# Technocracy

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Form of government ruled by experts

This article is about the form of government. For other uses, see [Technocracy (disambiguation)](/source/Technocracy_(disambiguation)).

**Technocracy** is an expert-based type of [governance](/source/Governance). In its strongest sense, it is a [form of government](/source/Form_of_government) in which decisions across all sectors and policy domains follow [evidence](/source/Evidence)-based, [efficiency](/source/Efficiency)-oriented procedures grounded in [scientific methods](/source/Scientific_methods) and [instrumental rationality](/source/Instrumental_rationality). In a weaker sense, the term refers to hybrid models that delegate specific functions to experts or implement expertise-driven decision procedures in areas such as [central banking](/source/Central_banking), [public health](/source/Public_health), or [environmental regulation](/source/Environmental_regulation).

Technocracy is often regarded as a challenge to [democracy](/source/Democracy) since it grounds [political legitimacy](/source/Political_legitimacy) in elite expertise, while democracy justifies itself as the rule of the people. One approach to resolving their tensions suggests that democratically elected officials choose political goals, while technocrats choose the most efficient ways to realize those goals, serving as advisors and implementers. Technocracy is closely related to [meritocracy](/source/Meritocracy), expertocracy, epistocracy, [managerialism](/source/Managerialism), and [algocracy](/source/Algocracy). It contrasts with [populism](/source/Populism), which frames politics as a struggle between common people and a perceived elite.

Proponents of technocracy argue that scientific expertise and evidence-guided policy produce better outcomes. They hold that its [value](/source/Value_theory)-neutral approach is best suited to promote the long-term [welfare of society](/source/Social_welfare) as a whole. Opponents contend that technocracy is [anti-democratic](/source/Anti-democratic) by [excluding large segments of the population](/source/Elitism) from politics, that the claim to neutrality masks value-laden choices, and that science alone is insufficient for political decisions.

Early contributions to the idea of technocracy appear in the [utopian](/source/Utopian) visions of [Plato](/source/Plato), [Francis Bacon](/source/Francis_Bacon), and [Henri de Saint-Simon](/source/Henri_de_Saint-Simon). The notion of science- and rationality-based governance gained prominence during the [Enlightenment](/source/Age_of_Enlightenment) and became increasingly influential as [industrial](/source/Industrial_revolution) and [post-industrial](/source/Post-industrial) transformations made societies more complex. Notable examples of technocratic influence are found in the North American [technocracy movement](/source/Technocracy_movement) of the 1930s, Soviet and Chinese [centralized planning](/source/Centralized_planning), developmental efforts in Latin America and Singapore, and the institutional architecture of the European Union.

## Definition

Technocracy is a [form of government](/source/Form_of_government) or an approach to political action that emphasizes [expertise](/source/Expertise), but its precise definition is disputed. One characterization focuses on [who makes decisions](/source/Leader), defining technocracy as rule by experts in contrast to [democracy](/source/Democracy) as rule by the people. Another centers on decision procedures rather than rulers, highlighting the role of technical skills, scientific [evidence](/source/Evidence), and instrumental [rationality](/source/Rationality).[1] More abstractly, technocracy can be defined as the view that the main source of [political legitimacy](/source/Political_legitimacy) is expert-driven reasoning and specialized knowledge, rather than popular will or hereditary entitlement.[2]

In its strongest sense, technocracy means that all main governmental operations follow technocratic principles. Because pure technocracy is rare, the term is often used in a weaker sense to describe leadership styles or institutions that apply such principles within other forms of government, such as a democratically elected leader who relies heavily on expert advice, or a [central bank](/source/Central_bank) in which unelected officials set [monetary policy](/source/Monetary_policy) based on technical criteria.[3]

A hallmark of technocracy is its [science](/source/Science)-focused approach. It frames policy objectives, resource allocation, and administrative procedures in terms of [evidence-based](/source/Evidence-based_practice) and efficiency-oriented processes that follow a rigorous [methodology](/source/Methodology) privileging [quantifiable outcomes](/source/Quantitative_method). It typically employs [cost-benefit analysis](/source/Cost-benefit_analysis) and [risk management](/source/Risk_management), intended to improve the long-term prosperity of society as a whole rather than serving the partisan interests of specific groups. Advocates emphasize the method's [objective](/source/Objectivity_(science)) and [impartial](/source/Impartial) character, but its claims to value-neutrality and freedom from ideology are contested. Technocracy is normally considered a form of [elitism](/source/Elitism) since large parts of the population may lack the technical knowledge and specialized skills required to participate in complex policy decisions. [Anti-pluralism](/source/Pluralism_(political_theory)) is another frequently discussed feature. It reflects the commitment to the singular interest of the long-term social welfare of the whole community in contrast to political processes that mediate among competing interests and preferences of distinct groups.[4]

A technocrat is someone who supports technocracy.[5][a] A technotopia is an idealized society or government model in which all major aspects of governance are guided by technical expertise.[6] The term *technocracy* comes from the [ancient Greek](/source/Ancient_Greek_language) words τέχνη (*tekhne*), meaning 'skill' or 'craft', and κράτος (*kratos*), meaning 'rule'.[5] Its earliest known use dates to the 1890s.[7] The engineer William H. Smyth is usually credited with coining the modern meaning of the term in 1919. The term's popularity increased in the 1930s as part of the [technocratic movement](/source/Technocratic_movement).[8]

## Areas and approaches

Technocratic principles can be applied to different areas of governance and implemented in several ways. In its broadest form, a pure technocracy would be a society in which decision-making in all sectors and policy domains is guided by experts following empirical evidence. However, this theoretical ideal is not found in real-world conditions, where technocracy usually manifests as a hybrid model integrated with other approaches to governance.[9] Some policy areas are more amenable to technocratic management than others, particularly those with clearly defined policy goals, quantifiable metrics, and accessible evidence.[10]

[Central banks](/source/Central_banks) often rely on financial experts operating relatively insulated from electoral processes, such as the [European Central Bank](/source/European_Central_Bank).[11]

One key area is the [central banking](/source/Central_banking) system, in which financial experts often operate independently of electoral processes. Central banks are responsible for [monetary policy](/source/Monetary_policy) and [financial stability](/source/Financial_stability). For example, they typically control the base [interest rate](/source/Interest_rate) to promote price stability, high [employment](/source/Employment), and [economic growth](/source/Economic_growth). Their decisions are based on diverse technical indicators, such as [inflation](/source/Inflation) and employment figures, weighing trade-offs among their objectives to achieve a prudent balance.[12] Other economy-related aspects of technocratic governance include [fiscal policy](/source/Fiscal_policy), [taxation](/source/Taxation), and the management of [financial crises](/source/Financial_crisis).[13]

