# Tianxia

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Chinese cultural, philosophical, and political concept

"T'ien Hsia" redirects here. For the magazine published in the 1930s and 1940s, see [T'ien Hsia Monthly](/source/T'ien_Hsia_Monthly). For the 2007 TV series, see [Ming Dynasty (2007 TV series)](/source/Ming_Dynasty_(2007_TV_series)).

Tianxia Chinese name Chinese 天下 Literal meaning under heaven[1] Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin tiānxià Gwoyeu Romatzyh tianshiah Wade–Giles t'ien1-hsia4 IPA [tʰjɛ́n.ɕjâ] Wu Romanization thie-ya Hakka Romanization ien24 ha55 Yue: Cantonese Yale Romanization tīn-hah Jyutping tin1-haa6 IPA [tʰin˥.ha˨] Southern Min Hokkien POJ thian-hā Eastern Min Fuzhou BUC tiĕng-hâ Vietnamese name Vietnamese alphabet thiên hạ Chữ Hán 天下 Zhuang name Zhuang lajmbwn Korean name Hangul 천하 Hanja 天下 Transcriptions Revised Romanization cheonha McCune–Reischauer ch'ŏnha Japanese name Kanji 天下 Kana てんか てんげ てんが あめのした Transcriptions Romanization tenka tenge tenga ame-no-shita

Part of a series on Names of China خىتاي Cathay चीन Cīna 天朝 Celestial Empire 中華帝國 Chinese Empire 神州 Divine land 四海 Four Seas 华夏; 華夏 Huaxia 九州 Nine Provinces Σηρικά Serica 支那 Shina 天下 Tianxia 中国 Tiongkok 中国; 中國 Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom) 中华; 中華 Zhonghua v t e

***Tianxia*** ([Chinese](/source/Chinese_language): 天下; [pinyin](/source/Pinyin): *Tiānxià*; lit. '[everything] under [Heaven](/source/Tian)') is a term for a historical [Chinese cultural](/source/Chinese_culture) concept that denoted either the entire geographical world or the metaphysical realm of mortals, and later became associated with political sovereignty. In [ancient China](/source/History_of_China#Ancient_China) and [imperial China](/source/History_of_China#Imperial_China), *tianxia* denoted the lands, space, and area divinely appointed to the [Chinese sovereign](/source/Chinese_sovereign) by universal and well-defined principles of order. The center of this land was directly apportioned to the Chinese court, forming the center of a world view that centered on the Chinese court and went concentrically outward to major and minor officials and then the common subjects, [tributary states](/source/Tributary_system_of_China), and finally ending with fringe [barbarians](/source/Barbarian#China).

The larger concept of *tianxia* is closely associated with [civilization](/source/Civilization) and order in classical Chinese philosophy. Some contemporary Chinese scholars have attempted to apply the concept in the 21st century.

## Historical development

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The historical consensus is that a *tianxia* system existed at various points in Chinese history. Historical views differ, however, on exactly when it was in place.[2] According to academic Chenyang Song, in ancient times, *tianxia* represented a unity of the "supremacy" (maintaining interconnectedness between political entities), "heaven" (directing the fate of the people), and "ancestors" (who bestowed blessings on royal descendants).**[3]**: 50 How a system of *tianxia* operated varied over time, ranging from vassal states accepted the authority of a Chinese emperor to when vassal states nominally paid tribute while in fact exercising their own authority. In the most expansive historical view, a *tianxia* system existed between the Zhou (1027–256 BC) and Qing dynasties (1644–1911).[2]

According to political scientist [Yan Xuetong](/source/Yan_Xuetong) of [Tsinghua University](/source/Tsinghua_University), "Given the then lack of a modern science of understanding geography, the Chinese notion of all under heaven meant all the land, sea, and people under heaven. The term all under heaven was virtually synonymous with the world."[4] As reconstructed by philosopher [Zhao Tingyang](/source/Zhao_Tingyang), *tianxia* presupposed "inclusion of all" and implied acceptance of the world's diversities, emphasizing harmonious reciprocal dependence and ruled by virtue as a means for lasting peace.[5] According to Zhao, in the *tianxia* system, rulers relied on humane authority, as opposed to tyranny and military force, to win the hearts and minds of the people.[5]

