{{short description|Four provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, separating commercial and investment banking}} {{About|four specific provisions of the [[Banking Act of 1933]], which is also called the '''Glass–Steagall Act'''|the earlier piece of economic legislation|Glass–Steagall Act of 1932}} {{Wall street crash 1929}} The '''Glass–Steagall legislation''' describes four provisions of the United States [[Banking Act of 1933]] separating [[commercial bank|commercial]] and [[investment banking|investment]] banking.<ref name="name">{{harvnb|CRS|2010a|pp=1 and 5}}. Wilmarth 1990, p. 1161.</ref>
As with the [[Glass–Steagall Act of 1932]], the common name comes from the names of the Congressional sponsors, Senator [[Carter Glass]] and Representative [[Henry B. Steagall]].<ref>Wilmarth 2008, p. 560.</ref>
The separation of commercial and investment banking prevented securities firms and investment banks from taking deposits and commercial Federal Reserve member banks from: * dealing in non-governmental securities for customers; * investing in non-investment grade securities for themselves; * underwriting or distributing non-governmental securities; * affiliating (or sharing employees) with companies involved in such activities.
Starting in the early 1960s, federal banking regulators' interpretations of the Act permitted [[commercial banks]], and especially commercial bank affiliates, to engage in an expanding list and volume of securities activities.<ref name="uphold" /> Congressional efforts to "repeal the Glass–Steagall Act", referring to those four provisions (and then usually to only the two provisions that restricted affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms),<ref name="repeal" /> culminated in the 1999 [[Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act]] (GLBA), which repealed the two provisions restricting affiliations between banks and securities firms.<ref name="GLBA" />
By that time, many commentators argued Glass–Steagall was already "dead".<ref name="dead" /> Most notably, [[Citibank]]'s 1998 affiliation with [[Salomon Smith Barney]], one of the largest U.S. securities firms, was permitted under the [[Federal Reserve Board]]'s then existing interpretation of the Glass–Steagall Act.<ref name="Citi" /> In November 1999, President [[Bill Clinton]] publicly declared "the Glass–Steagall law is no longer appropriate".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/money-power-wall-street/transcript/? |title=Money, power, and Wall Street: Transcript, Part 4, (quoted as "The Glass–Steagall law is no longer appropriate—") |publisher=[[PBS]]|work=April 24 and May 1, 2012; encore performance July 3, 2012|access-date=October 8, 2012}} {{Citation|title=Transcript of Clinton remarks at Financial Modernization bill signing|publisher=[[U.S. Newswire]] |location=Washington, D.C.|date=November 12, 1999|quote=It is true that the Glass-Steagall law is no longer appropriate to the economy in which we lived. It worked pretty well for the industrial economy, which was highly organized, much more centralized and much more nationalized than the one in which we operate today. But the world is very different.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56922|title=Statement on Signing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act|date=November 12, 1999|work=The University of California, Santa Barbara – The American Presidency Project|access-date=April 6, 2017|archive-date=February 7, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160207062207/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56922|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Some commentators have stated that the GLBA's repeal of the affiliation restrictions of the Glass–Steagall Act was an important cause of the [[2008 financial crisis]]. [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] laureate [[Joseph Stiglitz]] argued that the effect of the repeal was "indirect": "[w]hen repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on top".<ref name="Kuttner" /><ref name="capitalistfools">{{Cite web|url=http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2009/01/stiglitz200901-2|title=Joseph E. Stiglitz on capitalist fools|last=Stiglitz|first=Joseph E.|website=[[Vanity Fair (magazine)|Vanity Fair]]|date=9 December 2008|access-date=2016-09-11}}</ref> Economists at the [[Federal Reserve System|Federal Reserve]], such as [[Chair of the Federal Reserve|Chairman]] [[Ben Bernanke]], have argued that the activities linked to the [[2008 financial crisis]] were not prohibited (or, in most cases, even regulated) by the Glass–Steagall Act.<ref name="W&M" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm|title=FRB: Speech--Bernanke, Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble--January 3, 2010|website=www.federalreserve.gov|access-date=2016-09-11}}</ref><ref name="optimal">Mester, Loretta J. "Optimal industrial structure in banking." (2005).</ref>
==Sponsors== [[File:GlassSteagall.jpg|thumb|right|300px|[[United States Senate|Sen.]] [[Carter Glass]] ([[Democratic Party (United States)|D]]–[[List of United States senators from Virginia|Va.]]) and [[United States House of Representatives|Rep.]] [[Henry B. Steagall]] ([[Democratic Party (United States)|D]]–[[Alabama's 3rd congressional district|Ala.-3]]), the co-sponsors of the Glass–Steagall Act.]] The sponsors of both the [[Banking Act of 1933]] and the [[Glass–Steagall Act of 1932]] were [[southern Democrats]]: Senator [[Carter Glass]] of Virginia (who by 1932 had served in the House and the Senate, and as the secretary of the treasury); and Representative [[Henry B. Steagall]] of Alabama, who had served in the House for the preceding 17 years.