Technocratic principles are also applied to the area of [healthcare](/source/Healthcare). Expert panels may implement reforms to [medical training](/source/Medical_training), increase reliance on [medical technology](/source/Medical_technology), design and evaluate [vaccination](/source/Vaccination) programs, adjust drug policy, and coordinate responses during health crises, such as [pandemics](/source/Pandemics). Technocratic concerns about efficient resource allocation may depersonalize the [doctor–patient relationship](/source/Doctor%E2%80%93patient_relationship) and can lead to reductions of [public health services](/source/Public_health_services) by cutting cost-ineffective interventions to prioritize high-impact treatments.[14]

In the field of [education](/source/Education), the influence of technocracy can take various forms. Experts may revise curricula and propose reforms, often with an emphasis on centralization while reducing the autonomy of local institutions. This approach is usually accompanied by standardization, such as [standardized testing](/source/Standardized_testing) and quantifiable metrics to track educational progress. Another facet is the integration of modern technology into classrooms, including computers, the internet, and [artificial intelligence](/source/Artificial_intelligence).[15] A further intersection is found in educational institutions or programs that prepare elite students for expert roles in governance, such as specialized schools or competitive selection processes that filter candidates for senior civil service careers.[6]

In [environmental policy](/source/Environmental_policy), technocratic principles are used to adjust regulations to ecological issues, ranging from [climate change](/source/Climate_change) to [water quality](/source/Water_quality) and [biodiversity](/source/Biodiversity) conservation.[16] Other relevant areas include [urban planning](/source/Urban_planning), [energy infrastructure](/source/Energy_infrastructure), and [research funding](/source/Research_funding).[17]

In addition to the variety of policy areas, there are also different ways of implementing technocratic principles. One model casts technocrats as advisors who collect and interpret empirical evidence, devise policy options, and evaluate their advantages and disadvantages. In this role, technocrats do not hold immediate decision-making powers but wield influence indirectly by shaping how leaders understand and choose among alternatives. This approach contrasts with models in which technocrats have direct authority.[18] Technocracy can also shape governance by implementing decision-making procedures and bureaucratic systems, shifting the emphasis from who holds office to how decisions are made. In this case, technocratic power resides more in administrative mechanisms and organizational arrangements than in individual experts.[19]

Another approach focuses on [information technology](/source/Information_technology) to assist or automate political decisions. For example, [algocracy](/source/Algocracy) relies on [algorithms](/source/Algorithms) and artificial intelligence to analyze data and devise policies. Proposed models vary in the role of humans, ranging from humans as primary decision-makers assisted by artificial intelligence to fully automated systems.[20] [Cyberocracy](/source/Cyberocracy), a similar concept, envisions a future form of government in which information and access to information technology are the primary sources of political power.[21]

Technocrats typically aim for the long-term prosperity of the community as a whole, but this goal can be interpreted in different ways. The [Keynesian](/source/Keynesian) model seeks to achieve it through economic growth and fair redistribution, relying on an extensive bureaucracy and comprehensive planning. [Neoliberal](/source/Neoliberal) approaches, by contrast, seek to promote community well-being through competition among individuals and organizations, centering technocratic policies on competitive frameworks and risk management.[22]

## Relation to other political ideologies

### Democracy

[Jürgen Habermas](/source/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas) argued that expert knowledge should be integrated into democratic processes without replacing them.[23]

Various academic discussions of technocracy examine its relation to other political ideologies, such as [democracy](/source/Democracy). Democracy vests political power in the people. Citizens have the most immediate control in [direct democracy](/source/Direct_democracy), where they participate by voting on laws and policies. In [indirect democracy](/source/Indirect_democracy), they elect representatives who decide on the public's behalf.[24]

Technocracy is often framed as a challenge or alternative to democracy. This view emphasizes their contrasting principles of [political legitimacy](/source/Political_legitimacy) and [decision-making](/source/Decision-making). Technocracy grounds authority in expertise and technical knowledge, resulting in decisions that may not align with popular opinion or the consent of the governed. As a result, democratic [accountability](/source/Accountability) to voter preferences is replaced by the responsibility of pursuing the long-term common good. Similarly, technocratic procedures of evidence-based analysis and expert deliberation bypass democratic decision-making through confrontation and negotiation among competing interest groups and viewpoints. This is typically accompanied by [depoliticization](/source/Depoliticization), with contentious issues being framed as neutral technical problems, whereas democratic processes acknowledge evaluative differences and seek to mediate among them. Although technocracy does not restrict political participation through rigid hereditary or [class systems](/source/Social_class), its reliance on specialized expertise often excludes large segments of the population and marginalizes lay perspectives.[25]

A contrasting view rejects the claim that democracy and technocracy are incompatible, seeing them instead as complementary approaches whose tensions can be resolved. One outlook argues that technocracy is primarily about [instrumental rationality](/source/Instrumental_rationality) or how to choose the means to achieve a given goal. According to this view, the people or elected officials choose political goals while the technocrats choose the most efficient ways to realize those goals, acting as advisors and implementers. Another approach confines technocracy to certain institutions or functions within a government. For example, a democratically elected government may delegate [monetary policy](/source/Monetary_policy) or public health reforms to expert panels.[26] In this context, one argument holds that every government relies on technocratic principles to some degree by consulting experts and aligning policy to empirical evidence.[27]

The compatibility of democracy and technocracy may also depend on social circumstances. Beneficial conditions for technocratic democracies include a broad consensus on the general goals of state policy and a willingness of individuals to accept short-term personal sacrifices for the sake of the long-term prosperity of the community.[28]

### Populism

Technocracy is commonly contrasted with [populism](/source/Populism), which seeks to promote the interests of ordinary people. Populism typically frames politics as a struggle between morally pure people and a corrupt, self-serving elite. It usually promotes a personalistic leader who appeals to popular sentiment and is regarded as a direct representative of the will of the people.[29]

In several respects, populism is directly opposed to technocracy. Its skeptical attitude toward elitism and expert rule challenges the technocratic reliance on expertise and specialized knowledge. This tension is also reflected in the sources of political legitimacy: populism emphasizes [mass mobilization](/source/Mass_mobilization) and the representation of popular opinion, whereas technocracy sees evidence-based competence and scientific rationality as primary sources of authority.[30]

