# BioWatch

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United States federal government program

**BioWatch** is a [United States federal government](/source/United_States_federal_government) program to detect the release of [pathogens](/source/Pathogens) into the air as part of a [terrorist](/source/Terrorist) attack on major [American](/source/United_States) cities. Reportedly operating in [Philadelphia](/source/Philadelphia), [New York City](/source/New_York_City), [Washington, DC](/source/Washington%2C_DC), [San Diego](/source/San_Diego), [Boston](/source/Boston), [Chicago](/source/Chicago), [San Francisco](/source/San_Francisco), [Atlanta](/source/Atlanta), [St. Louis](/source/St._Louis), [Houston](/source/Houston), [Los Angeles](/source/Los_Angeles) and 21 other cities,[1] the BioWatch program was created in 2001 in response to the increased threat of bioterrorism sparked by the [2001 anthrax attacks](/source/2001_anthrax_attacks), and was announced in [President](/source/President_of_the_United_States) [George W. Bush](/source/George_W._Bush)'s [State of the Union Address](/source/State_of_the_Union_Address) of 2003.[1]

The program, described as "the nation's first early warning network of sensors to detect biological attack" operates via a system of filters located within existing [Environmental Protection Agency](/source/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) air filters that monitor air quality. Results from these filters are analyzed by the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](/source/Centers_for_Disease_Control_and_Prevention), who pass any significant results to the [Federal Bureau of Investigation](/source/Federal_Bureau_of_Investigation).[1]

As of mid-2012, the system had generated a large number of false positives (alerts that are determined to be naturally occurring and not terrorist releases), with more than 50 such cases documented between 2003 and 2008. State and local health officials have never ordered evacuations or distributed emergency medicines in response to a positive reading from the system.[2]

In an audit reported by Associated Press on March 4 2021, BioWatch was said to have failed in detecting known threats, questioning the value of the program.[3]

## History

### Origins

See also: [2001 anthrax attacks](/source/2001_anthrax_attacks)

[Anthrax](/source/Anthrax) spores can be released into the air, as with all other forms of matter

The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, also known as Amerithrax from its FBI case name, occurred over the course of several weeks beginning on September 18, 2001. Letters containing [anthrax spores](/source/Bacillus_anthracis) were mailed to several news media offices and two [Democratic](/source/Democratic_Party_(United_States)) [U.S. Senators](/source/United_States_Senate), killing five people and infecting 17 others. As a response, the US increased countermeasure research funding and funding into the [public health sector](/source/Health_care_in_the_United_States). Before the BioWatch program, the quickest method of detecting the presence of an infectious material was through the diagnosis of infected patients, however the most effective treatment takes place prior to infection or in its early stages.[1] While the [Central Intelligence Agency](/source/Central_Intelligence_Agency) maintains that the use of bioterrorism in the United States is unlikely,[4] the Biowatch program was created in 2001 in conjunction with the FBI, EPA, [United States Department of Homeland Security](/source/United_States_Department_of_Homeland_Security) and the US [Laboratory Response Network](/source/Laboratory_Response_Network) for Bioterrorism, and was tested by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Association of Public Health Laboratories. According to the DHS, the BioWatch program helps to provide "early warning of a mass pathogen release."[1] The original 31 city program cost $60 million to implement, with a proposed expansion in 2005 to cost $118 million.[5]

### Reform Efforts

To remedy this, another program was created in 2003 that was meant to shorten the detection time to 6 hours and that could detect more than the six pathogens. After 11 years and $200 million spent on testing and development, however, the program was cancelled in 2014 because the new devices could not be made to work. For now, the 36-hour detection program continues, with maintenance costs of $80 million per year. The undersecretary for the science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security stated to Congress in February 2016 that his team was in an "exploratory process" phase for addressing the program's shortcomings, and that a solution was hoped for in 3–8 years.[6]

## Instances of positive results

- On October 9, 2003, a BioWatch filter in [Houston, Texas](/source/Houston%2C_Texas), detected "low levels of the bacterium that causes [tularemia](/source/Tularemia)".[1] Three consecutive days of positive results were recorded.[7] Additional tests were taken, and the local area was watched for signs of infection among the population. While an investigation is still ongoing, Director of the Houston Department of Health and Human Services stated that "We are investigating to determine if the bacteria was always present or newly present and if it represents a health threat to the community."[1]

- Small amounts of tularemia bacteria were again detected in BioWatch filters in the Mall area and elsewhere in [Washington, DC](/source/Washington%2C_DC), the morning after an anti-war demonstration on September 24, 2005. Biohazard sensors were triggered at six locations. While thousands of people were potentially exposed, no infections were reported.[8]

