# Truth
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{{Short description|Conformity to reality}}
{{redirect|The truth|other uses of "The truth"|The Truth (disambiguation)|other uses of "Truth"|Truth (disambiguation)}}
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{{use dmy dates|date=October 2024}}
'''Truth''' is conformity to [reality](/source/reality) or [fact](/source/fact). It contrasts with [falsity](/source/falsity) or misrepresentation that fails to align with the world. Truth is typically treated as a [property](/source/Property_(philosophy)) of [truthbearers](/source/Truth-bearer), such as [sentences](/source/Sentence_(linguistics)), [proposition](/source/proposition)s, or [belief](/source/belief)s that describe things as they are. It is closely related to truthfulness, a [virtue](/source/virtue) associated with [honesty](/source/honesty), and to [truthlikeness](/source/truthlikeness), a characteristic of theories that approximate the truth.
Various [theories of the nature of truth](/source/Theories_of_truth) have been proposed, but its precise definition remains contested. The [correspondence theory](/source/Correspondence_theory_of_truth) holds that a statement is true if it corresponds to facts. According to the [coherence theory](/source/Coherence_theory_of_truth), truth consists in logical consistency and mutual support among beliefs. [Pragmatists](/source/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth) understand truth in terms of practical consequences and epistemic practices, claiming that truth is what works or what would withstand the test of unlimited inquiry. The [semantic theory](/source/Semantic_theory_of_truth) analyzes the [truth conditions](/source/truth_conditions) of sentences in an object language from the perspective of a [metalanguage](/source/metalanguage). [Deflationary theories](/source/Deflationary_theory_of_truth) argue that truth has no significant intrinsic nature, holding that the linguistic role of truth-related expressions exhausts the concept of truth. [Pluralists](/source/Pluralism_(philosophy)) assert that the definition of truth varies with the domain of analysis, while [relativists](/source/Relativism) maintain that the same statement can be true in one perspective and false in another. Theories of truth are challenged by logical [paradox](/source/paradox)es, such as the [liar paradox](/source/liar_paradox). There are also discussions about the existence of additional truth values besides ''true'' and ''false'' and about the possibility of truth value gaps{{em dash}}statements that have no truth value.
Philosophers distinguish types of truth by domain, content, and epistemic access, including ''[a priori](/source/a_priori)'', necessary, [moral](/source/Morality), [aesthetic](/source/aesthetic), [religious](/source/religious), and [scientific](/source/scientific) truths. Truth plays a central role in the sciences as a goal of inquiry. The empirical sciences seek truth through [observation](/source/observation) and [experimentation](/source/experimentation), whereas the [formal sciences](/source/formal_sciences) rely on [deductive reasoning](/source/deductive_reasoning) from [fundamental principles](/source/Axiom). Many religious traditions regard truth as a virtue and ground it in a divine source. Truth also acts as a guiding norm in the fields of [ethics](/source/ethics), [law](/source/law), and [journalism](/source/journalism).
Discussions of truth arose in [antiquity](/source/Ancient_philosophy) in [Hindu](/source/Hindu_philosophy), [Jain](/source/Jain_philosophy), [Buddhist](/source/Buddhist_philosophy), and [Greek thought](/source/Ancient_Greek_philosophy). In the [medieval period](/source/medieval_period), [Christian](/source/Christian_philosophy) and [Islamic philosophers](/source/Islamic_philosophy) explored the relation between truth and [God](/source/God). Discussions in the modern and contemporary periods have addressed diverse topics, such as the nature of truth and its relation to thought, language, and reality.
== Definition ==
Truth is conformity to [facts](/source/facts) or accordance with [reality](/source/reality). It is often understood as a property of [statements](/source/Proposition) or [beliefs](/source/beliefs) that present the world as it is, or as a relation between language or thought and how things actually are. However, its precise definition is disputed, with different theories focusing on elements such as correspondence, coherence, or practical usefulness.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|p=534–535}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2018|pp=1–3}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|pp=926–927}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zXzEP1SgMz8C&pg=PA1 1–3]}} }}] In a slightly different sense, the term can also refer to genuineness, as in "a true friend" or "true gold", spiritual teachings, like "the truth of the scriptures", or facts themselves, such as "in truth, the product was defective."[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|pp=901–902}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} | {{harvnb|MW staff|2026}} }}]
Truth contrasts with [falsehood](/source/falsehood) or falsity, which encompasses misrepresentations that do not meet this standard and fail to align with reality. The [negation](/source/negation) of a true statement is a falsehood.[{{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=6–7}}] Truth plays a central role in many human endeavors. It acts as a goal of inquiry when deciding what to believe and as a standard to which right conduct should conform by being responsive to how things actually are. People refer to truth to indicate reliable information, mark scientific findings well supported by [evidence](/source/evidence), distinguish accurate legal [testimony](/source/testimony) from misrepresentation, and emphasize honesty and sincerity in personal life. Truth is typically regarded as a positive value, either because of its beneficial consequences or as an [intrinsic good](/source/Value_theory) pursued for its own sake.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lynch|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zXzEP1SgMz8C&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2004|pp=2–3, 12–15}} }}]
The word ''truth'' comes from the [Old English](/source/Old_English) {{lang|ang|trēowth}}, meaning {{gloss|fidelity}}. It entered [Modern English](/source/Modern_English) via the [Middle English](/source/Middle_English) term {{lang|enm|trewthe}}.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|MW staff|2026}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} | {{harvnb|OED staff|2026}} }}]
== Basic concepts ==
=== Truthbearers ===
{{main|Truthbearer}}
Truth is commonly treated as a feature of truthbearers{{em dash}}entities that can be true or false. Philosophers discuss which entities serve as truthbearers, including [sentences](/source/Sentence_(linguistics)), [propositions](/source/propositions), and [beliefs](/source/beliefs). Sentences are concrete linguistic entities composed of strings of words, like "It's raining in Nairobi." Their public nature and clear structure can aid philosophical analysis of truth-related phenomena. However, it is not always possible to establish a straightforward relation between a sentence and its truth value since its meaning can be [context](/source/context)-dependent and may also be influenced by [ambiguous](/source/ambiguous) terms. As a result, a sentence may be true under one [interpretation](/source/Interpretation_(philosophy)) and false under another. Another difficulty is that sentences belong to specific languages, with the danger of limiting philosophical analysis to language-specific features rather than articulating universal principles.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=Lead section, § What Sorts of Things are True (or False)?}} | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.1 Truth-bearers}} }}]{{efn|There are several versions of the view that sentences are truthbearers. Some theorists focus on general sentence types, while others prefer individual sentence [tokens](/source/Type%E2%80%93token_distinction), which are particular instances occurring in specific contexts. A common restriction limits the discussion to statements or declarative sentences, excluding sentences that do not have truth values, such as questions and commands.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=§ What Sorts of Things are True (or False)?}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.1 Truth-bearers, § 6.6 Truth and Assertion}} }}]}}
Propositions are typically understood as [abstract entities](/source/Abstract_object) that serve as the meanings of declarative sentences, mitigating the difficulties of context dependence, ambiguity, and language specificity. However, their abstract nature can make philosophical discussions less tangible, and there is disagreement about the existence of abstract objects. Beliefs and related [mental states](/source/mental_states) are concrete psychological entities, taking the form of subjective attitudes about what is the case. They establish a direct link between truth and [cognition](/source/cognition) but are difficult to study because of their private nature.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=§ What Sorts of Things are True (or False)?}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|pp=6–7}} }}]
Monists argue that there is only a single kind of truthbearer, while [pluralists](/source/Pluralism_(philosophy)) accept different kinds. Some identify one kind as primary, explaining the truth values of secondary truthbearers in terms of the primary one. For example, one proposal reduces the truth of beliefs to sentences since sentences can be used to express beliefs.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} }}]
=== Truthmakers and truth conditions ===
{{Main|Truthmaker|Truth condition}}
[[File:DavidMArmstrong (cropped).jpg|thumb|left|alt=David Malet Armstrong.|[David Malet Armstrong](/source/David_Malet_Armstrong) emphasized the role of truthmakers in establishing a connection between truth and being.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Asay|loc=§ 1. History of Truthmaker Theory}} | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=291–292}} }}]]]
Various theories rely on the concept of truthmakers as the counterpart of truthbearers. A truthmaker is a real entity whose existence makes a truthbearer true, establishing a link between language or thought and the world. For example, an orange carrot could act as a truthmaker of the sentence "the carrot is orange". Truthmakers are often treated as [sufficient conditions](/source/Necessity_and_sufficiency): the existence of a truthmaker is enough for the sentence to be true, independent of other factors.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=152}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2004|pp=1–7}} | {{harvnb|Beebee|Dodd|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=l24TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–3]}} }}] Philosophers discuss which entities function as truthmakers, with candidates including facts or [states of affairs](/source/states_of_affairs), [tropes](/source/Trope_(philosophy)), and [particular objects](/source/Particulars).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Asay|loc=Lead section, § 4. Kinds of Truthmakers}} | {{harvnb|MacBride|Daly|2025|loc=§ 2.5 Truth Supervenes Upon Being}} }}]
Truthmakers are closely related to truth conditions, which are ways or circumstances under which a statement is true. Truth conditions are requirements of how the world must be for a statement to be true. For instance, one truth condition of the sentence "it is raining" is that raindrops are falling. Truth conditions are often treated as necessary conditions: if a truth condition does not obtain, then the sentence cannot be true, independent of other factors.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=11–12, 152}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.2 Truth and Truth Conditions}} }}]{{efn|[Truth-conditional semantics](/source/Truth-conditional_semantics) define sentence meaning through truth conditions: to understand a sentence is to grasp the circumstances in which it is true, with truth conditions as the necessary and sufficient conditions of its truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shaw|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zb2ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA190 190]}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.2 Truth and Truth Conditions}} | {{harvnb|Kearns|2011|pp=8–11}} }}]}} A key motivation for truthmakers and truth conditions is the idea that truth depends on reality: truth is not a free-floating convention but is anchored in how things are.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=11–12, 152}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2004|pp=1–7}} | {{harvnb|MacBride|Daly|2025|loc=§ 3.2 Truth Depends on Being}} }}]
=== Others ===