The *tianxia* [world view](/source/World_view) was not fully developed during the [Shang dynasty](/source/Shang_dynasty). During the [Zhou dynasty](/source/Zhou_dynasty), it is first attested that Heaven took on anthropomorphic deity traits,[*[relevant?](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Writing_better_articles#Stay_on_topic)*] and the concept of *tianxia* became common. Other political terms emerged during this time. These include 'four quarters' (四方; *sìfāng*)—referring to the territory established by the Zhou court and governed from the capital—and 'ten thousand states' (万邦; 萬邦; *wànbāng*), referring to both the territory as well as the [Hua](/source/Huaxia) and [barbarian](/source/Hua%E2%80%93Yi_distinction) subjects residing on it. The Zhou kings received and empowered these "Ten Thousand States" by virtue of the [Mandate of Heaven](/source/Mandate_of_Heaven).[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

During the [Spring and Autumn](/source/Spring_and_Autumn_period) and [Warring States periods](/source/Warring_States_period) comprising the latter half of the Zhou dynasty, the power of local rulers developed rapidly, and several regions outside the Zhou cultural sphere became powerful [states](/source/State_(Ancient_China)) themselves.[6] As many of these states had shared cultural heritage and economic interests, the concept of a great nation centered on the [Yellow River Plain](/source/Yellow_River_Plain) gradually expanded. The term *tianxia* began to appear in classical texts such as the *[Zuozhuan](/source/Zuozhuan)*[7] and *[Guoyu](/source/Guoyu_(book))*.[8]

The theme of unification applied to *tianxia* can be seen in [Sun Tzu](/source/Sun_Tzu)'s *[The Art of War](/source/The_Art_of_War)* where the supreme goal of offensive strategy was to conquer without destroying that which you sought to conquer:

必以全爭於天下，故兵不頓而利可全，此謀攻之法也。

— Sun Tzu,*The Art of War*
Chapter III[9]

Translation:

Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and your gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy.

— Griffith translation, 1963[10]

During [Qin's wars of unification](/source/Qin's_wars_of_unification), the concept of *tianxia* was adapted to act as an actual geographic entity. [Qin Shi Huang](/source/Qin_Shi_Huang)'s goal to 'unify all under Heaven' was in fact representative of his desire to control and expand Chinese territory. At the founding of the [Han dynasty](/source/Han_dynasty), the equivalence of *tianxia* with the Chinese nation evolved due to the practice of [enfeoffment](/source/Enfeoffment) of imperial relatives in return for military assistance. Although many areas enjoyed great autonomy, the practice established and spread Chinese language and culture throughout an even wider territory.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*] Scholars including [Dong Zhongshu](/source/Dong_Zhongshu) sought to standardize the meaning of *tianxia*.[11]: 45 Dong described *tianxia* as a world order in three concentric layers: "The nation is on the inside and the various feudal kingdoms are on the outside; the feudal kingdoms are on the inside while the barbarians are on the outside."[11]: 45

Unified China fractured into many different dynasties during the [Northern and Southern period](/source/Northern_and_Southern_period), and with it went the practical use of the term *tianxia*. In the 7th century during the [Tang dynasty](/source/Tang_dynasty), some northern tribes of [Turkic](/source/Turkic_peoples) origin, after being made vassal, referred to [Emperor Taizong](/source/Emperor_Taizong_of_Tang) as the "[Khan of Heaven](/source/Khan_of_Heaven)".[12]

