{{short description|Shareholder using equity to pressure management}} '''Shareholder activism''' is a form of [[activism]] in which [[shareholder]]s use [[Equity (finance)|equity]] stakes in a [[corporation]] to put pressure on its [[management]].<ref>Reasonable Investor(s), Boston University Law Review, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2579510 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200520113606/http://ssrn.com/abstract=2579510/ |date=20 May 2020 }}</ref> A fairly small stake (less than 10% of outstanding shares) may be enough to launch a successful campaign. In comparison, a full takeover bid is a much more costly and difficult undertaking. The goals of shareholder activism range from financial (increase of [[shareholder value]] through changes in corporate policy, [[cost reduction|cost cutting]], etc.) to non-financial ([[disinvestment]] from particular countries, etc.).<ref>{{cite web |title=Activist Investor Definition |url=https://www.carriedin.com/activist-investor |website=Carried Interest |access-date=17 July 2015 |archive-date=25 June 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190625230601/https://www.carriedin.com/activist-investor |url-status=live }}</ref> Shareholder activists can address [[self-dealing]] by corporate insiders, although large stockholders can also engage in self-dealing to themselves at the expense of smaller minority shareholders.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|241}}
Shareholder activism can take any of several forms: [[Proxy fight|proxy battles]], publicity campaigns, [[shareholder resolutions]], litigation, and negotiations with management. [[Daniel Loeb]], head of [[Third Point Management]], is notable for his use of sharply written letters directed towards the CEOs of his target companies.
Activism may help to address the [[Principal–agent problem|principal-agent problem]] where the agents (management) do not adequately respond to the wishes of the principals (investors) of [[publicly traded]] companies. In the 2010s, investments in the activist asset class grew, with activists receiving coverage by the media<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Grossman|first1=Richard|last2=Arcano|first2=Stephen|title=Navigating Today's Shareholder Activism Landscape|url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/navigating-today%E2%80%99s-shareholder-activism-landscape|journal=Transaction Advisors|issn=2329-9134|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141108172335/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/navigating-today%E2%80%99s-shareholder-activism-landscape|archive-date=8 November 2014}}</ref> and positive attention from investors.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Golden|first1=Peter|last2=Richter|first2=Philip|last3=Schwenkel|first3=Robert|last4=Shine|first4=David|last5=Sorkin|first5=John|last6=Weinstein|first6=Gail|title=Shareholder Activism in M&A|url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/shareholder-activism-ma|journal=Transaction Advisors|issn=2329-9134|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141109205147/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/shareholder-activism-ma|archive-date=9 November 2014}}</ref> Activists have typically engaged in adversarial campaigns, but have also in some cases been able to acquire board seats with a formal proxy context.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Gerber|first1=Marc|title=US Corporate Governance: Have We Crossed the Rubicon|url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/us-corporate-governance-have-we-crossed-rubicon|journal=Transaction Advisors|issn=2329-9134|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160605085829/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/us-corporate-governance-have-we-crossed-rubicon|archive-date=5 June 2016}}</ref>
Shareholder activists are influencing [[mergers and acquisitions]]. A 2015 survey of corporate development leaders found that 60% of respondents saw shareholder activism affecting transaction activity in their industry.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ruggeri |first1=Chris |last2=Kirschner |first2=Ken |last3=Blanchard |first3=Tony |title=Corporate Development Strategy: Thriving in your Business Ecosystem |url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/corporate-development-strategy |journal=Transaction Advisors |issn=2329-9134 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170202012324/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/corporate-development-strategy |archive-date=2 February 2017}}</ref> Increasingly, non-financial forms of shareholder activism are affecting companies in a range of sectors. Shareholders, often with a comparatively small stake in a company, are seeking to influence the company's environmental and social performance.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cundill|first=Gary|date=2017|title=Non-financial shareholder activism: a process model for influencing corporate environmental and social performance.