Truthfulness is a [virtue](/source/virtue){{efn|In a slightly different sense, ''truthful'' is also used as a synonym of ''true'' or ''accurate''.[{{harvnb|AHD staff|2022a}}]}} associated with [honesty](/source/honesty) and consistency among one's words, beliefs, and behavior. It is closely related to speaking the truth but differs in some key aspects. For example, if a person sincerely states a belief, they may be truthful even if the belief is false. Conversely, someone may state a truth with the intent to [deceive](/source/Deception), or a [liar](/source/liar) may accidentally tell a truth. In both cases, truth alone is insufficient for truthfulness. Truthfulness contrasts with deception and dishonesty. Lying occurs when a speaker intentionally says something they believe to be false.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cooper|2005|pp=927–928}} | {{harvnb|Bok|1998|loc=Lead section, § Truth, Truthfulness, Falsity and Deceit}} }}] [Bullshitting](/source/On_Bullshit) is a related phenomenon in which a speaker is indifferent to truth or falsehood, for instance, because they only care about persuading or manipulating their audience. [Truthiness](/source/Truthiness), a similar term, refers to the tendency to prioritize intuition and [gut feelings](/source/gut_feelings) over evidence and [rational analysis](/source/Rationality).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kozma|Schroer|2014|pp=104–105}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|2011|loc=§ 3. Wikiality, Truthiness, and Gut Thinking: Doing Philosophy Colbert-Style}} }}] Its meaning overlaps with the term ''[post-truth](/source/post-truth)'', which denotes situations in which [public opinion](/source/public_opinion) is shaped by [appeal to emotions](/source/appeal_to_emotions) rather than objective facts.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|OUP staff|2016}} | {{harvnb|CUP staff|2026}} | {{harvnb|O'Callaghan|2020|pp=339–340}} }}] Deception can also take [non-verbal](/source/Non-verbal_communication) forms, such as edited photographs, [deepfakes](/source/deepfakes), and [AI-generated content](/source/AI-generated_content) intended to mislead or fabricate events.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dynel|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=CZFdDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA236 236–237]}} | {{harvnb|Dhamani|2026|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VayEEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA163 163]}} }}]
[Truthlikeness](/source/Truthlikeness) or verisimilitude is a concept applied to theories or statements that are close to the truth. It is often used in the context of inquiry to indicate that a theory is not fully true but approximates this goal better than others. For example, [heliocentrism](/source/heliocentrism) is a model of the [Solar System](/source/Solar_System) that is correct in certain aspects, like that planets orbit around the sun, and wrong in others, like claiming that the orbits are perfect circles. As a result, heliocentrism is not true in a strict sense but truthlike. Truthlikeness comes in degrees. For instance, heliocentrism is more truthlike than [geocentrism](/source/geocentrism), which places the [Earth](/source/Earth) at the center of the universe.{{efn|Truthlikeness can also be used to compare true assertions. For instance, the assertion "spiders have more than two legs" is less truthlike than the assertion "spiders have eight legs" because it is less precise.[{{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Logical Problem}}]}} Different philosophical approaches to truthlikeness have been proposed. Some look at [logical consequences](/source/logical_consequences), arguing that a theory's degree of truthlikeness depends on the number of its true and false consequences. Others focus on [resemblance](/source/Similarity_(philosophy)), comparing how similar the theory's description is to the actual world.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Niiniluoto|1987|pp=[xi–x, 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Logical Problem, § 3. The Axiological Problem}} }}] According to some suggestions, [truth itself also comes in degrees](/source/Degree_of_truth), an idea found in [fuzzy logics](/source/fuzzy_logics). However, the traditional view is that truth is [bivalent](/source/Principle_of_bivalence): an assertion is either true or false with nothing in between.[{{harvnb|James|2005|p=326}}]
Truth is closely related to [justification](/source/Justification_(epistemology)) and [evidence](/source/evidence) with some key differences. A belief is justified if it meets certain epistemic norms, for example, by resting on good reasons or strong evidence. Evidence for a proposition is something that supports its truth, such as [observation](/source/observation) or reliable [testimony](/source/testimony). Justification and evidence separate warranted beliefs from [superstition](/source/superstition) and lucky guesses but do not guarantee truth: even well-founded beliefs can be false in unfavorable circumstances. If a justified belief is true, it may amount to [knowledge](/source/knowledge), which, unlike justification on its own, has truth as a core component.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=50–51, 92–95}} | {{harvnb|Goldman|Bender|2005|p=465}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=149}} }}] [Epistemologists](/source/Epistemologists) discuss various sources of knowledge or how people may arrive at truth, such as [perception](/source/perception), [introspection](/source/introspection), [memory](/source/memory), [reason](/source/reason), and testimony.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|loc=§ 3. Ways of Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Smith|2023|p=3}}}}] Verification and [fact-checking](/source/fact-checking) are processes that aim to assess the truth value of a proposition.[{{harvnb|Hickerson|Schwartz|Wright|2025|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6dEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT122 § Glossary: Fact-checking]}}] They may rely on [criteria of truth](/source/criteria_of_truth), which are standards by which one can recognize that a claim is true.[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|p=13}}]
== Theories ==
{{main|Theories of truth}}
Theories of truth aim to identify what all truths have in common. Their goal is not to list true statements but to clarify the [concept](/source/concept) of truth, discern its [essential features](/source/Essence), and explain truth-related phenomena. There are disagreements about whether such features exist and whether a given feature is an essential component or an external criterion only indicating the presence of truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=1–6}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2018|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=13, 35}} }}]
=== Correspondence ===
{{main|Correspondence theory of truth}}
[[File:Correspondence theory of truth.svg|thumb|alt=A red apple, and the statement "[This] apple is red."|According to the correspondence theory, a statement is true if it corresponds to facts.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=14–15}} }}]]]
The correspondence theory asserts that a belief or statement is true if it corresponds to facts. This view emphasizes the relation between thought or language and reality, arguing that truth matches how things are. It is one of the oldest and most influential theories of truth.[{{harvnb|David|2018|p=245}}]}} but the precise relation between the two is disputed. Various suggestions have been made regarding the nature of truthbearers, like seeing them as propositions, sentences, or beliefs. The classical view analyzes their relation to reality in terms of objects and [properties](/source/Property_(philosophy)). It assumes that truthbearers have a subject-predicate structure, in which the [subject](/source/Subject_(grammar)) refers to an entity and the [predicate](/source/Predicate_(grammar)) denotes a property. According to this view, a statement corresponds to reality if it refers to an entity that carries the denoted property. Fact-based theories, by contrast, hold that a statement expresses a fact, and it is true if the fact obtains.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=§ 1. History of the Correspondence Theory}} | {{harvnb|David|2018|pp=238–245}} }}] One version asserts a one-to-one correlation between truths and facts, while another understands correspondence more broadly as a structural similarity that does not require a perfect one-to-one mirroring.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=§ 6. Correspondence as Isomorphism}} | {{harvnb|David|2018|pp=245–247}} }}]
[Truthmaker theory](/source/Truthmaker_theory) is closely related to correspondence theory and is often treated as a modern version of it.[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=21–23}}] Truthmaker theory stresses that truth depends on reality and analyzes the relation between truths and their truthmakers. Its most comprehensive form is truthmaker maximalism, which asserts that every truth has a truthmaker. Atomic truthmaker theory, by contrast, limits this view to simple statements and analyzes the truth of complex statements in terms of simpler ones.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Asay|loc=Lead section, § 3. Maximalism and Non-Maximalism}} | {{harvnb|Beebee|Dodd|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=l24TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–3]}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=26–27, 31–32}} }}]
A key motivation for the correspondence theory is its intuitive appeal and its ability to ground truth in objective reality. A key challenge is to clarify how exactly truths relate to facts. Critics hold that the correspondence theory is uninformative or circular because it fails to explain what ''correspondence'' means. They argue that it assumes an implicit understanding of the relation without offering an independent account. Another objection asserts that the correspondence theory is too narrow because it is unable to explain truth in fields like mathematics, logic, and morality, where it is more difficult to identify independent facts corresponding to statements.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=14–26}} | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=§ 4. Arguments for the Correspondence Theory, § 5. Objections to the Correspondence Theory}} | {{harvnb|Kirkham|1998|loc=Lead section, § 3. Objections to Correspondence Theories}} }}]
=== Coherence ===
{{main|Coherence theory of truth}}
thumb|alt=Diagram of three beliefs and arrows between them|The coherence theory understands truth as logical consistency and mutual support among beliefs.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=536}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=26–27}} }}]
The coherence theory understands truth{{efn|The coherence theory of truth is similar to the coherence theory of [knowledge](/source/knowledge) but not identical.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fei|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ot6uEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA79 79]}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902}} }}]}} as a relation between beliefs rather than between a belief and a fact. It asserts that a belief is true if it is part of a coherent web of beliefs. Coherence theorists typically stress that beliefs do not occur in isolation but are part of a broader perspective on reality since they depend on conceptual frameworks and background assumptions not explicitly represented in the content of each belief. For example, the belief that [photons](/source/photons) lack mass rests on a network of ideas from [particle physics](/source/particle_physics) that ground its meaning and ramifications. Accordingly, coherence theory is associated with a form of [holism](/source/holism) that privileges comprehensive perspectives over individual beliefs.[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=29}}]}}
Different suggestions for the nature of coherence have been proposed. A minimal requirement is usually that the beliefs are [logically consistent](/source/Consistency): they do not contradict each other. Another often-discussed condition is that the beliefs support each other, meaning that a collection of unrelated but consistent beliefs is not sufficient for coherence.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=3}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=26–27}} }}] In the strongest form, coherentism requires that all beliefs cohere. Less demanding versions assert that only the majority of beliefs need to cohere or that coherence is required within specific domains, such as scientific or moral beliefs, but not across domains.[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=26–29}}]
One criticism acknowledges that coherence is relevant for testing or verifying what is true but contends that coherence theory confuses criteria of verification with truth itself. Another objection argues that there can be competing coherent sets of beliefs where one set contradicts the other, meaning that coherence alone cannot determine which set is correct. For example, a fictional story does not become true just because it is coherent.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} | {{harvnb|Capps|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Misak|2018|pp=283–284}} }}]
