# Chanak crisis

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1922 Anglo-Turkish war scare

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Chanak crisis Part of the Anglo-Turkish War (1918–1923) British pilots of 203 Squadron look on as ground personnel service the engine of one of the squadron's Nieuport Nightjar fighters whilst detached to Gallipoli, Turkey, in 1922 Date September – October 1922 Location Çanakkale, Turkey Result Turkish Victory Belligerents Ankara Government United Kingdom France Italy Greece Commanders and leaders Mustafa Kemal Pasha İsmet Pasha Fevzi Pasha Fahrettin Pasha David Lloyd George Winston Churchill Raymond Poincaré Units involved V Cavalry Corps Occupation forces Strength 28,000 All Allied forces in Istanbul and Çanakkale[1] 27,419 19,069 3,992 795 Total: c. 51,300 soldiers (411 machine guns, 57 artillery pieces) (French and Italian forces withdrew as soon as the ultimatum was delivered.) Casualties and losses None None

v t e Turkish War of Independence Anglo-Turkish War Constantinople Shehzadebashi Akbash 1920 Summer Offensive Tal Afar Chanak crisis Greco-Turkish War Occupation 1st Smyrna Urla Malgaç Bergama Erbeyli Erikli Tellidede Aydın 1920 Summer Offensive Gediz 1st İnönü 2nd İnönü Kütahya–Eskishehir Sakarya 1922 Samsun Great Offensive Dumlupınar Balıkesir 2nd Smyrna Franco-Turkish War Marash Urfa Aintab Karboğazı Kaç Kaç Kovanbaşı Kanlıgeçit Fadıl Eastern Front Invasion of Armenia Oltu Sarikamish Surmalu Kars Alexandropol Invasion of Georgia Batumi Revolts Ahmet Anzavur İzmit Geyve Yozgat Konya Koçgiri

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The **Chanak crisis** ([Turkish](/source/Turkish_language): *Çanakkale Krizi*), also called the **Chanak affair** and the **Chanak incident**, was a war scare in September 1922 between the [United Kingdom](/source/United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Ireland) and the [Government of the Grand National Assembly](/source/Government_of_the_Grand_National_Assembly) in [Turkey](/source/Government_of_the_Grand_National_Assembly). *Chanak* refers to [Çanakkale](/source/%C3%87anakkale), a city on the [Anatolian](/source/Anatolia) side of the [Dardanelles Strait](/source/Dardanelles_Strait). The crisis was caused by Turkish efforts to push the [Greek armies out of Turkey](/source/Greco-Turkish_War_(1919%E2%80%931922)) and restore Turkish rule in the [Allied](/source/Allies_of_World_War_I)-occupied territories, primarily in [Constantinople](/source/Constantinople) (now [Istanbul](/source/Istanbul)) and Eastern [Thrace](/source/Thrace). Turkish troops marched against British and French positions in the [Dardanelles](/source/Dardanelles) neutral zone. For a time, war between Britain and Turkey seemed possible, but [Canada](/source/Canada) refused to agree as did [France](/source/French_Third_Republic) and [Italy](/source/Kingdom_of_Italy). British public opinion did not want a war. The British military did not either, and the top general on the scene, Sir [Charles Harington](/source/Charles_Harington_(British_Army_officer%2C_born_1872)), refused to relay an ultimatum to the Turks because he counted on a negotiated settlement. The [Conservatives](/source/Conservative_Party_(UK)) in Britain's coalition government refused to follow [Liberal](/source/Liberal_Party_(UK)) Prime Minister [David Lloyd George](/source/David_Lloyd_George), who with [Winston Churchill](/source/Winston_Churchill) was calling for war.[2]

The crisis quickly ended when Turkey, having overwhelmed the Greeks, agreed to a negotiated settlement that gave it the territory it wanted. Lloyd George's mishandling of the crisis contributed to his downfall via the [Carlton Club meeting](/source/Carlton_Club_meeting). The crisis raised the issue of who decided on war for the [British Empire](/source/British_Empire), and was Canada's first assertion of diplomatic independence from London. Historian [Robert Blake](/source/Robert_Blake%2C_Baron_Blake) says the Chanak crisis led to [Arthur Balfour](/source/Arthur_Balfour)'s definition of Britain and the [dominions](/source/Dominion) as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of the domestic or internal affairs, though united by a common allegiance to [the Crown](/source/The_Crown), and freely associated as members of the [British Commonwealth of Nations](/source/British_Commonwealth_of_Nations)". In 1931 the [UK Parliament](/source/Parliament_of_the_United_Kingdom) enacted Balfour's formula into law through the [Statute of Westminster 1931](/source/Statute_of_Westminster_1931).[3]