|journal=International Journal of Management Reviews|volume=20|issue=2|pages=606–626|doi=10.1111/ijmr.12157|hdl=1826/12686| s2cid=148727396 |hdl-access=free}}</ref> Other forms of activist campaigns include influencing [[Divestment|divestitures]], with results from [[Fortune 500]] companies, between 2007 and 2015, suggesting these are often more successful in terms of increasing shareholder value than management led divestitures.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ludwig |first=Christopher |last2=Rossman |first2=Jim |last3=Pitcher |first3=Quinn |date=2025-04-08 |title=Q1 2025 Review of Shareholder Activism |url=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/04/08/q1-2025-review-of-shareholder-activism/ |access-date=2025-12-28 |website=The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance |language=English}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Chen |first=Siwen |last2=Feldman |first2=Emelie |title=Activist-Impelled Divestitures and Shareholder Value |url=https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2005/11/Activist-Impelled.pdf |access-date=28 December 2025 |website=Wharton}}</ref>
== History == Corporations in 18th-century Europe were relatively uncommon, but in the United States they were more prevalent, starting with 300 in the 1790s and expanding by around 26,000 between 1790 and the 1860s, resulting in about 15 times the corporations in Great Britain by 1830.<ref name=":2">{{Citation|last1=Wright|first1=Robert E.|title=Corporate Governance and Stockholder/Stakeholder Activism in the United States, 1790–1860: New Data and Perspectives|date=2011|work=Origins of Shareholder Advocacy|pages=231–251|editor-last=Koppell|editor-first=Jonathan G S|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US|language=en|doi=10.1057/9780230116665_11|isbn=978-1-349-29072-7|last2=Sylla|first2=Richard}}</ref> These early corporations contained provisions for [[corporate governance]], including restricted charters, bylaws, prudent-mean voting rules,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dunlavy|first=Colleen A.|date=21 February 2007|title=Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights|journal=[[Washington and Lee Law Review]]|volume=63|page=1347| language=en|location=Rochester, NY|ssrn=964377}}</ref> dividend payments, and press coverage.<ref name=":2" />
Between 1900 and 1950, about 1.22 "offensive" activist initiatives occurred per year, with more occurring in the 1940s and 1950s.<ref name=":2" /> Notable investors included [[Cyrus S. Eaton]], [[The Phoenix Companies|Phoenix Securities Corporation]], [[Benjamin Graham]], [[J. Paul Getty]], and [[Malcolm Greene Chace|Malcolm Chace]].<ref name=":2" /> Activism was likely limited by the lack of ownership dispersion, meaning that many corporations had large shareholders with sizable blocks (10 to 20% of total shares) who already exerted significant control over the corporation.<ref name=":2" />
During the 1980s activism referred to as [[corporate raid]]ing emerged, before this reducing after corporations formed strategies to mitigate this. As such tactics declined, there was a rise in [[institutional investor]]s, with institutional investor activism led by policy changes in locations such as the UK and continental Europe, with factors such as conflicts of interests constraining activism. By the 21st century, [[hedge fund]]s and [[private equity fund]]s became well placed to engage in shareholder activism.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ringe |first=Wolf-Georg |date=March 2025 |title=ECGI Working Paper Series in Law - Adaptive Advocacy: The Reinvention of Shareholder Activism |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5196390# |access-date=28 December 2025 |website=SSRN}}</ref> By the 2010s shareholder activism which predominantly occurred in places such as the US and Europe began to expand into Asia and quickly surpassed the amount of activism occurring in Europe.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Basnayake |first=Harsha |date=June 2017 |title=Shareholder Activism In Asia |url=https://thehedgefundjournal.com/shareholder-activism-in-asia/ |access-date=2025-12-28 |website=thehedgefundjournal.com |language=en-GB}}</ref>
== Notable investors and funds == Notable activist investors include: [[Isaac Le Maire]] (1558–1624),<ref name=":0">Frentrop, Paul (2009). ''The First Known Shareholder Activist: The Colorful Life and Times of Isaac le Maire (1559–1624)'', in Frentrop/Jonker/Davis 2009, 11–26</ref> [[Carl Icahn]],<ref name=":1">[https://www.carriedin.com/activist-investors/ Carried Interest: "Activist Investors"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150725141030/https://www.carriedin.com/activist-investors/ |date=25 July 2015 }}. Retrieved 6 May 2015.