# China Development Bank

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Development bank in the People's Republic of China (PRC)

China Development Bank Head office in Beijing Native name 国家开发银行 Industry Development finance Founded 1994; 32 years ago (1994) Headquarters China Key people Zhao Huan (chairman) Products Banking Revenue 681,795,000,000 renminbi (2018) Owner Government-owned Number of employees 9,000 (2021)[1] Website www.cdb.com.cn

China Development Bank Simplified Chinese 国家开发银行 Traditional Chinese 國家開發銀行 Literal meaning National Development Bank Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Guójiā Kāifā Yínháng

**China Development Bank** (**CDB**) is a [policy bank](/source/Policy_bank) of China under the [State Council](/source/State_Council_of_China). Established in 1994, it has been described as the engine that powers the national government's economic development policies.[2][3] It has raised funds for numerous large-scale infrastructure projects, including the [Three Gorges Dam](/source/Three_Gorges_Dam) and the [Shanghai Pudong International Airport](/source/Shanghai_Pudong_International_Airport).

The bank is the second-largest [bond](/source/Bond_(finance)) issuer in China after the Ministry of Finance. In 2009, it accounted for about a quarter of the country's yuan bonds and is the biggest foreign-currency lender. CDB debt is owned by local banks and treated as a risk-free [asset](/source/Asset) under the proposed People's Republic of China capital adequacy rules (i.e. the same treatment as PRC government bonds).[3]

## History

CDB Tower in [Shanghai](/source/Shanghai)

CDB Tower in [Zhengzhou](/source/Zhengzhou)

The China Development Bank (CDB) was established in 1994 to provide development-oriented financing for high-priority government projects, particularly major infrastructure and projects that raise quality of life.[4]: 209 It is under the direct jurisdiction of the [State Council](/source/State_Council) and the People's Central Government. At present, it has 35 branches across the country and one representative office.

The main objective as a state financial institution is to support the macroeconomic policies of the central government and to support national economic development and strategic structural changes in the economy.[5] The bank provides financing for national projects such as infrastructure development, basic industries, energy, and transportation.[6] Most of CDB's loans are for domestic projects, and it began lending for projects abroad in the early 2000s.[7]: 41

From 1994 to 1998, CDB's fundraising was subject to a higher degree of state control than in later periods.[7]: 32 In the 1990s, CDB facilitated the creation of China's interbank [bond market](/source/Bond_market).[7]: 9 Initially, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) required domestic financial institutions such as commercial banks to buy policy bank bonds.[7]: 32 At this stage, the PBOC usually set high yields and did not permit the apportioned bonds to be sold on the secondary market.[7]: 33 In February 1996, CDB began its first overseas bond issuance in Japan, followed a year later by an issuance in the United States.[7]: 34 Overseas issuance helped CDB diversify its funding sources.[7]: 34 Ultimately, the issuance of bonds allowed CDB to become a financially independent bank without the state's tax revenues.[7]: 9

In April 1998, former PBOC deputy governor [Chen Yuan](/source/Chen_Yuan), the eldest son of [Chen Yun](/source/Chen_Yun), was appointed CDB's governor.[7]: 34[8]: 63 Chen implemented reforms designed to increase CDB's autonomy by reducing state involvement in CDB's fundraising and lending.[7]: 34

From 1998 to 2008, CDB increased its fundraising autonomy and used an auction-based bond issuance mechanism to raise its funds.[7]: 32 In 1999, CDB offered China's first [floating rate bond](/source/Floating_rate_note).[7]: 35

CDB plays a major role in alleviating infrastructure and energy bottlenecks in the Chinese economy. In 2003, CDB made loan arrangements for, or evaluated and underwrote, a total of 460 national debt projects and issued 246.8 billion yuan in loans. This accounted for 41% of its total investment. CDB's loans to the "bottleneck" investments that the government prioritizes amounted to 91% of its total loan count. It also issued a total of 357.5 billion yuan in loans to western areas and more than 174.2 billion yuan to old industrial bases in Northeast China. These loans substantially increased the economic growth and structural readjustments of the Chinese economy.[9]

In 2005 and 2006, CDB successfully issued two pilot Asset-Backed Securities[10] (ABS) products in the domestic China market. Along with other ABS products issued by China Construction Bank, CDB has created a foundation for a promising debt capital and [structured finance](/source/Structured_finance) market.[11][12]

[China and Venezuela](/source/China%E2%80%93Venezuela_relations) established the China-Venezuela Joint Fund in 2007, with the goal of offering capital funding for infrastructure projects in Venezuela which can be performed by Chinese companies.[7]: 98–99 CDB lent $4 billion to the fund and the [Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank](/source/BANDES) (BANDES) contributed $2 billion.[7]: 98

