Libya and weapons of mass destruction

{{Short description|none}} {{Infobox nuclear weapons by country | country_name = Libya | image_photo =Gas-ultra centrifuges from Libya.jpg | caption =The gas centrifuge tubes acquired from Libya's program, ca. 2002. | image_location =250px|center|Location of Libya | map_caption = | program_start ={{start year and age|1969}} | first_test = ''None'' | first_fusion = ''None'' | last_test = ''None'' | largest_yield = ''None'' | total_tests = ''None'' | peak_stockpile = ''None''<br>{{small|(Program was initial and developmental stage before its rollback)}} | current_stockpile = ''None'' | current_usable_stockpile = | current_usable_stockpile_megatonnage = | maximum_range =Scud-B<br>{{convert|300|km|mi}} | nuclear_triad = No | NPT_party = '''Yes''' | program_end = {{start date and age|2003|12|19}} }}

{{Weapons of mass destruction}} Libya pursued programs to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction from when Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libyan Army seized control of Libya in 1969 until he announced on 19 December 2003 that Libya would voluntarily terminate its programs of nuclear, chemical, ballistic missiles, and other efforts that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons of mass destruction.<ref name=Chronology>[http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States], Arms Control Association.</ref><ref>[https://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/libya_timeline.shtml News Update on IAEA & Libya] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120328014901/https://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/libya_timeline.shtml |date=2012-03-28 }}, Chronology of Key Events, (December 2003 - September 2008), International Atomic Energy Agency.</ref><ref name=NuclearThreat>{{Cite web|last=Rohlfing|first=Joan|title =Libya: Nuclear Programme Overview|work =Nuclear Threat Initiative|url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/index.html|access-date=11 August 2011}}</ref>

In 1968, Libya under King Idris signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), ratified it under Gaddafi in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1980.<ref>[http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf GOV/2004/12], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004.</ref> Despite being the signatory state of NPT, Libya under Gaddafi pursued nuclear weapons from different venues including employing of foreign experts and using the proliferation network to locally advance its efforts.<ref name="NuclearThreat" /> After the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, followed by the Iraq War in 2003, Libya engaged in rolling back its efforts in an exchange of improving the relations with the United States and the Western world.<ref name="NuclearThreat" /> The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and rolling back its program, with independent verification by the IAEA.<ref name="NuclearThreat" />

In 1972, Libya signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and ratified it in 1982.<ref name="NuclearThreat" />

In 1970, Libya secretly acquired chemical weapons capability from the Soviet Union and was one of the non-signatory states of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), only acceded to become a member of the CWC on 6 January 2004.<ref name="opcwlibya">[http://www.opcw.org/news/article/the-chemical-weapons-convention-enters-into-force-in-libya/ The Chemical Weapons Convention Enters Into Force in Libya] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408210026/https://www.opcw.org/news/article/the-chemical-weapons-convention-enters-into-force-in-libya/ |date=2018-04-08 }}, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2 February 2004.</ref> Libya declared 24.7 metric tonnes of mustard gas, 1,390 metric tonnes of chemical precursors for making sarin, as well as 3,563 unloaded chemical weapon munitions (aerial bombs).<ref name="OPCW">OPCW, [http://www.opcw.org/the-opcw-and-libya/libya-facts-and-figures/ Libya: Facts and Figures] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130927221429/http://www.opcw.org/the-opcw-and-libya/libya-facts-and-figures/ |date=2013-09-27 }}</ref><ref name="nti">{{cite news|url=http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/libyas_cw_capabilities.pdf?_=1341530904&_=1341530904|title=Libya's CW Capabilities|date=June 2011}}</ref> Destruction of the Libyan chemical weapons was agreed upon when the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) set January 2014 as the deadline for the full destruction of Libya's chemical weapons.<ref name="libyaend">{{cite web |title=Libya Completes Destruction of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons |url=http://www.opcw.org/news/article/libya-completes-destruction-of-its-category-1-chemical-weapons/ |work=OPCW |date=4 February 2014}}</ref> Libya began destroying its chemical stockpiles and munitions later in 2004,<ref>{{cite web|last=Zanders|first=Jean Pascal|title=Destroying Libya's Chemical Weapons: Deadlines and Delays|url=http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/110519_destroying_libya_cw.htm|publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)|access-date=13 August 2011|date=19 May 2011}}</ref> but it missed deadlines for converting one chemical weapons production facility to peaceful use and for destroying its stockpile of mustard agent.<ref>{{cite web|last=Zanders|first=Jean Pascal|title=Uprising in Libya: The False Specter of Chemical Warfare|url=http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/110519_destroying_libya_cw.htm|publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)|access-date=13 August 2011|date=May 19, 2011}}</ref>

