The Establishment (Pakistan)

{{short description|Deep-state dominance of the military in Pakistan}} {{pp-extended|small=yes}} {{Use Pakistani English|date=March 2024}} {{Use dmy dates|date=November 2024}} {{Distinguish|Establishment Division}} {{Tone|date=January 2021}} '''The Establishment''' ({{langx|ur|اسٹیبلشمنٹ}}), also referred to as the '''military establishment''', or '''deep state''', is a term commonly used in Pakistan to describe the influence of the Pakistan Armed Forces, intelligence agencies, and associated pro-military entities within the country's governance structure.

Since Pakistan's independence in 1947,<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i5GMCwAAQBAJ&q=%22civil-military+establishment%22++pakistan&pg=PA11|title=The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience|last=Jaffrelot|first=Christophe|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2015|isbn=978-0-19-023518-5|pages=586|quote=The civil-military establishment ruled Supreme for 60 years - from 1947 to 2007 - by crushing or betraying social movements and preventing the development of society.}}</ref><ref name="wsjpak1">[https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-extends-powerful-army-chiefs-term-11566239708 Pakistan Extends Powerful Army Chief’s Term] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191019114057/https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-extends-powerful-army-chiefs-term-11566239708 |date=19 October 2019 }}, Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2019. "... critics of the military say it helped Mr. Khan win the 2018 election, as a new force in Pakistani politics and it is accused of being behind a campaign against the country's two established political parties."</ref> the Establishment has periodically assumed direct control of the government through military coups and has frequently played a substantial role in influencing political and security policies during civilian administrations.<ref name="h986">{{cite web | last=Hussain | first=Abid | title=Can Pakistan's politicians break the military's stranglehold? | website=Al Jazeera | date=30 January 2024 | url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/can-pakistans-politicians-break-the-militarys-stranglehold | access-date=12 November 2024 | archive-date=12 November 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241112120635/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/can-pakistans-politicians-break-the-militarys-stranglehold | url-status=live }}</ref> It is widely regarded as an influential force in Pakistan's political and strategic affairs, particularly in areas concerning domestic policies, national security and foreign relations.<ref name="d233">{{cite journal | last=Shah | first=Aqil | title=Pakistan's Military Still Runs the Show | journal=Foreign Affairs | date=16 June 2023 | url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/pakistans-military-still-runs-show-imran-khan | access-date=12 November 2024}}</ref> This includes state policies introduced during various periods of military rule, including the Islamization measures implemented under General Zia-ul-Haq.<ref name="hazzani-131">{{cite book|last=Ḥaqqānī|first=Husain|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&q=zia+ul-haq+most+noted&pg=PA132|title=Pakistan: between mosque and military|publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|year=2005|isbn=978-0-87003-214-1|location=Washington|page=131|quote=Zia ul-Haq is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. Undoubtedly, Zia went farthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state, and he nurtured the jihadist ideology ...|access-date=23 May 2010}}</ref>

In the 2000s, the military establishment later reversed its support of political Islam under General Pervez Musharraf, who pursued enlightened moderation, leading Pakistan to join the United States-led war on terror and subsequently becoming designated as a major non-NATO ally by the Bush administration.<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200225114011/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html |date=25 February 2020 }}, by Pervez Musharraf, 1 June 2004, ''The Washington Post''</ref> Furthermore, in the 2010s, General Raheel Sharif pursued a policy of hardline crackdowns on Islamist militant groups, continuing this reversal of Zia-ul-Haq's aggressive pro-Islamist policies.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Boone |first1=Jon |title=Pakistan begins long-awaited offensive to root out militants from border region |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/pakistan-offensive-militants-north-waziristan |access-date=17 September 2020 |work=The Guardian |date=15 June 2014 |archive-date=5 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200805230301/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/pakistan-offensive-militants-north-waziristan |url-status=live }}</ref> Civilian members of the military-dominated Establishment have included: Sharifuddin Pirzada, Tariq Azim Khan, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan{{sfn|Cohen|2004|pp=68–70}} A. K. Brohi,{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=85}} Ghulam Ishaq Khan{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=146}} and Zafar Ahmed Ansari.{{sfn|Haqqani|2005|p=25}}