By the time of the [Song dynasty](/source/Song_dynasty), northern China was ruled by the [Khitan](/source/Khitan_people)-led [Liao dynasty](/source/Liao_dynasty), the [Jurchen](/source/Jurchen_people)-led [Jin dynasty](/source/Jin_dynasty_(1115-1234)), and the [Tangut](/source/Tangut_people)-led [Western Xia](/source/Western_Xia) dynasty. After being threatened by these northern states and realizing the possible effects of a war to the country and people, the Song rulers invented a false concept of kinship with the Jurchens in an attempt to improve relations.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*] The [Mongol](/source/Mongols)-led [Yuan dynasty](/source/Yuan_dynasty) divided Chinese subjects into two types: those of the south, and those of the north. When the [Ming dynasty](/source/Ming_dynasty) overthrew the Yuan dynasty and reunited China under [ethnic Han](/source/Han_people) rule, the concept of *tianxia* returned largely as it was during the Han dynasty.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

At the end of the Ming dynasty, criticisms of [Neo-Confucianism](/source/Neo-Confucianism) and its mantras of 'cultivation of moral character, establishment of family, ordering the state, and harmonizing *tianxia*', a quote from the *[Great Learning](/source/Great_Learning)*,[13] became widespread, producing large shifts in [Confucianism](/source/Confucianism). The philosopher [Wang Fuzhi](/source/Wang_Fuzhi) believed that *tianxia* was of a fixed, unchangeable dimension, notwithstanding the fact that the Great Learning's mentioning of harmonizing *tianxia* was actually in reference to government. Using these arguments, Wang was highly critical of Neo-Confucianism. On the other hand, the collapse of the Ming dynasty and the establishment of the [Manchu](/source/Manchu_people)-led [Qing dynasty](/source/Qing_dynasty) by the, people previously considered "fringe barbarians", heavily influenced people's views of *tianxia*. [Gu Yanwu](/source/Gu_Yanwu), a contemporary of Wang Fuzhi, wrote that the destruction of the State was not equivalent to the destruction of *tianxia*. He argued that the Manchus simply filled the role of Emperor, and that the *tianxia* of traditional Chinese culture was thus carried on.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

The idea of the absolute authority of the Chinese emperor and the extension of *tianxia* by the assimilation of vassal states began to fade for good with [George Macartney](/source/George_Macartney%2C_1st_Earl_Macartney)'s embassy to China in 1793. George Macartney hoped to deal with China as [Great Britain](/source/Great_Britain) would with other European nations of the time, and to persuade the Emperor to reduce restrictions on trade. The [Qianlong Emperor](/source/Qianlong_Emperor) rejected his request, and stated that China was the foremost and most divine nation on Earth and had no interest in foreign goods. In the early 19th century, Britain's victory over Qing China in the [First Opium War](/source/First_Opium_War) forced China to sign an [unequal treaty](/source/Unequal_treaty). This marked the beginning of the end for the *tianxia* concept.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

Following their defeat in the [Second Opium War](/source/Second_Opium_War), China was forced to sign the [Treaty of Tianjin](/source/Treaty_of_Tianjin), in which China was made to refer to Great Britain as a "sovereign nation", equal to itself. This made it impossible for China to continue dealing with other nations under the traditional *tianxia* system, and forced it to establish [a foreign affairs bureau](/source/Zongli_Yamen).[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

Due to the [liberal international order](/source/Liberal_international_order) arguably being based on [Westphalian sovereignty](/source/Westphalian_sovereignty), the idea that sovereign nations deal with each other as equals, China's traditional *tianxia* worldview collapsed.[14] After China's defeat in the [First Sino-Japanese War](/source/First_Sino-Japanese_War), the Japanese terminated Korea's traditional status as a tributary state of China, and the system of feudal enfeoffment and vassalage that had been practiced since the Han dynasty came to an end, a move that greatly changed attitudes toward the *tianxia* concept. At the end of the 19th century, Chinese Ambassador to Britain [Xue Fucheng](/source/Xue_Fucheng) took the traditional [Hua-Yi distinction](/source/Hua-Yi_distinction) in the *tianxia* world view and replaced it with a Chinese-foreigner distinction.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

