# Peshmerga

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Internal security forces of Iraq's Kurdistan Region

Peshmerga پێشمەرگه Pêşmerge Flag of Kurdistan, used by the Peshmerga Motto Ey Reqîb[1] Founded 1946; 80 years ago (1946) (Mahabad Republic) Current form 2003; 23 years ago (2003) (Kurdistan Region) Headquarters Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq Website gov.krd/mopa Leadership President of Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Shoresh Ismail Abdulla Personnel Military age 21–41 Conscription None Active personnel 138,000 (planned end strength by 2026; current estimates 150,000–200,000)[2][3] Industry Domestic suppliers Iraqi Ministry of Defense[4] Foreign suppliers Current: Albania[5] Australia[6] Austria[7] Belgium[8] Bulgaria[9] Canada[5] Croatia[5] Cyprus[10] Czech Republic[11] Denmark[12] Estonia[13] Finland[14] France[5] Germany[5] Greece[15] Hungary[13] India[16] Iran[17] Israel[17] Italy[5] Netherlands[18] New Zealand[19][20] Norway[18] Romania[21] Russia[22] Slovakia[19] Slovenia[23] Sweden[24] United Kingdom[5] United States (continued via CTEF)[2][25] Former: Czechoslovakia[26] Soviet Union[26] Related articles History 19th century - 21st century Before 2003: Mehmûd Berzencî revolts Ehmed Barzanî revolt 1943 Barzanî revolt First Iraqi–Kurdish War Second Iraqi–Kurdish War PUK insurgency Iran–Iraq War 1983–1986 Kurdish rebellions Kurdistan Region–PKK conflict Anfal campaign Gulf War 1991 Iraqi uprisings Battle of Sulaymaniyah Kurdish Civil War Islamist insurgency in Kurdistan After 2003: 2003 invasion of Iraq Operation Viking Hammer First Iraq War Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011) Iraqi civil war (2006–2008) Iraqi insurgency (2011–2013) War in Iraq (2013–2017) US intervention in the Syrian civil war 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict Iraqi insurgency (2017–present) Operation Inherent Resolve[2] Attacks on US bases during the Gaza war 2026 Iran war 2026 Iranian strikes on the Kurdistan Region Ranks Military ranks of the Peshmerga

The **Peshmerga** ([Kurdish](/source/Kurdish_language): پێشمەرگه, [romanized](/source/Romanization_of_Kurdish): *Pêşmerge*, [lit.](/source/Literal_translation) ''Those Who Face Death'')[27] are the internal security forces of the [Kurdistan Region](/source/Kurdistan_Region). According to the [Constitution of Iraq](/source/Constitution_of_Iraq), [federal regions](/source/Federal_regions_of_Iraq) (such as the Kurdistan Region) are responsible for "the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the respective regions, such as police, security forces, and regional guards."[28] Other security institutions of the Kurdistan Region include the [Zêrevanî](/source/Zeravani) ([gendarmerie](/source/Gendarmerie)), [Asayish](/source/Asayish_(Kurdistan_Region)) ([security](/source/Security_agency) and [counterterrorism](/source/Counterterrorism) service), *[Parastin u Zanyarî](/source/Parastin_u_Zanyari)* ([intelligence agency](/source/Intelligence_agency)) and the [Kurdish police](/source/Police_(Kurdistan_Region)) force. The modern Peshmerga were established in 1946 as the [national army](/source/Army) of the [Mahabad republic](/source/Mahabad_republic). However, the history of Kurdish armed fighters dates back to antiquity and was partly organized in the 16th to 19th century, when they served as soldiers for various [Kurdish tribal leaders](/source/Kurdish_tribes) and [principalities](/source/Kurdish_principalities), as well as tribal paramilitary [border guards](/source/Border_guard) under [Ottoman](/source/Ottoman_Empire) and [Safavid](/source/Safavid_Iran) rule. By the 20th century, these forces had evolved into a more disciplined and organized [guerrilla](/source/Guerrilla_warfare) movement fighting for the independence of [Kurdistan](/source/Kurdistan), and in the 21st century they were institutionalized under the [Kurdistan Regional Government](/source/Kurdistan_Regional_Government) (KRG).[29]

Formally, the Peshmerga are under the command of the [Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs](/source/Ministry_of_Peshmerga_Affairs) (MoPA) of the KRG. In practice, however, the Peshmerga's structure is largely divided and controlled separately by the two Iraqi Kurdish political parties: the [Democratic Party of Kurdistan](/source/Kurdistan_Democratic_Party) (KDP) and the [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan](/source/Patriotic_Union_of_Kurdistan) (PUK). Unifying and integrating the Peshmerga under the MoPA has been on the Kurdistan Region's public agenda since 1992, with significant progress under a 2022 U.S.-KRG Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aiming for full unification by 2026, though challenges like partisanship and external threats persist.[30][2][31]

Besides being the official name for the KRG's internal security forces, historically the word Peshmerga has also been used for a variety of Kurdish militias and armed groups, especially in [Iranian Kurdistan](/source/Iranian_Kurdistan). A few examples are the Peshmerga of the [KDPI](/source/Democratic_Party_of_Iranian_Kurdistan), [PAK](/source/Kurdistan_Freedom_Party) and [Komala](/source/Komala_Party_of_Iranian_Kurdistan).[32]

## Etymology

The word "Peshmerga" can be translated to "to stand in front of death",[33][34][35] and Valentine states it was first used by [Qazi Muhammad](/source/Qazi_Muhammad) in the short-lived [Mahabad Republic](/source/Republic_of_Mahabad) (1946–47).[36] The word is understandable to [Persian](/source/Persian_language) speakers.[37] Because, the name was also used to refer to an elite unit within the [Sassanid Empire's military](/source/Military_of_the_Sasanian_Empire), specifically a sub-unit of the [Pushtigban](/source/Pushtigban), called the [Gyan-avspar](/source/Gyan-Avspar).[38] These warriors were renowned for their unwavering loyalty and bravery, often serving as the last line of defense for the [Sassanid kings](/source/List_of_monarchs_of_the_Sasanian_Empire).[39][40][41][42]

## History

Main article: [History of the Peshmerga](/source/History_of_the_Peshmerga)

Long before the establishment of the Peshmerga, Kurdish fighters were known in the [Middle East](/source/Middle_East) for their military traditions and use of [guerrilla tactics](/source/Guerrilla_tactics).[29][43]

In antiquity, [Babylonian](/source/Babylonia) sources from around the 7th century BC referred to the inhabitants of the mountains of what is now [southern Kurdistan](/source/Southern_Kurdistan) as *Qutil*. The term has been suggested to derive from the [Akkadian](/source/Akkadian_language) word *qardu* and the [Persian](/source/Persian_language) word *gurd*, both of which are associated with meanings such as "hero" or "warrior." Conflicts between these presumed proto-Kurdish mountain communities and the peoples of [Lower Mesopotamia](/source/Lower_Mesopotamia) are documented in pre-Biblical sources and are regarded as some of the earliest examples of guerrilla-style warfare in the region.[29][43]

Between AD 224 and 226, [Ardashir I](/source/Ardashir_I), founder of the [Sasanian Empire](/source/Sasanian_Empire), fought Kurdish forces but only gained partial control. His successor, [Ardashir II](/source/Ardashir_II), ended their remaining autonomy in the mountains. Ardashir called the Kurdish fighters *jânspâr/gyan-avspar*, meaning "self-sacrificers," similar to the later Peshmerga.[29]

In the [Islamic period](/source/History_of_Islam), Kurdish soldiers most notably fought under [Saladin](/source/Saladin).[29] Elite units were predominantly composed of Kurds, and Saladin's personal guard was generally drawn from Kurdish members.[44][45][46]

From the 16th to the 19th century, Kurdish fighters served under various [tribal leaders](/source/Kurdish_tribes) and [principalities](/source/Kurdish_principalities), and sometimes as paramilitary [border guards](/source/Border_guard) under [Ottoman](/source/Ottoman_Empire) and [Safavid](/source/Safavid_Iran) rule, while also participating in the regular armies of these empires. Under the Kurdish [Zand dynasty](/source/Zand_dynasty), [women](/source/Kurdish_women) were allowed to serve alongside their husbands, reflecting a level of gender equality more common in [Kurdish societies](/source/Kurdish_culture) than in neighboring Muslim communities.[29]

[Bedir Khan Beg](/source/Bedir_Khan_Beg) leading a cavalry charge.

In the 19th century, [Badr Khan](/source/Badr_Khan) mobilized 70,000 Kurdish fighters in campaigns against the Ottoman Empire to establish his own dynasty. Similarly, [Sheikh Ubeydullah](/source/Sheikh_Ubeydullah) gathered around 20,000 fighters in opposition to Ottoman rule.[29]

In response to increasing Kurdish mobilization and tribal attacks, the Ottoman Empire established the [Hamidiye Cavalry](/source/Hamidiye_(cavalry)) to secure Kurdish loyalty under the banner of [Pan-Islamism](/source/Pan-Islamism). The Hamidiye Cavalry is often considered a precursor to the modern Peshmerga, particularly in terms of military organization and training. The Hamidiye Cavalry provided many Kurds with their first experience in organized, non-tribal warfare, teaching them [military tactics](/source/Military_tactics) and the use of modern equipment. Officers from these units (e.g.: [Halis Öztürk](/source/Halis_%C3%96zt%C3%BCrk) and [Halid Beg Cibran](/source/Halid_Beg_Cibran)), but also former members of the regular [Ottoman army](/source/Ottoman_army) (e.g.: [Ihsan Nuri](/source/Ihsan_Nuri), [Ibrahim Heski](/source/Ibrahim_Heski), and various members of the [Society for the Rise of Kurdistan](/source/Society_for_the_Rise_of_Kurdistan), [Azadî](/source/Azad%C3%AE), and [Xoybûn](/source/Xoyb%C3%BBn)), later became influential in Kurdish uprisings and helped shape the structure of future Kurdish forces.[29]

### Early Kurdish revolts

See also: [Timeline of Kurdish uprisings](/source/Timeline_of_Kurdish_uprisings)

Kurdish cavalry under [Mahmud Barzanji](/source/Mahmud_Barzanji).

