# Signal passed at danger

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Train passing stop signal without authority

Two-aspect signal at danger (stop) in the United Kingdom

A **signal passed at danger** (**SPAD**) is an event on a [railway](/source/Railway) where a train passes a stop [signal](/source/Railway_signal) without authority.[1] This is also known as [running a red](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/run_a_red_light), in the [United States](/source/United_States) as a **stop signal overrun (SSO)**[2] and in Canada as **passing a stop signal**.[3] SPAD is defined by [Directive](/source/Directive_(European_Union)) 2014/88/EU as any occasion when any part of a train proceeds beyond its authorised movement.[4] Unauthorised movement means to pass either:[4]

- a trackside colour light signal or semaphore at danger, or an order to stop where a [train protection system](/source/Train_protection_system) (TPS) is not operational

- the end of a safety-related movement authority provided in a TPS

- a point communicated by verbal or written authorisation laid down in regulations

- stop boards (buffer stops are not included) or hand signals

## Etymology

The name derives from red [colour light signals](/source/Railway_signal#Colour_light_signals) and horizontal [semaphore signals](/source/Railway_semaphore_signal) in the United Kingdom, which are said to be *at danger* when they indicate that trains must stop (also known as the signal being *on*). This terminology is not used in North America where not all red signals indicate stop.[5]: 72 In the UK, a **signal passed at red** (**SPAR**) is used where a signal changes to red directly in front of a train, due to a fault or emergency, meaning it is impossible to stop before the signal.

## Causes

The high [inertia](/source/Inertia) of trains, and the low [adhesion](/source/Adhesion_railway) between the wheels and track, means it takes a long [distance](/source/Braking_distance) for the [train brakes](/source/Railway_brake) to stop a train. SPADs are most commonly a small overrun of the signal (instead of a long overrun), because the driver has braked too late. The safety consequences for these types of SPADs may be minor. On the other hand, some SPADs involve the driver being unaware they have passed a signal at danger and continue until notified by network controllers, or a collision occurs, as in the [Ladbroke Grove rail crash](/source/Ladbroke_Grove_rail_crash).

The causes and prevention of SPADs is actively researched. Common causes of SPADs include:

- Misjudgement[6]

- Environmental conditions

- [Inattention](/source/Attention)

- [Distraction](/source/Distraction)[3]

- [Fatigue](/source/Fatigue_(safety))[7][8]

- Misreading of an adjacent signal due to line curvature (a "crossread"), or sighting on one beyond[6]

- [Misunderstanding](/source/Understanding)

- [Miscommunication](/source/Communication)[6]

- Incomplete or lapsed [route knowledge](/source/Route_knowledge_(rail))

- [Acute medical condition](/source/Acute_(medicine)) (medical emergency), such as a [heart attack](/source/Myocardial_infarction) or [stroke](/source/Stroke)

- [Chronic medical condition](/source/Chronic_condition), such as [sleep apnea](/source/Sleep_apnea) causing [microsleep](/source/Microsleep)

- Driver deviation from standard operating procedures[9]

- False assumptions based on familiarity and past situations[9]

- Poor change management practices[9]

- Failure to properly assess competencies[9]

## Prevention

### Automatic train protection

[Automatic train protection](/source/Automatic_train_protection) (ATP) is a system that can limit train speed in situations other than at a signal set at danger. ATP can supervise speed restrictions and distance to danger points. It can also take into account individual train characteristics such as brake performance etc. Therefore ATP can determine when brakes should be applied in order to stop the train before passing a signal at danger. Presently, In the UK, only a small percentage of trains ([Great Western Railway](/source/Great_Western_Railway_(train_operating_company)) and [Chiltern Railways](/source/Chiltern_Railways)) are fitted with this equipment.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

### Driver's reminder appliance

The [driver's reminder appliance](/source/Driver's_reminder_appliance) (DRA) is an inhibiting switch located on the driver's desk of United Kingdom passenger trains designed specifically to prevent "[starting away SPADs](#Signal_passed_at_danger_in_the_United_Kingdom;_Terminology_and_procedures)". The driver is required to operate the DRA whenever the train is brought to a stand,[10] either after passing a signal displaying caution or at a signal displaying danger.