In October 2014, Libya asked for foreign assistance to transport its 850 tonne stockpile of precursor chemicals for making nerve gas out of Libya for destruction.<ref name="SP" /> In February 2015, Libyan military sources told media that unidentified armed men had captured large amounts of Libya’s chemical weapons, including mustard gas and sarin.<ref name="Al-Awsat" /><ref name="northafricapost" /> Destruction of Libya's chemical weapon precursors was completed in November 2017.<ref name="opcwdestruction">{{Cite web|url=https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-director-general-praises-complete-destruction-of-libyas-chemical-weapon-stockpile/|title=OPCW Director-General Praises Complete Destruction of Libya's Chemical Weapon Stockpile|website=www.opcw.org|language=en|access-date=2018-02-10}}</ref>

Libya signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 20 September 2017, but has not ratified it.<ref>{{cite web |title=UNODA Treaties |url=https://treaties.unoda.org/t/tpnw |website=treaties.unoda.org}}</ref>

==Nuclear program==

In 1968, Libya under Idris became a signatory state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was ratified by Muammar Gaddafi in 1975.<ref name="NTI 2003"/> This was followed by the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1980 that allowed the cooperation on peaceful applications of nuclear power with the Soviet Union.<ref name="NTI 2003"/><ref name=NuclearThreat/><ref name=Chronology/>

Despite being a signatory state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its international obligations, Libya under Gaddafi since 1969 had actively pursued its ambitions of acquiring nuclear weapons by employing large number of foreign experts and used proliferation network to allegedly to counter the covert Israeli nuclear capability.<ref name="NTI 2003">{{cite news |title=The Program begins: 1968|url=http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/libya/nuclear/|access-date=24 April 2013|newspaper=NTI |date=2003}}</ref>

Eventually, the Libyan efforts were later exposed by Friedrich Tinner (one of their leading foreign experts) in an exchange for immunity in 2003. Earlier in July 1995, the IAEA had reported that Libya had made a "strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment," which can enrich uranium for use in nuclear reactors as well as for nuclear weapons.<ref name=Chronology/>

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, followed by the Iraq War in 2003, Libya under Gaddafi engaged in nuclear disarmament with the assistance from the United States and the IAEA in an exchange for improving relations with the Western world.<ref name=Chronology/>

At the time its nuclear program was rolled back, the Libya's nuclear program remained in and early developmental stage.<ref name=NuclearThreat/>

=== Foreign assistance === Gaddafi's most famous buying foray for nuclear weapons was in 1970, when Libyan leaders paid a state visit to China. Gaddafi and his Prime Minister Abdessalam Jalloud made an unsuccessful attempt to convince China to sell tactical nuclear weapons to Libya.<ref name=NuclearThreat/><ref name="Wisconsin Project reports">{{cite web |title=Libya Has Trouble Building the Most Deadly Weapons |url=http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/libya/trouble.html |work=The Risk Report Volume 1 Number 10 |publisher=Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Controls |access-date=24 April 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130420212851/http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/libya/trouble.html |archive-date=20 April 2013 |date=December 1995}}</ref> Gaddafi's justification for seeking nuclear weapons was his concern over the Israeli nuclear capability, and publicly expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons.{{cn|date=April 2026}}

In 1974, Gaddafi paid a state visit to Pakistan to attend the second summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Lahore and found a secret opportunity to research on the nuclear weapons in Pakistan. With the 1977 coup of the Bhutto administration by the Pakistani military, Libya was restricted and any attempts for its requests were rebuffed by the upcoming Zia administration due to President Zia himself distrusted and disliked the Libyans.<ref name=Timemagazine>{{Cite magazine|last=Stengel|first=Richard|author-link=Richard Stengel|title =Who has the Bomb?|magazine=Time|page=7|date=3 June 1985|url =http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761-7,00.html|archive-date=19 May 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110519084415/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761-7,00.html |access-date=23 February 2011}}</ref>

