# Battle of Chora

> Mediated Wiki article. Canonical URL: https://mediated.wiki/source/Battle_of_Chora
> Markdown URL: https://mediated.wiki/source/Battle_of_Chora.md
> Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chora
> Source revision: 1323827536
> License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)

2007 battle during the War in Afghanistan

For the battle between Pashtuns and Hazaras in the 19th century, see [Battle of Uruzgan](/source/Battle_of_Uruzgan).

Battle of Chora Part of the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) A Dutch army PzH 2000 firing on Taliban positions in Chora. Photographed by David Axe on June 16, 2007. Date 15–19 June 2007 Location Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan 32°51′10″N 66°05′05″E / 32.8528°N 66.0847°E / 32.8528; 66.0847 Result Coalition victory Belligerents Coalition: Netherlands Australia Afghanistan Anti-Coalition Militia:[1] Taliban[1] Commanders and leaders Colonel Hans van Griensven[2] Lieutenant Colonel Rob Querido[3] Captain Larry Hamers[3] Barakzai militia leader Rozi Khan[4] Mullah Mutalib †[5] Mullah Ismael †[5] Strength 500+ soldiers 100 police officers c. 100 militiamen[6] Unknown, possibly several hundred insurgents[7] Casualties and losses 16 killed[8] 1 killed[9] 71 killed[10] 50-80[11]