</ref> [[Nelson Peltz]] ([[Trian Partners]]),<ref name=":1" /> [[Bill Ackman]] ([[Pershing Square Capital Management|Pershing Square]]),<ref name=":1" /> [[Daniel Loeb]] ([[Third Point Management]]),<ref name=":1" /> [[Barry Rosenstein]],<ref name=":1" /> [[Larry Robbins]] ([[Glenview Capital Management|Glenview]]),<ref name=":3" />{{Rp|19}} [[David Einhorn (hedge fund manager)|David Einhorn]], [[Gregg Hymowitz]] (EnTrust Global),<ref>{{cite web |last1=Chung |first1=Juliet |last2=Benoit |first2=David |title=The Man Behind Activist Investors' Biggest Bets |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-man-behind-activist-investors-biggest-bets-1500037200 |publisher=WSJ |access-date=17 May 2020 |date=14 July 2017 |archive-date=17 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200717033341/https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-man-behind-activist-investors-biggest-bets-1500037200 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Larry Fink]] ([[BlackRock]]),<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTDdDgr-xYo | title=Larry Fink CEO - "You have to Force Behaviours, at Black Rock we are Forcing Behaviours" | website=[[YouTube]] | date=16 September 2023 }}</ref> [[Christer Gardell]] ([[Cevian Capital]]), and [[Ryan Cohen]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Trentmann |first1=Nina |last2=Maurer |first2=Mark |title=GameStop CFO Was Forced Out as Activist Investor Pushes New Strategy |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/gamestop-cfo-was-forced-out-as-activist-investor-pushes-new-strategy-11614214793 |publisher=WSJ |access-date=19 March 2021 |date=24 February 2021 }}</ref>
During the 1980s, activist investors such as [[Carl Icahn]] and [[T. Boone Pickens]] gained international notoriety and were often perceived as "corporate raiders" for acquiring an equity stake in publicly owned companies and then forcing them to take action to improve value or rid themselves of activist investors by buying back the raider's investment at a premium, often at the expense of other shareholders.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-09-13 |title=The Co-Founder of Shareholder Activism Is Dead, but His Cause Is Thriving |url=https://www.ai-cio.com/news/shareholder-activist-oil-tycoon-t-boone-pickens-dies/ |access-date=2025-12-28 |website=Chief Investment Officer |language=en}}</ref> More recently, activist investor [[Phillip Goldstein (investor)|Phillip Goldstein]] suggested that the role of the activist investor has moved from green mail to one of being a catalyst to unlock value in an underlying security, and says that the public perception of activist investors as "corporate raiders" has dissipated.<ref name="opalesque">{{cite web|url=http://www.opalesque.tv/youtube/Phil_Goldstein/1|title=Phil Goldstein: The Bulldog's passion for value investing|date=21 January 2011|website=Opalesque TV|access-date=15 July 2018|archive-date=6 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706161751/http://www.opalesque.tv/youtube/Phil_Goldstein/1|url-status=live}}</ref>
Activist investment funds include: [[California Public Employees' Retirement System]] (CalPERS),<ref>Forbes: "Calpers Votes Against Jamie Dimon, Again" {{cite web |title=Calpers Votes Against Jamie Dimon, Again |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/05/20/calpers-votes-against-jamie-dimon-again/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304075211/http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/05/20/calpers-votes-against-jamie-dimon-again/ |archive-date=4 March 2016 |access-date=23 August 2017 |website=[[Forbes]]}}. Retrieved 28 June 2013.</ref> [[Icahn Enterprises|Icahn Management LP]], Santa Monica Partners Opportunity Fund LP, [[State Board of Administration of Florida]] (SBA),<ref>{{cite journal |last=Eric |first=Finseth |year=2011 |title=Shareholder Activism by Public Pension. Funds and the Rights of Dissenting. Employees under the First Amendment |url=http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/FinsethFinal.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy |volume=34 |issue=1 |pages=289–366 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130515011601/http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/FinsethFinal.pdf |archive-date=15 May 2013 |access-date=28 June 2013}}</ref><ref>ProxyDemocracy.org: "FLORIDA SBA" {{cite web |title=ProxyDemocracy | Florida SBA |url=http://www.proxydemocracy.org/data/funds/81 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130511051844/http://www.proxydemocracy.org/data/funds/81 |archive-date=11 May 2013 |access-date=28 June 2013}} Retrieved 28 June 2013.</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Corporate Governance Principles and Proxy Voting Guidelines |url=https://www.sbafla.com/governance/ |website=Florida State Board of Administration |access-date=20 April 2026}}</ref><ref>Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation: "Florida SBA Supports Proxy Access and Advisory Firm Transparency" {{cite web |date=April 2011 |title=Florida SBA Supports Proxy Access and Advisory Firm Transparency |url=http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/01/florida-sba-supports-proxy-access-and-advisory-firm-transparency/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140801165431/http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/01/florida-sba-supports-proxy-access-and-advisory-firm-transparency/ |archive-date=1 August 2014 |access-date=28 June 2013}} Retrieved 28 June 2013.</ref> and [[Relational Investors|Relational Investors, LLC]].