With relations severed with Pakistan, Gaddafi normalized relations with India in 1978, and eventually reaching a mutual understanding for civil nuclear cooperation with India.<ref>{{cite book |last1=V. R. Micallef |first1=Joseph |title=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |date=August 1981 |publisher=Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. |pages=14–15 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TAoAAAAAMBAJ |access-date=3 September 2023 |language=en}}</ref> An effort was made to gain access to the raw uranium ore in a view of enriching towards industrial-grade uranium but this approach proved difficult and failed due to lack of scientific capability. In 1980, Libya decided to acquire plutonium and secretly imported {{convert|1200|kg|lbs}} of uranium ore from Niger without notifying it to the IAEA as required by its safeguards' agreement. In 1982, Libya made an unsuccessful negotiation attempt with Belgium to procure a small industrial plant for manufacturing UF<sup>4</sup> solid compound.<ref name=NuclearThreat/>

In 1984, Gaddafi facilitated the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to Libya and was successful in reaching a pact with India on nuclear technology. India, citing the lack of manpower and infrastructure, later downplayed any cooperation with Libya.<ref name=NuclearThreat/> During the same year, Libya had reached out to Japan for procuring a small uranium conversion plant and a Japanese company supplied Libya with the technology; the sale was apparently arranged directly with the Japanese instead of through middlemen.<ref>{{cite news |title=Japan firm sold Libya key nuclear technology |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna4514496 |access-date=3 September 2023 |work=NBC News |agency=Associated Press |date=12 March 2004 |language=en}}</ref>

In 1985 and onward, Libya under Gaddafi used a smuggling network which UN weapons investigators found had connections to China.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China|newspaper=Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/02/15/libyan-arms-designs-traced-back-to-china/2aacac24-4d49-4198-9aa0-7d68962fd8c2/|date=2004-02-15|access-date=2020-01-01}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|title=China 'link' to Libya nuke design|publisher=BBC|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3491329.stm|date=2004-02-16|access-date=2020-01-01}}</ref>

The Libyan program had employed Friedrich Tinner, a Swiss engineer who guided on most of the Libyan efforts on scaling the uranium towards military-grade using the gas centrifuges methods but was unable to produce an operating centrifuge without the outside technical experts.<ref name=NuclearThreat/> In 1995, Gaddafi renewed calls for nuclear weapons and pursued new avenues for nuclear technology procurement, while publicly affirming its NPT commitments.<ref>Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Nonproliferation Review 4, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 97.</ref> With the enforcement of the economic sanctions on Libya and Iran by the Clinton administration in 1996, Gaddafi sought to persuade U.S. President Bill Clinton to lift UN sanctions in exchange for giving up its WMD programs.<ref name="autogenerated2">[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iraq-war-did-not-force-gadaffis-hand/ The Iraq War did not Force Gadaffi's Hand], Martin Indyk, Brookings Institution, March 9, 2004.</ref>

In 1997, Libya received technical information on gas centrifuges from its smuggling network and was able to restart the project under Tinner, after it received 20 pre-assembled centrifuges and components for an additional 200 centrifuges and related parts from foreign suppliers.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |title=SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-928401-6 |page=640 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gqaYM9BxoVMC |access-date=3 September 2023 |language=en |author1-link=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute }}</ref>

In October 2000, the Libyan efforts oversaw by Tinner were successful in installing a complete single centrifuge, using a pre-assembled rotors, at its ''Al Hashan'' site. However, further experiments relating to the efficiency, performance, and efficacy of the centrifuges failed as the technical guides and documents were too difficult to interpret and bring into operation.<ref name=NuclearThreat/> Ultimately, Libya notified the IAEA and told its investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs at that time, and due to its extreme difficulty, Libya would have had to ask the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear weapon.<ref name=NuclearThreat/>

====Soviet Union==== {{Main|Libya–Russia relations}} In 1979, Libya fostered close strategic ties with the Soviet Union including cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear technology under IAEA safeguards. In 1981, the Soviet Union agreed to build a {{convert|10|MW|GW}} research reactor at Tajoura, known as the "Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF)". There were reports of unsanctioned experiments being performed by the Russian experts on the uranium at the behest of the Libyan government. An unnamed nuclear weapon state, whose name has been kept secret by the IAEA, allegedly assisted Libya in these experiments. American nuclear weapons expert, David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, said the Soviet Union and China were the most likely suspects.<ref name=NuclearThreat/>