==Legislative history== {{Main|1933 Banking Act}}
Between 1930 and 1932, Senator Carter Glass (D-VA) introduced several versions of a bill (known in each version as the Glass bill) to regulate or prohibit the combination of commercial and investment banking and to establish other reforms (except deposit insurance) similar to the final provisions of the 1933 Banking Act.<ref>Kennedy 1973, pp. 50-53 and 203-204. Perkins 1971, pp. 497-505.</ref> On June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt signed the bill into law. Glass originally introduced his banking reform bill in January 1932. It received extensive critiques and comments from bankers, economists, and the Federal Reserve Board. It passed the House on February 16, 1932, the Senate on February 19, 1932, and [[Glass–Steagall Act of 1932|signed into law]] by [[Herbert Hoover|President Hoover]] eight days later.<ref>Herring, E. Pendleton, "American Government and Politics: First Session of the Seventy-second Congress." American Political Science Review 25, no. 5, 846-874.</ref> The Senate passed a version of the Glass bill that would have required commercial banks to eliminate their securities affiliates.<ref>Kennedy 1973, pp. 72-73.</ref>
The final Glass–Steagall provisions contained in the 1933 Banking Act reduced from five years to one year the period in which commercial banks were required to eliminate such affiliations.<ref>Patrick 1993, pp. 172-174. Kelly III 1985, p. 54, fn. 171. Perkins 1971, p. 524.</ref> Although the deposit insurance provisions of the 1933 Banking Act were very controversial, and drew veto threats from President [[Franklin Delano Roosevelt]], President Roosevelt supported the Glass–Steagall provisions separating commercial and investment banking, and Representative Steagall included those provisions in his House bill that differed from Senator Glass's Senate bill primarily in its deposit insurance provisions.<ref>Patrick 1993, pp. 168-172. Burns 1974, pp. 41-42 and 79. Kennedy 1973, pp. 212-219.</ref> Steagall insisted on protecting small banks while Glass felt that small banks were the weakness to U.S. banking.
Many accounts of the Act identify the [[Pecora Commission|Pecora Investigation]] as important in leading to the Act, particularly its Glass–Steagall provisions, becoming law.<ref>Kennedy 1973, pp. 103-128 and 204-205. Burns 1974, p 78.</ref> While supporters of the Glass–Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking cite the Pecora Investigation as supporting that separation,<ref>Perino 2010</ref> Glass–Steagall critics have argued that the evidence from the Pecora Investigation did not support the separation of commercial and investment banking.<ref>Bentson 1990, pp. 47-89. Cleveland and Huertas 1985, pp. 172-187.</ref>
This source states that Senator Glass proposed many versions of his bill to Congress known as the Glass Bills in the two years prior to the Glass–Steagall Act being passed. It also includes how the deposit insurance provisions of the bill were very controversial at the time, which almost led to the rejection of the bill once again.
The previous Glass Bills before the final revision all had similar goals and brought up the same objectives, which were to separate commercial from investment banking, bring more banking activities under Federal Reserve supervision, and to allow branch banking. In May 1933, Steagall's addition of allowing state-chartered banks to receive federal deposit insurance and shortening the time in which banks needed to eliminate securities affiliates to one year was known as the driving force of what helped the Glass–Steagall act to be signed into law.