In 2019 and beyond, notable activist investors included [[Starboard Value]], [[Icahn Enterprises]], [[Elliott Investment Management]],<ref>{{Cite news |title=Elliott Management and the art of telling bosses they’re wrong |url=https://www.economist.com/business/2026/03/19/elliott-management-and-the-art-of-telling-bosses-theyre-wrong |access-date=2026-03-20 |work=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> and [[Third Point]].<ref name=":3" /> In 2019, mutual funds such as [[Wellington Management Company]] began to show signs of activism.<ref>{{Cite news|date=15 March 2019|title=Mutual funds start to put their mouth where their money is|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-companies-funds-analysis-idUSKCN1QW1C8|access-date=7 September 2020|archive-date=31 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531135620/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-companies-funds-analysis-idUSKCN1QW1C8|url-status=live}}</ref> A prominent campaign by hedge fund [[Engine No. 1]] resulted in them winning three seats on Exxon's board in 2021, with the objective of influencing the company to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Smyth |first=Jamie |last2=White |first2=Alexandra |date=2025-09-15 |title=SEC allows Exxon plan to limit shareholder activism |url=https://www.ft.com/content/215ca553-651e-42eb-8d8d-4960e539beef |access-date=2026-02-08 |work=Financial Times}}</ref>
Examples of activist investors in Asia include [[Oasis Management]],<ref>{{Cite web |last=Barnes |first=Oliver |date=October 15, 2023 |title=Activist Oasis stands to net £40mn profit from Wagamama owner sale |url=https://www.ft.com/content/ec51f634-59dd-495f-81b1-e4ced30c2d26 |access-date=2024-01-21 |website=www.ft.com}}</ref> [[David Webb (Hong Kong activist)|David Webb]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=2026-01-13 |title=Hong Kong activist investor David Webb dies at 60 |url=https://www.thestandard.com.hk/market/article/321504/Hong-Kong-activist-investor-David-Webb-dies-at-60 |work=The Standard}}</ref> and [[Yoshiaki Murakami]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lewis |first=Jane |date=2025-10-26 |title=Yoshiaki Murakami: Japan’s original corporate raider |url=https://moneyweek.com/people/yoshiaki-murakami-japans-original-corporate-raider |access-date=2025-12-28 |website=MoneyWeek |language=en}}</ref>
=== Outreach strategies === Activist investors advertise their message out in various ways including postal mail, websites, and social media.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-SandC-MnA-2018-US-Shareholder-Activism-Analysis.pdf|title=Review and Analysis of 2018 U.S. Shareholder Activism|publisher=[[Sullivan & Cromwell]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191229202934/https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-SandC-MnA-2018-US-Shareholder-Activism-Analysis.pdf|archive-date=29 December 2019|access-date=28 February 2020<!-- |lay-url=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/20/annual-review-and-analysis-of-2019-u-s-shareholder-activism/#more-124183 -->}}</ref>
=== Funding === Activist investors are often hedge funds funded by accredited investors and institutions. In 2019, institutions were demanding more upfront explanation of the activist ideas before funding, and in some cases requiring that the funds be placed into special purpose vehicles specifically for the project.<ref>{{Cite news|date=30 July 2019|title=Karmic reckoning? Investors in activist hedge funds agitate for change|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-hedgefunds-investors-focus-idUSKCN1UP17T|access-date=6 July 2020|archive-date=7 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200707185811/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-hedgefunds-investors-focus-idUSKCN1UP17T|url-status=live}}</ref> Activist hedge funds, which are hedge funds that "take concentrated positions in the equity of public corporations and actively engage with corporate managers" can address the principal-agent problem and limit self-dealing by providing management with high-powered incentives to increase value.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hirst|first1=Scott|last2=Bebchuk|first2=Lucian|last3=Cohen|first3=Alma|date=1 July 2017|title=The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors|url=https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/340|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|volume=31|issue=3|pages=89| doi=10.1257/jep.31.3.89 |access-date=5 November 2020|archive-date=6 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201106130802/https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/340/|url-status=live|doi-access=free}}</ref>'''{{rp|104}}'''
== Offensive versus defensive == Shareholder activism can be categorized as "offensive" or "defensive"; in the latter case, an existing shareholder attempts to correct some deficiency, while offensive activists build a position with the intention to agitate for change.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|256}} Shareholders can also initiate a [[derivative suit]] to force action by the corporation. Shareholders can also engage in a [[Securities Class Action|securities class action]] but these are typically not associated with activism.