In 1984, Libya began to negotiate with the Soviet Union for purchasing a commercial nuclear power plant but talks failed due to technical difficulties encountered in understanding and running the Russian genertaion II reactors.<ref name=NuclearThreat/>

In 1991, Libya tried to exploit the chaos generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to nuclear technology, expertise, personnel, and materials.<ref name="USA Today"/> In 1992, it was reported by an official of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow claimed that Libya had unsuccessfully tried to recruit two of his colleagues to work at the "Tajoura Nuclear Research Center" in Libya.<ref name="USA Today"/> Other reports also suggested that Russian scientists had been hired to work on a covert Libyan nuclear efforts.<ref name="USA Today">jack Kelley, "Russian Nuke Experts Wooed," USA Today, 8 January 1992; "Libya Denies Offers to Soviets," Washington Post, 11 January 1992.</ref>

In March 1998, Russia and Libya signed a contract with the Russian consortium, the ''Atomenergoeksport'', for a partial overhaul of the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center.<ref name="Jon B 2002 p. 307">Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.</ref>

===Dismantlement=== {{Main|Disarmament of Libya}}

In 1992, the rollback of the Libya's nuclear program started with the Clinton administration according to the U.S. diplomat, Martin Indyk, who maintained that the negotiations and diplomatic efforts rolling back Libyan nuclear program were started as early as Bill Clinton assuming the presidency.<ref name="Jon B 2002 p. 307"/>

==Chemical weapons program== [[File:Tornado GR4 Attack on Libyan SCUD Launcher MOD 45155729.jpg|thumb|right|250px|A RAF Tornado striking the Scud missile launcher during the military intervention in Libya in 2011.]] In August 1987, the Chadian government accused Libya of using chemical weapons during the Chadian–Libyan War. In 1970, Libya under Gaddafi received Scud missile launchers and obtained chemical munitions from the former Soviet Union and the East Germany with other reports claiming that the Libyans received chemical warfare training from the Soviet Union and some chemical agents from Poland in 1980,<ref name=Spiers>{{cite book |last1=Spiers |first1=Edward M. |title=Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation |date=1994 |publisher=Springer |page=65 |isbn=978-0-230-37564-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gbeADAAAQBAJ&pg=PA65 |language=en}}</ref> or from Iran in exchange for naval mines for their tanker war against Iraq.<ref name="Prados">{{cite journal |last1=Prados |first1=John |title=How Qaddafi came clean |journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |date=1 November 2005 |volume=61 |issue=6 |pages=26–33 |doi=10.2968/061006011 |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.2968/061006011 |access-date=24 November 2024 |publisher=Sage Journals |issn=0096-3402|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In response to these claims the United States shipped 2,000 gas masks to Chad.<ref name=Spiers/> According to West German intelligence reports, Libya was working on the construction of chemical weapons facility during the 1980s.<ref name=Spiers /><ref name="Prados" />

Libya under Gaddafi actively maintained a chemical weapons program and deliverable to Soviet-supplied missiles, which was ostensibly decommissioned in the 2003 and early 2010s as Gaddafi sought to normalise relations with the Western world. Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention with effect on 5 February 2004,<ref name=opcwlibya/> and declared 24.7 metric tonnes of mustard gas, 1,390 metric tonnes of chemical precursors for making sarin, as well as 3,563 unloaded chemical weapon munitions (aerial bombs).<ref name=OPCW/><ref name=nti/>

===Destruction=== The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) supervised the destruction of Libya's chemical weapons through February 2011, when it was forced to suspend its operations due to the uprising against Gaddafi and the resulting deterioration of the country's stability. By then, Libya had destroyed 40% of its precursor materials and 55% of its mustard gas, as well as 3,500 chemical weapon munitions.<ref>Nuclear Threat Initiative, 30 September 2011, [http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/senate-delegation-positive-about-security-of-libyan-wmd-materials/ Senate Delegation Positive About Security of Libyan WMD Materials]</ref> In early September 2011, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü said reports he had received indicated that the remaining weapons were secure and had not fallen into the hands of militant groups.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/07/libya-chemical-weapons_n_952020.html|agency=The Huffington Post|title=Libya: Chemical Weapons Secure According To U.N. Watchdog|date=7 September 2011|access-date=25 September 2011}}</ref>