In the 21st century, some academics have criticized contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang for "aggrandising" the concept of *tianxia* and being vague on details of what it may entail in the contemporary world.[15]

## Usage in the Sinosphere

See also: [Little China (ideology)](/source/Little_China_(ideology))

### Korea

Based on epitaphs dating to the 4th and 5th centuries, [Goguryeo](/source/Goguryeo) had concepts of [Son of Heaven](/source/Son_of_Heaven) (天帝之子) and independent *tianxia*.[16] The rulers of [Goryeo](/source/Goryeo) used the titles of emperor and Son of Heaven, and positioned Goryeo at the center of the *haedong* 'east of the sea', which encompassed the historical domain of the [Three Kingdoms of Korea](/source/Three_Kingdoms_of_Korea).[17]

During the 17th century, with the fall of the Ming dynasty in China, a concept of Korea as the cultural center of Confucianism, or "[Little China](/source/Sojunghwa)" emerged among the Confucian literati of the Joseon dynasty.[18]

### Contemporary China

Chinese [state media](/source/State_media) frequently portrays [general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party](/source/General_Secretary_of_the_Chinese_Communist_Party) [Xi Jinping](/source/Xi_Jinping) as having the *tianxia* perspective to seek "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and peaceful development of humanity".[5] Under this contemporary view, China's re-emergence as a great power presents an opportunity to reshape the [liberal international order](/source/Liberal_international_order) into a hub-and-spoke pattern around a single, central state.[19][20] In this contemporary discourse on *tianxia*, proponents argue that *tianxia*'s moral appeal distinguishes it from *[realpolitik](/source/Realpolitik)*, which they submit as creating discord. Similarly, this modern treatment toward *tianxia* purports to be superior to the [United Nations](/source/United_Nations) system, which is characterized as more akin to a political market, in which political operations are limited and constrained by parochial national interests. Historian [Steve Tsang](/source/Steve_Tsang) states that the [Chinese Communist Party](/source/Chinese_Communist_Party)'s concept of "[Community of Common Destiny](/source/Community_of_Common_Destiny)" presumes a vision of *tianxia* over and above the liberal international order.[21][5] At the [CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-level Meeting](/source/CPC_in_Dialogue_with_World_Political_Parties_High-level_Meeting) in 2017, Xi said:[22]

The Chinese nation has aspired for "all being one family under heaven'' since ancient times. We believe in harmony between humankind and the world, harmony among all nations, and great harmony for all under tianxia. We long for the utopian world of "when the Great Way prevails, tianxia works for the common good:' ... People of different countries across the world should uphold the concept of 'we are all one family under heaven;' embrace each other with open arms, understand each other, seek commonalities and respect differences, and collectively work hard to build the common destiny for humankind.

Applying the *tianxia* system to a modern framework, Chinese political scientist Yan Xuetong argues that great powers seeking international respect must use "humane authority" instead of seeking to impose hegemony.[5] These concepts influence the [Chinese school of international relations](/source/Chinese_school_of_international_relations).[23]

Various academics have noted that the current discourse of *tianxia* has been produced for domestic consumption and risks alienating foreigners.[15][24] Danish academics Klaas Dykmann and Ole Bruun state, "[f]oreign observers, particularly in democratic societies, will further note the glaring inconsistencies between the “harmonious world” conception and the tough realities of the domestic harmonious society, and between China's global media outreach and its increasing domestic control, digital surveillance, blacklisting, and media isolation of the Chinese public."[15]

## Western calques

The expression 'all under heaven' inspired literary expressions with reference to China in a number of Western languages, such as the Russian Поднебесная *Podnebesnaya*. The English term "[Celestial Empire](/source/Celestial_Empire)" is possibly derived from the title "Son of Heaven".[25]