Once applied, the DRA displays a red light and prevents traction power from being taken until the DRA is manually cancelled by the driver.

## Collision prevention systems

Whilst the ideal safety system would prevent a SPAD from occurring, most equipment in current use does not stop the train before it has passed the danger signal. However, provided that the train stops within the designated [overlap](/source/Overlap_(railway_signalling)) beyond that signal, a collision should not occur.

### Train stops

Main article: [Train stop](/source/Train_stop)

On the [London Underground](/source/London_Underground) (for example), mechanical [train stops](/source/Train_stop) are fitted beside the track at signals to stop a train, should a SPAD occur.

Train stops are also installed on main line railways in places where tripcock equipped trains run in extensive tunnels, such as the on the [Northern City Line](/source/Northern_City_Line) where the [Automatic Warning System](/source/Automatic_Warning_System) and [Train Protection & Warning System](/source/Train_Protection_%26_Warning_System) are not fitted.

### Automatic Warning System

Main article: [Automatic Warning System](/source/Automatic_Warning_System)

On the UK mainline, [AWS](/source/Automatic_Warning_System) consists of an on-board receiver/timer connected to the [emergency braking system](/source/Emergency_brake_(train)) of a train, and magnets located in the center of the track. At each AWS site, a permanent magnet arms the system and an electromagnet connected to the green signal lamp disarms the system and a confirming chime is provided to the driver. If the receiver does not disarm within one second after arming, a warning tone sounds at the driver's desk and if it is not cancelled by the driver, the emergency brakes will be activated. A visual indication remains set to remind the driver that they have passed a restrictive [signal aspect](/source/Railway_signal#Aspects_and_indications).

### Train Protection & Warning System

Main article: [Train Protection & Warning System](/source/Train_Protection_%26_Warning_System)

On the UK mainline, [TPWS](/source/Train_Protection_%26_Warning_System) consists of an on-board receiver/timer connected to the [emergency braking system](/source/Emergency_brake_(train)) of a train, and radio frequency transmitter loops located on the track. The 'Overspeed Sensor System' pair of loops is located on the approach to the signal, and will activate the train's emergency brake if it approaches faster than the 'trigger speed' when the signal is at *danger*. The 'Train Stop System' pair of loops is located at the signal, and will activate the emergency brake if the train passes over them at any speed when the signal is at *danger*.

The deployment of TPWS is not universal; only those signals where the risk of collision is considered to be significant are fitted with it.

### Flank protection

At certain junctions, especially where if the signal protecting the junction was passed at danger a side collision is likely to result, then flank protection[11] may be used. Derailers and/or facing points beyond the signal protecting the junction will be set in such a position to allow a safe overlap if the signal was passed without authority. This effectively removes the chance of a side-impact collision as the train would be diverted in a parallel path to the approaching train.

### SPAD indicators

SPAD indicator

Animation demonstrating a SPAD indicator in action.

Prior to the introduction of TPWS in the UK, "SPAD indicators" were introduced at high risk locations (for example: the entry to a single track section of line). Consisting of three red lamps, they are placed beyond the protecting stop signal and are normally unlit. If a driver passes the signal at 'danger', the top and bottom lamps flash red and the centre lamp, which has the word "STOP" written across the lens in black, is lit continuously. Whenever a SPAD indicator activates, all drivers who observe it are required to stop immediately, even if they can see that the signal pertaining to their own train is showing a *proceed* aspect.

## UK acronyms: SPAD / SPAR

In the UK, incidents where a signal is passed at danger without authority are categorised according to principal cause. A **SPAD** is where the train proceeds beyond its authorised movement to an unauthorised movement. Other types are categorised as **SPAR** ("signal passed at red").

Prior to December 2012,[12] the term "SPAD" applied to all such incidents, with a letter specifying cause.