A central difficulty for utility-based theories is that practical consequences and usefulness depend on situations and desires. This can lead to [subjectivism](/source/subjectivism) or [relativism](/source/relativism) since what is useful in one case may not be in another. Another challenge is that although practical consequences often align with truth, this is not always the case: a false belief may have good consequences in certain situations.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} }}]
A different version of pragmatism defines truth from the perspective of scientific research. It holds that truth is the ideal limit of inquiry or what researchers would believe after unlimited investigation. Other pragmatist approaches define truth as beliefs that have withstood thorough examination or as statements that fulfill discourse norms and can be asserted with warrant.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Capps|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902–903}} }}]
=== Semantic ===
{{main|Semantic theory of truth}}
[[File:Alfred Tarski 1968 (as-is, cropped) (cropped).jpg|thumb|left|alt=Alfred Tarski.|[Alfred Tarski](/source/Alfred_Tarski) formulated the semantic theory of truth.[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}}]]]
The semantic theory characterizes truth in terms of [truth conditions](/source/truth_conditions). It distinguishes between an object language, which contains true sentences that are being analyzed, and a [meta-language](/source/meta-language) to express their truth conditions using so-called T-sentences. T-sentences have the form: '"" is true in if and only if ' where is the object language, is a sentence of the object language, and is a sentence of the meta-language describing truth conditions. For example, '"La nieve es blanca." is true in Spanish if and only if snow is white' is a T-sentence with Spanish as the object language and English as the meta-language. The semantic theory was originally formulated by [Alfred Tarski](/source/Alfred_Tarski), who limited it to the analysis of [formal languages](/source/formal_languages). Subsequent philosophers, such as [Donald Davidson](/source/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)), have also applied it to [natural languages](/source/natural_languages). The semantic theory is often combined with the idea that truth conditions can be analyzed by [studying the components of sentences](/source/Principle_of_compositionality), such as names and predicates, which are then interpreted to refer to certain entities or situations described in the truth conditions.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537–538}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=49–56, 66–67}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dGuYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA16 16–19, 22]}} }}]
A key motivation for the semantic theory is its ability to characterize truth in a precise manner without introducing metaphysical assumptions concerning the existence and nature of facts, correspondence, or coherence. By talking about truth in the object language through a metalanguage, it also avoids paradoxes that arise if a language contains its own truth-predicate, such as the liar paradox. However, it is controversial to what extent the semantic theory offers substantial insights into the nature of truth rather than only providing a formal device for analyzing truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=66–67}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dGuYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA16 16–19]}} }}]
=== Deflationary ===
{{main|Deflationary theory of truth}}
[[File:What is truth.jpg|thumb|alt=Painting: Pontius Pilate (left) asks Jesus (right) "What is truth?"|An early skepticism about the nature of truth is expressed in [Pontius Pilate](/source/Pontius_Pilate)'s rhetorical question to [Jesus](/source/Jesus), asking "[What is truth?](/source/John_18%3A38)"[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|p=34}} | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2005|pp=59–60}} }}]]]
Deflationary theories argue that truth has no significant or interesting intrinsic nature. They hold that attempts by substantive or robust theories, such as correspondence theory and coherence theory, misconstrue truth by assuming a deep metaphysical structure, engaging in pseudoproblems where trivial answers would suffice. Deflationists typically analyze how truth-related expressions are used in language, holding that understanding their linguistic roles exhausts the concept of truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=33–34}} | {{harvnb|Azzouni|2018|pp=477–478}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zXzEP1SgMz8C&pg=PA5 5]}} }}]
Different deflationary theories propose distinct accounts of the linguistic function of truth-related terms.{{efn|One categorization groups deflationary theories into moderate deflationism, which accepts the idea that truth is a predicate in a logical sense, and radical deflationism, which rejects this view.[{{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=34–44}}]}} The [redundancy theory](/source/Redundancy_theory_of_truth) asserts that the predicate "is true" is superfluous and does not contribute to meaning. According to this view, the sentences 'Snow is white.' and '"Snow is white" is true.' have the same meaning. Disquotationalism holds that the predicate "is true" acts as a linguistic device to remove quotation marks and make generalizations. The performative theory treats truth as a performative expression that speakers can use to endorse statements, like when saying "That's true." [Prosententialism](/source/Prosententialism) treats truth not as a regular predicate but as an operator. This operator can be applied to expressions that refer to other statements, as in "What Smith said is true." Minimalism understands truth as a logical property whose role is expressed in T-sentences.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=34–44}} | {{harvnb|Armour-Garb|Stoljar|Woodbridge|2023|loc=Lead section, § 3. The Varieties of Contemporary Deflationism}} | {{harvnb|Azzouni|2018|pp=477–479}} }}]
Various criticisms of deflationism target specific versions of it, such as criticisms of the redundancy theory or minimalism. However, there are also broader objections that seek to undermine deflationism in general. One argument holds that deflationism fails to explain key aspects of truth, like that truth serves as the aim of beliefs or that theoretical truth can lead to practical success.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Armour-Garb|Stoljar|Woodbridge|2023|loc=§ 4. Objections to Deflationism}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|p=51}} }}]
=== Others ===
[Pluralists](/source/Pluralist_theories_of_truth) hold that there is no unified concept of truth that covers all cases. Instead, they argue that truth is a heterogeneous notion and that different theories apply to different domains. For example, a pluralist may accept the correspondence theory for empirical truths but adopt the coherence theory for mathematical truths.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=20, 110}} | {{harvnb|Pedersen|Lynch|2018|pp=543–545}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2004|pp=4–5}} }}]
Absolutism asserts that truth is the same for everyone, meaning that what is true does not depend on individual standpoints, opinions, or contexts. It contrasts with [relativism](/source/relativism), which maintains that the same statement can be true in one perspective or [context](/source/Contextualism) and false in another.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2005|pp=xiii–xvii}} | {{harvnb|Cappelen|Huvenes|2018|pp=521}} }}] Local relativism limits this dependency to particular domains, such as moral truth. Global relativism, by contrast, extends this view to all truths. Critics argue that global relativism is self-defeating theory that undermines its own authority: applied to itself, it holds that it is only true in some perspectives that all truths are relative.[{{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=65–66}}] [Nihilism](/source/Nihilism) or skepticism about truth{{efn|This view differs from [skepticism](/source/Philosophical_skepticism) about knowledge, an often-discussed view in [epistemology](/source/epistemology) that asks whether knowledge is possible.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stone|2000|pp=527–528}} | {{harvnb|Pedersen|Lynch|2018|pp=543–544}} }}]}} presents a more radical view that rejects the existence of truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pedersen|Lynch|2018|pp=543–544}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Asay|2022|pp=687–688}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=4–5}} }}]
One common categorization divides theories of truth into [realism](/source/Philosophical_realism) and [anti-realism](/source/anti-realism). Realists see truth as an objective feature that is determined by what the world is like and exists independently of thoughts and descriptions. Anti-realists argue that truth depends in part or entirely on the epistemic situation or how beliefs relate to justification, verification, inquiry, or one another.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 4. Realism and Anti-realism}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=5, 9}} | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|p=5}} }}] Realism is typically associated with absolutism, while anti-realism is more closely linked to relativism.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Young|1996|pp=68–69}} | {{harvnb|Young|1986|pp=503–504}} }}]
[Verificationism](/source/Verificationism) argues that a statement is true if it is verifiable. It maintains that the procedures for confirming or disconfirming claims are not external tests of truth but constitutive norms. Verificationists typically assert that there are different verification procedures for different claims, for example, that scientific claims about empirical phenomena require observation and experimentation, whereas mathematical claims are established through deductive proof.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=29–31}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 4.2 Anti-realism and truth}} }}] What is verifiable or falsifiable depends on the situation and the abilities of investigators, meaning that verificationist truth is not purely objective. Additionally, some statements may be neither verifiable nor falsifiable, raising the question of whether verificationism requires a third truth value or truth-value gaps.[{{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 4.2 Anti-realism and truth}}] Verificationism is sometimes grouped with coherentism as an [epistemic theory](/source/Epistemic_theories_of_truth). Epistemic theories define truth in terms of epistemic concepts, including coherence, verifiability, [justification](/source/Justification_(epistemology)), and [rationality](/source/rationality).[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=27, 29–31}}]
thumb|alt=Illustration of the undefined truth value of the proposition "This proposition is false."|The liar paradox involves a proposition with an inconsistent truth assignment: if the proposition is true, it follows that it is false, and if it is false, it follows that it is true.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Deutsch|2022|pp=533–534}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Glanzberg|Ripley|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}]
The identity theory holds that something is true if it is identical to reality. This view rejects the distinction between truthbearers and truthmakers, arguing that truths are facts rather than representations.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=37–39}} | {{harvnb|Gaskin|2021|loc=Lead section}} }}] Axiomatic theories are deductive theories based on a small number of [fundamental principles](/source/Axiom). Instead of providing explicit definitions, they treat truth as a primitive or undefined concept and formulate general rules of how it behaves.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fujimoto|Halbach|2018|pp=718–719}} | {{harvnb|Halbach|Leigh|Łełyk|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}] According to the [consensus theory](/source/Consensus_theory_of_truth), proposed by [Jürgen Habermas](/source/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas), truth is what people would agree upon under ideal circumstances.[{{harvnb|Hesse|1978|pp=372, 379–380}}] The term ''folk theory of truth'' refers to widely held beliefs of ordinary people about truth, like the idea that a proposition is true if its negation is false.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lynch|2005|pp=29–30}} | {{harvnb|Ulatowski|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8ipADwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–3]}} }}]