== Reinforcement of deep-state dominance == The Establishment is notable for its covert interventions and organisation of military coups against the civilian government, and was reportedly behind the 1953–54 Constitutional Coup in the Dominion of Pakistan.<ref name="epak1">[http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9772.html Pakistan Constitutional Beginnings] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191111051439/http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9772.html |date=11 November 2019 }} PAKISTAN – A Country Study</ref><ref name="epak3">[https://web.archive.org/web/20041217215440/http://icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/pakintrigue.htm#1953coup declassified US Intelligence]. {{Dead link|date=April 2020}}</ref> It also organised the coups of 1958,<ref name="epak3" /> 1977,<ref name="epak4">{{cite book|last1=Hyman|first1=Anthony|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cjPgESaC-7sC&pg=PA30|title=Pakistan, Zia and After--|last2=Ghayur|first2=Muhammed|last3=Kaushik|first3=Naresh|date=1989|publisher=Abhinav Publications|isbn=81-7017-253-5|location=New Delhi|page=30|quote=Operation Fair Play went ahead … as the clock struck midnight [on 4 July 1977] ... [Later,] General Zia [told Bhutto] that Bhutto along with other political leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties would be taken into what he called 'protective custody'.}}</ref><ref name="epak5">{{cite book|last1=Dossani|first1=Rafiq|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TwO9zmj6aQ0C&pg=PA42|title=Prospects for Peace in South Asia|last2=Rowen|first2=Henry S.|date=2005|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=978-0-8047-5085-1|page=42|quote=Zia-ul-Haq, however, chose not to abrogate the 1973 Constitution. Rather, Zia's government suspended the operation of the Constitution and governed directly, through the promulgation of martial law regulations … Between 1977 and 1981 Pakistan did not have legislative institutions.}}</ref>{{sfn|Cohen|2004}} and 1999.<ref name="OPR">{{cite book|author=Hassan Abbas|url=https://archive.org/details/pakistansdriftin00hass/page/16|title=Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America's war on terror|publisher=M.E. Sharpe|year=2005|isbn=978-0-7656-1496-4|pages=[https://archive.org/details/pakistansdriftin00hass/page/16 16–40]}}</ref> The Pakistan Army has been involved in enforcing martial law against civilian governments under the claim of restoring law and order in the country as is its role in the Constitution of Pakistan. It has dismissed the legislative branch and parliament a total of four times since Pakistan's independence, and maintains wider commercial, foreign, and political interests in the country. Due to this imbalance of power, the Pakistani military has faced allegations of acting as a state within a state.<ref name="Dawn Newspapers, Javed">{{cite news|last1=Javid|first1=Hassan|date=23 November 2014|title=COVER STORY: The Army & Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan|language=en|work=DAWN.COM|publisher=Dawn Newspapers|agency=Dawn Newspapers|url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1146181|url-status=live|access-date=16 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170816152146/https://www.dawn.com/news/1146181|archive-date=16 August 2017}}</ref><ref name="epak6">{{cite book|last1=Aqil|first1=Shah|title=The army and democracy : military politics in Pakistan|date=1973|publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=9780674728936}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Haqqani|2005}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Aziz|first1=Mazhar|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jQl9AgAAQBAJ&q=pakistan+army+a%5Dnd+politics|title=Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State|date=2007|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9781134074099|language=en|access-date=16 August 2017}}</ref><ref name="epak7">{{cite book|last1=Chengappa|first1=Bidanda M.|title=Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy|date=2004|publisher=APH Publishing|isbn=9788176485487|language=en}}</ref>

== Characteristics and composition == Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani journalist and scholar, notes that the Establishment is overwhelmingly dominated by the Pakistan Armed Forces (i.e. serving and retired officers, SPDF personnel, military-sponsored think-tanks etc.), with its core members also including civil bureaucrats, politicians, media houses and major economic players.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://lubpak.net/archives/4648|title=Mapping the establishment – by Ayesha Siddiqa|date=15 January 2010|website=LUBP|access-date=8 December 2019|archive-date=5 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191105180200/https://lubpak.net/archives/4648|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=STRuDQAAQBAJ&q=ayesha+siddiqa+mapping+%22The+Establishment%22&pg=PT53|title=Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence|last1=Ahmad|first1=Ishtiaq|last2=Rafiq|first2=Adnan|date=3 November 2016|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-317-23594-1|pages=Chapter 3|chapter=Mapping the 'Establishment' - Ayesha Siddiqa}}</ref> Abubakar Siddique, a Bangladeshi writer, observed that the civilians involved with the Establishment, such as politicians and judges, are also very "pro-military".<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=s0deBAAAQBAJ&q=%22The+Establishment%22+++Pakistan&pg=PT130|title=The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan|last=Siddique|first=Abubakar|date=15 June 2014|publisher=Hurst|isbn=978-1-84904-499-8|pages=Chapter 6|chapter=The Military's Pashtun Wars}}</ref> American political scientist Stephen P. Cohen says in his book, ''The Idea of Pakistan'':{{sfn|Cohen|2004|pp=68-70}} "Of all of Ayub Khan's achievements, the most enduring was an informal political system that tied together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites. Subsequently dubbed the "Establishment," it resembles a classic oligarchy. Pakistani politician, Mushahid Hussain, revealed that members of the Establishment included members of the business community; journalists, editors, and media experts; and a few academics and members of think tanks. At times, some foreign ambassadors with particularly close ties to the leadership were de facto members [...] Military officers and civilian bureaucrats above a certain level were potential members. As Hussain notes, the informality of the Establishment ensures that occupying a particular post does not confer membership.