v t e War in Afghanistan History Timeline 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Battles and operations v t e Invasion Crescent Wind Rhino Mazar-i-Sharif Kunduz Herat Kabul Tarinkot Trent Kandahar Qala-i-Jangi Shawali Kowt Sayyd Alma Kalay Tora Bora v t e Helmand Province campaign Lejay Eagle Fury Lashkar Gah 2006 Taliban offensive Mountain Thrust 1st Sangin Mountain Fury Nawzad Achilles Musa Qala I Volcano Kryptonite Silver Pickaxe-Handle Hammer Nasrat Musa Qala II Garmsir Eagle's Summit Red Dagger Shahi Tandar Diesel Mar Lewe Panther's Claw Strike of the Sword Dahaneh Cobra's Anger Moshtarak Tor Shezada Battle of Sangin Camp Bastion January 2017 Lashkargah Sangin June 2017 Lashkargah Camp Shorabak Grishk v t e Kandahar Province 2001 Kandahar bombing Fall of Kandahar Tarnak Farm Mongoose Medusa Avalanche 2006 Taliban offensive Kaika Panjwaii Falcon Summit Hoover Luger Kamin Shah Wali Kot 2008 Kandahar Spin Boldak Sarposa Arghandab Wech Baghtu 2009 Kandahar Nadahan Hamkari Dragon Strike Baawar Battle of Kandahar Kandahar massacre 2017 Kandahar 2020 Kandahar v t e Eastern Afghanistan Hazar Qadam Anaconda (Takur Ghar) Warrior Sweep Jacana Haven Denial Mountain Resolve Korangal valley (Red Wings) Jaji border incident Bagram (2007) South Korean hostages Nangar Khel Aranas Wanat Ebrahimkhel Alasay Bari Alai Ganjal Kamdesh Narang Khataba 2010 Badakhshan massacre Bad Pakh Bulldog Bite Barawala Kalay Valley Do Ab Asadabad Bagram (2014) Jalalabad (2015) Bagram (2015) Nangarhar Jalalabad (2016) Janikhel Bagram (2016) Mohmand Valley Tora Bora Jalalabad (January 2018) Jalalabad (July 2018) Jalalabad (September 2018) Charikar Jalalabad (2019) Bagram (2019) May 2020 v t e Kabul Province 2002 2008 Serena Hotel 2008 Indian embassy Uzbin 2009 raids NATO HQ 2009 Indian embassy Bakhtar January 2010 February 2010 May 2010 2011 Inter-Continental Hotel September 2011 December 2011 April 2012 June 2013 Palace January 2014 2014 Serena Hotel December 2014 Park Palace Parliament 7 August 2015 10 August 2015 22 August 2015 Spanish Embassy April 2016 Canadian Embassy July 2016 American University September 2016 January 2017 March 2017 May 2017 October 2017 mosque 28 December 2017 2018 Inter-Continental Hotel Ambulance March 2018 22 April 2018 30 April 2018 September 2018 2019 mosque 1 July 2019 28 July 2019 7 August 2019 17 August 2019 2 and 5 September 2019 17 September 2019 6 March 2020 Gurdwara May 2020 June 2020 July 2020 August 2020 September 2020 October 2020 November 2020 University December 2020 2021 school Fall of Kabul (2021) 2021 hospital v t e Kunduz Province Airlift Siege Harekate Yolo Karez Oqab 2009 airstrike Sahda Ehlm Gala-e Gorg Halmazag 2015 battle Hospital airstrike Hostage crisis 2016 battle Boz Qandahari Kunduz madrassa 2020 Major operations Mountain Viper Asbury Park 2006 Taliban offensive Perth Chora Firebase Anaconda Shewan Balamorghab Sabzak Derapet Doan Kunduz (2015) Omari Tarinkot Kunduz (2016) Boz Qandahari Darzab (2017) Farah Darzab (2018) Kunar (2019–2020) Ghazni 2021 Taliban offensive Zaranj Kunduz Herat Kandahar Lashkargah Kabul Airstrikes Sayyd Alma Kalay Uruzgan wedding Hyderabad Gora Prai Haska Meyna/Deh Bala Azizabad Wech Baghtu Granai Kunduz (2009) Uruzgan helicopter Sangin (2010) Mano Gai Baraki Barak Kapisa Kunar Kunduz hospital Sangin (2017) Nangarhar Kunduz madrassa Major insurgent attacks 2002 Kabul 2007 Attempted assassination of Dick Cheney S Korean hostage Baghlan sugar factory 2008 Kandahar Spin Boldak Khost Kabul Indian embassy Kabul hotel 2009 Kabul raids Kabul NATO Kandahar Kabul Indian embassy Kabul UN guesthouse Camp Chapman 2010 Kabul (Jan) Kabul (Feb) Kabul (May) Nadahan 2011 Logar Kabul hotel Nimruz Zabul Kabul (Sep) Kabul & Mazar-e-Sharif 2012 Raids Camp Bastion FOB Salerno Attack 2013 Farah Kabul court Kabul palace Jalalabad Herat 2014 Kabul restaurant Kabul hotel Herat Indian consulate Bagram 1st Paktika 2nd Paktika Kabul school 2015 Jalalabad Kabul hotel Kabul Parliament Khost Kabul police Kabul Airport Kabul NATO Ghazni Kandahar Kabul Spanish embassy Bagram 2016 Jalalabad Kabul NDS Kunduz-Takhar highway Kabul Canadian embassy Wardak Kabul Hazara protest Kabul University Kabul Defense Ministry Mazar-i-Sharif Bagram 2017 Bombings (Jan) Kabul hospital Camp Shaheen Kabul (May) Herat (Jun) June Lashkargah Herat (Aug) Gardez & Ghazni Kabul & Ghor Kabul Shi'ite 2018 Kabul hotel Jalalabad (Save the Children) Kabul ambulance Kabul (Mar) Kabul (22 Apr) Kabul (30 Apr) Jalalabad (Jul) Baghlan Kabul (Sep) Jalalabad (Sep) 2019 Maidan Shar Camp Shorabak Kabul mosque Kabul Defense Ministry Ghazni Kabul office Farah Kabul police Kabul wedding Kabul (Sep) Charikar & Kabul Qalat Jalalabad Haska Meyna Bagram 2020 Kabul (6 Mar) Kabul gurdwara May June July August Jalalabad September October November Kabul University December 2021 Jan-Aug Kabul school Spin Boldak Massacres Dasht-i-Leili Shinwar Nangar Narang Maywand Khataba Badakhshan Kandahar FOB Delhi Other U.S. urination incident Quran burning protests Insurgents' bodies U.S.–Afghan agreement United States–Taliban deal U.S. withdrawal 2011–2016 2020–2021 Peace process 2021 Kabul airlift