== Laws == In the United States, acquisition of over 5% of beneficial ownership in a company with the intention to influence leadership must be accompanied by a [[Schedule 13D]] filing; investors who do not intend to become activists may file a [[Schedule 13G]] instead.
=== Proxy access === {{Main|Proxy statement#Proxy access}}
Historically, investors were required to mail separate ballots when trying to nominate someone of their own to the board, but beginning in 2015, proxy access rules began to spread driven by initiatives from major institutional investors, and as of 2018, 71% of S&P 500 companies had a proxy access rule.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web|url=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/the-latest-on-proxy-access/|title=The Latest on Proxy Access|last1=Gregory|first1=Holly J.|last2=Grapsas|first2=Rebecca|website=corpgov.law.harvard.edu|language=en-US|access-date=29 August 2019|last3=Holl|first3=Claire|last4=LLP|first4=Sidley Austin|last5=on| date=February 2019 |archive-date=29 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190829043851/https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/the-latest-on-proxy-access/|url-status=live}}</ref>
=== Voting === Votes for the board may be "straight" or "cumulative". In straight voting (aka statutory voting), shareholders get one vote per share on all ballot questions (e.g., candidates for the [[board of directors]] or shareholder proposals). In [[cumulative voting]], a shareholder receives a general vote for however many number of ballot questions there are. The votes can then be all cast for (or against) a single ballot question, which makes it easier for minority shareholders to elect candidates.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Coyle |first=John F. |date=25 January 2016 |title=Altering Rules, Cumulative Voting, and Venture Capital |journal=Utah Law Review |language=en |location=Rochester, NY |ssrn=2719849}}</ref> There has also been a movement toward "majority" voting, where a candidate must receive the majority of votes.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web|url=https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2006/10/majority-voting-for-directors|title=Majority Voting for Directors {{!}} Insights|website=[[jonesday.com]]|language=en|access-date=19 March 2020|archive-date=19 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200319014822/https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2006/10/majority-voting-for-directors|url-status=live}}</ref> Most large corporations are incorporated in Delaware due to the well-developed [[Delaware General Corporation Law]]; in Delaware, cumulative voting is optional, but exceptions exist; for example, a California-based but Delaware-registered corporation may be "pseudo-foreign" under California law and therefore have to comply with California law.<ref name=":6" />
== Performance ==
Research has suggested that activist investment strategies may generate returns higher than those achieved through passive investing. A 2012 study by Activist Insight<ref>{{Cite web |title=Activist Insight – Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance Information |url=http://www.activistinsight.com/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121127232258/http://www.activistinsight.com/ |archive-date=2012-11-27 |language=en}}</ref> found that the mean annual net return of more than 40 activist-focused hedge funds consistently outperformed the MSCI World Index in the years following the [[2008 financial crisis]].<ref>{{cite web |title=New Shareholder Activist Index Reveals Rewards of Activist Investing |url=http://www.activistinsight.com/press/Activist%20Insight%20Press%20Release%20-%20Activism%20Outperforms%20-%20Nov%202012.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150623015933/http://www.activistinsight.com/press/Activist%20Insight%20Press%20Release%20-%20Activism%20Outperforms%20-%20Nov%202012.pdf |archive-date=2015-06-23 |access-date=2012-12-12}}</ref>
Activist investing continued to draw attention in subsequent years. In 2013, it was reported as the top-performing hedge fund strategy, with activist funds earning average returns of 16.6%, compared to 9.5% for the hedge fund industry overall.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wood |first1=John |last2=Dysart |first2=Theodore |title=Assessing the Merits of an Activist Investor's Point of View |url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/assessing-merits-activist-investor%E2%80%99s-point-view |journal=Transaction Advisors |issn=2329-9134 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150723090437/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/assessing-merits-activist-investor%E2%80%99s-point-view |archive-date=2015-07-23 |url-status=live}}</ref>