A stockpile of mustard gas, which the OPCW reported the regime may have attempted to hide from inspectors overseeing the chemical weapons program's dismantlement, was reportedly found in the Jufra District by anti-Gaddafi fighters less than two weeks later.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/22/libyan-rebels-gaddafis-chemical-weapons?newsfeed=true|work=The Guardian|title=Libyan rebels discover Gaddafi's chemical weapons|first=Ian|last=Black|date=22 September 2011|access-date=25 September 2011|location=London}}</ref> In late September it was reported by the ''Wall Street Journal'' that a major ammunition complex, including chemical-weapons-capable artillery shells, was unguarded and open to looting.<ref>Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3 October 2011, [http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/libyan-weapons-depot-unguarded-open-to-looters/ Libyan Weapons Depot Unguarded, Open to Looters]</ref> In December 2012 a senior Spanish intelligence official said that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb "probably also has non-conventional arms, basically chemical, as a result of the loss of control of arsenals", with Libya the most likely source.<ref>''Daily Telegraph'', 10 December 2012, [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9735472/Al-Qaeda-may-have-chemical-weapons-Spains-counter-terror-chief-warns.html Al Qaeda may have chemical weapons, Spain's counter-terror chief warns]</ref>

Libya's National Transitional Council cooperated with the OPCW in the destruction of the remaining chemical weapons.<ref>[http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Libyas_NTC_pledges_to_destroy_chemical_weapons_OPCW_999.html Libya's NTC pledges to destroy chemical weapons: OPCW]</ref> After assessing the chemical stockpiles, the OPCW set a deadline for the destruction of the weapons by the Libyan government.<ref>[http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Chemical_weapons_inspectors_to_return_to_Libya_999.html Chemical weapons inspectors to return to Libya]</ref> As of September 2013, 1.6 metric tons of mustard blister agent loaded in artillery rounds, 2.5 metric tons of congealed mustard agent, and 846 metric tons of chemical weapons ingredients remained to be destroyed.<ref name=nti_11_sep_2013_remains_on_hold>{{cite news|last=Barnes|first=Diane|title=Destruction of Libyan Chemical-Loaded Arms Remains on Hold|url=http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/destruction-libyan-chemical-loaded-arms-remains-hold/|access-date=26 October 2013|newspaper=Global Security Newswire (NTI)|date=11 September 2013}}</ref>

According to ''The New York Times'', in February 2014, the remnants of Libya's chemical weapons had been discreetly destroyed by the United States and Libya, using a transportable oven technology to destroy hundreds of bombs and artillery rounds filled with deadly mustard agent.<ref>{{cite news|title=Libya's Cache of Toxic Arms All Destroyed |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/world/africa/libyas-cache-of-toxic-arms-all-destroyed.html?_r=0|newspaper= New York Times|date=2 February 2014|access-date=4 February 2014}}</ref><ref name="france24 libya">{{cite web |url=http://www.france24.com/en/20140205-libya-gaddafi-chemical-weapons-destroyed/ |title=Libya destroys last of Gaddafi's chemical weapons – France |publisher=France 24 |access-date=5 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140205120827/http://www.france24.com/en/20140205-libya-gaddafi-chemical-weapons-destroyed/ |archive-date=5 February 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

In September 2014, OPCW said Libya still had around 850 tonnes of industrial chemicals that could be used to produce chemical weapons.<ref>{{cite news|title=Libya asks chemical weapons watchdog to remove stockpile|url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/24-Sep-2014/libya-asks-chemical-weapons-watchdog-to-remove-stockpile|newspaper= Daily Times|date=24 September 2014|access-date=27 September 2014}}</ref> In October 2014, Libya asked for foreign assistance to transport that stockpile of raw materials for making nerve gas out of Libya for destruction.<ref name=SP>{{cite news|title=NBC Weapons: Libya Needs Help To Be Gas Free|url=http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htchem/articles/20141030.aspx|newspaper= StrategyPage.com|date=30 October 2014}}</ref> On 5 February 2015, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of OPCW agreed on the need to complete the destruction of the remaining precursor chemicals.<ref>{{cite news|title=Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Visits the OPCW|url=http://www.opcw.org/news/article/libyan-minister-of-foreign-affairs-visits-the-opcw/|work=OPCW|date=5 February 2015}}</ref>