The **Battle of Chora** was a military engagement in [Chora District](/source/Chora_District), [Uruzgan Province](/source/Uruzgan_Province), Afghanistan, occurring from 15 to 19 June 2007. The battle was between [ISAF](/source/International_Security_Assistance_Force) – primarily composed of [Dutch](/source/Netherlands) troops – and allied [Afghan forces](/source/Afghan_Armed_Forces) against anti-coalition militias (ACM), believed to be affiliated with the [Taliban](/source/Taliban). The battle centered on control of the Chora District's administrative center, a strategic location for the Taliban due to its role as a key ground route linking the contested [Gizab District](/source/Gizab_District) in the north to the provincial capital, [Tarinkot](/source/Tarinkot). According to some press reports, the fighting was the largest Taliban offensive of 2007 in Afghanistan, and resulted in the death of one Dutch soldier,[9] as well as approximately 50 to 80 civilians and 70 Taliban fighters.

## Background

In August 2006, the [ISAF](/source/International_Security_Assistance_Force) [Task Force Uruzgan](/source/Task_Force_Uruzgan) (TFU) assumed responsibility for [Uruzgan Province](/source/Uruzgan_Province), southern [Afghanistan](/source/Afghanistan), replacing the U.S.-led [Operation Enduring Freedom](/source/Operation_Enduring_Freedom) in the region. The TFU, led by the [Dutch](/source/Netherlands), comprised approximately 1,200 Dutch troops and several hundred Australian personnel. The Dutch military sought to restore its reputation, particularly after its failure to prevent the [Srebrenica massacre](/source/Srebrenica_massacre) in 1995. The Dutch government emphasized that the mission would prioritize reconstruction over combat.[12]

The TFU established its two primary bases near the towns of [Tarinkot](/source/Tarinkot) ([Kamp Holland](/source/Kamp_Holland)) and [Deh Rawood](/source/Deh_Rawood). Additionally, two patrol bases were positioned in the [Dehrashan Valley](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dehrashan_Valley&action=edit&redlink=1) and north of Deh Rawood. The operational strategy followed the [inkspot strategy](/source/Inkspot_strategy), focusing initially on securing small areas around the main bases before expanding control through the [clear-hold-build](/source/Clear_and_hold) approach and [winning hearts and minds](/source/Winning_hearts_and_minds) initiatives.[13]

In February 2007, the second TFU rotation arrived under the command of Colonel [Hans van Griensven](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hans_van_Griensven&action=edit&redlink=1). The [Battle Group](/source/Battlegroup_(army)) deployed in spring 2007 was led by Lieutenant-Colonel [Rob Querido](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Rob_Querido&action=edit&redlink=1). A Dutch Special Operations Forces detachment, known as Task Force Viper, was also integrated into the TFU. A [Provincial Reconstruction Team](/source/Provincial_Reconstruction_Team) (PRT) was responsible for the reconstruction.[14]

## Prelude

Prior to the start of the TFU, the [2006 Dutch/Australian Offensive](/source/2006_Dutch%2FAustralian_Offensive) (including the [Operation Perth](/source/Operation_Perth)[15]) had cleared the Chora area. However, as no Australian troops remained to secure the valley, the Dutch opted to conduct irregular patrols in the region to hold and build, despite the limited resources.[16] Later, the PRT resumed development efforts, undertaking projects such as constructing a school, a mosque, and a bridge.[5]

By February 2007, reports indicated a growing Taliban presence around Chora, with intentions to launch attacks in the area. Following several skirmishes, the Taliban seized an [Afghan National Police](/source/Afghan_National_Police) (ANP) checkpoint on April 26, 2007, near [Kala Kala](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kala_Kala,_Afghanistan&action=edit&redlink=1), located near the Baluchi pass to the Baluchi valley. An initial attempt by the ANP, supported by a Dutch platoon, to retake the checkpoint failed, but a second attempt succeeded on April 29, 2007. This incident prompted the decision to permanently station two platoons, part of the [company](/source/Company_(military_unit)) 'A-Coy' commanded by Captain Larry Hamers in Chora's capital, [Ali Shirzai](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ali_Shirzai&action=edit&redlink=1).[17] They used the government building nicknamed the 'White Compound' as their base.[18]

Despite these efforts, Taliban activity persisted, with frequent harassment of ANP and Dutch patrols. In response, Dutch forces launched a three-day operation from May 22 to 24, 2007, targeting the Baluchi Pass and the Dehrashan Valley. While the operation resulted in engagements with Taliban forces, a significant buildup of insurgents could not be confirmed.[19] During a visit by the commanding officer of [Regional Command South](/source/Regional_Command_South), British Major General [Jacko Page](/source/Jacko_Page), on May 24, the Dutch requested Afghan reinforcements. On June 6, 30 soldiers from the [Afghan National Army](/source/Afghan_National_Army) (ANA) arrived in Chora, accompanied by three Dutch members of the [Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team](/source/Operational_Mentoring_and_Liaison_Team).[20]

On the day prior to the arrival of the ANA, a Dutch reconnaissance unit was ambushed near Nowri, approximately 35 kilometers northeast of Ali Shirzai, by an estimated 100 insurgents. The unit successfully disengaged, and with air support, an estimated 25–40 Taliban fighters were killed. Aerial footage confirmed a buildup of Taliban forces, while intercepted communications featuring foreign languages corroborated reports of the presence of possibly experienced foreign fighters.[21] Estimates of the total number of Taliban fighters varied: the Afghan [National Directorate of Security](/source/National_Directorate_of_Security) and ANA placed the figure between 150 and 250, while other sources suggested numbers ranging from 300 to 1,000.[22]

On 15 June, a Dutch platoon returning from securing a women's [shura](/source/Shura) in Tarin Kot was targeted by a [suicide bomber](/source/Suicide_bomber). The explosion resulted in the deaths and injuries of several Afghan civilians, as well as the death of [Private First Class](/source/Private_First_Class) [Timo Smeehuijzen](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Timo_Smeehuijzen&action=edit&redlink=1) and injuries to three other Dutch soldiers.[20] Querido intended to give this platoon a three day-rest before deploying them again.[23]

## Battle

### June 16

At 4 am, A U.S. [A-10 Thunderbolt II](/source/A-10_Thunderbolt_II)[7] spotted a group of at least 60 people moving toward Chora. The pilot asked the Dutch whether he was allowed to fire, but the Querido declined because there was too much uncertainty over their identity and intentions.[18]

In the early morning, ANP checkpoints in Kala Kala, Nyazi (both to the west of Ali Shirzai) and Sarab (to the east) were attacked.[24] Dutch troops in Chora moved to support the Afghan police. In the afternoon, the checkpoint Sarab was captured by opposing forces. Later in the day, the two other checkpoints fell to the opposing forces as well.[24]

In Kamp Holland, Querido assessed the number of opposing forces at around 200, unsure whether this was part of the anticipated large scale attack. Together with Van Griensven, he looked for ways to relieve the pressure of the troops in Chora. Viper was sent to the Baluchi Pass, to draw the attention of opposing forces. Two other platoons (part of B-Coy) were moved closer to Chora as well to distract the opposing forces.[23]

Skirmishes continued around the checkpoints, subsiding by 18:30. The coalition forces received air support during the fights. In the afternoon, the compound came under mortar fire, leading the coalition to reinforce its defenses with claymore mines and barbed wire. Meanwhile, Afghan soldiers established checkpoints and conducted patrols in Ali Shirzai.[25]

#### Decision to stay or retreat

Amid ongoing fighting in the valley, Hamers questioned Querido and Van Griensven, asking, "What is Chora worth to us?" In response, Van Griensven convened a meeting with his advisors. Querido, the principal advocate for withdrawal, expressed doubts whether he would be allow to use the amount of force required to hold Chora. He adjusted his earlier estimate of 200 enemy fighters, warning that a potential of 1,000 could overwhelm the compound. Additionally, the difficulty of supplying the group with fuel and ammunition further complicated the situation.[26]

Van Griensven, however, was also concerned about the implications for the civilian population in Chora. Reports had been received by the coalition indicating that locals had been executed or mutilated in acts of revenge. He further feared that a retreat would bolster Taliban propaganda and undermine the credibility of both the Dutch and ISAF missions, particularly in light of the Dutch failure to prevent the Srebrenica genocide.[25]

Following a heated debate, Van Griensven ultimately decided to order his forces to hold their position and continue fighting. He decided to use all means available to him, which included both air power and a [howitzer](/source/Howitzer), the [Panzerhaubitze 2000](/source/Panzerhaubitze_2000), stationed at Kamp Holland. Van Griensven stated that "in respect tot the 'rules of engagement', we will push ourselves to the limits of what is permissible". The Dutch [Ministry of Defence](/source/Ministry_of_Defence_(Netherlands)), [Ministry of Foreign Affairs](/source/Ministry_of_Foreign_Affairs_(Netherlands)) and the [Chief of Defence](/source/Chief_of_Defence_(Netherlands)) [Dick Berlijn](/source/Dick_Berlijn) were informed of the decision. Van Griensven also informed Page, who according to Van Griensven agreed with the use of observed air support and unobserved artillery fire.[27]

#### Reinforcements and evacuations

The howitzer would be used to fire west of Ali Shirzai.[28] The Dutch asked local Chora leadership to inform civilians of the use of artillery fire and advise them to leave the area. The evacuation was confirmed by a local tribe leader and reporting from the Dutch troops in Ali Shirzai.[29]

The Dutch requested the help of [Australian Special Forces](/source/Special_forces_of_Australia), but were informed they were not yet at [full operating capability](/source/Full_operating_capability). The Australian Special Forces Operations commander, Major General [Mike Hindmarsh](/source/Mike_Hindmarsh), was also at unease with the unobserved artillery fire, which was not allowed by the Australian rules of engagement. In the early morning of June 17, diplomatic efforts were partially successful. The Australian Special Forces would be allowed to participate in combat operations, but not to enter the Chora District Centre.[30]

The Dutch asked for the help of [Rozi Khan](/source/Rozi_Khan), a local militia leader of the [Barakzai](/source/Barakzai) tribe, with whom the Dutch were in good standing. Khan agreed to support the Dutch with around 100 fighters, although the number would vary throughout the battle.[31]

The TFU also asked for additional ANA troops to reinforce the ANA/OMLT detachment already in Chora. Around 50 ANA soldiers were mustered in the night, accompanied by thee OMLT mentors. In two waves, they were flown with a [Chinook](/source/Boeing_CH-47_Chinook) to the white compound in the morning.[32]

### June 17

Right after midnight, when no air support as available for the Dutch, the howitzer fired 30 [155 mm](/source/155_mm_caliber) grenades over two hours. The majority of the shells targeted open field near roads and crossroads to limit the risk of collateral damage. Another 28 guided bombs were dropped by air craft that night, controlled by Dutch [joint terminal attack controllers](/source/Joint_terminal_attack_controller) (JTACs). An estimated 50 anti-coalition militia were killed, as well as Afghan citizens who had not been evacuated.[28]

Despite the assessment in Kamp Holland that the situation was particularly ominous, the situation had stabilised in Ali Shirzai.[32] Hamers recalled: "All seemed relatively calm after a raging storm". Intercepted communication revealed that the bombardments had dealt significant casualties to the opposing forces, including their leadership. The troops also observed wounded and killed civilians, who had not left or were not warned.[33]

Outside of Chora, Viper and two B-Coy engaged the opposing forces in the Dehrashan Valley. At the end of the day, B-Coy took up positions near the village of Shah Mansoor. Viper attempted to return to Kamp Holland, but one of their vehicles, the [Patria](/source/Patria_Pasi), broke down. The [quick response force](/source/Quick_response_force) (QRF) arrived, but with the wrong spare parts. Part of the Viper group returned to Kamp Holland to pick up the parts, while the other part remained to secure the location around the vehicle.[34]

### June 18

On Sunday, June 17, and Monday, June 18, Dutch reinforcements arrived from Camp Holland and a second Dutch base in [Deh Rahwod](/source/Deh_Rahwod), increasing the number of Dutch troops at Chora to 500.[5]

At one time, six Dutch [F-16s](/source/General_Dynamics_F-16_Fighting_Falcon) were in the air, engaging ground targets assigned by the infantry.[35]

On the night of Sunday, June 17, to the morning of Monday, June 18, during the loading of an [L16 81mm mortar](/source/L16_81mm_mortar), which was deployed in the courtyard of the Chora District government building, a round exploded inside the launch tube, killing Dutch Sergeant-Major Jos Leunissen and wounding three other Dutch soldiers.[5]

### June 19

At 9:30 a.m., NATO briefly withdrew the aircraft supporting the fighting at Chora, but air support was restored at 9:40 when Van Griensven reportedly threatened to withdraw the six Dutch F-16s from NATO command.[*[why?](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Please_clarify)*][7]

At 10:00, Dutch and Afghan troops, together with Rozi Khan's militia, made a push called "Operation Troy", in which they recaptured the three lost checkpoints.[5]

## References

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202123–25_1-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202123–25_1-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 23–25.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202127_2-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 27.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202128_3-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202128_3-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 28.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202124,_53_4-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 24, 53.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-Bemmel_5-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-Bemmel_5-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-Bemmel_5-2) [***d***](#cite_ref-Bemmel_5-3) [***e***](#cite_ref-Bemmel_5-4) [***f***](#cite_ref-Bemmel_5-5) van Bemmel, Noël (June 23, 2007). ["Infanteristen, commando's: iedereen vecht tegen Taliban"](https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/infanteristen-commando-s-iedereen-vecht-tegen-taliban~bf01902e/). *[de Volkskrant](/source/De_Volkskrant)* (in Dutch).

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202153_6-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 53.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-Vrijsen_7-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-Vrijsen_7-1) [***c***](#cite_ref-Vrijsen_7-2) Vrijsen, Eric (January 4, 2008). ["Uruzgan: Het gevecht om Chora"](https://web.archive.org/web/20080108145452/http://oruzgan.web-log.nl/uruzgan_weblog/2008/01/uruzgan_het_gev.html). *Uruzgan Weblog* (in Dutch). Archived from [the original](http://oruzgan.web-log.nl/uruzgan_weblog/2008/01/uruzgan_het_gev.html) on January 8, 2008. Retrieved March 7, 2015 – via Web-log.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-8)** ["Over 100 die in southern Afghan battle"](https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-06-18-afghanistan-airstrike_N.htm). *[USA Today](/source/USA_Today)*. [Associated Press](/source/Associated_Press). June 18, 2007. Retrieved July 4, 2007.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-VolkskrantReconstruction2021_9-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-VolkskrantReconstruction2021_9-1) ["Burgerdoden en genegeerde waarschuwingen: wat mis ging in Uruzgan bij de Slag om Chora"](https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/burgerdoden-en-genegeerde-waarschuwingen-wat-mis-ging-in-uruzgan-bij-de-slag-om-chora~b6f0f9ba/). *[de Volkskrant](/source/De_Volkskrant)* (in Dutch). March 29, 2021. Retrieved August 28, 2025.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-icasualties_default_10-0)** ["Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition"](https://web.archive.org/web/20150402135220/http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx). *iCasualties.org*. Archived from [the original](http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx) on April 2, 2015. Retrieved March 7, 2015.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202168_11-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 68.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202120_12-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 20.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202119–21_13-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 19–21.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202127–31_14-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 27–31.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEVan_JoolenSchoonhoven202146–55_15-0)** [Van Joolen & Schoonhoven 2021](#CITEREFVan_JoolenSchoonhoven2021), pp. 46–55.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202135WiltenburgLeeuwenburgVan_der_Vorm2022a315-316_16-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 35; [Wiltenburg, Leeuwenburg & Van der Vorm 2022a](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburgVan_der_Vorm2022a), p. 315-316.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202135–36_17-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 35–36.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEVan_JoolenSchoonhoven202172_18-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEVan_JoolenSchoonhoven202172_18-1) [Van Joolen & Schoonhoven 2021](#CITEREFVan_JoolenSchoonhoven2021), pp. 72.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202136_19-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 36.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202136–37_20-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202136–37_20-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 36–37.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202137–38_21-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 37–38.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202138,_42_22-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 38, 42.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202148_23-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202148_23-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 48.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202147_24-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202147_24-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 47.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202148–49_25-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202148–49_25-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 48–49.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202149–50_26-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 49–50.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202150–51_27-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 50–51.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202155_28-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202155_28-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 55.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202151_29-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 51.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202152_30-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 52.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202152–53_31-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 52–53.

1. ^ [***a***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202157–58_32-0) [***b***](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202157–58_32-1) [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 57–58.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202159_33-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), p. 59.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEWiltenburgLeeuwenburg202158–59_34-0)** [Wiltenburg & Leeuwenburg 2021](#CITEREFWiltenburgLeeuwenburg2021), pp. 58–59.

1. **[^](#cite_ref-Brill_35-0)** Brill, Paul (June 28, 2007). ["'Ze schoten een magazijn op me leeg'"](https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/ze-schoten-een-magazijn-op-me-leeg~b91db24e/). *de Volkskrant* (in Dutch).

## Sources

- Van Joolen, Olof; Schoonhoven, Silvan (2021). *Schaduwoorlog Uruzgan: de rauwe werkelijkheid van de Nederlandse missie in Afghanistan* (in Dutch). Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-90-468-2915-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-90-468-2915-8).

- Wiltenburg, Ivor; Leeuwenburg, Lysanne (2021). [*The Battle of Chora: A Military Operational Analysis of the 2007 Defence of the Chora District Centre in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan*](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359057334). Breda: NLDA Press. [ISBN](/source/ISBN_(identifier)) [978-94-93124-12-7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-94-93124-12-7).

- Wiltenburg, Ivor; Leeuwenburg, Lysanne; Van der Vorm, Martijn (2022a). ["De Slag om Chora. Deel 1: Een reconstructie van de junidagen in 2007"](https://militairespectator.nl/sites/default/files/bestanden/artikelen/militaire_spectator_6_2022_Wiltenburg.pdf) (PDF). *Militaire Spectator* (in Dutch). **191** (6): 312–325.

- Wiltenburg, Ivor; Leeuwenburg, Lysanne; Van der Vorm, Martijn (2022b). ["De Slag om Chora. Deel 2: Zoekende tussen trots en controverse"](https://militairespectator.nl/sites/default/files/bestanden/artikelen/militaire_spectator_7_8_2022_wiltenburg_0.pdf) (PDF). *Militaire Spectator* (in Dutch). **191** (7/8): 372–383.

---
Adapted from the Wikipedia article [Battle of Chora](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chora) by Wikipedia contributors ([contributor history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chora?action=history)). Available under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Changes may have been made.