThePrint Exclusive: Asim Munir's India nuke threat from US ballroom—'will take half the world down' |url=https://theprint.in/world/pakistan-army-chief-field-marshal-asim-munir-florida-speech-nuclear-threat-india/2718095/ |access-date=2025-08-12 |website=ThePrint |language=en-US}}</ref> India condemned the remarks as "nuclear sabre-rattling," while Pakistan's Foreign Office later claimed the comments were "distorted."<ref>{{Cite web |title="Nuke Sabre-Rattling Is Pak's Stock-In-Trade": India On Asim Munir Comments |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-irresponsible-state-with-nukes-sources-on-asim-munir-comments-9061158 |access-date=2025-08-12 |website=NDTV |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-08-12 |title=Pakistan denies nuclear threat claims, says India misrepresenting army chief's US remarks |url=https://arab.news/g5m96 |access-date=2025-08-12 |website=Arab News PK |language=en}}</ref>
In March 2026, ex-high commissioner to India [[Abdul Basit (diplomat)|Abdul Basit]] threatened that if US were to attack Pakistan, the country's "default move" would be to target Indian cities such as New Delhi and Mumbai with nuclear weapons if US isn't within range.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news |date=2026-03-23 |title=If America strikes us, we should attack Indian cities like Delhi and Mumbai: Ex-Pak envoy |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/if-america-strikes-us-we-should-attack-indian-cities-like-delhi-and-mumbai-ex-pak-envoy/articleshow/129738177.cms |access-date=2026-03-24 |work=The Times of India |issn=0971-8257}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite news |title='Pak Must Not Think Twice, Hit Mumbai, Delhi': Ex Envoy's Chilling Remark |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/abdul-basit-india-pakistan-have-done-it-earlier-pak-ex-envoys-mumbai-delhi-warning-on-tv-show-11250036 |work=NDTV}}</ref>
=== Middle East === On 17 September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a [[Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement|strategic mutual defense agreement]] that committed each country to respond to acts of aggression against the other. The agreement attracted attention because of longstanding discussion among analysts regarding a possible nuclear dimension to Saudi–Pakistani strategic relations. Historical studies of Pakistan's nuclear program note that financial assistance from some Arab states played a role in supporting the program during its early development in the 1970s. Scholars have written that Pakistan's leadership under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought financial backing from several Arab states and received financial backing from countries including [[Libya]] and [[Saudi Arabia]] during the early phase of the project following the 1971 war with India.<ref name="Weissman 1981 45"/><ref name="Chakma20112">{{cite book |last=Chakma |first=Bhumitra |title=The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia |publisher=Ashgate |year=2011 |page=42 |quote=Bhutto sought financial assistance from several Muslim countries, including Libya and Saudi Arabia, to support Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.}}</ref><ref name="Shaikh20092">{{cite journal |last=Shaikh |first=Farzana |year=2009 |title=Making Sense of Pakistan |journal=International Affairs |quote=Bhutto concluded secret understandings with China and Libya to finance and support Pakistan’s nuclear programme.}}</ref> This financial backing from Middle Eastern partners has been described by historians as an important factor that helped Pakistan sustain its nuclear program during periods of economic strain and international sanctions.<ref>{{cite book |last=Corera |first=Gordon |title=Shopping for Bombs |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2006 |pages=29–31 |quote=Pakistan's nuclear program benefited from financial support from wealthy allies in the Middle East during its early development.}}</ref>{{sfn|Khan|2012|p=147}} In his historical study of Pakistan's nuclear program, Feroz Hassan Khan also wrote that Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance that helped sustain the program during periods of economic pressure and sanctions.{{sfnq|Khan|2012|p=|q=Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue.}} Pakistani Defense Minister [[Khawaja Asif]] initially stated, "No one should doubt what we have and what the capabilities are that will be available to them under this pact," a remark widely interpreted as implying nuclear coverage, though he later clarified that nuclear arms were "not on the radar" of the agreement. Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator with close ties to the Saudi monarchy, welcomed the "deterrence that comes from sharing Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella," although no official confirmation was provided and the full scope of the agreement remained unclear.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-09-26 |title=Has Pakistan extended its nuclear umbrella to Riyadh? No one will say. |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/09/26/pakistan-saudi-arabia-security-nuclear-weapons/ |access-date=2025-09-26 |newspaper=The Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>