==Separating commercial and investment banking==
The Glass–Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking was in four sections of the 1933 Banking Act (sections 16, 20, 21, and 32).<ref name="name" /> The [[Banking Act of 1935]] clarified the 1933 legislation and resolved inconsistencies in it. Together, they prevented commercial Federal Reserve member banks from: * dealing in non-governmental securities for customers * investing in non-investment grade securities for themselves * underwriting or distributing non-governmental securities * affiliating (or sharing employees) with companies involved in such activities
Conversely, Glass–Steagall prevented securities firms and investment banks from taking deposits.
The law gave banks one year after the law was passed on June 16, 1933, to decide whether they would be a commercial bank or an investment bank. Only 10 percent of a commercial bank's income could stem from securities. One exception to this rule was that commercial banks could underwrite government-issued bonds.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall) {{!}} Federal Reserve History|url=https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass-steagall-act|access-date=2021-10-01|website=www.federalreservehistory.org}}</ref>{{citation needed|date=October 2019}}
There were several "loopholes" that regulators and financial firms were able to exploit during the lifetime of Glass–Steagall restrictions. Aside from the Section 21 prohibition on securities firms taking deposits, neither savings and loans nor state-chartered banks that did not belong to the Federal Reserve System were restricted by Glass–Steagall. Glass–Steagall also did not prevent securities firms from owning such institutions. [[Savings and loan association|S&L]]s and securities firms took advantage of these loopholes starting in the 1960s to create products and affiliated companies that chipped away at commercial banks' deposit and lending businesses.<ref>Michael Brandl, ''Money, Banking, Financial Markets & Institutions'' (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2020), 306-8. {{ISBN|1337904821}}</ref>
While permitting affiliations between securities firms and companies other than Federal Reserve member banks, Glass–Steagall distinguished between what a Federal Reserve member bank could do directly and what an affiliate could do. Whereas a Federal Reserve member bank could not buy, sell, underwrite, or deal in any security except as specifically permitted by Section 16, such a bank could affiliate with a company so long as that company was not "engaged principally" in such activities. Starting in 1987, the Federal Reserve Board interpreted this to mean a member bank could affiliate with a securities firm so long as that firm was not "engaged principally" in securities activities prohibited for a bank by Section 16. By the time the GLBA repealed the Glass–Steagall affiliation restrictions, the Federal Reserve Board had interpreted this "loophole" in those restrictions to mean a banking company ([[Citigroup]], as owner of [[Citibank]]) could acquire one of the world's largest securities firms ([[Salomon Smith Barney]]).{{citation needed|date=October 2019}}
By defining commercial banks as banks that take in deposits and make loans and investment banks as banks that underwrite and deal with securities the Glass–Steagall act explained the separation of banks by stating that commercial banks could not deal with securities and investment banks could not own commercial banks or have close connections with them. With the exception of commercial banks being allowed to underwrite government-issued bonds, commercial banks could only have 10 percent of their income come from securities.{{citation needed|date=October 2019}}
==Decline and repeal== {{Main |Decline of the Glass–Steagall Act}}
It was not until 1933 that the separation of commercial banking and investment banking was considered controversial. There was a belief that the separation would lead to a healthier financial system.<ref>{{cite web|title=Banking Act of 1933, commonly called Glass-Steagall|url=http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/25|access-date=2014-03-20|archive-date=2015-04-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150428033924/http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/25|url-status=dead}}</ref> As time passed, however, the separation became so controversial that in 1935, Senator Glass himself attempted to "repeal" the prohibition on direct bank underwriting by permitting a limited amount of bank underwriting of corporate debt.
In the 1960s, the [[Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]] issued aggressive interpretations of Glass–Steagall to permit national banks to engage in certain securities activities. Although most of these interpretations were overturned by court decisions, by the late 1970s, bank regulators began issuing Glass–Steagall interpretations that were upheld by courts and that permitted banks and their affiliates to engage in an increasing variety of securities activities. Starting in the 1960s, banks and non-banks developed financial products that blurred the distinction between banking and securities products, as they increasingly competed with each other.