## Response and criticism

The BioWatch system has received a mix of responses since coming online, many that result in waste of resources and a lowering public confidence in the system.[1] A Congressional report in 2003 recorded that there was concern that the BioWatch filters would fail to detect indoor or underground releases, and also that the existence of BioWatch filters in some cities would direct terrorists to attack other cities without such protection. The report also highlighted the risk of the filters themselves being detected and destroyed.[1] The report also states that, as EPA filters are located based on different policies than what would provide optimum locations for counter-bioterrorism sensors, the BioWatch filters may not be optimally located.[1] Furthermore, the BioWatch system may miss releases that take place within the gaps in coverage.[9] The [House of Representatives](/source/United_States_House_of_Representatives) also concluded that models used to predict the spread of an infectious agent after release and detection may be inaccurate.[10][11]

The Congressional Report also raises concerns as to whether BioWatch can detect pathogens in large, polluted cities, as well as issues relating to the BioWatch filter reporting harmful pathogens that are actually within safe background levels, and thus would throw up more positive hits than actual investigation warrants.[1] There are also concerns that the BioWatch filters kill whatever pathogen has set them off, thus removing the possibility of further tests being undertaken.[12] Finally, concerns were raised in the Congressional Report regarding the sensitivity of the filters, and the fact that each filter would be exposed to different environmental conditions and thus a standardized detection rate would be near impossible to achieve. The complicated response that would be required should the BioWatch filter detect a pathogen would also be difficult to implement and put strain on local health authorities. Funding, policy and evaluation of effectiveness were all other areas of concern[1][11]

In June 2013, Mike Walter, the manager of the [Office of Health Affairs BioWatch Program](/source/DHS_Office_of_Health_Affairs), made a few remarks during his testimony to the [House Committee on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations](/source/United_States_House_Energy_Subcommittee_on_Oversight_and_Investigations). Walter said the benefits of the BioWatch Program give public health decision makers more time and more options to mitigate a [bioterrorist](/source/Bioterrorism) event. He said that early detection is critical to the successful treatment of affected populations and provides public health decision makers more time – and thereby more options – in responding to, mitigating, and recovering from a bioterrorist event. If a [bioagent](/source/Bioagent) is detected and assessed to be the result of an act of bioterrorism and/or a threat to public health, prophylactic treatment can be started prior to the widespread onset of symptoms resulting in more lives saved. He also talked about the federal, state and local partnership, tools for preparedness and is developing robust quality assurance, as well as assessing new technologies to shorten decision time in relation to bioagent detection.[13]

## References

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-fas_1-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-fas_1-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-fas_1-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-fas_1-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-fas_1-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-fas_1-5) [***g***](#cite_ref-fas_1-6) [***h***](#cite_ref-fas_1-7) [***i***](#cite_ref-fas_1-8) [***j***](#cite_ref-fas_1-9) [***k***](#cite_ref-fas_1-10) [***l***](#cite_ref-fas_1-11) >[*The BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism*](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32152.html#_1_3) Congressional Research Service Report No. RL 32152. November 19, 2003, retrieved October 22, 2007

1. **[^](#cite_ref-2)** David Willman (July 7, 2012). ["The biodefender that cries wolf"](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-biowatch-20120708,0,5093512.story?track=lat-pick). *Los Angeles Times*.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-3)** ["Audit finds major gaps in US bio weapons detection system"](https://apnews.com/article/bioterrorism-terrorism-united-states-biological-weapons-19da38a1af8b1f3b1c41573d6cbdff7a). *[Associated Press](/source/Associated_Press)*. 20 April 2021.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-4)** Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects, June, 2003.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-5)** [*A Hot Idea*](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/biosensing_05.htm) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20070904091831/http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/biosensing_05.htm) September 4, 2007, at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine) National Defense University, retrieved October 22, 2007

1. **[^](#cite_ref-brill_6-0)** Brill, Steven. ["Is America Any Safer?"](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/). The Atlantic. Retrieved 18 August 2016.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-7)** Houston Department of Health and Human Services, [*Officials Following Up on Bacteria Detection*](http://www.ci.houston.tx.us/departme/health/bacteria%20detection.htm) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20041211072610/http://www.ci.houston.tx.us/departme/health/bacteria%20detection.htm) December 11, 2004, at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine) Press Release

1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** Dvorak P (2005-10-02). ["Health Officials Vigilant for Illness After Sensors Detect Bacteria on Mall: Agent Found as Protests Drew Thousands of Visitors"](https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/01/AR2005100101209.html). *Washington Post*. p. C13. Retrieved 2007-05-08. A week after six bioterrorism sensors detected the presence of a dangerous bacterium on the Mall, health officials said there are no reports that any of the thousands of people in the nation's capital Sept. 24 have tularemia, the illness that results from exposure to the bacteria.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-9)** Geoff Dutton, *Ohio Says Security Requires Secrecy On Tests For Air Toxins,* The Columbus Dispatch, March 21, 2003, p. 3

1. **[^](#cite_ref-10)** U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, *Emerging Threats and International Relations, Following Toxic Clouds: Science and Assumptions in Plume Modeling*, 108th Congress, June 2, 2003

