{{Short description|1922 Anglo-Turkish war scare}} {{Use dmy dates|date=April 2015}} {{Use Canadian English|date=January 2023}} {{More footnotes needed|date=October 2020}} {{Infobox military conflict | conflict = Chanak crisis | width = | partof = the [[United Kingdom during the Turkish War of Independence|Anglo-Turkish War (1918–1923)]] | image = [[File:100 years of the RAF MOD 45163650.jpg|300px]] | caption = British pilots of 203 Squadron look on as ground personnel service the engine of one of the squadron's Nieuport Nightjar fighters whilst detached to Gallipoli, Turkey, in 1922 | date = September – October 1922 | place = [[Çanakkale]], [[Turkey]] | coordinates = | map_type = | map_relief = | map_size = | map_marksize = | map_caption = | map_label = | territory = | result = Turkish Victory | status = | combatants_header = | combatant1 = {{flagdeco|Ottoman Empire|1823}} [[Government of the Grand National Assembly|Ankara Government]] | combatant2 = {{plainlist| *{{flagicon|United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland}} [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] *{{flagicon|French Third Republic}} [[French Third Republic|France]] *{{flagicon|Kingdom of Italy}} [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]] * {{flagicon|Greece|royal}} [[Kingdom of Greece|Greece]]}} | combatant3 = | commander1 = {{plainlist| *{{flagdeco|Ottoman Empire|1823}} [[Mustafa Kemal Atatürk|Mustafa Kemal Pasha]] *{{flagdeco|Ottoman Empire|1823}} [[İsmet İnönü|İsmet Pasha]] *{{flagdeco|Ottoman Empire|1823}} [[Fevzi Çakmak|Fevzi Pasha]] *{{flagdeco|Ottoman Empire|1823}} [[Fahrettin Altay|Fahrettin Pasha]]}} | commander2 = {{plainlist| *{{flagicon|United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland}} [[David Lloyd George]] *{{flagicon|United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland}} [[Winston Churchill]] *{{flagicon|French Third Republic}} [[Raymond Poincaré]]}} | units1 = {{flagdeco|Ottoman Empire|1823}} V Cavalry Corps | units2 = Occupation forces | units3 = | strength1 = {{flagdeco|Ottoman Empire|1823}} 28,000 | strength2 = All Allied forces in [[Istanbul]] and [[Çanakkale]]<ref>Zekeriya Türkmen, (2002), İstanbul'un işgali ve İşgal Dönemindeki Uygulamalar (13 Kasım 1918 – 16 Mart 1920), Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, XVIII (53): pages 338–339. (in Turkish)</ref> *{{flagicon|United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland}} 27,419 *{{flagicon|French Third Republic}} 19,069 *{{flagicon|Kingdom of Italy}} 3,992 * {{flagicon|Greece|royal}} 795 '''Total:''' {{circa}} 51,300 soldiers (411 machine guns, 57 artillery pieces) {{small|(French and Italian forces withdrew as soon as the ultimatum was delivered.)}} | strength3 = | casualties1 = None | casualties2 = None | casualties3 = | notes = | campaignbox = }} {{Campaignbox Theaters of the Turkish War of Independence}} {{overcoloured|section|date=May 2026}} The '''Chanak crisis''' ({{langx|tr|Çanakkale Krizi}}), also called the '''Chanak affair''' and the '''Chanak incident''', was a war scare in September 1922 between the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] and the [[Government of the Grand National Assembly]] in [[Government of the Grand National Assembly|Turkey]]. ''Chanak'' refers to [[Çanakkale]], a city on the [[Anatolia]]n side of the [[Dardanelles Strait]]. The crisis was caused by Turkish efforts to push the [[Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922)|Greek armies out of Turkey]] and restore Turkish rule in the [[Allies of World War I|Allied]]-occupied territories, primarily in [[Constantinople]] (now [[Istanbul]]) and Eastern [[Thrace]]. Turkish troops marched against British and French positions in the [[Dardanelles]] neutral zone. For a time, war between Britain and Turkey seemed possible, but [[Canada]] refused to agree as did [[French Third Republic|France]] and [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]]. British public opinion did not want a war. The British military did not either, and the top general on the scene, Sir [[Charles Harington (British Army officer, born 1872)|Charles Harington]], refused to relay an ultimatum to the Turks because he counted on a negotiated settlement. The [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservatives]] in Britain's coalition government refused to follow [[Liberal Party (UK)|Liberal]] Prime Minister [[David Lloyd George]], who with [[Winston Churchill]] was calling for war.<ref>{{cite book|last=Taylor | first = A. J. P. | author-link = A. J. P. Taylor |title=English History 1914–1945|url=https://archive.org/details/englishhistory1900tayl|url-access=registration|year=1965|publisher=Oxford University Press|pages=[https://archive.org/details/englishhistory1900tayl/page/190 190]–92|isbn=9780191501296}}</ref>