Over time, the civil–military power equation has undergone changes, such as increased power sharing between the civilian government and the military as well as the convergence of interests in major aspects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nzMlDwAAQBAJ&q=Beyond+the+civil-military+divide+Pakistan%27s+Democratic+Transition%3A+Change+and+Persistence+edited+by+Ishtiaq+Ahmad%2C+Adnan+Rafiq&pg=PA31|title=Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence|last=Ahmad|first=Ishtiaq|date=3 November 2016|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-1-317-23595-8|editor-last=Ahmad|editor-first=Ishtiaq|pages=31–33|chapter=Pakistan's third democratic transition|editor-last2=Rafiq|editor-first2=Adnan}}</ref> During the tenure of General Ayub Khan, the Establishment's code and tenants included the following (as outlined in Cohen's book): India was the main, existential threat to Pakistan, and accordingly the Pakistani military was a priority in all affairs of the state.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=71}} Since Pakistan could not take on India alone, military alliances were important and essential to the state's survival.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=71}} Likewise, natural allies included other moderate Islamic states, which were seen as role models.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=71}} Domestically, the military was a role model for the Pakistani people. Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region that served as the core territorial conflict hotspot between India and Pakistan, was always an issue for the Establishment, to the extent that it became an integral reason for the existence of Pakistan.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=71}} Quick reforms and revolutions were considered problematic.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=71}}

Foreign aid from the United States, Japan, and then the People's Republic of China (after 1963) was a driver of the economy.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=72}} The Establishment ensured control over information dissemination through the media and academia.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=72}} Radical and/or violent Islamic groups were slowly tolerated.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=72}} The Establishment theoretically tolerated democratic rule and never seriously imposed Islam; the army being less tolerant of Islamists. Just by surviving, Pakistan and its Establishment would be defeating India.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a founding member of the Establishment,<ref>{{harvnb|Cohen|2004|p=73}}: "In this Ayub had been egged on by his activist foreign minister, the young Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was ambitious, ruthless, and a charter member of the Establishment."</ref> started looking for a new identity for Pakistan, chiefly one that it did not share with neighbouring rival India. Accordingly, Pakistan started to look towards the Middle East for "aid, ideology, and strategic cooperation"; while at the same time turning its back away from its own shared history with India in South Asia.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=170}} Further building on Ayub Khan-era policies, Kashmir remained important for the Establishment for a variety of reasons; most notably due to its strategic importance to Pakistan. Furthermore, it was seen as a chance for Pakistan to fulfil its vision of its founding, the two-nation theory—that of being a "homeland for oppressed Indian Muslims".{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=71}} Outside of the Kashmir conflict, India as a nation was perceived as an existential threat to Pakistan in every way,<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jjaTAwAAQBAJ&q=%22Establishment%22+++Pakistan|title=Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War|last=Fair|first=C. Christine|date=2014|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-989270-9|pages=173|quote=[...] conviction of Pakistan's defense establishment that India is fundamentally opposed to Pakistan's existence, rejects the two nation theory, and seeks every opportunity to undo history [...] the two states are thus locked in an existential conflict with no obvious resolution.}}</ref>{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=121}}{{sfn|Haqqani|2005|p=15}} particularly after the 1971 secession of Muslim-majority Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), and the latter's belief that India did not pose an existential threat, effectively endangering the two-nation theory.{{sfn|Cohen|2004|p=282}}

On 1 April 2022, Prime Minister Imran Khan announced that in context of no-confidence motion against him in the National Assembly, the "establishment" had given him three options to choose from viz: "resignation, no-confidence [vote] or elections".<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 April 2022 |title=PM Imran says 'establishment' gave him three options: resignation, no-confidence vote or elections |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1682900 |access-date=1 April 2022 |work=Dawn |language=en |archive-date=10 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220410055945/https://www.dawn.com/news/1682900 |url-status=live }}</ref>