- A **SPAD** (formerly *Category A SPAD*) is where the train proceeds beyond its authorised movement to an unauthorised movement.[12]

- A **Technical SPAR** (formerly *Category B SPAD*) is where the signal reverted to danger in front of the train due to an equipment failure or signaller error and the train was unable to stop before passing the signal.

- A **Signaller SPAR** (formerly *Category C SPAD*) is where the signal was replaced to danger in front of the train by the signaller in accordance with the rules and regulations and the train was unable to stop before passing the signal.

- A **Runaway SPAR** (formerly *Category D SPAD*) is where an unattended train or vehicles not attached to a traction unit run away past a signal at danger. Note that where this was the fault of the driver, this will be classed as a SPAD.

Some SPADs are defined as:

- **SAS SPAD** – "Starting against signal" SPAD,[13] where the train was standing at a danger signal and the driver moved past it.

- **SOY SPAD** – "Starting on yellow" SPAD,[13] where the train started on a caution signal and the driver did not appreciate that the next signal would be at danger.

## Passing signals at danger – with authority

Signals form part of a complex system, and it is inevitable that faults may occur. They are designed to [fail safe](/source/Fail-safe), so that when problems occur, the affected signal indicates danger (an example where this did not happen, known as a [wrong-side failure](/source/Wrong-side_failure), was the [Clapham Junction rail crash](/source/Clapham_Junction_rail_crash) due primarily to faulty wiring). To keep the network running, safety rules enable trains to pass signals that cannot be cleared to a proceed aspect. Provided that authority for the movement is obtained, a SPAD does not occur. There are two methods of obtaining that authority:[14]

### Driver obtains signaller's authority to pass a signal at danger

Once the train has been brought to a stand at a signal which is at danger, the driver should attempt to contact the signaller. If the signal cannot be cleared then the driver must obtain the signaller's authority to pass it at danger. Methods for contacting the signaller may include [GSM-R](/source/GSM-R) cab radio, signal post telephone or [mobile phone](/source/Mobile_phone).

In the UK, the signaller can authorise a driver to pass a signal at danger when:[15]

- The signal is defective or disconnected

- The signal cannot be cleared because [signalling](/source/Railway_signal) or [level crossing](/source/Level_crossing) equipment has failed

- The signal is to be passed at danger for [shunting](/source/Shunting_(rail)) purposes

- The signal cannot be cleared because a train or movement which has reversed is then required to start from beyond that signal

- An electric train is to pass the signal protecting an isolated section and proceed towards the limiting point

- A train has been accepted using restricted acceptance because the line is clear only up to the home signal of the next signal box and the section signal cannot be cleared

- In an emergency, and then only when authorised by the signal box supervisor or Operations Control, so that a train carrying passengers can enter an occupied section to use a station platform

- An [engineering train](/source/Work_train) is to move towards a [possession](/source/Track_(rail_transport)#Maintenance), or leave a line under possession at an intermediate point

- A train is to pass the signal protecting engineering work to gain access to a station where the train is required to start back, or a line under single line working, or a siding

- The line is to be examined to check that it is clear

- A train is to proceed at caution through an [absolute block section](/source/Absolute_block_signalling) from the [signal box](/source/Signalling_control) in rear when a failed train has been removed

- A train is to enter the section after a train or vehicle that has proceeded without authority has been removed, or the front portion of a divided train has passed through the section

- A train is to enter the section to assist a failed train, evacuate passengers from a failed train, remove a portion of a divided train, or remove a train or vehicles that have proceeded without authority

- [Single line working](/source/Single-line_working) applies

- [Working by pilotman](/source/Token_(railway_signalling)#Working_by_pilotman) or modified working applies

The driver and signaller must come to a clear understanding, and ensure they agree about how it is to be done. In the UK the signaller tells the driver of a specific train to pass a specific signal at danger, proceed with caution and travel at a speed that enables him to stop short of any obstruction, and then obey all other signals. If the signal is fitted with TPWS, the driver resets the Driver Reminder Appliance, pushes the TPWS Trainstop Override button in the cab, and proceeds cautiously through the section. If the train reaches the next signal without finding an obstruction, they must obey its aspect, at which point they can revert to normal working.

