{{Short description|Economics measure of willingness to pay}} The '''Becker–DeGroot–Marschak method''' ('''BDM'''), named after Gordon M. Becker, Morris H. DeGroot and Jacob Marschak for the 1964 ''Behavioral Science'' paper, "Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method" is an incentive-compatible procedure used in experimental economics to measure willingness to pay (WTP).<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1002/bs.3830090304 |vauthors=Becker GM, DeGroot MH, Marschak J |title=Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method |journal=Behav Sci |volume=9 |issue=3 |pages=226–32 |date=July 1964|pmid=5888778 }}</ref>
Today there are several variations of the BDM methodology. In one common way, the subject formulates a bid. The bid is compared to a price determined by a random number generator. If the subject's bid is greater than the price, they pay the price and receives the item being auctioned. If the subject's bid is lower than the price, they pay nothing and receive nothing.
In another common method, the subject is presented with a series of sequentially increasing or random-order monetary amounts. They must decide if they would prefer to have that amount of money or the item at hand. Then, one of these numbers is chosen either specifically by the experimenter or is randomly generated. If the chosen number is less than the amount of money at which the subject stated they would prefer the item, the subject must purchase the item.
From the subject's perspective, the method is equivalent to a Vickrey auction against an unknown bidder. BDM's incentive compatibility is a well established theoretical result, and it relies on similar arguments to that of the Vickrey auction. When one considers uncertainty in WTP, the incentive-compatibility of BDM will no longer hold.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Kaas, K.P. |author2=Ruprecht, H. |title=Are the Vikrey Auction and the BDM Mechanism Really Incentive Compatible? Empirical Results and Optimal Bidding Strategies in Cases of Uncertain Willingness-to-pay |journal=Schmalenbach Business Review |volume=58 |pages=37–55 |date=January 2006 |url=http://www.fachverlag.de/sbr/pdfarchive/einzelne_pdf/sbr_2006_jan-037-055.pdf |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110719002340/http://www.fachverlag.de/sbr/pdfarchive/einzelne_pdf/sbr_2006_jan-037-055.pdf |archivedate=2011-07-19 |doi=10.1007/BF03396723 }}</ref> The BDM method is most widely used in experimental economics,<ref>{{cite book|author=Shogren|first1=Jason F.|title=Experimental auctions: methods and applications in economic and marketing research|last2=Lusk|first2=Jayson|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2007|isbn=978-0-521-67124-8|location=Cambridge, UK|author-link2=Jayson Lusk}}</ref> but has also been used in the domains of agriculture<ref>{{cite thesis |degree=MSc |title=The Impact of Information on Willingness-to-pay for Bison |url=http://library2.usask.ca/theses/available/etd-06272003-145718/ |last=Cunningham |first=Cody F. |year=2003 |publisher=College of Agriculture, University of Saskatchewan }}</ref> and marketing.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Wertenbroch, K. |author2=Skiera, B. |title=Measuring Consumers' Willingness to Pay at the Point of Purchase |journal=Journal of Marketing Research |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=228–241 |date=May 2002 |doi=10.1509/jmkr.39.2.228.19086 |ssrn=285452 }}</ref>
An early attempt at a BDM-type method was by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.<ref>{{cite journal | title=Goethe's Second-Price Auction | author=Moldovanu, Benny | author2=Tietzel, Manfred | name-list-style=amp | journal=Journal of Political Economy | year=1998 | volume=106 | issue=4 | pages=854–859 | doi=10.1086/250032| citeseerx=10.1.1.560.8278 }}</ref> In 1797 he asked a publisher how much he would be willing to pay for his new poem ''Hermann and Dorothea'' and revealed that he had sent a sealed letter to his lawyer with a reserve amount. If the publisher's stated amount was greater than the reserve, the publisher just paid the reserve amount. Otherwise, the publisher did not receive the poem. Unfortunately, Goethe's lawyer divulged the reserve amount to the publisher so that the publisher's true willingness to pay was not revealed.
The BDM method can also be used to incentivize expert appraisers to reveal the true value of an item, even if computing the true value is costly for them.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Alkoby |first1=Shani |last2=Sarne |first2=David |last3=Segal-Halevi |first3=Erel |last4=Sharbaf |first4=Tomer |date=2018-07-09 |title=Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/3237383.3238000 |journal=Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems |series=AAMAS '18 |location=Richland, SC |publisher=International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |pages=1850–1852 }}</ref>
== See also == *Vickrey auction *Incentive compatibility
== References == {{reflist}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method}} Category:Experimental economics