However, there are also aspects in which populism and technocracy overlap. Both are seen as challenges or threats to democracy, in part because of their [anti-pluralistic](/source/Pluralism_(political_theory)) outlooks. In populism, this tendency is expressed in its claim to represent a unified popular will, dismissing dissenting views as betrayals of the people's true interests. In technocracy, dissenting views are often portrayed as irrational or biased positions that do not align with expert opinions on how to promote the long-term prosperity of the community as a whole.[31]

[Technopopulism](/source/Technopopulism) attempts to reconcile these two approaches. It combines the populist appeal to a personalistic leader representing the will of the people with a claim to legitimacy based on the leader's expertise, usually coupled with a technology-focused outlook.[32]

### Others

As a form of [elitism](/source/Elitism), technocracy vests political power in a small group of technical experts.[33] Other types of elitism have different criteria of political inclusion. [Aristocracy](/source/Aristocracy) has a social class of ruling elites, typically grounded in hereditary birth and inherited titles.[34] [Plutocracy](/source/Plutocracy) places political authority in the hands of the wealthy.[35] [Theocracy](/source/Theocracy) merges political and religious power, justifying its authority by appeal to a divine command.[36] Elitism contrasts with [egalitarianism](/source/Egalitarianism), which holds that all individuals should have equal political rights and opportunities.[37]

Technocracy is closely related to [meritocracy](/source/Meritocracy), which highlights the principle of merit by selecting people based on their ability. It can apply to governmental positions or, more broadly, to any social function or job. The core idea is that everybody has the position they deserve.[38] Expertocracy is sometimes defined as a weaker form of technocracy that seeks to align decision-making processes to expert opinions without transferring power to technical elites.[39][b] Other related political ideologies include epistocracy, which asserts that the degree of political influence of citizens should correspond to their competence in political decision-making,[40] and [managerialism](/source/Managerialism), which advocates business-like and efficiency-driven management techniques.[41]

Through its emphasis on value neutrality, technocracy contrasts with political ideologies that explicitly advance substantive values or normative goals.[42] For example, [liberalism](/source/Liberalism) promotes personal [freedom](/source/Freedom), [individual rights](/source/Individual_rights), [tolerance](/source/Toleration), the [rule of law](/source/Rule_of_law), and the protection of [private property](/source/Private_property).[43] [Socialism](/source/Socialism) prioritizes [economic equality](/source/Economic_inequality), [social welfare](/source/Social_welfare), and [collective ownership](/source/Collective_ownership).[44] [Nationalism](/source/Nationalism) values social cohesion grounded in [national identity](/source/National_identity) and shared customs, culture, and language.[45] Technocracy typically seeks to sideline evaluative and ideological commitments by framing decisions around empirical evidence and cost-benefit analysis rather than pursuing substantive values.[46] However, it may also be combined with certain normative goals, as in [neoliberal](/source/Neoliberal) technocracy and technocratic socialism.[47]

Technocracy is typically contrasted with [authoritarianism](/source/Authoritarianism), which seeks to centralize and monopolize political power in a single leader or party and uses a hierarchical structure to suppress dissent. However, authoritarian regimes may adopt technocratic principles to consolidate control and justify their legitimacy by appealing to efficiency and expertise, giving rise to [techno-authoritarianism](/source/Techno-authoritarianism).[48]

## Arguments

### For

[Howard Scott](/source/Howard_Scott_(engineer)), a leading figure of the Technical Alliance and Technocracy Inc., held that technocratic governance can maximize efficiency and increase abundance.[49]

[Political theorists](/source/Political_theory) discuss various arguments for and against technocracy. Advocates emphasize the central role of skill and competence in political decision-making. They argue that political situations are complex, particularly in a [globalized](/source/Globalization) world marked by rapid technological advances. These complexities make it difficult to consider all relevant factors, predict outcomes of increasingly interconnected processes, and adjust policies accordingly. This view holds that scientific expertise and evidence-guided inquiry offer a better foundation for effective political decisions than ideology or popular sentiment. Technocrats highlight the rationality and efficiency of their procedures, which seek to avoid contradictory and irrational elements found in approaches that rely on partisan interests and public opinion. Accordingly, they promise better outcomes, benefiting the community as a whole through material progress.[50]

Another line of thought centers on [value](/source/Value_theory)-neutrality. It asserts that the technocratic focus on objective analysis and scientific solutions promotes the implementation of optimal solutions that prioritize overall welfare. Advocates hold that the ideal of serving the community as a whole helps insulate policy from partisan agendas and lobbying efforts that privilege specific interest groups. Similarly, the emphasis on competence, transparent decision criteria, and quantifiable results constitutes a form of meritocratic fairness that can safeguard against [corruption](/source/Corruption) and [nepotism](/source/Nepotism).[51]

A different set of arguments focuses on the long-term perspective. It asserts that technocracies are better suited to implement necessary but unpopular reforms that benefit the community in the long run. This view maintains that expert-driven political legitimacy sidelines short-term electoral pressures or incentives to maximize popular approval through immediate benefits. Supporters further highlight technocracy's openness to innovation and flexibility to adapt policy in response to emerging challenges or new data.[52]

### Against

Critics of technocracy often focus on its [anti-democratic](/source/Anti-democratic) tendencies, viewing it as a form of elitism that excludes large segments of the population from [political participation](/source/Political_participation). They argue that governance should align with public consent and reflect a diversity of opinions and preferences. In their view, technocracy alienates ordinary people from politics by framing policy choices as purely technical problems. A related concern is that technocratic decision-makers are not directly [accountable](/source/Accountability) to the electorate, raising questions about their political legitimacy and the risk of a technology-justified authoritarianism.[53]

Another criticism rejects the claim that technocracy is value-neutral. It argues that the reliance on [scientific methods](/source/Scientific_methods), quantitative metrics, and efficiency carries implicit evaluative biases, meaning that ideological commitments and value conflicts are not removed but merely hidden under the guise of objective analysis.[54] A related objection holds that a technocratic focus on [instrumental rationality](/source/Instrumental_rationality) reduces political decisions to problems of optimization and neglects the [intrinsic worth](/source/Intrinsic_value_(ethics)) of individuals. It contends that instrumental rationality about the best means to achieve a goal needs to be accompanied by normative rationality about which goals are worth pursuing. This view asserts that there are diverse normative goals and that politics should consider different options and negotiate value trade-offs instead of adopting a narrow perspective that disregards alternative outlooks. Similarly, claims to neutrality can hide partisan agendas, such as attempts by corporate [lobbies](/source/Lobbying) to influence policy under the guise of impartial optimization.[55]