Separately, starting in the 1980s, Congress debated bills to repeal Glass–Steagall's affiliation provisions (Sections 20 and 32). Some believe that major U.S. financial sector firms established a favorable view of deregulation in American political circles, and in using its political influence in Congress to overturn key provisions of Glass-Steagall and to dismantle other major provisions of statutes and regulations that govern financial firms and the risks they may take.<ref>[[Simon Johnson (economist)|Simon Johnson]] and [[James Kwak]], [[13 Bankers|"13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown"]], (New York: [[Pantheon Books]], 2010), p. 133</ref> In 1999 Congress passed the '''[[Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act]]''', also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,<ref>{{cite web|title=Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, commonly called Gramm-Leach-Bliley |url=http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/53}}</ref>{{dead link|date=October 2025}} to repeal them. Eight days later, President [[Bill Clinton]] signed it into law.
==Aftermath of repeal== {{Main|Aftermath of the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act}} After the [[2008 financial crisis]], some commentators argued that the repeal of Sections 20 and 32 had played an important role in leading to the [[United States housing bubble]] and [[2008 financial crisis]]. [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences|Economics Nobel Memorial]] laureate [[Joseph Stiglitz]], for instance, argued that "[w]hen repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on top", and banks which had previously been managed conservatively turned to riskier investments to increase their returns.<ref name="capitalistfools" /> Another laureate, [[Paul Krugman]], contended that the repealing of the act "was indeed a mistake"; however, it was not the cause of the [[2008 financial crisis]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/opinion/democrats-republicans-and-wall-street-tycoons.html|title=Democrats, Republicans and Wall Street Tycoons|last=Krugman|first=Paul|date=2015-10-16|newspaper=The New York Times|issn=0362-4331|access-date=2016-09-11}}</ref>
Other commentators believed that these banking changes had no effect, and the [[2008 financial crisis]] would have happened the same way if the regulations had still been in force.<ref name="mitigate" /> [[Lawrence J. White]], for instance, noted that "it was not [commercial banks'] investment banking activities, such as underwriting and dealing in securities, that did them in".<ref name="White">{{citation| last=White| first=Lawrence J.| title=The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999: A Bridge Too Far? Or Not Far Enough?| journal=Suffolk University Law Review| volume=43| issue=4| year=2010| pages=938 and 943–946| url=http://web-docs.stern.nyu.edu/old_web/economics/docs/workingpapers/2010/White_The%20Gramm-Leach-Bliley%20Act%20of%201999.pdf| access-date=February 20, 2012| archive-date=December 28, 2015| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151228182411/http://web-docs.stern.nyu.edu/old_web/economics/docs/workingpapers/2010/White_The%20Gramm-Leach-Bliley%20Act%20of%201999.pdf| url-status=dead}}.</ref>
==Post-financial crisis reform debate== {{Main |Glass–Steagall in post-financial crisis reform debate}} Following the [[2008 financial crisis]], legislators unsuccessfully tried to reinstate Glass–Steagall Sections 20 and 32 as part of the [[Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act]]. Both in the United States and elsewhere around the world, banking reforms have been proposed that refer to Glass–Steagall principles. These proposals include issues of "[[ringfencing]]" commercial banking operations and [[narrow banking]] proposals that would sharply reduce the permitted activities of commercial banks - institutions that provide capital liquidity to investment management firms to shore up over-inflated market valuation of securities (whether debt or equity). Reconciliation of over-committed funds is possible by filing claims to the [[FDIC]] (Federal Deposit Insurance Company) - hence further increasing the federal budget deficit.