==Criticism== {{Main|Criticism of Pakistan Armed Forces}} [[File:Pashtun Tahafuz Movement Bannu 2018.jpg|thumb|Anti-establishment powershow in Bannu attended by thousands of people]] In Pakistan, there have been several protests against the Establishment but these are not covered by the Pakistani media channels since they are not allowed by the Establishment.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Paley|first=Sofia|date=22 August 2019|title=Pakistan's media forced into self-censorship|url=https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2019/08/pakistans-media-forced-into-self-censorship/|access-date=27 June 2021|website=Index on Censorship|language=en-GB|archive-date=27 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210627003704/https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2019/08/pakistans-media-forced-into-self-censorship/|url-status=live}}</ref> The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), for instance, openly criticises the Pakistan Army and accuses the Pakistani state of violating the basic human rights of Pashtuns.<ref>{{cite news|author=Taha Siddiqui|date=13 January 2018|title=The PTM in Pakistan: Another Bangladesh in the making?|language=en|work=Al Jazeera|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ptm-pakistan-bangladesh-making-190111140428304.html|access-date=13 January 2018|archive-date=13 January 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190113091659/https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ptm-pakistan-bangladesh-making-190111140428304.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

In Pakistan, especially in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, there is a famous slogan "''ye jo dehshatgardi hai, iske peeche wardi hai",'' {{langx|ur|{{Nastaliq|یہ جو دہشت گردی ہے، اس کے پیچھے وردی ہے}}}} “ ('those in uniform are behind terrorism').<ref>{{Cite news|date=14 April 2019|title=Hunger Strike, Protests in Pak's Balochistan After Quetta Blast|url=https://www.thequint.com/news/world/pakistan-protests-after-balochistan-quetta-blast|access-date=27 June 2021|work=TheQuint|archive-date=27 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210627003701/https://www.thequint.com/news/world/pakistan-protests-after-balochistan-quetta-blast|url-status=live}}</ref> Due to the popularity of the slogan PTM adopted it.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Siddiqui|first=Taha|date=13 January 2019|title=The PTM in Pakistan: Another Bangladesh in the making?|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/1/13/the-ptm-in-pakistan-another-bangladesh-in-the-making|access-date=27 March 2022|work=aljazeera.com|language=en-US|archive-date=27 March 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220327162900/https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/1/13/the-ptm-in-pakistan-another-bangladesh-in-the-making|url-status=live}}</ref> The PTM led by Manzoor Ahmad Pashteen has significantly raised awareness among Pakistan’s Pashtun community about the military establishment’s actions. Originating from South Waziristan, Pashteen’s leadership sparked widespread peaceful protests, highlighting extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and landmine hazards in tribal areas. His distinctive red-and-black cap and compelling speeches symbolized resistance, exposing the civilian toll of military operations like Operation Zarb-e-Azb.<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 April 2018 |title=Pashtun tribe, angry with Pakistan's army, demands justice for war victims |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-protests/pashtun-tribe-angry-with-pakistans-army-demands-justice-for-war-victims-idUSKBN1HH1ZQ |website=Reuters}}</ref> Despite media blackouts and state repression, PTM’s social media activism amplified Pashtun grievances, challenging the military’s unchecked authority and advocating for justice and constitutional rights.<ref>{{Cite web |date=13 February 2019 |title=Pakistan's Pashtun Crackdown Stokes Wide Unrest |url=https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistans-pashtun-crackdown-stokes-wide-unrest |website=International Crisis Group}}</ref>

In September 2020, the Pakistan Democratic Movement was formed with the main objective to remove the Establishment's association with the politics of Pakistan.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Zafar|first=Imad|date=26 October 2020|title=Sharif checkmates Pakistani establishment|url=https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/sharif-checkmates-pakistani-establishment/|work=Asia Times|access-date=26 October 2020|archive-date=29 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029015002/https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/sharif-checkmates-pakistani-establishment/|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2023 when Imran Khan was arrested after his removal from government in April 2022 and the subsequent political crisis in the country, there were large-scale protests against the Establishment's strongholds by Khan's party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf which led to a crackdown against it.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hussain |first=Abid |date=12 May 2023 |title=Why are Imran Khan's supporters angry with Pakistan's military? |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/12/why-are-imran-khans-supporters-angry-with-pakistans-military |work=Al Jazeera |access-date=8 January 2024 |archive-date=12 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230512072748/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/12/why-are-imran-khans-supporters-angry-with-pakistans-military |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Khuhro |first=Zarrar |date=11 May 2023 |title=Imran Khan's arrest has exploded Pakistan's reservoir of rage |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/5/11/imran-khans-arrest-has-exploded-pakistans-reservoir-of-rage |work=Al Jazeera |access-date=8 January 2024 |archive-date=8 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240108092309/https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/5/11/imran-khans-arrest-has-exploded-pakistans-reservoir-of-rage |url-status=live }}</ref>

