# Mental event > Mediated Wiki article. Canonical URL: https://mediated.wiki/source/Mental_event > Markdown URL: https://mediated.wiki/source/Mental_event.md > Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_event > Source revision: 1332972946 > License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) Any event that happens within the mind of a conscious individual For the use of this term in Buddhism, see [Mental factors (Buddhism)](/source/Mental_factors_(Buddhism)). A **mental event** is any event that happens within the [mind](/source/Mind) of a [conscious](/source/Consciousness) individual. Examples include [thoughts](/source/Thought), feelings, decisions, [dreams](/source/Dream), and realizations.[1] These events often make up the conscious life that are associated with cognitive function.[2] Some believe that mental events are not limited to human thought but can be associated with animals[3] and [artificial intelligence](/source/Artificial_intelligence)[4] as well. Whether mental events are identical to complex physical events, or whether such an identity even makes sense, is central to the [mind–body problem](/source/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem). ## Relation to mind–body problem Some state that the mental and the physical are the very same property which cause any event(s). This view is known as [substance monism](/source/Monism#Types). An opposing view is [substance dualism](/source/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Substance_or_Cartesian_dualism), which claims that the mental and physical are fundamentally different and can exist independently. A third approach is [Donald Davidson](/source/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher))'s *[anomalous monism](/source/Anomalous_monism)*. The [Philosophy of Action](/source/Philosophy_of_Action) states that every action is caused by prior thoughts or feelings, and understanding those mental events would in turn explain behavior.[5] [Physicalism](/source/Physicalism), a form of substance monism, states that everything that exists is either physical or depends on that which is physical.[6] The existence of mental events has been used by philosophers as an argument against physicalism. For example, in his 1974 paper *[What Is it Like to Be a Bat?](/source/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F)*, Thomas Nagel argues that physicalist [theories of mind](/source/Theory_of_mind) cannot explain an organism's subjective experience because they cannot account for its mental events. [Epiphenomenalism](/source/Epiphenomenalism), according to Stanford, "Is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effect upon any physical events."[7] This stance then brings up the idea of [introspection](/source/Introspection). According to David Lieberman, [introspection](/source/Introspection) is the ability for a person to observe his or her own mental state or events.[8] Mental events can happen consciously and subconsciously at any given point. All mental events take place due to external stimuli. Which then must be processed via [working memory](/source/Working_memory). ## Mental Events and Working Memory Mental events must occur in the [working memory](/source/Working_memory) of short term-store. Both working memory and [short-term memory](/source/Short-term_memory) are essential to mental events and [cognition](/source/Cognition). According to Lieberman (2021), Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed that working memory consists of three distinct subsystems: what are called a [phonological loop](/source/Phonological_loop), a [visuo-spatial sketchpad](/source/Visuospatial_sketchpad), and [central executive](/source/Central_executive).[9] The phonological loop is responsible for holding speech-based sounds while the visuo-spatial sketchpad holds visual concepts in the mind. Both work independent of each other. Whereas the central executive is responsible for controlling both systems. The central executive is also responsible for aiding in tasks such as reasoning and understanding language.[10] In order for mental events to occur, in [Homo sapiens](/source/Human), situations and events must be processed through working memory in order to be perceived as a mental event. Without this system of memory, situations cannot be stored as mental events. All thoughts, feelings, decisions, dreams, and realizations must cycle through this process indefinitely. ## Examples - Mary is walking through a [park](/source/Park) and she [sees](/source/Visual_perception) and recognizes [City Hall](/source/City_Hall). This instance of seeing and recognizing City Hall is an instance of [perception](/source/Perception)—something that happens in Mary's mind. That instance of perception is a mental event. It is an *event* because it is something that happens, and it is *mental* because it happens in Mary's mind. - Mary feels happy after doing well on an exam and she [smiles](/source/Smile). This thought is a mental event. The smile is a physical event. - An [orca](/source/Orca) recognized a feeling of hunger. It eats a fish. The recognition of the feeling of hunger is a mental event. Eating the fish is the physical event. - Mary is listening to her friend talk while admiring a painting she is looking at. Her [visuo-spatial sketchpad](/source/Visuospatial_sketchpad) is allowing her to think about the painting she likes, creating a mental event. Simultaneously, her [phonological loop](/source/Phonological_loop) is allowing her to understand the conversation. Both systems are being operated by the [central executive](/source/Central_executive). ## See also - [Mental function](/source/Mental_function) - [Mental operations](/source/Mental_operations) - [Mental rotation](/source/Mental_rotation) - [Functional neuroimaging](/source/Functional_neuroimaging) - [Noumenon](/source/Noumenon) - [Psychedelic experience](/source/Psychedelic_experience) - [Synchronicity](/source/Synchronicity) - [Working memory](/source/Working_memory) - [Vertiginous question](/source/Vertiginous_question) ## References 1. **[^](#cite_ref-1)** Bunnin, Nicholas; Yu, Jiyuan (2004). ["Mental event"](http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g978140510679514_ss1-74). *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy*. Blackwell Reference Online. Retrieved 2016-11-23. 