### Driver passes a signal at danger under their own authority

If contact with the signaller cannot be made then the driver must not move the train, unless it is standing at one of the following signals:

- A signal controlled from a signal box that is closed on [absolute block](/source/Absolute_block_signalling) line only.

- An automatic signal where local instructions permit it, e.g. signals within tunnels on the [Northern City Line](/source/Northern_City_Line#Operational_procedures).

After passing a signal at danger under their own authority, the driver must stop at the next signal (even if it is showing a proceed aspect) and inform the signaller of what they have done.

## EU statistics of SPADs as precursors of accidents

ERADIS database on SPADs as precursors of accidents per million kilometers[16] Area 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Austria 0.099 0.077 0.101 0.131 0.070 0.033 0.067 0.080 0.072 0.255 0.378 0.398 0.553 0.768 0.630 0.848 0.834 Belgium 0.782 1.044 0.816 1.061 0.905 0.756 0.577 0.683 0.952 0.937 0.550 0.739 0.744 0.576 0.752 0.877 Bulgaria 0.139 0.416 0.342 0.095 0.000 0.128 0.144 0.568 0.556 0.431 0.680 0.752 0.605 0.958 0.924 0.701 0.734 Switzerland 0.182 0.561 0.610 0.689 0.599 0.613 0.492 0.457 0.543 0.593 0.574 0.540 0.576 0.712 Channel Tunnel 0.765 0.542 0.708 0.525 1.071 1.042 0.168 0.713 0.374 0.241 0.610 0.606 0.253 0.769 1.302 0.694 Czechia 0.377 0.170 0.149 0.239 0.487 0.529 0.496 0.485 0.525 0.562 0.716 0.763 0.815 0.840 0.886 1.001 0.988 Germany 0.693 0.728 0.354 0.341 0.441 0.385 0.361 0.451 0.463 0.490 0.506 0.566 0.519 0.510 0.577 0.564 Denmark 9.387 1.283 1.378 3.311 2.859 2.664 2.198 2.231 1.833 1.943 1.943 2.292 2.257 2.708 2.390 3.008 3.562 Estonia 0.265 0.280 0.147 0.000 0.143 0.284 0.000 0.534 0.710 0.597 0.768 0.694 0.818 0.606 0.822 0.147 Greece 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.255 0.059 0.239 0.086 0.000 11.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Spain 0.502 0.501 0.576 0.500 0.466 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.406 0.423 0.468 0.577 0.460 0.519 0.498 0.421 0.574 Finland 0.354 0.418 0.563 0.400 0.686 0.392 0.393 0.654 0.604 1.030 1.325 1.268 0.813 0.951 0.534 0.699 0.328 France 0.069 0.212 0.229 0.264 0.231 0.255 0.238 0.293 0.302 0.241 0.304 0.319 0.413 0.537 0.599 0.584 0.466 Croatia 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.048 0.000 0.082 0.092 0.099 0.143 0.095 Hungary 0.075 0.105 0.073 0.066 0.098 0.164 0.202 0.173 0.168 0.101 0.037 0.157 0.083 0.130 0.799 0.204 0.611 Ireland 1.919 1.842 1.104 1.155 0.791 0.332 0.435 0.985 0.547 0.827 0.712 0.480 0.713 0.628 0.643 0.449 0.659 Italy 0.064 0.041 0.055 0.043 0.031 0.038 0.063 0.051 0.064 0.056 0.070 0.085 0.065 0.103 0.098 0.107 0.080 Lithuania 8.968 4.002 0.190 0.498 0.142 0.000 0.273 0.212 0.070 0.212 0.000 0.195 0.065 0.296 0.000 0.203 0.168 Luxembourg 0.124 0.490 1.241 0.571 0.444 0.666 1.633 0.345 1.233 0.805 0.927 0.641 0.856 0.628 Latvia 0.234 0.108 0.256 0.214 0.361 0.108 0.159 0.228 0.158 0.323 0.061 0.192 0.118 0.196 0.259 0.270 0.357 Netherlands 2.195 1.964 1.727 1.621 1.156 1.040 0.007 0.000 0.720 0.642 0.635 0.661 0.842 0.863 0.626 0.657 0.673 Norway 1.646 1.540 1.494 2.426 2.497 1.265 1.091 1.360 1.377 1.179 1.251 1.260 1.367 1.319 1.127 0.937 1.246 Poland 17.993 11.825 0.062 0.059 0.128 0.147 0.157 0.300 0.276 0.320 0.386 0.431 0.410 0.381 0.591 0.552 Portugal 0.611 0.488 0.575 0.296 0.150 0.591 0.667 0.717 0.821 0.444 0.862 0.471 0.522 0.219 0.757 0.783 0.646 Romania 4.478 4.415 4.119 4.881 6.106 4.971 4.122 4.339 3.183 5.344 4.576 3.430 3.752 3.948 0.000 0.000 0.000 Sweden 1.466 1.615 1.990 2.530 2.413 2.116 2.336 2.046 1.678 0.943 1.526 1.746 2.055 1.690 1.441 1.603 1.490 Slovenia 0.790 0.835 0.746 0.659 0.531 0.246 0.302 0.000 0.390 0.325 0.141 0.409 0.000 0.099 0.296 0.000 0.094 Slovakia 1.530 1.549 1.520 1.668 0.463 0.551 0.843 0.706 0.383 0.457 0.492 0.581 0.568 0.394 0.692 0.648 0.492 United Kingdom 0.657 0.622 0.576 0.457 0.585 0.509 0.411 0.498 0.551 0.493 0.419 0.514 0.559 0.573 0.517