The Kurdish revolts of the early 20th century, such as the [uprisings led by Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji](/source/Mahmud_Barzanji_revolts), the [Ali Batı Revolt](/source/Ali_Bat%C4%B1_Revolt), the [Koçgiri rebellion](/source/Ko%C3%A7giri_rebellion), the [Beytüşşebab rebellion](/source/Beyt%C3%BC%C5%9F%C5%9Febab_rebellion), the [Sheikh Said rebellion](/source/Sheikh_Said_rebellion), the [Ararat Rebellion](/source/Ararat_rebellion), and the [Ahmed Barzani revolt](/source/Ahmed_Barzani_revolt), played an important role in the development of the modern Peshmerga. These events provided early experience in [guerrilla](/source/Guerrilla_warfare) and [non-conventional warfare](/source/Non-conventional_warfare) against state authorities and contributed to the spread of [Kurdish nationalism](/source/Kurdish_nationalism) among Kurdish fighters. They also strengthened the [Barzani tribe](/source/Barzani_(tribe)), from which key leaders like [Ahmed Barzani](/source/Ahmed_Barzani) and [Mustafa Barzani](/source/Mustafa_Barzani) emerged.[29][47]

Building on the military experience gained during these uprisings, Mustafa Barzani later organized Kurdish forces in order to liberate [Kurdistan](/source/Kurdistan). In 1943, he led approximately 2,000 Kurdish fighters in an [uprising against the Iraqi Army and British forces](/source/1943_Barzani_revolt), an event often regarded as a precursor to the modern Peshmerga forces that would later emerge, particularly during the period of the [Republic of Mahabad](/source/Republic_of_Mahabad).[47]

### Mahabad Republic

During the brief existence of the self-declared [Republic of Mahabad](/source/Republic_of_Mahabad) (1946–1947), a contingent of Kurdish fighters led by Mustafa Barzani served as its official [national army](/source/Army) after Barzani crossed the [Iraq–Iran border](/source/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_border) to support the establishment of the Kurdish state in [Iranian Kurdistan](/source/Iranian_Kurdistan).[48][49]

According to Kurdish lore, the leaders of Mahabad gathered to choose a name for their army. As the story goes, they struggled to find a suitable word for 'soldier.' A server, overhearing their discussion, suggested *peshmerga,* a slang term from his nearby village. The name was adopted, and the force was formally named the Peshmerga.[50] Furthermore, under president [Qazi Muhammad](/source/Qazi_Muhammad)’s orders, a committee of “hand-picked litterateurs and writers” also developed distinct Kurdish military terminology to define ranks and positions.[51]

[Mustafa Barzani](/source/Mustafa_Barzani) (center front) with other Kurdish military officials of the Republic of Mahabad.

The relative of [Simko Shikak](/source/Simko_Shikak), [Amr Khan Shikak](/source/Amar_Khan_Shikak), along with the tribal leader of [Baneh](/source/Baneh), [Hama Rashid](/source/Hama_Rashid_revolt), Khan Banei, and Zero Beg Herki, were appointed as [Marshals](/source/Marshal) of the Peshmerga army by the Minister of War, Mohammed Hossein Saif Qazi. Due to his extensive warfare experience Mustafa Barzani was appointed as Marshal and [chief of staff](/source/Chief_of_staff)[47] of the army. Officers maintained a professional appearance through their Soviet-style uniforms, further advised and organized by the [Soviet military](/source/Soviet_Armed_Forces) officer Captain [Salahaddin Kazimov](/source/Salahaddin_Kazimov). The Soviets continued their influence by sending at least 60 Kurdish officers to [Soviet Azerbaijan](/source/Azerbaijan_Soviet_Socialist_Republic) for additional military training. The Mahabad army consisted of about 70 [officers](/source/Officer_(armed_forces)), 40 [non-commissioned officers](/source/Non-commissioned_officer), and 1,200 [privates](/source/Private_(rank)). As one of the senior leaders, Mustafa Barzani was responsible for appointing officers within the ranks.[51]

In order to protect the republic's sovereignty, the Peshmerga engaged in their first fight during the [Battle of Qahrawa](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Qahrawa&action=edit&redlink=1), near the town of [Saqqez](/source/Saqqez). They ambushed an [Iranian](/source/Imperial_Guard_(Iran)) garrison, killing 21 soldiers, wounding 17, and capturing 40. By mid-May 1946 Kurdish forces numbered approximately 12,750 Peshmerga, but most Kurdish offensives were limited to minor skirmishes.[51]

#### Fall of the republic

See also: [Republic of Mahabad § Aftermath](/source/Republic_of_Mahabad#Aftermath)

The withdrawal of Soviet support and the subsequent [collapse of the republic](/source/Republic_of_Mahabad#End), including the [execution](/source/Capital_punishment) of its head of state, Qazi Muhammad, dismantled the Peshmerga's organization, who had agreed with the Iranians to peacefully withdraw from the capital of [Mahabad](/source/Mahabad), to avoid civilians casualties.[47][52] Peshmerga forces led by Barzani remained active in rural areas of Iranian Kurdistan for a period following the collapse of the republic and engaged Iranian Army units in March 1947. During these clashes, the Peshmerga reportedly inflicted significant casualties and captured several Iranian officers, particularly during the [Battle of Nalos](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Nalos&action=edit&redlink=1), including Lieutenant Jahanbani, the son of General [Nader Jahanbani](/source/Nader_Jahanbani).[29]

Iranian attacks continued against the remaining Peshmerga forces, prompting Barzani to order a retreat toward his home region of [Barzan](/source/Barzan%2C_Iraq) in [Iraqi Kurdistan](/source/Iraqi_Kurdistan). Upon reaching the Iraqi–Iranian border, several returning Peshmerga officers were arrested by the [Iraqi Army](/source/Iraqi_Army) and executed, despite earlier assurances of [amnesty](/source/Amnesty). In an effort to capture Barzani, Iraqi authorities subsequently deployed large numbers of troops to the region. Anticipating further action, Barzani and his followers fled once again, moving along the [Turkish–Iranian border](/source/Iran%E2%80%93Turkey_border) and eventually into the Soviet Union, where they remained in [exile](/source/Exile) until 1958.[29]

### Iraqi Kurdistan

Mid-20th-century Peshmerga fighters with the famous Kurdish guerrilla fighter [Mama Risha](/source/Mama_Risha) (center back).

Following the [1958 Iraqi military coup](/source/14_July_Revolution), exiled Peshmerga fighters led by Barzani and his newly established [Kurdistan Democratic Party](/source/Kurdistan_Democratic_Party) (KDP) were permitted to return to Iraq by [Abdul-Karim Qasim](/source/Abdul-Karim_Qasim). In return, Barzani’s Peshmerga initially supported Qasim's efforts to establish a multiethnic Iraqi state against [Arab nationalist](/source/Arab_nationalism) revolts. However, as Barzani's influence grew, Qasim declined to meet Kurdish demands, leading to increasing tensions between the two sides. By the end of 1961, Barzani had succeeded in uniting many Kurdish tribes under the Peshmerga and controlled large parts of Iraqi Kurdistan. These developments, combined with Qasim’s concerns over Barzani’s expanding power, culminated in the outbreak of the [First Iraqi–Kurdish War](/source/First_Iraqi%E2%80%93Kurdish_War) in 1961. The conflict, which lasted until 1970, marked the first major war fought by the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan, with Barzani and his forces seeking Kurdish independence.[29][49] The war resulted in the signing of the [Iraqi–Kurdish Autonomy Agreement](/source/Iraqi%E2%80%93Kurdish_Autonomy_Agreement_of_1970) between the Kurds and the [Ba'athist regime](/source/Ba'athist_Iraq), which [had replaced Qasim in 1963](/source/Ramadan_Revolution). Kurdish autonomy had failed to be implemented by 1974, which led to the [Second Iraqi–Kurdish War](/source/Second_Iraqi%E2%80%93Kurdish_War) in 1975. [Jalal Talabani](/source/Jalal_Talabani), a leading member of the KDP, left the same year to revitalize the resistance and founded the [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan](/source/Patriotic_Union_of_Kurdistan) (PUK). This event created the baseline for the political discontent between the KDP and PUK that divides Peshmerga forces and much of Kurdish society to this day.[53][54] After Mustafa Barzani's death in 1979, his son [Masoud Barzani](/source/Masoud_Barzani) took over his position.[49] Political tensions increased between the KDP and PUK in the years after, while Peshmerga forces fought to keep Iraqi Kurdistan under their own party's control, whilst also fighting off the [Iraqi Army](/source/Iraqi_Army)'s incursions.[55]

In 1988, the [Ba'athist Iraqi](/source/Ba'athist_Iraq) regime launched the [Anfal campaigns](/source/Anfal_campaign) against the Peshmerga and their civilian supporters in rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, most of them civilians. During the fighting against the Peshmerga, the Iraqi army was at times supported by Kurdish collaborators, commonly referred to as *[jash](/source/Jash_(term))*.[56]

Kurdish fighter during the [1991 Iraqi uprisings](/source/1991_Iraqi_uprisings) (Raperîn)

Following the [First Gulf War](/source/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War), the [1991 uprisings](/source/1991_Iraqi_uprisings) (Raperîn) broke out, which led to [*de facto* autonomy](/source/1991_Iraqi_uprisings#Kurdish_sovereign_enclave) for the [Kurdistan Region](/source/Kurdistan_Region).[55] Both party-affiliated and non-party-affiliated Peshmerga played a significant role during the uprisings, while their fighting capabilities were greatly enhanced by the [Iraqi no-fly zones](/source/Iraqi_no-fly_zones_conflict), which stayed in place until 2003.[56][57] Killed Peshmerga were commemorated as [martyrs](/source/Martyr). The memory of killed, injured and [veteran](/source/Veteran) Peshmerga fighters became widespread in public life through paintings, sculptures, and memorials, as well as through regular representation on radio and television and in commemorative rituals. Most Kurdish collaborators were granted [amnesty](/source/Amnesty), and some were subsequently incorporated into the Peshmerga forces of their respective parties.[56]

After gaining autonomy, the [Kurdish Civil War](/source/Iraqi_Kurdish_Civil_War) broke out, a conflict between the rivaling KDP and PUK parties, in which Peshmerga forces were used to fight against each other.[55] The civil war officially ended in September 1998 when the Barzanis and Talabanis signed the *Washington Agreement* establishing a formal peace treaty.[58] In the agreement, the parties agreed to share oil revenue and power, deny the use of Iraqi Kurdistan to the [Kurdistan Workers' Party](/source/Kurdistan_Workers'_Party) (PKK), and to not allow Iraqi troops into the Kurdish regions. By then, around 5,000 Peshmerga and civilians had been killed on both sides, and many more had been evicted for being on the "wrong side".[59]

Throughout the decades of conflict, the Peshmerga were widely considered to be liberators of the [Kurdish population](/source/Kurdish_population).[56]

### 2003-2011 invasion and occupation of Iraq

See also: [Operation Viking Hammer](/source/Operation_Viking_Hammer) and [Iraqi no-fly zones conflict](/source/Iraqi_no-fly_zones_conflict)

Kurdish Peshmerga and U.S. special forces after defeating [Ansar al-Islam](/source/Ansar_al-Islam_in_Kurdistan) during [Operation Viking Hammer](/source/Operation_Viking_Hammer) in [Halabja](/source/Halabja), Iraqi Kurdistan.