1. **[^](#cite_ref-2)** Mental Events. Oxford Reference. Retrieved 7 Mar. 2023, from [https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100150420](https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100150420) 1. **[^](#cite_ref-3)** Griffin, Donald R. (2001-05-01). [*Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness*](https://books.google.com/books?id=mjssc-xf9CkC). University of Chicago Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780226308654](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780226308654). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-4)** McCarthy, John (1995). ["Making Robots Conscious of their Mental States"](https://web.archive.org/web/20161223134419/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1cf4/0f6b1c72df43fdbbe19191bf08475cc9d343.pdf) (PDF). Stanford University. [S2CID](/source/S2CID_(identifier)) [10544902](https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:10544902). Archived from [the original](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1cf4/0f6b1c72df43fdbbe19191bf08475cc9d343.pdf) (PDF) on 2016-12-23. Retrieved 2016-11-23. 1. **[^](#cite_ref-5)** Bunnin, Nicholas; Yu, Jiyuan, eds. (2004). *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy* (1 ed.). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1002/9780470996379](https://doi.org/10.1002%2F9780470996379). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780470996379](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780470996379). 1. **[^](#cite_ref-6)** Stoljar, Daniel (2016). Zalta, Edward (ed.). ["Physicalism"](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/physicalism). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition)*. Retrieved 2016-11-23. 1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** Robinson, William, "Epiphenomenalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/epiphenomenalism/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/epiphenomenalism/) 1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** Lieberman, D. A. (2021). Chapter 10 Working Memory. In Learning and Memory (2nd ed., p. 13). Cambridge University Press. 1. **[^](#cite_ref-9)** Lieberman, D. A. (2021). Chapter 10 Working Memory. In Learning and Memory (2nd ed., p. 284). Cambridge University Press. 1. **[^](#cite_ref-10)** Lieberman, D. A. (2021). Chapter 10 Working Memory. In Learning and Memory (2nd ed., pp. 286–287). Cambridge University Press. ## Further reading - [*The Mental Life of Plants and Worms, Among Others*](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/apr/24/mental-life-plants-and-worms-among-others) [Oliver Sacks](/source/Oliver_Sacks) April 24, 2014 issue [New York Review of Books](/source/New_York_Review_of_Books) v t e Philosophy of mind Philosophers G. E. M. Anscombe Aristotle Armstrong Thomas Aquinas J. L. Austin Alexander Bain George Berkeley Henri Bergson Ned Block Franz Brentano C. D. Broad Tyler Burge David Chalmers Patricia Churchland Paul Churchland Andy Clark Dharmakirti Donald Davidson Daniel Dennett René Descartes Fred Dretske Fodor Goldman Martin Heidegger David Hume Edmund Husserl William James Frank Cameron Jackson Immanuel Kant David Lewis (philosopher) John Locke Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Maurice Merleau-Ponty Marvin Minsky Thomas Nagel Alva Noë Derek Parfit Plato Hilary Putnam Richard Rorty Gilbert Ryle John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Baruch Spinoza Alan Turing Michael Tye Vasubandhu Ludwig Wittgenstein Stephen Yablo Zhuangzi more... Theories Behaviorism Biological naturalism Dualism Eliminative materialism Emergent materialism Epiphenomenalism Functionalism Interactionism Naïve realism Neurophenomenology Neutral monism New mysterianism Nondualism Occasionalism Panpsychism Parallelism Phenomenalism Phenomenology Physicalism Type physicalism Property dualism Representational Solipsism Substance dualism Concepts Abstract object Animal machine Chinese room Creativity Cognition Cognitive closure Concept Consciousness Hard problem of consciousness Hypostatic abstraction Idea Identity Intelligence Artificial Human Intentionality Introspection Intuition Language of thought Mental event Mental image Mental process Mental property Mental representation Mind Mind–body problem Pain Problem of other minds Propositional attitude Qualia Tabula rasa Understanding Zombie Related Metaphysics Philosophy of artificial intelligence / information / perception / self Category Philosophers category Project Task Force --- Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Mental event](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_event) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_event?action=history)). 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