The crisis quickly ended when Turkey, having overwhelmed the Greeks, agreed to a negotiated settlement that gave it the territory it wanted. Lloyd George's mishandling of the crisis contributed to his downfall via the [[Carlton Club meeting]]. The crisis raised the issue of who decided on war for the [[British Empire]], and was Canada's first assertion of diplomatic independence from London. Historian [[Robert Blake, Baron Blake|Robert Blake]] says the Chanak crisis led to [[Arthur Balfour]]'s definition of Britain and the [[dominion]]s as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of the domestic or internal affairs, though united by a common allegiance to [[the Crown]], and freely associated as members of the [[British Commonwealth of Nations]]". In 1931 the [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|UK Parliament]] enacted Balfour's formula into law through the [[Statute of Westminster 1931]].<ref>{{cite book|last= Blake | first = Robert | author-link = Robert Blake, Baron Blake |title=The Decline of Power, 1915–1964|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-38krH-9XDMC&pg=PT68|year=2013|publisher=Faber & Faber|page=68|isbn=9780571298259}}</ref> [[File:Turkish Strait disambig.svg|thumb|250px|Locations of the Turkish Straits: the Bosphorus (red), linking the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea, and the Dardanelles (yellow), linking the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea]]
==The events== The [[Turkish Army|Turkish troops]] had recently [[Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922)|defeated Greek forces]] and recaptured [[İzmir]] (Smyrna) on 9 September and were advancing on Constantinople in the neutral zone established by the [[Armistice of Mudros]] and [[Treaty of Sèvres]]. On September 10, the [[War Office]] began to express concerns over the viability of the [[Greek Army]] and urged a British withdrawal to [[Gallipoli]], but Harington rejected the advice because he believed such an attack was not likely and that the small force could be an effective deterrent.<ref name=":0" /> In an interview published in ''[[Daily Mail]]'', 15 September 1922, leader of the [[Turkish nationalism|Turkish national]] movement [[Mustafa Kemal Atatürk|Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk)]] stated that "Our demands remain the same after our recent victory as they were before. We ask for [[Anatolia|Asia Minor]], Thrace up to the River [[Maritsa]] and [[Constantinople]] ... We must have our capital and I should in that case be obliged to march on Constantinople with my army, which will be an affair of only a few days. I much prefer to obtain possession by negotiation, though naturally I cannot wait indefinitely."<ref>[https://theses.gla.ac.uk/1578/1/2002daleziouphd.pdf Eleftheria Daleziou, Britain and the Greek-Turkish War and Settlement of 1919–1923: The Pursuit of Security by 'Proxy' in Western Asia Minor]</ref> The [[British Cabinet]] met on the same day and decided that British forces should maintain their positions. On the following day, in the absence of [[Foreign Secretary (United Kingdom)|Foreign Secretary]] [[George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston|Lord Curzon]], certain Cabinet ministers issued a [[communiqué]] threatening Turkey with a declaration of war by Britain and the [[Dominion]]s, on the grounds that Turkey had violated the Treaty of Sèvres. On 18 September, on his return to London, Curzon pointed out that this would enrage the [[Prime Minister of France]], [[Raymond Poincaré]], and left for [[Paris]] to attempt to smooth things over. Poincaré, however, had already ordered the withdrawal of the French detachment at Chanak but persuaded the Turks to respect the neutral zone. Curzon reached Paris on 20 September and, after several angry meetings with Poincaré, reached agreement to negotiate an armistice with the Turks.<ref name="Macfie">[[A. L. Macfie|Macfie, A. L.]] "The Chanak Affair (September–October 1922)", ''Balkan Studies'' 1979, Vol. 20 Issue 2, pp. 309–341.</ref>
Meanwhile, the Turkish population living in Constantinople were being organised for a possible offensive against the city by the [[Government of the Grand National Assembly|Kemalist]] forces. For instance, [[Ernest Hemingway]], reporting for ''[[The Toronto Daily Star]]'' at the time as a war correspondent, wrote about a specific incident: {{blockquote|Another night a destroyer ... stopped a boatload of Turkish women who were crossing from Asia Minor ... On being searched for arms it turned out all the women were men. They were all armed and later proved to be Kemalist officers sent over to organize the Turkish population in the suburbs in case of an attack on Constantinople.<ref>Ernest Hemingway, ''Hemingway on War'', p 278 Simon and Schuster, 2012 {{ISBN|1476716048}},</ref>}}