Locations of the Turkish Straits: the Bosphorus (red), linking the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea, and the Dardanelles (yellow), linking the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea

## The events

The [Turkish troops](/source/Turkish_Army) had recently [defeated Greek forces](/source/Greco-Turkish_War_(1919%E2%80%931922)) and recaptured [İzmir](/source/%C4%B0zmir) (Smyrna) on 9 September and were advancing on Constantinople in the neutral zone established by the [Armistice of Mudros](/source/Armistice_of_Mudros) and [Treaty of Sèvres](/source/Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres). On September 10, the [War Office](/source/War_Office) began to express concerns over the viability of the [Greek Army](/source/Greek_Army) and urged a British withdrawal to [Gallipoli](/source/Gallipoli), but Harington rejected the advice because he believed such an attack was not likely and that the small force could be an effective deterrent.[4] In an interview published in *[Daily Mail](/source/Daily_Mail)*, 15 September 1922, leader of the [Turkish national](/source/Turkish_nationalism) movement [Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk)](/source/Mustafa_Kemal_Atat%C3%BCrk) stated that "Our demands remain the same after our recent victory as they were before. We ask for [Asia Minor](/source/Anatolia), Thrace up to the River [Maritsa](/source/Maritsa) and [Constantinople](/source/Constantinople) ... We must have our capital and I should in that case be obliged to march on Constantinople with my army, which will be an affair of only a few days. I much prefer to obtain possession by negotiation, though naturally I cannot wait indefinitely."[5] The [British Cabinet](/source/British_Cabinet) met on the same day and decided that British forces should maintain their positions. On the following day, in the absence of [Foreign Secretary](/source/Foreign_Secretary_(United_Kingdom)) [Lord Curzon](/source/George_Curzon%2C_1st_Marquess_Curzon_of_Kedleston), certain Cabinet ministers issued a [communiqué](/source/Communiqu%C3%A9) threatening Turkey with a declaration of war by Britain and the [Dominions](/source/Dominion), on the grounds that Turkey had violated the Treaty of Sèvres. On 18 September, on his return to London, Curzon pointed out that this would enrage the [Prime Minister of France](/source/Prime_Minister_of_France), [Raymond Poincaré](/source/Raymond_Poincar%C3%A9), and left for [Paris](/source/Paris) to attempt to smooth things over. Poincaré, however, had already ordered the withdrawal of the French detachment at Chanak but persuaded the Turks to respect the neutral zone. Curzon reached Paris on 20 September and, after several angry meetings with Poincaré, reached agreement to negotiate an armistice with the Turks.[6]

Meanwhile, the Turkish population living in Constantinople were being organised for a possible offensive against the city by the [Kemalist](/source/Government_of_the_Grand_National_Assembly) forces. For instance, [Ernest Hemingway](/source/Ernest_Hemingway), reporting for *[The Toronto Daily Star](/source/The_Toronto_Daily_Star)* at the time as a war correspondent, wrote about a specific incident:

Another night a destroyer ... stopped a boatload of Turkish women who were crossing from Asia Minor ... On being searched for arms it turned out all the women were men. They were all armed and later proved to be Kemalist officers sent over to organize the Turkish population in the suburbs in case of an attack on Constantinople.[7]