## Accidents involving a signal passed at danger without authority

This list is incomplete; you can help by adding missing items. (August 2008)

Country Incident Year United States Norwalk rail accident 1853 United Kingdom Lewisham rail crash 1857 Canada St-Hilaire train disaster 1864 United Kingdom Hexthorpe rail accident 1887 Denmark Gentofte train crash 1897 United Kingdom Potters Bar rail accidents 1898 United Kingdom Slough rail accident 1900 United States Washington DC train wreck 1906 Australia Sunshine rail disaster 1908 United Kingdom Tonbridge accident 1909 United Kingdom Ais Gill disaster 1913 United Kingdom Ilford rail crash 1915 Hungary Herceghalom rail crash 1916 United Kingdom Charfield railway disaster 1928 Germany Genthin rail disaster 1939 United Kingdom Norton Fitzwarren rail crash 1940 United Kingdom Eccles rail crash 1941 United States Lackawanna Limited wreck 1943 United Kingdom Potters Bar rail accidents 1946 United Kingdom Harrow and Wealdstone rail crash 1952 United Kingdom Luton rail crash 1955 United Kingdom Lewisham rail crash 1957 United Kingdom Dagenham East rail crash 1958 United States Newark Bay rail accident 1958 United Kingdom Coppenhall Junction railway accident 1962 Netherlands Harmelen train disaster 1962 United Kingdom Marden rail crash 1969 Australia Violet Town railway disaster 1969 United Kingdom Paisley Gilmour Street rail accident 1979 United Kingdom Invergowrie rail accident 1979 United States Philadelphia Conrail West Chester Branch collision 1979 Poland Otłoczyn railway accident 1980 United Kingdom Wembley Central rail crash 1984 United Kingdom Eccles rail crash 1984 Canada Hinton train collision 1986 United Kingdom Colwich rail crash 1986 United States Chase train collision 1987 United Kingdom Glasgow Bellgrove rail crash 1989 United Kingdom Purley station rail crash 1989 Germany Rüsselsheim train disaster 1990 Japan Shigaraki train disaster 1991 United Kingdom Newton rail accident 1991 United Kingdom Cowden rail crash 1994 Canada Toronto subway accident 1995 Germany Garmisch-Partenkirchen train collision 1995 United States Secaucus Train Collision 1996 United States Silver Spring train collision 1996 Australia Hines Hill train collision 1996 United Kingdom Southall rail crash 1997 Australia Beresfield rail disaster 1997 Finland Suonenjoki rail collision 1998 United Kingdom Spa Road Junction rail crash 1999 United Kingdom Winsford railway accident 1999 United Kingdom Ladbroke Grove rail crash 1999 Norway Åsta accident 2000 Belgium Pécrot 2001 United Kingdom Norton Bridge rail crash 2003 Egypt Qalyoub rail accident 2006 Netherlands Arnhem 2006 United States Chatsworth train collision 2008[17] Belgium Halle train collision 2010 India Badarwas train collision 2010 Indonesia Petarukan train collision 2010 Germany Saxony-Anhalt train accident 2011 Netherlands Sloterdijk train collision 2012 United States Goodwell, Oklahoma 2012[18] Switzerland Granges-près-Marnand 2013 Romania Cotești 2014[19] Belgium Hermalle-sous-Huy train collision 2016 Portugal Soure train crash 2020[20] United Kingdom Salisbury rail crash 2021[21]