In British politics, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, and the Conservatives [[F. E. Smith, 1st Earl of Birkenhead|Lord Birkenhead]] and [[Austen Chamberlain]] were pro-Greek and wanted war; all other Conservatives of the [[Lloyd George ministry|coalition in his government]] were pro-Turk and rejected war. Lloyd George's position as head of the coalition became untenable.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{cite book|last=Alfred F. Havighurst|title=Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h4Tm6VRqZmMC&pg=PA174|year=1985|publisher=University of Chicago Press|pages=174–75|isbn=9780226319704}}</ref> The Lloyd George cabinet was influenced by false intelligence, including the possibility that Turkey would conclude a military agreement with [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Soviet Russia]]. Although [[MI6]] reported that Turkey and Soviet Russia were already drifting apart, the Cabinet continued to express concern about a [[Soviet Navy]] intervention. Churchill published a pro-war manifesto warning of a massive Turkish offensive into Europe undoing the result of the war, which was widely lambasted and embarrassed the British government. Lloyd George was warned by the [[Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office|Foreign Office]], the [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Imperial General Staff]], and even former [[Supreme Allied Commander]] [[Ferdinand Foch]] against supporting the Greeks but ignored them.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Steiner|first=Zara | author-link = Zara Steiner |title=The lights that failed : European international history, 1919-1933|date=2005|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-151881-2|location=Oxford|oclc=86068902}}</ref> Furthermore, the British public were alarmed by the Chanak episode and the possibility of going to war again. It further undercut Lloyd George that he had not fully consulted the Dominion prime ministers.
Unlike 1914, when [[World War I]] broke out, Canada in particular did not automatically consider itself active in the conflict. Instead, Prime Minister [[William Lyon Mackenzie King]] insisted that the [[Parliament of Canada]] should decide on the course of action the country would follow. King was offended by the telegram he received from Churchill asking for Canada to send troops to Chanak to support Britain, and sent back a telegram, which was couched in [[Canadian nationalism|Canadian nationalist]] language, declaring that Canada would not automatically support Britain if it came to war with Turkey.<ref name="Levine, Allan">[[Levine, Allan]] (2001). ''William Lyon Mackenzie King: a Life Guided by the Hand of Destiny''. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre</ref>{{rp|131}} Given that the majority of the MPs of King's [[Liberal Party of Canada|Liberal Party]] were opposed to going to war with Turkey together with the [[Progressive Party of Canada|Progressive]] MPs who were supporting King's minority government, it is likely that Canada would have declared neutrality if the crisis came to war. The Chanak issue badly divided Canadian public opinion with [[French Canadians]] and Canadian nationalists in [[English Canada]] like professor [[Oscar D. Skelton]] saying Canada should not issue "blank cheques" to Britain like that issued in 1914 and supporting King's implicit decision for neutrality.<ref name="Levine, Allan"/>{{rp|131}} By contrast, the [[Conservative Party of Canada (1867–1942)|Conservative]] leader [[Arthur Meighen]] in a speech in [[Toronto]] criticized King and declared: "When Britain's message came, then Canada should have said, 'Ready, aye ready, we stand by you.{{'"}}<ref name="Levine, Allan"/>{{rp|132}}<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Çanak (Chanak) crisis (1922) |url=http://biographi.ca/en/topics/topic-match-list.php?id=1493 |access-date=2024-07-30 |website=Dictionary of Canadian Biography}}</ref> By the time the issue had been debated in the [[House of Commons of Canada]], the threat at Chanak had passed. Nonetheless, King made his point: the Canadian Parliament would decide the role that Canada would play in [[Foreign relations of Canada|external affairs]] and could diverge from the British government.<ref>[[Robert MacGregor Dawson|Dawson, Robert MacGregor]] (1958). ''William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1874–1923''. pp. 401–416.</ref> The other dominion prime ministers—with the two exceptions of [[Dominion of Newfoundland|Newfoundland]] and [[Dominion of New Zealand|New Zealand]], which each offered a battalion<ref name=":0" />— and allies [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]] and [[Kingdom of Romania|Romania]] gave no support.<ref name="Macfie"/>
On 23 September, the British cabinet decided to give [[East Thrace]] to the Turks, thus forcing Greeks to abandon it without a fight. This convinced Kemal to accept the opening of armistice talks and on 28 September he told the British that he had ordered his troops to avoid any incident at Chanak, nominating [[Mudanya]] as the venue for peace negotiations. The parties met there on 3 October and agreed to the terms of the [[Armistice of Mudanya]] on 11 October, two hours before British forces were due to attack.