In the years after, tensions remained high, but both parties came closer to each other, and in 2003 both of them, jointly took part in the [overthrowing of the Baathist regime](/source/2003_invasion_of_Iraq) as part of the [Iraq War](/source/Iraq_War) and the broader [Global War on Terror](/source/War_on_terror).[60] The [CIA](/source/Central_Intelligence_Agency) and other [US special forces](/source/United_States_special_operations_forces), who arrived in Iraq in early 2002, conducted [unconventional warfare](/source/Unconventional_warfare_(United_States)) operations with the Peshmerga against [Ansal al-Islam](/source/Ansar_al-Islam_in_Kurdistan) terrorists. Furthermore Peshmerga were organized to form a 'northern Front' against [Saddam Hussein](/source/Saddam_Hussein)'s troops.[61] As the bombing campaign and subsequent invasion of Iraq began, Peshmerga forces, operating alongside U.S. Special Forces, advanced beyond the Kurdistan Region and took control of large areas that were widely regarded as Kurdish but had previously been outside Kurdish control. These areas included [Sinjar](/source/Sinjar), [Tuz Khurmatu](/source/Tuz_Khurmatu), [Khanaqin](/source/Khanaqin), and [Kirkuk](/source/Kirkuk).[62] By tying down Saddam Hussein’s [5th Division](/source/5th_Division_(Iraq)) in northern Iraq, the Peshmerga, helped facilitate the [coalition](/source/Coalition_of_the_willing_(Iraq_War))’s invasion of [southern Iraq](/source/Southern_Iraq) and reduced the number of Iraqi forces available to oppose coalition operations elsewhere, likely saving hundreds if not thousands of lives.[63] The Peshmerga also played a key role in helping the United States on the mission to capture Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.[64][65]

After the overthrowing, the Peshmerga were politically recognized and obtained a special legal position. This improvement came from the [Coalition Provisional Authority](/source/Coalition_Provisional_Authority) (CPA) with issuing orders that recognized the Peshmerga and exempted them from disbandment.[66] However, the decision was preceded by disagreements between Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani and the U.S. Administrator of Iraq, [Paul Bremer](/source/Paul_Bremer), who regarded the continued existence of the Peshmerga as a "red line" in the formation of the new Iraqi state. Barzani rejected calls for disbandment, reportedly telling Bremer to "be a man and come to Kurdistan to disband [the] Peshmerga." Bremer subsequently abandoned his efforts to disband the Peshmerga.[67] In August 2003, parts of the Peshmerga were assigned to [border security](/source/Border_control) and [oil pipeline](/source/Pipeline) protection, while others trained with [coalition troops](/source/Coalition_of_the_willing_(Iraq_War)). Peshmerga units collaborated closely with U.S. forces on [patrols](/source/Patrol), [interrogations](/source/Interrogation), and security missions. At one point, the Peshmerga made up 30% of the [new Iraqi Army](/source/Iraqi_Ground_Forces#Rebuilding_an_Army_from_2003).[66]

In 2004, [CTG Kurdistan](/source/CTG_Kurdistan) captured Saudi-born Pakistani terrorist [Hassan Ghul](/source/Hassan_Ghul), who was operating for [al-Qaeda in Iraq](/source/Al-Qaeda_in_Iraq). Ghul was turned over to American intelligence officers shortly afterwards, which eventually led to the [killing of Osama bin Laden](/source/Killing_of_Osama_bin_Laden) in a covert American military operation in [Pakistan](/source/Pakistan) in 2011.[68][69][70]

#### Legal status of the Peshmerga

Article 117 of the new [2005 Iraqi Constitution](/source/Constitution_of_Iraq) allowed [federal regions](/source/Federal_regions_of_Iraq) (such as the Kurdistan Region) to establish their own internal security services; that is, the "police, security forces and guards of the region." The Peshmerga are legally recognized as one of these permissible regional internal security forces.[71]

In 2006, a major conference in Erbil, involving the KRG, Iraqi Government, and [Multinational Forces in Iraq](/source/Multi-National_Force_%E2%80%93_Iraq), further clarified the Peshmerga's role: defending the Kurdistan Region, supporting federal security efforts, fighting [terrorism](/source/Terrorism), and preserving constitutional institutions.[66][72]

#### Post-recognition phase

Following recognition by international powers and under the Iraqi Constitution, the situation in the Kurdistan Region during the [occupation of Iraq](/source/Occupation_of_Iraq_(2003%E2%80%932011)) remained relatively stable, allowing the Peshmerga to reorganize and train their forces at military academies in the [Zakho](/source/Zakho)–[Duhok](/source/Duhok) and Qalachulan–[Sulaymaniyah](/source/Sulaymaniyah) areas,[66][72] while staying divided between the KDP and the PUK.

Over the course of the occupation of Iraq, the Peshmerga’s role gradually evolved from primarily providing security to participating in active [counterinsurgency](/source/Counterinsurgency) operations, in coordination with [Iraqi security forces](/source/Iraqi_security_forces) and multinational forces, against former Ba’athist elements, Al-Qaeda, Sunni tribal fighters, and foreign combatants. [Anti-terror](/source/Anti-terror) operations carried out by the Peshmerga contributed to making the Kurdistan Region one of the more stable areas in Iraq.[73]

In 2009 to 2010, growing accusations of corruption against both parties led to the defection of many party-affiliated Peshmerga to the [Gorran Movement](/source/Gorran_Movement), which called for the dissolution of party militias and the elimination of corruption.[59] Following the death of its leader, [Nawshirwan Mustafa](/source/Nawshirwan_Mustafa), the movement’s popularity declined,[74] and most Peshmerga fighters remained under the control of the KDP and PUK.

Kurdish Peshmerga soldier with an [M93 rifle](/source/Zastava_M93_Black_Arrow).

### 2014 war against the Islamic State

In the first half of 2014, during the [Islamic State](/source/Islamic_State)’s (ISIL/ISIS) [offensive](/source/Islamic_State_invasion_of_Iraq), the [Iraqi Armed Forces](/source/Iraqi_Armed_Forces) rapidly collapsed in much of [Sunni](/source/Sunni_Islam)-majority [western Iraq](/source/Western_Iraq), leading to the [fall of Mosul](/source/Fall_of_Mosul) and other strategic areas. Peshmerga forces, many of whom had not experienced major combat for over a decade, swiftly moved into positions abandoned by Iraqi forces in [disputed territories](/source/Disputed_territories_of_northern_Iraq) with significant Kurdish populations, including [Sinjar](/source/Sinjar), [Jalawla](/source/Jalawla), [Tuz Khurmatu](/source/Tuz_Khurmatu), [Rabia](/source/Rabia%2C_Iraq) and the oil-rich city of [Kirkuk](/source/Kirkuk). Most of Iraqi Kurdistan's southern regions, including Jalawla, Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk remained under Peshmerga control until 2017 and were [defended on numerous occasions](/source/Battle_of_Kirkuk_(disambiguation)) against ISIS offensives.[73][75]

2015 [VOA](/source/VOA) report about Peshmerga fighting IS south of [Erbil](/source/Erbil)

In the second half of 2014, however, the Peshmerga proved unable to hold their newly gained positions to Iraqi Kurdistan's west ([Nineveh Plains](/source/Nineveh_Plains)/[Nineveh governorate](/source/Nineveh_Governorate)), including Sinjar, which was followed by widespread massacres committed by the Islamic State, including the [Yazidi genocide](/source/Yazidi_genocide). After initially withdrawing, with the regional capital [Erbil](/source/Erbil) coming within approximately 30 minutes of an Islamic State advance, the Peshmerga later counterattacked and recaptured the entire [Erbil governorate](/source/Erbil_Governorate), large areas to Iraqi Kurdistan's west, in Nineveh Governorate, and to Iraqi Kurdistan's south, in the [Diyala](/source/Diyala_Governorate) and [Kirkuk](/source/Kirkuk_Governorate) governorates. These operations were carried out in coordination with U.S. air support and Kurdish forces from the [People’s Protection Units](/source/People's_Protection_Units) (YPG) and the [Kurdistan Workers’ Party](/source/Kurdistan_Workers'_Party) (PKK), which cooperated with the Peshmerga during several offensives in Nineveh Governorate, including the [Sinjar offensives](/source/Sinjar_offensive). The Sinjar offensives marked one of the first cross-border military collaborations between Kurdish forces from different parts of [Kurdistan](/source/Kurdistan) in the 21st century.[73][75][76]

In September 2014, during the [Siege of Kobani](/source/Siege_of_Koban%C3%AE), approximately 300 Peshmerga fighters were deployed to [Syrian Kurdistan](/source/Syrian_Kurdistan) to assist Kurdish forces there, marking the first official deployment of the Peshmerga outside Iraq. Equipped with heavy weaponry, the Peshmerga crossed two international borders and were greeted by large crowds of [Kurds in Turkey](/source/Kurds_in_Turkey) during their transit.[73]

According to Myles B. Caggins III, the Senior Spokesperson for the [Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS](/source/Combined_Joint_Task_Force_%E2%80%93_Operation_Inherent_Resolve) at the time, the Peshmerga made the "ultimate sacrifice" in the war Against the Islamic State with over 1,300 Peshmerga fighters being killed, and upwards of 8,000 being wounded.[75] As stated by a report of the German [Federal Office for Migration and Refugees](/source/Federal_Office_for_Migration_and_Refugees), the Peshmerga are seen by locals as heroes due to their involvement in the fight against ISIS.[76]

### Post-2017 reforms

Main article: [Peshmerga § Unification efforts](#Unification_efforts)

Following the defeat of ISIS in 2017, conflicts with the Iraqi government, supported by [Shi'ite](/source/Shi'ite) militas and the [IRGC](/source/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps) renewed, leading to the [2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict](/source/2017_Iraqi%E2%80%93Kurdish_conflict).[77]

Post-ISIS Peshmerga reforms focused on unification and modernization. In September 2022, the U.S. and KRG renewed a MoU to create a unified, nonpartisan force under MoPA command by 2026, including disbanding partisan Units 70 and 80, establishing two Area Commands and 11 light infantry divisions, and achieving a planned strength of 138,000.[2] By mid-2025, four divisions were operational, biometric enrollment exceeded 85%, and unification entered its final phase, with completion expected by year-end.[78][79] Advancements included the 2025 'Peshmerga Medical Force Readiness Initiative' and proposals for air defense systems.[80][81] Continued Coalition support via CTEF provided stipends, vehicles, and equipment.[2] However, progress has been slowed by KDP-PUK division, ISIS' threat, and disputes with the central government in Baghdad.[82]

## Structure

### Party affiliations

The Peshmerga are mostly divided among forces loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and those loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),[83] while other, minor Kurdish parties such as the [Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party](/source/Kurdistan_Socialist_Democratic_Party) also have their own small Peshmerga units.[84] The [Kurdistan Islamic Movement](/source/Kurdistan_Islamic_Movement) also had its own Peshmerga unit, which became an official Peshmerga branch during the Iran-Iraq war, and was disarmed in 2003.[85] In daily life and the media, Peshmerga are referred to as *Peshmerga i parti* (KDP) or *Peshmerga i yaketi* (PUK) – i.e., KDP peshmerga or PUK Peshmerga.[86] The KDP and PUK do not disclose information about the composition of their forces with government or media.[83] Thus there is no reliable number of how many Peshmerga fighters exist.[83] Media outlets have speculated that there are between 150,000 and 200,000 Peshmerga, but this number is highly disputed.[87][88] The Peshmerga are divided into a KDP-governed "yellow" zone covering [Dohuk Governorate](/source/Dohuk_Governorate) and [Erbil Governorate](/source/Erbil_Governorate) and a PUK-governed "green" zone covering [Sulaymaniyah Governorate](/source/Sulaymaniyah_Governorate) and [Halabja Governorate](/source/Halabja_Governorate).[89][83][30] Each zone has its own branch of Peshmerga with their own governing institutions that do not coordinate with the other branch.[30][90]

### Unification efforts

As a result of the split nature of the Peshmerga forces, there is no central command center in charge of the entire force, and Peshmerga units instead follow separate military hierarchies depending on political allegiance.[91] Multiple unification and depoliticizing efforts of the Peshmerga have been made since 1992. Many deadlines have been missed,[30] reforms have been watered down,[83] and most of the Peshmerga are still under the influence and command of the KDP and the PUK.

#### Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs

Main article: [Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs](/source/Ministry_of_Peshmerga_Affairs)

After gaining autonomy in 1991 the Kurdistan Region created its own proto-defence ministry: [The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs](/source/Ministry_of_Peshmerga_Affairs) (MoPA). The Ministry was established to professionalize, unify, and centralize command of the party-affiliated Peshmerga forces, but in its early years it lacked real authority, something that became evident during the [Kurdish civil war](/source/Iraqi_Kurdish_Civil_War). Following the end of the civil war the KDP and PUK agreed to the re-establishment of the unified Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, which was favoured by the overall *KRG Unification Agreement*, and formally took place in 2006. In January 2010, the MoPA created the first, to itself subordinate, integrated Peshmerga brigade, called a [Regional Guard Brigade](/source/Regional_Guard_Brigades) (RGB). Three more RGBs were formed in March of the same year. Mario Fumerton and Wladimir van Wilgenburg commented, "The KDP’s temporary alliance with [Saddam Hussein](/source/Saddam_Hussein) to expel the PUK from [Erbil](/source/Erbil) in 1996 is still remembered as a grave betrayal; conversely, many KDP members recall being driven out of other territories by the PUK. In part for these reasons, each side keeps a portion of its own forces under direct party control as a final guarantee to maintain the balance of power."[92][93][94]

In 2016 and 2017, following the events of the [Iraqi Civil War](/source/Iraqi_Civil_War_(2014%E2%80%932017)), the [United States](/source/United_States) and several [European](/source/Europe) nations pressured the PUK and KDP to set up more mixed [brigades](/source/Brigade) as a condition for aid and funding. The PUK and KDP united 12 to 14 brigades under the RGB, which were then placed under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.[83] The [Netherlands](/source/Netherlands), the US, the UK, and [Germany](/source/Germany) form the Multi-National Advisory Group (MNAG) that supports the project to establish a "modern, effective, affordable, and accountable Peshmerga."[95] In addition, to support reform efforts, the [United Kingdom](/source/United_Kingdom) appointed a Special Defence Adviser to the MoPA.[96]

In 2022, the KDP's [1st Support Force](/source/1st_Support_Forces_Command) and the PUK's [2nd Support Force](/source/2nd_Support_Forces_Command) were integrated into the MoPA, a move described by Col. Todd Burroughs, deputy director of the US-led coalition's Military Advisor Group North, as a 'significant step in the Peshmerga reform process.'[95][97]

#### 2022 Memorandum of understanding

A major step towards unification was reached in 2022, when a four-year [memorandum of understanding](/source/Memorandum_of_understanding) (MoU) between the [US Department of Defense](/source/United_States_Department_of_Defense) and Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs was signed, outlining conditions and timelines for integration into MoPA, effective until September 2026.[75][2]

By 2025, unification was in its final phase, with 10 additional brigades formed, two command regions planned, and salary payments digitialized via the 'MyAccount' system.[98][2] An Inspector General Report for *Operation Inherent Resolve* report noted progress in establishing four divisions, but highlighted delays in the development of Area Commands and persistent partisanship.[2] As of Q2 2025, 28 Regional Guard Brigades were unified, 4 divisions operational, biometric enrollment exceeded 85%, and a four-year budget was submitted for a 138,000-strong force. Salary digitization via 'MyAccount' was nearing completion.[2][99]

#### Future outlook

In spite of all reforms, officers partially still continue to report to and take orders from their party leaders who also control the deployment of forces loyal to them and appoint front-line and sector commanders.[30] Critical reforms stalled include the full incorporation of Units 80 and 70, and additional division HQs, amid U.S. frustration over partisanship.[2][100] Peshmerga officials repeatedly affirm that full unification will be completed by 2026, if not sooner and U.S. officials stress that they will continue supporting unifying efforts.[101][102]

### Combat Forces

Both the KDP and the PUK Peshmerga rely heavily on [irregulars](/source/Irregular_military) in times of conflict to increase their ranks.[103] However, both maintain several [professional military](/source/Military) brigades. The Peshmerga forces are described as a [secular](/source/Secularity) force with a [Muslim](/source/Muslims) majority and smaller [Assyrian](/source/Assyrian_people), [Chaldean Catholic](/source/Chaldean_Catholic_Church), [Yazidi](/source/Yazidis), [Shabak](/source/Shabaks) and [Kaka'i](/source/Yarsanism) units.[71][104][105][106][107] Though some units are composed of minorities, they are not segregated and serve in regular infantry divisions too.[108] In 2016 the MoPA intended to create a military division for the [Arabs](/source/Arabs) and [Turkmen](/source/Iraqi_Turkmen) of Kirkuk Province, but financial difficulties halted the project.[109] Most minority units have been formed, when the Peshmerga took over the [disputed territories](/source/Disputed_territories_of_northern_Iraq) in the [War against the Islamic State](/source/War_against_the_Islamic_State).[110]

The following units are affiliated with or have been identified within the Peshmerga force:

Force Estimated size Command Description MoPA-affiliated units Regional Guard Brigades (RGB)[30][83][111] 73,000 (as of 2025, with 28 unified brigades)[2][112][113] Şoreş Îsmaîl MoPA's main force. Supposedly apolitical.[114] 1st Support Forces Command[115] 10,000 combined with the 2nd Support Forces.[97] Lt. Gen. Sihad Barzani Transferred to MoPA from KDP in 2022. Focuses on support roles, including artillery and officer training. 2nd Support Forces Command[115] 10,000 combined with the 1st Support Forces.[97] Maj. Gen. Mariwan Muhammed Amin Transferred to the MoPA from PUK in 2022. Focuses on support roles. KDP-affiliated units 80 Unit[30][83][111] 50,000–60,000 Najat Ali Salih KDP. In process of integration into MoPA by 2026.[2][116] Zeravani[30] 51,000–120,000 active personnel and 250,000 reservists[29][117] Masoud Barzani KDP's militarized police force. Gulan Forces[118][119] 6,000 (2016)[120] Mansour Barzani Commanded by Mansour Barzani. Peshmerga Roj[111] 3,000–6,000 fighters Ibrahim Biro and Brig. Gen. Mohammed Rejeb Dehdo Military wing of the ENKS. Consists of Kurds from Syria. Located in the KRG, Pro-KDP and takes orders from Masoud Barzani. Counter Terrorism Department (Kurdistan Region)[121] N/A N/A Counterterrorism unit part of the Kurdistan Region Security Council. Barzan Forces[122][123][124] N/A N/A Brigade formation, consisting of men recruited from the Barzani clan. Its also known as Barzan Army. Black Tiger Battalion[125] N/A Sirwan Barzani Formed to confront the Islamic State in 2014 under Sirwan Barzani, who carries the nickname 'Black Tiger'. Presidential Guard (Kurdistan Region)[30] N/A Nechirvan Barzani Military unit tasked with protecting the President of Kurdistan Region. PUK-affiliated units 70 Unit[30][83][111] 50,000–60,000 Sheikh Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa PUK. In process of integration into MoPA by 2026.[2][116] Defense and Emergency Forces (DEF)[126][127] 32,000[127] N/A PUK's equivalent of KDP's Zeravani. They are also known as Black Forces. CTG Kurdistan[30] 5,000[128] Wehab Helebcî Hezekani Kosrat Rasul[30] 2,000–3,000 Kosrat Rasul Ali Kosrat Rasul Ali's personal protection brigade, one of the last remaining units to defend during the Kirkuk crisis.[129] Kurdistan Commando Forces[130] 500–10,000 Diyar Omar Well-equipped Commando unit.[131] Golden Force[132][133] N/A Barham Sheikh Mohammed Sub-unit of the Kurdistan Commando Forces. Presidential Peshmerga Brigade[30] N/A Hero Ibrahim Ahmed (Jalal Talabani formerly) A unit which was stationed in Baghdad during the presidency of Jalal Talabani.[72] Minority units Êzîdxan Protection Force or "Yazidi Peshmerga"[134] 7,000[135]–8,000[136]–10,000[111] Haydar Shesho and Qasim Shesho Pro-KDP. Yazidi Democratic Party. Incorporated into MoPA.[137] Jazeera Brigade[110][111] 2,000 Brig. Gen. Bolond Hussayn Brigade of Ethnic-Arabs from Zummar and Rabia. Affiliated with the MoPA. Formed by the KDP. Battalion of the Assyrian Democratic Movement[138][139] ~ 360 (1993), ~ 2,000 (2014) William Ishaya (formerly) Neutral between the KDP and PUK. Affiliated with the MoPA. Military wing of the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Nineveh Plain Guard Forces (NPGF) or "Christian Peshmerga"[111][140][141] 1,500–2,500 Sarkis Aghajan Mamendo (unconfirmed) Pro-KDP. Affiliated with the MoPA. Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council. Shabak Battalion[107] ~ 1,000 Col. Mahmood Shabak Battalion made up of the Shabak minority. Kaka'i Battalion[142][143] ~ 680 (August 2015) Nezar and Adel Kakai Battalion made up of the Kaka'i religious minority. Affiliated with the MoPA. Tiger Guards[144][145] ~ 600 (March 2015) N/A Christian brigade under the authority of the KRG.[144] Nineveh Plains Force (NPF)[111][141] ~ 500 (July 2015) Romeo Hakari Pro-KDP. Affiliated with the MoPA. Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party. Dwekh Nawsha[111][139] ~ 100–250 Lt. Col. Odisho Pro-KDP. Military wing of the Assyrian Patriotic Party. Not as clearly acting as official sub-units of Kurdish forces as the NPGF or NPF. Asayish (security force) KDP Asayish Unknown Barzan Qassab KDP. Affiliated with the Ministry of Interior. PUK Asayish Unknown N/A PUK. Affiliated with the Ministry of Interior. PUK Asayish SWAT units Unknown N/A PUK. Others KDPS Peshmerga[146] 3,000 N/A Peshmerga force of the Kurdistan Social Democratic Party.