As part of China's response to the [2008 financial crisis](/source/2008_financial_crisis), emphasis on CDB's policy aspects increased and the state formalized its credit guarantee for CDB.[7]: 32 CDB was one of the financial agencies implementing China's stimulus plan and vastly increased its lending for infrastructure and industrial projects.[7]: 37–38

From 2009 to 2019, CDB has issued 1.6 trillion yuan in loans to more than 4,000 projects involving infrastructure, communications, transportation, and basic industries. The investments are spread along the Yellow River, and both south and north of the [Yangtze River](/source/Yangtze_River). CDB has been increasingly focusing on developing the western and northwestern provinces in China. This could help reduce the growing economic disparity in the western provinces, and it has the potential to revitalize the old industrial bases of northeast China.[13]

In 2010, CDB provided $30 billion in financing to [Chinese solar](/source/Solar_power_in_China) power manufacturers.[14]: 1

At the end of 2010, CDB held US$687.8 billion in loans, more than twice the amount of the [World Bank](/source/World_Bank).[3]

After Chen left the governorship of CDB in 2013, the bank's institutional power decreased.[7]: 157

The next CDB governor, [Hu Huaibang](/source/Hu_Huaibang), removed CDB personnel to staff the bank with personnel loyal to himself.[7]: 158 Hu then leveraged his personal influence to approve large amounts of industrial loans which ultimately failed.[7]: 158 Hu was removed from office in 2018 on suspicion of corruption and he was sentenced to life in prison in 2021 for accepting bribes to approve projects that should not have passed CDB criteria.[7]: 158–159 Following these events, CDB became significantly more cautious in its financing decisions.[7]: 159

CDB is among the state entities which contribute to the [China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund](/source/China_Integrated_Circuit_Industry_Investment_Fund), which was established in an effort to decrease China's reliance on foreign [semiconductor](/source/Semiconductor_industry_in_China) companies.[15]: 274 The fund was established in 2014.[15]: 274

In 2014, CDB was one of the funders of the [Silk Road Fund](/source/Silk_Road_Fund), along with the [State Administration of Foreign Exchange](/source/State_Administration_of_Foreign_Exchange), [China Investment Corporation](/source/China_Investment_Corporation), and [Export-Import Bank of China](/source/Export%E2%80%93Import_Bank_of_China).[4]: 221

In 2015, China used its [foreign exchange reserves](/source/Foreign-exchange_reserves_of_China) to recapitalize CDB, which in turn empowered it to make significant foreign loans.[8]: 70

In 2017, CDB provided RMB 130 billion to fund infrastructure and environmental upgrading in [Xiong'an](/source/Xiong'an).[16]: 155

As of December 2018, outstanding loans to 11 provincial-level regions along the belt amounted to 3.85 trillion yuan (about 575 billion U.S. dollars), according to the CDB. New yuan loans to these regions reached 304.5 billion yuan last year, accounting for 48 percent of the bank's total new yuan loans. The funds mainly went to major projects in the fields of ecological protection and restoration, infrastructure connectivity, and industrial transformation and upgrading. The CDB will continue to support ecological protection and green development of the Yangtze River in 2019, said CDB Chairman Zhao Huan. China issued a development plan for the Yangtze River Economic Belt in September 2016 and a guideline for green development of the belt in 2017. The [Yangtze River Economic Belt](/source/Yangtze_River_Economic_Belt) consists of nine provinces and two municipalities that cover roughly one-fifth of China's land. It has a population of 600 million and generates more than 40 percent of the country's GDP.[17]

As of at least 2018, CDB was the world's largest development bank, with total assets exceeding 16 trillion RMB.[18]: 101

In 2020, China joined the [G20](/source/G20)-led Debt Service Suspension Initiative, through which official bilateral creditors suspended debt repayments of 73 of the poorest debtor countries.[7]: 134 China did not include CDB loans as part of the initiative under the logic that CDB was a commercial lender rather than an official bilateral creditor.[7]: 135

Along with the Silk Road Fund and the Export-Import Bank of China, the China Development Bank is one of the primary financing sources for [Belt and Road Initiative](/source/Belt_and_Road_Initiative) projects in Africa,[19]: 245 and is an important funder of BRI projects more generally.[20]

## Organizational structure

The Governors of the bank report to a Board of Supervisors, who are accountable to the central government. There are four vice governors and two assistant governors.[21] At the end of 2004, CDB had about 3,500 employees.[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*] About 1,000 of CDB's employees work at the [Beijing](/source/Beijing) Headquarters, with the rest in 35 mainland branches; including a representative office in Tibet and a branch in [Hong Kong](/source/Hong_Kong).[*[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)*]