In March 2026, in response to [[Tulsi Gabbard]]'s assessment that Pakistan's increased missile ranges would pose a threat to US in the future, Pakistani ex-diplomat [[Abdul Basit (diplomat)|Abdul Basit]] remarked that he prayed that the ranges would extend to the point that Israel can be targeted.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />
== Delivery systems == === Land === {{As of|2011}}, Pakistan possesses a wide variety of nuclear-capable [[Medium-range ballistic missile|medium range ballistic missiles]] with ranges up to 2750 km.<ref>{{cite web|title=Design Characteristics of Pakistan's Ballistic Missiles|url=http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/delivery-systems/|publisher=NTI|access-date=4 July 2012|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120629044352/http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/delivery-systems/|archive-date=29 June 2012}}</ref> Pakistan also possesses nuclear-tipped [[Babur (cruise missile)|Babur cruise missiles]] with ranges up to 700 km. In April 2012, Pakistan launched a [[Shaheen-I#Shaheen 1A (Hatf IV)|Hatf-4 Shaheen-1A]], said to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead designed to evade missile-defense systems.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/asia/pakistan-says-it-test-fires-nuclear-capable-missile.html|title=Pakistan Says It Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile|work=The New York Times|author=Salman Masood|date=25 April 2012|access-date=26 April 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120426093639/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/asia/pakistan-says-it-test-fires-nuclear-capable-missile.html|archive-date=26 April 2012}}</ref> These land-based missiles are controlled by [[Army Strategic Forces Command (Pakistan)|Army Strategic Forces Command]] of [[Pakistan Army]].
Pakistan is also believed to be developing [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s for use on the battlefield with ranges up to 60 km such as the [[Nasr (missile)|Nasr missile]]. According to Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, citing a Pakistani news article,<ref>{{cite news|last=Abbassi|first=Ansar|title=Pakistan has developed smartest nuclear tactical devices |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=27634&title=Pak-develops-smartest-nuclear-devices|access-date=22 January 2012|work=The News International |date=30 November 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120102174243/http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=27634&title=Pak-develops-smartest-nuclear-devices|archive-date=2 January 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Pakistan is developing its own equivalent to the [[Davy Crockett (nuclear device)|Davy Crockett launcher]] with a miniaturised warhead that may be similar to the [[W54]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Lewis|first=Jeffrey |title=Pakistan's Nuclear Artillery?|url=http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4866/pakistans-nuclear-artillery|publisher=Arms Control Wonk|access-date=22 January 2012|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120129052359/http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4866/pakistans-nuclear-artillery|archive-date=29 January 2012}}</ref>