#### Specialized Units

The Peshmerga Media Cell is one of the specialized units of the MoPA. Established in January 2022, it was created to professionalize the force's information and [media operations](/source/Information_warfare). The unit acts as the official channel for statements on Peshmerga activities, with responsibilities that include safeguarding operational security, protecting journalists reporting from conflict zones, and ensuring the dissemination of accurate information to local and international audiences.[147] It has also received support from international coalition advisers in developing media and information management practices.[148]

### Peshmerga in the Iraqi Army

Due to limited funding and the vast size of the Peshmerga forces, the KRG planned to downsize its forces from large numbers of low-quality forces to a smaller but much more effective and well-trained force.[149] Consequently, in 2009, the KRG and [Baghdad](/source/Baghdad) engaged in discussions about incorporating parts of the Peshmerga forces into the [Iraqi Army](/source/Iraqi_Ground_Forces) in what would be the 15th and 16th Iraqi Army [divisions](/source/Division_(military)).[150][151] However, after increasing tension between [Erbil](/source/Erbil) and Baghdad regarding the [disputed areas](/source/Disputed_territories_of_northern_Iraq), the transfer was largely put on hold. Some Peshmerga were already transferred but reportedly [deserted](/source/Desertion) again, and there are allegations that former Peshmerga forces remained loyal to the KRG rather than their Iraqi chain of command; regardless, thousands of members of the 80 Unit of KDP and the 70 Unit of PUK are based in Baghdad and cooperate well with other Iraqi forces.[152][153][154]

The Presidential Peshmerga Brigade of the PUK was stationed in Baghdad and paid by the Iraqi government during the presidency of [Jalal Talabani](/source/Jalal_Talabani).[72]

### Ranks

Main article: [Military ranks of the Peshmerga](/source/Military_ranks_of_the_Peshmerga)

The Peshmerga, despite wearing a variety of uniform types, consistently maintain proper standards of dress. This includes the correct display of [rank insignia](/source/Military_ranks_of_the_Peshmerga) for both enlisted personnel and [commissioned officers](/source/Officer_(armed_forces)), as well as the proper wear of headgear. In addition, they have designated ceremonial and duty uniforms that project a highly professional appearance.[155]

Officers can be promoted by the [President of the Kurdistan Region](/source/President_of_Kurdistan_Region) for outstanding military and civil achievements.[156]

## Inventory and capabilities

Main article: [List of equipment of the Peshmerga](/source/List_of_equipment_of_the_Peshmerga)

Peshmerga forces largely rely on old arms captured from battles. The Peshmerga captured large stockpiles of weapons during the [1991 Iraqi uprisings](/source/1991_uprisings_in_Iraq).[157] Several stockpiles of weapons were captured from the old Iraqi Army during the 2003 U.S. [invasion of Iraq](/source/Invasion_of_Iraq), in which Peshmerga forces were active. Following the retreat of the new Iraqi Army during the June 2014 Islamic State offensive, Peshmerga forces reportedly again managed to get hold of weapons left behind by the Iraqis.[158] Since August 2014, Peshmerga forces have also captured weapons from the Islamic State.[159]

Peshmerga soldiers stand in formation during the Modern Brigade Course graduation ceremony.

The Peshmerga arsenal is limited and confined by restrictions because the Kurdish Region has to purchase arms through the Iraqi government. Due to disputes between the KRG and the Iraqi government, arms flows from Baghdad to Kurdistan Region have been almost nonexistent, as Baghdad fears Kurdish aspirations for independence.[160][161][83] After the Islamic State offensive of August 2014, multiple governments armed the Peshmerga with [light arms](/source/Firearm), [night-vision devices](/source/Night-vision_device), and [ammunition](/source/Ammunition).[162][163] However, Kurdish officials and Peshmerga stressed that they were not receiving enough and Baghdad was blocking arms from reaching the KRG, emphasizing the need for weapons to be sent directly and not through Baghdad.[164][165] Despite this, the United States has maintained that the government of Iraq is responsible for the security of Iraqi Kurdistan and that Baghdad must approve all military aid.[83] As of 2025, continued CTEF support provided vehicles, heavy equipment, small arms, ammunition, and non-lethal aid, with proposals for air defenses in the 2024 NDAA.[2][166]

The Peshmerga lack a proper [medical corps](/source/Medical_corps) and [communication](/source/Communication) units.[83] This became apparent during the [Islamic State offensive in 2014](/source/Northern_Iraq_offensive_(June_2014)) where the Peshmerga found itself lacking ambulances and frontline [field hospitals](/source/Field_hospital), forcing wounded fighters to walk back to safety.[83] There is also a lack of communication tools, as Peshmerga commanders are forced to use civilian cellphones to communicate with each other.[83] Under the guidance of the [US-led coalition](/source/Combined_Joint_Task_Force_%E2%80%93_Operation_Inherent_Resolve) the Peshmerga started to standardize its weapons systems, replacing [Soviet](/source/Soviet_Union)-era weapons with [NATO firearms](/source/List_of_5.56%C3%9745mm_NATO_firearms).[83] In 2015, for the first time, Peshmerga soldiers received urban warfare and military intelligence training from foreign trainers of the [CJTF–OIR](/source/Combined_Joint_Task_Force_%E2%80%93_Operation_Inherent_Resolve).[167] Some Peshmerga of the MoPA have also been trained by American private military contractors like [DynCorp](/source/DynCorp).[168] By 2025, advancements included the Peshmerga Medical Force Readiness Initiative to address field hospital shortages.[169]

## Issues

Peshmerga has been accused of [corruption](/source/Corruption), [partisanship](/source/Partisanship), [nepotism](/source/Nepotism) and [fraud](/source/Fraud).[170][171][172][173] The Peshmerga was accused of listing "ghost employees" who do not exist or do not show up for work, but receive salaries. Those setting up the scam split the salary with these employees.[83]

In addition the KDP and PUK have used the Peshmerga to exert a [monopoly](/source/Monopoly) on the use of force within their zones.[83] In 2011 KDP Peshmerga fired on anti-government protesters in [Sulaymaniyah](/source/Sulaymaniyah), and the PUK later used its own security forces to break up these protests,[30] leading to criticism from all of the opposition parties in the [Kurdistan Region Parliament](/source/Kurdistan_Region_Parliament). In 2014 the KDP used its Peshmerga forces to stop delegates from the [Gorran Movement](/source/Gorran_Movement) to enter Erbil and attend parliament.[83]

Outside of [Kurdistan Region](/source/Kurdistan_Region) the Peshmerga has been criticized for using force to exert control of local [Arab](/source/Arab), [Yazidi](/source/Yazidi) and [Assyrian](/source/Assyrian_people) communities, particularly during the [Iraqi Civil War](/source/Iraqi_Civil_War_(2014%E2%80%932017)).[174]

Concerns about persistent partisanship remain.[2] In 2025, U.S. reports expressed frustration over stalled unification due to party lines, despite commitments.[100]

## Role of women

Main article: [Kurdish women](/source/Kurdish_women)

### Historic involvement

[People's Defense Units](/source/People's_Defense_Units)' (YPG) woman volunteer with Peshmerga soldier

Women have played a significant role in the Peshmerga since its foundation, compared to other [Middle Eastern](/source/Middle_East) militaries. The Kurdish [Zand tribe](/source/Zand_tribe) was known for allowing women in military roles.[29] During the [Iraqi–Kurdish conflict](/source/Iraqi%E2%80%93Kurdish_conflict) the majority of women served within the Peshmerga in supporting roles such as building camps, taking care of the wounded, and carrying munitions and messages.[103] Several women brigades served on the front lines. The PUK started recruiting women during the [Kurdish Civil War](/source/Iraqi-Kurdish_Civil_War). Women were given a 45-day basic training, which included [parade drills](/source/Military_parade) and basic [marksmanship](/source/Marksman) training with various rifles, [mortars](/source/Mortar_(weapon)), and [RPGs](/source/RPG-7).[29]

### Modern era

In the months leading up to the [2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq](/source/2003_invasion_of_Iraq), the United States launched [Operation Viking Hammer](/source/Operation_Viking_Hammer) which dealt a huge blow to Islamic terrorist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan and uncovered a [chemical weapons](/source/Chemical_warfare) facility.[175][176][177][178][179] The PUK later confirmed that female Kurdish fighters had participated in the operation.[103]

[Female Peshmerga](#Role_of_women) soldiers training with [G36's](/source/Heckler_%26_Koch_G36)

In 2014 the Peshmerga had at least 600 [women in their ranks](/source/Women_in_the_military).[180] The number of women increased significantly during the war against ISIS due to a shortage of manpower and the desire for revenge.[180] The Peshmerga have one entirely female [brigade](/source/Brigade).[181] In the KDP, these Peshmerga women have been refused access to the frontline and are mostly used in logistics and management positions,[182] while PUK Peshmerga women are deployed on the front lines and are actively engaging in combat.[183][184][29] Women are [paid the same](/source/Equal_pay_for_equal_work) as men.[180]

### Famous female fighters

[Margaret George Malik](/source/Margaret_George_Shello) was an iconic [Assyrian](/source/Assyrian_people) guerilla fighter and commander within the Peshmerga who was given a leading position in important battles such as the [Battle of Zawita Valley](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Zawita_Valley&action=edit&redlink=1).[185][186][187] She was nicknamed "[Joan of Arc](/source/Joan_of_Arc) of Kurdistan" for the courage she displayed in combat. In 1995 Colonel [Nahida Rashid](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nahida_Rashid&action=edit&redlink=1) created the first women's Peshmerga unit. Other well known female Peshmergas are [Hero Ibrahim Ahmad](/source/Hero_Ibrahim_Ahmed), [Amineh Kakabaveh](/source/Amineh_Kakabaveh), [Pakhshan Zangana](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pakhshan_Zangana&action=edit&redlink=1), and [Kafiya Suleiman](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kafiya_Suleiman&action=edit&redlink=1).[188]