In British politics, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, and the Conservatives [Lord Birkenhead](/source/F._E._Smith%2C_1st_Earl_of_Birkenhead) and [Austen Chamberlain](/source/Austen_Chamberlain) were pro-Greek and wanted war; all other Conservatives of the [coalition in his government](/source/Lloyd_George_ministry) were pro-Turk and rejected war. Lloyd George's position as head of the coalition became untenable.[4][8] The Lloyd George cabinet was influenced by false intelligence, including the possibility that Turkey would conclude a military agreement with [Soviet Russia](/source/Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic). Although [MI6](/source/MI6) reported that Turkey and Soviet Russia were already drifting apart, the Cabinet continued to express concern about a [Soviet Navy](/source/Soviet_Navy) intervention. Churchill published a pro-war manifesto warning of a massive Turkish offensive into Europe undoing the result of the war, which was widely lambasted and embarrassed the British government. Lloyd George was warned by the [Foreign Office](/source/Foreign%2C_Commonwealth_and_Development_Office), the [Imperial General Staff](/source/Chief_of_the_General_Staff_(United_Kingdom)), and even former [Supreme Allied Commander](/source/Supreme_Allied_Commander) [Ferdinand Foch](/source/Ferdinand_Foch) against supporting the Greeks but ignored them.[4] Furthermore, the British public were alarmed by the Chanak episode and the possibility of going to war again. It further undercut Lloyd George that he had not fully consulted the Dominion prime ministers.

Unlike 1914, when [World War I](/source/World_War_I) broke out, Canada in particular did not automatically consider itself active in the conflict. Instead, Prime Minister [William Lyon Mackenzie King](/source/William_Lyon_Mackenzie_King) insisted that the [Parliament of Canada](/source/Parliament_of_Canada) should decide on the course of action the country would follow. King was offended by the telegram he received from Churchill asking for Canada to send troops to Chanak to support Britain, and sent back a telegram, which was couched in [Canadian nationalist](/source/Canadian_nationalism) language, declaring that Canada would not automatically support Britain if it came to war with Turkey.[9]: 131 Given that the majority of the MPs of King's [Liberal Party](/source/Liberal_Party_of_Canada) were opposed to going to war with Turkey together with the [Progressive](/source/Progressive_Party_of_Canada) MPs who were supporting King's minority government, it is likely that Canada would have declared neutrality if the crisis came to war. The Chanak issue badly divided Canadian public opinion with [French Canadians](/source/French_Canadians) and Canadian nationalists in [English Canada](/source/English_Canada) like professor [Oscar D. Skelton](/source/Oscar_D._Skelton) saying Canada should not issue "blank cheques" to Britain like that issued in 1914 and supporting King's implicit decision for neutrality.[9]: 131 By contrast, the [Conservative](/source/Conservative_Party_of_Canada_(1867%E2%80%931942)) leader [Arthur Meighen](/source/Arthur_Meighen) in a speech in [Toronto](/source/Toronto) criticized King and declared: "When Britain's message came, then Canada should have said, 'Ready, aye ready, we stand by you.'"[9]: 132[10] By the time the issue had been debated in the [House of Commons of Canada](/source/House_of_Commons_of_Canada), the threat at Chanak had passed. Nonetheless, King made his point: the Canadian Parliament would decide the role that Canada would play in [external affairs](/source/Foreign_relations_of_Canada) and could diverge from the British government.[11] The other dominion prime ministers—with the two exceptions of [Newfoundland](/source/Dominion_of_Newfoundland) and [New Zealand](/source/Dominion_of_New_Zealand), which each offered a battalion[4]— and allies [Yugoslavia](/source/Kingdom_of_Yugoslavia), [Italy](/source/Kingdom_of_Italy) and [Romania](/source/Kingdom_of_Romania) gave no support.[6]

On 23 September, the British cabinet decided to give [East Thrace](/source/East_Thrace) to the Turks, thus forcing Greeks to abandon it without a fight. This convinced Kemal to accept the opening of armistice talks and on 28 September he told the British that he had ordered his troops to avoid any incident at Chanak, nominating [Mudanya](/source/Mudanya) as the venue for peace negotiations. The parties met there on 3 October and agreed to the terms of the [Armistice of Mudanya](/source/Armistice_of_Mudanya) on 11 October, two hours before British forces were due to attack.

## Consequences

A cartoon drawn after [David Lloyd George](/source/David_Lloyd_George)'s resignation

Lloyd George's rashness resulted in the calling of a [meeting of Conservative MPs](/source/Carlton_Club_meeting%2C_19_October_1922) at the [Carlton Club](/source/Carlton_Club) on 19 October 1922, which passed a motion that the [Conservative Party](/source/Conservative_Party_(UK)) should fight the next general election as an independent party. This decision had dire ramifications for Lloyd George, as the Conservative Party made up the vast majority of the 1918–1922 post-war coalition. Indeed, they held an outright majority in the Commons and could have [formed a government](/source/Majority_government) alone if they so wished.