Critics also target the strong focus on science and the claim that technocracies achieve better outcomes. They argue that technocracy adopts [scientism](/source/Scientism) and falsely assumes that science can solve all political problems. In response, they assert that the scientific method is limited and cannot reliably predict social outcomes, specifically in complex and interconnected systems of human behavior. Many aspects of social life are difficult to quantify, and efforts to do so can result in misleading metrics that ignore key factors. This can produce implementation gaps in which idealized models fail in real-world conditions. Unique local contexts pose further challenges, as attempts to impose uniform solutions can lead to unexpected results.[56] Additionally, there are expert disagreements in which competing theories predict divergent outcomes without providing clear guidance for policymakers on which theory to follow.[57] On a conceptual level, critics hold that technocracy is a poorly defined notion that can denote a wide spectrum of approaches to governance depending on the context.[58]

## History

### Intellectual and cultural developments

In his book *[New Atlantis](/source/New_Atlantis)*, Francis Bacon envisioned a technocratic utopia ruled by scientists.[59]

[Henri de Saint-Simon](/source/Henri_de_Saint-Simon) is sometimes regarded as the "father of technocracy" because of his idea of a new kind of society based on scientific rationality.[60]

[Tench Coxe](/source/Tench_Coxe) promoted a technocratic outlook that seeks to solve political problems with machine-based manufacturing.[61]

Some precursors to technocratic thought are found in [ancient philosophy](/source/Ancient_philosophy). In [ancient Greece](/source/Ancient_Greece), [Plato](/source/Plato) (c. 427 – c. 347 BCE) characterized politics as a *[techne](/source/Techne)*—an art or craft with a specific goal, comparable to other expert practices such as medicine. He argued that political skill and knowledge of [human nature](/source/Human_nature) are essential to just and prudent leadership. He regarded rule by wise [philosopher-kings](/source/Philosopher-kings) as the ideal form of governance.[62] In [ancient China](/source/Ancient_China), some technocratic principles are reflected in [Confucianism](/source/Confucianism), which arose in the 6th or 5th century BCE. They include the elitist view that the most virtuous and capable should rule.[63] Beginning in the 7th century CE, this tradition also saw the emergence of a rigorous, merit-based [examination system](/source/Imperial_examination) designed to select the most competent candidates for government service.[6]

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the [Scientific Revolution](/source/Scientific_Revolution) established a new paradigm of rational inquiry in which truth is not passively revealed but actively discovered by following the [scientific method](/source/Scientific_method) and seeking [empirical evidence](/source/Empirical_evidence).[64] During the subsequent [Age of Enlightenment](/source/Age_of_Enlightenment) in the late 17th and 18th centuries, Enlightenment thinkers emphasized [reason](/source/Reason), science, and technical rationality. They promoted the pursuit of knowledge and challenged traditional authorities.[65] This cultural and intellectual movement shaped the [French Revolution](/source/French_Revolution), which introduced several technocratic principles into governance. It advanced programs of social engineering and recast political authority around meritocratic expertise.[66][c] The growing economic complexity during the [Industrial Revolution](/source/Industrial_Revolution) in the late 18th and 19th centuries further accelerated the demand for specialized knowledge and expert-led management.[68]

These developments also influenced political thought. [Francis Bacon](/source/Francis_Bacon) (1561–1626) envisioned a technocratic [utopia](/source/Utopia) in his *[New Atlantis](/source/New_Atlantis)*. Unlike Plato, he argued that empirical scientists, rather than philosopher-kings, should rule. For Bacon, politics should take the form of scientific administration, with scientific elites as benevolent rulers promoting the general interest of the whole.[59] Building on Bacon's vision, [Henri de Saint-Simon](/source/Henri_de_Saint-Simon) (1760–1825) conceived a new kind of society based on scientific rationality. He held that a society led by scientists, artists, and industrialists would prosper, with a merit-based hierarchy and an elite class made up of the most educated and productive members of society. Saint-Simon is sometimes regarded as the "father of technocracy".[60] His student [Auguste Comte](/source/Auguste_Comte) (1798–1857) formulated [positivism](/source/Positivism), arguing that scientific understanding based on empirical evidence is the highest form of knowledge.[69]

[Jeremy Bentham](/source/Jeremy_Bentham)'s (1748–1832) [utilitarianism](/source/Utilitarianism) also influenced technocratic thought, particularly the idea that governance should maximize overall welfare, laying the groundwork for [cost-benefit analysis](/source/Cost-benefit_analysis) in public administration.[70] [Tench Coxe](/source/Tench_Coxe) (1755—1824) advanced a technocratic vision that regards machine-driven manufacturing as the main solution to political problems, seeing it as "the means of our political salvation".[71] In his novel *[Looking Backward](/source/Looking_Backward)*, [Edward Bellamy](/source/Edward_Bellamy) (1850–1898) reached a mass audience with his utopian vision of technocracy in which technology is harnessed to ensure abundance, leisure, and peace for all citizens.[6]

[Frederick Winslow Taylor](/source/Frederick_Winslow_Taylor) (1856–1915) developed and popularized the application of scientific management and efficiency-focused organization to industrial manufacturing and labor processes.[72][d] [Henry Gantt](/source/Henry_Gantt) (1861–1919), an associate of Taylor, sought to extend these ideas into the political realm. He proposed a "new democracy" that grounds governance in scientific facts. For him, the degree of an individual's political authority should correspond to their ability and willingness to advance the common good.[74] His outlook was also influenced by [Thorstein Veblen](/source/Thorstein_Veblen) (1857–1929), who criticized [capitalism](/source/Capitalism) for introducing conflicts of interest that hinder the public good. He argued that a system run by engineers and technicians could better serve common prosperity.[75]

[Max Weber](/source/Max_Weber) (1864–1920) explored the role of [instrumental rationality](/source/Instrumental_rationality) in modern society. He argued that the pervasiveness of scientific and technical reason is a key feature of [modernity](/source/Modernity), emphasizing the importance of mathematical and scientific knowledge and the increasing reliance on trained experts and managers to organize social life.[76]

During the two [World Wars](/source/World_Wars), technocratic principles were implemented to gain military and economic advantages by increasing productivity and efficiency. This happened in several fields, including the [weapons industry](/source/Weapons_industry), [logistics](/source/Logistics), and mobilization of the workforce.[77]