## Gallery

		- Peshmerga gathered near the Syrian border in 2014

		- Peshmerga soldiers in ceremonial gear

		- Peshmerga Parade

		- Peshmerga meet Anti-IS Coalition advisors

## References

1. **[^](#cite_ref-1)** ["Hundreds of Christians join Peshmerga"](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/33ec84f9-5889-4d6e-8f97-affa72db3694/Hundreds-of-Christians-join-Peshmerga-). *Kurdistan24*. February 19, 2016. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-5) [***g***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-6) [***h***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-7) [***i***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-8) [***j***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-9) [***k***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-10) [***l***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-11) [***m***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-12) [***n***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-13) [***o***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-14) [***p***](#cite_ref-OIR2025_2-15) ["Lead Inspector General Report on Operation Inherent Resolve Q2 FY2025"](https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/oir_q2_fy25_final_report.pdf) (PDF). U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General. May 2025. pp. 49–50. Retrieved August 20, 2025. The planned end strength for Peshmerga under the MoPA's command is 138,000.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-3)** ["Peshmerga Ministry Nears Completion of Force Unification"](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/858806/peshmerga-ministry-nears-completion-of-force-unification-says-top-official). *Kurdistan24*. August 2025. Retrieved August 20, 2025.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-4)** Multiple sources: - ["Iraq supplies Kurds with ammunition in unprecedented move, U.S. says"](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-ammunition/iraq-supplies-kurds-with-ammunition-in-unprecedented-move-u-s-says-idUSKBN0G82BP20140809). *Reuters*. August 9, 2014. Retrieved July 26, 2019. - ["MOD issues clarification on the howitzers allocated to Peshmerga"](https://ina.iq/en/security/34845-mod-issues-clarification-on-the-howitzers-allocated-to-peshmerga.html). [Iraqi News Agency](/source/Iraqi_News_Agency). September 9, 2024.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-jcpa_5-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-jcpa_5-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-jcpa_5-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-jcpa_5-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-jcpa_5-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-jcpa_5-5) [***g***](#cite_ref-jcpa_5-6) ["The Status of Western Military Aid to Kurdish Peshmerga Forces"](http://jcpa.org/article/the-status-of-western-military-aid-to-kurdish-peshmerga-forces/). *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-australia_6-0)** Pollard, Ruth (September 11, 2014). ["Australian-supplied weapons have reached the Kurdish frontline"](https://www.smh.com.au/world/australiansupplied-weapons-have-reached-the-kurdish-frontline-20140911-10ffla.html). *The Sydney Morning Herald*. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** ["Austria to provide Peshmerga with medical support"](https://web.archive.org/web/20190726173137/http://poland.gov.krd/austria-to-provide-peshmerga-with-medical-support/). Archived from [the original](http://poland.gov.krd/austria-to-provide-peshmerga-with-medical-support/) on July 26, 2019. Retrieved July 26, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-belgium_8-0)** ["L'aide belge aux Peshmergas est prête à partir vers l'Irak"](https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_l-aide-belge-aux-peshmergas-est-prete-a-partir-vers-l-irak?id=9222692). *RTBF Info* (in French). February 24, 2016. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-9)** ["България е изпратила на кюрдите в Ирак автомати и патрони за 6 млн. лева"](https://www.mediapool.bg/bulgaria-e-izpratila-na-kyurdite-v-irak-avtomati-i-patroni-za-6-mln-leva-news225406.html). *Mediapool.bg* (in Bulgarian). September 30, 2014. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-cyprus_10-0)** ["Cyprus could send more light arms, ammunition to Kurdistan: FM"](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/4c3de48d-b53f-4ae1-8602-8b0b28249879). *Kurdistan24*. November 11, 2017. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-czechia_11-0)** ["Czech Rifles and Ammunition for the Peshmerga. Prague Supporting the Fight Against Daesh Again – Defence24.com"](https://www.defence24.com/czech-rifles-and-ammunition-for-the-peshmerga-prague-supporting-the-fight-against-daesh-again). *www.defence24.com* (in Czech). January 27, 2016. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-12)** ["Forsvarsavisen 01"](https://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/publikationer/forsvarsavisen/Documents/Forsvarsavisen_01_2015.pdf) (PDF) (in Danish). Ministry of Defense. p. 3. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-iss_13-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-iss_13-1) Jan Joel Andersson and Florence Gaub (2015). ["Adding fuel to the fire? Arming the Kurds"](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_37_Kurds.pdf) (PDF). *Issue Alert*. **37**. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-finland_14-0)** ["Finland increases military support to Kurdistan"](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/35196208-14f6-41a2-888d-645dd997e9fd/Finland-increases-military-support-to-Kurdistan-). *Kurdistan24*. September 16, 2016. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-greece_15-0)** ["Greece to send ammunition to Iraqi Kurds"](https://web.archive.org/web/20150922174314/http://www.worldbulletin.net/iraqi-kurdistan/145285/greece-to-send-ammunition-to-iraqi-kurds). Archived from the original on September 22, 2015. Retrieved September 27, 2014.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-16)** ["Assistant Head of DFR and Indian Ambassador discuss areas of cooperation"](https://web.archive.org/web/20200617100546/https://dfr.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=46772). *dfr.gov.krd*. April 20, 2017. Archived from [the original](https://dfr.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=46772) on June 17, 2020. Retrieved July 8, 2019.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-israel_17-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-israel_17-1) Arash Reisinezhad (2018). *The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia*. Springer. p. 115. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-3319899473](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-3319899473).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-nlno_18-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-nlno_18-1) ["Dutch and Norwegians train Peshmerga on basic soldier skills"](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/igphoto/2001689688/). *www.centcom.mil*. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-weiss_19-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-weiss_19-1) Guido Weiss (July 8, 2015). ["Global Support for Peshmerga Forces"](https://web.archive.org/web/20180103141502/http://kurdstrat.com/2015/07/08/global-support-for-peshmerga-forces/). Kurdstrat. Archived from [the original](http://kurdstrat.com/2015/07/08/global-support-for-peshmerga-forces/) on January 3, 2018. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-20)** Mosul, Martin Chulov near (October 20, 2016). ["Kurdish forces vow no retreat until Nineveh plains are retaken from Isis"](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/20/kurdish-forces-vow-no-retreat-until-nineveh-plains-are-retaken-from-isis). *The Guardian*. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-21)** Hasan, H. A. (May 21, 2016). ["Romania Pledges Continuous Support for Peshmerga"](http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/277154). *www.basnews.com*. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-russia_22-0)** Litovkin, Nikolai (March 18, 2016). ["Russia delivers first weapons supplies to Iraqi Kurds"](https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/03/18/russia-delivers-first-weapons-supplies-to-iraqi-kurds_576809). *Russia Beyond*. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-23)** ["Inherent Resolve in northern Iraq"](https://web.archive.org/web/20200617100619/http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/international-cooperation/international-operations-and-missions/iraq-oir/#c3128). Archived from [the original](http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/international-cooperation/international-operations-and-missions/iraq-oir/#c3128) on June 17, 2020. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-24)** ["Sweden will continue support for Peshmerga forces in Kurdistan: Defense Minister"](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/6b8eab4f-fed9-4bb2-bfde-af7f47839295). *Kurdistan24*. May 10, 2018. Retrieved July 3, 2019.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-25)** ["New Pentagon Budget Request Shows Increased Support for Peshmerga"](https://kurdistanchronicle.com/b/2953). *Kurdistan Chronicle*. March 13, 2024. Retrieved August 20, 2025. The 2025 Defense Budget Request includes a huge increase in support for the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-Mitrokhin_26-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-Mitrokhin_26-1) *The Mitrokhin archive. II : the KGB and the world*. London: Penguin. 2014. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0141977980](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0141977980).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-27)** ["Peshmerga and the Ongoing Fight against ISIS"](https://web.archive.org/web/20190703183200/https://kurdistantribune.com/Peshmerga-and-the-ongoing-fight-against-isis/). March 27, 2016. Archived from [the original](https://kurdistantribune.com/peshmerga-and-the-ongoing-fight-against-isis/) on July 3, 2019. Retrieved July 31, 2018.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-28)** ["Constitution of Iraq"](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en) (PDF).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-5) [***g***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-6) [***h***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-7) [***i***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-8) [***j***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-9) [***k***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-10) [***l***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-11) [***m***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-12) [***n***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-13) [***o***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-14) [***p***](#cite_ref-Lortz2015_29-15) Lortz, Michael G. (2005). [*Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces – the*Peshmerga*– from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq*](http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-1038) (MA thesis). Florida State University.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-5) [***g***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-6) [***h***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-7) [***i***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-8) [***j***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-9) [***k***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-10) [***l***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-11) [***m***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-12) [***n***](#cite_ref-CMEC_30-13) van Wilgenburg, Wladimir; Fumerton, Mario (December 16, 2015). ["Kurdistan's Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces"](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR_WilgenburgFumerton_Kurdistan_English_final.pdf) (PDF). *Carnegie Middle East Center*. Retrieved February 12, 2018.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-31)** ["U.S. Voices Frustration Over Stalled Peshmerga Reform in Kurdistan"](https://peregraf.com/en/news/9424). *Peregraf*. August 1, 2025. Retrieved August 20, 2025. Despite formal commitments, Peshmerga units remain fragmented along party lines, with little meaningful progress toward true unification.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-32)** Smith, Crispin (2018). [*Independent Without Independence: The IraqiKurdish Peshmerga in International Law**](https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/wp-content/uploads/sites/84/HLI102_crop-1.pdf) (PDF) (Volume 59, Number 1 ed.). Harvard University. p. 248.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-33)** Stratton, Allegra (June 26, 2006). ["Hero of the people"](http://www.newstatesman.com/node/153517). *[New Statesman](/source/New_Statesman)*. Retrieved February 14, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-34)** Koerner, Brendan (March 21, 2003). ["What does the Kurdish word Peshmerga mean?"](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2003/03/are_kurdish_soldiers_facing_death_or_seeking_death.html). *Slate.com*. Retrieved October 18, 2016.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-35)** From the [Kurdish](/source/Kurdish_language) **pêş** (پێش) "before" and **merg** مەرگ "death".

1. **[^](#cite_ref-36)** Valentine, Those Who Face Death, KDP, 2018.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-37)** Stilo, Donald (March 2008). [*Aspects of Iranian Linguistics*](https://books.google.com/books?id=nlkZBwAAQBAJ&q=pishmarg+word&pg=PA15). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9781443810135](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781443810135). Retrieved October 19, 2017.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-38)** ["Gyan-Avspar – The Sassanids (Empire Divided) – Total War: Rome II"](https://www.honga.net/totalwar/rome2/unit.php?l=ja&v=rome2&f=3c_sassanid&u=3c_Sas_Gyan_Avspar_commander). *Royal Military Academy*. Retrieved May 16, 2025.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-39)** Hughes, Ian (January 15, 2009). [*Belisarius: The Last Roman General*](https://books.google.com/books?id=1bfNDwAAQBAJ&dq=Gyan-avspar+peshmerga&pg=PT45). Pen and Sword. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-84468-941-5](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-84468-941-5).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-40)** Farrokh, Kaveh (July 13, 2005). [*Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224–642*](https://books.google.com/books?id=9SguvgAACAAJ). Bloomsbury USA. p. 6. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-84176-713-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-84176-713-0).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-41)** ["Russian Lead Miniatures.Heavy Armed Sassanid Knight. The Army of Gyan – Avspar P | #1758881952"](https://www.worthpoint.com/worthopedia/russian-lead-miniatures-heavy-armed-1758881952). *Worthpoint*. Retrieved May 16, 2025.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-42)** Aladić, Dubravko. [*Roman-Sassanian Conflict in the Third Century Campaigns of Shapur I and the Battle of Edessa*](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374531936).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:30_43-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:30_43-1) S. R. Valentine, *Peshmerga: Those Who Face Death*, KDP, 2018, see the introduction and chapter one.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-44)** Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin (State University of New York Press, 1972), pp. 44–45