## Other usage

In 2013, the Singaporean historian [Wang Gungwu](/source/Wang_Gungwu) coined the term "[American *Tianxia*](/source/American_Tianxia)" to refer to the contemporary world order led by the United States.[26]

## See also

- [Chinese unification](/source/Chinese_unification)

- [Chinese exceptionalism](/source/Chinese_exceptionalism)

- [Four Seas](/source/Four_Seas)

- [Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere](/source/Greater_East_Asia_Co-Prosperity_Sphere) – World War II era Pan-Asian union under the Empire of Japan

- [Huaxia](/source/Huaxia)

- [Heaven worship](/source/Heaven_worship)

- [Hero (2002 film)](/source/Hero_(2002_film)) — 2002 film centered on the term with controversy on the translation of *tianxia* to *All Under Heaven* versus *Our Land*

- [Panarchy](/source/Panarchy_(political_philosophy))

- *[Pax Sinica](/source/Pax_Sinica)*

- [The Land of Fire](/source/The_Land_of_Fire)

- [Zhao Tingyang](/source/Zhao_Tingyang)

- [Universal monarchy](/source/Universal_monarchy)

## References

### Citations

1. **[^](#cite_ref-SullivanLiu-Sullivan2021_1-0)** Sullivan, Lawrence R.; Liu-Sullivan, Nancy Y. (2021). [*Historical Dictionary of Chinese Culture*](https://books.google.com/books?id=kIoTEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA423). Rowman & Littlefield. p. 423. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-5381-4604-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-5381-4604-0).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTETsangCheung2024174–175_2-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTETsangCheung2024174–175_2-1) [Tsang & Cheung 2024](#CITEREFTsangCheung2024), pp. 174–175.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-3)** Song, Chenyang (2025). *Nationalist and Popular Culture Practices on Social Media: A Digital Ethnography of Chinese Online Fandom Nationalists*. Bielefeld: Transcript. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-3-8376-7926-7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-3-8376-7926-7).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-4)** [Yan, Xuetong](/source/Yan_Xuetong) (2013-12-31). Sun, Zhe (ed.). *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*. Vol. 5. [Princeton University Press](/source/Princeton_University_Press). p. 218. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1515/9781400848959](https://doi.org/10.1515%2F9781400848959). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-4008-4895-9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-4008-4895-9). [JSTOR](/source/JSTOR_(identifier)) [j.ctt32bbm1](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bbm1).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEZhao2023120–121_5-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEZhao2023120–121_5-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEZhao2023120–121_5-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEZhao2023120–121_5-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEZhao2023120–121_5-4) [Zhao 2023](#CITEREFZhao2023), p. 120–121.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-6)** Puranen, Matti (17 Jul 2020). [*Warring States and Harmonized Nations: Tianxia Theory as a World Political Argument*](https://jyx.jyu.fi/bitstream/handle/123456789/71032/978-951-39-8218-8_vaitos_2020_07_17_jyx.pdf) (PDF) (PhD thesis). JYU Dissertations, no. 247. University of Jyväskylä. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-951-39-8218-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-951-39-8218-8). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20201214021008/https://jyx.jyu.fi/bitstream/handle/123456789/71032/978-951-39-8218-8_vaitos_2020_07_17_jyx.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 14 Dec 2020.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** For *tianxia* in the *Zuozhuan*, the first appearance in the text is in **Zhuang** 12, in the narrative portion; the first appearance in the annalistic portion is in **Xi** 24 (636 BCE). [Durrant, Stephen](/source/Stephen_Durrant); Li, Wai-yee; [Schaberg, David](/source/David_Schaberg), eds. (2016). *Zuo Tradition. Zuozhuan. 左傳: Commentary on the "Spring and Autumn Annals"*. University of Washington Press. pp. 168, 372. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-295-999159](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-295-999159).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** See for example *[Guoyu](/source/Guoyu_(book))* **1** in [內史過論晉惠公必無後](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/s:%E5%9C%8B%E8%AA%9E/%E5%8D%B701#內史過論晉惠公必無後).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-9)** *Sunzi Bingfa*, [謀攻第三](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/s:%E5%AD%AB%E5%AD%90%E5%85%B5%E6%B3%95#謀攻第三).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-10)** [Sun Tzu](/source/Sunzi) (1963) [c. 300s BCE]. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 79.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:Laikwan2_11-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:Laikwan2_11-1) Laikwan, Pang (2024). *One and All: The Logic of Chinese Sovereignty*. Stanford, CA: [Stanford University Press](/source/Stanford_University_Press). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9781503638815](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781503638815).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-12)** Liu Yitang (1997). *Studies of Chinese Western Regions*. Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Company. p. 79. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [957-09-1119-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/957-09-1119-0).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-13)** [Zhu Xi](/source/Zhu_Xi), ed. (1100s). "[Passages from the *Da Xue*](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/s:%E5%9B%9B%E6%9B%B8%E7%AB%A0%E5%8F%A5%E9%9B%86%E8%A8%BB/%E5%A4%A7%E5%AD%B8%E7%AB%A0%E5%8F%A5)". 四書章句集註 [*Collected Passages from the Four Books, with Annotations*] (in Chinese). 物格而后知至。知至而后意誠。意誠而后心正。心正而后身脩。身脩而后家齊。家齊而后國治。國治而后天下平。