Theories of truth are challenged by various [paradoxes](/source/paradoxes) in which basic intuitions or principles yield [contradictory](/source/Contradiction) conclusions. The [liar paradox](/source/liar_paradox) involves a statement with an inconsistent truth assignment, like the claims "I am lying" or "This statement is false": if the statement is true, it follows that it is false, and if it is false, it follows that it is true. Other paradoxes include the [Curry paradox](/source/Curry_paradox), the [Russell-Myhill paradox](/source/Russell-Myhill_paradox), and Grelling's paradox.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=5–7, 119}} | {{harvnb|Field|2008|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7KASDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2, 23–24, 83–84]}} | {{harvnb|Deutsch|2022|pp=534–535, 541–543}} }}] Some paradoxes arise if a language contains its own [truth predicate](/source/truth_predicate).{{efn|A truth predicate is a linguistic device that ascribes truth to a sentence, like the expression "... is true".[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=48–49}}]}} Tarski sought to avoid this problem by analyzing formal languages that do not have truth predicates. [Saul Kripke](/source/Saul_Kripke) proposed a different approach that limits how truth predicates can be used within a language without excluding them.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Field|2008|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7KASDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA56 56–58]}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}} }}]
== Types ==
[[File:Pythagorean theorem2.svg|thumb|alt=The Pythagorean theorem: given a right triangle with legs of lengths a and b, and hypotenuse of length c, a^2 + b^2 = c^2|Mathematical truths, like the [Pythagorean theorem](/source/Pythagorean_theorem), are traditionally categorized as ''a priori'' truths.[{{harvnb|Horsten|2023|loc=§ 5.4 Mathematical Proof}}]]]
Various types of truth are distinguished in the academic discourse by domain, content, and epistemic access. For some types, it is controversial whether they exist in a strict sense. The difference between {{lang|la|[a posteriori](/source/A_priori_and_a_posteriori)}} and {{lang|la|a priori}} truths rests on the source of knowledge. {{lang|la|A posteriori}} truths require sensory experience, such as observing that water boils at 100°C at [standard atmospheric pressure](/source/standard_atmospheric_pressure). {{lang|la|A priori}} truths can be known through pure reasoning, such as a proof of a mathematical theorem.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ A Priori and a Posteriori Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Baehr|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead section}} }}] A related distinction is between [synthetic and analytic](/source/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction) truths, based on the source of the truth. A sentence is synthetic if its truth depends on what the world is like, such as "[Mount Everest](/source/Mount_Everest) is the highest mountain on Earth". A sentence is analytic if its truth depends only on the meanings of its terms, as in "all bachelors are unmarried".[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Juhl|Loomis|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix–x, 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2023}} | {{harvnb|Pradhan|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DR-VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}]{{efn|{{lang|la|A priori}} truths are typically associated with analytic truths and {{lang|la|a posteriori}} truths are typically associated with synthetic truths, but the precise characterization of their relation is disputed.[{{harvnb|Weatherson|2016|pp=231–233}}]}} [Logical truth](/source/Logical_truth)s or [tautologies](/source/Tautology_(logic)) are a special class of analytic truths. Their truth is determined by the [logical form](/source/logical_form) of statements, regardless of concrete contents, as in statements of the form "if , then ".[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Soames|1999|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LQ0nSJtm4KYC&pg=PA120 120]}} | {{harvnb|Gómez-Torrente|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Nature of Logical Truth}} | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2008}} }}] The [negation](/source/negation) of a logical truth is a logical falsity or [contradiction](/source/contradiction). Contradictions can take the form of affirming and denying the same idea within a single statement, as in "the light is on and the light is not on". Most logicians consider all contradictions to be false to avoid absurdity. One exception is the school of [dialetheism](/source/dialetheism), which holds that some contradictions are true, arguing that reality itself can be contradictory.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Akiba|2020|p=67}} | {{harvnb|Priest|Berto|Weber|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}]
A truth is necessary if it could not have been otherwise, meaning that it is true under all conceivable circumstances. A sentence is actually true if it correctly describes the actual world. A sentence is possibly true if there are conceivable circumstances where it is true, regardless of whether these circumstances obtain in the actual world.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=149–150}} | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=Lead section}} }}]
[Evaluative truths](/source/Value_theory) are about what is good or bad in some sense. They include [ethical](/source/Ethics) truths, which assess the [moral](/source/Morality) status of principles, actions, and persons, such as the claim "murder is wrong". [Aesthetic](/source/Aesthetic) truths are about the appeal of entities, including judgments about what is [beautiful](/source/beauty) and about the [meanings of artworks](/source/Aesthetic_interpretation). Axiological nihilists and [error theorists](/source/Error_theory) challenge the existence of evaluative truths, arguing that no values exist or that all value statements are false.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} | {{harvnb|Zangwill|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Aesthetic Truth}} }}] [Subjectivism](/source/Subjectivism), another view, holds that they are [subjective](/source/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)) truths. A subjective truth depends on individual attitudes or personal preferences, meaning that a statement may be true from the perspective of one person and false from another. They contrast with objective truths, which are verifiable and hold regardless of individual attitudes or perspectives.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Solomon|2005|p=900}} | {{harvnb|Lyon|2005|p=667}} }}]
The concept of religious truth encompasses core teachings and doctrines within religious traditions, addressing not only how things are but also how people relate to the world. They typically concern the [meaning of life](/source/meaning_of_life), the nature of [ultimate reality](/source/ultimate_reality) and [the divine](/source/the_divine), and the values and practices that should guide human conduct. Some traditions distinguish between absolute and relative truth, with absolute truth pointing to a [transcendent](/source/Transcendence_(religion)), divine reality while relative truth refers to conventional or context-dependent teachings for everyday life. Religious truths are often grounded in [faith](/source/faith), drawing rationalist and scientific criticisms for lacking substantial [empirical evidence](/source/empirical_evidence).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Streng|2005|pp=9368–9370}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|pp=903–904}} }}]
Various forms of truth are distinguished by the field of inquiry they belong to. Scientific truths are well-established theories in the scientific community, validated through rigorous application of the [scientific method](/source/scientific_method).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Girifalco|2007|pp=267–268}} | {{harvnb|Hatfield|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}] In studying the empirical world, scientists often employ mathematical truths, which are abstract theorems or principles demonstrated through [deductive reasoning](/source/deductive_reasoning) from [basic principles](/source/Axioms). [Philosophers of mathematics](/source/Philosophers_of_mathematics) discuss whether mathematical truths should be interpreted as insights into [mind-independent abstract objects](/source/Mathematical_Platonism) or as human [constructions](/source/Constructivism_(philosophy_of_mathematics)) arising from formal frameworks and symbolic manipulation.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nutting|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introducing the Problem}} | {{harvnb|Horsten|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Benacerraf|1973|pp=661–666}} }}] [Historical truth](/source/History) refers to the accurate presentation of past events, but it is controversial to what extent historians can achieve this ideal. Difficulties arise from the subjective nature of interpretation and the influence of personal values and biases when integrating evidence from diverse sources to arrive at a coherent narrative.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Haecker|1985|pp=267–268}} | {{harvnb|Carr|2006|loc=§ 2. "Critical" Philosophy of History: Philosophical Reflection on Historical Knowledge, § 3. Postmodern Skepticism and Its Critics}} }}] Personal historical truth plays a role in [psychoanalysis](/source/psychoanalysis) as a factor shaping an [individual's identity](/source/Personal_identity), such as the lasting effects of [traumatic childhood experiences](/source/Adverse_childhood_experiences). The remembered events may diverge from objective reality due to distortions introduced by [repression](/source/Repression_(psychoanalysis)) and [confabulation](/source/confabulation).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Akhtar|2009|pp=557–558}} | {{harvnb|De Mijolla-Mellor|2005|pp=749–750}} }}]
In [logic](/source/logic) and [semantics](/source/semantics), truth {{lang|la|simpliciter}} is sometimes distinguished from truth relative to a certain context, such as truth in a [possible world](/source/possible_world) or in a [model](/source/Model_theory). A possible world is a way of how things could have been. For example, the dinosaurs went extinct in the actual world, but there are possible worlds where they survived. Accordingly, the sentence "the dinosaurs were wiped out" is true in the actual world but false in some possible worlds. Similarly, model theory uses models{{em dash}}abstract mathematical structures{{em dash}}to represent the meanings of logical terms and expressions. In this context, the truth value of a formula can depend on the model: it may be true in one model and false in another.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cresswell|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QOGO-sab1PIC&pg=PA113 113]}} | {{harvnb|Garson|2024|loc=§ 6. Possible Worlds Semantics}} | {{harvnb|Winter|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aDRWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–20, 24–27, 240–241]}} }}] A related problem in the [philosophy of literature](/source/philosophy_of_literature) concerns truth in [fiction](/source/fiction), referring to statements that accurately describe events or characters in the imagined universe of a work of fiction, such as the claim that [Harry Potter](/source/Harry_Potter_(character)) wears glasses.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Currie|1986|pp=195–196}} | {{harvnb|Bourne|Caddick Bourne|2022|pp=15–16}} }}]
== In various fields ==
=== Science and philosophy ===
Truth is central to many disciplines. It is often considered a goal of inquiry that guides scientific research and intellectual life.[{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=1–2}}] Empirical scientists formulate testable [hypotheses](/source/hypotheses) to explain phenomena. They rely on [observation](/source/observation) and [experimentation](/source/experimentation) to collect objective data, comparing results with initial hypotheses to confirm or disconfirm theories.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Howell|2013|pp=193–194}} | {{harvnb|Kasim|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9-TqIjCDp6YC&pg=PA29 29–30]}} | {{harvnb|Aspers|Corte|2019|pp=139, 145–148}} }}]
The [formal sciences](/source/formal_sciences) demonstrate the truth of theories through more abstract methods, usually based on [deductive reasoning](/source/deductive_reasoning).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Löwe|2002|pp=5–6}} | {{harvnb|Agazzi|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nd0eEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 27]}} }}] For example, mathematicians employ [several proof methods](/source/Mathematical_proof) to establish theorems, such as [direct proof](/source/direct_proof), [proof by contradiction](/source/proof_by_contradiction), and [mathematical induction](/source/mathematical_induction).[{{harvnb|DeBonis|2025|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RYdBEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–18]}}] [Formal logic](/source/Formal_logic) studies the nature of deductive reasoning and the [rules of inference](/source/rules_of_inference) it follows. A key principle in this field is that deductive inferences preserve truth: if all premises are true, then the conclusion cannot be false. Logicians develop [formal systems](/source/formal_systems){{em dash}}abstract frameworks that precisely encode forms of deductive reasoning{{em dash}}and examine which truths can and cannot be proven within a given formal system.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bonevac|1999|pp=679–681}} | {{harvnb|Hintikka|2019|loc=Lead section, § Nature and Varieties of Logic}} }}]{{efn|Some formal systems introduce a [truth predicate](/source/truth_predicate) as a formal device to talk about the truth of sentences within the system.[{{harvnb|Eberle|1984|pp=151–152}}]}} [Truth tables](/source/Truth_tables), another tool in logic, express how the truth values of compound propositions depend on those of their constituent propositions.[{{harvnb|Marcus|2005|p=928}}]