As of 2021, the CDB has more than 9,000 employees.[1]

CDB does not accept deposits from individuals.[7]: 39 Its depositors are other financial agencies that are collaborating with CDB or entities which are repaying loans borrowed from CDB.[7]: 39

### Ownership

CDB is wholly [state-owned](/source/State-owned_enterprises_of_China) through multiple state bodies.[7]: 85 As of 2019, the owners were [Central Huijin Investment Ltd.](/source/Central_Huijin_Investment) (one of China's [sovereign funds](/source/Sovereign_funds_of_China)), Buttonwood Investment Holding Company Ltd. (owned by the [State Administration of Foreign Exchange](/source/State_Administration_of_Foreign_Exchange)), and the [National Council for Social Security Fund](/source/National_Council_for_Social_Security_Fund).[7]: 85

### Subsidiaries and other ventures

In 2018, CDB was among the Chinese banks which launched the China-Arab Bank Consortium.[22]

- [China Development Bank International Investment](/source/China_Development_Bank_International_Investment)

## Leadership

[Stuart Gulliver](/source/Stuart_Gulliver), [executive director](/source/Executive_director) of [HSBC](/source/HSBC) signs a "Memorandum of Understanding" with Zheng Zhijie, Vice Governor of China Development Bank, 10 January 2011.

CDB has a thirteen-member board of directors.[7]: 84 Three are the executives in charge of managing CDB.[7]: 84 Six are directors from the agencies that hold shares of CDB.[7]: 84 The four "government-ministry directors" come from the [National Development and Reform Commission](/source/National_Development_and_Reform_Commission), the [Ministry of Finance](/source/Ministry_of_Finance_(China)), the [Ministry of Commerce](/source/Ministry_of_Commerce_(China)), and the [People's Bank of China](/source/People's_Bank_of_China).[7]: 84

### List of governors

Name (English) Name (Chinese) Tenure begins Tenure ends Note Yao Zhenyan [zh] 姚振炎 March 1994 March 1998 [7]: 83 Chen Yuan 陈元 March 1998 September 2008 [7]: 83 Jiang Chaoliang 蒋超良 September 2008 November 2011 Zheng Zhijie 郑之杰 October 2012 October 2019 Ouyang Weimin [zh] 欧阳卫民 October 2019 May 2023 Tan Jiong [zh] 谭炯 May 2023

### List of chairmen of the board

Name (English) Name (Chinese) Tenure begins Tenure ends Note Chen Yuan 陈元 September 2008 April 2013 Hu Huaibang 胡怀邦 April 2013 September 2018 [7]: 83 Zhao Huan [zh] 赵欢 September 2018 [7]: 83

## See also

- [List of national development banks](/source/List_of_national_development_banks)

## References

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-About_China_Development_Bank_2021_1-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-About_China_Development_Bank_2021_1-1) ["About China Development Bank 2021"](http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/gykh_512/khjj/). *www.cdb.com.cn*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20160622232120/http://www.cdb.com.cn:80/English/gykh_512/khjj/) from the original on 2016-06-22. Retrieved 2021-02-18.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-cdb.com.cn_2-0)** [CDB History Archived](http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/Column.asp?ColumnId=96) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20050708081752/http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/Column.asp?ColumnId=96) 2005-07-08 at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine)