=== Air === The [[Pakistan Air Force|Pakistan Air Force (PAF)]] is believed to have practiced "[[Toss bombing|toss-bombing]]" in the 1980s and 1990s, a method of launching weapons from [[fighter-bombers]] which can also be used to deliver nuclear warheads.{{Citation needed|date=September 2011}} The PAF has two dedicated units ([[No. 16 Squadron (Pakistan Air Force)|No. 16 ''Black Panthers'']] and [[No. 26 Squadron (Pakistan Air Force)|No. 26 ''Black Spiders'']]) operating 27 aircraft in each squadron (78 aircraft total) of the [[JF-17 Thunder]], believed to be the preferred vehicle for delivery of nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=96657&Itemid=2 |title=First Squadron of JF-17 Thunder inducted in PAF |agency=Associated Press of Pakistan |access-date=3 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222163116/http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=96657&Itemid=2 |archive-date=22 December 2015 |url-status=dead}}</ref> These units are major part of the [[Air Force Strategic Command (Pakistan)|Air Force Strategic Command]], a command responsible for nuclear response. The PAF also operates a fleet of [[F-16 Fighting Falcon|F-16]] fighters, of which 18 were delivered in 2012 and confirmed by General [[Ashfaq Parvez Kayani]], are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. With a third squadron being raised, this would bring the total number of dedicated nuclear capable aircraft to a total of 75.<ref>{{cite web |last=Gishkori |first=Zahid |url=http://tribune.com.pk/story/338584/boosting-air-defence-f-16s-replace-americans-at-jacobabad-airbase/ |title=Boosting air defence: F-16s replace Americans at Jacobabad airbase |work=The Express Tribune |date=19 February 2012 |access-date=3 January 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103121327/http://tribune.com.pk/story/338584/boosting-air-defence-f-16s-replace-americans-at-jacobabad-airbase/ |archive-date=3 January 2014}}</ref> The PAF also possesses the [[Ra'ad (air-launched cruise missile)|Ra'ad]] air-launched cruise missile which has a range of 350 km and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of between 10kt and 35kt.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century|url=http://www.missilethreat.com/cruise/id.144/cruise_detail.asp|date=14 October 2009|website=missilethreat.com|url-status=dead|archive-url= http://arquivo.pt/wayback/20091014085148/http%3A//missilethreat%2Ecom/cruise/id%2E144/cruise_detail%2Easp |archive-date=14 October 2009}}</ref>
A 2016 report by [[Hans M. Kristensen]] stated that "The F-16s were considered to be the first planes that are nuclear-capable in the Pakistan arsenal and the French Mirage III was upgraded as well to carry a new air launch cruise missile. But the United States made its case. What Pakistan does once they get the planes is inevitably up to them," he said. The report also stated that Pakistan is obliged under the terms of its contract to ask the US for permission before the fighters are converted. To date, the US has given only two countries (Pakistan and Israel) implicit permission to modify their F-16s to carry nuclear warheads.<ref>{{cite web |author=Padma Rao Sundarji |title=F-16 fighters sold by US to Pakistan are nuclear-enabled: Scientist |date=19 November 2016 |website=DNA |url=http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-pakistan-s-f-16s-nuclear-enabledus-scientist-2274844 |access-date=10 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170909144629/http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-pakistan-s-f-16s-nuclear-enabledus-scientist-2274844|archive-date=9 September 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>
It has also been reported that an air-launched [[cruise missile]] (ALCM) with a range of 350 km has been developed by Pakistan, designated [[Ra'ad (air-launched cruise missile)|Hatf 8]] and named Ra'ad, which may theoretically be armed with a nuclear warhead. It was reported to have been test-fired by a [[Dassault Mirage III|Mirage III]] fighter and, according to one Western official, is believed to be capable of penetrating some [[air defence]]/[[missile defence]] systems.<ref name="powerpolitics.org">{{cite web |url=http://powerpolitics.org/?p=161 |title=Pakistan Unveils Cruise Missile |publisher=Power Politics |date=13 August 2005 |access-date=21 August 2010 |url-status=usurped |archive-date=27 July 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110727183355/http://powerpolitics.org/?p=161}}</ref>
=== Sea === The [[Pakistan Navy]] was first publicly reported to be considering deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines in February 2001. Later in 2003 it was stated by [[Admiral Shahid Karimullah]], then [[Chief of Naval Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Naval Staff]], that there were no plans for deploying [[nuclear weapon]]s on submarines but if "''forced to''" they would be. In 2004, Pakistan Navy established the [[Naval Strategic Forces Command (Pakistan)|Naval Strategic Forces Command]] and made it responsible for countering and battling naval-based weapons of mass destruction. It is believed by most experts that Pakistan is developing a sea-based variant of the [[Babur (cruise missile)|Hatf VII Babur]], which is a nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missile.<ref name="NTI: Research: Submarine Proliferation by countries.">{{cite web |last=NTI |first=Nuclear Threat Initiatives |title=Pakistan's Naval capabilities: Submarine system |work=Research: Submarine Proliferation by countries |publisher=NTI: Research: Submarine Proliferation by countries |date=June 2011 |url=http://www.nti.org/db/submarines/pakistan/index.html |access-date=9 June 2011 |url-status=live |archive-date=11 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111111084738/http://www.nti.org/db/submarines/pakistan/index.html}}</ref>