In the book *[The Managerial Revolution](/source/The_Managerial_Revolution)*, [James Burnham](/source/James_Burnham) (1905–1987) grounded technocratic principles in a sociological analysis of the growing role of managers and technical experts in modern [industrial societies](/source/Industrial_societies).[78] [John Kenneth Galbraith](/source/John_Kenneth_Galbraith) (1908–2006) further explored these ideas in his book *[The New Industrial State](/source/The_New_Industrial_State)*, arguing that advanced technology requires large corporations, long-term planning, and an extensive network of technical experts.[79] In the book *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, [Daniel Bell](/source/Daniel_Bell) (1919–2011) shifted the focus from industrial to [post-industrial society](/source/Post-industrial_society). He highlighted the importance of technocratic principles as knowledge, science, and [information technologies](/source/Information_technologies) become the primary drivers of economic growth.[80]

[Postmodern thinkers](/source/Postmodern_philosophy) examined the increasing centrality of expert knowledge in modern society. [Michel Foucault](/source/Michel_Foucault) (1926–1984) explored how knowledge is used to wield [power over populations](/source/Biopower) through indirect mechanisms embedded in [correctional](/source/Correctional_institution), medical, and educational institutions.[81] [Jean-François Lyotard](/source/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois_Lyotard) (1924–1998) warned of the totalizing and dehumanizing tendencies of technocratic rationality.[82] A different criticism was formulated by the [Frankfurt School](/source/Frankfurt_School) theorist [Jürgen Habermas](/source/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas) (1929–2026), who regarded technocracy as a threat to democracy, proposing that expert knowledge should be integrated into democratic processes without replacing them.[23]

### In different regions

Symbol of Technocracy Inc.

Various aspects of technocratic governance were present in the [Soviet Union](/source/Soviet_Union), particularly during the leadership of [Leonid Brezhnev](/source/Leonid_Brezhnev).[83]

In the 1930s in North America, the [technocracy movement](/source/Technocracy_movement) emerged from the [Technical Alliance](/source/Technical_Alliance), which had been founded in 1919 by [Howard Scott](/source/Howard_Scott_(engineer)) (1890–1970). Followers of the technocracy movement applied Veblen's ideas to the [Great Depression](/source/Great_Depression)—a deep economic crisis that had started in 1929. They argued that this crisis was a symptom of capitalism and proposed a technocratic reorganization of society to overcome it. In addition to the political governance by engineers, scientists, and technical managers, this program aimed to replace the price-based economy with one that organizes distribution and consumption based on energy costs. It sought to increase abundance while reducing average workload through centralized planning, integrating North America into a self-sufficient unit called a *technate*.[84][e] In the post-World War II decades, technocracy influenced U.S. politics by shaping institutional frameworks, particularly in economic and military spheres. Links to politics happened through regulatory and advisory bodies such as the [Atomic Energy Commission](/source/United_States_Atomic_Energy_Commission), the [National Science Foundation](/source/National_Science_Foundation), the [Council of Economic Advisers](/source/Council_of_Economic_Advisers), and the [RAND Corporation](/source/RAND_Corporation).[86]

Various aspects of technocratic governance were also present in the [Soviet Union](/source/Soviet_Union), such as the centralized economic planning by experts under the [State Planning Committee](/source/Gosplan), established in 1921. These tendencies were particularly prominent during the leadership of [Leonid Brezhnev](/source/Leonid_Brezhnev) (1906–1982), who promoted a scientific-technological revolution with an increased reliance on engineers as political leaders.[83]

In the 1950s and early 1960s, China implemented technocratic elements as engineers from elite universities rose to political power to engage in central planning and implement communist-style industrialization. This trend saw a significant backlash during the [Cultural Revolution](/source/Cultural_Revolution) (1966–1976), marked by anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism. Since the late 1970s, the technocratic influence has been restored and expanded, with leadership often characterized by a synthesis of technical expertise and [socialist ideology](/source/Socialism).[87]

Technocratic tendencies were prominent in Latin America starting in the 1960s and 1970s, both in democratic and authoritarian regimes. They typically took the form of state-led development efforts in sectors such as agriculture, industry, and health, exemplified by the expert-guided reforms in Colombia under the [National Front](/source/National_Front_(Colombia)) governments. In subsequent decades, the technocratic agenda in Latin America increasingly centered on the economy.[88]

Since the 1970s and 1980s, Singapore saw the establishment of an administrative state focused on rational organization, technical skill, and meritocratic egalitarianism while seeking to avoid ideological polarization and partisan interests. Because of its economic success in the form of rapid development and growth, it is often regarded as a leading exemplar of the advantages of technocracy.[89] Other Asian examples of the implementation of technocratic principles are found in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.[90]

Beginning in the second half of the 20th century, the formation of the European Union introduced various forms of technocratic governance, such as the establishment of expert-led institutions with little democratic control, including the [European Central Bank](/source/European_Central_Bank).[91] Starting in the 1990s, [evidence-based policy making](/source/Evidence-based_policy) has become an influential approach in the United Kingdom, seeking to align governance with robust empirical evidence and rigorous scientific evaluation.[92] In the 2000s and 2010s, several EU countries adopted technocratic measures in response to political or economic turmoil, such as technocratic cabinets in Italy and Greece during the [European financial crisis](/source/Euro_area_crisis).[93]

## See also

- [Bright green environmentalism](/source/Bright_green_environmentalism) – Stance favoring the convergence of technological change with environmentalism

- [Player Piano](/source/Player_Piano_(novel)) – First novel published by Kurt Vonnegut in 1952

- [Post-politics](/source/Post-politics) – Critique of post-Cold War politics of consensus

- [Post-scarcity economy](/source/Post-scarcity_economy) – Situation in which all goods are available to all free of chargePages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets

- [Project Cybersyn](/source/Project_Cybersyn) – Chilean 1971–73 economic management project

- [Redressement Français](/source/Redressement_Fran%C3%A7ais) – French anti-parliamentarian political movement

- [Scientocracy](/source/Scientocracy) – System of government

## References

### Notes

1. **[^](#cite_ref-6)** The term is sometimes used in a derogatory sense to imply an overemphasis of technology and a lacking awareness of moral and humanistic considerations.[5]

1. **[^](#cite_ref-41)** In a different sense, expertocracy can also mean that experts seize power from democratically elected officials.[19]

1. **[^](#cite_ref-70)** A further development in France was the establishment of elite schools, the [Grande écoles](/source/Grande_%C3%A9cole), which served to train state administrators, engineers, and scientists, preparing a technocratic elite.[67]

1. **[^](#cite_ref-77)** Influenced by this approach, [Henry Ford](/source/Henry_Ford) (1863–1947) translated scientific management into standardized [mass production](/source/Mass_production) using [assembly lines](/source/Assembly_lines).[73]