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-BloombergMagJune2011_3-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-BloombergMagJune2011_3-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-BloombergMagJune2011_3-2) Michael Forsythe, Henry Sanderson (June 2011). "Financing China Costs Poised to Rise With CDB Losing Sovereign-Debt Status". *Bloomberg Market Magazine*.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:03_4-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:03_4-1) Lin, Shuanglin (2022). *China's Public Finance: Reforms, Challenges, and Options*. New York, NY: [Cambridge University Press](/source/Cambridge_University_Press). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-009-09902-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-009-09902-8).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-5)** ["China Development Bank International Investment Limited - Investor Relations"](http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/ir/financialreport.htm). cdb-intl.com. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20190521064606/http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/ir/financialreport.htm) from the original on 2019-05-21. Retrieved 2019-10-16.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-6)** ["China Development Bank International Investment Limited - Portfolio"](http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/portfolio/valuation.htm). cdb-intl.com. 2019-08-30. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20190517092320/http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/portfolio/valuation.htm) from the original on 2019-05-17. Retrieved 2019-10-16.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-5) [***g***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-6) [***h***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-7) [***i***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-8) [***j***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-9) [***k***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-10) [***l***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-11) [***m***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-12) [***n***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-13) [***o***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-14) [***p***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-15) [***q***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-16) [***r***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-17) [***s***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-18) [***t***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-19) [***u***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-20) [***v***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-21) [***w***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-22) [***x***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-23) [***y***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-24) [***z***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-25) [***aa***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-26) [***ab***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-27) [***ac***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-28) [***ad***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-29) [***ae***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-30) [***af***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-31) [***ag***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-32) [***ah***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-33) [***ai***](#cite_ref-:Chen_7-34) Chen, Muyang (2024). *The Latecomer's Rise: Policy Banks and the Globalization of China's Development Finance*. Ithaca and London: [Cornell University Press](/source/Cornell_University_Press). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9781501775857](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781501775857). [JSTOR](/source/JSTOR_(identifier)) [10.7591/jj.6230186](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/jj.6230186).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:3_8-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:3_8-1) Liu, Zongyuan Zoe (2023). *Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances its Global Ambitions*. The Belknap Press of [Harvard University Press](/source/Harvard_University_Press). [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.2307/jj.2915805](https://doi.org/10.2307%2Fjj.2915805). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780674271913](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780674271913). [JSTOR](/source/JSTOR_(identifier)) [jj.2915805](https://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.2915805). [S2CID](/source/S2CID_(identifier)) [259402050](https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:259402050).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-9)** ["Annual report"](http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/irdoc/irpdf/e/1062/2003an/ar2003.pdf) (PDF). *www.cdb-intl.com*. 2003. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20190306043354/http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/irdoc/irpdf/e/1062/2003an/ar2003.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2019-03-06. Retrieved 2019-10-16.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-10)** ["Handbook of China's Financial System1/61 Chapter 6: Bond MarketHandbook on China's Financial System"](http://www.zhiguohe.com/uploads/1/0/6/9/106923057/handbookchinafinancialsystem_ch6_bondmarket_20181001.pdf) (PDF). *www.zhiguohe.com*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20190306044318/http://www.zhiguohe.com/uploads/1/0/6/9/106923057/handbookchinafinancialsystem_ch6_bondmarket_20181001.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2019-03-06. Retrieved 2019-10-16.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-11)** ["Annual report"](http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/irdoc/irpdf/e/1062/2005an/ar2005.pdf) (PDF). *www.cdb-intl.com*. 2005. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20190306044327/http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/irdoc/irpdf/e/1062/2005an/ar2005.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2019-03-06. Retrieved 2019-10-16.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-12)** ["Annual report"](http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/irdoc/irpdf/e/1062/2006an/ar2006.pdf) (PDF). *www.cdb-intl.com*. 2006. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20190306043231/http://www.cdb-intl.com/eng/irdoc/irpdf/e/1062/2006an/ar2006.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2019-03-06. Retrieved 2019-10-16.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-13)** ["Archived copy"](https://web.archive.org/web/20190306044432/https://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/cop_2018/469306/original/CDB_SUSTAINABILITY_REPORT_2017.pdf?1541989624) (PDF). Archived from [the original](https://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/cop_2018/469306/original/CDB_SUSTAINABILITY_REPORT_2017.pdf?1541989624) (PDF) on 2019-03-06. Retrieved 2019-03-02.{{[cite web](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Cite_web)}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title ([link](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:CS1_maint:_archived_copy_as_title))

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:322_14-0)** Lewis, Joanna I. (2023). *Cooperating for the Climate: Learning from International Partnerships in China's Clean Energy Sector*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The [MIT Press](/source/MIT_Press). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-262-54482-5](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-262-54482-5).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:Zhang_15-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:Zhang_15-1) Zhang, Angela Huyue (2024). *High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy*. [Oxford University Press](/source/Oxford_University_Press). [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001](https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foso%2F9780197682258.001.0001). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780197682258](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780197682258).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:04_16-0)** Hu, Richard (2023). *Reinventing the Chinese City*. New York: [Columbia University Press](/source/Columbia_University_Press). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-231-21101-7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-231-21101-7).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-17)** Wang, Ling; Lee, Shao-ju; Chen, Ping; Jiang, Xiao-mei; Liu, Bing-lian (2016-06-20). [*Contemporary Logistics in China: New Horizon and New Blueprint*](https://books.google.com/books?id=Xvx6DAAAQBAJ). Springer. p. 124. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9789811010521](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9789811010521).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:6_18-0)** Lan, Xiaohuan (2024). *How China Works: An Introduction to China's State-led Economic Development*. Translated by Topp, Gary. [Palgrave Macmillan](/source/Palgrave_Macmillan). [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.1007/978-981-97-0080-6](https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-981-97-0080-6). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-981-97-0079-0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-981-97-0079-0).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-19)** Murphy, Dawn (2022). *China's Rise in the Global South: the Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's Alternative World Order*. Stanford, California: [Stanford University Press](/source/Stanford_University_Press). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-5036-3009-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-5036-3009-3).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:0_20-0)** Curtis, Simon; Klaus, Ian (2024). *The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order*. New Haven and London: [Yale University Press](/source/Yale_University_Press). p. 167. [doi](/source/Doi_(identifier)):[10.2307/jj.11589102](https://doi.org/10.2307%2Fjj.11589102). [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780300266900](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780300266900). [JSTOR](/source/JSTOR_(identifier)) [jj.11589102](https://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.11589102).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-21)** [China Development Bank](https://web.archive.org/web/20080320033701/http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=1956)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-:13_22-0)** Zhang, Chuchu (2025). *China's Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum?*. Changing Dynamics in Asia-Middle East Relations series. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: [Routledge](/source/Routledge). p. 185. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-1-032-76275-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-032-76275-3).