== Research and statistics == Shareholder activism directed at both European and American companies has been surging.<ref>{{Cite web| url=https://www.searchenginejournal.com/places-to-share-your-content/234905/| title=20 Places You Should be Sharing Your Content| date=14 June 2018| access-date=15 November 2018| archive-date=16 November 2018| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116043239/https://www.searchenginejournal.com/places-to-share-your-content/234905/| url-status=live}}</ref> A 1996 study found that larger firms with higher institutional holdings made firms more likely to be targeted by activist investors.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05208.x|title = Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS| journal=The Journal of Finance| volume=51| pages=227–252|year = 1996|last1 = Smith|first1 = Michael P.}}</ref> Researchers also try to understand what makes company a desirable target for an activist investor.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1177/0007650308316524|title = Justice and Large Corporations| journal=Business & Society| volume=47| issue=4| pages=523–548|year = 2008|last1 = Logsdon|first1 = Jeanne M.| last2=Van Buren| first2=Harry J.|s2cid = 153607878}}</ref> Since the late 2010s scholars and practitioners have started using [[machine learning]] methodologies to predict both targets and activists.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.nordantech.com/en/blog/data-science/activism-vorhersagen | title=Shareholder Activism: Wir sagen voraus wen es trifft! | work=Nordantech | access-date=15 November 2018 | archive-date=16 November 2018 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116001252/https://www.nordantech.com/en/blog/data-science/activism-vorhersagen | url-status=live }}</ref>
As of 2018, an average of 272 activist campaigns were initiated each year in the United States, including 47 proxy contests.<ref name=":3" /> The trend has also been global in scope; approximately 47% of companies targeted by activist investors during this period were located outside the United States,<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Activist Investing Annual Review 2019 |url=https://www.srz.com/resources/the-activist-investing-annual-review-2019.html |url-access=registration |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190509214151/https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/AIAnnual_Review2019.pdf |archive-date=2019-05-09 |publisher=Schulte Roth & Zabel}}</ref> with Europe and Asia seeing increases in the [[Compound annual growth rate|CAGR]] of such campaigns of over 40%, between 2016 and 2020, companies in Australia, Argentina, Brazil and Canada seeing increases of over 20%, compared to activist campaigns in the US increasing by 3%.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Foldesy |first=Jody |last2=Rice |first2=Gregory |last3=Weinstein |first3=Simon |date=2021-04-26 |title=To Defeat an Activist Investor, Think Like One |url=https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/strategies-for-managing-activist-investors |access-date=2025-12-28 |website=BCG Global |language=en}}</ref>
In H1 2025, the business sectors that experienced the highest volume of shareholder activism campaigns globally were Industrials (22%), Technology (20%) and Healthcare (12%), with Industrials most targeted in [[Asia-Pacific|APAC]], Technology most targeted in the US and the Healthcare sector most targeted in Europe.<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 July 2025 |title=Review of Shareholder Activism - H1 2025 |url=https://www.lazard.com/research-insights/review-of-shareholder-activism-h1-2025/ |access-date=2025-12-28 |website=Lazard |language=en}}</ref>
== Retail involvement == Any shareholder, including non-institutional [[retail investors]], may submit a shareholder proposal in the United States, and between 1934 and the mid-1980s these shareholders typically submitted proposals.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Miller|first=Robin|date=1 May 2016|title=Shareholder Advocacy In Corporate Elections: Case Studies In Proxy Voting Websites For Retail Investors|url=https://commons.clarku.edu/idce_masters_papers/52|journal=International Development, Community and Environment|access-date=19 March 2020|archive-date=19 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200319005505/https://commons.clarku.edu/idce_masters_papers/52/|url-status=live}}</ref> One estimate placed institutional owners at 68% of shares and retail at 32% of shares, but 98% of institutional owners vote and only 28% of retail owners vote.<ref name=":5" /> Institutional shareholders, however, often vote automatically upon the advice of [[Proxy firm|proxy advisory firms]]; allowing retail shareholders to vote based upon a guideline ("standing voting instructions") has been proposed to increase their involvement.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fisch |first=Jill E. |date=2017 |title=Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor |journal=Minnesota Law Review |language=en |location=Rochester, NY |ssrn=2972838}}</ref>