1. **[^](#cite_ref-14)** [Zhao, Tingyang](/source/Zhao_Tingyang) (2021-06-29). *All under Heaven: The Tianxia System for a Possible World Order*. Vol. 3. Translated by Harroff, Joseph E. (1 ed.). [University of California Press](/source/University_of_California_Press). [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.2307/j.ctv1n9dkth](https://doi.org/10.2307%2Fj.ctv1n9dkth). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-520-97421-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-520-97421-0). [JSTOR](/source/JSTOR_(identifier)) [j.ctv1n9dkth](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1n9dkth).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:0_15-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:0_15-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:0_15-2) Dykmann, Klaas; Bruun, Ole (May 31, 2021). ["China's Pledge to Civilise "All Under Heaven""](https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1868102621992775). *[Journal of Current Chinese Affairs](/source/Journal_of_Current_Chinese_Affairs)*. **50** (2): 227–247. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1177/1868102621992775](https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1868102621992775). [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [1868-1026](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1868-1026).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-16)** - Jo Yeongkwang (조영광) (2015). ["Status and Tasks for Study of the Foreign Relations and World View of Koguryo in the Gwanggaeto Stele" 광개토왕비에 보이는 대외 관계와 고구려 천하관에 대한 연구 현황과 과제](http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/NODE06520451). *Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong* (in Korean) (49): 70–76. [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [1975-7840](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1975-7840). Retrieved 3 November 2018. - [고구려의 천하관](http://contents.history.go.kr/front/hm/view.do?treeId=010201&tabId=01&levelId=hm_013_0010). *우리역사넷* (in Korean). National Institute of Korean History. Retrieved 3 November 2018. - [장수왕의 남진 정책](http://contents.history.go.kr/front/ta/view.do?levelId=ta_m71_0030_0020_0010_0020). *우리역사넷* (in Korean). National Institute of Korean History. Retrieved 6 December 2018.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-17)** Em, Henry (2013). [*The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea*](https://books.google.com/books?id=DxAd2Aw_jP0C&pg=PA24). Duke University Press. pp. 24–26. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-822-35372-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-822-35372-0). Retrieved 3 November 2018.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-18)** Berger, Stefan (2007). [*Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective*](https://books.google.com/books?id=qIODDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA126). Springer. p. 126. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-230-22305-9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-230-22305-9). Retrieved 4 November 2018.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-19)** Babones, Salvatore (2017-09-26), "Taking China Seriously: Relationality, Tianxia, and the "Chinese School" of International Relations", *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, [Oxford University Press](/source/Oxford_University_Press), [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.602](https://doi.org/10.1093%2Facrefore%2F9780190228637.013.602), [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-19-022863-7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-022863-7)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-20)** Babones, Salvatore (25 September 2019). "From Tianxia to Tianxia: The Generalization of a Concept". *Chinese Political Science Review*. **5** (2): 131–147. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1007/s41111-019-00139-9](https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs41111-019-00139-9). [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [2365-4244](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/2365-4244).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTETsangCheung2024_21-0)** [Tsang & Cheung 2024](#CITEREFTsangCheung2024).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTETsangCheung2024172-173_22-0)** [Tsang & Cheung 2024](#CITEREFTsangCheung2024), p. 172-173.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:Curtis&Klaus_23-0)** Curtis, Simon; Klaus, Ian (2024). *The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order*. New Haven and London: [Yale University Press](/source/Yale_University_Press). p. 199. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.2307/jj.11589102](https://doi.org/10.2307%2Fjj.11589102). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780300266900](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780300266900). [JSTOR](/source/JSTOR_(identifier)) [jj.11589102](https://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.11589102).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-24)** [Callahan, William A.](/source/William_A._Callahan) (18 November 2008). ["Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?"](https://pure.manchester.ac.uk/ws/files/27692570/POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS-DOCUMENT.PDF) (PDF). *[International Studies Review](/source/International_Studies_Review)*. **10** (4): 749–761. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00830.x](https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1468-2486.2008.00830.x).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-25)** Weekley, Ernest (1967). [*An etymological dictionary of modern English*](https://archive.org/details/etymologicaldict00week). Dover. p. 270.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-26)** Wang, Gungwu. ["Renewal: The Chinese State and the New Global History"](https://www.thechinastory.org/2013/08/wang-gungwu-%E7%8E%8B%E5%BA%9A%E6%AD%A6-on-tianxia-%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B/). *Australian Centre on China in the World*. Chinese University Press. Retrieved 1 July 2017.

