# Object of the mind > Mediated Wiki article. Canonical URL: https://mediated.wiki/source/Object_of_the_mind > Markdown URL: https://mediated.wiki/source/Object_of_the_mind.md > Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object_of_the_mind > Source revision: 1349574588 > License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) "Mental object" redirects here. For other uses, see [Mental model (disambiguation)](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Mental_model_(disambiguation)&action=edit&redlink=1). Object that exists in the imagination An **object of the mind** is an [object](/source/Object_(philosophy)) that [exists](/source/Existence) in the [mind](/source/Mind) or [imagination](/source/Imagination), but which, in the real world, can only be represented or modeled. Some such objects are [abstractions](/source/Abstraction), [concepts](/source/Concept) and [scenarios](/source/Scenario) in [literature](/source/Literature) and [fiction](/source/Fiction). Closely related are **intentional objects**, which are what thoughts and feelings are about ([intentionality](/source/Intentionality)), even if they are not about anything real (such as thoughts about [unicorns](/source/Unicorn), or feelings of apprehension about a dental appointment which is subsequently cancelled).[1] However, intentional objects may coincide with real objects (as in thoughts about horses, or a feeling of regret about a missed appointment). ## Mathematical objects Main article: [Mathematical object](/source/Mathematical_object) Mathematics and geometry describe [abstract objects](/source/Abstract_object) that sometimes correspond to familiar shapes, and sometimes do not. Circles, triangles, rectangles, and so forth describe two-dimensional shapes that are often found in the real world. However, mathematical formulas do not describe individual physical circles, triangles, or rectangles. They describe ideal shapes that are [objects](/source/Object_(philosophy)) of the [mind](/source/Mind). The incredible precision of mathematical expression permits a vast applicability of mental abstractions to real life situations. Many more mathematical formulas describe shapes that are unfamiliar, or do not necessarily correspond to objects in the real world. For example, the [Klein bottle](/source/Klein_bottle)[2] is a one-sided, sealed surface with no inside or outside (in other words, it is the three-dimensional equivalent of the [Möbius strip](/source/M%C3%B6bius_strip)).[3]: 2029 Such objects can be represented by twisting and cutting or taping pieces of paper together, as well as by computer simulations. To hold them in the imagination, abstractions such as extra or fewer dimensions are necessary. ## Logical sequences [If-then arguments](/source/Deductive_reasoning#Modus_ponens) posit [logical](/source/Logical) [sequences](/source/Sequences) that sometimes include objects of the mind. For example, a [counterfactual](/source/Counterfactual_conditional) argument proposes a [hypothetical](/source/Hypothetical) or [subjunctive](/source/Subjunctive) [possibility](/source/Subjunctive_possibility) which *could* or *would* be true, but *might not* be false. [Conditional](/source/Conditional_probability) sequences involving subjunctives use [intensional](/source/Intensional_logic) language, which is studied by [modal logic](/source/Modal_logic),[4] whereas [classical logic](/source/Classical_logic) studies the [extensional](/source/Extensional) language of [necessary](/source/Logical_possibility) and [sufficient](/source/Sufficient) conditions. In general, a logical [antecedent](/source/Antecedent_(logic)) is a sufficient condition, and a logical [consequent](/source/Consequent) is a necessary condition (or the [contingency](/source/Contingency_(philosophy))) in a [logical conditional](/source/Logical_conditional). But logical conditionals accounting only for necessity and sufficiency do not always reflect every day if-then reasoning, and for this reason they are sometimes known as [material conditionals](/source/Material_conditional). In contrast, [indicative conditionals](/source/Indicative_conditional), sometimes known as non-material conditionals,[5] attempt to describe if-then reasoning involving hypotheticals, fictions, or counterfactuals. [Truth tables](/source/Truth_tables) for if-then statements identify four unique combinations of premises and conclusions: true premises and true conclusions; false premises and true conclusions; true premises and false conclusions; false premises and false conclusions. [Strict conditionals](/source/Strict_conditional) assign a positive [truth-value](/source/Truth-value) to every case except the case of a true premise and a false conclusion. This is sometimes regarded as counterintuitive, but makes more sense when false conditions are understood as objects of the mind. ### False antecedent A false antecedent is a premise known to be false, fictional, imaginary, or unnecessary. In a conditional sequence, a false antecedent may be the basis for any consequence, true or false.[6]: 150–151 The subjects of [literature](/source/Literature) are sometimes false antecedents. Examples include the contents of false documents, the origins of [stand-alone](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/stand-alone) phenomena, or the implications of [loaded words](/source/Loaded_words). Moreover, artificial sources, personalities, events, and histories. False antecedents are sometimes referred to as "[nothing](/source/Nothing)", or "[nonexistent](/source/Nonexistent)", whereas nonexistent referents are not referred to.[7]: 5–258 [Art](/source/Art) and [acting](/source/Acting) often portray scenarios without any antecedent other than an artist's imagination. For example, mythical heroes, legendary creatures, gods and goddesses. ### False consequent A false consequent, in contrast, is a conclusion known to be false, fictional, imaginary, or insufficient. In a conditional statement, a fictional conclusion is known as a [non sequitur](/source/Non_sequitur_(logic)), which literally means *out of sequence*. A conclusion that is out of sequence is not contingent on any premises that precede it, and it does not follow from them, so such a sequence is not conditional. A conditional sequence is a connected series of statements. A false consequent cannot follow from true premises in a connected sequence. But, on the other hand, a false consequent can follow from a false antecedent.[8]: 209 As an example, the name of a [team](/source/Team), a [genre](/source/Genre), or a [nation](/source/Nation) is a collective term applied [ex post facto](/source/Ex_post_facto) to a group of distinct individuals. None of the individuals on a sports team is the team itself, nor is any musical chord a genre, nor any person America. The name is an identity for a collection that is connected by consensus or [reference](/source/Reference), but not by sequence. A different name could equally follow, but it would have different [social](/source/Social) or [political](/source/Political) [significance](/source/Meaning_(semiotics)). ## Philosophy Main article: [Nonexistent objects](/source/Nonexistent_objects) See also: [Empty name](/source/Empty_name), [Noneism](/source/Noneism), [Theory of descriptions](/source/Theory_of_descriptions), [Nonexistence](/source/Nonexistence), and [Meontology](/source/Meontology) In [metaphysics](/source/Metaphysics) and [ontology](/source/Ontology), Austrian philosopher [Alexius Meinong](/source/Alexius_Meinong) advanced [nonexistent objects](/source/Nonexistent_objects) in the 19th and 20th century within a "[theory of objects](/source/Abstract_object_theory)". He was interested in intentional states which are directed at nonexistent objects. Starting with the "principle of [intentionality](/source/Intentionality)", mental phenomena are intentionally directed towards an object. People may imagine, desire or fear something that does not exist. Other philosophers concluded that intentionality is not a real relation and therefore does not require the existence of an object, while Meinong concluded there is an object for every mental state whatsoever—if not an existent then at least a nonexistent one.[9] ### Philosophy of mind Main article: [Mind–body dualism](/source/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism) In [philosophy of mind](/source/Philosophy_of_mind), [mind–body dualism](/source/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism) is the doctrine that mental activities exist apart from the physical body, notably posited by [René Descartes](/source/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes) in *[Meditations on First Philosophy](/source/Meditations_on_First_Philosophy)*. ## Invented sources Main article: [False document](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=False_document&action=edit&redlink=1) Further information: [Tolkien's frame stories](/source/Tolkien's_frame_stories) Many objects in fiction follow the example of false antecedents or false consequents. For example, *[The Lord of the Rings](/source/The_Lord_of_the_Rings)* by [J.R.R. Tolkien](/source/J.R.R._Tolkien) is based on an imaginary book. In the *Appendices* to *The Lord of the Rings*, Tolkien's characters name the *[Red Book of Westmarch](/source/Red_Book_of_Westmarch)* as the source material for *The Lord of the Rings*, which they describe as a translation. But the *Red Book of Westmarch* is a fictional document that chronicles events in an [imaginary world](/source/Imaginary_world). ## Convenient fictions Further information: [Fictionalism](/source/Fictionalism) [Social reality](/source/Social_reality) is composed of many standards and [inventions](/source/Inventions) that facilitate [communication](/source/Communication), but which are ultimately objects of the mind. For example, [money](/source/Money) is an object of the mind which [currency](/source/Currency) represents. Similarly, [languages](/source/Language) signify [ideas](/source/Idea) and [thoughts](/source/Thoughts). Objects of the mind are frequently involved in the roles that people play. For example, [acting](/source/Acting) is a profession which predicates real jobs on fictional premises. [Charades](/source/Charades) is a game people play by guessing imaginary objects from short play-acts. Imaginary [personalities](/source/Personalities) and histories are sometimes invented to enhance the [verisimilitude](/source/Verisimilitude) of [fictional universes](/source/Fictional_universes), and/or the [immersion](/source/Immersion_(virtual_reality)) of [role-playing games](/source/Role-playing_games). In the sense that they exist independently of extant personalities and histories, they are believed to be fictional characters and fictional time frames. [Science fiction](/source/Science_fiction) is abundant with future times, alternate times, and past times that are objects of the mind. For example, in the novel *[Nineteen Eighty-Four](/source/Nineteen_Eighty-Four)* by [George Orwell](/source/George_Orwell), the number 1984 represented a year that had not yet passed. [Calendar dates](/source/Calendar_date) also represent objects of the mind, specifically, past and future times. In *[The Transformers: The Movie](/source/The_Transformers%3A_The_Movie)*, which was released in 1986, the narration opens with the statement, "It is the year 2005." In 1986, that statement was futuristic. During the year 2005, that reference to the year 2005 was factual. Now, *The Transformers: The Movie* is [retro-futuristic](/source/Retro-futuristic). The number 2005 did not change, but the object of the mind that it represents did change. Deliberate [invention](/source/Invention) also may reference an object of the mind. The intentional invention of fiction for the purpose of [deception](/source/Deception) is usually referred to as [lying](/source/Lie), in contrast to invention for [entertainment](/source/Entertainment) or [art](/source/Art). Invention is also often applied to [problem solving](/source/Problem_solving). In this sense the physical invention of materials is associated with the [mental](/source/Mind) invention of fictions. Convenient fictions also occur in science. ## Science The theoretical posits of one era's scientific theories may be demoted to mere objects of the mind by subsequent discoveries: some standard examples include [phlogiston](/source/Phlogiston) and [ptolemaic epicycles](/source/Ptolemaic_epicycle). This raises questions, in the debate between [scientific realism](/source/Scientific_realism) and [instrumentalism](/source/Instrumentalism) about the status of current posits, such as [black holes](/source/Black_hole) and [quarks](/source/Quark). The situation is further complicated by the existence in scientific practice of entities which are explicitly held not to be real, but which nonetheless serve a purpose—convenient fictions. Examples include [field lines](/source/Field_line), [centers of gravity](/source/Centers_of_gravity), and [electron holes](/source/Electron_hole) in semiconductor theory. ## Self-reference This section may contain original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. (September 2007) (Learn how and when to remove this message) A [reference](/source/Reference) that names an imaginary [source](/source/Source_text) is in some sense also a [self-reference](/source/Self-reference). A self-reference automatically makes a comment about itself. Premises that name themselves as premises are premises by self-reference; conclusions that name themselves as conclusions are conclusions by self-reference. In their respective [imaginary worlds](/source/Imaginary_world) the *[Necronomicon](/source/Necronomicon)*, *[The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy](/source/The_Hitchhiker's_Guide_to_the_Galaxy)*, and the *[Red Book of Westmarch](/source/Red_Book_of_Westmarch)* are realities, but only because they are referred to as real. Authors use this technique to invite readers to [pretend](/source/Roleplaying) or to make-believe that their imaginary world is real. In the sense that the stories that quote these books are true, the quoted books exist; in the sense that the stories are fiction, the quoted books do not exist. ## See also - [Abstraction](/source/Abstraction) - [Existence](/source/Existence) - [Intentionality](/source/Intentionality) - [Noumenon](/source/Noumenon) - *[The Concept of Mind](/source/The_Concept_of_Mind)* - [Unobservable](/source/Unobservable) - [Impossible world](/source/Impossible_world) - [Incompleteness theorems](/source/Incompleteness_theorems) ## References 1. **[^](#cite_ref-1)** [Tim Crane - *Intentional Objects*](https://www.academia.edu/28177480/Intentional_Objects). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-2)** [Burger, E. B.](/source/Edward_Burger), & [Starbird, M.](/source/Michael_Starbird), "A One-Sided, Sealed Surface—The Klein Bottle", in E. B. Burger, M. Starbird, T. Stonebarger, & T. Dunton, *Joy of Thinking: The Beauty and Power of Classical Mathematical Ideas* ([Chantilly, VA](/source/Chantilly%2C_Virginia): [The Teaching Company](/source/The_Great_Courses), 2003). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-3)** [Ben-Menahem, A.](/source/Ari_Ben-Menahem), *Historical Encyclopedia of Natural and Mathematical Sciences* ([New York](/source/New_York_City): [Springer](/source/Springer_Science%2BBusiness_Media), 2009), [p. 2029](https://books.google.com/books?id=9tUrarQYhKMC&pg=PA2029&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-4)** ["Modal logic - Encyclopedia of Mathematics"](https://encyclopediaofmath.org/wiki/Modal_logic). *encyclopediaofmath.org*. Retrieved 2022-07-11. 1. **[^](#cite_ref-5)** Payne, W. R., "The Non-material Conditional". 1. **[^](#cite_ref-6)** [Murray, R.](/source/Richard_Murray_(mathematician)), with [Walker, J. J.](/source/John_James_Walker), & Wheeler, G. B., *Murray's Compendium of Logic—with an Accurate Translation, and a Familiar Commentary* (Dublin: M. W. Rooney, 1852; London: [Simpkin & Marshall](/source/Simpkin_%26_Marshall), 1852), [pp. 150–151](https://books.google.com/books?id=cndZAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA150&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** [Nickerson, R. S.](/source/Raymond_S._Nickerson), *Conditional Reasoning: The Unruly Syntactics, Semantics, Thematics, and Pragmatics of "If"* (Oxford & New York: [Oxford University Press](/source/Oxford_University_Press), 2015), [pp. 5–258](https://books.google.com/books?id=ZrsDCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA5&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** [Long, A. A.](/source/A._A._Long), & [D. N. Sedley](/source/David_Sedley), *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Translations of the principal sources, with philosophical commentary* (Cambridge: [Cambridge University Press](/source/Cambridge_University_Press), 1987), [p. 209](https://books.google.com/books?id=AfemGeG8SysC&lpg=PA209&hl=cs&pg=PA209&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-9)** *[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](/source/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy)*, ["Nonexistent Objects: Historical Roots"](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/#HistRootAlexMeinProbInte). [Portals](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Contents/Portals): - [Philosophy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Philosophy) - [Psychology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Psychology) --- Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Object of the mind](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object_of_the_mind) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object_of_the_mind?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.