==See also== * [[American International Group]] * [[Arthur H. Vandenberg]] * [[Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000]] * [[Corporate law]] * [[Decline of the Glass–Steagall Act]] * [[Sarbanes–Oxley Act]] * [[Subprime mortgage crisis]] * [[Systemic risk]] * [[Volcker rule]]
==Notes== {{Reflist|3 |refs= <ref name="uphold">{{harvnb|CRS|2010a|p=10}}</ref> <ref name="Citi">Simpson Thacher 1998, pp. 1-6. Lockner and Hansche 2000, p. 37. Macey 2000, p. 718.</ref> <ref name="repeal">Reinicke 1995, pp. 104-105. Greenspan 1987, pp. 3 and 15-22. {{harvnb|FRB|1998}}.</ref> <ref name="GLBA">Macey 2000, p. 716. Wilmarth 2002, p. 219, fn. 5.</ref> <ref name="Kuttner">{{citation| last=Kuttner| first=Robert| title=The Alarming Parallels Between 1929 and 2007| journal=The American Prospect| date=October 2, 2007| page=2| url=http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_alarming_parallels_between_1929_and_2007| access-date=February 20, 2012| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111019192852/http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_alarming_parallels_between_1929_and_2007| archive-date=October 19, 2011| url-status=dead}}.</ref> <ref name="dead">Wilmarth 2002, pp. 220 and 222. Macey 2000, pp. 691-692 and 716-718. Lockner and Hansche 2000, p. 37.</ref> <ref name="mitigate">{{citation| url=http://www.aba.com/Issues/Documents/0b044fd57d78482b9ef3f2a7c194e973GrammLeachHelpedtoResolvenotCausetheCreditCrisisJa.pdf| title=Gramm-Leach-Bliley Did Not Cause the Financial Crisis| date=January 2010| publisher=[[American Bankers Association]]| access-date=July 13, 2012| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120804064823/http://www.aba.com/Issues/Documents/0b044fd57d78482b9ef3f2a7c194e973GrammLeachHelpedtoResolvenotCausetheCreditCrisisJa.pdf| archive-date=2012-08-04| url-status=dead}}. {{citation| url=http://factcheck.org/2008/10/who-caused-the-economic-crisis/| title=Who Caused the Economic Crisis?| date=October 1, 2008| publisher=[[FactCheck]].org| access-date=February 20, 2012}} {{citation| url=http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-09-23/bill-clinton-on-the-banking-crisis-mccain-and-hillary| last=Bartiromo| first=Maria| title=Bill Clinton on the banking crisis, McCain, and Hillary| date=September 23, 2008| magazine=Bloomberg Businessweek Magazine| access-date=October 11, 2012}}</ref> <ref name="W&M">{{citation |last=White |first=Lawrence J. |title=The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999: A Bridge Too Far? Or Not Far Enough? |journal=Suffolk University Law Review |volume=43 |issue=4 |year=2010 |pages=938 and 943–946 |url=http://www.law.suffolk.edu/highlights/stuorgs/lawreview/documents/White_Lead_Formatted.pdf |access-date=February 20, 2012 }}{{dead link|date=January 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}. {{citation |last=Markham |first=Jerry W. |title=The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match For The Bankers: Glass–Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley |journal=University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law |volume=12 |issue=4 |year=2010 |pages=1092–1134 |url=http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jbl/articles/volume12/issue4/Markham12U.Pa.J.Bus.L.1081(2010).pdf |access-date=February 20, 2012 |archive-date=August 4, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120804064841/http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jbl/articles/volume12/issue4/Markham12U.Pa.J.Bus.L.1081(2010).pdf |url-status=dead }}.</ref> }}
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==Further reading== {{wikisource}} {{refbegin|30em}} * {{Citation|author-link=Benjamin Anderson|last=Anderson |first=Benjamin |title=Economics and the Public Welfare |location=New York |publisher=D. Van Nostrand Company |year=1949 }}. * {{Citation |last1=Barth |first1=James R. |last2=Brumbaugh |first2=R. Dan Jr. |name-list-style=amp |last3=Wilcox |first3=James A. |title=Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass–Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking |journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]] |volume=14 |issue=2 |year=2000 |pages=191–204 |jstor=2647102 |doi=10.1257/jep.14.2.191|doi-access=free }}. * {{citation|last1=Blass|first1=Asher A.|last2=Grossman|first2=Richard S.