### Sources

[Library resources](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:The_Wikipedia_Library) about
 **Tianxia**

- [Resources in your library](https://ftl.toolforge.org/cgi-bin/ftl?st=wp&su=Tianxia)

- [Resources in other libraries](https://ftl.toolforge.org/cgi-bin/ftl?st=wp&su=Tianxia&library=0CHOOSE0)

- Mizoguchi, Yuzo; et al. (2001). 中國思想文化事典 (in Japanese). Tokyo University Press.

- Hayashiya, Tatsusaburō (1966). 日本の歴史 12 - 天下一統 (in Japanese). Chūō Kōron.

- Tamagake, Hiroyuki (1998). *Nihon Chūsei Shisōshi Kenkyū* 日本中世思想史研究 (in Japanese). Perikan.

- Mizubayashi, Takeshi; et al. (2001). 体系日本史 2 － 法社会史 (in Japanese). Yamakawa.

- Fujiwara, Ri'ichirō (1971). ヴェトナム諸王朝の変遷. 岩波講座世界歴史 12 中世 (in Japanese). Iwanami.

- Yamauchi, Kōichi (2003). 世界史リブレット 67 朝鮮から見た華夷思想 (in Japanese). Yamakawa.

- Sugiyama, Masa'aki (2004). モンゴル帝国と大元ウルス. Tokyo University Press.

- [Tsang, Steve](/source/Steve_Tsang); Cheung, Olivia (2024). *The Political Thought of Xi Jinping*. Oxford University Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-197-68936-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-197-68936-3).

- Hamashita, Takeshi (1997). 朝貢システムと近代アジア. Iwanami.

- [Zhao, Suisheng](/source/Suisheng_Zhao) (2023). *The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Stanford University Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-503-63088-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-503-63088-8).

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Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Tianxia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tianxia) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tianxia?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.