1. **[^](#cite_ref-90)** The movement later split into two rival groups, the Continental Committee on Technocracy led by [Harold Loeb](/source/Harold_Loeb) and Technocracy Inc. led by Scott, but its influence declined in the following years.[85]

### Citations

1. **[^](#cite_ref-1)** - [Caramani 2020](#CITEREFCaramani2020), pp. 3–4 - [Hakken 2008](#CITEREFHakken2008) - [Bickerton & Accetti 2020](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2020), pp. 29–32 - [Esmark 2020](#CITEREFEsmark2020), pp. [3–4](https://books.google.com/books?id=j1raDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3) - [Lenk 2005](#CITEREFLenk2005), Lead section, § Types of Technocracy

1. **[^](#cite_ref-2)** [Rummens 2024](#CITEREFRummens2024), § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology

1. **[^](#cite_ref-3)** - [Esmark 2020](#CITEREFEsmark2020), p. [3, 53, 64–65](https://books.google.com/books?id=j1raDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3) - [Caramani 2020](#CITEREFCaramani2020), pp. 4, 12

1. **[^](#cite_ref-4)** - [Esmark 2020](#CITEREFEsmark2020), pp. [2–4](https://books.google.com/books?id=j1raDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA2) - [Caramani 2020](#CITEREFCaramani2020), p. 4 - [Bertsou & Caramani 2020](#CITEREFBertsouCaramani2020), pp. 93–94

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-auto1_5-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-auto1_5-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-auto1_5-2) [Wilson 2008](#CITEREFWilson2008)

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-auto4_7-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-auto4_7-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-auto4_7-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-auto4_7-3) [Pfaffenberger 2008](#CITEREFPfaffenberger2008)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** [OED staff 2026](#CITEREFOED_staff2026)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-9)** - [Visser 2026](#CITEREFVisser2026), pp. [201–202](https://books.google.com/books?id=t5mlEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA201) - [Hakken 2008](#CITEREFHakken2008)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-10)** - [Esmark 2020](#CITEREFEsmark2020), p. [3, 53, 64–65](https://books.google.com/books?id=j1raDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3) - [Caramani 2020](#CITEREFCaramani2020), pp. 4, 12 - [Bickerton & Accetti 2021](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2021), pp. 25–32 - [Fischer 1990](#CITEREFFischer1990), pp. 18

1. **[^](#cite_ref-11)** - [Caramani 2020](#CITEREFCaramani2020), pp. 4, 12–14 - [Centeno 1993](#CITEREFCenteno1993), pp. 315–316

1. **[^](#cite_ref-12)** - [Centeno 1993](#CITEREFCenteno1993), pp. 321–322 - [Habermas 2015](#CITEREFHabermas2015), pp. 3–8

1. **[^](#cite_ref-13)** - [Centeno 1993](#CITEREFCenteno1993), p. 321 - [Esmark 2020](#CITEREFEsmark2020), p. [47, 64–65](https://books.google.com/books?id=j1raDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA47) - [Moenjak 2014](#CITEREFMoenjak2014), pp. [60–61, 70](https://books.google.com/books?id=dNj1AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA60)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-14)** - [Valbruzzi 2020](#CITEREFValbruzzi2020), p. 124 - [Friedman 2019](#CITEREFFriedman2019), pp. § I.3 Technocratic Regulation and the Limits of State Autonomy - [Bertsou & Caramani 2020](#CITEREFBertsouCaramani2020), pp. 91–92 - [Sánchez-Cuenca 2020](#CITEREFSánchez-Cuenca2020), p. 57

1. **[^](#cite_ref-15)** - [Burris 1993](#CITEREFBurris1993), pp. 120–125 - [Alexiadou 2020](#CITEREFAlexiadou2020), pp. 137, 144–147 - [Clarence 2002](#CITEREFClarence2002), pp. 3, 7–9 - [Bertsou 2026](#CITEREFBertsou2026), pp. 483–484

1. **[^](#cite_ref-16)** - [Burris 1993](#CITEREFBurris1993), pp. 130–135 - [Trifonas 2018](#CITEREFTrifonas2018), pp. 3–5 - [Clarence 2002](#CITEREFClarence2002), pp. 3

1. **[^](#cite_ref-17)** - [Selk 2025](#CITEREFSelk2025), pp. 1–5 - [Olson 2015](#CITEREFOlson2015), p. [26](https://books.google.com/books?id=BFzpCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA26) - [Tacconi 2017](#CITEREFTacconi2017), p. [81](https://books.google.com/books?id=OlcPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA81)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-18)** - [Moroni 2017](#CITEREFMoroni2017), pp. [141](https://books.google.com/books?id=6mBQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA141) - [Stephens & Allen 2021](#CITEREFStephensAllen2021), p. 190 - [Clarence 2002](#CITEREFClarence2002), pp. 3 - [Silva 2007](#CITEREFSilva2007), pp. [76–77](https://books.google.com/books?id=Hll_AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA76)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-19)** - [Lenk 2005](#CITEREFLenk2005), § Types of Technocracy - [Bickerton & Accetti 2020](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2020), pp. 30–31

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-auto6_20-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-auto6_20-1) [Lenk 2005](#CITEREFLenk2005), § Types of Technocracy

1. **[^](#cite_ref-21)** - [Danaher 2016](#CITEREFDanaher2016), § 1. Introduction, § 2. What Is Algocracy? - [Lenk 2005](#CITEREFLenk2005), § Types of Technocracy

1. **[^](#cite_ref-22)** [Ronfeldt 1992](#CITEREFRonfeldt1992), pp. 243–244, 255–256, 268

1. **[^](#cite_ref-23)** [Rummens 2024](#CITEREFRummens2024), § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology, § 2. From Welfarist Bureaucracy to Neoliberal Governance

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-auto3_24-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-auto3_24-1) [Baynes & Prattico 2022](#CITEREFBaynesPrattico2022), pp. 107–110

1. **[^](#cite_ref-25)** - [Caramani 2020](#CITEREFCaramani2020), pp. 1–3 - [Dargent 2015](#CITEREFDargent2015), pp. [13–14](https://books.google.com/books?id=EDbJBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA13) - [Scruton 2007](#CITEREFScruton2007), pp. [169–171](https://books.google.com/books?id=t9uGDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA169)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-26)** - [Caramani 2020](#CITEREFCaramani2020), pp. 6–11 - [Bertsou & Caramani 2020](#CITEREFBertsouCaramani2020), pp. 93–94 - [Centeno 1993](#CITEREFCenteno1993), pp. 326–237, 239–330