Various websites have been created to facilitate retail involvement,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2011/04/25/the-floodgates-are-open-shareholder-activists-intensify-social-media-utilization/|title=The Floodgates Are Open: Shareholder Activists Intensify Social Media Utilization|last=Levick|first=Richard|date=25 April 2011|website=Forbes|language=en|access-date=19 March 2020|archive-date=19 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200319012126/https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2011/04/25/the-floodgates-are-open-shareholder-activists-intensify-social-media-utilization/|url-status=live}}</ref> including Moxy Vote, Shareowners.org, United States Proxy Exchange and ProxyDemocracy.org, but over time these generally shut down.<ref name=":5" />
== Political and labor involvement == Labor unions, including through pension funds such as [[CalPERS]] coalitions such as the [[Strategic Organizing Center]] often engage in shareholder proposals.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Morgenson|first=Gretchen|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/business/proxy-climate-change-executive-pay.html|title=Want Change? Shareholders Have a Tool for That|date=24 March 2017|work=The New York Times|access-date=19 March 2020|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=19 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200319011644/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/business/proxy-climate-change-executive-pay.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The Shareholder Rights Group is a coalition of shareholder proposal advocates.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.responsible-investor.com/articles/sec-rulemaking-threatens-to-disrupt-esg-investment-ecosystem-and-undermine-shareholder-rights|title=SEC rulemaking threatens to disrupt ESG investment ecosystem and undermine shareholder rights|website=Responsible Investor|date=7 January 2020 |language=en|access-date=19 March 2020|archive-date=19 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200319013139/https://www.responsible-investor.com/articles/sec-rulemaking-threatens-to-disrupt-esg-investment-ecosystem-and-undermine-shareholder-rights|url-status=live}}</ref>
=== Socially responsible investing === Organizations such as [[Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility|the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR)]], [[As You Sow]] and [[Ceres (organization)|Ceres]] use shareholder resolutions, and other means of pressure, to address issues such as sustainability and human rights.
For an analysis of the hundreds of annual shareholder resolutions, see Proxy Preview.<ref>{{cite web|title=Proxy Preview|url=https://www.proxypreview.org/|website=|publisher=As You Sow}}</ref>
== See also == * [[Board of directors]] * [[Corporate governance]] * [[Corporate raid]] * [[Corporate social responsibility]] *{{anli|Passive investor}} * [[Proxy statement]] * [[Shareholder rebellion]] * [[Socially responsible investing]]
==References== {{reflist}}
==Further reading== * [https://web.archive.org/web/20060209022313/http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/07/news/companies/timewarner_icahn/index.htm Icahn calls for Time Warner breakup, buyback / CNNMoney.com] * [https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1002590/000089914005000128/t2774169.txt Third Point Management's letter to Star Gas CEO, Irik Sevin] * [http://denver.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2005/05/02/daily1.html?page=2 Qwest Withdraws from Bidding – Denver Business Journal / MCIpetition.com ] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20131227032056/http://www.ecgi.org/activism/ Academic Literature Summary] (archived 27 December 2013) * [http://cira.thinkabit.net/downloads/File/Engelhardt,%20The%20Rise%20of%20Activist%20Investing%20and%20How%20to%20Respond.pdf The Rise of Activist Investing and How to Respond] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150922070004/http://cira.thinkabit.net/downloads/File/Engelhardt,%20The%20Rise%20of%20Activist%20Investing%20and%20How%20to%20Respond.pdf |date=2015-09-22 }} * [https://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/insights/am-activist-alert A&M Activist Alert] * [https://www.nordantech.com/en/blog/data-science/activism-vorhersagen Predicting Shareholder Activist Targets, Nordantech.com] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116001252/https://www.nordantech.com/en/blog/data-science/activism-vorhersagen |date=2018-11-16 }}
{{Hedge funds}}
[[Category:Corporate governance]] [[Category:Activism by type]] [[Category:Shareholders]] [[Category:Shareholder-rights activists| ]]