==Consequences== [[File:Cartoon Drawn After David Lloyd George's Resignation.jpg|thumb|A cartoon drawn after [[David Lloyd George]]'s resignation]] Lloyd George's rashness resulted in the calling of a [[Carlton Club meeting, 19 October 1922|meeting of Conservative MPs]] at the [[Carlton Club]] on 19 October 1922, which passed a motion that the [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] should fight the next general election as an independent party. This decision had dire ramifications for Lloyd George, as the Conservative Party made up the vast majority of the 1918–1922 post-war coalition. Indeed, they held an outright majority in the Commons and could have [[Majority government|formed a government]] alone if they so wished.
Lloyd George also lost the support of the influential [[George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston|Lord Curzon]], who considered that the Prime Minister had been manoeuvring behind his back. Following the Carlton Club decision Lloyd George resigned as prime minister, never to hold office again.<ref>[[John Darwin (historian)|Darwin, J. G.]] "The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet", ''History'', Feb 1980, Vol. 65 Issue 213, pp 32–48.</ref> Although many expected a new coalition to be formed under a Conservative prime minister, the Conservatives, under returned party leader [[Bonar Law]], subsequently won the [[1922 United Kingdom general election|1922 general election]] with an overall majority.
British and French forces were ultimately withdrawn from the neutral zone in summer 1923, following the ratification of the [[Treaty of Lausanne]].
The Chanak crisis fundamentally challenged the assumption that the Dominions would automatically follow Britain into war.<ref name=":1" /> The British journalist [[Mark Arnold-Forster]] wrote: "1922 was a year in which accepted doctrines fell like ninpins...It had been assumed till then that although parts of the British Empire—Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa—had been granted self government, the whole Empire would automatically support the mother country in any war which the British government in London thought advisable or necessary...But the Chanak incident marked the beginning of a family quarrel within the British, which weakened it. The mother country's children were no longer prepared to go to war simply because mother said so".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Arnold-Forster |first1=Mark |title=The World At War |date=1973 |publisher=William Collins & sons |location=London|pages=17–19}}</ref> The crisis changed the relations between the Dominions and London, paving the way for the [[Statute of Westminster 1931]], which gave statutory recognition to the autonomy of the six Dominions.
== References == {{Reflist}}
==Further reading== * Adelson, Roger. ''London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902–1922'' (1995) pp 207–11 * * Darwin, J. G. "The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet", ''History'' (1980) 65#213 pp 32–48. [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1980.tb02082.x/full online] * Ferris, John. "'Far too dangerous a gamble'? British intelligence and policy during the Chanak crisis, September–October 1922." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' (2003) 14#2 pp: 139–184. [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592290412331308851 online] * Ferris, John. "Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877–78, 1922 and 1938." ''Intelligence and National Security'' (2006) 21#5 pp: 675–696. [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600957647 online] * Laird, Michael. "Wars averted: Chanak 1922, Burma 1945–47, Berlin 1948." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (1996) 19#3 pp: 343–364. DOI:10.1080/01402399608437643 * Mowat, Charles Loch., ''Britain Between The Wars 1918-1940'' (1955) pp 116–19, 138. * Sales, Peter M. "WM Hughes and the Chanak Crisis of 1922." ''Australian Journal of Politics & History'' (1971) 17#3 pp: 392–405. * Steiner, Zara. ''The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933'' (Oxford History of Modern Europe) (2005) pp 114–19 * Walder, David. ''The Chanak Affair'' (Macmillan, 1969) {{Turkish War of Independence}}
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