On 9 January 2017, Pakistan conducted a successful launch of the Babur III missile from an underwater mobile platform. The Babur-III has a range of 450 km and can be used as a [[second-strike]] capability.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-missiles-idUSKBN14T1EL|title=Pakistan fires 'first submarine-launched nuclear-capable missile'|date=10 January 2017|newspaper=Reuters|access-date=26 July 2017|archive-date=2019-01-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190119000353/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-missiles-idUSKBN14T1EL|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://arynews.tv/en/pakistan-test-fires-first-submarine-launched-cruise-missile-babur-3/|title=Pakistan test-fires first submarine cruise missile Babur-3|date=9 January 2017|website=AryNews.tv|access-date=26 July 2017|archive-date=2019-03-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190327090515/https://arynews.tv/en/pakistan-test-fires-first-submarine-launched-cruise-missile-babur-3/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38563330|title=Pakistan 'launches first cruise missile from submarine'|work=BBC News|date=9 January 2017|access-date=26 July 2017|archive-date=2019-06-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190617162944/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38563330|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="tribune.com.pk">{{cite web|url=http://tribune.com.pk/story/1289288/pakistan-successfully-test-fires-babur-iii-cruise-missile/|title=Pakistan fires 'first submarine-launched nuclear-capable missile' - The Express Tribune|date=9 January 2017|website=Tribune.com.pk|access-date=26 July 2017|archive-date=2019-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190422223205/https://tribune.com.pk/story/1289288/pakistan-successfully-test-fires-babur-iii-cruise-missile/|url-status=live}}</ref> It has been speculated that the missile is ultimately designed to be incorporated with [[Hangor-class submarine]] and the [[Agosta-class submarine#Pakistan Navy|Agosta 90B class submarine]] which has been reported to have been modified. However no such tests have been carried out yet.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistans-tests-new-sub-launched-nuclear-capable-cruise-missile-what-now/|title=Pakistan Tests New Sub-Launched Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile. What Now?|last=Panda|first=Ankit|work=The Diplomat|access-date=2017-12-28|archive-date=2017-12-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171201182439/https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistans-tests-new-sub-launched-nuclear-capable-cruise-missile-what-now/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-risks-of-pakistans-sea-based-nuclear-weapons/|title=The Risks of Pakistan's Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons|last=Panda|first=Ankit|work=The Diplomat|access-date=2017-12-28|archive-date=2017-12-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171228171819/https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-risks-of-pakistans-sea-based-nuclear-weapons/|url-status=live}}</ref> On 29 March 2018, Pakistan reported that the missile had again been successfully tested.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.financialexpress.com/defence/pakistan-tests-its-indigenously-built-submarine-launched-cruise-missile-babur/1115584/|title=Pakistan tests its indigenously built Submarine Launched Cruise Missile Babur|date=2018-03-30|work=The Financial Express|access-date=2018-03-30|archive-date=2018-03-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180330064448/http://www.financialexpress.com/defence/pakistan-tests-its-indigenously-built-submarine-launched-cruise-missile-babur/1115584/|url-status=live}}</ref>
With a stockpile of plutonium, Pakistan would be able to produce a variety of miniature nuclear warheads which would allow it to nuclear-tip the [[C-802]] and [[C-803]] anti-ship missiles as well as being able to develop nuclear torpedoes, [[nuclear depth bomb]]s and [[Naval mine|nuclear naval mines]].{{Citation needed|date=September 2011}}
