{{Short description|European Union regulation adopted in 2023}} {{Infobox EU legislation |type=regulation |number=2023/2675 |status=current |Enhancedcooperation= |title=Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the [[European Parliament]] and of the [[Council of the European Union|Council]] of {{date|22 November 2023}} on protecting the [[European Union|Union]] and its [[Member state of the European Union|Member States]] from economic coercion by third countries |Parties=[[European Union]] |madeby=[[European Parliament]] and [[Council of the European Union]] |madeunder=Article 207(2) [[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union|TFEU]] |OJref=OJ L, 2023/2675, 7.12.2023 |OJrefurl=http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2675/oj |made={{date|22 November 2023}} |commenced={{date|27 December 2023}} |implementation= |application={{date|27 December 2023}} |replaced= |CommProp=COM(2021) 775 final – 2021/0406(COD) |ESCOpin= |CROpin= |ParlOpin= |Reports= A9-0246/2022 |replaces= |amends= |amendedby= |replacedby= |EPVote={{date|3 October 2023}} |CouncilVote={{date|22 November 2023}} }}
The '''Anti-Coercion Instrument''' ('''ACI'''), nicknamed the '''trade bazooka''',<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hawser |first1=Anita |title=How the EU's 'trade bazooka' could impact banks |url=https://www.thebanker.com/content/f13b0b78-e8e0-4d72-a848-125af9261de1 |website=[[The Banker]] |date=7 April 2025 |access-date=13 July 2025 |language=en}}</ref> is a regulation of the [[European Union]] proposed in December 2021,<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |title=Effective Deterrence? The Coming European Anti-Coercion Instrument |url=https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/effective-deterrence-coming-european-anti-coercion-instrument |access-date=2025-04-09 |website=Institut Montaigne |language=en}}</ref> adopted in November 2023, and that entered into force on 27 December 2023.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |title=EU Prepares to Counter US Tariffs with Anti-Coercion Instrument |url=https://natlawreview.com/article/eus-foremost-economic-retaliation-device-anti-coercion-instrument |access-date=2025-04-09 |website=National Law Review |language=en}}</ref><ref name="EC-ACI">{{Cite web |title=Protecting against coercion |url=https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/protecting-against-coercion_en |website=European Commission |publisher=Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security |access-date=14 November 2025 |language=en}}</ref> It aims to protect the EU and its member states from [[economic coercion]] by third countries<ref>[https://ec.europa.eu/assets/home/emn-glossary/glossary.html?letters=u&detail=third+country third country]</ref> and provides a framework for EU action, including examination, engagement, and the adoption of countermeasures.<ref name="EC-ACI" />
Combining security policy and [[trade policy]], it is a defence and [[Deterrence theory|deterrence]] tool designed to prevent [[Coercion (international relations)|coercion]] by creating penalties for whichever country is performing the coercion.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=The EU's New Anti-Coercion Instrument Will Be a Success if It Isn't Used |work=Internationale Politik Quarterly |url=https://ip-quarterly.com/en/eus-new-anti-coercion-instrument-will-be-success-if-it-isnt-used |access-date=2025-04-09}}</ref> Analytically, one conference proceeding from 2025 introduces the term "geo-legality" to describe how the EU deploys its legal-normative authority, including the ACI, as leverage to counter external (economic) pressure.{{efn|name=VartanianMethod|Namely, Vartanian (2025) reports drawing on a [[Delphi method|Delphi-style]] consultation with twenty-three EU institutional officials and experts, including participants from the [[European Commission]]'s [[Directorate-General for Legal Service|Legal Service and Directorate-General for Trade]], to inform an account of how EU institutions understand and might operationalize counter-coercive tools such as the ACI when responding to pressure by China, the United States, and other third countries.}}<ref name=":4">{{Cite conference |last=Vartanian |first=Peter H. |title=EU (Legal) Statecraft in an Age of Coercion |book-title=Proceedings of the Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union |date=2025 |volume=2025 |issue=1 |language=en |doi=10.5642/urceu.VGLR6395|doi-access=free }}</ref>{{rp|pp=138, 142–143}}
Among the coercive measures against which it could be used are [[boycott]]s and [[trade restriction]]s.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news |last=Pronczuk |first=Monika |date=2021-12-08 |title=Proposal Would Allow E.U. to Retaliate Against Economic Pressure |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/world/europe/eu-sanctions-economic-retaliation.html |access-date=2025-04-09 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In addition, an earlier version of the ACI contained proposed mechanisms for compensation to affected member states; the final Instrument, instead, provides a framework for seeking reparation from the coercing country.<ref name=":2" />
The ACI had originally been developed primarily as a deterrence tool against [[China]].<ref>{{cite news |title=EU considers retaliatory measures over Trump Greenland tariff 'blackmail' |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/18/europe-diplomats-crisis-talks-trump-tariffs-greenland |access-date=18 January 2026 |work=The Guardian}}</ref> As of January 2026, the ACI has not yet been used.<ref>{{cite web|date=January 19, 2026 | title=What is the EU anti-coercion 'bazooka' it could use against the US over Greenland? |url=https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20260119-what-is-eu-anti-coercion-instrument-could-use-against-us-over-trump-greenland-tariffs |website= [[France24]] | accessdate= January 19, 2026}}</ref> In 2026, EU leaders are weighing its potential first use against the [[United States]] in response to the [[Greenland crisis]].<ref>{{cite news |title=After Trump Reignites a Trade War Over Greenland, Europe Weighs Going All-Out |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/18/world/europe/greenland-us-trade-war.html |access-date=18 January 2026 |work=The New York Times}}</ref> The [[Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade]], an asymmetrical free trade agreement with the United States, was put on hold by EU leaders in response.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mancini |first=Ryan |date=2026-01-17 |title=US-EU trade deal in jeopardy over Trump's new tariffs |url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/5694469-european-union-trade-deal-trump-tariffs/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260118052141/https://thehill.com/policy/international/5694469-european-union-trade-deal-trump-tariffs/ |archive-date=2026-01-18 |access-date=2026-01-19 |work=The Hill |language=en-US |url-status=live }}</ref>