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-bs_11-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-bs_11-1) [*DHS OIG Report Finds Mismanagement of BioWatch Program*](http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/biosecurity_briefing/archive/govt_response/content/2007-02-09-dhsoigrptmismanagementbiowatch.html) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20071023082300/http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/biosecurity_briefing/archive/govt_response/content/2007-02-09-dhsoigrptmismanagementbiowatch.html) October 23, 2007, at the [Wayback Machine](/source/Wayback_Machine) Center for Biosecurity, retrieved October 22, 2007

1. **[^](#cite_ref-12)** *[BioWatch Program Aims For Nationwide Detection of Airborne Pathogens](http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/biowatch.html)* CIDRAP News, February 26, 2003, revised March 10, 2003

1. **[^](#cite_ref-13)** Tinder, Paul (June 24, 2013). ["BioWatch Program manager testifies before House of Representatives"](https://web.archive.org/web/20131104161937/http://www.bioprepwatch.com/medical_countermeasures/biowatch-program-manager-testifies-before-house-of-representatives/330922/). BioPrepWatch. Archived from [the original](http://www.bioprepwatch.com/medical_countermeasures/biowatch-program-manager-testifies-before-house-of-representatives/330922/) on 4 November 2013. Retrieved 8 July 2013.

## External links

- [*The BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism*](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32152.html#Back48) Congressional Research Service Report No. RL 32152, November 19, 2003.

- [*DHS' Management of the BioWatch Program*](https://web.archive.org/web/20110712130242/http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-22_Jan07.pdf) Department of Homeland Security, January 2007.

v t e United States biological defense program Organizations Federal administrative DHS DHS Chemical and Biological Defense Division DHS Office of Health Affairs (National Biosurvelliance Integration Center, BioWatch) National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility National Bioforensic Analysis Center DNI National Counterproliferation Center (Advisory Committee on Bioterrorism) DHHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Division of Select Agents and Toxins (CDC) National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity DoD Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs Defense Threat Reduction Agency Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System Joint Program Executive Office for CBRN Defense (JPEO-CBRND) National Center for Medical Intelligence Federal research Trans- departmental National Interagency Confederation for Biological Research (National Interagency Biodefense Campus, Fort Detrick) Integrated National Biodefense Medical Countermeasures Portfolio (DHHS/DoD) Military U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Dugway Proving Ground Civilian Galveston National Laboratory (UTMB/NIAID) Integrated Research Facility (HHS/NIAID) Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (HHS) Homeland Security Research Program (EPA/DHS) Plum Island Animal Disease Center (USDA) Foreign Disease Weed Science Research Unit (USDA) Response Local Local Health Departments State State Health Departments Nebraska Biocontainment Patient Care Unit Federal National Medical Response Team/National Pharmacy Response Team (NDMS, HHS) Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (USMC) Epidemic Intelligence Service (CDC) Aeromedical Biological Containment System (CDC) Bioterror Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Laboratory (CDC) Non- governmental Academic centers and think tanks Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (formerly Center for Biosecurity) Henry L. Stimson Center Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment Center for Biodefense and Emerging Pathogens (Brown University) Middle-Atlantic Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research Center for Biodefense Immune Modeling (University of Rochester) Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases (NCBID; George Mason Univ.) Government contractors Battelle Memorial Institute SRI International Idaho Technology Phoenix Air Programs and projects Threat reduction Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, implemented the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Biological Threat Reduction (DoD) plus Project Bacchus Project Clear Vision Project Jefferson Biosurveillance National Biosurveillance Strategy Laboratory Response Network (CDC) BioWatch (EPA, CDC) Global Bio-Surveillance Technology Initiative (GBTI), Bio-Surveillance Management Office (BMO) (part of JPEO-CBD) ESSENCE (DoD) RODS (Civilian) Biosecurity/Biosurety Select Agent Program (CDC) Personnel Reliability Program (DoD) Medical intelligence National Intelligence Assessments on Infectious Diseases Disaster response National Response Framework of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (DHS; including NIMS and ICS) National Disaster Medical System (DHHS) Strategic National Stockpile (CDC, DHS) Technology and equipment Protection MOPP NBC suit Respirators Detection Cell CANARY Biological Materials MASINT Autonomous Pathogen Detection System Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) Biocontainment Biosafety level Biosafety cabinet Positive pressure personnel suit Law Treaties Geneva Protocol (1925, 1975) Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs (1969) Biological Weapons Convention (1972) Legislation Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 Executive Order 13139 (1999) Patriot Act (2001) Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act (2002) Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 Project Bioshield Act (2004) Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (2005) Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (2006) Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 International representation Global Health Security Initiative Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) History Past biological incidents 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack 1989 California medfly attack 2001 anthrax attacks Wood Green ricin plot (2002) 2003 ricin letters 2013 ricin letters Defunct organizations and programs United States Army Medical Unit United States biological weapons program Sunshine Project Aeromedical Isolation Team (DoD) Predict (USAID) Related topics Agro-terrorism Biodefense Biosecurity in the United States Biological agent Biological hazard Biological warfare (BW) Biosurveillance Bioterrorism CBRN defense Decontamination Entomological warfare Isolation (health care) Select agent Smallpox virus retention debate

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Adapted from the Wikipedia article [BioWatch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BioWatch) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BioWatch?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.