==== Nuclear submarine ==== In response to [[INS Arihant|INS ''Arihant'']], India's first [[nuclear submarine]], the Pakistan Navy pushed forward a proposal to build its own nuclear submarine as a direct response to the Indian nuclear submarine program.<ref name=defnews11>{{cite news|last=Ansari|first=Usman|title=Pakistani Navy to Develop Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Reports |date=11 February 2012 |url=http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120211/DEFREG03/302110003/Pakistani-Navy-Develop-Nuclear-Powered-Submarines-Reports |access-date=13 August 2013 |archive-date=13 August 2013 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130813113712/http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120211/DEFREG03/302110003/Pakistani-Navy-Develop-Nuclear-Powered-Submarines-Reports |url-status=dead |work=[[Defense News]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Ghosh|first=Palash|title=India Joins Nuclear Submarine Community; Pakistan Alarmed|url=http://www.ibtimes.com/india-joins-nuclear-submarine-community-pakistan-alarmed-433850|access-date=13 August 2013|work=[[International Business Times]]|date=4 April 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131003191547/http://www.ibtimes.com/india-joins-nuclear-submarine-community-pakistan-alarmed-433850|archive-date=3 October 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> Many military experts believe that Pakistan has the capability of building a nuclear submarine and is ready to build such a fleet.<ref name=defnews11/> In February 2012, the Navy announced it would start work on the construction of a nuclear submarine to better meet the Indian Navy's nuclear threat.<ref name="ARY News">{{cite news |title=Pakistan Navy to build nuclear submarine|date=10 February 2012|publisher=[[ARY News]] |url=http://www.arynews.tv/english/newsdetail.asp?nid=54527|access-date=8 April 2012|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130418182536/http://www.arynews.tv/english/newsdetail.asp?nid=54527 |archive-date=18 April 2013}}</ref> According to the Navy, the nuclear submarine is an ambitious project, and will be designed and built indigenously. However, the Navy stressed that "the project completion and trials would take anywhere from between 5 to 8 years to build the nuclear submarine after which Pakistan would join the list of countries that has a nuclear submarine."<ref name=defnews11/><ref name="ARY News"/>
== Biological weapons == While suspicions have been raised regarding research into biological warfare, Pakistan is not widely believed to be producing or stockpiling [[Biological agent|biological weapons]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Princeton |date=August 1993 |title=Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks |url=https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1993/9341/934104.PDF}}</ref> In 1996, the [[United States Department of Defense|U.S. Department of Defense]] noted that Pakistan possessed the necessary resources and expertise to conduct biological warfare R&D, and suggested that some research with potential biological warfare applications was underway. However, no concrete evidence has been provided by the U.S. government to substantiate these assertions.<ref name="NTI Research on Countries" />
Pakistan's advanced biotechnology sector is recognized as having the capability to support limited research and development related to biological weapons, should the government ever choose to pursue such activities. The Pakistani government has consistently denied any involvement in the development, production, or stockpiling of biological weapons or agents, emphasizing that offensive biological warfare programs are not part of its defense strategy.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Khurshid |first=Dr Syed Javaid |date=2020-08-05 |title=Pakistan's Compliance with Biological Weapons Convention |url=https://strafasia.com/pakistans-compliance-with-biological-weapons-convention/ |access-date=2025-06-08 |website=Strafasia {{!}} Strategy, analysis, News and insight of Emerging Asia |language=en-GB}}</ref> Pakistan became a signatory to the [[Biological Weapons Convention|Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention]] and ratified it in 1974. Since then, Pakistan has actively supported the convention, advocating for greater participation among member states, encouraging new signatories, and, as part of the [[Non-Aligned Movement|non-aligned movement]], promoting the right of states to engage in peaceful scientific research involving biological and toxin materials.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Disarmament Diplomacy: - BWC Report |url=https://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/dd/dd62/62bwc.htm |access-date=2025-06-08 |website=www.acronym.org.uk}}</ref>