== Background == The ACI was designed in part to address the requirement for unanimous consent among EU member states when adopting certain trade-restrictive measures. Under the Instrument, the veto power is removed for these cases, and trade restrictions in response to coercion are now adopted through two [[qualified majority vote]]s.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /> Episodes of pressure on the EU and its member states, such as United States sanctions against companies involved in constructing the [[Nord Stream 2]] pipeline around 2019<ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=2019-12-21 |title=Nord Stream 2: Trump approves sanctions on Russia gas pipeline |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50875935 |access-date=2025-04-09 |language=en-GB}}</ref> and the implementation of [[Tariffs in the first Trump administration#Steel and aluminum|steel and aluminum tariffs in 2018]],<ref name=":3" /> also informed debate on the Instrument. Another important driver was [[China]]'s use of trade restrictions against countries such as [[Lithuania]] and [[Norway]].<ref name=":2" /><ref name="CELIS">{{Cite web |last1=Tzifa |first1=Georgia |last2=Shulha |first2=Mariia |title=The EU Anti-Coercion Regulation: A New Tool Against Economic Pressure |url=https://www.celis.institute/celis-blog/the-eu-anti-coercion-regulation-a-new-tool-against-economic-pressure/ |website=CELIS Institute |date=19 May 2025 |access-date=14 November 2025 |language=en}}</ref>
As early as in 2021, notably, Lithuania permitted [[Taiwan]] to open the [[Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania]], after which China responded with wide-ranging trade measures; this situation has been described as catalyzing the development of the ACI.<ref name=":4" />
Alternatively, the ''New York Times'' has linked the Instrument's use to the [[Belarus–European Union border crisis]], during which [[Belarus]] threatened to shut down [[natural gas]] shipments to the European Union.<ref name=":3" />
== Procedure == Under the regulation, "economic coercion" refers to a situation in which a third country seeks to pressure the European Union or a member state into making a particular policy choice by applying, or threatening to apply, measures affecting trade or investment.<ref name="EC-ACI" /> The procedure is activated when the [[European Commission]] examines a potential case of coercion, either on its own initiative or following a substantiated request, and then submits a proposal to the [[Council of the European Union]] to determine whether economic coercion exists.<ref name="EC-ACI" /><ref name="CELIS" /> If the Council, acting by qualified majority, confirms that coercion is taking place, the Commission engages with the third country to seek a resolution, including through negotiations, mediation, or adjudication.<ref name="EC-ACI" /> If those efforts fail, the EU may adopt "response measures" such as [[customs duties|tariffs]], restrictions on trade in goods and services, limits on access to public programmes and financial markets, or measures affecting [[intellectual property]] rights and foreign direct investment.<ref name="EC-ACI" /><ref name="CELIS" /> These restrictions can be targeted at states, companies, or individuals, thereby deploying EU legal authority as leverage. Through a "geo-legal" lens, then, this pattern of legal responses situates the ACI within a broader EU toolkit of counter-coercive instruments.<ref name=":4" />{{rp|p=136|loc=Table 3}}
== Proposed uses ==
=== Greenland crisis === {{As of|2026|01}}, [[President of France|French President]] [[Emmanuel Macron]] has urged the EU to consider the use of the Anti-Coercion Instrument in regard of tariffs imposed on some EU members by [[President of the United States|US president]] [[Donald Trump]] as part of Trump's proposal for a forced [[Greenland crisis|United States annexation of Greenland]], which is a part of the [[Danish Realm]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-01-18 |title=Macron urges EU to deploy trade 'bazooka' against US as Trump ramps up tensions |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/hit-back-donald-trump-europe-mulls-unthinkable-options-greenland-threats-ramp-up-tensions/ |access-date=2026-01-18 |website=POLITICO |language=en-GB}}</ref>
=== British response ===
On 26 April 2026, the [[British Chambers of Commerce]] called on the UK government to create its own "trade bazooka" to protect British economic interests in response to tariff threats from US President [[Donald Trump]]. The lobby group argued that the UK's "inadequate economic security" was putting growth and jobs at risk, and urged ministers to adopt legislation similar to the EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument.<ref>{{cite news |last=Partington |first=Richard |title=UK urged to deploy EU-style 'trade bazooka' against Trump's tariffs |url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/apr/26/uk-urged-deploy-eu-style-trade-bazooka-trump-tariffs |work=The Guardian |date=26 April 2026 |access-date=27 April 2026}}</ref>
== Notes == {{Notelist}}
== References == {{Reflist}}
== External links == * [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02023R2675-20231207 Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries]
{{Legislation of the European Union}} {{Law}} {{European Union topics}} {{Portal bar|European Union|Law}} {{Authority control}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:European Union Law}} [[Category:European Union law]] [[Category:2023 in law]] [[Category:2023 in the European Union]] [[Category:European Union regulations]] [[Category:Greenland crisis]]