## Accidents following a signal passed at danger with authority

Whenever a signal is passed at danger the driver is required to "proceed with caution, stop short of any obstructions, and drive at speed that will enable you to stop within the distance which you can see to be clear". Failure to do this has caused the following collisions:

- [Australia](/source/Australia) – [Roseville](/source/Roseville_(NSW)_collision_(1950)), 1950

- [United Kingdom](/source/United_Kingdom) – [Stratford (London Underground)](/source/Stratford_tube_crash), 1953

- [United Kingdom](/source/United_Kingdom) – [Coppenhall Junction](/source/Coppenhall_Junction_railway_accident), 1962

- [United Kingdom](/source/United_Kingdom) – [Wrawby Junction](/source/Wrawby_Junction_rail_crash), 1983

- [Australia](/source/Australia) – [Glenbrook](/source/Glenbrook_train_disaster), 1999

- [Italy](/source/Italy) – [Vittorio Emanuele (Rome Metro)](/source/2006_Rome_metro_crash), 2006

## Accidents where the signaller incorrectly authorised a driver to pass a signal at danger

Except where [permissive working](/source/Permissive_Working_(railway)) is in use, [interlocking](/source/Interlocking) usually prevents a train from being signalled into a section that is already occupied. When operational needs require it, this can be overridden, and provided it is carried out in accordance with the rules this is a safe practice. However, failure to follow protocol can result in a collision:

- [United States](/source/United_States) – [Nashville, Tennessee](/source/Great_Train_Wreck_of_1918), 1918

- [Romania](/source/Romania) – [Bucerdea](/source/Bucerdea_Gr%C3%A2noas%C4%83), 1968

- [United Kingdom](/source/United_Kingdom) – [Castlecary rail accidents](/source/Castlecary_rail_accidents), 1968

- [United Kingdom](/source/United_Kingdom) – [Seer Green](/source/Seer_Green_rail_crash), 1981

- [Indonesia](/source/Indonesia) – [Jakarta](/source/1987_Bintaro_train_crash), 1987

- [Luxembourg](/source/Luxembourg) / [France](/source/France) – [Zoufftgen](/source/Zoufftgen_train_collision), 2006

- [Poland](/source/Poland) – [Szczekociny](/source/Szczekociny_rail_crash), 2012

- [Germany](/source/Germany) – [Bad Aibling](/source/Bad_Aibling_rail_accident), 2016

- [Greece](/source/Greece) – [Thessaly](/source/Tempi_train_crash), 2023

## See also

- [Ding-ding, and away](/source/Ding-ding%2C_and_away), British slang for a guard incorrectly giving permission to a driver to start away from a platform against a red signal.