On 21 February 2015, ''Asharq Al-Awsat'' reported that an anonymous Libyan army official stated extremists had seized large amounts of Gaddafi’s chemical weapons from multiple locations. The official warned that the targeted caches included mustard gas and sarin.<ref name=Al-Awsat>{{cite news|title=Libya militias capture chemical weapons: army official|url=http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341700/libya-militias-capture-chemical-weapons-army-official|work=Asharq Al-Awsat|date=21 February 2015|access-date=23 February 2015|archive-date=2 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150702061846/http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341700/libya-militias-capture-chemical-weapons-army-official|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Report: Chemical weapons in Libya 'seized by extremists' |url=http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/africa/61872-150221-report-chemical-weapons-in-libya-seized-by-extremists|work=i24news|date=21 February 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Libyan Army official tells Arab paper that militias captured chemical weapons|url=https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Libyan-Army-official-tells-Arab-paper-that-militias-captured-chemical-weapons-391810|work=The Jerusalem Post|date=22 February 2015}}</ref> ''The North Africa Post'' later reported that chemical weapons were stolen by armed men who stormed the chemical factory in the Jufra district where the weapons were stored. Military sources reportedly stated that among the chemical weapons are mustard gas and sarin.<ref name=northafricapost>{{cite news|title=Libya: Unidentified armed men attack chemical factory, flee with chemical weapons|url=http://northafricapost.com/7086-libya-unidentified-armed-men-attack-chemical-factory-fled-with-chemical-weapons.html|work=The North Africa Post|date=23 February 2015}}</ref> On 31 August 2016, the last stockpile of ingredients for chemical weapons in the country was removed to Germany to avoid it falling into the hands of militants and was slated for destruction.<ref>{{cite news|title=Libya hands over last stockpile of chemical weapon ingredients|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/01/libya-hands-over-last-stockpile-of-chemical-weapon-ingredients|work=The Guardian|date=1 September 2016}}</ref> Destruction of Libya's chemical weapon precursors was completed in November 2017.<ref name=opcwdestruction/>

==Ballistic missiles== thumb|Threat ranges of Soviet-supplied Libyan Scud missiles.

The strategic relations with the Soviet Union allowed Libya to purchase at least 80 Scud-B missiles with transporter erector launchers, 40 FROG-7 missiles with transporter erector launchers, and several hundreds of chemical weapons deliverable missiles from the Soviet Union.<ref name="FAS">{{cite web |title=Missile Proliferation - Libya |url=https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/libya.htm |website=Federation of American Scientists |access-date=7 November 2024}}</ref>

In 1982, Libya sent two 9P117 trucks and around 20 Scud-B missiles to Iran for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) alongside with its instructors during the War of the cities against Iraq.<ref name="Zaloga"/> After the Russians in Soviet Union pressured Libya to stop supplying missiles, the Iranian IRGC sought assistance from the North Korea instead for missile production.<ref name="Zaloga">{{cite book |last1=Zaloga |first1=Steven J. |title=Scud Ballistic Missile and Launch Systems 1955–2005 |date=2013 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-4728-0306-1 |pages=80, 82, 90 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8X-HCwAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref>

In 1986, Gaddafi ordered the launch of ''Scud-B'' missiles against a United States facility on the Italian island of Lampedusa in retaliation for the United States bombing of Libya.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Marcus |first1=Jonathan |title=Scud: 'Entry level' ballistic missile |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20712241 |access-date=9 November 2024 |work=BBC News |date=13 December 2012}}</ref> Two missiles were fired, but fell short of their mark.<ref name="Zaloga" /><ref>{{cite report |title=Southern Europe's "Near Abroad": Western Mediterranean Security |page=5 |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001123261.pdf |website=Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |access-date=9 November 2024 |date=July 2000}}</ref>