1. **[^](#cite_ref-27)** - [Bickerton & Accetti 2020](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2020), pp. 30–31 - [Rummens 2024](#CITEREFRummens2024), § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology

1. **[^](#cite_ref-28)** - [Bertsou & Caramani 2020](#CITEREFBertsouCaramani2020), pp. 93–94 - [Lenk 2005](#CITEREFLenk2005), § Assessment

1. **[^](#cite_ref-29)** - [Centeno 1993](#CITEREFCenteno1993), pp. 326–238 - [Gratton & Edenhofer 2025](#CITEREFGrattonEdenhofer2025), pp. 1–2

1. **[^](#cite_ref-30)** - [Scruton 2007](#CITEREFScruton2007), p. [537](https://books.google.com/books?id=t9uGDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA537) - [Bickerton & Accetti 2021](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2021), pp. 25–28 - [Bickerton & Accetti 2015](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2015), pp. 1–2, 15–16

1. **[^](#cite_ref-31)** - [Rummens 2024](#CITEREFRummens2024), Lead sectin, § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology - [Esmark 2020](#CITEREFEsmark2020), pp. 1–2, 204–205, 222 - [Scruton 2007](#CITEREFScruton2007), p. [537](https://books.google.com/books?id=t9uGDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA537)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-32)** - [Bickerton & Accetti 2015](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2015), pp. 1–2, 15–16 - [Rummens 2024](#CITEREFRummens2024), Lead sectin, § 1. Technocracy as a Thin Ideology - [Bickerton & Accetti 2021](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2021), pp. 25–32 - [Centeno 1993](#CITEREFCenteno1993), pp. 327,

1. **[^](#cite_ref-33)** [Bickerton & Accetti 2021](#CITEREFBickertonAccetti2021), pp. 17–19, 24

1. **[^](#cite_ref-34)** [Bertsou & Caramani 2020](#CITEREFBertsouCaramani2020), p. 94

1. **[^](#cite_ref-35)** [Scruton 2007](#CITEREFScruton2007), pp. [36–38](https://books.google.com/books?id=t9uGDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA36)

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1. **[^](#cite_ref-42)** [Méndez 2022](#CITEREFMéndez2022), pp. 153–154

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1. **[^](#cite_ref-46)** - [Moseley](#CITEREFMoseley), § 3c. Socialism - [Scruton 2007](#CITEREFScruton2007), pp. [646–648](https://books.google.com/books?id=t9uGDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA646) - [Fiala 2015](#CITEREFFiala2015), p. [250](https://books.google.com/books?id=XXApBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA250) - [Gilabert & O'Neill 2024](#CITEREFGilabertO'Neill2024), Lead section

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- Andreas, Joel (2009). *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class*. Stanford University Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-8047-7110-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-8047-7110-8).

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- Bertsou, Eri (2026). "Technocratic Attitudes During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Europe and the US". *West European Politics*. **49** (2): 483–513. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1080/01402382.2025.2463272](https://doi.org/10.1080%2F01402382.2025.2463272).

- Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (2020). "Measuring Technocracy". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). *The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy*. Routledge. pp. 91–110. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-000-04360-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-000-04360-0).

- Bickerton, Christopher; Accetti, Carlo Invernizzi (2015). "Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?". *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*. **20** (2): 1–21. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1080/13698230.2014.995504](https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13698230.2014.995504).

- Bickerton, Christopher; Accetti, Carlo Invernizzi (2020). "Technocracy and Political Theory". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). *The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy*. Routledge. pp. 29–43. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-000-04360-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-000-04360-0).

- Bickerton, Christopher J.; Accetti, Carlo Invernizzi (2021). *Technopopulism: The New Logic of Democratic Politics*. Oxford University Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-19-880776-6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-880776-6).

- Brown, Garrett Wallace; McLean, Iain; McMillan, Alistair (2018). *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations*. Oxford University Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-19-967084-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-967084-0).

- Burris, Beverly H. (1993). *Technocracy at Work*. State University of New York Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-7914-1495-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-7914-1495-8).

- Caramani, Daniele (2020). "Introduction". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). *The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy*. Routledge. pp. 1–26. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-000-04360-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-000-04360-0).

- Centeno, Miguel Angel (1993). "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy". *Theory and Society*. **22** (3): 307–335. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1007/BF00993531](https://doi.org/10.1007%2FBF00993531).

- Clarence, Emma (2002). "Technocracy Reinvented: The New Evidence Based Policy Movement". *Public Policy and Administration*. **17** (3): 1–11. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1177/095207670201700301](https://doi.org/10.1177%2F095207670201700301).

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- Dargent, Eduardo (2015). [*Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government*](https://books.google.com/books?id=EDbJBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1). Cambridge University Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-107-05987-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-107-05987-0).

- Dargent, Eduardo (2020). "Technocracy in Latin America: Between Stability and Democratic Deficit". In Bertsou, Eri; Caramani, Daniele (eds.). *The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy*. Routledge. pp. 216–231. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-000-04360-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-000-04360-0).

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- Olson, Richard G. (2015). [*Scientism and Technocracy in the Twentieth Century: The Legacy of Scientific Management*](https://books.google.com/books?id=BFzpCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1). Lexington Books. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-4985-2571-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-4985-2571-8).

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- Peron, Alcides Eduardo dos Reis; Almstadter Mattar de Magalhães, David; Caetano, Gabriel Fernandes (2025). "Beyond Digital Repression: Techno-authoritarianism in Radical Right Governments". *Cogent Social Sciences*. **11** (1). [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1080/23311886.2025.2528457](https://doi.org/10.1080%2F23311886.2025.2528457).

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- Radaelli, Claudio M. (2017). *Technocracy in the European Union*. Routledge. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-317-88435-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-317-88435-4).

- Riess, Julian (2022). "Why Do Experts Disagree?". In Gunn, Paul (ed.). [*Technocracy and the Epistemology of Human Behavior: The Debate over Power Without Knowledge*](https://books.google.com/books?id=gpYIEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA230). Taylor & Francis. pp. 218–241. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-000-78405-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-000-78405-3).

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- Sadowski, Jathan (2020). "Rediscovering a Risky Ideology: Technocracy and Its Effects on Technology Governance". *Journal of Responsible Innovation*. **7** (sup1): 112–116. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1080/23299460.2020.1816345](https://doi.org/10.1080%2F23299460.2020.1816345).