## References

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1. **[^](#cite_ref-fra-sso_2-0)** Multer, Jordan; Safar, Hadar; Roth, Emilie; France, Megan (June 2019). [Why do Passenger Trains Pass Stop Signals – A Systems View](https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2019-12/Passenger%20trains%20pass%20stop%20signals2.pdf) (PDF) (Report). Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration. DOT/FRA/ORD-19/19. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20210518183112/https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2019-12/Passenger%20trains%20pass%20stop%20signals2.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 18 May 2021. Retrieved 18 May 2021.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-NTSB_Texting_3-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-NTSB_Texting_3-1) Hersman, Deborah. ["Texting: Tomorrow's Unacceptable Behavior"](https://web.archive.org/web/20170215181302/https://app.ntsb.gov/investigations/2010/philadelphia_pa_oped.html). [National Transportation Safety Board](/source/National_Transportation_Safety_Board). Archived from [the original](https://app.ntsb.gov/investigations/2010/philadelphia_pa_oped.html) on 15 February 2017. Retrieved 11 September 2016.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-lexeu_4-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-lexeu_4-1) ["L_2014201EN.01000901.xml"](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0088). *eur-lex.europa.eu*. Retrieved 20 September 2024.*This article incorporates text from this source, which is available under the [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) license.*

1. **[^](#cite_ref-cror_5-0)** Cite error: The named reference cror was invoked but never defined (see the [help page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Cite_errors/Cite_error_references_no_text)).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-Humreb_6-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-Humreb_6-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-Humreb_6-2) ["Articles"](https://web.archive.org/web/20220815130112/https://www.humanreliability.com/articles/Getting%20at%20the%20underlying%20causes%20of%20SPADs.pdf/). Archived from [the original](http://www.humanreliability.com/articles/Getting%20at%20the%20underlying%20causes%20of%20SPADs.pdf) (PDF) on 15 August 2022. Retrieved 12 December 2016.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** "Driver fatigue caused two Reading SPADs, says RAIB report". *Rail Magazine*. Vol. 812. 26 October – 8 November 2016. p. 23.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** ["Managing the risk from fatigue"](https://web.archive.org/web/20160913203216/http://rssb.co.uk/Library/improving-industry-performance/2016-01-poster-human-factors.pdf) (PDF). *RSSB*. [Rail Safety and Standards Board](/source/Rail_Safety_and_Standards_Board). Archived from [the original](http://www.rssb.co.uk/library/improving-industry-performance/2016-01-poster-human-factors.pdf) (PDF) on 13 September 2016. Retrieved 21 November 2016.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-DW17_9-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-DW17_9-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-DW17_9-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-DW17_9-3) ["Signal DP29 passed at danger involving suburban passenger train DW17 and near collision with another suburban passenger train Park Road Station, Queensland, on 25 March 2019"](https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/rair/ro-2019-009).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-DfT_Rail_Electrification_10-0)** ["Online Rulebook – Module TW1 – Section 10.3"](https://web.archive.org/web/20110929162822/http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Rule_Book/Rule%20Book%20Modules/TW%20-%20Train%20Working/GERT8000-TW1%20Iss%208.pdf) (PDF). RSSB. Archived from [the original](http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Rule_Book/Rule%20Book%20Modules/TW%20-%20Train%20Working/GERT8000-TW1%20Iss%208.pdf) (PDF) on 29 September 2011. Retrieved 16 May 2010.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-11)** ["Railway Group Standards: Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection & Trapping"](https://www.rssb.co.uk/rgs/standards/GKRT0064%20Iss%201.pdf) (PDF). RGS. Retrieved 18 February 2011.{{[cite web](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Cite_web)}}: CS1 maint: url-status ([link](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:CS1_maint:_url-status))