|year=1998|title=Who Needs Glass–Steagall? Evidence From Israel's Bank Share Crisis and the Great Depression|journal=Contemporary Economic Policy|volume=16|issue=2|pages=185–196|doi=10.1111/j.1465-7287.1998.tb00511.x}}. * {{citation|author-link=Arthur F. Burns|last=Burns|first=Arthur F.|year=1988|title=The Ongoing Revolution in American Banking|publisher=American Enterprise Institute|location=Washington, D.C.|isbn=978-0-8447-3654-9|url=https://archive.org/details/ongoingrevolutio0000burn}}. * {{citation| last1=Calomiris| first1=Charles W.| last2=White| first2=Eugene N.| year=1994| title=The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance, chapter 5 in The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, edited by Claudia Golden and Gary D. Libecap| journal=Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law| volume=5| issue=2| pages=137–193| url=https://www.nber.org/chapters/c6575.pdf| access-date=February 27, 2012}}. * {{citation|last=Calomiris|first=Charles W.|year=2000|title=U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0-521-58362-6}} * {{citation |author-link=Jordi Canals|last=Canals|first=Jordi|year=1997|title=Universal Banking: International Comparisons and Theoretical Perspectives|publisher=Clarendon Press|location=Oxford; New York|isbn=978-0-19-877506-5|url=https://archive.org/details/universalbanking00cana}}. * {{citation|last=Coggins|first=Bruce|year=1998|title=Does Financial Deregulation Work? A Critique of Free Market Approaches|publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing Limited|location=Northampton, MA|series=New Directions in Modern Economics|isbn=978-1-85898-638-8}}. * {{Citation |last=Firzli |first=M. Nicolas |title=Bank Regulation and Financial Orthodoxy: the Lessons from the Glass–Steagall Act |journal=[[:fr: Revue Analyse Financière|Revue Analyse Financière]] |date=January 2010 |pages=49–52 |language=fr}}. * {{Citation|last=Hambley|first=Winthrop P.|title=The Great Debate-What will become of financial modernization|journal=Community Investments|volume=11|issue=2|date=September 1999|pages=1–3|url=http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/investments/cra99-2/debate.html|access-date=February 16, 2012|archive-date=April 3, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110403053008/http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/investments/cra99-2/debate.html|url-status=dead}}. * {{citation|last=Huertas|first=Thomas|year=1983|chapter=Chapter 1: The Regulation of Financial Institutions: A Historical Perspective on Current Issues|editor-last=Benston|editor-first=George J.|title=Financial Services: The Changing Institutions and Government Policy|publisher=Prentice-Hall|location=Englewood Cliffs, N.J.|isbn=978-0-13-316513-5|chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/financialservice0000bens}}. * {{Citation |last1=Kroszner |first1=Randall S. |author-link2=Raghuram Rajan |last2=Rajan |first2=Raghuram G. |name-list-style=amp |year=1994 |title=Is the Glass–Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933 |journal=[[American Economic Review]] |volume=84 |issue=4 |pages=810–832 |jstor=2118032 }}. * {{Citation |last=Lewis |first=Toby |title=New Glass–Steagall Will Shake Private Equity |work=[[Financial News]] |date=January 22, 2010 }}. * {{citation |last=Mester |first=Loretta J. |title=Repealing Glass–Steagall: The Past Points the Way to the Future |journal=Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review |issue=July/August |year=1996 |url=http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/1996/july-august/Glass–Steagall.cfm |access-date=February 25, 2012 }}{{dead link|date=January 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}. * {{citation |author-link=Hyman Minsky|last=Minsky |first=Hyman |title=Can ''It'' Happen Again? |location=Armonk, N.Y. |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |year=1982|isbn=978-0-873-32213-3}}. * {{citation |author-link=Frederic Mishkin|last=Mishkin |first=Frederic S. |year=2006 |title=How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail? A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman's ''Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts'' |journal=Journal of Economic Literature |volume=44 |issue=December |pages=988–1004 |url=http://www.business.unr.edu/faculty/rtl/791/toobigtofail.pdf |access-date=February 25, 2012 |doi=10.1257/jel.44.4.988 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140821183952/http://www.business.unr.edu/faculty/rtl/791/toobigtofail.pdf |archive-date=August 21, 2014 }}. * {{citation|author-link=Ferdinand Pecora|last=Pecora|first=Ferdinand|year=1939|title=Wall Street Under Oath: The Story of Our Modern Money Changers| publisher=A.M. Kelley|location=New York|publication-date=1966 |work=(reprint of 1939 edition pubslished by Simon &Schuster, New York)|series=Reprints of Economics Classics|lccn=68-20529}}. * {{citation|last1=Saunders|first1=Anthony|last2=Walter|first2=Ingo|year=1994|title=Universal Banking in the United States: What could we gain? What could we lose?