Apart from political movements, many journalists have also taken voice against the Establishment. Hamid Mir, Pakistan's most well-known journalist, spoke against the Establishment many times. Assassination attempts have been made on many journalists who spoke against the Establishment including Mir,<ref>{{Cite web|date=8 May 2014|title=Am I a traitor?|url=https://cpj.org/2014/05/am-i-a-traitor/|access-date=27 June 2021|website=Committee to Protect Journalists|language=en-US|archive-date=27 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210627150043/https://cpj.org/2014/05/am-i-a-traitor/|url-status=live}}</ref> Asad Ali Toor,<ref>{{Cite news|date=26 May 2021|title=Pakistan: Journalist critical of military attacked at home|url=https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-journalist-critical-of-military-attacked-at-home/a-57665723|work=Deutsche Welle|language=en-GB|access-date=27 June 2021|archive-date=21 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210621020950/https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-journalist-critical-of-military-attacked-at-home/a-57665723|url-status=live}}</ref> and others. Prominent journalist Matiullah Jan was also abducted and Jan accused the Establishment of abducting him.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kugelman|first=Michael|date=3 June 2021|title=Pakistan's Press Enters a Dark Era|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/03/pakistan-press-freedom-journalism-media/|access-date=27 June 2021|website=Foreign Policy|language=en-US|archive-date=27 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210627175736/https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/03/pakistan-press-freedom-journalism-media/|url-status=live}}</ref> Journalist Imran Riaz Khan, with over 5.6 million YouTube subscribers, was abducted on 11 May 2023, allegedly for criticizing the government and military.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bilal |first=Rana |date=26 May 2023 |title=LHC directs 'all agencies' to find Imran Riaz |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1755976 |website=DAWN.COM}}</ref> Released in September 2023 after alleged torture, he was rearrested in February 2024 for corruption.<ref>{{Cite news |date=23 February 2024 |title=Imran Riaz sent to jail in corruption case |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1816493 |work=Dawn}}</ref> Initially a PTI and military supporter, Khan mocked Pashtun and Baloch missing persons, calling them "traitors" who "deserved to disappear".<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 December 2023 |title=Journalist Imran Riaz Apologizes for undermining the issue of Baloch Missing Persons |url=https://thebalochcircle.com |website=The Baloch Circle}}</ref> After his own disappearance, he apologized, expressing solidarity with Baloch families.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Imran Riaz Khan - YouTube |website=YouTube |url=https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCaszgR2TH3qNw_CxLHAd2SQ}}</ref>

==References== ===Citations=== {{reflist}}

=== Bibliography === {{refbegin|}} * {{cite book |last=Cohen |first=Stephen F. |title=The idea of Pakistan |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |year=2004 |isbn=9780815715023 |location=University of Michigan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YfttAAAAMAAJ |access-date=17 September 2020 |archive-date=5 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105012626/https://books.google.com/books?id=YfttAAAAMAAJ |url-status=live }} * {{cite book |last=Haqqani |first=Husain |title=Pakistan: Between mosque and military |year=2005 |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |location=Washington, DC |isbn=978-0870032141 |edition=1. print. |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/pakistanbetweenm00haqq }} * {{cite book |last=Khan |first=Reham |title=Reham Khan (memoir) |location=Pakistan |isbn=9789353023225 |year=2018 |url=https://archive.org/stream/RehamKhanRehamKhan/Reham-Khan-Reham-Khan_djvu.txt }} {{refend}}

==External links== * [https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorists-immigration-status-nationality-risk-analysis-1975-2017 Terrorists immigration status nationality risk analysis] *Daniel L. Byman. "[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_terrorism_byman.pdf The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism]" (PDF). ''Brookings.edu''. Retrieved 5 October 2018.

{{Pakistani intelligence agencies}} {{Pakistan Armed Forces}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Establishment (Pakistan), The}} Category:War on terror Category:State-sponsored terrorism Category:Military science Category:Political science Category:Politics of Pakistan Category:Political terminology Category:Government of Pakistan Category:Military of Pakistan