Many issues concerning the relation between truth and inquiry are addressed by [epistemology](/source/epistemology), which studies the nature, origins, and limits of knowledge. This field treats truth as a central aspect of [knowledge](/source/knowledge){{efn|Epistemology differs in this respect from [anthropology](/source/anthropology) and [sociology](/source/sociology), which tend to characterize knowledge as ideas and practices that are shared and reproduced in societies, irrespective of their truth values.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]}} | {{harvnb|Barth|2002|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Tufari|2003|loc=Lead section}} }}]}} and examines the ways of attaining it, including the approaches of the empirical and formal sciences.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=49–50, 92–95, 101}} | {{harvnb|Bird|2010|p=5}} }}] The [philosophy of language](/source/philosophy_of_language) and [semantics](/source/semantics) regard truth as an aspect of the meaning of sentences. They are interested in the relation between words, ideas, and the world and analyze phenomena that complicate this relation, such as [ambiguity](/source/ambiguity), [vagueness](/source/vagueness), and [context](/source/context) dependence. They also address the problem of truth-value gaps: the question of whether some statements are neither true nor false.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Williams|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} | {{harvnb|Mcdowell|1982|pp=299–300}} | {{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=526–531}} }}]{{efn|Truth-value gaps are sometimes contrasted with contradictions in which a statement is both affirmed and denied, implying that it is both true and false.[{{harvnb|Priest|Berto|Weber|2025|loc=Lead section}}]}}
[Ethics](/source/Ethics) is concerned with right behavior, including truth-related behavior. For example, [Immanuel Kant](/source/Immanuel_Kant) argued that people have a duty to tell the truth and are prohibited from lying. In [metaethics](/source/metaethics), philosophers discuss whether moral statements and principles can be true, as [cognitivists](/source/Moral_cognitivism) claim, or not, as [non-cognitivists](/source/Non-cognitivism) contend.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mertens|2016|pp=27–28}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 3a. Cognitivism Versus Non-Cognitivism}} }}]
=== Religion and art ===
[[File:Al-Haqq.svg|thumb|upright=.8|alt="Al-Haqq", written in Arabic|The [Abrahamic traditions](/source/Abrahamic_religions) associate truth with the divine, such as the [Islamic](/source/Islamic) term {{tlit|ar|[Al-Haqq](/source/Al-Haqq)}} ('the Truth') as one of [Allah](/source/Allah)'s names.[{{harvnb|Streng|2005|pp=9368–9372}}]]]
Truth plays a central role [in many religions](/source/Religious_views_on_truth). The [Abrahamic traditions](/source/Abrahamic_religions) stress the importance of truthfulness and closely link truth to the divine, as reflected in the [Jewish](/source/Jewish) description of God as {{tlit|he|El Emet}} ('God of Truth'), [Jesus](/source/Jesus)'s statement "[I am the way, the truth, and the life](/source/Via_et_veritas_et_vita)" in [Christianity](/source/Christianity), and the [Islamic](/source/Islamic) term {{tlit|ar|[Al-Haqq](/source/Al-Haqq)}} ({{lit|the Truth}}) as one of [Allah](/source/Allah)'s names.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Streng|2005|pp=9368–9372}} | {{harvnb|Green|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3FoYjBICoU8C&pg=PA21 21]}} }}] Philosophers in these traditions have debated the relationship between the religious truths of [faith](/source/faith) and the philosophical truths of [reason](/source/reason). They typically argue that apparent tensions are resolvable through right interpretation. An alternative approach relies on the doctrine of [double truth](/source/double_truth), according to which divergent truths can coexist in different domains.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|pp=219–220}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=10–11}} }}]
In [Hinduism](/source/Hinduism), truth or [satya](/source/satya) is a key virtue to be practiced in thought, speech, and action, and is considered a source of individual and societal [well-being](/source/well-being). For example, it is one of the [five moral restraints](/source/Yamas) in [Patanjali's Yoga](/source/Yoga_Sutras_of_Patanjali).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jones|Ryan|2007|p=509}} | {{harvnb|Mohapatra|Mohapatra|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vpiU9m7T_tQC&pg=PA39 39]}} }}] In [Buddhism](/source/Buddhism), the concept of truth is closely related to [Buddha](/source/Buddha)'s teachings, such as the doctrine of the [Four Noble Truths](/source/Four_Noble_Truths) about the causes of [suffering](/source/Dukkha) and the path to [liberation](/source/Nirvana).[{{harvnb|Sarao|2017|pp=150–151}}] Buddhists also hold the [theory of two truths](/source/Two_truths_doctrine), according to which conventional truth, associated with the phenomenal world and everyday experience, differs from ultimate truth, which concerns the fundamental nature of reality and is required for attaining liberation.[{{harvnb|Thakchoe|2025|loc=Lead section}}] A related contrast in [Jainism](/source/Jainism) distinguishes between relative truth, which is limited to a particular time, place, and [perspective](/source/Anekantavada), and absolute truth, which transcends individual viewpoints but cannot be fully expressed in language.[{{harvnb|Schwartz|2017|pp=1257–1258}}] A form of perspectivism is also found in [Taoism](/source/Taoism), which argues that knowledge is shaped by a person's interests and engagement with the world, with each perspective providing only a partial view of reality.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Singh|2025|pp=146, 150–151}} | {{harvnb|Connolly|2011|pp=487–488}} }}]
Truth can also be expressed in the field of [art](/source/art) by manifesting ideas or understanding through aesthetic phenomena. The meanings of artworks are not always directly accessible and may require [interpretation](/source/Aesthetic_interpretation) to uncover. For example, a novel exploring the feelings and choices of fictional characters may reveal deeper truths about human nature and [moral dilemmas](/source/moral_dilemmas). Artworks may also evoke experiences that a person has not felt before, showing them new perspectives, familiarizing them with alternative ways of life, or preparing them for possible future challenges. Aesthetic philosophers discuss whether or how the truths expressed in an artwork shape aesthetic experience and contribute to its overall value.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|1998|loc=Lead section, § 2.Literature and Moral Insight, § 4. The Artistic Relevance of Truth}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|2006|pp=333, 336–337}} }}]
=== Others ===
[[File:Statue of Truth.jpg|thumb|right|alt=Photo of a statue of a robed woman holding a book|[Walter Seymour Allward](/source/Walter_Seymour_Allward)'s {{lang|la|Veritas}} ('Truth') outside [Supreme Court of Canada](/source/Supreme_Court_of_Canada), emphasizing truth as a guiding norm of law]]
Truth plays a central role in [law](/source/law) as a guiding norm to which legal processes and decisions should align. Because of difficulties in reconstructing what happened, this field relies on various [standards of proof](/source/Burden_of_proof_(law)) and [evidentiary](/source/Evidence_(law)) rules to ascertain pertinent facts. Consequently, truth by itself can be insufficient if it cannot be proven in [court](/source/court), contrasting factual truth with legal truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lawson|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tZUtDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2, 24]}} | {{harvnb|Mordini|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aZ0NDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA359 359]}} }}]
Similarly, truth is a key element in [journalism](/source/journalism), where reporters seek information from reliable sources and [fact-check](/source/Fact-checking) claims to accurately inform the public. [Media theorists](/source/Media_studies) discuss obstacles to this process, such as the spread of [misinformation](/source/misinformation), [misleadingly edited photographs](/source/Photograph_manipulation), [AI-generated image](/source/AI-generated_image)s, [political propaganda](/source/political_propaganda), and [algorithmic bias](/source/algorithmic_bias)es on social media platforms.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Birks|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zaO-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Goldstein|2007|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ha6i7TTKCtsC&pg=PR9 ix–xii, 1–2, 126–127]}} | {{harvnb|Zhang|Billard|2025|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JccdEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA84 84]}} }}]
[Psychologists](/source/Psychology) and [cognitive scientists](/source/Cognitive_science) study [cognitions](/source/cognitions) as truth-related mental processes that acquire, transform, or use information. They examine different types of cognitive processes, like [perception](/source/perception), [memory](/source/memory), and [thought](/source/thought), and investigate how [biases](/source/Cognitive_bias) and distortions affect these processes.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Matlin|2013|pp=21–22, 419–420, 427–428}} | {{harvnb|Balota|Cortese|2000|pp=153–154}} }}]
In [computer science](/source/computer_science), ''true'' and ''false'' are values of constants and variables belonging to the [Boolean data type](/source/Boolean_data_type). One of their key applications happens in [control structures](/source/control_structures) that determine the flow of code execution, such as [conditional expressions](/source/Conditional_(computer_programming)) that execute a code path only if a test condition evaluates to ''true''.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wagener|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5Jaa1BVverIC&pg=PA209 209–212]}} | {{harvnb|Henderson|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3Tla6d153uwC&pg=PA53 53–54]}} }}]
[Probability theory](/source/Probability_theory) deals with uncertain information. It uses numbers between 0 and 1 to represent the [probability](/source/probability) that a statement is true and provides rules for calculating how the probabilities of different statements influence each other.[{{harvnb|Belhaouari|Bensmail|Mehrdoust|2025|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uYREEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA99 99–101]}}]
== History ==
=== Ancient and medieval ===
[[File:1500-1200 BCE Rigveda, manuscript page sample i, Mandala 1, Hymn 1 (Sukta 1), Adhyaya 1, lines 1.1.1 to 1.1.9, Sanskrit, Devanagari.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of a text written in Sanskrit|The [Rigveda](/source/Rigveda), an ancient Indian scripture, explored the relation between [cosmic truth](/source/%E1%B9%9Ata) and [individual truth](/source/Satya).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brown|1972|pp=57–60}} | {{harvnb|Whitehouse|1983|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jrexCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA430 430]}} }}]]]
[[File:Aristotle Altemps Inv8575.jpg|thumb|alt=Bust of Aristotle.|upright=.8|[Aristotle](/source/Aristotle) conceived an early form of the correspondence theory of truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=354–358}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Greek Origins}} }}]]]