|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0-19-508069-8|url=https://archive.org/details/universalbanking0000saun}}. * {{citation|editor1-last=Saunders|editor1-first=Anthony|editor2-last=Walter|editor2-first=Ingo|year=1997|title=Universal Banking: Financial System Design Reconsidered|publisher=Irwin Professional Publishing|location=Chicago|isbn=978-0-7863-0466-0}}. * {{citation|author-link=Christopher W. Shaw|last=Shaw|first=Christopher W.|year=2019|title=Money, Power, and the People: The American Struggle to Make Banking Democratic|publisher=University of Chicago Press|location=Chicago|isbn=978-0-2266-3633-7|url=https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo38871708.html}}. * {{Citation |last=Uchitelle |first=Louis |author-link=Louis Uchitelle |newspaper=[[New York Times]] |title=Elders of Wall St. Favor More Regulation |date=February 16, 2010 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/business/17volcker.html }}. * {{Citation |last=White |first=Eugene Nelson |year=1986 |title=Before the Glass–Steagall Act: An analysis of the investment banking activities of national banks |journal=[[Explorations in Economic History]] |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=33–55 |doi=10.1016/0014-4983(86)90018-5 }}. * {{citation|author-link=Henry Parker Willis|last1=Willis|first1=Henry Parker|last2=Chapman|first2=John|year=1934|title=The Banking Situation: American Post-War Problems and Developments|publisher=Columbia University Press|location= New York|oclc=742920}}. * {{citation| last=Wilmarth| first=Arthur E. Jr.| year=2007| title=Walmart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce| journal=Connecticut Law Review| volume=39| issue=4| pages= 1539–1622|ssrn=984103}}. {{refend}}
==External links== * [https://www.processhistory.org/shaw-a-decisive-influence-the-american-publics-role-in-financial-regulation/ History of Glass-Steagall Act from Organization of American Historians] * [https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html On the systematic dismemberment of the Act from PBS's ''Frontline''] * [https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/466/item/15952 Full text of the Glass–Steagall Act followed by New York Federal Reserve Bank Explanation] * [https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/675 Glass Subcommittee hearings] * [https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/87 Pecora Investigation hearings] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20120224051943/http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/firstfifty/ FDIC History: 1933-1983] * [http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/1987/S87.pdf 1987 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium on Restructuring the Financial System] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120804064825/http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/1987/S87.pdf |date=2012-08-04 }} * [https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/991 Public Law 73-66, 73d Congress, H.R. 5661: an Act to Provide for the Safer and More Effective Use of the Assets of Banks, to Regulate Interbank Control, to Prevent the Undue Diversion of Funds into Speculative Operations] * [https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=LOsoAAAAIBAJ&sjid=39IEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6593%2C3084741 The Southeast Missourian, March 10, 1933] details legislative debate when passing the bill
{{New Deal}} {{Bank regulation in the United States}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Glass-Steagall Act}} [[Category:1933 in American law]] [[Category:73rd United States Congress]] [[Category:Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]] [[Category:Legal history of the United States]] [[Category:United States federal banking legislation]] [[Category:Repealed United States legislation]] [[Category:Financial regulation in the United States]] [[Category:Separation of investment and retail banking]] [[Category:History of banking in the United States]]