Lloyd George also lost the support of the influential [Lord Curzon](/source/George_Curzon%2C_1st_Marquess_Curzon_of_Kedleston), who considered that the Prime Minister had been manoeuvring behind his back. Following the Carlton Club decision Lloyd George resigned as prime minister, never to hold office again.[12] Although many expected a new coalition to be formed under a Conservative prime minister, the Conservatives, under returned party leader [Bonar Law](/source/Bonar_Law), subsequently won the [1922 general election](/source/1922_United_Kingdom_general_election) with an overall majority.

British and French forces were ultimately withdrawn from the neutral zone in summer 1923, following the ratification of the [Treaty of Lausanne](/source/Treaty_of_Lausanne).

The Chanak crisis fundamentally challenged the assumption that the Dominions would automatically follow Britain into war.[10] The British journalist [Mark Arnold-Forster](/source/Mark_Arnold-Forster) wrote: "1922 was a year in which accepted doctrines fell like ninpins...It had been assumed till then that although parts of the British Empire—Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa—had been granted self government, the whole Empire would automatically support the mother country in any war which the British government in London thought advisable or necessary...But the Chanak incident marked the beginning of a family quarrel within the British, which weakened it. The mother country's children were no longer prepared to go to war simply because mother said so".[13] The crisis changed the relations between the Dominions and London, paving the way for the [Statute of Westminster 1931](/source/Statute_of_Westminster_1931), which gave statutory recognition to the autonomy of the six Dominions.

## References

1. **[^](#cite_ref-1)** Zekeriya Türkmen, (2002), İstanbul'un işgali ve İşgal Dönemindeki Uygulamalar (13 Kasım 1918 – 16 Mart 1920), Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, XVIII (53): pages 338–339. (in Turkish)

1. **[^](#cite_ref-2)** [Taylor, A. J. P.](/source/A._J._P._Taylor) (1965). [*English History 1914–1945*](https://archive.org/details/englishhistory1900tayl). Oxford University Press. pp. [190](https://archive.org/details/englishhistory1900tayl/page/190)–92. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780191501296](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780191501296).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-3)** [Blake, Robert](/source/Robert_Blake%2C_Baron_Blake) (2013). [*The Decline of Power, 1915–1964*](https://books.google.com/books?id=-38krH-9XDMC&pg=PT68). Faber & Faber. p. 68. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780571298259](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780571298259).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:0_4-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:0_4-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-:0_4-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-:0_4-3) [Steiner, Zara](/source/Zara_Steiner) (2005). *The lights that failed : European international history, 1919-1933*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-0-19-151881-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-19-151881-2). [OCLC](/source/OCLC_(identifier)) [86068902](https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/86068902).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-5)** [Eleftheria Daleziou, Britain and the Greek-Turkish War and Settlement of 1919–1923: The Pursuit of Security by 'Proxy' in Western Asia Minor](https://theses.gla.ac.uk/1578/1/2002daleziouphd.pdf)

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-Macfie_6-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-Macfie_6-1) [Macfie, A. L.](/source/A._L._Macfie) "The Chanak Affair (September–October 1922)", *Balkan Studies* 1979, Vol. 20 Issue 2, pp. 309–341.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** Ernest Hemingway, *Hemingway on War*, p 278 Simon and Schuster, 2012 [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [1476716048](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/1476716048),

1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** Alfred F. Havighurst (1985). [*Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century*](https://books.google.com/books?id=h4Tm6VRqZmMC&pg=PA174). University of Chicago Press. pp. 174–75. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [9780226319704](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780226319704).