## External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to [China Development Bank](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:China_Development_Bank).

- [Official website](http://www.cdb.com.cn/)

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v t e Belt and Road Initiative Corridors and projects (2019 Joint Communique)[1] Southeast Asia China–Myanmar Economic Corridor Eastern Economic Corridor (Thailand) Two Corridors, One Belt (Vietnam) Economic corridor in Greater Mekong Subregion China–Indochina Peninsula economic corridor/China–Laos Economic Corridor China–Laos–Thailand Railway Cooperation Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridor (Indonesia) New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor Two Countries, Twin Parks (Malaysia) Brunei–Guangxi Economic Corridor South Asia China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Trans-Himalayan Network/China–Nepal Railway Eurasia China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–China International Highway China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan International Highway New Eurasian Land Bridge China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor International North–South Transport Corridor Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway/Alyat Free Economic Zone Europe Port of Piraeus China–Europe Land–Sea Express Line Trans-European Transport Network TRACECA/TITR China–Belarus Industrial Park Africa Suez Canal Economic Zone Cape to Cairo Road Port Sudan–Ethiopia Railway Addis Ababa–Djibouti Economic Corridor Northern Corridor LAPSSET VICMED South America Agua Negra Pass International Tunnel Other Transoceanic fiber optic cable Polar Silk Road Related Projects (not under 2019 Joint Communique)[2] Ports and Zones Hambantota (Port, Airport) Hulhumalé Sino–Oman Industrial Park China–UAE Industrial Zone Bayport Terminal (Port of Haifa) Lekki Free Trade Zone Port of Chancay Domains Air Space Digital Energy grid Dispute resolution Dropped Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor Financial Concepts Internationalization of the renminbi Panda bonds Green finance Banking Policy Agricultural Development Bank of China China Development Bank China Exim Bank Sinosure Sino Guarantee Multilateral Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank New Development Bank SCO Interbank Consortium Platforms Funds Silk Road Fund China–Kazakhstan Production Capacity Cooperation Fund Green Silk Road Fund China–Eurasian Economic Cooperation Fund China–ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund Russia–China Investment Fund China–CEE Investment Cooperation Fund China–LAC Cooperation Fund Sino-Latin American Production Capacity Cooperation Investment Fund China–Brazil Fund China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund China–Africa Development Fund China-Portuguese Speaking Countries Cooperation and Development Fund UAE-China Joint Investment Cooperation Fund Credit lines Special Loan Program for China–Latin America Infrastructure Project China–Arab states special loans Political Policy Leading Group Community of shared future for mankind Dialogue Belt and Road Forum 2017 2019 2023 Multilateral mechanisms (2019 Leading Group report)[3] G20 APEC Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Asia–Europe Meeting Asia Cooperation Dialogue Caribbean Development Bank Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia ASEAN-China (10+1) Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Greater Tumen Initiative Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Forum on China–Africa Cooperation China–Arab States Cooperation Forum China–CELAC Forum China-CEEC (14+1) China-Pacific Island Countries Forum World Economic Forum Boao Forum for Asia Category ^ Annex, Economic corridors and other projects catalyzed and supported by connectivity, 2019 Belt and Road Forum Joint Communique ^ These projects and themes are not listed in the economic corridors list under the 2019 Annex but are frequently associated with the Belt and Road Initiative in media and scholarship. ^ The Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Contributions and Prospects released in April 2019 by the Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative.

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Adapted from the Wikipedia article [China Development Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Development_Bank) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Development_Bank?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.