Discussions of the role and nature of truth arose in [antiquity](/source/Ancient_history). In [ancient India](/source/ancient_India), the [Rigveda](/source/Rigveda), composed in the 2nd millennium BCE, stressed the spiritual importance of truthfulness, exploring the relation between [the cosmic truth](/source/%E1%B9%9Ata), which concerns the laws of the universe, and [individual truth](/source/Satya), which concerns each individual's duty.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schwartz|2017|pp=1257–1258}} | {{harvnb|Nath|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA65 65–66]}} }}] [Buddhism](/source/Buddhism), originating roughly in the 6th century BCE,[{{harvnb|DK staff|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8rqpDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA76 76]}}] closely associated truth with [Buddha](/source/Buddha)'s teachings and formulated the [two truths doctrine](/source/two_truths_doctrine), according to which conventional truth of everyday life differs from ultimate truth about the fundamental nature of reality.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sarao|2017|pp=150–151}} | {{harvnb|Thakchoe|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}] The school of [Nyaya](/source/Nyaya), which arose around 200 CE,[{{harvnb|Phillips|1998|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=z02WEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA39 39]}}] understood truth as a property of accurate cognitions, analyzing their internal structure in terms of objects, properties, and relations.[{{harvnb|Shaw|2024|pp=178–184}}] The topic of truth received less attention in ancient Chinese thought, where the focus was more on right conduct and practical consequences than on abstract semantic properties of statements.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fraser|2020|pp=113–117}} | {{harvnb|Fraser|2024|loc=§ 3. The Search for Objective Standards, § 4. Epistemology}} }}]
In [ancient Greek thought](/source/Ancient_Greek_philosophy), truth was understood as {{lang|grc|aletheia}} or disclosure, which could refer both to reality itself and to what is revealed to the mind.[{{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=339–342}}] [Parmenides](/source/Parmenides) (fl. 5th century BCE)[{{harvnb|Palmer|2025|loc=Lead section}}] distinguished truth from opinion, associating truth with thought and being while contrasting it with non-being.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=347–349}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Greek Origins}} }}] [Protagoras](/source/Protagoras) ({{circa|490|420 BCE}}) proposed a form of relativism according to which "man is the measure of all things".[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=349–350}} | {{harvnb|Bonazzi|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}] The [skeptics](/source/Ancient_skepticism) questioned the human ability to acquire truth and recommended [suspension of belief](/source/Epoch%C3%A9).[{{harvnb|Vogt|2022|loc=Lead section}}] [Plato](/source/Plato) ({{circa|428|348 BCE}}) formulated an account of true and false statements, linking truth to reality or the way things are. His student [Aristotle](/source/Aristotle) (384–322 BCE) conceived an early form of the correspondence theory of truth. He distinguished truthbearers in thought and speech from the things they describe, arguing that a statement is true if it aligns with how things are. Aristotle also separated truth itself from criteria of truth and held that something can be true even if no one thinks about it.[{{harvnb|Hill|Blazejak|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UQE5EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}}] defended the [bivalence of truth](/source/Principle_of_bivalence), according to which every proposition is either true or false, and distinguished propositions from uttered sentences and the reality they describe.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dentsoras|2022|pp=107–110}} | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=§ 1. Brief History}} }}]
At the transition to the [medieval period](/source/Medieval_philosophy), [Augustine of Hippo](/source/Augustine_of_Hippo) (354–430 CE) integrated Greek philosophy with [Christian](/source/Christianity) doctrine. He held that truth is unchangeable, eternal, and necessary, maintaining that truth is identical to God.[{{harvnb|Cameron|2018|pp=50–52}}] Building on Augustine's ideas, [Anselm of Canterbury](/source/Anselm_of_Canterbury) (1033–1109 CE) argued that statements are true only in a derivative sense since truth primarily resides in things that participate in God as the highest truth. Similarly, [Thomas Aquinas](/source/Thomas_Aquinas) (1225–1274 CE) conceived truth as a metaphysical property of entities. He maintained that a thing is true if it matches God's idea of it, analogous to how a designed artifact may perfectly correspond to what the artisan intended.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cameron|2018|pp=52–53}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Patristic and Medieval Thought}} }}] In [Islamic thought](/source/Islamic_philosophy), [Avicenna](/source/Avicenna) ({{circa|980}}–1037 CE) distinguished three senses of truth: as the reality of individual entities, as the divine reality of God as a necessary being, and as the correctness of statements.[{{harvnb|Lizzini|2023|pp=246–249, 258–260}}]
=== Modern and contemporary ===
[[File:Wismar Marienkirche Bronzebüste Gottlob Frege (01-1).JPG|thumb|upright=.6|alt=Bust of Gottlob Frege.|[Gottlob Frege](/source/Gottlob_Frege) examined the role of truth in logic.[{{harvnb|Heck|May|2018|pp=193–197, 200, 208–209, 212–213}}]]]
[[File:Russell1907-2.jpg|thumb|alt=Bertrand Russell.|upright=0.8|[Bertrand Russell](/source/Bertrand_Russell) proposed an influential fact-based correspondence theory of truth.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=228–233}} | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=Lead section, § 1.2 Object-Based and Fact-Based Versions}} }}]]]
In [early modern philosophy](/source/early_modern_philosophy), [René Descartes](/source/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes) (1596–1650) examined truth from an epistemological perspective, arguing for the existence of clear and distinct ideas that are true and cannot be doubted.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nelson|2018|pp=75–80}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Modern Development}} }}] [Baruch Spinoza](/source/Baruch_Spinoza) (1632–1677) asserted that human ideas are adequate or inadequate but not true in a strict sense since only ideas in God's mind are true.[{{harvnb|Nelson|2018|pp=80–82}}] [John Locke](/source/John_Locke) (1632–1704) maintained that thoughts or mental propositions are the primary truthbearers, understanding them as combinations of signs or ideas. He held that sentences or verbal propositions are true in a derivative sense if they express true mental propositions.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nelson|2018|pp=83–85}} | {{harvnb|Murray|Tillman|2022|p=9}} | {{harvnb|Powell|2022|pp=131–133}} }}]
[Immanuel Kant](/source/Immanuel_Kant) understood [judgments](/source/judgments) as the main truthbearers, arguing that a judgment is true if it agrees with its object. In his [transcendental idealism](/source/transcendental_idealism), objects are not entirely independent of observers since the mind actively structures experience following inbuilt forms and [categories](/source/Category_(Kant)). This raises the question of the extent to which truth is objective or subjective.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tolley|2018|pp=93–98}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Modern Development}} }}] [Bernard Bolzano](/source/Bernard_Bolzano) (1781–1848) criticized this aspect of Kant's philosophy and proposed a clear distinction between subjective acts of representation and the objective contents of those acts, which can be true or false.[{{harvnb|Tolley|2018|pp=101–103}}] [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel](/source/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel) (1770–1831) regarded truth as an agreement of a thing with its concept rather than a property of statements. According to his holistic vision, all finite things are strictly speaking false, and only the whole is true.[{{harvnb|Magee|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=khvwPJMzNzMC&pg=PA250 250–251]}}] Inspired by Hegel, [F. H. Bradley](/source/F._H._Bradley) (1846–1924) agreed that truth ultimately resides in the whole or [the absolute](/source/Absolute_(philosophy)). He held that truth comes in degrees based on the extent to which an entity aligns with the whole. His views are often interpreted as a form of coherence theory or identity theory.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baldwin|2018|pp=125–128}} | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=233–237}} }}]
[Søren Kierkegaard](/source/S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard) (1813–1855) emphasized subjective truth or how a person's inward commitments shape their existence, expressed in the slogan "truth is subjectivity".[{{harvnb|Schacht|1973|pp=297–313}}] [Friedrich Nietzsche](/source/Friedrich_Nietzsche) (1844–1900) understood truth as a moral phenomenon that serves the preservation and enhancement of life. He saw it as an expression of the [will to power](/source/will_to_power), rejecting correspondence theory in favor of a [perspectivism](/source/perspectivism) that acknowledges multiple viewpoints without an overarching objective truth.[{{harvnb|Burnham|2014|p=325–329}}] In the [pragmatist](/source/Pragmatism) tradition, [William James](/source/William_James) (1842–1910) characterized truth in terms of practical consequences and utility, while [C. S. Peirce](/source/C._S._Peirce) (1839–1914) argued that truth is what would result after endless scientific inquiry.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Capps|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} }}]
[Gottlob Frege](/source/Gottlob_Frege) (1848–1925) examined the role of truth in logic, such as his ideas that sentences refer to truth values and that [logical operators](/source/logical_operators) and [predicates](/source/Predicate_(logic)) are functions that yield truth values. His outlook inspired deflationism, but not all of his views are compatible with this theory.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heck|May|2018|pp=193–197, 200, 208–209, 212–213}} | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=§ 7. Deflationary Theories}} }}] In their early philosophies, [G. E. Moore](/source/G._E._Moore) (1873–1958) and [Bertrand Russell](/source/Bertrand_Russell) (1872–1970) defended a kind of primitivism according to which truth is an indefinable property. They later proposed a fact-based correspondence theory, often treated as the classical formulation of this view, stating that a belief is true if it corresponds to a fact.[{{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=244–245}}]
[Alfred Tarski](/source/Alfred_Tarski) (1901–1983) developed the [semantic theory of truth](/source/semantic_theory_of_truth), which uses a meta-language to analyze the truth conditions of sentences in an object language. He limited this view to truth in [formal languages](/source/formal_languages). [Donald Davidson](/source/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)) (1917–2003) extended Tarski's approach to the study of truth in [natural languages](/source/natural_languages).[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=268–269, 273, 288}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=6, 44, 46, 50–51}} }}] [Michael Dummett](/source/Michael_Dummett) (1925–2011) criticized deflationism and developed a form of verificationism according to which a statement is true if it is verifiable.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=275–279}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=31–32, 52}} }}]{{efn|The idea of verificationism was already discussed earlier by the [logical positivists](/source/Logical_positivism). However, it is controversial whether they understood it only as a theory of meaning or also as a theory of truth.[{{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=254–256}}]}} Responding to the difficulties of providing a unified concept of truth, [Hilary Putnam](/source/Hilary_Putnam) (1926–2016) and [Richard Rorty](/source/Richard_Rorty) (1931–2007) formulated pluralist theories of truth, according to which the nature of truth is not uniform but depends on the analyzed domain.[{{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=278, 301–302}}]
[Edmund Husserl](/source/Edmund_Husserl) (1859–1938) analyzed truth from a [phenomenological](/source/Phenomenology_(philosophy)) perspective as an ideal correlate of intentional acts, emphasizing the role of evident experience.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dupre|1964|pp=345}} | {{harvnb|Dahlstrom|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2l7M6YHn9VoC&pg=PA34 34]}} }}] His student [Martin Heidegger](/source/Martin_Heidegger) (1889–1976) understood truth as unconcealment in his attempt to recover the ancient Greek concept of {{lang|grc|aletheia}}, which he regarded as more fundamental than the modern concept of correspondence.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wrathall|2025|loc=§ 2.7 Truth}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Contemporary Directions}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=4–5}} }}] In his [existentialist](/source/existentialist) philosophy, [Jean-Paul Sartre](/source/Jean-Paul_Sartre) (1905–1980) characterized truth as "subjectivity externalized", understanding it as the way the mind-independent world is illuminated and becomes meaningful to human consciousness.[{{harvnb|Wider|1995|pp=91–92}}] [Postmodern philosophers](/source/Postmodern_philosophy) challenged the idea that truth is objective and universal, analyzing how power relations and social contexts shape what is accepted as true. For example, [Michel Foucault](/source/Michel_Foucault) explored the role of truth in discursive practices and social institutions, such as the idea that institutions determine what counts as truth and use it to wield power.[{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=4–5}} | {{harvnb|Gutting|Oksala|2025|loc=§ 3. Major Works}} | {{harvnb|Trakakis|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=XXdKCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35–36]}} }}]