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-rgsonline.co.uk_12-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-rgsonline.co.uk_12-1) ["GO/RT3119 - Accident and Incident Investigation"](https://web.archive.org/web/20131112130104/http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards/Traffic%20Operation%20and%20Management/Railway%20Group%20Standards/GORT3119%20Iss%203.pdf) (PDF). December 2012. Archived from [the original](http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards/Traffic%20Operation%20and%20Management/Railway%20Group%20Standards/GORT3119%20Iss%203.pdf) (PDF) on 12 November 2013. Retrieved 12 November 2013.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-ecpdp_13-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-ecpdp_13-1) ["Professional Driving Policy – a Freedom of Information request to East Coast Main Line Company Limited"](https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/professional_driving_policy). *WhatDoTheyKnow*. 27 January 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-14)** ["Online Rulebook – Module S5 – Section 1.1 "Signaller's authority""](https://web.archive.org/web/20110929162822/http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Rule_Book/Rule%20Book%20Modules/TW%20-%20Train%20Working/GERT8000-TW1%20Iss%208.pdf) (PDF). RSSB. Archived from [the original](http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Rule_Book/Rule%20Book%20Modules/TW%20-%20Train%20Working/GERT8000-TW1%20Iss%208.pdf) (PDF) on 29 September 2011. Retrieved 4 March 2016.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-15)** ["Online Rulebook – Module S5 – Section 1 "When a signal can be passed at danger""](https://web.archive.org/web/20110929162822/http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Rule_Book/Rule%20Book%20Modules/TW%20-%20Train%20Working/GERT8000-TW1%20Iss%208.pdf) (PDF). RSSB. Archived from [the original](http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Rule_Book/Rule%20Book%20Modules/TW%20-%20Train%20Working/GERT8000-TW1%20Iss%208.pdf) (PDF) on 29 September 2011. Retrieved 18 June 2017.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-16)** ["European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety"](https://eradis.era.europa.eu/default.aspx). *European Union Agency for Railways*. Retrieved 20 September 2024.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-17)** National Transportation Safety Board (21 January 2010). ["NTSB determines engineer's failure to observe and respond to red signal caused 2008 Chatsworth accident; recorders in cabs recommended"](https://web.archive.org/web/20100210075446/https://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2010/100121.html) (Press release). Archived from [the original](https://ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2010/100121.html) on 10 February 2010. Retrieved 23 January 2010.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-18)** National Transportation Safety Board (18 June 2013), [*NTSB Head-On Collision of Two Union Pacific Railroad Freight Trains Near Goodwell, Oklahoma June 24, 2012*](https://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2013/RAR1302.pdf) (PDF), retrieved 24 November 2013

1. **[^](#cite_ref-19)** Clock, Nine O' (4 August 2014). ["Rail accident at entry point of Cotesti station of the Galati Regional"](https://www.nineoclock.ro/2014/08/04/rail-accident-at-entry-point-of-cotesti-station-of-the-galati-regional/). *Nine O' Clock - first exclusively daily publication to appear in English language in Romania*.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-20)** Neves, Sofia (1 August 2020). ["Erro humano causou acidente com Alfa Pendular em Soure. Operadores da máquina passaram o sinal vermelho"](https://www.publico.pt/2020/08/01/sociedade/noticia/erro-humano-causou-acidente-alfa-pendular-soure-operadores-maquina-passaram-sinal-vermelho-1926699) [Human error caused [Alfa Pendular](/source/Alfa_Pendular) crash in [Soure](/source/Soure%2C_Portugal). [Maintenance] vehicle drivers passed signal at danger]. *[Público](/source/P%C3%BAblico_(Portugal))* (in Portuguese). Retrieved 13 April 2021.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-21)** ["Collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction"](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/collision-between-passenger-trains-at-salisbury-tunnel-junction). *GOV.UK*. Retrieved 3 November 2021.

## External links

- [Office of Rail Regulation](https://web.archive.org/web/20070928005454/http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.7788)

- [UK Health and Safety Executive - Signals passed at danger](https://web.archive.org/web/20060212185331/https://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spads.htm) - Archived 12 February 2006.

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Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Signal passed at danger](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_passed_at_danger) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_passed_at_danger?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.