Only known incident of biological weaponry related to Pakistan is the arrest of two retired nuclear scientists by Pakistan authorities after discovering documents related to [[Anthrax weaponization|anthrax weapons]] in their offices. These scientists were linked to an organization which was found to have ties to [[Al-Qaeda]], and documents seized from their facilities in Kabul included materials on biological weapons, specifically [[anthrax]], and designs for crude delivery systems such as balloons.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Rohde |first=Douglas Frantz With David |date=2001-11-28 |title=A NATION CHALLENGED: BIOLOGICAL TERROR; 2 Pakistanis Linked to Papers on Anthrax Weapons |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/world/nation-challenged-biological-terror-2-pakistanis-linked-papers-anthrax-weapons.html |access-date=2025-06-08 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
== Chemical weapons == Pakistan has no publicly acknowledged chemical weapons programme, and is a signatory and ratified member of the 1993 [[Chemical Weapons Convention]] (CWC) and maintains active membership in the [[Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons|Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]] (OPCW). As part of its obligations, Pakistan has enacted strict national legislation prohibiting the development, production, and use of chemical weapons, and has mandated that all domestic chemical producers report their chemical imports. While Pakistan possesses the technical knowledge to potentially produce various chemical warfare agents, its government remains legally bound to refrain from any such activities. Since ratifying the CWC in 1997, Pakistan has undergone regular OPCW inspections of its chemical industry. These inspections have not uncovered any irregularities or violations.<ref>{{Cite web |title=OPCW strengthens chemical response readiness across Asia |url=https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2025/02/opcw-strengthens-chemical-response-readiness-across-asia |access-date=2025-06-08 |website=OPCW |language=en}}</ref>
== See also == * [[Weapons of mass destruction]] * [[Chronology of Pakistan's rocket tests]] ** [[Pakistani missile research and development program|Hatf Program]] ** [[List of missiles of Pakistan]] *Nuclear industry **[[Nuclear power in Pakistan]] *Nuclear weapons policy ** [[Pakistan Armed Forces]] **[[Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan]] *Nuclear Command and Control ** [[National Command Authority (Pakistan)]]
== References == {{Reflist}}
'''Bibliography''' {{refbegin}} * {{cite book |last = Khan |first = Feroze Hassan |title = Eating Grass: The making of Pakistan atomic bomb |publisher = Stanford Security Studies |date = 7 November 2012 |location = Stanford, CA |isbn = 978-0804776011 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=yGgrNAsKZjEC |access-date = 26 April 2016 |archive-date = 2023-01-16 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230116113907/https://books.google.com/books?id=yGgrNAsKZjEC |url-status = live }} * {{cite book | last =Rehman | first =Shahid-ur- | title =Long Road to Chagai | publisher =Printwise Publications | year =1999 | location =Islamabad, Pakistan | isbn =978-9698500009 | url =https://books.google.com/books?id=sNMgAQAAIAAJ | access-date =2020-05-07 | archive-date =2023-02-07 | archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230131/https://books.google.com/books?id=sNMgAQAAIAAJ | url-status =live }} {{refend}}
== Further reading == {{refbegin|colwidth=35em}} * {{cite book |last=Bhutto |first=ZA |author-link=Zulfikar Ali Bhutto |title=The Myth of Independence |publisher=Oxford University Press, USA |date=15 April 1969 |location=Berkeley, CA, US |isbn=978-0192151674 |url=https://archive.org/details/mythofindependen0000bhut}} * {{cite book |last=Cohen |first=Stephen P. |author-link=Stephen Philip Cohen |year=2004 |title=The idea of Pakistan |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-0815715023 |edition=1st paperback |url=https://archive.org/details/ideaofpakistan00cohe}} * {{cite news |last=Haider |first=Taj |author-link=Taj Haider |title=CTBT: Security Perspectives |newspaper=Dawn |location=Pakistan |date=27 March 2000 |url=https://www.dawn.com/ |access-date=2012-11-18 |archive-date=2012-11-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121118081035/http://dawn.com/ |url-status=live}} * {{cite book |last=Lieven |first=Anatol |author-link=Anatol Lieven |title=[[Pakistan: A Hard Country]] |publisher=PublicAffairs |location=New York |isbn=978-1610390231 |edition=1st |year=2011}} * {{cite news |last=Lodhi |first=Maliha |author-link=Maliha Lodhi |title=Nuclear compulsion |newspaper=The News International |date=6 November 2012 |url=http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-141314-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-compulsions |access-date=2013-10-11 |archive-date=2013-10-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131030134446/http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-141314-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-compulsions |url-status=dead}} * {{cite web |last=Luongo |first=Kenneth N. |title=Building Confidence in nuclear safety in Pakistan |publisher=Arms Control Associations |date=December 2007 |url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo |access-date=2013-10-11 |archive-date=2013-11-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103055208/http://armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo |url-status=live}} * {{cite web |last=Rais |first=Rasul Baksh |title=Debating first use |work=Daily Times |date=25 November 2008 |url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008/11/25/story_25-11-2008_pg3_2 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130620202549/http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008/11/25/story_25-11-2008_pg3_2 |url-status=dead |archive-date=20 June 2013}} * {{cite web |last=Saleem |first=Farukh |author-link=Farrukh Saleem |title=Tipping point |url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C11%5C21%5Cstory_21-11-2007_pg3_4 |work=Daily Times |access-date=11 October 2013 |archive-date=2023-02-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207230701/https://dailytimes.com.pk/ |url-status=live}} * {{cite web |last=Sattar |first=Abdul |author-link=Abdul Sattar (diplomat) |title=Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia |work=The Nonproliferation Review |access-date=11 October 2013 |year=1994 |url=http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/sattar22.pdf |archive-date=2012-06-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120606194526/http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/sattar22.pdf |url-status=live}} {{refend}}
== External links == * [http://upstart.bizjournals.com/news-markets/international-news/portfolio/2007/11/19/Abdul-Qadeer-Khan-Profile.html?page=all Why He Went Nuclear] by Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins * [http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/post-cold-war/india-pakistan/india-pakistan-conflict.htm Nuclear Files.org] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200323104733/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/post-cold-war/india-pakistan/india-pakistan-conflict.htm |date=2020-03-23 }} Pakistan's nuclear conflict with India- background and the current situation * [https://web.archive.org/web/20160305212923/http://depo.org.pk/ Defense Export Promotion Organization – Ministry of Defense] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20020604043755/http://www.atomicarchive.com/Reports/India/Missiles.shtml Pakistani & Indian Missile Forces] (Tarmuk missile mentioned here) * [https://web.archive.org/web/20160805021459/http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare%2FPakistani%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Program Annotated bibliography on Pakistan's nuclear weapons from the Alsos Digital Library] * [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/nuclear-history-documents The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project] The Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project contains a collection of primary source documents on Pakistani nuclear development. * {{cite Q|Q95767347}}<!-- Pakistan’s nuclear father, master spy --> * {{cite Q|Q95770244}}<!-- The Man Who Designed Pakistan’s Bomb--> * [https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/lis.pdf Laser isotope separation research by Pakistan]
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Pakistan's Nuclear Program - A Detailed Overview}} [[Category:Defence industry of Pakistan|Weapons of mass destruction]] [[Category:Weapons of mass destruction by country]] [[Category:Nuclear weapons programme of Pakistan]] [[Category:Explosives engineering]]