==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy|Psychology}}
* [Asha](/source/Asha)
* [Slingshot argument](/source/Slingshot_argument)
== References ==
=== Notes ===
{{notelist|30em}}
=== Citations ===
{{reflist|30em}}
=== Sources ===
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{cite book |last1=Agazzi |first1=Evandro |editor-last1=Dilworth |editor-first1=Craig |title=Right, Wrong and Science |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-33322-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nd0eEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 |language=en |date=2016 }}
* {{cite web |author1=AHD staff |title=Truth |url=https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=truth |website=The American Heritage Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins |access-date=9 January 2026 |date=2022 }}
* {{cite web |author1=AHD staff |title=Truthful |url=https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=truthful |website=The American Heritage Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins |access-date=9 January 2026 |date=2022a }}
* {{cite book |last1=Akhtar |first1=Salman |date=2009 |title=Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychoanalysis |chapter=Narrative Truth and Historical Truth |pages=557–558 |publisher=Karnac Books}}
* {{cite book |last1=Akiba |first1=Ken |title=The Philosophy Major's Introduction to Philosophy: Concepts and Distinctions |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-16321-6 |language=en |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Allwood |first1=Carl Martin |title=The Encyclopedia of Cross-Cultural Psychology |date=2013 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons, Inc. |isbn=978-1-118-33989-3 |pages=69–72 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 |language=en |chapter=Anthropology of Knowledge |doi=10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Armour-Garb |first1=Bradley |last2=Stoljar |first2=Daniel |last3=Woodbridge |first3=James |title=Deflationism About Truth |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=24 January 2026 |date=2023 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Armstrong |first1=David Malet |title=Truth and Truthmakers |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-511-31595-4 |language=en |date=2004 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Asay |first1=Jamin |title=Truthmaker Theory |url=https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Asay |first1=Jamin |title=Something is True |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=105 |issue=3 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12836 |date=2022 |pages=687–705 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Aspers |first1=Patrik |last2=Corte |first2=Ugo |title=What is Qualitative in Qualitative Research |journal=Qualitative Sociology |volume=42 |issue=2 |doi=10.1007/s11133-019-9413-7 |date=2019 |pages=139–160|pmc=6494783 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Azzouni |first1=Jody |pages=477–502 |chapter=17. Deflationist Truth |editor1-last=Glanzberg |editor1-first=Michael |title=The Oxford Handbook of Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-174977-3 |language=en |date=2018}}
* {{cite web |last1=Baehr |first1=Jason S. |title=A Priori and A Posteriori |url=https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=17 September 2022 |archive-date=7 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210807213522/https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Baldwin |first1=Thomas |pages=125–149 |chapter=5. Truth in British Idealism and its Analytic Critics |editor1-last=Glanzberg |editor1-first=Michael |title=The Oxford Handbook of Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-174977-3 |language=en |date=2018}}
* {{cite book |last1=Balota |first1=David A. |last2=Cortese |first2=Michael J. |editor1-last=Kazdin |editor1-first=Alan E. |title=Encyclopedia of Psychology |volume=2 |publisher=American Psychological Association |isbn=978-1-55798-187-5 |chapter=Cognitive Psychology: Theories |date=2000 |pages=153–158}}
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* {{cite book |last1=Lawson |first1=Gary |title=Evidence of the Law: Proving Legal Claims |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-43205-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tZUtDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2017 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Lizzini |first1=Olga L. |editor1-last=Krause |editor1-first=Katja |editor2-last=López-Farjeat |editor2-first=Luis Xavier |editor3-last=Oschman |editor3-first=Nicholas A. |title=Contextualizing Premodern Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-003-30989-5 |edition=1st |doi=10.4324/9781003309895-13 |language=en |chapter=Ontology and Logic in Avicenna's Concept of Truth |date=2023 |pages=246–275 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Loux |first1=Michael J. |last2=Crisp |first2=Thomas M. |title=Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction |date=2017 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-138-63933-1 |edition=4th }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Löwe |first1=Benedikt |title=The Formal Sciences: Their Scope, Their Foundations, and Their Unity |journal=Synthese |volume=133 |issue=1-2 |doi=10.1023/A:1020887832028 |date=2002 |pages=5–11}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lowe |first1=E. J. |chapter=Truth |pages=926–927 |date=2005 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lynch |first1=Michael P. |title=The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-62145-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zXzEP1SgMz8C&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2001 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Lynch |first1=Michael P. |title=True to Life: Why Truth Matters |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-27870-6 |date=2004 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Lynch |first1=M. P. |title=Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth |journal=Synthese |volume=145 |issue=1 |doi=10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2 |date=2005 |pages=29–43}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lyon |first1=Ardon |chapter=Objectivism and Subjectivism |page=667 |date=2005 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7}}
* {{cite web |last1=MacBride |first1=Fraser |last2=Daly |first2=Christopher |title=Truthmakers |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 January 2026 |date=2025 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Magee |first1=Glenn Alexander |title=The Hegel Dictionary |publisher=A&C Black |isbn=978-1-84706-591-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=khvwPJMzNzMC&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2010 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Marcus |first1=Ruth Barcan |chapter=Truth-table |page=928 |date=2005 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7}}
* {{cite book |last1=Matlin |first1=Margaret W. |title=Cognition |edition=8th |date=2013 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-14896-9}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Mcdowell |first1=John |title=Truth-Value Gaps |journal=Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics |volume=104 |doi=10.1016/S0049-237X(09)70201-0 |date=1982 |pages=299–313}}
* {{cite web |last1=McGrath |first1=Matthew |last2=Frank |first2=Devin |title=Propositions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=7 November 2025 |date=2024 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Mertens |first1=Thomas |title=On Kant's Duty to Speak the Truth |journal=Kantian Review |volume=21 |issue=1 |doi=10.1017/S1369415415000291 |date=2016 |pages=27–51}}
* {{cite book |last1=Misak |first1=Cheryl |pages=283–304 |chapter=11. The Pragmatist Theory of Truth |editor1-last=Glanzberg |editor1-first=Michael |title=The Oxford Handbook of Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-174977-3 |language=en |date=2018}}
* {{cite book |last1=Mohapatra |first1=Amulya |last2=Mohapatra |first2=Bijaya |title=Hinduism: Analytical Study |publisher=Mittal Publications |isbn=978-81-7099-388-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vpiU9m7T_tQC&pg=PA39 |language=en |date=1993 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Mordini |first1=Emilio |editor1-last=Tistarelli |editor1-first=Massimo |editor2-last=Champod |editor2-first=Christophe |title=Handbook of Biometrics for Forensic Science |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-50673-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aZ0NDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA359 |language=en |chapter=Ethics and Policy of Forensic Biometric |date=2017 |pages=353–366 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Murray |first1=Adam Russell |last2=Tillman |first2=Chris |editor1-last=Tillman |editor1-first=Chris |editor2-last=Murray |editor2-first=Adam |title=The Routledge Handbook of Propositions |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-27050-0 |edition=1st |doi=10.4324/9781315270500-1 |language=en |chapter=Introduction |date=2022 |pages=1–54}}
* {{cite web |author1=MW staff |title=Truth |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/truth |website=Merriam-Webster Dictionary |publisher=Merriam-Webster, Incorporated |access-date=9 January 2026 |language=en |date=2026 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Nath |first1=Lopita |editor1-last=Curta |editor1-first=Florin |editor2-last=Holt |editor2-first=Andrew |title=Great Events in Religion: An Encyclopedia of Pivotal Events in Religious History [3 volumes] |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing USA |isbn=978-1-61069-566-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA65 |language=en |chapter=Mahavira dn the Foundations of Jainism (6th century BC) |date=2016 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Nelson |first1=Alan H. |pages=75–92 |chapter=3. Early Modern Theories of Truth |editor1-last=Glanzberg |editor1-first=Michael |title=The Oxford Handbook of Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-174977-3 |language=en |date=2018}}
* {{cite book |last1=Niiniluoto |first1=I. |title=Truthlikeness |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-90-277-2354-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Xh5YR6kUPIkC&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=1987 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Nutting |first1=Eileen S. |title=The Benacerraf Problem of Mathematical Truth and Knowledge |url=https://iep.utm.edu/benacerraf-problem-of-mathematical-truth-and-knowledge/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=14 January 2026}}
* {{cite book |last1=O'Callaghan |first1=Cian |editor1-last=Kobayashi |editor1-first=Audrey |title=International Encyclopedia of Human Geography |publisher=Elsevier |isbn=978-0-08-102296-2 |doi=10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10683-3 |language=en |chapter=Postpolitics and Post-Truth |date=2020 |pages=339–345 }}
* {{cite book |last1=O'Farrell |first1=F. P. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |date=2003 |publisher=Thomson/Gale |isbn=978-0-7876-4008-8 |language=en |chapter=Truth |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/truth}}
* {{cite book |last1=Oddie |first1=Graham |title=The International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-8641-4 |edition=1st |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588 |language=en |chapter=Value Realism |doi=10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588 |date=2013 |access-date=2024-09-09 |archive-date=2024-09-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240922164154/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Oddie |first1=Graham |last2=Cevolani |first2=Gustavo |title=Truthlikeness |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthlikeness/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 January 2026 |date=2022 }}
* {{cite web |url=https://www.oed.com/dictionary/truth_n |website=Oxford English Dictionary |date=2026 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=3rd |title=Truth, n. |author=OED staff}}
* {{cite book |last1=Oliver |first1=Alex |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |chapter=Value, Ontological Status of |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N066-1 |date=1998 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }}