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-Levine,_Allan_9-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-Levine,_Allan_9-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-Levine,_Allan_9-2) [Levine, Allan](/source/Levine%2C_Allan) (2001). *William Lyon Mackenzie King: a Life Guided by the Hand of Destiny*. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-:1_10-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-:1_10-1) ["Çanak (Chanak) crisis (1922)"](http://biographi.ca/en/topics/topic-match-list.php?id=1493). *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*. Retrieved 30 July 2024.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-11)** [Dawson, Robert MacGregor](/source/Robert_MacGregor_Dawson) (1958). *William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1874–1923*. pp. 401–416.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-12)** [Darwin, J. G.](/source/John_Darwin_(historian)) "The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet", *History*, Feb 1980, Vol. 65 Issue 213, pp 32–48.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-13)** Arnold-Forster, Mark (1973). *The World At War*. London: William Collins & sons. pp. 17–19.

## Further reading

- Adelson, Roger. *London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902–1922* (1995) pp 207–11

- Darwin, J. G. "The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet", *History* (1980) 65#213 pp 32–48. [online](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1980.tb02082.x/full)

- Ferris, John. "'Far too dangerous a gamble'? British intelligence and policy during the Chanak crisis, September–October 1922." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* (2003) 14#2 pp: 139–184. [online](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592290412331308851)

- Ferris, John. "Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877–78, 1922 and 1938." *Intelligence and National Security* (2006) 21#5 pp: 675–696. [online](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520600957647)

- Laird, Michael. "Wars averted: Chanak 1922, Burma 1945–47, Berlin 1948." *Journal of Strategic Studies* (1996) 19#3 pp: 343–364. DOI:10.1080/01402399608437643

- Mowat, Charles Loch., *Britain Between The Wars 1918-1940* (1955) pp 116–19, 138.

- Sales, Peter M. "WM Hughes and the Chanak Crisis of 1922." *Australian Journal of Politics & History* (1971) 17#3 pp: 392–405.

- Steiner, Zara. *The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford History of Modern Europe) (2005) pp 114–19

- Walder, David. *The Chanak Affair* (Macmillan, 1969)

v t e Turkish War of Independence Concepts Committee of Union and Progress Partition of the Ottoman Empire National awakening Turkish National Movement Karakol society Sultanahmet demonstrations Amasya Circular Erzurum Congress Balıkesir Congress Alaşehir Congress Sivas Congress Amasya Protocol Grand National Assembly Media Elections Ottoman Parliament (1919) Grand National Assembly (1920) Grand National Assembly (1923) Issues Article VII of Mudros Occupation of Constantinople Occupation of Mosul Prosecution of Ottoman war criminals| Malta exiles Constantinople Trials King–Crane Commission Occupation of Smyrna Menemen massacre Military occupation of Constantinople Treaty of Sèvres Kaç Kaç incident Samsun deportations Amasya trials Yalova Peninsula massacres Fire of Manisa Burning of Smyrna Chanak crisis Population exchange Personae non gratae Campaigns British Constantinople Al-Jazeera Front First Offensive of Sulaymaniyah Taşlıca Tal Afar uprising Battle of Babaçiçek Özdemir Operation Köysancak Eskişehir (1920) Şehzadebaşı raid Akbaş Summer Offensive of 1920 Chanak crisis Revolts Koçgiri rebellion Konya rebellion Kuva-yi Inzibatiye Battle of Geyve Revolt of Ahmet Anzavur Yozgat Armenia Oltu Sarıkamış Kars Alexandropol French Marash Urfa Aintab Karboğazı Kaç Kaç Kovanbaşı Kanlıgeçit Fadıl Alemdar Incident Greek Occupation (Smyrna, 1919) Urla Malgaç Bergama Erbeyli Erikli Tellidede Aydın Summer Offensive of 1920 Gediz 1st İnönü 2nd İnönü Eskişehir Sakarya Great Offensive Dumlupınar Liberation of Balıkesir Capture of Smyrna U.S. Bombardment of Samsun Georgia Artvin (1921) Ardahan Batumi Agreements Allies Paris Peace conference Conference of London (1920) San Remo conference Conference of London (1921–1922) Lausanne conference Ottoman/Constantinople Armistice of Mudros Amasya Protocol Misak-ı Millî Treaty of Sèvres Grand National Assembly/Ankara Treaty of Alexandropol Treaty of Moscow Conference of London (1920) Cilicia Peace Treaty Treaty of Ankara Treaty of Kars Conference of London (1921–1922) Armistice of Mudanya Conference of Lausanne Treaty of Lausanne Timeline

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