1. **[^](#cite_ref-45)** Stephen Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus 1193–1260 (SUNY Press, 1977), p. 23

1. **[^](#cite_ref-46)** Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp. 116–117

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:22_47-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:22_47-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:22_47-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-:22_47-3) Khorsheed, Hussein M. (2020). [*THE ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL FORCES IN COMBATING TERRORISM DURING CIVIL WAR: THE CASE OF PESHMERGA OF KURDISTAN REGION-IRAQ AGAINST ISIS (2014–2017)*](https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/6e34f42f-b88e-4a3d-9824-38abd48dbd2a/content). Monterey, Canada: Naval Postgraduate School.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-first_mahabad_source_48-0)** Abdulla, Mufid (June 12, 2011). ["Mahabad – the first independent Kurdish republic"](https://web.archive.org/web/20160528231328/http://kurdistantribune.com/2011/mahabad-first-independent-kurdish-republic/). *The Kurdistan Tribune*. Archived from [the original](http://kurdistantribune.com/2011/mahabad-first-independent-kurdish-republic/) on May 28, 2016. Retrieved February 14, 2015.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-ma_barzani_49-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-ma_barzani_49-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-ma_barzani_49-2) ["President"](https://web.archive.org/web/20140730010255/http://www.krgspain.org/government/profiles/english-president/). *[Kurdistan Regional Government](/source/Kurdistan_Regional_Government) Representation in Spain*. 2015. Archived from the original on July 30, 2014. Retrieved February 14, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-50)** Koerner, Brendan (March 21, 2003). ["Are Kurdish Soldiers "Facing Death" or "Seeking Death"?"](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2003/03/what-does-the-kurdish-word-peshmerga-mean.html). *Slate*. [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [1091-2339](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1091-2339). Retrieved July 23, 2025.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:21_51-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:21_51-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:21_51-2) Waisy, Karwan Salih (July 15, 2015). ["The Kurdish Peshmarga Force 1943–1975"](https://socialscienceresearch.org/index.php/GJHSS/article/view/1402). *Global Journal of Human-Social Science*. **15** (D2). [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [2249-460X](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/2249-460X).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-52)** Meiselas, Susan (2008). *Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History* (2nd ed.). [University of Chicago Press](/source/University_of_Chicago_Press). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-226-51928-9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-226-51928-9).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-53)** van Bruinessen, Martin (1986). ["The Kurds between Iran and Iraq"](http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011925). *MERIP Middle East Report* (141): 14–27. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.2307/3011925](https://doi.org/10.2307%2F3011925). [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [0888-0328](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0888-0328). [JSTOR](/source/JSTOR_(identifier)) [3011925](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3011925).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-54)** ["Getting Peshmerga Reform Right: Helping the Iraqi Kurds to Help Themselves in Post-ISIS Iraq – Foreign Policy Research Institute"](https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/05/getting-peshmerga-reform-right-helping-iraqi-kurds-help-post-isis-iraq/). *www.fpri.org*.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:25_55-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:25_55-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:25_55-2) S. R. Valentine, Peshmerga: Those Who Face Death, KDP, 2018, chapter six.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:26_56-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:26_56-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:26_56-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-:26_56-3) Fischer-Tahir, Andrea (2012). ["Gendered Memories and Masculinities: Kurdish Peshmerga on the Anfal Campaign in Iraq"](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/jmiddeastwomstud.8.1.92). *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*. **8** (1): 92–114. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.2979/jmiddeastwomstud.8.1.92](https://doi.org/10.2979%2Fjmiddeastwomstud.8.1.92). [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [1552-5864](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1552-5864).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-57)** ["March 5th: The Anniversary of Raperin"](https://kurdistanchronicle.com/babat/2586). *Kurdistan Chronicle*. April 13, 2023. Retrieved February 10, 2026.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-58)** Abdulrahman, Frman (February 23, 2012). ["Never-ending mystery: what really happened to Kurdish civil war missing"](http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3000). *niqash*. Retrieved February 22, 2015.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:27_59-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:27_59-1) McDermid, Charles (February 20, 2010). ["New force emerges in Kirkuk"](https://web.archive.org/web/20100222221442/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LB20Ak02.html). *[Asia Times Online](/source/Asia_Times_Online)*. Archived from the original on February 22, 2010. Retrieved February 22, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-WhoPeshmerga_60-0)** [Profile: Who are the Peshmerga?](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28738975) BBC News. Retrieved 19 December 2014.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-61)** Chivers, C. J. (March 24, 2003). ["A Nation at War: Second Front; Allied Troops Are Flown Into Airfields In North Iraq"](https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/24/world/nation-war-second-front-allied-troops-are-flown-airfields-north-iraq.html). *The New York Times*. Retrieved July 8, 2021.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-62)** ["Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq: V. The 2003 Iraq War and its Aftermath"](https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/6.htm). *www.hrw.org*. Retrieved January 30, 2026.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-63)** Woodward, Bob (2004). *[Plan of Attack](/source/Plan_of_Attack)*.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:23_64-0)** Rai, Manish (October 6, 2014). ["Kurdish Peshmerga Can Be a Game-changer in Iraq And Syria"](http://www.khaama.com/kurdish-peshmerga-can-be-a-game-changer-in-iraq-and-syria-6802). *[Khaama Press](/source/Khaama_Press)*. Retrieved February 14, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:24_65-0)** ["Operation Red Dawn's eight-month hunt"](http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/12/15/1071336860245.html). *[The Sydney Morning Herald](/source/The_Sydney_Morning_Herald)*. December 15, 2003. Retrieved February 14, 2015.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:7_66-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:7_66-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:7_66-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-:7_66-3) Khorsheed, Hussein M. (2020). [*THE ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL FORCES IN COMBATING TERRORISM DURING CIVIL WAR: THE CASE OF PESHMERGA OF KURDISTAN REGION-IRAQ AGAINST ISIS (2014–2017)*](https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/6e34f42f-b88e-4a3d-9824-38abd48dbd2a/content). Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. pp. 35–36.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-67)** ["Barzani says he refused request by Bremer to disband Peshmerga in 2003"](https://theinsightinternational.com/barzani-bremer-disband-peshmerga-2017-09-03). *The Insight International*. September 3, 2017. Retrieved January 30, 2026.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-68)** Ambinder, Marc (April 29, 2013). ["How the CIA really caught Bin Laden's trail"](http://theweek.com/article/index/243389/how-the-cia-really-caught-bin-ladens-trail#axzz34IzUbxqb). *[The Week](/source/The_Week)*. Retrieved February 14, 2015.

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1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:20_144-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:20_144-1) ["Iraq Christian Brigade To Battle ISIS: Anti-Islamic State 'Tiger Guards' Will Support Kurdish Fighters"](http://www.ibtimes.com/iraq-christian-brigade-battle-isis-anti-islamic-state-tiger-guards-will-support-1846070). *International Business Times*. March 13, 2015. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20160803201117/http://www.ibtimes.com/iraq-christian-brigade-battle-isis-anti-islamic-state-tiger-guards-will-support-1846070) from the original on August 3, 2016. Retrieved June 3, 2016. Retrieved 3 June 2016.

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1. **[^](#cite_ref-146)** ["How are non-Pêshmerga armed special forces used?"](http://mezopotamyaajansi.net/en/NEWS/content/view/http%3A%2F%2Fmezopotamyaajansi.net%2Fen%2FNEWS%2Fcontent%2Fview%2F169464). *mezopotamyaajansi.net*. April 28, 2022. Retrieved September 16, 2025.

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1. **[^](#cite_ref-149)** Cordesman, Anthony H.; Mausner, Adam (2009). [*Withdrawal from Iraq*](https://books.google.com/books?id=S6oP3Y9ZM3sC&pg=PA129). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780892065530](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780892065530). Retrieved March 20, 2015.

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1. **[^](#cite_ref-156)** ["President Nechirvan Barzani promotes ranks of Peshmerga Ministry officers"](https://www.gulanmedia.com/en/story/316795). *Gulan Media*. February 8, 2024. Retrieved September 15, 2025.

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1. **[^](#cite_ref-158)** Hugh Naylor (September 18, 2014). ["As ISIL retreats, Iraqi Kurds gain new ammunition"](https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/as-isil-retreats-iraqi-kurds-gain-new-ammunition-1.234090). *The National*. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-159)** Richard Spencer, The Telegraph (October 3, 2014). ["Kurdish forces captured an ISIS base after a two-day siege – but the ISIS fighters inside somehow slipped away"](https://nationalpost.com/2014/10/03/kurdish-forces-captured-a-isis-base-after-a-two-day-siege-but-the-isis-fighters-inside-somehow-slipped-away/). *National Post*. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-160)** Hollie McKay. ["Iraq's Peshmerga desperate for US arms in fight against ISIS"](https://web.archive.org/web/20150103073335/http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/03/iraq-peshmerga-desperate-for-us-arms-in-fight-against-isis/). *Fox News*. Archived from [the original](http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/03/iraq-peshmerga-desperate-for-us-arms-in-fight-against-isis/) on January 3, 2015. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-161)** ["Arms for Kurdish Peshmerga to affect military balance"](http://www.dw.de/arms-for-kurdish-peshmerga-to-affect-military-balance/a-17853077). *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-162)** Nicholas Watt (August 14, 2014). ["UK prepares to supply arms directly to Kurdish forces fighting Isis"](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/uk-britain-arms-supply-kurdish-forces-iraq-isis). *The Guardian*. Retrieved October 23, 2014.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-163)** ["Seven western states join US to arm Iraqi Kurdistan: Pentagon"](https://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/8/state8392.htm). *ekurd.net*.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-164)** ["Iraq's Kurds appeal for new U.S. arms to combat Islamic State"](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iraqs-kurds-appeal-for-new-us-arms-to-combat-islamic-state/2014/11/12/d2a0fe28-6aa6-11e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html). *Washington Post*. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-165)** ["Iraqi Kurds say West not providing enough arms to defeat Islamic State"](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-barzani-idUSKCN0J30ON20141119). *Reuters*. November 19, 2014. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-166)** ["After the Coalition: Evaluating the Next Steps"](https://newlinesinstitute.org/political-systems/after-the-coalition-evaluating-the-next-steps-for-foreign-forces-in-iraq-and-syria/). Newlines Institute. March 18, 2025. Retrieved August 20, 2025.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-167)** ["Coalition helps Peshmerga muscle up on urban warfare"](http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/160420155). *Rudaw*. April 16, 2015. Retrieved April 17, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-168)** ["Peshmerga forces receive combat vehicle and helicopter assault training"](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/387565/Peshmerga-forces-receive-combat-vehicle-and-helicopter-assault-training). *Kurdistan24*. March 10, 2022. Retrieved September 15, 2025.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-169)** ["The Kurdistan Region – Representation in the United States"](https://us.gov.krd/new-history-of-kurdistan/). KRG Representation in the US. April 2025. Retrieved August 20, 2025.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-170)** ["The Peshmerga of Iraq"](http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insideiraq/2008/03/2008525185811788617.html). *[Aljazeera.com](/source/Aljazeera.com)*. March 1, 2008. Retrieved February 22, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-171)** ["KRG and the 'godfathers': 2006 secret US cable on Wikileaks"](http://kurdistantribune.com/2014/krg-godfathers-2006-secret-cable-on-wikileaks/). *The Kurdistan Tribune*. May 8, 2014. Retrieved February 22, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-172)** Devigne, Jacqueline (2011). [""Iraqoncilable" Differences? The Political Nature of the Peshmerga"](http://tiglarchives.org/sites/default/files/resources/nimep/v5/NIMEP_Insights_2011_48-64.pdf) (PDF). *NIMEP Insights*. Retrieved February 22, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-173)** ["PUK official warns Peshmerga will not take orders from anyone else: Iraqi Kurdistan"](http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/3/state7820.htm). Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-174)** ["Marked With An "X" | Iraqi Kurdish Forces' Destruction of Villages, Homes in Conflict with ISIS"](https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/11/13/marked-x/iraqi-kurdish-forces-destruction-villages-homes-conflict-isis). Human Rights Watch. November 13, 2016. Retrieved April 24, 2018.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-175)** *Plan of Attack*, [Bob Woodward](/source/Bob_Woodward), Simon and Schuster, 2004.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-176)** Mike Tucker; Charles Faddis (2008). [*Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War inside Iraq*](https://archive.org/details/operationhotelca00tuck). The Lyons Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-59921-366-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-59921-366-8).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-177)** ["An interview on public radio with the author"](https://web.archive.org/web/20110930081326/http://wamu.org/audio/dr/08/10/r2081007-22101.asx). Archived from [the original](http://wamu.org/audio/dr/08/10/r2081007-22101.asx) on September 30, 2011.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-Chalk,_Peter_2012_178-0)** Chalk, Peter, Encyclopedia of Terrorism Volume 1, 2012, ABC-CLIO