* {{cite web |author1=OUP staff |title=Word of the Year 2016 is... |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161116101017/https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 |website=Oxford Dictionary |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2016 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Palmer |first1=John |title=Parmenides |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/parmenides/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2026 |date=2025 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Parent |first1=Ted |title=Modal Metaphysics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=15 January 2026}}
* {{cite book |last1=Pedersen |first1=Nikolaj J. L. L. |last2=Lynch |first2=Michael P. |pages=543–576 |chapter=20. Truth Pluralism |editor1-last=Glanzberg |editor1-first=Michael |title=The Oxford Handbook of Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-174977-3 |language=en |date=2018}}
* {{cite book |last1=Phillips |first1=Stephen H. |title=Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of New Logic |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |isbn=978-81-208-1488-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z02WEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA39 |language=en |date=1998 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Powell |first1=Lewis |chapter=6. Lockean Propositions |doi=10.4324/9781315270500-9 |pages=130–143 |editor1-last=Tillman |editor1-first=Chris |editor2-last=Murray |editor2-first=Adam |title=The Routledge Handbook of Propositions |publisher=Routledge |edition=1st |date=2022 |isbn=978-1-315-27050-0 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Pradhan |first1=Ramesh Chandra |title=Mind, Meaning and World: A Transcendental Perspective |publisher=Springer Nature Singapore |isbn=978-981-13-7228-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DR-VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |language=en |date=2019 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Pratt |first1=Alan |title=Nihilism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/nihilism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=7 February 2025}}
* {{cite web |last1=Priest |first1=Graham |last2=Berto |first2=Francesco |last3=Weber |first3=Zach |title=Dialetheism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 January 2026 |date=2025 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Russell |first1=Bruce |title=A Priori Justification and Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 September 2022 |date=2020 |archive-date=12 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812143105/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Russell |first1=Gillian |title=Analytic/Synthetic Distinction |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0044.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies |publisher=Oxford University Press |access-date=16 August 2024 |language=en |date=2023 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Sarao |first1=K. T. S. |editor1-last=Sarao |editor1-first=K. T. S. |editor2-last=Long |editor2-first=Jeffery D. |date=2017 |title=Buddhism And Jainism |chapter=Aryasacca |pages=150–153 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-94-024-0852-2}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Schacht |first1=Richard |title=Kierkegaard on 'Truth is Subjectivity' and 'The Leap of Faith' |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |volume=2 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1973.10716045 |date=1973 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Schwartz |first1=Andrew |editor1-last=Sarao |editor1-first=K. T. S. |editor2-last=Long |editor2-first=Jeffery D. |date=2017 |title=Buddhism And Jainism |chapter=Truth (Jainism) |pages=1257–1259 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-94-024-0852-2}}
* {{cite book |last1=Shaw |first1=James R. |title=Wittgenstein on Rules: Justification, Grammar, and Agreement |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-760998-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zb2ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA190 |language=en |date=2023 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Shaw |first1=J. L. |editor1-last=Keating |editor1-first=Malcolm |editor2-last=Dasti |editor2-first=Matthew R. |title=The Vindication of the World |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-003-40178-0 |edition=1st |doi=10.4324/9781003401780-11 |language=en |chapter=The Nyāya on Truth |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Simmons |first1=Keith |editor1-last=Borchert |editor1-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy |volume=9: Shaftesbury–Zulibri |date=2006 |publisher=Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference |isbn=978-0-02-865789-9 |edition=2. |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/truth |chapter=Truth |pages=534–542}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Singh |first1=Danesh |title=Perspectivism and Skill Knowledge in Zhuangzi's Philosophy |journal=Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy |volume=1 |issue=2 |doi=10.1163/29502799-bja10008 |date=2025 |pages=146–165 |doi-access=free }}
* {{cite book |last1=Slocombe |first1=William |title=Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-48935-9 |language=en |date=2006}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=Emmanuel |title=Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs |journal=Episteme |doi=10.1017/epi.2023.49 |date=2023 |volume=22 |pages=179–192 |issn=1750-0117 |doi-access=free }}
* {{cite book |last1=Soames |first1=Scott |title=Understanding Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-512335-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LQ0nSJtm4KYC&pg=PA120 |language=en |date=1999 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Solomon |first1=Robert C. |chapter=Subjective Truth |page=900 |date=2005 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7}}
* {{cite web |last1=Steup |first1=Matthias |last2=Neta |first2=Ram |title=Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 July 2024 |date=2024 |archive-date=21 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200721023728/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Stone |first1=Jim |title=Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=60 |issue=3 |doi=10.2307/2653812 |date=2000 |pages=527–545}}
* {{cite book |last1=Streng |first1=Frederick J. |editor-last=Jones |editor-first=Lindsay |title=Encyclopedia Of Religion |chapter=Truth |edition=2nd |date=2005 |publisher=Thomson Gale |pages=9368–9377 |isbn=978-0-02-865997-8}}
* {{cite web |last1=Stroll |first1=Avrum |title=Epistemology |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=20 May 2022 |language=en |archive-date=10 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190710175341/https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |url-status=live |date=2023 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Strollo |first1=Andrea |title=Truth (Bearers) Pluralism |journal=Synthese |volume=201 |issue=4 |doi=10.1007/s11229-023-04081-x |date=2023 |hdl=11368/3042498 |hdl-access=free }}
* {{cite book |last1=Taylor |first1=Paul |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Art and Truth |publisher=Routledge |date=1998 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-M008-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Taylor |first1=C. C. W. |chapter=Double Truth |page=219–220 |date=2005 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7}}
* {{cite web |last1=Thakchoe |first1=Sonam |title=The Theory of Two Truths in India |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 January 2026 |date=2025 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Tolley |first1=Clinton |pages=93–122 |chapter=4. Idealism and the Question of Truth |editor1-last=Glanzberg |editor1-first=Michael |title=The Oxford Handbook of Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-174977-3 |language=en |date=2018}}
* {{cite book |last1=Trakakis |first1=N. N. |editor1-last=Oppy |editor1-first=Graham |title=The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-51592-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XXdKCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA36 |language=en |chapter=Postmodern Approches to Religion |date=2015 |pages=32–50}}
* {{cite book |last1=Tufari |first1=P. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |date=2003 |publisher=Thomson/Gale |isbn=978-0-7876-4008-8 |language=en |chapter=Knowledge, Sociology of |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge}}
* {{cite book |last1=Ulatowski |first1=Joseph |title=Commonsense Pluralism about Truth: An Empirical Defence |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-69465-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8ipADwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2017 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Vogt |first1=Katja |title=Ancient Skepticism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 January 2026 |date=2022 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wagener |first1=Jerrold L. |editor1-last=Reilly |editor1-first=Edwin D. |title=Concise Encyclopedia of Computer Science |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-09095-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5Jaa1BVverIC&pg=PA209 |language=en |chapter=Control Structures |date=2004 |pages=209–212}}
* {{cite book |last1=Weatherson |first1=Brian |editor1-last=Cappelen |editor1-first=Herman |editor2-last=Gendler |editor2-first=Tamar Szabó |editor3-last=Hawthorne |editor3-first=John |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-966877-9 |edition=1st |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.24 |language=en |chapter=13. Analytic–Synthetic and A Priori–A Posteriori History |date=2016 |pages=231–248}}
* {{cite book |last1=Whitehouse |first1=Ruth |title=Macmillan Dictionary of Archaeology |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-1-349-04874-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jrexCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA430 |language=en |date=1983 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Wider |first1=Kathleen |title=Truth and Existence: The Idealism in Sartre's Theory of Truth |journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies |volume=3 |issue=1 |doi=10.1080/09672559508570805 |date=1995 |pages=91–109}}
* {{cite book |last1=Williams |first1=Stephen G. |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Meaning and Truth |publisher=Routledge |date=1998 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-X024-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Winter |first1=Yoad |title=Elements of Formal Semantics: An Introduction to the Mathematical Theory of Meaning in Natural Language |publisher=Edinburgh University Press |isbn=978-0-7486-7777-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aDRWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2016 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wolenski |first1=Jan |author-link=Jan Wolenski |editor1-last=Niiniluoto |editor1-first=I. |editor2-last=Sintonen |editor2-first=Matti |editor3-last=Wolenski |editor3-first=Jan |title=Handbook of Epistemology |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-4020-1986-9 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=History of Epistemology |date=2004 |pages=3–56 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Woleński |first1=Jan |title=Aletheia in Greek thought until Aristotle |journal=Annals of Pure and Applied Logic |volume=127 |issue=1-3 |doi=10.1016/j.apal.2003.11.020 |date=2004 |pages=339–360 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Wrathall |first1=Mark |title=Martin Heidegger |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=30 January 2026 |date=2025 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Young |first1=James O. |title=Relatively Speaking: The Coherence of Anti-Realist Relativism |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |volume=16 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1986.10717132 |date=1986 |pages=503–509}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Young |first1=James O. |title=Relativism and Anti-realism |journal=Ratio |volume=9 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00094.x |date=1996 |pages=68–77}}
* {{cite web |last1=Zangwill |first1=Nick |title=Aesthetic Judgment |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-judgment/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 January 2026 |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Zhang |first1=Erique |last2=Billard |first2=Thomas J. |editor1-last=Ramasubramanian |editor1-first=Srividya |editor2-last=Banjo |editor2-first=Omotayo O. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Media and Social Justice |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-774436-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JccdEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA84 |language=en |chapter=Queer and Transgender Media Studies |date=2025 |pages=78–86}}
{{refend}}
==External links==
{{wikiquote}}
{{Wiktionary|truth}}
{{Commons category|Truth}}
{{Theories of Truth|state=expanded}}
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Category:Truth
Category:Concepts in epistemology
Category:Concepts in logic
Category:Concepts in metaphysics
Category:Meaning (philosophy)
---
Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Truth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.