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- Visser, Eva (2026). "Planning the Technate: The Apolitical Politics of the 1930s' Technocratic Movement in North America and Europe". In Veen, Adriejan van; Jung, Theo (eds.). [*Depoliticisation before Neoliberalism: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political in Modern Europe*](https://books.google.com/books?id=t5mlEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA202). Springer Nature. pp. 201–228. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-3-031-74101-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-3-031-74101-2).

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- Wilson, Harlan (2008). "Technocrat". [*International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*](https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/technocracy) (2nd ed.). Macmillan Reference. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-02-866117-9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-02-866117-9).

## External links

Wikiquote has quotations related to ***[Technocracy](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Special:Search/Technocracy)***.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to [Technocracy](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Technocracy).

- [*Technocracy* by William Henry Smyth](https://librivox.org/search?title=Technocracy&author=Smyth&reader=&keywords=&genre_id=0&status=all&project_type=either&recorded_language=&sort_order=catalog_date&search_page=1&search_form=advanced) public domain audiobook at [LibriVox](/source/LibriVox)

- [Technocracy: An Alternative Social System – Arvid Peterson – (1980)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I9ps5vJrIxM) on [YouTube](/source/YouTube_video_(identifier))

- Technocracy: An Interpretation [Technocracy: An Interpretation](https://archive.org/details/TechnocracyStuartChase) by [Stuart Chase](/source/Stuart_Chase)

- [*Technocracy and Socialism*](https://archive.org/details/TechnocracyAndSocialism), by [Paul Blanshard](/source/Paul_Blanshard).

- [Technocracy Parts I-IV., Working Explosively, A Protest Against Mechanistic Efficiency. Working Explosively Versus Working Efficiently](https://archive.org/details/technocracyworki00smytrich) by William Henry Smyth.

- [Technocracy Study Course Unabridged](https://archive.org/details/TechnocracyStudyCourseUnabridged) by Marion King Hubbert, Howard Scott, Technocracy Inc.,

v t e Political philosophy Terms Authority Citizenship‎ Duty Elite Emancipation Freedom Government Hegemony Hierarchy Justice Law Legitimacy Liberty Monopoly Nation Obedience Peace People Pluralism Power Progress Propaganda Property Regime Revolution Rights Ruling class Society Sovereignty‎ State Utopia War Government Aristocracy Oligarchy Autocracy Bureaucracy Dictatorship Democracy Ochlocracy Gerontocracy Meritocracy Monarchy Tyranny Plutocracy Republic Technocracy Theocracy Ideologies Agrarianism Anarchism Capitalism Christian democracy Colonialism Communism Communitarianism Confucianism Conservatism Corporatism Distributism Environmentalism Fascism Feminism Feudalism Hindutva Imperialism Islamism Liberalism Libertarianism Localism Marxism Monarchism Multiculturalism Nationalism Nazism Populism Republicanism Social Darwinism Social democracy Socialism Third Way Concepts Balance of power Bellum omnium contra omnes Body politic Clash of civilizations Common good Consent of the governed Divine right of kings Family as a model for the state Monopoly on violence Natural law Negative and positive rights Night-watchman state Noble lie Noblesse oblige Open society Ordered liberty Original position Overton window Separation of powers Social contract State of nature Statolatry Supermajority Tyranny of the majority Philosophers Antiquity Aristotle Chanakya Cicero Confucius Han Fei Lactantius Mencius Mozi Plato political philosophy Polybius Shang Sun Tzu Thucydides Xenophon Middle Ages Al-Farabi Aquinas Averroes Bruni Dante Gelasius al-Ghazali Ibn Khaldun Marsilius Muhammad Nizam al-Mulk Ockham Plethon Wang Early modern period Boétie Bodin Bossuet Calvin Campanella Filmer Grotius Guicciardini Hobbes political philosophy James Leibniz Locke Luther Machiavelli Milton More Müntzer Pufendorf Spinoza Suárez 18th and 19th centuries Al-Afghani Bakunin Bastiat Beccaria Bentham Bolingbroke Bonald Burke Carlyle Comte Condorcet Constant Cortés Engels Fichte Fourier Franklin Godwin Haller Hegel Herder Hume Iqbal Jefferson Kant political philosophy Le Bon Le Play Madison Maistre Marx Mazzini Mill Montesquieu Nietzsche Owen Paine Proudhon Renan Rousseau Sade Saint-Simon Smith Spencer de Staël Stirner Taine Thoreau Tocqueville Tucker Voltaire 20th and 21st centuries Agamben Ambedkar Apo Arendt Aron Badiou Bauman Benoist Berlin Bernstein Burnham Chomsky Dmowski Du Bois Dugin Dworkin Evola Fanon Fisher Foucault Fromm Fukuyama Gandhi Gentile Gramsci Guénon Habermas Hayek Hoppe Huntington Kautsky Khomeini Kirk Kropotkin Laclau Lenin Luxemburg Mansfield Mao Marcuse Maurras Michels Mises Mosca Mouffe Negri Nozick Nursi Nussbaum Oakeshott Ortega Pareto Popper Qutb Rand Rawls Röpke Rothbard Russell Sartre Savarkar Schmitt Scruton Shariati Sorel Spann Spengler Strauss Sun Taylor Voegelin Walzer Weber Works Analects of Confucius (c. 475 BCE) Republic (c. 375 BCE) Politics (c. 335 BCE) On the Republic (51 BCE) Siyasatnama (11th century) Treatise on Law (c. 1274) Monarchy (1313) Muqaddimah (1337) The Prince (1532) Patriarcha (1642) Leviathan (1651) Two Treatises of Government (1689) The Spirit of Law (1748) The Social Contract (1762) Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) Rights of Man (1791) Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820) Democracy in America (1835–1840) The Communist Manifesto (1848) On Liberty (1859) The Revolt of the Masses (1929) The Road to Serfdom (1944) The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) A Theory of Justice (1971) The End of History and the Last Man (1992) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) Related Authoritarianism Collectivism and individualism Conflict theories Contractualism Critique of political economy Egalitarianism Elite theory Elitism History of political thought Institutional discrimination Jurisprudence Justification for the state Political ethics Political spectrum Left-wing politics Centrism Right-wing politics Religion in politics Christianity Islam Judaism Secular state Separation of church and state State atheism Political violence Separatism Social justice Statism Totalitarianism Category:Political philosophy

Authority control databases National United States France BnF data Czech Republic Israel Other Historical Dictionary of Switzerland Yale LUX

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Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Technocracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technocracy) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technocracy?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.