1. **[^](#cite_ref-179)** ["Ansar al-Islam"](https://fas.org/irp/world/para/ansar.htm). Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved August 8, 2012.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:6_180-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:6_180-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:6_180-2) ["Meet the Kurdish women fighting the Islamic State"](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11216064/Meet-the-Kurdish-women-fighting-the-Islamic-State.html). *Telegraph*. November 8, 2014. [Archived](https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11216064/Meet-the-Kurdish-women-fighting-the-Islamic-State.html) from the original on January 12, 2022. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-181)** Gruber-Sytchev, Verena (2020). [*The Social Construction of Military Unity and a Post-merger Integration of the Unified Peshmerga Forces in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/138254475/2020_Gruber_Sytchev_Verena_1363759_ethesis.pdf) (PDF). King's College London. p. 8.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-182)** ["No Frontline Deployment for Female Kurdish Troops"](http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/28092014). *Rudaw*. Retrieved March 20, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-183)** ["KRG halts recruiting of female Peshmerga"](http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/220620151). Rudaw.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-184)** ["Meet the female Peshmerga forces fighting IS"](https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/iraq-kurdistan-female-regiment-peshmerga-fight-is.html). Al-Monitor. August 11, 2014.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-Vindheim2016_185-0)** Vindheim, Jan Bojer (2016). [*Kurdistan stiger fram*](https://books.google.com/books?id=hlBfDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT71). Kolofon Forlag. p. 71. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-82-300-1494-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-82-300-1494-3).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-186)** ["Assyrians in Iraq, Vahram Petrosian"](http://www.aina.org/articles/assyriansiniraq.pdf) (PDF).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-Sankey2018_187-0)** Sankey, Margaret D. (2018). [*Women and War in the 21st Century: A Country-by-Country Guide*](https://books.google.com/books?id=4HxqDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA172). ABC-CLIO. p. 172. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-4408-5766-9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-4408-5766-9).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-188)** [*Female Militarization and Women's Rights: A Case Study of thePeshmerga and YPJ*](https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1690&context=honorstheses). [University of Central Florida](/source/University_of_Central_Florida). 2019. pp. 38, 43.

## Further reading

- Simon Ross Valentine, *Peshmerga: Those Who Face Death: The Kurdish Army, its History, Development, and the Fight against ISIS*, Kindle Direct Publishing, 2018, 300pp. [*[ISBN missing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citing_sources)*]

- Chapman, Dennis P., Lieutenant Colonel USA, *Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government*, *Mohammed Najat*, Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2011. [ISSN](/source/ISSN_(identifier)) [0026-3141](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0026-3141) Reviewed by Michael M. Gunter in *Middle East Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 3, Summer 2011.

## External links

Media related to [Kurdish Peshmerga](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Kurdish_Peshmerga) at Wikimedia Commons

- [Official MPA site at Kurdish Regional Government site](http://mope.gov.krd/English/) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20200710200404/http://mope.gov.krd/English/) July 10, 2020, at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine)

v t e Kurdistan Region articles History Iraqi–Kurdish conflict Iraqi insurgency (2011–2013) Geography Kurdistan Erbil (Hewlêr) Halabja (Helebce) Dohuk (Dihok) Sulaymaniyah (Slêmanî) Disputed territories Politics Human rights Military (Peshmerga) Foreign relations Foreign missions in Kurdistan Region Missions of Kurdistan Region Two-state solution (Iraqi–Kurdish negotiations) Independence referendum Economy Oil reserves Taqtaq-Feshkhabur pipeline Demographics Culture Anthem Flag People Security forces Peshmerga Parastin u Zanyari Asayish Zeravani

v t e Kurdish organisations Armenia Political parties Yezidi National Union (ULE) Iran Militant organizations Komala Komalah (CPI) Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) Organization of Iranian Kurdistan Struggle Sipay Rizgari Political parties Iranian Call and Reform Organization Kurdish United Front Iraq Militant organizations Peshmerga Êzîdxan Protection Force (HPŞ) Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ) Êzîdxan Women's Units Asayîşa Êzîdxanê Fayli Kurd Brigade Political parties Action Party for the Independence of Kurdistan Democratic National Union of Kurdistan (YNDK) Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (DPAK) Gorran Islamic Fayli Grouping in Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Group (IGK) Kurdistan Islamic Movement (IMK) Kurdish Tribal Association Communist Party of Kurdistan – Iraq Kurdistan Conservative Party Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Kurdistan Democratic Party – Progressive Front Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PÇDK) Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) New Generation Movement (NG) Kurdistan List Kurdistan Revolutionary Party Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP) Kurdistan Toilers' Party (KZP) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Service and Reform List Shursh Lebanon Political parties Kurdish Democratic Party Rezgari Party Syria Militant organizations Descendants of Saladin Brigade People's Protection Units (YPG) Women's Protection Units (YPJ) Kurdish Front Political parties Kurdish National Council (KNC-ENKS) Kurdish Supreme Committee Kurdish National Alliance in Syria (HNKS) Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S) Kurdish Democratic Political Union Kurdish Democratic Unity Party (PYDKS) Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) Civil society Women's Media Union Turkey Militant organizations Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Kurdish Hizbollah People's Defence Forces (HPG) Free Women's Units (YJA-STAR) Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) Civil Protection Units (YPS) Civil Protection Units-Women (YPS-Jin) Political parties Communist Party of Kurdistan (KKP) Democracy Party (DEP) Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) Democratic Society Party (DTP) Democratic Regions Party (DBP) Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR) Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) Freedom and Equality Party (ÖZEP) Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Kurdistan Islamic Movement (HİK) Islamic Party of Kurdistan (PİK) Kurdistan Democratic Party/North (KDP/Bakur) Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) People's Democracy Party (HADEP) Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) People's Labor Party (HEP) Revolutionary Party of Kurdistan (PŞK) Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR) Society for the Rise of Kurdistan Xoybûn (CSK) Workers Vanguard Party of Kurdistan (PPKK) Kurdistan Kurds Kurdish nationalism Kingdom of Kurdistan Kurdistansky Uyezd Republic of Ararat Republic of Mahabad Kurdistan Region Rojava List of Kurdish dynasties and countries

v t e Militaries of the Arab world Sovereign states Algeria Bahrain Comoros Djibouti Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mauritania Morocco Oman Palestine Qatar Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen States with limited recognition Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Somaliland Autonomous regional armed forces Peshmerga Non-state actors Islamic State Hamas Hezbollah Houthi movement People's Defense Units italic - country that sometimes recognized as part of Arab world

v t e Military of Kurdistan Leadership Masoud Barzani Masrour Barzani Mansour Barzani Bafel Talabani Shoresh Ismail Abdulla Saleh Muslim Mazloum Abdi Ferhad Şamî Kino Gabriel Abdullah Öcalan Murat Karayılan Abdulla Mohtadi Mustafa Hijri Military by regions Kurdistan Region (Iraq) Peshmerga 70s Unit 80s Unit 1st Support Forces Command 2nd Support Forces Command Regional Guard Brigades Kurdistan Commando Forces Golden Force CTG Kurdistan Counter Terrorism Department Gulan Forces Police Asayish Asayish (Sinjar District) Zerevani Êzîdxan Protection Force DAANES (Syria) Syrian Democratic Forces YPG YPG International Martyr Haroun Units Martyr Nubar Ozanyan Brigade International Freedom Battalion United Freedom Forces YPJ Army of Revolutionaries Kurdish Front Asayish Anti-Terror Units Hêzên Komandos Peshmerga Roj Northern Kurdistan (Turkey) PKK People's Defence Forces Free Women's Units Civil Protection Units Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement Peoples' United Revolutionary Movement Kurdistan Freedom Hawks Eastern Kurdistan (Iran) National Army of Kurdistan (SMK) PJAK Peshmerga Komala Peshmerga DPIK Peshmerga Administrative branches Kurdistan Region Security Council Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs Syrian Democratic Forces military councils Deir ez-Zor Manbij Al-Bab Jarabulus Historical Hamidiye Shekakis Barzanis Army of the Republic of Mahabad Conflicts Uprising of Sheikh Ubeydullah Kurdish rebellions during World War I Mahmud Barzanji revolts Iraqi–Kurdish conflict Kurdish–Iranian conflict Simko Shikak revolts First Second Sheikh Said rebellion Ararat rebellion Ahmed Barzani revolt Dersim rebellion Iran–Mahabad conflict First Iraqi–Kurdish War Second Iraqi–Kurdish War PUK insurgency 1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran Iran–Iraq War KDPI insurgency (1989–1996) Kurdish–Turkish conflict 1991 Kurdish uprisings Iran–PJAK conflict Syrian Civil War Rojava conflict Rojava–Islamist conflict Western Iran clashes (2016–present) 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict Equipment List of equipment of the Peshmerga Military ranks Military ranks of the Peshmerga Related History of the Peshmerga List of armed groups in the Syrian Civil War List of armed groups in the War in Iraq (2013–2017) War against the Islamic State Timeline of the Kurdistan Workers' Party insurgency (2015–2025) Kurdistan portal • Category

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Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Peshmerga](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peshmerga) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peshmerga?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.