The Libya under Gaddafi also worked on the development of a domestically produced {{convert|950-1000|km|abbr=on}} range missile, the "Al-Fatah" reportedly based on a West German design (the OTRAG rocket) with foreign assistance from Iraq, Iran, Serbia, and China.<ref name="FAS" /> Due the slow engineering progress of the program, it was reported that Libya entered negotiations with North Korea to purchase Hwasong-7 missiles (or even Taepodong missiles),<ref name="FAS" /><ref>{{cite book |last1=Stav |first1=Arieh |title=Threat of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Active Defense and Counter-Measures |date=2004 |publisher=Liverpool University Press |isbn=978-1-83624-230-7 |page=327 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cgwZEQAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref> but such rumors ultimately proved to be false after the disarmament of Libya in 2003.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Pinkston |first1=Daniel A. |title=The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program |date=2008 |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |isbn=978-1-58487-342-6 |page=30 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YckrAAAAYAAJ |access-date=7 November 2024 |language=en}}</ref>

The Libyans purchased at least five Hwasong-6 (''Scud-C'') missiles from North Korea in 1995, receiving them in 1999. They were never tested or deployed and were ultimately scrapped (alongside their planned local production) after 2003.<ref>{{cite web |title=Arms transfer database |url=https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferRegister |website=SIPRI |publisher=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute}}</ref> In exchange for the lifting of Western economic sanctions, Libya largely abandoned its domestic missiles program in 2004.<ref name="Zaloga" />

The Libyan Army under Gaddafi reportedly fired several Soviet Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles at areas in revolt against the regime, including Misrata and Ajdabiya, during the Libyan Civil War of 2011, but the missiles had missed their targets.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14538670|work=BBC News|title=Libya conflict: Gaddafi forces 'launched Scud missile'|date=16 August 2011|access-date=25 September 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7457858|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120729091301/http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7457858|url-status=dead|archive-date=July 29, 2012|work=DefenseNews|title=Gadhafi's Forces Fired 3 Scuds at Misrata: NATO|date=23 August 2011|access-date=25 September 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2011/08/29/bloomberg1376-LQOH7B1A1I4H01-062PRCVAAAN8DMGEEHICQN43MO.DTL |work=San Francisco Chronicle |title=Libyan Rebels Advance on Sirte Amid Protests Over Appointments |date=29 August 2011 |access-date=25 September 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110907071438/http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=%2Fg%2Fa%2F2011%2F08%2F29%2Fbloomberg1376-LQOH7B1A1I4H01-062PRCVAAAN8DMGEEHICQN43MO.DTL |archive-date= 7 September 2011 }}</ref> Several more Scuds, with launchers, were found by anti-Gaddafi fighters near Tripoli and Sirte.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/gaddafi-missiles-could-be-scrapped-1.1142836|work=IOL News|title=Gaddafi missiles could be scrapped|date=22 September 2011|access-date=25 September 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/scud-missile-battery-sits-unguarded-outside-tripoli-4385543|work=TVNZ|title=Scud missile battery sits unguarded outside Tripoli|date=5 September 2011|access-date=25 September 2011}}</ref> The final phases of the NATO intervention reportedly destroyed the remaining Scud missiles in Libyan inventory, effectively ending the Libyan missile capability.<ref name="Zaloga" />

{{Gallery |title=Chemical weapons delivery system of Libya (1971–2011) |width=160 |height=170 |align=center |File:Libyan SA-6 SAM.JPEG|A close-up view of a Soviet-provided Libyan SA-6 surface-to-air missile system. Destroyed in the NATO operation in 2011. |File:BM-21 Bengasi 0589 b1.JPG|A close-up view of a Soviet-provided Libyan BM-21 Grad missile system. Destroyed in the NATO operation in 2011. |File:1980s - soviet Scud B.JPEG|In 1980s, Libya inducted Scud-B missiles from former Soviet Union. Destroyed in the NATO operation in 2011. |File:Tornado GR4 Attack on Libyan SCUD Launcher MOD 45155729.jpg|A targeted strike on the Libyan 9K52 Frog-7 system. Destroyed in the NATO operation in 2011. }}

== See also == {{Portal|Libya}} *Foreign relations of Libya *Nuclear technology

== References == {{reflist}}{{Nuclear weapons by country}} Nuclear technology Nuclear technology Category:Nuclear technology in Libya Category:Weapons of mass destruction by country Category:Nuclear weapons programs Category:Soviet chemical weapons program Category:History of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi