# National Biodefense Strategy

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In the United States, the **National Biodefense Strategy** is a White House-issued policy document laying out the federal government's approach to [biodefense](/source/Biodefense) and [biosecurity](/source/Biosecurity).

The document's most recent version was published in October 2022 by the [Biden Administration](/source/Presidency_of_Joe_Biden) as the "National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health."[1] It aims "to create a world free from catastrophic biological incidents, laying out a set of objectives to effectively counter the spectrum of biological threats."[1] The 2022 strategy updates the prior 2018 strategy[2] published by the Trump Administration, which the federal government was directed to adopt by the [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017](/source/National_Defense_Authorization_Act_for_Fiscal_Year_2017).[3]

## History and background

Prior to the 2018 congressional directive, previous U.S. government biodefense strategies existed, including the [George W. Bush administration](/source/George_W._Bush_administration)'s 2004 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-10 ("[Biodefense for the 21st Century](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Biodefense_for_the_21st_Century&action=edit&redlink=1)"), which was one of many laws and executive actions enacted following the [2001 anthrax attacks](/source/2001_anthrax_attacks).[3] The push for increased federal funding in biodefense began during Bush's term in office. For example, in 2006, Bush, in his annual budget request, asked for a total of $5.1 billion for civilian biodefense. This number was a decrease of $2.5 billion from the previous year's budget. The drop was primarily attributed to the absence of [Project BioShield](/source/Project_Bioshield_Act) money in 2006; the money for that year was already allocated the previous year. Overall, the 2006 request contained incremental increases for all agencies involved in biodefense.[4] Homeland Security Presidential Directive-10's primary focus was on preventing, detecting, and responding to potential intentional attacks using biological weapons, and set forth the role of the nascent [U.S. Department of Homeland Security](/source/U.S._Department_of_Homeland_Security) and other institutions.[3]

During the [Obama administration](/source/Obama_administration), the 2009 [National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=National_Strategy_for_Countering_Biological_Threats&action=edit&redlink=1) and the 2012 [National Strategy for Biosurveillance](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=National_Strategy_for_Biosurveillance&action=edit&redlink=1) built on the Bush administration's work, and expanded biodefense strategy to emphasis global health security and other [public health](/source/Public_health) crises, whether of "natural, accidental, or deliberate origin."[3] The Obama administration biodefense strategies encompass "human, animal, and plant health" and included roles for "federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and international partners."[3]

The bipartisan [Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense](/source/Blue_Ribbon_Study_Panel_on_Biodefense), a privately sponsored group examining biodefense issues, convened in 2014 and issued a report in 2015.[5][3] The panel, co-chaired by former [governor of Pennsylvania](/source/Governor_of_Pennsylvania) [Tom Ridge](/source/Tom_Ridge), warned "that the U.S. is dangerously vulnerable to a large-scale biological attack and has urged Washington to develop a more comprehensive strategy."[5] The panel specifically found that the U.S. had not adopted a comprehensive biodefense strategy over "a decade of profusion of policy directives," and noted that there was a fracturing of responsibility for biodefense across multiple agencies and levels of government.[3] These concerns prompted the [U.S. Congress](/source/U.S._Congress) to include a provision in the [National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017](/source/National_Defense_Authorization_Act_for_Fiscal_Year_2017) that required the [secretaries of Defense](/source/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense), [Health and Human Services](/source/United_States_Secretary_of_Health_and_Human_Services), [Homeland Security](/source/United_States_Secretary_of_Homeland_Security), and [Agriculture](/source/United_States_Secretary_of_Agriculture) to coordinate to produce a comprehensive strategy for countering [biological warfare](/source/Biological_warfare) threats and other biological threats.[3]

## 2018 Strategy

Following the congressional directive, in September 2018, President Trump announced and issued the strategy. The strategy placed the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in charge of leading the federal government's biodefense efforts, and designated HHS to lead a committee of high-level officials from the Defense Department, Agriculture Department, and Homeland Security Departments, to review the biodefense capabilities of the [United States Intelligence Community](/source/United_States_Intelligence_Community) and 15 other executive branch agencies—i.e., the agencies' capacity to counter naturally occurring and human-caused biological threats.[6] Trump's [National Security Adviser](/source/National_Security_Adviser_(United_States)) [John Bolton](/source/John_Bolton) said that the [National Security Council](/source/United_States_National_Security_Council) would assist in the development of policy, and the interagency committee led by HHS would implement policy changes.[6] Trump said that the strategy drew lessons from the 2014 [West African Ebola virus epidemic](/source/West_African_Ebola_virus_epidemic).[5] The policy was the work product of the reorganized NSC under Bolton.[7][2]

According to *[Politico](/source/Politico)*, "Senior administration officials later said threats could be better addressed by streamlining processes for biotech companies to work with the HHS's [Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority](/source/Biomedical_Advanced_Research_and_Development_Authority), which supports private sector development of vaccines and drugs."[6]

One official from the Trump Administration said that the government's accounting requirements have made it difficult and undesirable for many companies to participate.[6]

HHS Assistant Secretary [Robert Kadlec](/source/Robert_Kadlec) said that one of his top priorities was to get a decade-long extension of the [Project BioShield](/source/Project_BioShield) Special Reserve Fund. The government can use that fund to buy countermeasures like vaccines, medication, and diagnostic tools. The fund was first authorized under President [George W. Bush](/source/George_W._Bush) in 2004.[6]

Later, the [Donald Trump administration](/source/First_presidency_of_Donald_Trump) announced they would siphon funds from medical programs to supplement fundings for the strategy. When questioned about this, it was reported that the [Obama administration](/source/Obama_administration) provided the plans for the strategy.

## 2022 Strategy

The Biden Administration's October 2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan has five goals with associated objectives for strengthening US biodefense, including (objectives for each goal are listed in the document):[1]

1. **Enable risk awareness and detection to inform decision-making across the biodefense enterprise**: "The United States will build risk awareness at the strategic level through analyses and coordinated research efforts to characterize naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate biological risks"

1. **Ensure biodefense enterprise capabilities to prevent bioincidents**: "The United States will work to prevent the outbreak and spread of naturally occurring infectious diseases and minimize the risk of laboratory accidents both domestically and globally. The United States will also strengthen biosecurity to prevent both state and non-state actors from obtaining or using biological material, equipment, and expertise for nefarious purposes"

1. **Ensure biodefense enterprise preparedness to reduce the impacts of bioincidents**: "The United States will take measures to reduce the impacts of bioincidents, including maintaining a vibrant national science and technology base to support biodefense; promoting a strong domestic and international public, veterinary, and plant health infrastructure; developing, updating, and exercising response and recovery capabilities; establishing risk communications; developing and effectively distributing and dispensing countermeasures"

1. **Rapidly respond to limit the impacts of bioincidents**: "The United States will respond rapidly to limit the impacts of bioincidents through information sharing and networking; evidence-driven, coordinated response operations and investigations; effective public messaging; and research"

1. **Facilitate recovery to restore the community, the economy, and the environment after a bioincident**: "The United States will take actions to restore critical infrastructure services and capability; coordinate recovery activities; provide recovery support and long-term mitigation; and minimize cascading effects elsewhere in the world"

The document also lays out a number of assumptions behind its strategic approach, including (full explanations in the document):[1]

- Biological Threats Are Persistent

- Biological Threats Originate from Multiple Sources

- Infectious Diseases Do Not Respect Borders

- Biological Incidents Impact Critical Infrastructure and Supply Chains

- Multisectoral and Multilateral Cooperation Is Critical for Effective Biodefense

- A One Health Approach Reduces the Occurrence and Impact of Bioincidents

- Science and Technology Will Continue to Advance Globally

## References

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:1_1-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:1_1-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:1_1-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-:1_1-3) [*National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health*](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-Final.pdf) (PDF). White House. October 2022. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the [public domain](/source/Public_domain).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:2_2-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:2_2-1) National Biodefense Strategy (8 September 2018). White House, National Security Council. [White House website](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20210120221449/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf) 2021-01-20 at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine) Retrieved 20 March 2020.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-5) [***g***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-6) [***h***](#cite_ref-BartholomewOmberg_3-7) Rachel Bartholomew & Kristin Omberg, [Making sense of the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy](https://thebulletin.org/2019/01/making-sense-of-the-2018-national-biodefense-strategy/) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20190120070948/https://thebulletin.org/2019/01/making-sense-of-the-2018-national-biodefense-strategy/) 2019-01-20 at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine), *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January 18, 2019).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-4)** Schuler, Ari (June 2005). "Billions for Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Budgeting, FY2005–FY2006". *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science*. **3** (2): 94–101. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1089/bsp.2005.3.94](https://doi.org/10.1089%2Fbsp.2005.3.94). [PMID](/source/PMID_(identifier)) [16000040](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16000040).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:3_5-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:3_5-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:3_5-2) ["White House Sets 'New Direction' in Biodefense Strategy"](https://apnews.com/4c21af485a7d4ccebb22f7316b55d014/White-House-sets-'new-direction'-in-biodefense-strategy). *Associated Press News*. 2018-09-18. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20200303020325/https://apnews.com/4c21af485a7d4ccebb22f7316b55d014/White-House-sets-%27new-direction%27-in-biodefense-strategy) from the original on 2020-03-03. Retrieved 2018-09-28.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:0_6-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:0_6-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:0_6-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-:0_6-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-:0_6-4) Owermohle, Sarah. ["Trump puts HHS in charge of defense against biological threats"](https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/18/trump-hhs-biodefense-827973). *POLITICO*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20181212070405/https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/18/trump-hhs-biodefense-827973) from the original on 2018-12-12. Retrieved 2018-12-31.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** Kessler, Glenn and Kelly, Meg. (20 March 2020). "Was the White House office for global pandemics eliminated?". [Washington Post website](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/20/was-white-house-office-global-pandemics-eliminated/) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20200320195152/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/20/was-white-house-office-global-pandemics-eliminated/) 2020-03-20 at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine) Retrieved 20 March 2020.

## External links

- [2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-Final.pdf), White House

- [2018 National Biodefense Strategy](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf), White House

v t e United States biological defense program Organizations Federal administrative DHS DHS Chemical and Biological Defense Division DHS Office of Health Affairs (National Biosurvelliance Integration Center, BioWatch) National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility National Bioforensic Analysis Center DNI National Counterproliferation Center (Advisory Committee on Bioterrorism) DHHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Division of Select Agents and Toxins (CDC) National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity DoD Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System Joint Program Executive Office for CBRN Defense (JPEO-CBRND) National Center for Medical Intelligence Federal research Trans- departmental National Interagency Confederation for Biological Research (National Interagency Biodefense Campus, Fort Detrick) Integrated National Biodefense Medical Countermeasures Portfolio (DHHS/DoD) Military U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Dugway Proving Ground Civilian Galveston National Laboratory (UTMB/NIAID) Integrated Research Facility (HHS/NIAID) Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (HHS) Homeland Security Research Program (EPA/DHS) Plum Island Animal Disease Center (USDA) Foreign Disease Weed Science Research Unit (USDA) Response Local Local Health Departments State State Health Departments Nebraska Biocontainment Patient Care Unit Federal National Medical Response Team/National Pharmacy Response Team (NDMS, HHS) Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (USMC) Epidemic Intelligence Service (CDC) Aeromedical Biological Containment System (CDC) Bioterror Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Laboratory (CDC) Non- governmental Academic centers and think tanks Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (formerly Center for Biosecurity) Henry L. Stimson Center Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment Center for Biodefense and Emerging Pathogens (Brown University) Middle-Atlantic Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research Center for Biodefense Immune Modeling (University of Rochester) Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases (NCBID; George Mason Univ.) Government contractors Battelle Memorial Institute SRI International Idaho Technology Phoenix Air Programs and projects Threat reduction Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, implemented the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Biological Threat Reduction (DoD) plus Project Bacchus Project Clear Vision Project Jefferson Biosurveillance National Biosurveillance Strategy Laboratory Response Network (CDC) BioWatch (EPA, CDC) Global Bio-Surveillance Technology Initiative (GBTI), Bio-Surveillance Management Office (BMO) (part of JPEO-CBD) ESSENCE (DoD) RODS (Civilian) Biosecurity/Biosurety Select Agent Program (CDC) Personnel Reliability Program (DoD) Medical intelligence National Intelligence Assessments on Infectious Diseases Disaster response National Response Framework of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (DHS; including NIMS and ICS) National Disaster Medical System (DHHS) Strategic National Stockpile (CDC, DHS) Technology and equipment Protection MOPP NBC suit Respirators Detection Cell CANARY Biological Materials MASINT Autonomous Pathogen Detection System Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) Biocontainment Biosafety level Biosafety cabinet Positive pressure personnel suit Law Treaties Geneva Protocol (1925, 1975) Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs (1969) Biological Weapons Convention (1972) Legislation Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 Executive Order 13139 (1999) Patriot Act (2001) Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act (2002) Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 Project Bioshield Act (2004) Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (2005) Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (2006) Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 International representation Global Health Security Initiative Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) History Past biological incidents 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack 1989 California medfly attack 2001 anthrax attacks Wood Green ricin plot (2002) 2003 ricin letters 2013 ricin letters Defunct organizations and programs United States Army Medical Unit United States biological weapons program Sunshine Project Aeromedical Isolation Team (DoD) Predict (USAID) Related topics Agro-terrorism Biodefense Biosecurity in the United States Biological agent Biological hazard Biological warfare (BW) Biosurveillance Bioterrorism CBRN defense Decontamination Entomological warfare Isolation (health care) Select agent Smallpox virus retention debate

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Adapted from the Wikipedia article [National Biodefense Strategy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Biodefense_Strategy) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Biodefense_Strategy?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.